Quarterly report for our investors - Second Quarter 2019

Second Quarter 2019
TO OUR INVESTORS
Q U A R T E R L Y R E P O R T

Dear investor
Imagine someone proposes the following investment to you: invest EUR 100 today and received EUR 96 including
coupons 10 years down the line. Not very attractive, right? In IRR terms, this investment would be generating a
0.3%... negative return! This is what the German government is offering to lend it money over 10 years. And as
surprising as this may seem, there is currently over EUR 13 trillion (12 times Spanish GDP) invested in fixed income
with negative IRRs.
What would you think if your bank offered you a mortgage where instead of paying interest you received it.
Lenders paying borrowers and depositors paying banks... This is already starting to happen in some European
countries.
While our funds ended the second quarter with positive yields – Bestinver Internacional: 11%, Bestinfond: 9% and
Bestinver Grandes Compañías: 13% – the German bund hit an all-time low this quarter. The so-called “financial
repression” is punishing savers and only rewarding those investors who are prepared to ride out period of volatility. In
light of this, we need to ask ourselves the following questions:
1- What are the negative bond yields telling us?
2- What does this mean for equity investors?
3- What does this mean for value investors?
The first question leads to an even more transcendental matter which is to try and determine if bond prices reflect
the fundamentals of the economy and an issuer’s exposure to credit risk or if, on the contrary, the IRRs on bonds are
an anomaly caused by central bank intervention.
The negative bond yields could be an indication or warning of many things. Economists are talking of a possible
recession, the threat of deflation and the effect of central banks’ expansionary policies. At Bestinver, we are not
experts on the macroeconomy but we do have our own thoughts on it.
The recession could clearly hit at any time; the challenge is knowing exactly when and how deep it will be. Figures
patently show that the global economy is slowing, although is not yet in a recession. Whatever the case may be, past
evidence shows that predicting recessions and staying ahead of the game by selling and then buying more cheaply is
rarely successful.
Deflation is a worry for those who see similarities between the Japanese economy after the 1990s and the current
state of western developed economies. However, even though we are aware of the serious problems of deflation, as
savers and investors, we, are more concerned about inflation.
Lastly, the measures taken by central banks, which have undoubtedly had a major impact on the performance of the
main assets (financial and real), do not appear to have changed sufficiently in recent months to explain the constant
decline in bond yields over the year.

It is difficult to interpret, at least for us, what the negative bond yields are signalling, but not knowing how to read
them does not mean that they do not have significance. We must continue to try and understand them.
What does this mean for equity investors?
The effects on equities are numerous, although two stand out from the rest. The first: an increase in volatility at all
levels. Volatility in the years before 2018 was abnormally low. Since the end of 2018, it can be said that volatility has
returned and is back to stay.
The second impact derives from how the market selects the companies in which to place its trust. With bond prices at
an all-time high, it is not surprising that precisely those companies that are most similar to bonds have performed the
best.
What can currently be seen is that the companies deemed to have stable fundamentals in defensive sectors
such as food, stable consumption and others have seen their share prices shoot up due to market uncertainty
about the trade war, the threat of lower global economic growth, and the search for returns at a time when
interest rates are at historical lows or even negative. Central banks have been the ones to force investors
to increase their tolerance to risk in their search for returns. But is this justified? Companies such as Diageo,
Nestlé, LVMH, L’Oreal, etc. have, in some cases, seen their shares rise by over 40% during the year, causing
their valuation multiples to spike, with investors paying more than 30 and even 40 times the earnings of these
companies. And not forgetting well-known tech companies such as Amazon and Netflix, with multiples of 80x
and up to 100x, respectively. High-quality companies continue to drive the upward market movements, but
are also safe havens during periods of weakness. On the other hand, cyclical companies quash the confidence
of investors who do not see sufficiently attractive valuations to take positions, without differentiating between
high-quality cyclical companies at a low point in the cycle from other companies that are both cyclical and
low quality and should not feature in long-term investment strategies. We believe caution is needed given the
current situation. We must not be washed along by the overriding current in the market and must carefully
weigh up our options to avoid assuming more risk than we should. The path ahead will not be an easy one but,
sooner or later, the market and its valuations tend to return to the middle ground. A stable business does not
necessarily mean a stable share price.
Sometimes we have the feeling that the current market climate has been seen in the past. The current period
reminds us of the 1970s. The “Nifty fifty” was a group of companies that became the favourites of investors because
of their record growth, increasing dividend payouts and high market capitalisation. These included Xerox, IBM, Polaroid
and Coca-Cola. They were called one-decision stocks: buy and never sell. Exorbitant prices were paid for them; at a
time when the US market traded at PER multiples of around 19x, this group of companies traded at a multiple that
doubled this (the most striking being: Polaroid with an earnings multiple of 91x, McDonald’s, 86x; Walt Disney, 82x;
and Avon Products, 65x). These companies’ shares sky-rocketed during the 1970s until the market crash of ‘74, After
that the prices of these “buy and never sell” stocks started to plummet, with 90% of them generating negative
returns over the following nine years. On average, the return was -46%. As Howard Marks says in one of his letters,
just because a company is good today does not mean it will continue to be tomorrow and even less so a good
investment.

What does this mean for value investors?
In June, the Spanish tennis star, Rafael Nadal (perhaps the best of all time) was crowned champion at Roland Garros.
After his win, I read in an interview with his former trainer – his uncle Toni Nadal – that Rafael Nadal’s strength
was not his skill at hitting the ball, rather his ability to withstand the pain and suffering during the bad times. Value
investors are similar. An investor’s success depends on their ability to stay faithful to their investment strategy when
things appear to be in a state of flux.
The current period for value investors is not one of suffering, since the YTD returns of over 10% are attractive.
However, value investors are facing an especially demanding scenario. Companies offering the greatest value today
are not those that have performed best in recent months. In this context, the easiest option would be to abandon
our convictions and choose to jump on the train of the highest quality companies, even paying a price that we
know restricts the potential for revaluation as it sits only slightly above net asset value. Investing today in certain
high-quality companies but at very high prices may be as unattractive as investing in German sovereign bonds with
negative yields. Both investments may bring success in the short term, but do not appear to be the most sensible
option for value investors who, by definition, are long-term investors. Keeping faith in cyclical companies that may
not be at the best point in the cycle but offer attractive investment potential is, without doubt, bolder and, we
believe, wiser.
For instance, we have been investing in Andritz (a supplier of plants, equipment and systems for the production
of paper and pulp, turbines for hydroelectric generation and presses for stamping in the automotive sector)
for just over a year. The market has heavily penalised this company’s share price during the year because
of falling pulp prices and the sharp decline in car sales in China. Nevertheless, we consider this will be short
lived and does not affect our investment thesis. When we analyse Andritz, we find a well-managed company
with a clear owner committed to creating long-term value and a leading position in its respective oligopolistic
segments. This type of example is precisely what leads us to believe the market is inefficient in the short term
and encourages us to look further ahead.
A significant part of Bestinver’s portfolio comprises high-quality companies (and why not say it) with high, albeit not
excessively high, share prices. These are the positions that have enabled us to post returns that comfortably remained
in positive territory over the course of the year. That said, we do expect the market will afford us the opportunity to
shift from these companies to ones with greater potential returns. We are in no hurry to make this move; we will wait
for the right moment (and valuations).
Last but no less important, I do not want to finish this letter without talking about liquidity risk and the problems
it has caused some renowned fund managers. It will soon be five years since I joined Bestinver after almost
20 years in London. One of the things that drew my attention at that time was the lack of interest, and even
disdain, shown by some fund managers to liquidity risk in Spain. For me, it has always been a fundamental part
of managing risk. It is crucial to be clear that the companies we invest in must have a liquidity profile that fits
with the fund’s liquidity. Investing in companies in which we could hold a large and disproportionate share of
their total capital could lead to undesirable effects on the returns of our portfolios, both when building positions
(pushing prices up) and reducing them (pushing prices down). Cases such as Woodford in the UK cause us to
be even more committed, if one can be, to managing illiquidity which, as I have said, is and will continue to be a
cornerstone of our investment strategy.

Beltrán de la Lastra
President and Director of Investments
BESTINVER
Dear investors: transparency is undoubtedly one of our core values. And this transparency leads me to point
out to you that investing will be uncomfortable for equity investors, and as is normally the case, will be subject
to extreme volatility. However, it will be even more uncomfortable for value investors, who will have to wait
patiently until the market offers the right opportunities, while other companies run by you much faster.
However, as well as discomfort, this market will bring long-term returns for us value investors, as has happened
in the past.
I’d once again like to take this opportunity to thank you for your trust in Bestinver. Best regards

Performance
14.1% annualised return
for Bestinfond since launch
Assets
More than €6 billion under
management
Investors
More than 50,000
Bestinver in numbers
Awards obtained
More than 100 in the
last 20 years
Independence
100% Acciona Group
Figures as at 30/06/2019. Bestinfond start date: 13/01/1993

11
CONTENTS
12
13
14
16
17
20
24
25
30
34
36
37
38
42
43
44
This document has been prepared by Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC for information purposes only, and may not be considered, under any circumstances, an
offer to invest in its investment funds. The information has been compiled by Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC using sources considered reliable. Nevertheless,
and although reasonable measures have been taken to ensure that the information is correct, Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC does not guarantee that it is
accurate, complete or up-to-date.
All of the opinions and estimations included in this document represent the opinion of Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC on the date to which they refer
and may vary without prior warning. All of the opinions contained herein have been issued on a general basis, without taking into account the specific
investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of each person.
Under no circumstances shall Bestinver Gestión, S.A. SGIIC, its administrators, employees or authorised personnel be held responsible for any harm of
any kind that may proceed, directly or indirectly, from the use of the information contained in this document. A statement of past performance does not
constitute, under any circumstances, a promise or guarantee of future returns.
All of Bestinver’s returns are expressed in € and in net terms, after expenses and commissions.
Potential: The growth potential that, in the opinion of Bestinver’s managers, the fund has at any given time, calculated as the difference between the
current PER and the target PER. This does not represent the gain that the fund will make in a certain period, given that, although the fund will achieve a
specific return, the objective of the managers is to increase, or at least maintain, that potential.
PER: The free cash-flow price at which the fund trades, based on the PER estimated by Bestinver’s managers for each company (including adjustments
such as:debt, point in the cycle, price, currency, etc.).
Target Price: the Net Asset Value that the shares in the fund may reach on the basis of the intrinsic value that all of the stocks that form the portfolio have,
in the opinion of Bestinver’s managers.
LEGAL WARNING
Portfolio performance and growth potential
International portfolio
Iberian portfolio
Portfolio analysis
International portfolio
Iberian portfolio
Investment funds
Equities
Mixed and fixed income
Hedge funds (Fondos de inversion libre)
Pension funds
Equities
Voluntary pension plan providers (EPSVs)
Equities

12
Portfolio performance
and growth potential

13
Table of annualised returns
2019 2018 3 years 5 years 10 years 15 years Launch
International portfolio 10,93% -14,15% 5,72% 5,03% 12,00% 8,82% 9,48%
European market 16,25% -10,57% 8,22% 5,07% 9,24% 5,87% 4,64%
Annualised returns
Target value Net asset value
69,1€ 42,9€
0€
10€
20€
30€
40€
50€
60€
70€
The net asset value of our international portfolio increased by 10.93% during the year, compared with +16.25% for
the European market (MSCI Europe with dividends) so far this year. Over the long term, the cumulative returns on
the international portfolio over the last 3 and 5 years have been 18.15% and 27.81%, respectively. The international
portfolio trades at a PER of 9.3x with a growth potential of 61%.
International
portfolio1.
Figures as at close of business: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver. European market: MSCI Europe with net dividend. Launch date: 31/12/1997.
Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns.
Investment in equities can lead to the loss of capital invested and is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5 years.
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
-4%
-12%
-8%
-14%
-16%
-2%
16%
18%
-10%
International portfolio European market
61%
Growth
potential

14
Annualised returns
Iberian portfolio 70% IGBM / 30% PSI
The net asset value of our Iberian portfolio grew by 2.03% during the year, compared with an increase of 10.74%
for the reference index (comprising the IGBM and the PSI). Over the long term, the cumulative returns on the
international portfolio over the last 3 and 5 years have been 19.96% and 6.41%, respectively.
The Iberian portfolio trades at a PER of 9x with a growth potential of 66%.
International
portfolio2.
Figures as at close of business: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver. Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has included net dividends. Launch date: 31/12/1997.
Investment in equities can lead to the loss of capital invested and is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5 years.
Iberian portfolio 2,03% -8,66% 6,25% 1,25% 6,82% 7,45% 10,16%
70% IGBM/30% PSI 10,74% -10,46% 8,44% -0,33% 1,13% 2,02% 3,01%
97,3€ 58,6€
0€
10€
20€
Growth
potential
66%
30€
40€
50€
60€
70€
80€
90€
100€
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
-2%
-4%
-12%
-8%
-10%

17
Industrial 40,7%
DASSAULT AVIATION 3,4%
KONECRANES 2,7%
FLSMIDTH & CO 2,5%
Communication & Technology 13,2%
INFORMA 5,7%
RELX 3,1%
LIONS GATE ENTERTAINMENT 0,9%
Consumer 23,3%
DELIVERY HERO 3,5%
JUST EAT 2,1%
CBD 1,9%
Financial 17,8%
STANDARD CHARTERED 4,7%
INTESA SANPAOLO 3,0%
ING GROUP 2,9%
Liquidity: 5,0%
DISTRIBUCIÓN SECTORIAL
International
portfolio1.
30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver
DISTRIBUTION OF THE PORTFOLIO
Geographical distribution Sectoral distribution
Europe 79,9%
Other 15,1%
Liquidity 5,0%
Consumer 23,3%
Financial 17,8%
Industrial 40,7%
Communication
& Technology
13,2%
Liquidity 5,0%

18
MAIN MOVEMENTS IN THE PORTFOLIO
Additions to the portfolio
CONVATEC
We invested in Convatec last quarter and have built up our position little by little over the last three months.
Convatec is a supplier of medical products for treating patients with chronic conditions, such as products for
difficult to heal wounds, specialist collectors for patients who have been operated on for colon cancer, catheters
for patients with urological problems and insulin infusion devices. We believe that Convatec operates in a very
attractive industry given its high barriers to entry and is one of the leading companies in all the segments in
which it is active. The company is currently restructuring, headed up by a new management team, and we
believe its price does not duly support the credibility of the restructuring being successful.
ZOOPLUS
We wanted to exploit the weak performance of this company’s shares in the latter months of last year to
double our position, returning to the levels we held a year earlier. Zooplus is involved in the retail distribution
(100% online) of pet food. After meetings with the management team in Munich, we believe that the marketing
campaigns being run by the company are having success, although we will certainly have to wait a few months
for them to take effect. We remain optimistic because, among other factors, Zooplus’s offering is far more
competitive than its competitors but it is still a fairly unknown brand. The flotation of its direct comparable in
the US, Chewy, was extremely successful, with its shares shooting up 60% the first day. Chewy trades at 3x
compared to Zooplus at 0.5x. The Chewy IPO also shows how it is possible to compete with Amazon, that it can
grow considerably more by increased spending on marketing while remaining efficient on the spending side, and
that a potential buyer for Zooplus has arrived on the scene.
DELIVERY HERO
We have increased our position in this home food delivery company, exploiting the sell-offs by its former owner,
Rocket Internet. More recently, the company upgraded its forecasts for 2019, increasing its projected income 17%
and accelerating its growth rate on the grounds that its investments have been successfully rolled out. As a result
of this, the company announced an increase in its 2019 investment plan, earmarking EUR 100 million more of its
capital for investment opportunities that will reinforce its leadership and drive growth, while raising its revenue
forecast for 2020.

19
Reductions in positions
NEXT
Following the penalising of their share prices in the last quarter of 2018, we decided to increase our position
in a number of cyclical companies in the United Kingdom where we considered the market was overreacting.
We invested in this clothing retailer in the United Kingdom in light of expected growth in its online sales, the
generation of stable profits, and its decent management team.
The company has performed splendidly, with its shares rising by over 35%, and therefore we have decided to
pare back our position as the margin of safety has narrowed.
Exits from the portfolio
VALMET
We have divested our position in Valmet – a provider of services for the pulp and paper industry, as well as
for power generation plants for the production of bioenergy. This company’s shares went up by around 50%,
resulting in a very small margin of safety.
ROCHE
We decided to reduce some of our more defensive positions and use this dry powder for other opportunities
the market has afforded us. The company has performed brilliantly since the beginning of the year, as has the
pharmaceutical sector in general, prompting us to offload our position as the margin of safety has narrowed.
LENTA
We have exited our position in this Russian supermarket chain given the perceived heightening competition which
is delaying the value creation we expected. The company’s corporate governance is also poorer than envisaged
with limited protection for minority investors, and after the public tender offer for the company we saw no
option other than to withdraw due to the risk of holding an illiquid position.
MAIN MOVEMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO

20
Financial 20,5%
UNICAJA BANCO 3,7%
MERLIN PROPERTIES 3,0%
BANCO SANTANDER 2,9%
Communication & Technology 13,2%
INDRA 4,3%
EUSKALTEL 3,3%
NOS SGPS 3,0%
Consumer 14,4%
IBERSOL 4,7%
JERONIMO MARTINS 3,9%
VISCOFAN 3,7%
Industrial 42,8%
SEMAPA 5,4%
GALP SGPS 4,5%
ACS ACTIVIDADES CONS Y SERV 4,0%
Liquidity: 9,0%
International
portfolio2.
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION
Date: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver
Spain 66,2%
Portugal 24,6%
Liquidity 9,0%
Consumer 14,4%
Financial 20,5%
Industrial 42,8%
Communication
& Technology
13,2%
Liquidity 9,0%

21
CORTICEIRA AMORIM
Corticeira is a Portuguese company that is part of the Amorim Group. It is the largest cork producer in the world
and operates, along with its biggest competitor Oeneo, in an oligopolistic market. Corticeira boasts a 45%
market share (5m stoppers out of 11.5m in total), while Oeneo has 20%.
Corticeira has four business units: stoppers, coverings, composites and insulations. The company operates in a
business with high barriers to entry due to the growing cycle of cork: the time from planting to the first suitable
harvest for wine corks is 25 years and then every nine years. This long growing period means many growers
opt for other crops with a faster return, which restricts supply. What sets Corticeira apart is that its established
position on the Iberian Peninsula (the principal region where cork is grown along with France) has enabled it to
broker long-term deals with the top growers in Portugal and Spain, giving it effective control over over 1 million
hectares of woodland. Corticeira exports much of its production to other wine producing countries such as the
United States, Australia, Chile, etc.
Despite alternative products such as plastic stoppers or twist caps coming onto the market, cork has been the
main material used to seal wine bottles. We believe this will not change in the high-quality wine segment where
consumers believe quality could be affected if other techniques are used and where the cost of the stopper
compared to the price of the bottle is immaterial (EUR 1-2/ stopper for a bottle costing more than EUR 50). As
with other parts of the alcoholic beverage segment, wine is also seeing consumers shift to higher quality brands,
which is positive for Corticeira’s business. More wine is also being consumed in emerging economies such as
China.
We exploited a placement to take a stake in the company.
ENCE ENERGIA Y CELULOSA
Ence produces paper pulp and generates renewable energy, primarily using biomass boilers.
The pulp business is extremely attractive as consumption is less volatile than that of other raw materials (less closely
linked to infrastructure investments) and has structural growth (thanks to the increased use of boxes as e-commerce
grows and the quality of life in emerging economies improves, resulting in greater use of toilet paper). Nonetheless,
it is hard to roll out new capacity in this business because of the difficulty posed by the three conditions that have
to be met to build new plants, which are very expensive (EUR 1-2 billion per new plant): 1) access to woodland
with sustainable forest certification; 2) access to transport infrastructure (trains and ports) requiring pubic-private
agreements; and 3) legal security during the life of the plant (30 years).
Electricity generation using biomass is a sector that we do not find as attractive because it requires feed-in tariffs
to be competitive due to the high production costs. Nevertheless, we believe that the growing environmental
awareness and the benefits of biomass of being able to generate electricity 24 hours a day (something the sun and
wind cannot do) means this technology has a place in the market despite the greater production costs. It also offers
an alternative to burning agricultural waste, which can reduce the risk of forest fires.
The share price was severely punished for two reasons: 1) a correction of pulp prices from levels we deemed to be
very high and prompted us to divest our position in Altri a few months back; and 2) new problems with the plant
in the city of Pontevedra (Galicia) which, after receiving an extension to its concession several years ago, has been
put in doubt. We believe the share price drop discounts for a scenario of very low prices that appears to be unlikely
taking into account that no new plants will be opened until 2021. This visibility comes from the fact that it takes

22
almost three years to build a new plant. We do not need to have visibility about the concession because the price
already discounts for a scenario in which it is not renewed and the company is channelling all investments to the
Asturias plant. All this comes against a backdrop of low leverage, enabling the company to absorb fluctuations in
pulp prices.
GRUPO PRISA
Grupo Prisa is a Spanish communications company providing news, cultural and educational content, operating
in 24 countries. It is active in the radio, television, press and publishing segments. We believe that the text book
business (Santillana) is especially important
alongside the traditional news and media business. This education division is very attractive because it has a
relatively short cycle, with books being replaced every 3 or 4 years, generating stable cash flows. Prisa has a 20%
market share in all the countries it serves.
The group therefore has some very attractive assets but has traditionally had very high levels of debt. Nevertheless,
it has gradually sold off assets and, following a second capital increase last quarter, has significantly pared back its
borrowings. We conclude that its current leverage is acceptable and the valuation is attractive, which is why we have
used this second capital increase to take a position in the company.
BANCO SABADELL
We took this position last quarter and have wanted to increase it.
Reductions in positions
CORPORACION FINANCIERA ALBA
Following this company’s performance since last December, we have exploited the decent prices to slightly
reduce our position.
ACS
Following the decent performance of this company’s shares and the margin of safety narrowing slightly, we
decided to decrease our position in the company somewhat.
Exits from the portfolio
TELEPIZZA GROUP
As a result of the public tender offer for this company by KKR and its plans to float it, we were forced to sell our
stake in the company as this lack of liquidity could threaten the ability of the funds to freely operate. We sold at
the sales price established in the public tender offer of EUR 6 and posted a return of nearly 20% on this position.

24
Bestinver Barcelona
Investment
funds

25
Bestinfond 9,47% -13,39% 5,79% 4,43% 10,84% 9,16% 14,10%
Reference index* 17,43% -5,30% 9,96% 8,81% 10,69% 7,41% 9,70%
Annualised returns
317€ 198,7€
0€
50€
100€
150€
200€
250€
300€
Growth
potential
60%
350€
Equities
1.
BESTINFOND
Reflects all of our investment ideas. Invests in global equities, especially in European companies.
Figures as at close of business: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 13/01/1993. Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has
included net dividends. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns.
*The index changed on 05/09/2018 and is now the MSCI World NR EUR. The historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking as a reference the data
obtained for the index in force at any given time.
Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5 years.
Investment funds
0%
-4%
2%
-2%
-6%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
Bestinfond Reference index
Europe 68,4%
Iberia 8,7%
Other 12,8%
Liquidity 10,0%
Consumer 21,4%
Financial 17,2%
Industrial 39,7%
Communication
& Technology
11,6%
Liquidity 10,0%
-12%
-8%
-14%
-10%

26
Bestinver internacional 10,93% -14,15% 5,72% 5,03% 12,00% 8,82% 9,48%
Reference index* 16,25% -10,57% 8,22% 5,07% 9,24% 5,87% 4,64%
69,1€ 42,9€
0€
10€
20€
30€
40€
50€
60€
70€
Growth
potential
61%
Annualised returns
Figures as at close of business: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 31/12/1997. Since 01/01/2016, the reference index
has included net dividends. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns.
Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5 years
Investment funds
BESTINVER INTERNACIONAL
Invests in a global way, although it mainly focuses on listed companies in Europe, excluding Spain and Portugal.
Europe 79,9%
Other 15,1%
Liquidity 5,0%
Consumer 23,3%
Financial 17,8%
Industrial 40,7%
Communication
& Technology
13,2%
Liquidity 5,0%
Bestinver internacional Reference index
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
-4%
-12%
-8%
-14%
-16%
-2%
16%
18%
-10%

27
BESTINVER BOLSA
Invests in listed companies in Spain and Portugal.
Investment funds
Bestinver bolsa 2,03% -8,66% 6,25% 1,25% 6,82% 7,45% 10,16%
Índice (70% IGBM / 30% PSI) 10,74% -10,46% 8,44% -0,33% 1,13% 2,02% 3,01%
Annualised returns
97,3€ 58,6€
0€
10€
20€
Growth
potential
66%
30€
40€
50€
60€
70€
80€
90€
100€
Spain 66,2%
Portugal 24,6%
Liquidity 9,0%
Consumer 14,4%
Financial 20,5%
Industrial 42,8%
Communication
& Technology
13,2%
Liquidity 9,0%
Bestinver bolsa Índice (70% IGBM / 30% PSI)
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
-2%
-4%
-12%
-8%
-10%

28
2019 2018 3 years 5 years Launch
Bestinver Grandes
Compañías
12,78% -9,20% 7,12% 4,57% 9,40%
Reference index* 17,43% -6,01% 10,13% 7,88% 10,79%
Annualised returns
266,2€ 196,8€
0€
50€
100€
150€
200€
250€
300€
Growth
potential
35%
Investment funds
BESTINVER GRANDES COMPAÑÍAS
Focuses on our selection of large companies. Reflects all of our investment ideas.
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
14%
12%
16%
18%
Grandes Compañías Reference index
-4%
-8%
-10%
-2%
-6%
Europe 64,8%
Iberia 13,7%
Other 5,9%
Liquidity 15,6%
Consumer 23,5%
Financial 3,0%
Industrial 37,9%
Communication
& Technology
19,9%
Liquidity 15,6%

29
BESTINVER LATAM
Equity investment fund that primarily invests in Latin America.
Figures as at close of business: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver. Launch date: 18/01/2019. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns.
Investment funds
2019
Bestinver Latam 2,73%
SP LATIN AMERICA 40NR -0,25%
Consumer 24,1%
Financial 23,7%
Industrial 31,3%
Communication
& Technology
10,2%
Liquidity 10,7%
Annualised returns
Bestinver Latam Reference index
2019
0%
1%
0,5%
-0,5%
1,5%
2,5%
2%
3%
-1%
Brazil 56,8%
Chile 7,2%
Colombia 8,6%
Mexico 8,7%
Peru 7,9%
Liquidity 10,7%

30
Investment funds
Mixed and
fixed income2.
Figures as at close of business: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver.
Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date:
29/06/1997.
Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has included net dividends.
*The index changed on 05/09/2018 and is now 50% MSCI W.NR
Eur / 50% Barc. Euro Agg 1-10y TR. The historical return data for
the reference index have been calculated taking as a reference the
data obtained for the index valid at any given time.
Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time
horizons of less than 2-3 years.
Geographical distribution
Bestinver Mixto Reference index
Annualised returns
Sectoral distribution
BESTINVER MIXTO
Invests up to 75% in equities and the remainder in fixed income.
Bestinver Mixto 7,96% -6,30% 4,88% 1,42% 5,50% 5,61% 7,53%
Reference index* 10,21% 2,80% 5,90% 0,32% 1,12% 1,92% 2,74%
Europe 51,5%
Iberia 6,6%
Other 8,5%
Fixed
income
22,9%
Liquidity 10,5%
Consumer 15,1%
Financial 13,0%
Industrial 29,9%
Communication
& Technology
8,6%
Fixed income 22,9%
Liquidity 10,5%
0%
-4%
-8%
12%
-10%
10%
2%
-2%
-6%
4%
6%
8%

31
BESTINVER PATRIMONIO
Mainly invests in fixed income, with up to 25% in global equities.
Investment funds
Figures as at close of business: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 24/07/2016.
Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has included net dividends. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns.
*The index changed on 05/09/2018 and is now 12.5% MSCI W. NR Eur / 87.5% Barc. Euro Agg 1-3y TR. The historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking
as a reference the data obtained for the index in force at any given time.
The investment policy of BESTINVER PATRIMONIO FI was changed substantially on 5 September 2018. The historical return data shown are not representative of the returns this fund
could obtain in the future.
Investment in this fund is not appropriate for time horizons of less than 2-3 years.
Bestinver Patrimonio Reference index
Annualised returns
2019 2018 3 years 5 years 10 years Launch
Bestinver Patrimonio 4,81% -6,30% 4,16% 3,66% 9,08% 5,49%
Reference index* 2,59% 2,80% 5,56% 5,26% 6,68% 3,43%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
-4%
-8%
-2%
14%
-6%
Europe 16,7%
Iberia 3,7%
Other 1,8%
Fixed
income
64,1%
Liquidity 13,7%
Consumer 7,6%
Financial 0,8%
Industrial 9,4%
Communication
& Technology
4,4%
Fixed income 64,1%
Liquidity 13,7%

32
Investment funds
BESTINVER RENTA
Invests in short-term Euro fixed income.
Figures as at close of business: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 30/10/1995.
*The index changed on 05/09/2018 and is now 100% Barc. Euro Agg 1-10y TR. The historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking as a reference the
data obtained for the index in force at any given time.
Investment in this fund is not appropriate for time horizons of less than 1-2 years.
Bestinver Renta 3,33% -1,02% 0,68% 0,47% 1,08% 1,81% 3,05%
Reference index* 3,30% 0,14% 1,26% 1,14% 1,21% 1,81% 2,63%
Bestinver Renta Reference index
0%
1%
1,5%
2%
3%
2,5%
3,5%
4%
Annualised returns
-1%
0,5%
-1,5%

33
Investment funds
BESTINVER CORTO PLAZO
Figures as at close of business: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver. Launch date: 20/07/2018.
Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 1 year.
2019 Launch
Bestinver Corto Plazo 0,26% -0,21%
(35% Letras Tesoro 1 año /
65% Eonia 7d)
-0,11% -0,23%
Bestinver Corto Plazo Reference index
2019 Launch
0%
1%
0,5%
-0,5%
1,5%
Annualised returns
-1%
-1,5%

34
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
14%
12%
16%
18%
-4%
-8%
-12%
-14%
-2%
-6%
-10%
The FIL Investment Fund invests in a portfolio without concentration restrictions and with a restricted liquidity profile.
FIL Investment funds:
Hedge Value Fund3.
Hedge Value Fund 7,63% -12,22% 7,88% 6,14% 12,27% 7,34%
MSCI World Index (Eur) 17,43% -4,17% 10,66% 9,98% 11,54% 5,05%
Annualised returns
Hedge Value Fund MSCI World Index (Eur)
399,5€ 236,7€
0€
50€
100€
150€
200€
300€
250€
350€
450€
Growth
potential
79%
400€
500€
Europe 50,6%
Iberia 15,4%
Other 25,7%
Liquidity 8,3%
Consumer 66,0%
Financial 0,0%
Industrial 13,9%
Communication
& Technology
11,7%
Liquidity 8,3%
Investment funds

36
Pension
funds
Bestinver León

37
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
14%
12%
0%
-4%
-8%
-10%
-12%
-14%
-2%
16%
18%
-6%
Renta
variable1.
BESTINVER GLOBAL
Invests in global equities.
Figures as at close of business: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver. Periods of
more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 31/12/2004.
Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has included net dividends.
*The index changed on 19/09/2018 and is now the MSCI World NR EUR. The
historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking as a
reference the data obtained for the index valid at any given time.
Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of
less than 5 years.
Bestinver Global Reference index
Pension funds
Bestinver Global 9,57% -13,20% 5,97% 4,68% 10,93% 8,05%
Reference index* 17,43% -5,30% 9,96% 8,81% 10,69% 6,24%
Annualised returns
Europe 68,0%
Iberia 8,7%
Other 12,7%
Liquidity 10,6%
Consumer 21,2%
Financial 17,2%
Industrial 39,5%
Communication
& Technology
11,6%
Liquidity 10,6%

38
Figures as at close of business: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver.
Periods of more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date:
30/10/1996. Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has included net
dividends. Past performance is not a guarantee of future returns.
*The index changed on 19/09/2018 and is now 50% MSCI W.NR Eur
/ 50% Barc. Euro Agg 1-10y TR. The historical return data for the
reference index have been calculated taking as a reference the data
obtained for the index valid at any given time.
Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time
horizons of less than 3-5 years.
Mixed
and fixed income2.
BESTINVER PLAN MIXTO
Geographical distribution
Sectoral distribution
Pension funds
Bestinver Plan Mixto 8,04% -10,82% 3,62% 2,85% 8,09% 7,09% 9,73%
Reference index* 10,21% -2,54% 7,72% 3,73% 6,08% 5,11% 6,34%
Annualised returns
Bestinver Plan Mixto Reference index
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
-2%
-4%
-6%
-8%
-10%
-12%
Europe 51,9%
Iberia 6,0%
Other 9,7%
Fixed
income
22,7%
Liquidity 9,7%
Consumer 16,2%
Financial 13,4%
Industrial 29,4%
Communication
& Technology
8,6%
Fixed income 22,7%
Liquidity 9,7%

39
0%
1%
2%
-3%
-1%
-2%
BESTINVER PLAN RENTA
Invests in short-term fixed income.
Figures as at close of business: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver. Periods of
more than 1 year at annualised rate. Launch date: 31/12/2004.
Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has included net dividends. Past
performance is not a guarantee of future returns.
*The index changed on 19/09/2018 and is now 100% Barc. Euro Agg 1-10y TR.
The historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking
as a reference the data obtained for the index in force at any given time.
Investment in this fund is not appropriate for time horizons
of less than 1-2 years.
Pension funds
Bestinver Plan Renta Reference index
Annualised returns
Bestinver Plan Renta 3,26% -1,33% 1,33% 1,02% 1,37% 1,85%
Reference index* 3,30% 0,58% 2,23% 1,77% 1,51% 1,98%
3%
4%

40
BESTINVER PLAN PATRIMONIO
Figures as at close of business: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver. Launch date: 15/11/2018 Past
performance is not a guarantee of future returns.
Investment in this fund is not appropriate for time horizons of less than
2-3 years.
2019 Launch
Bestinver Plan Patrimonio 2,94% 2,67%
(12,5% MSCI W.NR Eur /
87,5% Barc. Euro Agg 1-3y TR)
2,59% 1,78%
Bestinver Plan Patrimonio Reference index
2019 Launch
0%
1%
0,5%
1,5%
2%
2,5%
3%
Annualised returns
-1%
-0,5%
-1,5%
Investment funds

42
EPSVEPSV
Only for investors
who are tax resident
in the Basque Country
Bestinver Bilbao

43
EPSV
Renta
variable1.
BESTINVER CRECIMIENTO
Invests up to 100% in global equities.
Figures as at close of business: 30/06/2019. Source: Bestinver. Periods of more than 1 year at
annualised rate. Launch date: 11/12/2017.
*The index changed on 26/07/2018 and is now the MSCI World NR EUR. The historical return data
for the reference index have been calculated taking as a reference the data obtained for the index in
force at any given time.
2019 2018 Launch
Bestinver Crecimiento 10,23% -10,74% -4,79%
Reference index* 17,43% -0,99% 8,62%
Annualised returns
2019 Launch2018
-10%
15%
20%
10%
-5%
-20%
5%
0%
-15%
Bestinver Crecimiento Reference index
Consumer 20,4%
Financial 18,8%
Industrial 38,4%
Communication
& Technology
12,2%
Liquidity 10,1%
Europe 69,3%
Iberia 8,8%
Other 11,8%
Liquidity 10,1%

44
EPSV
Mixed and
fixed income2.
BESTINVER FUTURO
Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has included net dividends. Past performance is not a
guarantee of future returns.
*The index changed on 26/07/2018 and is now 50% MSCI W. NR Eur / 50% Barc. Euro Agg
1-10y TR. The historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking as a
Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 5
years.
Bestinver Futuro 8,26% -10,74% 4,32% 3,21% 6,02%
Reference index* 10,21% -0,99% 6,52% 5,43% 6,98%
Bestinver Futuro Reference index
Annualised returns
2019 2018 3 years 5 years
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
-4%
-8%
-12%
12%
-2%
-6%
-10%
Launch
Europe 51,9%
Iberia 7,3%
Other 9,2%
Fixed
income
23,2%
Liquidity 8,3%
Consumer 15,3%
Financial 13,6%
Industrial 31,0%
Communication
& Technology
8,6%
Fixed income 23,2%
Liquidity 8,3%

45
BESTINVER CONSOLIDACIÓN
Since 01/01/2016, the reference index has included net dividends. Past performance is not a
guarantee of future returns.
*The index changed on 26/07/2018 and is now 12.5% MSCI W. NR Eur / 87.5% Barc. Euro Agg
1-3y TR. The historical return data for the reference index have been calculated taking as a
Investment in this fund is inadvisable for time horizons of less than 2-3
years.
Bestinver
Consolidación
4,33% -3,51% 1,04% 1,48% 6,02%
Reference index* 2,59% -0,08% 2,65% 2,38% 6,98%
Annualised returns
Bestinver Consolidación Reference index
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
-2%
-3%
6%
7%
-4%
5%
-1%
EPSV
Europe 16,4%
Iberia 3,5%
Other 2,5%
Fixed
income
71,7%
Liquidity 6,0%
Consumer 8,3%
Financial 1,2%
Industrial 8,9%
Communication
& Technology
4,0%
Fixed income 71,7%
Liquidity 6,0%

Barcelona
C. Diputació, 246
planta 3
08007 Barcelona
A Coruña
Pl. de Mina 1,
planta 4
15004 A Coruña
youtube.com/bestinverAM @bestinverlinkedin.com/company/bestinver facebook.com/bestinver
Madrid
C. Juan de Mena, 8
planta 1
28014 Madrid
Pamplona
Avda. Carlos III El noble, 13-15
planta 2
31002 Pamplona
León
Avda. Padre Isla, 2
planta 1
24002 León
Sevilla
C.Fernández y
González 2,
41001 Sevilla
Valencia
C. Moratín 17
planta 2
46002 Valencia
Bilbao
C. Gran Vía 58
planta 4
48011 Bilbao
www.bestinver.es bestinver@bestinver.esTelephone 91 595 91 00
OFFICES

Quarterly report for our investors - Second Quarter 2019

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