Webinar: Regulatory organization and contractual relations


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Webinar: Regulatory organization and contractual relations

  1. 1. Across Latitudes and Countries Bus Rapid Transit  Center of ExcellenceRegulatory Organization and Contractual Relations  Between Agents ´ Rosário Macário Instituto Superior Técnico Lisboa, Portugal 
  2. 2. Outline Urban mobility system Agents, relations, decision levels Effects of introduction of a new mode/service ‐ BRT Institutions Regulatory Frameworks Contracts Regulatory framework and contracts as performance  drivers
  4. 4. What is the urban mobility system? • structured and coordinated set of modes, services and  infrastructure to ensure the displacement of persons and  goods in the city.• consisting of several elements, one physical  and material character, others organizational, institutional, and finally,  others of logical character.• a vital element of the competitiveness of the city, because  of that is a sub‐system of the urban system and it is used  to development of the city
  5. 5. DECISION LEVELS Three fundamental levels of decision-making:  Strategic: define the objectives to pursue and the resources to mobilize  Tactical: define the solutions types (technologies) and make the planning (capacity, networks, schedules)  Operational: execute the planned production Success of the process  At each level it is needed to have some idea of the implications of decisions of lower levels  Nevertheless, it is necessary to assemble retro-action processes that allow to adjust decisions to each superior levels which lower level analysis reveals In a democratic society, the strategic level should be policy makers responsibility
  6. 6. The elements of UMS• The infrastructures• The mobility services• The organization• The regulation• The information• The elements of other sectors that affect  our perception of the mobility system• Etc
  7. 7. The agents of UMS• Transport Authorities• Mobility Operators• Infrastructures Operators• Policy Makers• Representatives of the citizens• Third and fourth party providers• etc
  8. 8. Intra‐system links Infrastructure :  Hierarchy of road network in accordance with service levels;  Current and future roles of the main arteries  Parking location, P&R, etc.  Definition of zones or networks which can not be used by individual  traffic (protection zones) Services  Prioritization of services: primary and feeders; mass ("Transit") and  segmented.  Pricing policies (various services and including parking) System  Linking land use and transport   Linking transport of passengers and goods  Linking motorized and non motorized transports  Controlling externalities (emissions, accidents, noise)
  9. 9. Urban mobility system properties Robustness, i.e. stability and long‐term sustainability;  Adaptability, i.e. dynamic capability of adapting  services to the requirements of developments in  society and technology. Efficiency, i.e. high productivity in the ability to  change the basic resources into products and these  consumer units, providing the best result at the  lowest cost;• Diversity, ability to meet the aspirations of different  customer segments with different services in a  continuous adjustment between supply and demand  of the urban mobility system
  10. 10. Performance monitoring of UMS Industrial Performance ‐ processing of basic resources in  production of transport Network organization ‐ transformation between transport  units and levels of accessibility strategically defined Commercial performance‐ consumption potential represented  by these levels of accessibility, which is generally the level of  customer satisfaction Production of Externalities ‐ potential of each configuration to  generate a negative impact in terms of economic and social  view
  11. 11. Difficulties of Urban Mobility Systems Relation between decision levels Strategic Stakeholders S goals of the S interest system D ecisio n L evelsD ecisio n L evels consistency T gap T Service Monitoring Measuring O O performance criteria tools
  12. 12. Introduce a BRT = Changing the system Relation between decision levels Relation between agents Roles of each mode/service change Relations between the different agents change Objectives for urban development are challenged
  14. 14. What are institutions ? The term “institution” is used with a variety of meanings in common language as well as in philosophy, but with a more precise meaning in sociology and generally in the social sciences:  An institution is any structure or mechanism of social order and cooperation  governing the behavior of a set of individuals within a given human  community.   Institutions are identified with a social purpose and permanence,  transcending individual human lives and intentions, and with the making and  enforcing of rules governing cooperative human behavior Institutions create elements of order and predictability. Predictability in turn can enhance trust, which can enhance reciprocating loyalty, which can facilitate bargaining, compromise, and fiduciary relationships (Heclo, 2006)
  15. 15. How do Institutions Change? There is nothing automatic, self‐perpetuating, or self‐reinforcing about  institutional arrangements. Institutions represent compromises based  on specific coalitional dynamics, they are always vulnerable to shifts. Institutional change often occurs when problems of rule interpretation and enforcement open up space for actors to implement existing rules  in new ways.  – In fact, institutions have implications on distribution of resources, which  creates tensions that eventually lead to dissenting actions Quite often, changes reflect local adaptation to local experience,  making them relatively myopic and meandering, rather than  optimizing – So, they will most times be ‘‘inefficient,’’ in the sense of not reaching a  uniquely optimal arrangement
  16. 16. Why are specialized organizations  necessary? (I) In general, organizations are necessary as an  instrument of effectiveness  better performance  thanks to a hierarchy of command in particular tasks – This is valid both in the private and in the public domains In both domains the dimension and mission of  each organization cannot grow indefinitely – Loss of focus for the institution and of effectiveness of the chain of  command  subdivision in smaller organizations (departments /  divisions / units / etc.) is necessary
  17. 17. Why are specialized organizations  necessary? (II) In the public sector in democratic societies, institutional (organizational) design is more complex because excessive concentration of power is dangerous for the risk of abuse it entails – The “benevolent dictator” is an interesting allegory for use in  stories about the virtues of planning but they rarely come  about and don’t behave long like that  – Conciliation between effectiveness and control of abuse  (system of checks and balances) is achieved through a division  of power in mutually dependent layers, each with its own  organizations
  18. 18. Making Institutions Work Institutional design affects the degrees of freedom and  incentives (penalties and rewards) of individual and  collective agents, so it influences their behavior Institutional design may also include filters or screens,  restricting – Who is allowed to participate in some decisions – What options are available in certain decisions Penalties and Rewards to individual agents in the  institutions must be stimulating of the desired behavior and  proportional – In their conception, they should be complier‐centered, not  deviant‐centered
  20. 20. Common Pathologies in  Organizations From Focus to loss of coherence – Need for coordination – Method of Open Coordination (introduced by EU in the Lisbon  Strategy, 2000) Organizations (like all organisms) have a priority goal of  qualified survival – From focus on a problem to the need of keeping the problem  alive as a justification for survival Organizations are agents at the service of a principal – The principal in this case is the set of institutions they embody – But like all agents they tend to align their behavior with their  own interest and not so much with the interest of the  principal  need for contract (statute) with constraints and  incentives
  21. 21. Main types of Organizations in the  Transport Sector• In all countries, there are multiple types of  organizations in the Transport Sector – Because it is vital for the organization of peoples lives and activities  of companies, and so it is expected to function predictably• The main types of organizations in the Transport  Sector are: – Government to decide on Transport Policy – Agencies for planning of infrastructure and service networks – (Direct and added‐value) Service operators – Protective Regulators, establishing technical, safety and  environmental rules – Police and similar for enforcement of rules – Economic Regulators, to ensure efficient economic performance
  22. 22. What is the Regulatory Framework Who does what and when Right of initiative: market initiative versus  authority initiative Spectrum of competition
  23. 23. Pitfalls of competitive tendering Authorities tend to over‐specify the product, and then look for the  cheapest supplier Administrative setting of tariffs and subsidy levels leads to slow and  superficial changes in supply • Customer surveys may show satisfaction but they only represent the opinion  of those that have not left A commercially tuned attitude is needed, more easily found in  operators than in authorities. But there is no incentive for large  gambles:  • Short duration contracts, no incentives beyond “doing it right” • Excessive success would entice interest of other competitors
  24. 24. Economic Regulators and their role Economic Regulators are special organizations created to keep  watch against abuse from market failure, occurring in the  (mostly private) provision of goods and services in network  industries Difficult roles of regulators: preserve efficiency under limited or  no direct competition, administer tariff adjustments, push for  innovation (X‐efficiency), keep companies healthy – Inclusion of health of companies in the regulators’ agendas was a  central element in the process of attracting private equity into  these sectors (risk management)
  26. 26. Contractual relationshipsContractual models can be distinguished along several parameters:  – Whether they are static or dynamic,  – Whether they involve complete or incomplete contracts,  – Whether they describe bilateral or multilateral situations;  – Whether the private information bears on:  • What the agent does (hidden action) • What the agent is (hidden information)
  27. 27. Pure contractual forms in PT Management contract – represents a form of delegation from the authority to the operator who is confined to the professional management of the operations on behalf of the authority. The degree of delegation and of engagement of the contracted manager in any risk taking is decided on a case by case basis, but in all circumstances the contract is negotiated for a fixed period of time and agreed price Gross cost contract – the authority releases the control of the productive means – vehicles / rolling stock, depots/other infrastructure, etc ‐ to the operator, often setting also certain specific standard for quality of service, required fleets, etc., together with the agreed price for the production of the service. Very often contract length as to be associated to the lifecycle duration of material assets involved in  production, this is a common situation with railways companies. However, more  recent evolutions enable to have contract length almost independent from lifecycle of material assets through operational leasing Net cost contract – In Net Cost contracts both the productive and commercial risk are born by the operators. In these contracts the operator is normally entitled to retain all fare  revenue and bears all the risks (productive and commercial)
  28. 28. Quality and incentives in contracts Quality Measurements (Incentive/Penalty)  Internal: focus on service production  External: focus on customer’s perception/reaction Traditional Incentives  Gross cost contracts: Revenue incentives based on  perceived customer satisfaction or patronage  Net cost contracts: Shared revenue risk and minimum  quality standards monitored through perceived customer  satisfaction or patronage
  29. 29. The risks involved in the provision of  UPT services Production risks  ‐ related with productive factors  Commercial risks ‐ related with demand levels and pricing  policies Urban planning risks : land ‐use; traffic management;  transport system planning.
  30. 30. The risks involved in the provision of  UPT services Risks of classic contracts    When Authority defines all beforehand  Risk of initial misfit between requirements and supply  Market requirements evolve and supply is “tied up” by contractual obligations  When Operator has more right of initiative  More difficult to assure integration with other sectors  Contracts must be longer to allow development of new services, market reaction and payback of investments.  Incumbent gains market information advantages that may be decisive for winning successive tenders and exclude new comers.
  31. 31. Net Cost Contracts  are hard to manage Apparently, Net Cost contracts would be the answer  operator bears commercial risks Net Cost Contracts are harder for both sides:  For Operators, much harder preparation of bids, higher risks,  permanent costs of reading markets, short‐term contracts create risk  of baking the cake and have someone else eat it  For Authorities, lower number of contestants in tender, market  contestability possibly virtual after first cycle Biggest difficulties come during contract life  All changes of transport policy or traffic regulation may affect the  commercial side of PT operations, thus imposing compensation  So, net cost contracts become a barrier to innovation and adaptation  in urban management
  32. 32. Material Assets  and Contract Length Traditionally, contract length connected to lifecycle  duration of material assets More flexible solutions are now available – Fixed assets can belong to the Authority and be managed  directly or through management contracts w/ private parties – Mobile assets may be acquired through operational leasing • heavy maintenance performed by the suppliers (or subcontracted under  their responsibility) • disposal at the end of contract ensured by supplier – Contract for material assets may be done by the authority of  by the operator So, contract length may become (almost) independent  of lifecycle of material assets
  34. 34. Assessing UPT performance Performance of UPT should be assessed against  the three following dimensions: Industrial performance – monitoring the productive  side of the system at the operational level; Network organisation – monitoring the planning side  of the system at the tactical level Commercial performance – monitoring the quality  performance of the system, and simultaneously  providing feedback for the adjustment of the strategic  goals
  35. 35. Assessing industrial performanceFactors affecting industrial performance : – The regulatory and organisational framework (e.g.  structure‐conduct‐paradigm) – Other factors :  • Dimensions of urban area (e.g. economies of scale) • Diversity of modes and level of integration (e.g. network  economies, density and scope) • Complexity of the network (e.g. fleet capacity in feeder  routes)Industrial performance indicators should cover: – Productive efficiency: – Resource Management; – Environmental protective Management
  36. 36. Assessing network organisationFour main dimensions of integration to be  considered: Visible  – Physical: In space, time and technology: – Logical: Involving global system information, focused information and reliability of  connections provided by real time information: – Tariff: Entailing tariff integration and revenue sharing:  Invisible  – Organizational (Institutional and Contractual): Entailing allocation of responsibilities  between authorities and operators, and between operators from different modes; Indicators to assess network organization should  depart from the accessibility concept. i.e.: – Availability of transport, meaning network coverage in time and space; – Commercial accessibility, concerning availability of selling points; – Logical accessibility, concerning availability of information; – Financial accessibility, addressing tariff regimes and levels (e.g. affordability)  
  37. 37. Assessing commercial  performance Commercial performance is directly related with clients  satisfaction and requires close identification with clusters  of clients, which form specific market segments with  differentiated expectations Factors influencing the customers quality perception: – Previous experience; – Level of information; – Social statute – Price paid that either meets or not their expectation  Aspects to be considered in the assessment are: regularity,  continuity of service, comfort, convenience and security
  38. 38. Impacts of commercial performance• First, the impact on citizens’ use of public  transport measured by passenger.kms in public  transport;• Second, the impact on traffic congestion,  measured through market share of public  transport;• Third, the impact on the financial situation of the  Operators and authorities (reduction of  subsidyneeds), measured through the revenue  obtained.
  39. 39. Some pitfalls of UPT  performance assessment To truly assess the performance of UPT systems longitudinal comparisons are important but misrepresentative. We must assess transversal comparisons between system in different cities or urban areas Careful thought should be given to the factors influencing transversal comparisons, since they can potentially biases the interpretation of indicators, such as: organizational settings, geographical characteristics, land‐use patterns, intermodality and diversity of modes The separate analyze of performance dimensions should be complementary to the preliminary analysis of market structure to enable the full understanding of the dynamics of the system.
  40. 40. Thanks for participating ! Across Latitudes and Countries Bus Rapid Transit  Center of ExcellenceRegulatory Organization and Contractual Relations Between Agents ´ Rosário Macário rosariomacario@ist.utl.pt Instituto Superior Técnico Lisboa, Portugal 
  41. 41. March WebinarTransmilenio Bogotá: Evolution and challenges for the futureProfessor Juan Pablo Bocarejo Departamento de Ingeniería Civil y Ambiental Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá, ColombiaThursday, March 21st, at 12 noon CLST (UTC‐3)We propose an updated view of the Transmilenio system, in terms of key performance indicators and its evolution through time. We will discuss the real challenges, in particular related to the capacity of the BRT and the implementation of SITP (Sistema Integrado de Transporte Publico), the new integrated public transport system being implemented in Bogotá.  Finally we will present some specific research projects developed by the Urban and Sustainability group at Universidad de Los Andes – Bogotá.