Critical Nuclear Choices For the Second Obama Administration


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Critical Nuclear Choices For the Second Obama Administration

  1. 1. CRITICAL  NUCLEAR  CHOICES  FOR  THE   SECOND  OBAMA  ADMINISTRATION   Five  Key  Issues  the  United  States  Must   Face  in  Nuclear  Security  
  2. 2. In  Brief:     • Nuclear  threats  did  not  end  with  the  Cold  War.  Over  the  next  four  years,  the  Obama   administra%on  will  face  cri%cal  choices  on  nuclear  security  challenges.   • The  policies  the  administra%on  pursues  on  Iran,  U.S.  nuclear  strategy,  and  other  issues   will  have  significant  consequences  for  U.S.  na%onal  security.     • PuHng  aside  par%san  rhetoric  and  working  with  both  sides  of  the  aisle  will  be  key  to   developing  policies  that  effec%vely  address  these  cri%cal  nuclear  threats.     Long-­‐Term  Challenges  Remain  in  Five  Key  Areas:   •  PrevenDng  a  Nuclear  Iran   •  North  Korea  –  IsolaDon  or  Engagement?   •  Missile  Defense  and  Russia   •  Redefining  a  Partnership  with  Pakistan   •  The  U.S.  Nuclear  Deterrent       Cri%cal  Nuclear  Choices:     Obama’s  Second  Term    
  3. 3.  PrevenDng  a     The  State  of  Play:  Iran’s  Nuclear  Program   •  U.S.  intelligence  assesses  that  Iran  has  not  yet  made  Nuclear  Iran   •  the  decision  to  pursue  a  nuclear  weapon.   However,  concerns  about  Iran’s  nuclear  program     remain,  par%cularly  over  Iran’s  con%nued  uranium   enrichment  and  past  nuclear  research  at  a   controversial  military  facility.   •  Iran  s%ll  refuses  to  address  ongoing  internaDonal   concerns  about  its  past  and  current  nuclear  work.     SancDons  and  NegoDaDons   •  SancDons  imposed  by  the  internaDonal  community   have  had  an  effect  on  Iran’s  economy.   •  While  a  long-­‐term  deal  has  proved  elusive,  experts  and   officials  agree  that  there  is  sDll  Dme  to  negoDate  an   agreement  on  Iran’s  nuclear  program,  perhaps  star%ng   with  interim  confidence-­‐building  measures.   Ayatollah     •  Another  round  of  talks  between  Iran  and  the  P5+1  is   Ali  Khamenei,   expected  soon.   Supreme  Leader   of  Iran   While  the  military  op;on  should  remain  on   the  table,  at  this  stage  the  diploma9c   route  should  be  pursued.    
  4. 4. North  Korea’s  Nuclear  Program:    Engaging  North  Korea   A  NaDonal  Security  Challenge     •  North  Korea  conducted  nuclear  tests  in  2006  and   2009  and  may  have  enough  fissile  material  for   nine  warheads,  although  North  Korea  likely  lacks   the  technology  to  deploy  a  warhead  on  a  missile.     •  A  third  nuclear  test,  which  would  increase  North   Korea’s  certainty  in  its  nuclear  technology,   remains  a  possibility.     •  The  North  Korean  nuclear  challenge  requires  a   carefully  calibrated  approach.     •  The  U.S.  should  maintain  Northern   denuclearizaDon  as  the  ulDmate  goal  while   consistently  working  toward  accomplishing  more   modest  auxiliary  goals  such  as  regional  economic   coopera%on  and  academic  interac%on.   Modest  confidence  building  measures   are  necessary  to  establish  a  framework   for  engagement.    
  5. 5. Missile  Defense   In  Search  of  a  Breakthrough     AND  Russia   •  U.S.-­‐Russia  rela%ons  have  taken  a  downward  turn,   preven%ng  progress  on  key  nuclear  security  issues.       •  CooperaDon  on  missile  defense  could  be  the  key  to   breaking  through  the  U.S.-­‐Russia  stalemate.   •  The  U.S.  is  planning  to  deploy  missile  defense  systems   in  Europe  in  a  four  phases,  each  increasingly  capable.     •  Phase  IV,  the  most  advanced,  is  of  par%cular  concern   to  Russia,  which  insists  that  the  U.S.  enter  into  a  legal   guarantees  that  the  missile  defense  shield  is  not   directed  at  Russia.    A  Standard  Missile  3  Block  IB  Interceptor   •  The  U.S.  consistently  maintains  that  the  missile   defense  shield  is  directed  at  the  Iranian  and  North     Korean  missile  threats,  not  Russia.     •  Legal  guarantees,  which  could  put  U.S.  na%onal   security  interests  at  risk,  are  not  acceptable  for  the   U.S.  But  a  poliDcal  agreement  may  be  possible.     A  poli?cal  agreement  for  U.S.-­‐Russia   missile  defense  coopera?on  could  pave   the  way  for  coopera;on  on  other  An  SM-­‐3  interceptor  launched  from  an   important  security  issues.    Aegis-­‐class  ballis;c  missile  defense  ship  
  6. 6. Pakistan’s  Nuclear  Program  Engaging  Pakistan   •  One  of  the  fastest  growing  nuclear  arsenals,  Pakistan   is  es%mated  to  have  90  to  110  warheads:   •  The  threat  from  unauthorized  use  of  a  nuclear   weapon  or  nuclear  prolifera%on  is  great     –  Militants  have  successfully  a^acked  suspected   Pakistani  nuclear  facili%es   –  Tensions  with  India  make  the  threat  of  nuclear   escala%on  unacceptable     Points  of  Emphasis   •  Encourage  Pakistan  to  adopt  the  Addi%onal   Protocol    and  produce  a  formal  nuclear  strategy,   including  a  no-­‐first-­‐use  policy  toward  all  states   •  Encourage  bilateral  trade  with  India  and   confidence  building  measures   U.S.  policy  must  be  explicit  enough  to  establish   clear  goals,  func?onal  enough  to  allocate   necessary  resources,  and  dynamic  enough  to   navigate  the  conflic?ng  regional  forces.    
  7. 7. 21st  Century  Security  Challenges    U.S.  Nuclear  Strategy   •  A_er  the  Cold  War,  the  U.S.  faces  very  different   security  challenges,  including  climate  change  and     •  cyberwar.     The  U.S.  nuclear  arsenal  of  over  5,000  warheads  is   excessive  and  ineffecDve  in  addressing  21st  century   security  threats.     An  Outdated,  Expensive  Nuclear  Strategy   •  The  U.S.  is  on  track  to  spend  about  $640  billion  on   nuclear  weapons  and  related  programs  over  the  next   ten  years.   •  Unnecessary  nuclear  programs  divert  resources  from   more  important  defense  capabiliDes.     •  Elimina%ng  excess  nuclear  programs  will  save  billions   that  can  be  invested  in  necessary  defense  capabili%es.     The  U.S.  is  planning  to  spend  over  $10  billion  to   refurbish  the  B61  nuclear  bomb  (pictured).  About     200   B61s   are   deployed   in   Europe   today   –   more   than  20  years  aQer  the  end  of  the  Cold  War.         UpdaDng  our  nuclear  strategy  will   Credit:  Kelly  Michals,  Flickr     strengthen  U.S.  naDonal  security.      
  8. 8. FURTHER  READING     From  the  American  Security  Project     CriDcal  Nuclear  Choices  for  the  Next  AdministraDon    October  2012.  h^p://   Significant  Iranian  SancDons  Since  1995      March  2012.  h^p://   Iran  Facts  and  Figures    March  2012.  h^p://   North  Korea’s  Nuclear  Program    August  2012.  h^p://   U.S.  Missile  Defense  and  European  Security    June  2012.  h^p://   Why  the  U.S.  Cannot  Ignore  Pakistan    September  2012.  h^p://   A  New  Approach  to  Nuclear  Weapons   LtGen.  Dirk  Jameson,  ASP  Consensus  member    April  2012,  h^p://     Other  Resources   Weighing  the  Benefits  and  Costs  of  Military  AcDon  Against  Iran      The  Iran  Project,  September  2012.  h^p://  Made  by  Mary  Kaszynski  and  Mitchell  Freddura     What  Nuclear  Weapons  Cost  Us  (Working  Paper)    Ploughshares  Fund,  September  2012.  h^p://