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Extremismpresentation

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    Extremismpresentation Extremismpresentation Presentation Transcript

    • Religious Extremism, Institutions, and Income: Theory and Evidence ESHIA June,2007 Michael Makowsky H.B. Earhart Fellow Center for the Economic Study of Religion Department of Economics George Mason University
    • Extremism, Religious or Otherwise
      • For better or worse, religious extremism is associated with violence
      • Are there social and economic conditions under which extremist groups thrive or fail?
      • Can we model this emergence of viable extremist groups within a population?
      • Can we gain insight into peculiar characteristics of violent extremist groups
        • “ Approximately 90 percent of [Hamas’s] work is in social, welfare, cultural and educational activities. These are important elements of Hamas's popularity that keep it closely tied to the public.” - Reuven Paz(2001)
    • Extremist Groups and Violence
      • Extreme = High Sacrifice
      • Extreme Sacrifice Groups are not violent by nature (the heavy majority are entirely peaceful)
      • But…extremist groups possess the characteristic group loyalty and commitment necessary for the recruitment and training of martyrs (Iannaccone IJRR 2005)
    • Why Can Groups Demand Sacrifice?
      • Prisoner’s Dilemmas, Free-Riders, Principal-Agent problems – lots of reason’s why large groups should fail (Olson 1965)
      • Religious/Ideological groups manage to survive without contracts, high-cost monitoring, or wage incentives
      • Solution: Sacrifice and Stigma (Iannaccone JPE 1992)
    • Sacrifice And Stigma Model
      • Individuals use time and money to produce Private/Secular (S) and Group/Religious (K) goods
      • Religious groups prevent free-riding by Sacrifice & Stigma (S&S)
      • Effectiveness of S&S depends on relative prices (via income) and the substitutability of S for K
      Quick Version High Beta= Happy with one or the other Low Beta= Need a combination of both
    • The Functions (key on social interactions)
    • An Agent-Based Model of a Religious Economy (Built with the lovely MASON java library)
      • Sacrifice and Stigma – single group
      • Agent-based extension - macroscopic level, winners and losers
      • Dynamic, interactive, rules-based agents operating in a spatial and temporal world
      Max( U )
    • MARS – S&S
      • Agents color- and shape-coded by group
      • Groups identifiable along a sacrifice spectrum from 0 to
      • 100 % of secular productivity loss
      • Lognormal Income Distribution
    •  
    • Extremism as a Percent of the Population Income Substitutability
    • Empirical Connections – Krueger and Maleckova 2003
      • Terrorists from a country are decreasing in number as that nation’s civil liberties, as measured by Freedom House Civil Liberties Index, are increasing.
      • When Civil Liberties are controlled for, the relative wealth of the country and its illiteracy rate have no statistically significant effect.
    • Regression Analysis of the Model Quantile Regression Estimates: Fraction Log Full Income Dedicated to Club Production Standard errors in parentheses, all coefficients significant at 0.1% level 52272 52272 52272 52272 52272 N (0.014) (0.032) (0.014) (0.022) (0.001) 1.519 1.173 -2.543 -4.959 -9.12 Constant (0.013) (0.032) (0.017) (0.040) (0.002) 1.928 0.184 -3.539 -5.940 -8.478 Log Substitutability (β) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.000) -0.519 -0.961 -0.817 -0.828 -0.250 Log Full Income 90% 75% 50% 25% 10% Quantile
    • ISSP 1998 + Bootstrap Quantile Regression Religion - Work Ratio 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 5106 N -6.557 (2.344)** -13.362 (3.208)** -34.246 (5.667)** -29.100 (2.630)** -19.814 (4.092)** -7.041 (2.764)* 15.677 (3.762)** Constant 0.450 (0.140)** 0.921 (0.210)** 2.076 (0.338)** 1.640 (0.140)** 1.035 (0.248)** -0.104 (0.182) -1.486 (0.231)** Muslim 0.332 (0.153)* 1.119 (0.260)** 2.641 (0.223)** 2.475 (0.164)** 1.712 (0.336)** 0.681 (0.100)** -1.092 (0.318)** State Religion -1.025 (0.210)** -0.824 (0.309)** -2.460 (0.694)** -1.554 (0.240)** -1.092 (0.329)** 0.239 (0.446) 1.994 (0.205)** Religious Regulation -0.318 (0.034)** -0.238 (0.041)** -0.348 (0.048)** -0.342 (0.064)** -0.338 (0.068)** -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) Earnings 0.376 (0.335) -3.337 (0.641)** 0.210 (1.181) 0.269 (0.433) -0.266 (0.433) -0.375 (0.576) -2.450 (0.331)** Economic Freedom 2.290 (0.623)** 5.660 (1.243)** 12.701 (1.490)** 11.096 (0.814)** 6.071 (1.233)** -0.448 (0.892) -6.618 (1.048)** Civil Liberties 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30%
    • Testing Suggested Policy
    • Policy Test (continued)
      • A public good competitive with the club good reduces the appeal of extremism
      • The popular shift is towards the strict groups, and not the most liberal (secularists)
      • BUT there is no impact on the sacrifice profile of a population unless the public good is subject to group sacrifice requirements
        • This is potentially a good thing – sacrifice of the public good is most likely to be realized by groups operating outside the law.
    • Conclusions
      • Substitutability is necessary and quasi-sufficient for Extremist groups to be sustainable. Population Income matters, but is dominated by Subsitutability.
      • Extremist groups have incentive to package themselves as strong substitutes for privately productive activities
        • This correlates to Hamas and Hezbollah dedicating the bulk of their resources to social services
      • Public Goods competitive with the club good are a potentially viable mechanism for reducing the appeal of extremism
    • The Rest are just Appendices
      • The End
    • Experiment Parameterization
      • Test Variables – Beta and Mean Income
      • Fixed Parameters
      1 (prices of good) p S, p R 60 (number of Groups) G 0.3 b 0.7 a 0.3 α 1.25 s 1 b s , b k Value Related Function Parameter
    • Nash starting condition
      • iterated pure strategy interaction between an agent i­ and a generic neighbor j .
      • is assumed to be common knowledge, as is the rationality of both players. Player turns are executed sequentially (as opposed to simultaneously) with t incrementing by one when an agent makes a calculation. The starting value is a parameter value assigned to avoid indefinite solutions.
      R j R i R i =R j