Successfully reported this slideshow.
We use your LinkedIn profile and activity data to personalize ads and to show you more relevant ads. You can change your ad preferences anytime.

2016 Irish Ergonomics Society - HFE in oil and gas


Published on

Human Factors Engineering (HFE) in the oil and gas industries.

Published in: Engineering
  • Login to see the comments

  • Be the first to like this

2016 Irish Ergonomics Society - HFE in oil and gas

  1. 1. Tel: (+44) 01492 879813 Mob: (+44) 07984 284642 1 Human Factors Engineering in the Oil & Gas industry Good & Bad practices Andy Brazier
  2. 2. 2 A bit about me Chemical engineer BSc - Loughborough University PhD - Edinburgh University 20 years working as human factors consultant 11 years self-employed Chartered member of the Chartered Institute of Ergonomics and Human Factors (CIEHF) Associate member of Institute of Chemical Engineers (IChemE)
  3. 3. Experience Predominantly oil, gas, chemical, power and steel industries Human factors in process / major accident safety Design assessments Safety critical task analysis Staffing and organisational change Clients include Shell, BP, SSE, Centrica, Tata, Syngenta, Total, Maersk etc. 3
  4. 4. Places I have works – UK & Ireland 4
  5. 5. Places I have worked – further afield 5
  6. 6. Projects I have worked on but not visited 6
  7. 7. 7 Human factors and safety Up to 80% of accident causes can be attributed to human failures All major accidents involve a number of human failures Human factors is concerned with Understanding the causes of human failures Preventing human failures An important part of managing ‘major accident safety’
  8. 8. 8
  9. 9. 1. Annulus cement barrier did not isolate hydrocarbons Deepwater Horizon Explosions & Fire 2. Shoe track barriers did not isolate hydrocarbons 7. Fire and gas system did not prevent ignition 3. Negative- pressure test accepted - integrity not established 4. Influx not recognised until hydrocarbons were in riser 5. Well control response actions failed 6. Diversion of mud resulted in gas venting to rig 8. BOP emergency mode did not seal well Why?
  10. 10. Initially – did not achieve seal around drill pipe Negative pressure test accepted even though integrity had not been established Did not follow agreed test method Mis-interpreted data Crew had preferred method Operational instruction only broad guidance Did not recognise more liquid than expected No prediction available at time Rig crew expected to know how to perform test Previous experience Not aware of specified permit requirements Did not realise constant high pressure indicated a problem Plausible explanation (bladder effect) Why? Why? Why? Why? Why? Why? Why?
  11. 11. Crew busy with other activities Influx not recognised until hydrocarbon was present in riser Instructions required constant monitoring - did not specify how Crew not monitoring well Other activities interacting with pits Pits not set-up for combined activities Mud pit levels not available to monitor Why? Why?Why?
  12. 12. Well control response actions failed to regain control of the well Slow to detect the problem Crew not properly prepared in required actions Protocols did not cover the scenario Crew had not been trained to deal with the event Why? Why?
  13. 13. Human Factors Engineering (HFE) Understanding interactions between people and systems. Ensure systems are designed in a way that: Optimises the human contribution to production Minimises risks to health, personal or process safety and environmental performance. An important contribution to the quality, safety and fitness for purpose of equipment and facilities used in the oil & gas industry. 14
  14. 14. Applying HFE Eliminate, reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences of human error Improve human efficiency and productivity, thereby enhancing operational performance Improve user acceptance of new facilities 15
  15. 15. Focus effort Where people are expected to act as ‘risk barriers’ Prevent or reduce the likelihood of incidents Avoid escalation if an incident does occur. Human activities required to support or maintain physical and technological barriers Fabric of the ‘pressure envelope’ Pressure relief valves Safety instrument systems (trips). 16
  16. 16. Bow Tie 17 Vessel Failure Equip. failure Unignited release Fire Loss of containment Maintenance Operation Autoresponse Operator response Construction Design Detection
  17. 17. Vinyl Chloride Monomer Incident 18
  18. 18. HFE in Projects Screening – identify critical elements of the project Design analysis – systematic methods applied to identify specific design requirements Design validation – ensure HFE requirements have been achieved Support to start-up – additional actions to address HFE that are not directly design related. 19
  19. 19. HFE Screening Criteria Complexity of the human activities (particularly operations and maintenance) Hazards to people, environment and asset Frequency of human interaction Novelty of the item Known issues based on past experience In practice, most elements are HFE critical Screening is a way of identifying the ‘hot spots’ 20
  20. 20. Project philosophies Strategy for HFE integration Accessibility philosophy Anthropometric standard Staffing philosophy Automation philosophy Human machine interfaces (HMI) standards Local gauges Control system graphics and alarms Signs & labels 21
  21. 21. HFE Design Analysis Critical task analysis Accessibility requirements analysis Valves Instrumentation Local controls Staffing assessment 22
  22. 22. HFE design validation 3D model review Buildings (control rooms) evaluation Alarm review and rationalisation Graphics review Workload assessment 23
  23. 23. Support to start-up Construction requirements Inspection and audit Procedures Training and competence Organisation and management of change 24
  24. 24. OGP 454 Oil & Gas Producers Associate Human factors engineering in projects 25
  25. 25. Challenges Immature discipline – good practices not identified or agreed Lack of knowledge amongst operator companies and design contractors Not enough specialists with the right background in process / major accident safety Too little too late in many projects – tick box. 26
  26. 26. Examples 27
  27. 27. Valve access in design 28
  28. 28. Valve access in practice 29
  29. 29. Non-routine access 30
  30. 30. Cramped access 31
  31. 31. Access for maintenance 32
  32. 32. Unsafe access 33
  33. 33. Looks good? 34
  34. 34. Vessel internals – 190 cartridges 35
  35. 35. Usability 36
  36. 36. Understanding the task 37
  37. 37. Duplication 38
  38. 38. Multiplication 39
  39. 39. Labelling solution with design issues 40
  40. 40. Good labelling 41
  41. 41. Road route to avoid reversing 42
  42. 42. Control room looks good on paper 43
  43. 43. A ‘standard’ layout 44
  44. 44. A better layout? 45
  45. 45. Graphics – too crowded 46
  46. 46. Graphics - confusing 47
  47. 47. Graphics - pointless 48
  48. 48. Process examples 49
  49. 49. Compressor start-up Complicated equipment Normally started with an automated sequence Operators want the option to start manually 50
  50. 50. Coalescer priming Operators assumed the vessel could be left liquid full when in standby mode HFE assessment with vendor highlighted that this would damage internal components 51
  51. 51. Default use of Pressure Safety Valves Protecting against high pressure Valves have to be removed for calibration annually Not a problem for designers but can be for operators 52
  52. 52. Default use of wellhead with cellar Creates a confined space Liable to fill with sand or snow Not a problem for designers but can be for operators 53
  53. 53. Source of flush water – preparing for maintenance Water not always available May not be suitable quality (materials) Designers ‘assume’ water is always available 54
  54. 54. Automatic annulus management Technology exists – desire to use it No issues when all is OK What does the operator do when things are going wrong? 55
  55. 55. Automatic filter changeover Avoids part of a task for the operator How do they know it has happened? 56
  56. 56. Doing it better Standards and guidelines Limited value Not understood by designers Too much on approach without clear methods Task analysis Identify critical tasks Focus on design solutions first Procedures and training for the pre-operations preparations. 57
  57. 57. Anthropometrics Can be critical, but usually a low priority 58
  58. 58. Understanding human perception helps us design for people 59 Middle of the screen At the edge BigSmall Colourful Contrast Flashing Loud Quiet Italics – Bold - Underline RightLeft More – Noticeable - Less
  59. 59. Focus on tasks and methods This is the main difference that an HFE can make to a project Looking at the same design with a different perspective. 60
  60. 60. Key messages Start as early as you can Focus effort where greatest benefit can be achieved Process / major accident risk Frequency and nature of interaction End user involvement The project has to do the HFE. 61