Credit risk appetite and monetary policy transmission
1. Credit, Risk Appetite,
and Monetary Policy
Transmission
D AV I D A I K M A N , A N D R EA S L E H N E RT, N E L L I E L I A N G , M I C H E L E M O D U G N O
J U N E 5 , 2 0 1 7
V I E W S E X P R E S S E D A R E O U R O W N A N D N O T N E C E S S A R I L Y T H E V I E W S O F T H E F E D E R A L R E S E R V E B O A R D , B A N K O F E N G L A N D , O R S T A F F
2. Motivation
The global financial crisis highlighted the potential role of financial factors for the real economy
Long tradition linking risk appetite to business fluctuations (Keynes “animal spirits”)
High credit and asset valuations predict subpar economic performance (Borio and Lowe, 2002;
Drehmann and Juselius, 2015; Schularick and Taylor, 2012)
High credit growth and asset bubbles lead to weaker economic recoveries (Jorda, et al 2013)
Credit is a commonly cited financial imbalance: how do macroeconomic dynamics change if it is
elevated?
◦ Response to risk appetite shocks
◦ Monetary policy transmission
3. Outline
We characterize the time series of the credit-to-GDP gap and “risk appetite,” 1975 to 2014
We estimate VAR models of the macroeconomy and monetary policy
◦ Augmented with our risk appetite measure and the credit-to-GDP gap
◦ Threshold VAR allows for nonlinear dynamics
We characterize the response to
◦ Risk appetite shock
◦ Monetary policy shock
We split the sample into periods when the credit-to-GDP gap is high or low to test for
nonlinearities
4. Key empirical results
Our risk appetite measure (“ALLM”)
◦ Is an indicator of financial conditions and is expansionary
◦ But it can lead to a higher credit-to-GDP gap and recession
Dynamics are nonlinear depending on nonfinancial credit-to-GDP gap. When gap is high:
◦ ALLM shocks lead to recessions
◦ Monetary policy effect is attenuated
When the credit gap is high, monetary policy:
◦ Does not affect GDP, unemployment or inflation
◦ Does not affect our risk appetite measure
◦ Using Hanson-Stein (2015) framework, less transmission to yields 5 to 9 years out
Policy attenuation result also holds when the credit gap is growing (can’t stop the boom)
5. Recent papers on similar topics
Alpanda and Zubairy (March 2017)
◦ Monetary policy transmission varies with level of household debt
Ottonello and Winberry (May 2017)
◦ The level and distribution of business debt affects monetary policy transmission
◦ Rates ↓ → more indebted firms pay down debt, less indebted firms increase investment
Brunnermeier, Palia, Sastry, and Sims (April 2017)
◦ 10 variable VAR identified using Rigobon (2003) heteroskedasticity strategy – some periods see more
volatile shocks
◦ Includes HH & business credit, GZ, spreads, monetary policy, real activity
◦ Shocks that matter: monetary policy, financial stress
◦ Shocks that don’t matter: credit (household or business)
◦ Business credit does matter in a small system – y, p, BC, HHC
6. ALLM is in the tradition of financial
conditions indexes (FCIs)
•FCIs attempt to measure stimulus/contraction from financial conditions – private borrowing
rates, stock prices, the exchange value of the dollar
•Monetary policy → conditions → real economy
• Magnitude, timing potentially time-varying
•Post-crisis a resurgence of interest in FCIs including financial stress indexes:
• Broad review, focus on macro forecasting performance, “neoclassical” vs “non-neoclassical” variables
(Hatzius, Hooper, Mishkin, Schoenholz, and Watson 2010).
• A number of FCIs developed and routinely updated: Aramonte, Rosen, Schindler 2013 evaluate 12
separate indexes and evaluate them as early warning indicators and coincident indicator
• Some indexes rooted in theory, e.g. Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)’s excess bond premium, which uses
micro data on credit spreads to measure the residual after controlling for default risk
7. Constructing ALLM: Variables related to
lenders’ willingness to make riskier loans
Thought exercise: Want variables that measure lenders’ appetite for risk in making loans to
households and (nonfinancial) businesses (including commercial real estate)
1. Equity markets: stock market volatility and the S&P 500 price-earnings ratio.
2. Business credit: Triple-B corporate bond spread to Treasury, the share of nonfinancial
corporate bond issuance that is speculative-grade, and the index of credit availability from
the NFIB survey of small businesses.
3. Commercial real estate: a commercial real estate price index deflated into real terms and
commercial real estate debt growth.
4. Household: the residential price-to-rent ratio and lending standards for consumer
installment loans from the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS).
8. ALLM v1.0 and v2.0
ALLM v1.0 contains asset prices (VIX, P/E) and sentiment variables
So shocks to ALLM v1.0 could be:
◦ Valuation shocks: Investor risk sentiment or appetite (separate from financial accelerator effects)
◦ Lending standards shocks: Profitability of intermediaries (He and Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013) and
Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012))
Ongoing work exploring separating valuation and lending standards terms
◦ Identification is cleaner
Showing you results from ALLM v1.0 today
9. VAR specification
U.S. macro data 1975:Q1 to 2014:Q4
Log real GDP, GDP deflator, Unemployment rate
Credit-to-GDP gap
◦ Household vs. business
◦ Bank vs. nonbank
Risk appetite – asset valuations and lending standards
Federal funds rate
We define a measure to be a vulnerability if an impulse to the measure leads to an economic
contraction
10. VAR dynamics
Shocks are identified using the Cholesky decomposition with shocks ordered as in the monetary
policy literature
◦ Monetary policy reacts to all shocks in a period
◦ ALLM reacts to all shocks within a quarter save monetary policy
◦ The unemployment rate, the GDP deflator, and real GDP react to shocks to the vulnerability measure
and monetary policy with a one-quarter lag
Estimate the VAR following Giannone, Lenza, and Primiceri (2015)
◦ Bayesian technique specifies a prior that each variable follows a random walk, possibly with a drift; this
reduces estimation uncertainty and leads to more stable inference.
11. Threshold VAR
Nonlinear estimations – often speak of financial imbalances as “high” or “low”
◦ Dynamics could differ for a variety of reasons
Effectively estimate system on disjoint sets depending on whether the credit gap is above/below its
mean
Not model transitions from one state to another
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 𝑗
+ 𝐴 𝐿 𝑗
𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑢 𝑡
𝑗 𝑗 = high,if 𝐶𝑌𝑡 > 0.
𝑗 = low, if 𝐶𝑌𝑡 ≤ 0.
12. A word about the trend
When is credit “too high”?
◦ Credit-to-GDP is above its trend
How do you estimate the trend in credit-to-GDP?
HP filter 𝜆 = 400,000 – due to Borio and Lowe (2002, 2004) and Basel III
Many obvious problems
◦ But this is the canonical way to do it
◦ Undertaken lots of robustness work
◦ Any sufficiently slow-moving trend estimate is going to deliver the same results
25. Robustness tests
Alternative orderings of shocks
Credit in log level
Credit-to-potential GDP
Three states, different cutoffs for thresholds
Different ways of estimating the trend
Using growth rates instead of (detrended) levels
26. Other results (in the working paper)
Disaggregate types of credit
◦ Household vs. business – business matters a lot as in Brunnermeier et al and Ottonello & Winberry
◦ Bank vs. nonbank – banks matters more than nonbank
Alternative financial imbalances
◦ Runnable liabilities
◦ Leverage of intermediaries
27. Summary
Findings
◦ When the credit-to-GDP gap is high
◦ Economic growth subpar
◦ Economic dynamics are different – attention of monetary policy transmission
◦ Risk appetite – an indicator of financial conditions; but contributes to the buildup of credit-to-GDP
Implications
◦ Supports a story in which risk appetite shock leads → expansion & credit growth → credit bust
◦ Credit quantity, not just prices, has implications for real economic activity
◦ Macroeconomic responses are nonlinear – transmission channels may operate differently under
different conditions (Hubrich and Tetlow, 2015)
Ongoing work – revising ALLM
Editor's Notes
The global financial crisis highlighted the potential role of financial factors for explaining the performance of the real economy, business cycle fluctuations. Research has been expanding. A common framework for this research is to view recessions or crises as the result of shocks or triggers that hit a fragile financial sector or economy. The question is what are the fragilities, or vulnerabilities, that make it more likely that a shock would be amplified, rather than dampened or absorbed, and lead to poor economic performance.
In the early 2000s, Borio and others at the BIS began to argue that central bankers should be looking at excessive credit and asset valuations. In cross-country studies, they found these to be good predictors of recessions. More recently, Jorda, Schularick and Taylor, in a study of 14 countries with data going back to the late 1800s for a few, have found that high credit growth and asset prices before the peak are strong predictors of weak economic recoveries. And the difference in the recoveries varied significantly by credit growth, or whether there was also a banking crisis.
This paper sets our to systematically assesses possible vulnerabilities that can help to explain US performance in the past 40 years, since 1975. Following the papers cited above, we look at nonfinancial sector credit and asset valuations. We also look at financial sector leverage and short-term funding. (won’t spend time on those today). We also evaluate the effectiveness of monetary policy, since it is a key macroeconomic stabilization tool, which also affects private credit and asset values.
I’ll discuss three main findings today:
Nonfinancial credit-to-GDP gap is a vulnerability – a shock to credit when the credit gap is high leads to an economic contraction, a rise in unemployment
Dynamics are nonlinear – when the gap is low, a shock is expansionary, it does not lead to a contraction
Risk appetite, a measure that we construct and will explain later, is not a vulnerability. On its own, it appears to be a financial indicators variable. A shock is expansionary. But when the credit gap is high, a shock will lead to more credit, and eventually a contraction.
Monetary policy
The effects on the economy depend on the credit-to-GDP gap. When the gap is low, a shock to monetary policy works as expected. But when the gap is high, it has no effect on gdp or unemployment, or prices. We explore this result further. Within the model, we find that a shock to monetary policy is not reinforced by a tightening of risk appetite when credit is high, and so the transmission is attenuated. We go outside the model, and build on a Hanson and Stein framework of monetary policy transmission to forward rates. We find less transmission to forward rates when the credit gap is high.
Two points:
The series is not highly volatile – doesn’t swing back and forth between high and low credit
Positive credit-gap periods include both the boom and busts
Remains high, even rises a little, for a significant period after the financial cycle turns – could reflect borrowers drawing on pre-committed lines of credit, or it may reflect that GDP falls more quickly than credit
High in the late 1970s because of business credit and equities
Equities were low through most of the 1980s, but CRE and households were more elevated; then business credit conditions started rising in the mid 1980s, ending with the LBO bust
1990s – equity markets and business credit
Mid 2000s – all were rising and got high
Currently can see equities are above “normal”