1.
(LEAKED) MOBILE APPLICATION
DATA PRIVACY
YURY CHEMERKIN
SECURITY EXPERT RESEARCHER

2.
[ AGENDA ]
• Intro
• Similar public researchers
• Related/Previous work
• Current results
• Final thoughts

3.
UNTRUSTED PLACES
• Untrusted chargeable places.
• When you connect your device to them you will see a
notification you plugged to PC/Mac
• Untrusted network places.
• When you connect your device to them
• You will see nothing
• You will see a question about untrusted certificate. You
accept or decline it
• Someone make you to install trusted certificate

4.
UNTRUSTED PLACES

5.
PROBLEM. WHAT/WHO MAKES US
INSECURE?
• Are we revealing everything about ourselves
everywhere?
• Perhaps
• Don’t we know anything about security and
privacy?
• Perhaps
• Aren’t app developers responsible for security
fails?
• Who said they’re not? They are!
• They prefer not to tell about it only

6.
https://www.itr.co.uk/mobile
-app/
ITR RESEARCH RESULTS.
WHY CONSUMER UNINSTALLED MOBILE
APPS

7.
HOW MUCH DOES YOUR SECURITY
COST?
• Non-Special ‘Home’ Software
• Macroplant Software - $35-70 (home), $200-2500 (enterprise).
• XK72 Software - $50 per license or $400-700 per bundle
• PortSwigger - $300 per year
• … and so on
• Also, cracked edition is available (no difference pirate or buy )
• Special ‘Forensics’ Software
• Elcomsoft Breakers - $80 (home, you have to know your password),
$200 (pro – you don’t have to know it), $800 – bundle
• Elcomsoft Bundles - $1 500 – 2 500
• Oxygen Software – more expensive in twice at least
• … and so on
• Also, cracked edition is available for some old editions (better buy
new edition)

8.
OXYGEN FORENSIC® DETECTIVE
• Oxygen Forensic® Detective introduces offline maps and
new physical approach for Samsung Android devices!
• The updated version offers a new physical method for
Samsung Android OS devices via customer forensic
recovery. This innovative approach allows to bypass
screen lock and extract a full physical image of
supported Samsung devices.
• This innovative approach = root, steal data, deroot
• http://www.oxygen-
forensic.com/en/events/news/666-oxygen-forensic-
detective-introduces-offline-maps-and-new-physical-
approach-for-samsung-android-devices

9.
FACTS ABOUT APP INSECURITY
• At first glance, the VK Music app only displayed legitimate
functionality – it played audio files uploaded to the social
network. But further study showed that it also contained
malicious code designed to steal VKontakte user accounts and
promote certain groups on the social network.
• https://securelist.com/blog/incidents/72458/stealing-to-the-
sound-of-music/
• “In Russia will be kept of phone numbers, logins and passwords
of users. Messages we do not store, they are on the devices of
users,” Moscow representative of the company Viber said.
According to the company’s lawyers, messengers also fall under
the law which requires to store personal data of Russians on
servers located on the territory of the country.

10.
FACTS ABOUT APP INSECURITY
• InstaAgent, an app that connects to Instagram and promises to
track the people that have visited a user's Instagram account,
appears to be storing the usernames and passwords of Instagram
users, sending them to a suspicious remote server.
• An app developer from Peppersoft downloaded InstaAgent -- full
name "Who Viewed Your Profile - InstaAgent" -- and discovered
it's reading Instagram account usernames and passwords,
sending them via clear text to a remote server -
instagram.zunamedia.com.
• http://www.macrumors.com/2015/11/10/malicious-instaagent-
instagram-app/

11.
FACTS ABOUT APP INSECURITY
• Researchers find data leaks in Instagram, Grindr, OoVoo and more. The
problems include storing images and videos in unencrypted form on Web
sites, storing chat logs in plaintext on the device, sending passwords in
plaintext…
• http://www.cnet.com/news/researchers-find-data-leaks-in-instagram-
grindr-oovoo-and-more
• Another Popular Android Application, Another Leak. We have found that
another popular Google play app, “Camera360 Ultimate,” not only
enhances the users’ photos but also inadvertently leaks sensitive data,
which gives malicious parties unauthorized access to users’ Camera360
Cloud accounts and photos.
• https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-
research/2015/08/another_popular_andr.html

12.
WHAT COMPANIES THINK
ABOUT
‘QUOTES’ AND INSECURITY
• Instagram said it's moving to encrypted communications for its
images by moving to HTTPS, the secure version of the standard used
to transfer Web data over the Internet.
• They did it but it’s still affected to MITM attacks
• "Message data is stored in an unencrypted format because the
operating systems (both iOS and Android) provide data isolation that
prevents apps from having their storage read by other apps. This is
considered standard in the industry, and is completely safe," the Kik
said.
• Standard… it’s safe… just ROFL… and did you know there is way to
root device without owner knowledge?

13.
WHAT COMPANIES THINK
ABOUT
‘QUOTES’ AND INSECURITY
• SECURITY is core at 4Talk. Starting from secure phone number
registration, to interaction only with confirmed personal contacts,
to fully managing your account from any device you use.
• Y2014 wasn’t protected at all
• Y2015: Protected for Windows in-rest & transit, prevent MITM
• Y2015-2016: Protected for Android in-transit only, prevent MITM
• This app hasn’t PROXY FEATURE (!) So fun protection
• Y2015: Not protected at all for Mac
• Y2016: Network is protected (thanks Apple) for Mac
• Y2015-2016: Not protected for iOS and Mac OS at all
• Data Leakage is data that becomes available when you perform
typical activities. Instead, Vulnerability is a weakness of program.
Thus, Vulnerability ≠ Data Leakage, because no weakness in normal
activities…
• Average security support answer in regards of fail. Just spend small
amount of money ($$) to steal the user data with fake networks in

14.
WHAT COMPANIES THINK
ABOUT
‘QUOTES’ AND INSECURITY
• In its defense, AgileBits insisted that AgileKeychain was still
secure, and noted that the format dates back to 2008 when
the company was concerned about speed and battery drain
problems caused by encryption.
• http://appleinsider.com/articles/15/10/20/1password-to-
change-file-formats-after-key-file-found-to-contain-
unencrypted-data
• If you browse to your .agilekeychain “file” on disk, you find
that it is actually a directory. Inside this directory is a file
named “1Password.html”.

15.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
• I did many researches on mobile and app security.
• First of them were about something average between OS and Apps
– BlackBerry, Android. It was published and present around the
world
• 2013-2015 Researches
• Cross OS apps - protection concepts, OS specifics per concept,
outlines & remediation, EMM specifics
• “We know Twitter & Dropbox are better secured than bank apps!”
• http://www.slideshare.net/EC-Council/hh-yury-chemerkin
• http://defcamp.ro/dc14/Yury_Chemerkin.pdf
• In 2014 presented results cover ~700 apps
• Also in 2015
• http://def.camp/wp-
content/uploads/dc2015/Chemerkin_Yury_DefCamp_2015.pdf
• In 2015 presented results cover ~700 apps
• 2016 Current results: most interested cases (all up-to-dated prior

16.
SPECIAL PART FOR DEFCAMP
2015.
LAST MINUTE RESEARCH
• Everyone got a booklet-guide. Here was a short
info about trusted taxi companies.
• Meridian – no in-app payment features, store &
transmitting everything in plaintext
• Account, Local’n’Maps, and Device Information
• SpeedTaxi – no in-app payment features, store &
transmitting everything in plaintext. Some issues with a
server
• Account, Local’n’Maps, Device and Message Information
• Cobalcescu – no in-app payment features, store &
transmitting everything in plaintext. Some issues with a
server
• Account and Travel Information

17.
PRETTY INTERESTING SECURITY AND
PRIVACY FAILS
HOW TO FAIL WITH HTTPS
• Be any app like [ AirCanada ] and send information about device and
environment
• Be news/social app like [ Anews/Flipboard ] and send everything in
plaintext via http
• Be storage app like [ Asus WebStorage ] and send credentials in
plaintext
• (also fail with old hash algorithm, see next slides)
• Be travel app like [ AviaSales / Momondo], send everything in plaintext
and rely on 3rd party server MITM protection
• Be storage app like [ Box ], prevent MITM but fail and reveal credentials
to MITM tool
• Be taxi app like [ Gett / MaximTaxi ] and send everything in plaintext,
also fail with MITM protect of my credit card

18.
UNTRUSTED PLACES.
KINVEY IS A BACKEND FOR STORING
FILES & USER ACCOUNTS

19.
UNTRUSTED PLACES. KINVEY.
ADMIN IS LOGGING IN TO KINVEY
CONSOLE

20.
UNTRUSTED PLACES. KINVEY.
APP IS LOGGING IN &
DOWNLOADING FILES

21.
PROTECTION LEVELS.
• Some of 10 levels we’re using (0…9)
• 0 – plaintext (stored as and with 777 access or
transferred as is)
• 2 – weak (shared w/o dev.perm, MITM w/o root-fake
cert)
• 4 – medium (shared w dev.perm, MITM w root-fake cert)
• 5 – cached data
• 6 – protected (looks good but can be patched)
• 7 – strong protected (can’t be patched or bypassed or at
least incredible hard)

22.
APP INSECURITY. DISCLAIMER
• Everything presented further contains information for
educational purposes and only with using only your data &
licenses. Moreover, to each app presented here was not
applied any techniques and actions such as:
• modifying, decompiling, disassembling, decrypting and other
actions with the object code of any Program, aimed at obtaining
source codes of any Program
• Also, as known,
• the User may make a modification of the Software solely for his or
hers own use and reverse engineering for debugging such
modifications.
• All app results are up-to-date and test on up-to-date OS
(iOS 9, Android 5).
• Important note. In fact, no app has been changed at all and if
you’re on old Android OS < 5 or iOS < 9 than your data can be
stolen without or with fake root certificate depend on case,

23.
WE GUARANTEE THE
CONFIDENTIALITY OF YOUR
DATA
• Confidentiality - In information
security, confidentiality "is the
property, that information is not
made available or disclosed to
unauthorized individuals, entities, or
processes" (Excerpt ISO27000).
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_security#C
onfidentiality

24.
WE GUARANTEE THE
CONFIDENTIALITY OF YOUR
DATA

25.
HOTELS.RU
• Locally stored data [Android:
Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong
Protected]
• Token, Cached Data, Screenshot (iOS
only)
• Network data [Android: Plaintext], [iOS:
Medium]
• Geo Location, Token, Passwords, IDs,
Room Details, Address
• Reveal
2013 2014 2015 2016
Plaintext Plaintext Plaintext
Android:
Plaintext
iOS - Medium

26.
HOTELS.COM
• Locally stored data [Android:
Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong
Protected]
• Cached data
• Network data [Android: Medium], [iOS:
Medium]
• Geo Location, Device Data, Room Details
2013 2014 2015 2016
N/A N/A Medium Medium

27.
HOTELS.COM. EULA/PRIVACY
• How we protect your information
• We want you to feel confident about using this website and our
Apps to make travel arrangements, and we are committed to
protecting the information we collect. While no website or App can
guarantee security, we have implemented appropriate
administrative, technical, and physical security procedures to help
protect the personal information you provide to us. For example,
only authorized employees are permitted to access personal
information, and they may only do so for permitted business
functions. In addition, we use encryption when transmitting your
sensitive personal information between your system and ours, and
we employ firewalls and intrusion detection systems to help
prevent unauthorized persons from gaining access to your
information.
• https://ru.hotels.com/customer_care/privacy.html#protect

28.
AEROEXPRESS
• Locally stored data [Android: Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong Protected]
• Tickets + QR code, Email, Phone, Password, Screenshot of any app windows (iOS
only)
• Network data [Weak]
• Email, Phone, Password, Unique UserID, Last Login Time, email & phone
confirmed, DeviceID,
• OrderID, Base64(hash of Order), Order URL, Order date, Trip date, cost of order,
• TicketID, Route Info, ticket GUID, token, ticket QR Code
• Bank Card info (number, cvv, name, expiration), tokens, *aeroexpress.ru, *ruru,
*bank (AlfaBank)
• According to release notes & PCI DSS, App doesn’t store bank card info
(payment data). You can’t input that data type manually. However,
• iOS: Doesn’t store data after successful payment
• Android: Stores data after successful payment
• Both: Continue stores data after update - if previous version wasn’t removed and
data not wiped
2013 2014 2015 2016
Weak Weak Weak
Weak, Expect to
remove local card
info but fail

29.
AEROEXPRESS. EULA/PRIVACY
• Certified by the PCI DSS on a yearly basis. The certificate confirms the site's
compliance with the standards of the following international payment
systems: Visa/MasterCard, American Express, JCB, and Discover.
• To obtain the certificate, all the systems that receive, transmit, and encrypt
card information together with the overall structure of the company must
meet the minimum of 288 requirements stated in the PCI SAQ (Self-
Assessment Questionnaire D and Attestation of Compliance).
• The Thawte 128-bit SSL Certificate is a technology of data encryption. The
confidential information about your card number, CVV2 code, and other
details are submitted to our site through encryption. To exchange
information, a standard SSL-encryption is applied; the length of the key is
128 bit. Encrypted, it is further redirected to the bank's processing center
through the payment gateway.
• https://aeroexpress.tickets.ru/en/content/safety_payments.html

30.
AEROEXPRESS.
PASSES PCI DSS CERTIFICATION
• Aeroexpress has passed its PCI DSS certification. Now it is even safer for
passengers to pay for online services provided by this express carrier.
• In early February, Aeroexpress passed its PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry
Data Security Standard) certification, which is aimed at ensuring the secure
processing, storage and transfer of data about Visa and MasterCard
holders. Given the PCI DSS certified security level, Aeroexpress passengers
can pay for tickets via the website or the company’s mobile app using bank
cards and can be confident that their personal data and funds are safely
secured. PCI DSS provides for a comprehensive approach that ensures
information security and unites the payment system programmes of VISA
Account Information Security (AIS), Visa Cardholder Information Security
Program (CISP), and MasterCard Site Data Protection. We would like to
remind you that you can receive a discount of RUB 50 and RUB 100 when
purchasing Standard and Return tickets on the website or via the
company’s mobile app.

31.
PCI DSS. DATE: MARCH 2015
•6.2 Penetration Test Case
Study
….
•Main vulnerabilities ….
• Man in the middle
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/Penetr
ation_Testing_Guidance_March_2015.pdf

32.
PLATIUS
• Locally stored data [Android:
Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong Protected]
• Same like network data
• Network data [Android: Weak], [iOS: Medium]
• Email, Birthday, Full Name, Phone, Gender,
Activation code,
• Bank Card info (number, cvv, name, expiration),
tokens, *platius, *ruru, *bank (Sberbank)
2013 2014 2015 2016
Android - Weak
iOS - Weak
Android - Weak
iOS - Weak
Android - Weak
iOS - Weak
Android - No changes
iOS - Medium

33.
PLATIUS. EULA/PRIVACY
• 6.4 The administration doesn't guarantee
ensuring confidentiality of information and
data on the Participant and doesn't bear any
responsibility as transfer of the specified data
is carried out by means of open
communication channels for disclosure of such
information.
• https://platius.ru/en-
GB/Information/Agreement

34.
ROCKETBANK
• Locally stored data [Android: Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong
Protected]
• Email, Full Name, Phone, bank code word, Geo Location
• Network data [Android: Weak], [iOS: Medium]
• Email, Full Name, Phone, Activation code, bank code word,
• Passport : Details Data (All Info)
• Full Name, Full Address, Document ID, Birthday, Owner Image
• https://rocketbank.ru/api/v5/emails/..../form
• tariff": "i-am-vip-bitch-9-percent"
• Bitch, please © How I met your mother
2013 2014 2015 2016
Weak Weak Weak
Android - Weak
iOS - Medium

35.
ROCKETBANK. EULA/PRIVACY
• Клиент соглашается, что использование Аутентификационных данных, в том числе
сгенерированных Исполнителем уникальных кодов, направляемых Клиенту на контактный
номер телефона, является надлежащей и достаточной Идентификацией/
Аутентификацией Клиента, в целях совершения операций через Удаленные каналы
обслуживания.
• Unique codes and phone number are 2 params are enough
to perform authenticated actions over internet
• Исполнитель не несет рисков, связанных с неправомерным использованием третьими
лицами информации, указанной в п. I.19 Условий (above)
• Rocketbank Team doesn’t give a shit about risks
• Клиент принимает на себя риски, связанные с возможным нарушением
конфиденциальности, возникающие вследствие использования системы телефонной связи
и сети Интернет.
• The client is only responsible for everything happened
with him and his data over internet. Team is again doesn’t
give a shit about any kind of protection
• https://rocketbank.ru/rules

36.
RBK MONEY
• Locally stored data [Android:
Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong
Protected]
• Credentials…
• Network data [Android: Medium], [iOS:
Medium]
• Credentials…
2013 2014 2015 2016
Medium Medium Medium Medium

37.
RBK MONEY. EULA/PRIVACY
• This is a question of common sense and caution. The more
careful you are the less chance to be deceived by scammers
and other fraudsters. The main protection from them is
your unique password. To ensure security make password
not shorter than 8 symbols (use combination of random
letters and numbers) Don’t enter it anywhere except for the
RBK Money website and do not reveal it to other people.
Use modern antivirus programs where possible.
• Information about your card is stored, encrypted and
shown only to you. The payment is considered processed
after card activation. RBK Money reserves the right to make
additional payment confirmation by phone.
• http://www.rbkmoney.com/en/support#safety
• http://www.rbkmoney.com/en/support#cards

38.
DELIVERY CLUB
• Locally stored data [Android:
Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong
Protected]
• Token, address, geo location, password, ID,
full name, phone, short card info
• Network data [Android: Medium], [iOS:
Medium]
• Token, secret, deviceID, Full Name, phone,
email, password, Card Info (short, w/o cvv),
address, geo location, Loyalty Account Info
2013 2014 2015 2016
Plaintext/ Medium
(card)
Plaintext/ Medium
(card)
Plaintext/ Medium
(card)
Medium

39.
DELIVERY CLUB. EULA/PRIVACY
• We implement a variety of security measures to maintain the
safety of your personal information when you place an order
• We offer the use of a secure server. All supplied sensitive/credit
information is transmitted via Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
technology and then encrypted into our Payment gateway
providers database only to be accessible by those authorized with
special access rights to such systems, and are required to keep
the information confidential.
• After a transaction, your private information will be kept on file for
more than 60 days in order to show your actions history and
simplify future orders creation.
• http://www.delivery-club.ru/google_privacy.html

40.
ROSINTER
• Locally stored data [Android:
Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong
Protected]
• Account info, tokens
• Network data [Android: Weak], [iOS:
Weak]
• Email, Birthday, Full Name, token, apn-
token, Loyalty Account Info, Device Info,
Geo, Phone, Stream
2013 2014 2015 2016
Weak Weak Weak Weak

41.
ANYWAYANYDAY
• Locally stored data [Android:
Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong
Protected]
• Passenger Info, Passport Info, Loyalty Info,
Birthday, Order/Ticket Info, Trip Info,
Credentials Info
• Network data [Android: Medium], [iOS:
Protected]
• Passenger Info, Passport Info, Loyalty Info,
Birthday, Order/Ticket Info, Trip Info,
Credentials Info
Important note. In fact, app wasn’t changed at
all and if you’re on old iOS < 9 than your data
can be stolen with fake root certificate,
2013 2014 2015 2016
Medium Medium Medium
Android: Medium
iOS: Protected?

42.
ANYWAY. EULA/PRIVACY
• Для защиты персональных данных пользователей от
неправомерного или случайного доступа, уничтожения,
изменения, блокирования, копирования, распространения, а
также иных неправомерных действий с ними третьих лиц
применяются необходимые и достаточные организационные и
технические меры.
• To protect users' personal data against unauthorized or accidental
access, destruction, modification, blocking, copying, distribution,
and other illegal actions of third parties to them we apply the
necessary and sufficient organizational and technical measures.
•
https://www.anywayanyday.com/avia/privacypolicy/

43.
ALFABANK
• Locally stored data [Android:
Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong
Protected]
• Token (Alfa-Ally-Chat), Screenshot -
Protected
• Network data [Android: Medium], [iOS:
Medium]
• Name, Device Info, Token (Alfa-Ally-
Chat), Password, Login, Account Info,
Payment Info, Short Card Info,
Transaction Info2013 2014 2015 2016
Medium Medium Medium Medium

44.
AMAZON CLOUD, PHOTOS
• Locally stored data [Android:
Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong
Protected]
• Cached, Sync Documents
• Network data [Android: Protected
Failed], [iOS: Protected Failed]
• Reveal credentials and drop connection
2013 2014 2015 2016
Weak/Medium Weak/Medium Protected Failed Protected Failed

45.
AMAZON APP MARKET, GOOGLE
PLAY, MOBOMARKET
• Network data [Android: Medium]
• Amazon & Google reveal all data
including APK data (can be replaced
with another)
• Network data [Android: Plaintext]
• MoboMarket reveal all data including
APK data (can be replaced with
another)
2013 2014 2015 2016
Amazon – Weak, Google –
Medium, Mobomarket - Plaintext
Amazon – Weak, Google –
Medium, Mobomarket - Plaintext
Amazon – Weak, Google –
Medium, Mobomarket - Plaintext
Amazon – Weak, Google –
Medium, Mobomarket - Plaintext

46.
MOBOMARKET. EULA/PRIVACY
• We encrypt our services and data transmission using SSL. We strive at all
times to ensure that your personal data will be protected against
unauthorized or accidental access, processing, correction or deletion. We
implement appropriate security measures to safeguard and secure your
personal data. Please note, however, that no security measures are 100%
effective. We encourage you to take measures to protect your personal
data.
• You are responsible for maintaining the privacy and the confidentiality of
Information. Please keep yourself informed when accessing the internet
and to always read and review the policy / privacy statement on the site
that you are accessing. Please ensure that you do the following: (i) not to
disclose your password, (ii) not to provide any personal information to
anyone, including their names, (iii) never fill online forms without your
prior authorization. Please use complex passwords with long enough
combinations of letters and numbers that require unusual keyboard
combinations whereas; simple passwords are easy to be broken. Please
never give your password to anyone online. In any event, please change
your password periodically.
• http://www.mobomarket.net/policy.html

47.
GOOGLEPLAY. EULA/PRIVACY
• We work hard to protect Google and our users from unauthorised access to
or unauthorised alteration, disclosure or destruction of information that we
hold. In particular:
• We encrypt many of our services using SSL.
• We offer you two-step verification when you access your Google Account
and a Safe Browsing feature in Google Chrome.
• We review our information collection, storage and processing practices,
including physical security measures, to guard against unauthorised access
to systems.
• We restrict access to personal information to Google employees,
contractors and agents who need to know that information in order to
process it for us and who are subject to strict contractual confidentiality
obligations. They may be disciplined or their contract terminated if they fail
to meet these obligations.
• http://www.google.com/intl/en-GB_ru/policies/privacy/

48.
APP IN THE AIR
• Locally stored data [Android:
Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong
Protected]
• Loyalty Info, Order/Ticket Info, Trip Info,
Full Info, Trip Info (Media Data), Stats,
UserID, Work Info (from Facebook)
• Network data [Android: Medium], [iOS:
Protected]
• Loyalty Info, Order/Ticket Info, Trip Info,
Full Info, Trip Info (Media Data), Stats,
UserID, Work Info (from Facebook),
Tokens
2013 2014 2015 2016
Plaintext Plaintext Weak Medium Medium

49.
APP IN THE AIR. EULA/PRIVACY
• The security of your personal information is important to us. We do not hold any liability for any
personal data or any sensitive information you provided.
• We follow generally accepted industry standards to protect the personal information submitted, both
during transmission and once we receive it. However, no method of transmission over the Internet, or
method of electronic storage, is 100% secure. Therefore, while our goal to use commercially
acceptable ways to protect your personal information, we cannot guarantee it is absolutely secure.
Please keep it in mind before submitting any information about yourself. Please note that information
that you voluntarily make public in your user profile, or which you disclose by posting comments or
inserting of the Content will be publicly available and viewable by others. We do not hold any liability
for any information that you voluntarily choose to be public through such and/or other explicit
actions.
• We only use personal information collected through the APPINTHEAIR project and our Services for the
purposes described in the Terms http://i.appintheair.mobi/termsofuse. For example, we may use
information we collect:
• provide our Services or information you request, and to process and complete any transactions;
• to your emails, submissions, questions, comments, requests, and complaints and provide customer
service;
• http://www.appintheair.mobi/privacypolicy

50.
ASUS WEBSTORAGE
• Locally stored data [Android:
Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong
Protected]
• MD5(Password.ToLowerString())
• Network data [Android: Medium], [iOS:
Medium]
• Login, Email, Encryption Key(?), Tokens,
Device Settings, Sync Documents, File
Details
• MD5(Password.ToLowerString())
2013 2014 2015 2016
Medium Medium Medium Medium

51.
ASUS WEBSTORAGE.
EULA/PRIVACY
• We take precautions to protect your personal information against
unauthorized access or unauthorized alteration, disclosure or destruction.
These include internal reviews of our personal information collection,
storage and processing practices and security measures, as well as physical
security measures to guard against unauthorized access to systems where
we store your personal information. Transmission of personal information
between different locations of ASUS Cloud affiliated companies is
performed through our secured wide area network. When you submit
personal information via the service, your information is protected both
online and offline. However, ASUS Cloud cannot guarantee a perfect
security on the internet. When using the internet, we recommended that
you use alphanumerical usernames and passwords and change your
passwords on a regular basis, as well as keep your computer up to date by
applying the latest available security updates for your software and using
such tools as virus/spyware scanners.
• If you have any questions regarding the security of our web site, please
refer to our security web page.
• ISO27001, SSL, AES, RAID, https://www.asuswebstorage.com/navigate/security/
https://service.asuswebstorage.com/privacy/

52.
SKYPE
• Locally stored data [Android:
Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong
Protected]
• Media data (attachments), Message (or
last messages), friend list, Email/Login,
Snapshot
• Network data [Android: Weak/Strong],
[iOS: Weak/Strong]
• Media data (attachments), Message (or
last messages), Email/Login, Device Data,
UserID, MS Live password, no skype
password2013 2014 2015 2016
Weak/Strong Weak/Strong Weak/Strong Weak/Strong

53.
EVERNOTE
• Locally stored data [Android:
Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong
Protected]
• Tokens, UserID, Syc Documents (notes),
cached data, SnapShot (iOS only)
• Network data [Android: Medium], [iOS:
Protected]
• Sync Documents (notes), Full name, Account
Details, Credentials, tokens, etc.
• Important note. In fact, app wasn’t
changed at all and if you’re on old iOS < 9
than your data can be stolen with fake root
certificate, otherwise, NO
2013 2014 2015 2016
Medium Medium Medium
Android – Medium
iOS - Protected

54.
EVERNOTE. EULA/PRIVACY
• Evernote is committed to protecting the security of your
information and takes reasonable precautions to protect
it. We use industry standard encryption to protect your
data in transit. This is commonly referred to as
transport layer security (“TLS”) or secure socket layer
(“SSL”) technology. However, internet data
transmissions, cannot be guaranteed to be 100% secure,
and as a result, we cannot ensure the security of
information during its transmission between you and us;
accordingly, you acknowledge that you do so at your
own risk.
• https://evernote.com/legal/privacy.php?noredirect

55.
CYBER GHOST
• Locally stored data [Android:
Plaintext/Protected], [iOS: Strong
Protected]
• tokens
• Network data [Android:
Medium/Strong Protected], [iOS:
Medium/Strong Protected]
• Login, oauth consumer_key, token,
token_secret, radius_password, geo
location, ip, country, account details,
license key, license expiration2013 2014 2015 2016
N/A N/A
Medium/Strong
Protected
Medium/Strong
Protected

56.
CYBERGHOST. EULA/PRIVACY
• Personal data: CyberGhost collects and uses no personal data, such as
e-mail addresses, name, domicile address and payment information.
• If you register for the Premium-Service of CyberGhost VPN, we store a
fully anonymous User ID, an encoded password and your pay scale
information (activation key, start and end). The stored e-mail
addresses are not linked to a User ID.
• Log data: CyberGhost keeps no logs which enable interference with
your IP address, the moment or content of your data traffic. We make
express reference to the fact that we do not record in logs
communication contents or data regarding the accessed websites or
the IP addresses.
• In March 2012, CyberGhost had successfully passed an audit and
verification conducted by QSCert for the implemented Information
Safety Management System (ISMS) according to the international
industrial standards ISO27001 and ISO9001. The certification confirms
the high quality of the internal safety processes and is renewed yearly

57.
ISO 27001, ISMS, ETC.
• ISO27001 (and similar standards for non-IT areas)
explicitly do not require "have you taken every
sensible precaution to ensure it is", it is sufficient
to have a policy that acknowledges that you haven't
taken a bunch of very sensible precautions and
that you simply accept the risks caused by that
• If a company with a proper ISMS only accepts file
uploads with unsecure FTP, it means they thought
about this and decided either it's not their problem
or they don't care

58.
RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPER VS
LAZY ONE
• Apple (!) & Google (!)
• QIWI – best app with own
cryptography and has
implemented all security
features
• Dropbox - has implemented all
security features
• App in the Air (network, in
progress)
• CyberGhost (network, in
progress)
• Asus Web Storage (pwd, in
progress)
• Sberbank (background fixing)
• Hotels.Ru (network, in progress)
• DeliveryClub (network, in
progress)
• AnywayAnyday (network,
having fun with hardcoded
‘anyway’ 192bit  256bit key)
• Evernote (network)
• … everyone you saw in this
slide or among my researches

59.
PANDA SM MANAGER IOS
APPLICATION - MITM SSL
CERTIFICATE VULNERABILITY
• "Panda Systems Management is the new way to manage and monitor IT
systems."
"Inventory, monitoring, management, remote control and reporting... All
from a single Web-based console"
(https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/panda-sm-manager/id672205099)
• Timeline – Almost 1 Year (!)
• July 19, 2015 - Notified Panda Security via security@pandasecurity.com, e-
mail bounced
July 20, 2015 - Resent vulnerability report to
corporatesupport@us.pandasecurity.com & security@us.pandasecurity.com
July 20, 2015 - Panda Security responded stating they will investigate
July 31, 2015 - Asked for an update on their investigation
August 3, 2015 - Panda Security responded stating that the issue has been
escalated and is still being reviewed
August 14, 2015 - Asked for an update on their investigation
October 16, 2015 - Asked for an update on their investigation
• … NO ANSWER …
March 1, 2016 - Panda Security released version 2.6.0 which resolves this

60.
ADVICES.
YOU’RE DEVELOPER? DON’T CARE ABOUT
SECURITY/PRIVACY?
THEN YOUR CHOICE IS …
• BlackBerry. Protects everything locally stored except public folders &
external storage. Also it’s hardly to MITM except plain http traffic.
Even for Android (!)
• Windows Modern 10 apps. Anti-MITM protection on OS level by
default (still researching it, also can’t confirm it for Android app
support – Project Astoria)
• iOS. Ok. Easy way to make user to install trusted fake certificate to
MITM. Upgrade! Local app files on iOS < 8.3 could be accessed
without jailbreak
• Android. Fail. Easy way to make user to install trusted fake
certificate to MITM. Some vendors prevent unlocking bootloader
without user interaction to avoid root without his asking. But some
doesn’t (!)

61.
REMEDIATION: ANDROID
• Follow security programming guide from Google
• Call ‘setStorageEncryption’ API for locally stored files (new
Android OS v5+)
• Encrypt externally stored files on SD Card or Cloud (any OS)
• Define when encryption signature doesn’t matter, else
avoid it
• Reduce using of ‘MODE_WORLD_READABLE ’ unless it really
needs
• Avoid hardcoded and debug tracks as much as possible
(it’s easy to decompile)
• Add extra protect beyond OS (encryption, wiping, etc.)

62.
REMEDIATION : IOS
• Follow security programming guide from Apple
• Never store credentials on the phone file system. Use API or
web scheme instead
• Define when encryption signature doesn’t matter, else avoid
it
• Use implemented protection mechanism in iOS…
• But … add extra protection layer beyond OS protection in
case of jailbreak
• Use any API and protection mechanisms properly but never
default settings
• Don’t forget to encrypt SQL databases

63.
REMEDIATION : BLACKBERRY
• Follow security programming guide from BlackBerry
• Don’t store credentials in shared folders
• Encrypt data stored in shared folders
• Use implemented protection mechanism in BlackBerry…
• But … add extra protection layer beyond just in case
• Don’t forget to encrypt SQL databases
• Don’t develop Android app-ports
• Try to avoid using ported or Android native app under BlackBerry
• Develop more and use native apps for BlackBerry 

64.
REMEDIATION: WINMOBILE 10
• Credentials stored or transferred in plaintext locally.
• Data usually stored or transferred structured file type
that simplify an analysis
• Signature-based encryption helps quickly decrypt data
(depends on dynamically linked libraries)
• Data stored in SQLite databases usually not encrypted
• Keys may be hardcoded or put in data folder
• Applications could be analyzed on Windows 10 Desktop
via known methods like a desktop applications

65.
REMEDIATION: WIN 10
• Credentials stored or transferred in plaintext
locally.
• Data usually stored or transferred structured file
type that simplify an analysis
• Signature-based encryption helps quickly decrypt
data (depends on dynamically linked libraries)
• Data stored in SQLite databases usually not
encrypted
• Keys may be hardcoded or put in data folder
• Application data folder is access without any
restrictions

66.
REMEDIATION: MAC OS X
• Credentials stored/ transferred in plaintext locally.
• Data stored in a keychain without additional protection or
encryption
• Data usually stored or transferred structured file type that simplify
an analysis
• Signature-based encryption that helps to quickly decrypt data
• Avoiding protection mechanism in iOS that leads to pure
protection eventually
• Data stored in SQLite databases usually not encrypted
• Keys may be hardcoded
• Application data folder is access without any restrictions

67.
[ YURY CHEMERKIN ]
• MULTISKILLED SECURITY EXPERT
• WORK FOR ADVANCED MONITORING
• EXPERIENCED IN:
• REVERSE ENGINEERING & AV, DEVELOPMENT (PAST)
• MOBILE SECURITY, & CLOUD SECURITY
• IAM, COMPLIANCE, FORENSICS
• PARTICIPATION & SPEAKING AT MANY SECURITY
CONFERENCES

68.
(LEAKED) MOBILE APPLICATION
DATA PRIVACY
HOW TO CONTACT ME ?
ADD ME IN LINKEDIN:
HTTPS://WWW.LINKEDIN.COM/IN/YURYCHEMER
KIN
YURY CHEMERKIN
SEND A MAIL TO:
YURY.S@CHEMERKIN.COM