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Laws related to voice reform at the world bank group

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World Bank Governance, securities Regulation

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Laws related to voice reform at the world bank group

  1. 1. 1 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue Laws relatedto voice reform at the WorldBank Group A yearago, I knewalreadythe candidate Iwill support. Itwasaround12:30 PM thatThursday,my friend whois a republicanbutnota Trump fan wasdrivingme fromVA to DC library,I toldhimthat onlyTrump couldbeatthe Clintons withtheircombined80yearsof experience. AndI didadd that I diddecide tohelp himso I will take aleave tohelp himonline while masteringthe World BankGroup.Why the WorldBank Group? I have a great respectof that institutionandIhave beentryingtoscore a lot of friendsoverthere. But, thingswere notgoodat that time,a least three of myfriendsandlong-time employeesof the ‘Bank’did resigntojoinothersinstitutionsforthe same reason‘the WBG Presidentmanagerial style’andinadditionI was informedaboutWorldBank employeesprotestsinside the Bank mainbuilding. Thatsaid,I letmyself believeitwill be averyeasytransitionfrommy excellentcorporate andgovernance sectorcoupledwith financial regulationasaSEC expert. But,inpractice, itrequiresalotof new knowledge,fromthe corporate securitieswhichisamandatorydisclosure law, relatedtonew conceptsvotingpower,full timeboard, constituenciesandmore. Asyoumay recall byreadingmypast posts,the WorldBank Group isimmuned fromany lawsfromits members,all 189 countriesincludingUSA,maybe because of the welfare tiedtoits founding. To speedforwardthe deliveryandacceptance of the IMF membership includesinthe Bretton WoodsAgreementActsignedbyHarryTruman it statesthat onsection2 “ The Presidentishereby authorizedtoacceptmembershipforthe UnitedStatesinthe international monetaryFund(hereinafter referredtoas the ‘Fund’),andinthe international Bankfor Reconstruction andDevelopment (hereinafter referredtoas the ‘Bank’),providedforbythe Articlesof Agreementsof the Fundandthe Articlesof Agreementsof the Bankasset forthinthe Final Actof the UnitedNationsMonetaryandFinancial Conference datedJuly22,1944, anddepositedinthe archivesof the Departmentof State.” Thingsare worse whenitcomestothe review of the WorldBankGroup creation. Asyou know itis one of the oldestandpowerful welfare ‘Bank’inthe World. PleasereadEdwardMason(G?) andRobert Ashes (1973), the WorldBank since BrettonWoods,WashingtonDC,BrookingsInstitution,p.29“The United NationsMonetaryandFinancial Conference,betterknownasthe BrettonWoodsConference,tookplace overthree weeksinNewHampshire,USA,inJuly1940…..The governance of the International MonetaryFund was consideredfirstandtookup mostof the initial week’sdiscussions. Forreasonsof time andconvenience, the delegatesappliedtothe WorldBankthe same governance structure theyhaddesignedforthe IMF.” SimilaritiesandDifferences:IMFand WorldBank IMF WorldBank Leadsby a Managing Director Leadsby a President Can be its memberwithoutbeingaWorldbankmember Must be a IMF memberinorderto applyforits membership 189 membercountries 189 membercountries 2,300 employeesfrom182 membercountries 10,000 employeesfrom180 membercountries Has $215 Billionof fullypaidinquotas Has authorizedcapital of $184 Billionof whichmemberspay inabout 10 percent Assistall members industrializedandDTC Has borrowingandnon-borrowermembercountries  Overseesthe international monetarysystem  Promotesexchange stabilityandorderlyexchange relationsamongitsmembercountries  Seektopromote the economicdevelopment  Seektoend extreme poverty
  2. 2. 2 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue Are theyimmuned fromthe US rules,maybe? One of the oldestandpowerful regulatorybodyof most financial affairs inthe world isthe SEC. It was createdonJune 6, 1933 witha missiontoprotectinvestors, maintainfair,orderlyandefficientmarketsandfacilitate capitalformation. Itscommissionersare chosenby the US PresidentanditreportstobothUS CongressandUS President. Itsdivisionsandoffices seektodetect and addressviolationsandpotentialproblemsinthe securitiesmarket. InApril 2011, in response tothe SEC requesttosubmitcommentletter,the WorldBankGroupand IMF corporate counselsstatedthatall transactionsof the WBG were integratedtothe developmenteffectivenessof the MDB’s (Multilateral DevelopmentBanks) andthatanyattemptsto regulate suchactivitieswouldviolate the WBGandother MDBs privileges andimmunities. Havingsaidall that I want you to imagine thatthe Ohio,aviationstate,mandidfire andchase out a lotof staff at the bank. Andyou have beenhired fromthe corporate orothernon MDB sector to structure the incomingvoice reform event.Whatisthe voice reformisthe firstquestiontoanswer? VOTINGRIGHTSREALIGNMENT TARGET ANDFUNDING Before Phase 1 (pct point increase) target Phase 2 (pct point increase) target After IBRD Developed countries 57.40 -1.46 -3.13 52.81% votingpower Each member receives votes (one vote foreachshare ofthe bank’s capital stockheldby the member country)plus basic votes (calculatedso that the sum of all basic votes is equal to 5.55percent of the sum of basic votes andshares votes forall members countries) Developing countries 42.60 1.46 3.13 47.19 % votingpower IDA Developed countries 59.9 N.A -5.49 54.41% votingpower Each member receives thevotes it is allocatedunder IDA replenishment accordingtothe rules establishedin each IDA replenishment resolution. Votes consist of subscription votes andmembership Developing countries 40.1 N.A 5.49 54.59% votingpower IFC Developed countries 66.59 N.A -6.07 60.52 voting power Each member receives votes consistingof sharevotes (onevoteforeach share ofIFC’s capital stock heldby the membercountry)plus basic votes (calculatedso that thesum of all basic votes is equal to 5.55percent of the sum of basic votes andsharervotes for all members countries) Developing countries 33.41 N.A 6.07 39.48% votingpower MIGA Developed countries N.A Must maintain votingpower parity between developed countries and DTC (Developing andtransition countries) 50.03% votingpower Each member receives votes consistingof sharevotes (onevoteforeach share ofMIGA’s capital stock heldby the membercountry)plus parityvotes, calculatedso that the aggregate number of votes of category1 andcategory2 members is the same. Members choose which category they want tojoinat the time of membership. Category1, members were originally definedas developedcountries andcategory 2 members as developingcountries Developing countries N.A 49.97% votingpower Funding strategy  Exceptional allocationof 7,117 shares to 16 DTC  Establishment of Voice Trust fund  General Capital and Selected Capital increases of 725,876 shares including 70,000 already authorized but Funded IBRD with SelectedCapital Increase with  75% of the total SCI andshare allocatedon the basis GDP (economic weight)  20% on the basis of financial contributions (IDArecognition)  5% on the basis of the development andprotectionof the smallest poorcountries  Funded by selectedcapitalincrease of 230,374shares ($27.8 Billionwith paidin of $1.6Billion)  Formula used: .75 shares forEW + .2 shares forfinancial contribution + .05 shares for development contribution FoundedIDA subscription by the donorfinancingestablishedunder the name Voice Trust Fund(BTF)with $1.2Billion FoundedIFC subscription with $200Million capital increase,that means 200,000shares (1 share= $1,000)(130,000 authorizedforthe event and70,000 shares already authorizedbut unallocated)
  3. 3. 3 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue unallocated were approved In the corporate world,whenthe companyfacesangry majorinvestors,the VPforinvestorrelation (communication)callsthemandputsthemonthe company investornewsalerts;he sendsthemanalysts’ reportsaboutthe investingonhiscompany,recentCEO/CFOanalystscalls,annual reportof the company and more. He mayalso requestthe CEOto meetwiththemonscheduledlunchordinner meetingswhere theywill talkaboutnewproducts,newpartners,strategytomaximizingshareholdervalue andneutralizing competitors andmore. Atthe same token,the VPforcustomerservice will call,survey andmeetwithmajor angry customerstotalkabout howthe companyis helpingthe customertosave intermof qualityof his companyproductsversusitscompetitors’products,the convenience anddeliveryof service andthe like. Trend in VotingPower of The Top 8 ShareholdersCountries Countries World Bank Divisions 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 IBRD 16.39 16.36 16.09 15.63 15.19 15.02 16.16 16.63 USA IDA 12.16 11.24 11.09 10.86 10.76 10.70 10.47 10.33 IFC 23.63 23.59 23.59 22.70 23.69 21.52 20.99 20.99 MIGA 14.94 14.95 14.98 14.99 15.00 15.02 15.02 15.02 IBRD 4.30 4.30 4.22 4.13 4.01 4.06 3.93 3.94 UK IDA 5.37 5.25 5.46 5.56 5.61 5.92 6.04 6.17 IFC 5.11 5.02 5.11 4.85 5.04 4.60 4.48 4.48 MIGA 4.02 4.02 4.02 4.02 4.02 4.03 4.03 4.03 IBRD 7.85 7.88 9.62 9.24 8.48 8.13 7.49 7.19 JAPAN IDA 9.53 8.83 8.74 8.61 8.59 8.59 8.45 8.44 IFC 5.96 5.86 5.86 5.65 5.87 6.16 6.01 6.01 MIGA 4.20 4.21 4.21 4.21 4.21 4.22 4.22 4.22 IBRD 4.30 4.30 4.22 4.13 4.01 4.06 3.98 3.94 FRANCE IDA 4.04 3.82 3.86 3.81 3.82 3.82 3.82 3.79 IFC 5.11 4.57 5.11 4.85 5.04 4.60 4.48 4.48 MIGA 4.02 4.02 4.02 4.02 4.02 4.03 4.03 4.03 IBRD 4.48 4.48 4.41 4.62 4.50 4.56 4.38 4.21 GERMANY IDA 6.30 5.84 5.68 5.56 5.55 5.54 5.46 5.42 IFC 5.44 4.36 5.44 5.16 5.36 4.90 4.77 4.77 MIGA 4.18 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.19 4.20 4.20 4.20 IBRD 2.78 2.78 2.73 3.31 5.47 5.25 4.63 4.64 CHINA IDA 1.88 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.07 2.08 2.12 2.20 IFC 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.72 2.36 2.30 MIGA 2.63 2.64 2.64 2.69 2.64 2.64 2.64 2.64 IBRD 2.78 2.78 2.73 2.52 2.37 2.27 3.03 2.91 SAUDI ARABIA IDA 3.30 3.17 3.19 3.19 3.21 3.24 3.24 3.24 IFC 1.26 1.26 1.26 1.23 1.21 1.16 1.91 1.91 MIGA 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.64 2.64 2.64
  4. 4. 4 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue IBRD 2.78 2.78 2.73 2.52 2.37 2.27 2.83 2.91 RUSSIA IDA 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.37 0.33 IFC 3.43 3.38 3.43 3.27 3.38 3.91 3.82 3.82 MIGA 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.64 2.64 2.64 IBRD 45.66 45.66 46.75 46.1 46.4 45.62 46.43 46.37 TOTALS IDA 42.89 40.5 40.38 40.09 39.92 40.2 39.97 39.92 IFC 50.96 49.06 50.82 48.72 51.31 49.21 48.76 48.76 MIGA 39.25 39.29 39.32 39.38 39.34 39.42 39.42 39.42 Here what didhappenatthe WorldBank Group isthat underthe pressure of countriesmemberswiththe belief thattheyhave toolittle voiceandtoofew opportunitiesforparticipationatthe WorldBankGroup, regardlessof itsexcellentvital global contributions,global humanwelfare scorecard itwasa call for change by the MonterreyConsensus. In2002, the MonterreyConsensus [UN Conference onFinancingfor Development,March2002] encouragedthe WorldBankGroup to enhance the participationof all developing countriesandcountrieswitheconomicsintransition(DTC) byanymeanspossible. The so-calledvoice reformwassupposedtofocuson voice powerandshareholdingincluding:  Increasingvotingpower  Establishingunique IBRDshareholding  HoldingregularIBRDand IFCshareholdingreview  EnhancingDTC voice onthe WorldBank boards SHAREHOLDER VALUE SHIFTED (CONTROL) BY Top 8 Preferred shareholders of the World Bank Group IBRD (Founded on 12/27/1945) IFC (Founded on 7/20/1956) IDA (founded on 2/01/1960) MIGA founded on 4/12/1988) Capital Stock Voting power % variance Capital Stock Voting Power % total variance Capital Stock Voting Power % variance Capital Stock Voting Power % Total variance Total Shareholder Value Shifted (control) Amount paid ($Million) % Total Amount paid ($ thousands) % Total Amount paid ($ Million) % Total Amount paid ($ Million) % Total United States 2,670 17.07 16.16 0.91 569,379 22.19 20.99 1.20 51,045 18.28 10.33 7.95 67,406 18.36 15.02 3.34 34,635.03 United Kingdom 644.0 4.13 3.93 0.20 121,015 4.72 4.48 0.24 31,117 11.15 6.17 4.98 17,593 4.83 4.03 0.8 16,791.15 France 644.8 4.13 3.98 0.15 121,015 4.72 4.48 0.24 17,745 6.36 3.79 2.57 17,593 4.83 4.03 0.8 10,114.13 Germany 717.9 4.61 4.38 0.23 128,908 5.02 4.77 0.25 25,612 9.17 5.42 3.75 18,355 5.04 4.20 0.84 11,719.53 China 774.6 5.09 4.63 0.46 61,756 2.41 2.30 0.11 495 0.18 2.13 -1.95 11,359 3.12 2.64 0.48 -3,542.14 Japan 1,222.2 7.89 7.49 0.40 162,534 6.33 6.01 0.32 39,590 14.18 8.39 5.79 18,443 5.06 4.22 0.84 19,297.30 Saudi Arabia 484.6 3.17 3.03 0.14 51,038 1.99 1.91 0.08 2,709 0.97 3.24 -2.27 11,355 3.12 2.64 0.48 -4,569.23 Russia 452.0 2.97 2.83 0.14 102,853 4.01 3.82 0.19 764 0.27 0.33 -0.06 11,355 3.28 2.64 0.64 2,072 Total 7,630.1 49.06 46.43 2.63 1,155,945 51.39 48.76 2.63 169,077 60.56 39.8 20.76 173,459 47.64 39.42 8.22 86,517.771 (or 88,559.191) 6 yearsafteritsimplementation,the votingpowerisnotproducingthe targetresults. Bythe way, JohnMaynard Keyesdidpull that alarmin 1943 “inactual workingvotingpowerisnotlikelytoprove important. If the organizationbeginsvotingabouteverything,itwill notbe longbefore itbreaksdown” (Giannaris1991:920). In addition,Ihave toadmitthat ‘one share one vote”formulausedinthe corporate worldcannotproperlyworkat the World BankGroup because the ‘Bank’isan exceptionwithmembersbeing at the same time shareownersandborrowersornon-borrowersbutitdoesnotchange the rule. At the same token, borrowersrunWorldBank Groupwill neversurviveitdoesnotmatterthat theyare gettingthisvoting
  5. 5. 5 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue powerforfree of charge. There isnot incentive forthemtorecognize thatthe bankneedstomake moneyin orderto advance othermissionsof the banksincludingendingextremepovertyandgrantstothe poorest membersof the WorldBank Group. Once the WorldBank Group will notbe able to advance othermissions of the WorldBank Group includingdemocracy,humanrights,cybersecurityandthe like wealthyandnon- borrowercountrieswill cuttheirdonationandcontributiontothe WorldBankGroup. Period. The price to pay formaintainingthe newdecisionmakingof the bankbasedonthe new ‘voice reform’ ishuge and experience. Itiswhy I believe thereisameritand urgencyto seriously[notHollywoodactingwhile fellow humanbeingsare dying] considerthe introduction,testing(pilotprogram) andimplementationof double majorityvote foralmostall Executive DirectorsBoardmeetings. Imeana combinationof consensusand double majorityvote sothatwe have voice fromDTC. That said,we must reclassifyandcorrectcategoryA and categoryB (China,Saudi Arabiaandotherwill be reclassifiedtoA withthe wealthycountries). Thus, the true reasonfor the implementationof double majorityistocreate a forumfor an open,transparentand meritocraticprocessbasedon Business JudgmentRules(BJR). Double majoritywill entitlevetopowerto bothdonorsand borrowers(DTC) as a coalition. Asa group,donorswill start listeningtowhatborrowerssay duringconsensustalksorface vetovote.At the same time,borrowersasminorityshareholderscannot expecttochange the way the Bank isfundedunlesstheyhave agoodsubstitute. ItiswhyDTC cannot have bothways. Do theyneedmoneyfordevelopment?Ordotheyneedpowerfordevelopment? Also,thereis not secretandsuspicion whyUS choosesthe WorldBankPresident. There isanunwrittenlegal agreement that reservesthe World Bank Presidencytothe U.S.citizenandthe IMF to Europeanand itis basedonBJR. Whenit comesto restrictiononthe candidatestothe Executive Vice Presidencies(IFCandMIGA). It ismore for the bestinterestof diversificationanddonors’satisfaction. The bottomline isthatwhatvoice reform cannot fix double majoritycan. Main Winners and Losers of the Voting Realignment IBRD IDA IFC winners points losers points winners points losers points winners points losers points 1 China 1.64 Japan 1.01 U.K. .55 US 1.47 China 1.28 US 2.57 2 South Korea 0.58 France 0.55 Philippines .41 Japan 1.09 Brazil .62 Germany .58 3 Turkey 0.55 United Kingdom 0.55 Zimbabwe .32 Germany .69 Saudi Arabia .56 France .54 4 Mexico 0.50 United States 0.51 Algeria .26 France .29 Russia .43 UK .54 5 Singapore 0.24 Germany 0.48 Tajikistan .23 India .25 India .34 Italy .36 6 Greece 0.21 Canada 0.35 Moldova .22 Argentina .15 South Korea .40 Canada .35 7 Brazil 0.17 Netherlands 0.29 Uzbekistan .21 Mexico .14 Japan .16 Netherlands .23 8 India 0.13 Belgium 0.23 Azerbaijan .19 Pakistan .1 Kuwait .16 Belgium .21 9 Vietnam 0.12 Switzerland 0.20 Ukraine .18 Ghana .09 Romania .07 Australia .20 10 Spain 0.11 Australia 0.20 Kyrgyz .18 Switzerland .08 Zimbabwe .05 Spain .15 11 United Arab Emirates 0.09 Venezuela 0.16 Timor- Leste .15 Israel .08 Peru .04 Venezuela .11 12 Thailand 0.08 Italy 0.14 Guinea Bissau .15 Canada .07 Albania .02 Sweden .10 13 El Salvador 0.05 Nigeria 0.10 Mozambique .14 Netherlands .07 Bahamas .02 Switzerland .08 14 Costa Rica 0.05 Denmark 0.09 Sri Lanka .14 Ireland .07 Guinea .02 Denmark .07
  6. 6. 6 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue 15 Romania 0.05 South Africa 0.09 Djibouti .14 Ecuador .07 Iraq .02 Austria .07 *I did use 2009 and 2014 data for IDA Atthistime,I am lookingfora partnerto re-make acase against2010 voice reformandvoting power and make a pleafor the testingandadoptionfora combinationof double majorityvote andconsensus. To conclude,thisbottomwill provide toyoua guide forrulestovisitforyour presentationandreportabout incomingvotingreform(letsay,it is2009). GOOD LUCK Corporate and world bank legal issues impacted votingrights realignments Introduction:As youwill realize the World Bank Groupwas foundwith special laws andimmunityof its members’ regulation and law. For instance, inthe corporate world, one share equalsto one vote, that means whenshareowner increases her/his ownership, he/his ownership, he/she is increasing his/her control. At the World BankGroupthings are completelydifferent the more developedcountries are increasingtheir contribution to the World Bank Group, the more theyare losing their control of the WorldBankGroupcalled here votingpower  Right for refusal Technicallythe WBG did exercise its right of 1st refusalbygrabbing(not freelyoffer)shares from developedcountries and shifting themto DTC(developing andTransition Countries). In the corporate world, the issuer companymust fail to exercise its 1st refusalright inorder for somebodyelse to buythe available for sale issuedshares. It must be a free offer. Youmust remember that when the issuer companyrefuses to exercise this right, for market analysts, these sharesare overvaluedbecause it will make sense to hold undervaluedunallocatedshares  Right for FirstOffer In the corporate world, commonshareholders have the right to purchase new shares issued bythe corporation before others have the opportunityto purchase the remaining. As youare goingto findout, the anti-dilutionprotectionwas not available to protect developedcountries shareholders, it is whythey did lose their percentage ofownership during recapitalization byconsequent control votingrights (squeeze out). It was not a free, fair andclear waiver of rights while their contribution were usedto buy shares for others (developing countries)  Derivative suitrights The WorldBank Grouphas its owntype of derivative lawsuit procedure with a difference that most cases of complaints from countries or on behalfof the WBGcanbe onlyheardbythe Boardof Governors or in very rare case bythe International Court of Justice. But inpractice, it is more internal WorldBank Group matter, dealt throughnegotiation, consensus andBoard of Governors votes.  Voting rights A common shareholder has the right to vote onanymatter during the annual meeting andspecial meeting, this is the corporate standard. At the WorldBankGroup, the boardof governors where the voting power always counts, the developed countries votes are becoming lessreliable regardless oftheir contribution because ofthe enrollment of developingcountries withfree ofcharge basic votes and several expensive realignment somethingclose to star shopping spree event.  Termination clause My readingof this agreement is unclear, countriesincludingUS didrefuse to buymore shares, I do not know why, but theywere given to developingcountries. Other struggledcountries, a least one didnot subscribed to the newformula;protest strategyto endthe agreement, I donot know.  Conflictof interest In the corporate setting, you must inform the investing public about allthe conflict of interest. Here, it was reasonable to informmembers that a noncooperating wealthycountries to thisnew voice reform will make themlooknon compassionate to the poor countriesincludingMICbut nothingto with Business Judgment Rules (BJR) andfiduciaryduties. But a true parent andprovider has a responsibilityto control children and dependents.  Risk factors It is inthe best interest of the structurer andissuer to disclose riskfactors of this kind ofcomplex recapitalizations andissuance. One of the risks is the transfer of control from the wealthyandmajority owners to the minorityowners? What trigger thischange of control? Willit result into increase in commitment anddonation(grants) to the poor countries andgraduationof MIC? I do not think so. If wealthycountries object to this trend towardparityof control andfound competitors to the WorldBank, weaker its influence or just decrease their donationandcontributionto the bankas theyare losing controls, what will the Bankdo to preserve the institution?  Market Price The disclosure of the market price is required. Inthis case, it was a pro rata offer andacceptance.  Purpose and Plans Indeed, it was disclosed that the purpose of the reform was to increase control to poor countries called voice reform. Does it increase loans and grants for development? True reason ofthe creation ofthis
  7. 7. 7 ResearchconductedbyArthurMboue institution.  Withdrawal Rights It is disclosedin some of the Article of Agreements  Extension It will make sense to disclose the timeline to complyandifit will be anyextension to dealwith special situations. (for instance, 15 days to payfor the shares)( World BankGroup’s Article ofAgreements relatedto increaseof capitalstock ( General Capital Increase andSelected Capital Increase)  IBRD Article II, Section2(b)-the capital stock maybe increasedwhenthe Bank deems it advisable bya three fourths majorityof totalvoting power  IDA Article III,section(c)-whenanyadditionalsubscription is authorized, eachmember shallbe givenan opportunityto subscribe under suchconditions as shall be reasonablydeterminedbythe association, an amount whichwill enable it to maintainits relative voting power  IFC Article II, section2 (c)(iii)-in anyother case, bya four-fifths majorityof the totalvoting power  MIGA Chapter 1, article 3 (d)-a ‘special majority’ means anaffirmative vote of not less than twothirds of the total voting power representingnot lessthan fifty-five-percent of the subscribedshares of the Agencyis to be allocated. Chapter II, Article 5 c-the council, byspecial majority, mayat anytime increase the capital stockof the Agency World BankGroup’s Article ofAgreements relatedto issuance of sharesof Capital (allocation ofauthorizedshares)  IBRD Article V, section3 (b)-except as otherwise specificallyprovided, all matters before the Bankshall be decided bya majorityof the votes cast.  IFC Article II, section2(c)-the amount of capitalstock at anytime authorized maybe increasedbythe Boardof Governors as follows i. By a majorityof the votes cast, incase suchincrease is necessaryfor the purpose of issuing shares ofcapitalstock oninitial subscriptionbymembers other than original members, provided that the aggregate ofanyincreases authorizedpursuant to thissubparagraph shallnot exceed10,000 shares ii. In anyother case, bya four-fifths majorityof the total votingpower  IDA It is silent  MIGA It is silent World BankGroup’s Article ofAgreement relatedto council vote  IBRD Article V, section3, ii-the share votes of eachmember shall be the number of votes that results from the allocationof one vote for eachshare ofstock’s held  IFC Article IV, section3, the share votes ofeachmember shall be the number of votes that results from the allocationof one vote for eachshare ofstock held  IDA Article VI, section3,b,Except as otherwise speciallyprovided, all matters before the Associationshallbe decided bya majorityof votes cast  MIGA Chapter VI, Article 40, (a) and (b)  (a)-each Governor shall be entitled to cast the votes of the member he represents. Except as otherwise specifiedinthisConvention, decisions of the Council shall be takenbya majorityof the votes cast  (b)-A quorum for anymeeting of the Councilshallbe constitutedbya majorityof the Governors exercising not less thantwo-thirds of the total voting power.

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