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In the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit                        KOSAK v. AGUIRRE1      Wan-Swin Susan K...
its approval of Kosaks I-130 Petition, it later reaffirmed its approval on March 16, 2004.Accordingly, Kosak voluntarily d...
Both Kosak and the government have advanced plausible constructions of the statutoryprovisions at issue. As the prolixity ...
terminates the natural sibling relationship for immigration purposes. These determinations arewell within the BIAs purview...
consistent with settled BIA precedent that pre-dated Kosaks I-130 petition by over a decade.See Young, 114 F.3d at 887 (fi...
mother 3 who is now deceased, but he has since his birth remained in the        home of his natural parents.          On t...
.Matter of Li, 20 I&N Dec. 700 (BIA 1993) held:      (1) An adopted child, as defined by section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Immig...
Act, as amended, notwithstanding the proviso to section 101 (b) (1) (E) of      the Act, since petitioner-who entered this...
.Matter of Kirby, 131&N Dec. 173 (BIA 1969) held:      Where beneficiary was legally adopted by court decree in the Philip...
The solid basis upon which Kosak rests and the cases it favorably cited is neatlyexplained in the following excerpt from t...
Simicevic, 10 I&N Dec. 363 (BIA 1963). As the petitioner and the     beneficiary do not now have a common parent, they can...
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Cases on Non-Orphan Adoption Issues under the INA

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These do NOT relate to I-600s or I-800s but instead concern what is usually a "family adoption".

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Cases on Non-Orphan Adoption Issues under the INA

  1. 1. In the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit KOSAK v. AGUIRRE1 Wan-Swin Susan KOSAK, Appellant v. Eduardo AGUIRRE, Jr., Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services;  Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs;  Robert Devine, Acting Deputy Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services;  Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security;  Condolezza Rice, Secretary of State for the United States;  The Board of Immigration Appeals, Executive Office of Immigration Review, U.S. Department of Justice. No. 06-4055 Argued Dec. 6, 2007. -- March 06, 2008 [518 F. 3d 210]Before:  McKEE, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.Joseph C. Hohenstein (Argued), James J. Orlow, Orlow & Orlow, Philadelphia, PA, forAppellant.Mary C. Frye (Argued), Office of United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, forAppellees. OPINION OF THE COURTIn this case we review the Board of Immigration Appeals construction of Section 203(a)(4) ofthe Immigration and Nationality Act, which grants a visa preference to “[q]ualified immigrantswho are the brothers or sisters of citizens of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(4).The question presented is whether the District Court erred in according Chevron deference to theBIAs decision that adopted children may not invoke this preference in favor of theirbiological siblings. We hold that it did not. I.Appellant Wan-Swin Kosak, a native of Taiwan, was adopted by her aunt and uncle, both ofwhom are United States citizens. Kosak entered the United States in 1981 as a lawfulpermanent resident. In 1990 she filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative pursuant to 8 U.S.C.§ 1153(a)(4) on behalf of her biological sister, Wan-Gin Hwang. The Vermont Service Center(VSC) of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) granted the Petition, but when a visabecame available for Hwang in 2002, the U.S. Consulate in Taiwan declined to issue it. TheConsulate returned Kosaks Petition to the VSC and recommended revocation because it believedan adopted child could not confer immigration benefits on her natural sibling. In response tothe Consulates actions, Kosak filed suit in the United States District Court for the EasternDistrict of Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, after the VSC initially issued a notice of intent to revoke1 Cite as Kosak v. Aguirre, 518 F. 3d 210 - Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 2008 Case found at: http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/064055p.pdf orhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9260272694952184395&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr or as linked in this document following the text of the case. Discussion follows. Page 1 of 11
  2. 2. its approval of Kosaks I-130 Petition, it later reaffirmed its approval on March 16, 2004.Accordingly, Kosak voluntarily dismissed her federal lawsuit. Before Wan-Gin Hwangreceived her visa, however, the VSC changed course, and on June 24, 2005, it revoked its re-approval of Kosaks I-130 Petition. Kosak appealed the revocation, and the BIA dismissed herappeal in a per curiam opinion citing Matter of Li, 20 I. & N. Dec. 700 (BIA 1993).Kosak appealed the BIAs decision to the District Court and filed a motion for summaryjudgment, arguing that the BIAs decision was erroneous. The government filed its ownsummary judgment motion, which the District Court granted, holding that the BIAsinterpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(4) was entitled to Chevron deference. Kosak v. Devine,439 F.Supp.2d 410, 417-18 (E.D.Pa.2006). Kosak appeals the District Courts decision. II. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the BIAs interpretation ofthe INA pursuant to Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25,119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999). If “Congress has directly spoken to the precisequestion at issue,” its intent controls. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Where thestatute is “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” however, we will uphold theBIAs interpretation so long as it is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at843, 104 S.Ct. 2778.Kosak first claims that the unambiguous language of the statute entitles her to relief. Sheargues that Congress intended the “normal and natural” definitions of “brothers” and “sisters” tocontrol, namely, persons having at least one parent in common. Kosak asserts that both she andHwang are “child [ren]” of their biological “parent[s]” as those terms are defined in 8 U.S.C. §§1101(b)(1) and (2), and should therefore be recognized as “sisters” for purposes of § 1153(a)(4).A BIA 2 District Director adopted a similar position in Matter of Fujii, 12 I. & N. Dec. 495, 496(D.D.1967) (The “relationship of brother and sister created by the legitimate birth of thepetitioner and beneficiary to the same parents” is not destroyed “by the subsequent adoption ofthe latter.”).The government counters that because adoption severs the legal relationship between the naturalparent/s and child for immigration purposes, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i), it also severs therelationship between natural siblings. In support of its position, the government cites two BIAdecisions and an opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Li, 20 I. & N. Dec. at703 (petitioners adoption severed relationship with natural sibling because they no longer sharedcommon parents);  In re Xiu Hong Li, 21 I. & N. Dec. 13, 17-18 (BIA 1995) (adoption severedrelationship with natural parents);  Young v. Reno, 114 F.3d 879, 888 (9th Cir.1997) (findingpermissible the INSs conclusion that adoption severed the legal relationship between an adoptedchild and her natural siblings).2 The Court identified the wrong agency. It was actually an Immigration & NaturalizationService (INS) District Director. Page 2 of 11
  3. 3. Both Kosak and the government have advanced plausible constructions of the statutoryprovisions at issue. As the prolixity of the proceedings below suggests, the meaning of §1153(a)(4) cannot be resolved with reference to Congresss “unambiguously expressed intent” inthe statutory language. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Because the statute doesnot define “brothers” or “sisters,” Congress has not “directly spoken to the precise question atissue.” Id. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Moreover, there is nothing in the legislative history of §1153(a)(4) to suggest that Congress contemplated the effect of adoption on the siblingrelationship. Young, 114 F.3d at 886. Although Congress clearly intended adoption to severthe parent-child relationship, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i), there is no similar provision regardingthe sibling relationship. In the face of this Congressional silence and ambiguity, we defer to theBIAs construction of § 1153(a)(4) so long as it is a “permissible interpretation of the statute.”Natl Small Shipments Traffic Conf., Inc. v. United States, 887 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir.1989)(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778) (internal quotation omitted). III. To find the BIAs interpretation of § 1153(a)(4) “permissible,” we “need not conclude that[its] construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted,” nor that we would haveadopted the same interpretation. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 2778. In fact, wemay not substitute our own construction of § 1153(a)(4) “for a reasonable interpretation” of theBIA. Id. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. So long as the agencys construction “represents a reasonableaccommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agencys care by the statute,”we will not disturb it. Id. at 845, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374,383, 81 S.Ct. 1554, 6 L.Ed.2d 908 (1961)). Kosak argues that the BIAs interpretation was impermissible because:  (1) “determining anindividuals ‘status as a parent” is not within Congresss or the BIAs immigration authority, and(2) denying preferential visa status to the natural sibling of an adopted child is unnecessary toenforce the “Congressional bar to natural parents receiving immigration status from a child theyput up for adoption.” We find these arguments unpersuasive.First, as Kosak concedes, Congress and the BIA may define the parameters of the parent-childrelationship for immigration purposes. In exercising this authority, Congress specificallyprovided that “no natural parent of any ․ adopted child shall thereafter, by virtue of suchparentage, be accorded any right, privilege or status under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. §1101(b)(1)(E)(i). Kosak argues that the word “status” refers only to the parents “immigrationstatus,” and that nothing in the INA terminates the parents “natural,” “family law” status asbiological parent. Accordingly, Kosak urges us to use biological status to define the siblingrelationship for purposes of § 1153(a)(4).Contrary to Kosaks argument, § 1153(a)(4) requires the BIA to define the relationship betweenan adopted child and her natural sibling only to determine the latters immigration status.Because the BIA defines siblings as children of at least one common parent, Matter of Kong, 17 I& N Dec. 151, 153 (BIA 1979), the BIA reasonably consulted the INAs definitions of “child”and “parent.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1), (2). Recognizing that adoption terminates the naturalparent-child relationship pursuant to § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i), the BIA concluded that adoption also Page 3 of 11
  4. 4. terminates the natural sibling relationship for immigration purposes. These determinations arewell within the BIAs purview regarding immigration matters and do not affect the biologicalstatus of siblings.Second, Kosak argues that the BIA need not have held that adoption severs the natural siblingrelationship to give full effect to the prohibition against natural parents receiving immigrationbenefits through children they put up for adoption. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E)(i). Instead,Kosak suggests that the government “track” natural parents to prevent the “scenario specificallyprohibited by Congress whereby adopted children obtain preferences for natural siblings whothen obtain preferences for natural parents.” Young, 114 F.3d at 887.Initially, we question the feasibility of the tracking system Kosak proffers because once thenatural sibling becomes a United States citizen, she enjoys the same rights as any American,including the right to seek visas for her parents. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). But even ifKosaks proposal were feasible, it is not the only permissible solution; the BIAs construction ofthe statute is equally permissible.Indeed, the BIAs construction represents a “reasonable accommodation” of the “conflictingpolicies” of keeping families together, Young, 114 F.3d at 886, and preventing natural parentsfrom obtaining immigration benefits through children they put up for adoption. Id. at 887;Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Consistent with its precedent, the BIA concludedthat once an adoption occurs, the family to be unified is the adoptive family, while the naturalfamily, including siblings, may not receive immigration benefits by virtue of the adoption. SeeXiu Hong Li, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 17 (citing Li, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 703) (“[A]n alien should berecognized for immigration purposes as a child of his natural parents or of his adoptive parents,but not of both.”). IV. Kosak also argues that the BIAs interpretation of § 1153(a)(4) has changed too many timesto be accorded any deference. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that “[a]n agencyinterpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agencys earlier interpretation is‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently held agency view.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 n. 30, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (quoting Watt v.Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981)). But this principle of lawapplies only to final agency interpretations, not preliminary or deliberative ones. See id.(focusing on “the inconsistency of the positions the BIA has taken through the years,” not onconflicting preliminary decisions subject to BIA review) (emphasis added);  Exxon Corp. v.Lujan, 970 F.2d 757, 762 (10th Cir.1992) (distinguishing the agencys “three differentinterpretations” of the relevant statute “over a number of years” in Cardoza-Fonseca from asingle prior decision of a regional office of the Bureau of Land Management that lackedprecedential significance).Here, as Kosak notes, her Petition was transmitted back and forth between INS agencies and theState Department for several years before the VSC finally decided to revoke its initial grant ofher Petition. That final resolution alone is before us, see 5 U.S.C. § 704, and we find it Page 4 of 11
  5. 5. consistent with settled BIA precedent that pre-dated Kosaks I-130 petition by over a decade.See Young, 114 F.3d at 887 (finding consistent the BIAs decisions regarding the siblingrelationship from the 1979 Kong decision forward). Indeed, the BIA has held that the siblingrelationship is determined by reference to a common parent, Kong, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 153;that adoption severs the relationship between the natural parent and child, Xiu Hong Li, 21 I. &N. Dec. at 17-18;  and that by severing the natural parent-child relationship, adoption seversthe relationship between natural siblings for immigration purposes. Li, 20 I. & N. Dec. at706. The only contrary authority, Fujii, 12 I. & N. Dec. at 496-97, is a 1967 non-precedentialdecision of a BIA [actually INS] District Director that the BIA has long since abrogated. See 8C.F.R. § 1003.1(g); see also Kong, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 153; Li, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 706.Therefore, we find nothing inconsistent about the BIAs jurisprudence on the effect of adoptionon the sibling relationship and we accord it the requisite deference. V.In sum, because § 1153(a)(4) is silent with regard to the meaning of “brother” and “sister,” wehold that the BIAs decision that adopted children may not invoke this visa preference in favor oftheir biological siblings is a permissible construction of the statute that is entitled to deferenceunder Chevron. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.Found at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-3rd-circuit/1235961.htmlThe single seemingly anomalous case on this topic is Matter of Fujii, which heldthat: “Notwithstanding beneficiary’s adoption when two years of age, since he and the United States citizen petitioner are legitimate children of the same parents, he is classifiable as the brother of the petitioner and therefore, is eligible for preference classification under section 203(a) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended.”However, the specific circumstances of that anomalous case were unique in thatthe “adopted child” never left the household of the biological family unit sincetime of birth and the adoptive relationship was later legally severed pursuant toJapanese law. “The petitioner, beneficiary and their natural mother have all testified that the beneficiary never resided in the house of the beneficiarys adoptive Page 5 of 11
  6. 6. mother 3 who is now deceased, but he has since his birth remained in the home of his natural parents. On the termination of the adoption agreement between the beneficiary, made in his behalf by his natural parents, and his adoptive mother a notice of restoration of his name to the family register of the beneficiarys natural father was filed.....” Fujii at 495.Indeed the underlying reasons for the position taken in the Fujii case were laterexpanded upon and became part of the four criteria later spelled out as required foradoption nullification for immigration purposes.Matter of Xiu Hong Li, 21 I&N Dec. 13 (BIA 1995) held: (1) If the provisions of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) (1988), have been invoked in order to obtain or confer an immigration benefit by virtue of an adoptive relationship, the natural relationship will not thereafter be recognized for immigration purposes even if it is established that the adoptive relationship has been legally terminated. (2) A natural parent-child relationship can again be recognized for immigration purposes following the legal termination of an adoption meeting the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act if the petitioner can establish the following four criteria: (1) that no immigration benefit was obtained or conferred through the adoptive relationship, (2) that a natural parent-child relationship meeting the requirements of section 101(b) of the Act once existed, (3) that the adoption has been lawfully terminated under applicable law, and (4) that the natural relationship has been reestablished by law.It took a few tries to reach the above holding. The following are some earlier casesleading up to this one.3 Adoptive mother was widowed sister-in-law of common biological father. Page 6 of 11
  7. 7. .Matter of Li, 20 I&N Dec. 700 (BIA 1993) held: (1) An adopted child, as defined by section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(E) (1988), may not confer immigration benefits upon a natural parent without regard to whether the adopted child has been accorded or could be accorded immigration benefits by virtue of his or her adoptive status. Matter of Valsamakis, 12 I&N Dec. 421 (BIA 1967); and Matter of Lum, 11 I&N Dec. 55 (BIA 1964), overruled, Matter of Kirby, 131&N Dec. 173 (BIA 1969), modified. (2) The petitioner, who was an adopted child under the immigration laws, may not confer immigration benefits upon the beneficiary, his natural sibling, because their common natural parent no longer has the status of parent of the adopted child for immigration purposes..The holdings in the three cases cited in the above case follow:Matter of Valsamakis, 12 I&N Dec. 421 (BIA 1967) [overruled]: Petitioner, an adult naturalized citizen, who was admitted for permanent residence in 1951 in nonquota status as an eligible displaced Greek orphan under section 2(e) of the Displaced Persons Act of June 25, 1948, and who derived no benefits for immigration purposes from her subsequent adoption by United States citizens in 1952 while under 14 years of age, is not precluded by the proviso to section 101(b) (1) (E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, from conferring immediate relative status on her natural father, the beneficiary.This case was, as noted above, specifically overruled in 1993, however, it wouldalso have been in conflict with the later Hague Convention on Adoptions and therevised definition of child at INA § 101(b)(1)(G)..Matter of Lum, 11 I&N Dec. 55 (BIA 1964) [overruled] held: Petition of an adult naturalized United States citizen, who was adopted in China during infancy, is approved to accord her natural mother preference quota classification under section 203(a) (2). Immigration and Nationality Page 7 of 11
  8. 8. Act, as amended, notwithstanding the proviso to section 101 (b) (1) (E) of the Act, since petitioner-who entered this country not as an adopted child but as the nonquota wife of a U. S. citizen and whose adoptive father is dead and her adoptive mother, not having been heard from in many years, is presumed dead-has received no immigration benefit through her adoptive status and as a matter of either law or fact is in no position to claim such benefit through that status.”In order to reach its conclusion, the Board read the proviso relating to adoptedchildren and their biological parents much more generously than it can be readnow. In the intervening years since Lum was decided way back in 1964, theimmigration agencies have gained greater insight on the potential for fraud. Thecurrent more restrictive reading was the product of years of experienceencountering bogus adoptions from all over the world. When the provision wasstill relatively new, the BIA was still trying to give the benefit of the doubt. “.... Reading the section as a whole, instead of considering only the language of subparagraph (E), makes clear the sections intended scope. In referring to "such adopted child" the proviso obviously means an adopted child who under the terms of the section is eligible for or has obtained-an immigration benefit. The effect which the District Director gives to the proviso overlooks the significance of the word "such."...” At 55 * * * * * “Assuming that petitioner was legally adopted, the circumstances of her adoption merely coincide mechanically with the conditions imposed by the definition. Moreover, the criterion here is not that the adopted person has not at the time of petitioning already obtained a benefit under the immigration laws. Our decision contemplates that petitioner not only has not gained a benefit under the immigration laws through her adoption but could not now or ever obtain such a benefit. Both conditions must be present. We believe the foregoing statement disposes of the Services contention that our holding permits an adopted child to have greater rights than a natural child in that the adopted child could petition for two sets of parents and two sets of brothers and sisters. ...” At 59The service was proven correct time and again. Fraud knows no shame and bogusadoptions and bogus nullifications of them abound. Fake birth, death, adoption,marriage and divorce certificates are manufactured nonstop. Page 8 of 11
  9. 9. .Matter of Kirby, 131&N Dec. 173 (BIA 1969) held: Where beneficiary was legally adopted by court decree in the Philippines on September 25, 1950 when she was less than a year old and until 1964 she was in the possession and custody of the adoptive parents, a valid adoption exists in accordance with the requirements of section 101(b) (1) (E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, and the proviso to that section precludes the approval of a visa petition filed on behalf of the beneficiary by her natural mother to confer immediate relative status.Kirby marked the reluctant opening of the eyes of the BIA as to what INS alreadyknew. That being that where there is an opening for fraud, someone will try it.Kong would reinforce that proposition, you have to read Kong or there is no pointin even trying to understand these issues.Matter of Kong, 17 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 1979) held: (1) In order to qualify as brothers or sisters under section 203 (a)(5) of the Act, a petitioner must establish that both he and the beneficiary once qualified as children of a common parent and that parent is still a parent of each of them at the time the visa petition is adjudicated. (2) The "once qualified" rule has been applied to give effect to the time limitations set out in the Acts definition of "child" while recognizing that the circumstances creating the relationship are unaffected by the passage of time, marriage of the child, or even death. (3) Adoption in accordance with section 101 (b)(l)(E) of the Act creates a parent-child relationship under the Act. (4) Termination of an adoption accomplished in accordance with section 101 (b)(l)(E) of the Act terminates the parent-child relationship which the adoption created. (5) An adopted child who has gained immigration benefits through a natural parent by virtue of the termination of the adoption cannot confer immigration benefits on or through the adoptive parents. (6) Child whose adoption was formally terminated when she came to the U.S. upon the petition of her natural mother, no longer had a common parent with the beneficiary, her former adoptive brother, and visa petition in his behalf denied. Page 9 of 11
  10. 10. The solid basis upon which Kosak rests and the cases it favorably cited is neatlyexplained in the following excerpt from the frequently cited Matter of Kong, 17I&N Dec. 151, 153 (BIA 1979). “This Board has held that in order to qualify as brothers or sisters under section 203(a)(5) of the Act, the petitioner must establish that both he and the beneficiary once qualified as children of a common parent. See Matter of Ferreira, 16 I&N Dec. 495 (BIA 1978); Matter of Clahar, 16 I&N Dec. 484 (BIA 1978); Matter of Bourne, 16 I&N Dec. 367 (BIA 1977); Matter of Gur, 16 I&N· Dec. 123 (BIA 1977); Matter of Rehman, 16 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1975); Matter of Garner. 16 I&N Dec. 215 (BIA 1975) and cases cited in footnote 2 thereof; Matter of Heung, 16 I&N Dec. 145 (BIA 1974). The "once qualified" rule has been applied to give effect to the time limitations set out in the Acts definition of "child", while recognizing that the circumstances creating the relationship are unaffected by the passage of time, marriage of the child, or even death. Thus, in construing the term "parent" we have said: "While for immigration purposes a child ceases to be a child even if it fits into the various categories when it reaches the age of twenty-one or becomes married, the parent, once the required relationship has been established, always remains a parent." Matter of G-, 8 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 1959); see also Matter of Hassan, 16 I&N Dec.l6 (BIA 1976). This statement is overly broad in that it suggests that the status of "parent," once established, cannot be terminated. Neither Matter of Hassan, Matter of G-, nor any of the "once qualified" cases, cited above, involved the termination of an adoption or the question of the effect of termination of an adoption on family relationships created by it. Therefore, none of those cases is dispositive of the issue here. In the instant case, the petitioner once qualified as a child of the beneficiarys natural parents because she was adopted by them in accordance with section 101(b)(l)(E).FN2 However, the petitioners adoption was terminated in 1967 so that she could come to the United States on the petition of her natural mother. Thus, at the present time, her adoptive parents are not her "parents" because the relationship between them and the petitioner has been severed. Cf. Matter of Page 10 of 11
  11. 11. Simicevic, 10 I&N Dec. 363 (BIA 1963). As the petitioner and the beneficiary do not now have a common parent, they cannot qualify as brother and sister under the Act. ________________ FN2 Infancy adoptions pursuant to Chinese law and custom are recognized for purposes of United States immigration laws. Matter of Yue, 12 I&N Dec. 747 (BIA 1968). ________________ Further, immigration benefits have been conferred on the basis of the termination of the petitioners adoption. From the circumstances of this case, it appears that the petitioner and her family are manipulating their family relationships to gain benefits under the immigration laws....”Kong at 153-154. Page 11 of 11

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