Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission

Jun. 26, 2017
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
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Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission

Editor's Notes

  1. The global financial crisis highlighted the potential role of financial factors for explaining the performance of the real economy, business cycle fluctuations. Research has been expanding. A common framework for this research is to view recessions or crises as the result of shocks or triggers that hit a fragile financial sector or economy. The question is what are the fragilities, or vulnerabilities, that make it more likely that a shock would be amplified, rather than dampened or absorbed, and lead to poor economic performance. In the early 2000s, Borio and others at the BIS began to argue that central bankers should be looking at excessive credit and asset valuations. In cross-country studies, they found these to be good predictors of recessions. More recently, Jorda, Schularick and Taylor, in a study of 14 countries with data going back to the late 1800s for a few, have found that high credit growth and asset prices before the peak are strong predictors of weak economic recoveries. And the difference in the recoveries varied significantly by credit growth, or whether there was also a banking crisis. This paper sets our to systematically assesses possible vulnerabilities that can help to explain US performance in the past 40 years, since 1975. Following the papers cited above, we look at nonfinancial sector credit and asset valuations. We also look at financial sector leverage and short-term funding. (won’t spend time on those today). We also evaluate the effectiveness of monetary policy, since it is a key macroeconomic stabilization tool, which also affects private credit and asset values.
  2. I’ll discuss three main findings today: Nonfinancial credit-to-GDP gap is a vulnerability – a shock to credit when the credit gap is high leads to an economic contraction, a rise in unemployment Dynamics are nonlinear – when the gap is low, a shock is expansionary, it does not lead to a contraction Risk appetite, a measure that we construct and will explain later, is not a vulnerability. On its own, it appears to be a financial indicators variable. A shock is expansionary. But when the credit gap is high, a shock will lead to more credit, and eventually a contraction. Monetary policy The effects on the economy depend on the credit-to-GDP gap. When the gap is low, a shock to monetary policy works as expected. But when the gap is high, it has no effect on gdp or unemployment, or prices. We explore this result further. Within the model, we find that a shock to monetary policy is not reinforced by a tightening of risk appetite when credit is high, and so the transmission is attenuated. We go outside the model, and build on a Hanson and Stein framework of monetary policy transmission to forward rates. We find less transmission to forward rates when the credit gap is high.
  3. Two points: The series is not highly volatile – doesn’t swing back and forth between high and low credit Positive credit-gap periods include both the boom and busts Remains high, even rises a little, for a significant period after the financial cycle turns – could reflect borrowers drawing on pre-committed lines of credit, or it may reflect that GDP falls more quickly than credit
  4. High in the late 1970s because of business credit and equities Equities were low through most of the 1980s, but CRE and households were more elevated; then business credit conditions started rising in the mid 1980s, ending with the LBO bust 1990s – equity markets and business credit Mid 2000s – all were rising and got high Currently can see equities are above “normal”