Who Killed The Virtual Case File; Case Analysis


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Presented as a partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Management of information system class, summer 2010

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Who Killed The Virtual Case File; Case Analysis

  1. 1. Who Killed the Virtual Case File?Case analysis By:Ahmed CouchaAhmed MadianKamel El-SayedMohamed ShoushaMOIS , Summer 2010
  2. 2. MissionPrioritiesEmployeesBudget
  3. 3. Gasoline anddiesel taxes case .11/9 attacks.
  4. 4. Local and overseas Fieldoffices .Long reporting chain .Hands in many activitiesusing many forms .Shift to paperless work
  5. 5. HQ in J. Edgar Hoover building in Washington D.C.23 divisions (counter intelligence, criminal investigations…)Each division had its own IT budget resulting in 40 – 50 differentDB12,400 agents and 56 field offices
  6. 6. 51 legal attache offices across the globeField agent – Supervisor – Assistant specialagent – Special agentTons of paper work100s of standard forms (FD-209, FD-302, FD-472…)Entry on ACS (Automated Case Support)
  7. 7. Integrate the 5 data base The Trilogy management program systems used • Purchasing modern desktop computers • Developing secureSep 2000 high-performanceCongress WAN and LAN networks,approved • Modernizing the379.8M$ for 3 FBIs suite ofyears to upgrade investigativethe FBI IT software applications VCF)
  8. 8. Contract went to DynCorp (HW & NW) & SAIC (SW) Target completion by Mid 200411 Sep attack & the incompetence of the FBI systemLack of FBI blueprint (enterprise HW/SW investment decisions guidance) They had to characterize all their processes & needs to SAIC
  9. 9. JAD sessions (Joint Application Development) JAD sessions for 6 months every 2 weeksFollowed by a 2 week feedback cycle with no breaks.Jan 2002 extra 78M$ were approved to accelerate triology The flash cutover
  10. 10. SAIC broke its team into 8 subs to accelerate theprocessProblems raised as costs escalated & schedules slipping(lesson learnt: you can get 2 of 3 faster, cheaper, better)SAIC wanted help in its security team
  11. 11. Patton criticized the 800 pages ofrequirements as being too muchdetailed instead of being high levelMessage posting on the web(InfoSec news) led to thedeparture of PattonDecember 2002, an extra 137.9M$were approved bringing up thecost to 581M$
  12. 12.  Dec 2003 VCF was delivered to FBI FBI rejected the delivery of the VCF(17 functional deficiencies- ranging from big to small) SAIC was arguing that some are changes requirements Arbitrator was called in Both parties are responsible stating 59 issues:  19 changes problems  40 SAIC errors
  13. 13. “ we have requirements that are not in the final product, yet we have the capabilities in the final product that we don’t have requirements for” AZMI FBI CIO
  14. 14. FBI has no strong blueprint“With nodetaileddescription ofthe FBIsprocesses andIT infrastructureas a guidelineWe began tofeel our way inthe dark” Larry Depew
  15. 15. 400 from December 2002 to December 2003Once they saw the product of the code we wrote,then they would say, Oh, weve got to change this.That isnt what I meant," said SAICs Reynolds.SAIC engineers were like a construction crew workingfrom a set of constantly changing blueprints.
  16. 16. Robert J. Chiaradio An accountant bytraining and a former special agentLarry Depew a special agent
  17. 17. Louis J. Freeh directorof FBI till 2001Robert S. Muller III whogeared the project up
  18. 18. Robert J. In May 2002, Bob Dies, the CIO whoChiaradio had launched Trilogy,Left left the bureau Replaced by W. Mark Tanner, held the position of acting CIO Wilson Lowery for just three months, Jr. for a year until July 2002. Followed by Turning over his duties Darwin John to Darwin John.
  19. 19. Requirements were continually added violating thefirst rule of software planning: keep it simple. "There was no discipline to say enough is enough," Azmi FBI GIO.
  20. 20. "They were trying to design the system layout and thenthe whole application logic before they had actuallyeven figured out what they wanted the system to do.“ Patton Mathew "The culture within the FBI was, Were going to tell you how to do it.“ Sherry Higgins
  21. 21. Patton also claimed that SAIC wasdetermined to write much of the VCFfrom scratch."Every time youwrite a line of code,you introduce bugs,"noted Patton.
  22. 22. which made it difficultto adopt the systemuntil it was perfected.
  23. 23. The eight teams, working in parallel would later provetoo difficult for SAIC to combine into a single system.The company had settled on a spiral developmentmethodology,• SAIC programmers would write and compile a block of code than show it to Depews agents. The programmers tried to incorporate the suggested changes• SAIC engineers were like a construction crew working from a set of constantly changing blueprints.
  24. 24. Abandoned the flash cut over ideaContracted Bearingpoint to construct enterprisearchitecture to guide the development of FBI’s ITsystemsTest-drive a pilot version of VCFs electronic workflow(IOC);• see how people reacted to the graphical user interface;• create a way to translate the output from the VCF forms, into the ACS system;• check out network performance;• and develop a training program.
  25. 25. "We harvested some ofthe good work from the past.And now were in a good position to move on."
  26. 26. Sentinel, a four-phase, four-year projectPlanned to be up and runningin 2009
  27. 27. The contract was awarded in 2006 it was going tocost a total $425 million and take six years to be fullcomplete and rolled out.It is now at $451 million and is expected to rise to atleast $481 million and slip possibly several months ifnot longer.On March 2010 FBI Director decided to suspend workon Sentinel to correct some "minor" technical issuesand make some design changes
  28. 28. Organizing is what you do beforeyou do something, so that whenyou do it, it is not all mixed up