Prospects of ukraines cooperation with european and transatlantic structures in the context of ukrainian identitiesDocument Transcript
PROSPECTS OF UKRAINES COOPERATION WITH EUROPEAN AND TRANSATLANTIC STRUCTURES IN THE CONTEXT OF UKRAINIAN IDENTITIES To have an efficient and adequate discussion on the above subject the scientificpremises must be clearly defined. First of all, it is critical to identify two terms:"cooperation" and "identity" so that they could be correctly applied in the context ofthe problem in question. We suggest interpreting the term "cooperation" in a broad sense since the notionof cooperation as such has a sufficiently spacious functional field. This interpretationis best implemented, in our opinion, in the concept of interactionism. From this standpoint, cooperation is the action that emerges when two or more objects influenceeach other and such bilateral influence is key in the concept of interactionism [12, 5-24; 350]. In concrete implementation this is the system of direct and indirect contacts,ties, communication relations at individual ana group levels in all strata of public lifewhose process is associated with exchange of information, new unions, various jointprojects etc [5, 99-100]. The highest form of cooperation is institutionalized unionsand the most efficient results are achieved when this cooperation takes place in theframework of these unions (which incidentally can be built as result of this coop-eration) leading to formation of large interactive societal systems. The example of thelatter is European Council (EC), European Union (EU), NATO, Common EconomicSpace (CES) etc. It is quite evident that identity (identities) of population, groups predominantlyaffects elites and broad public attitude toward cooperation and integration of anycountry, in our case Ukraine, into European and transatlantic processes and structures(in a broader sense, interactive systems), and, finally, into the European and in-ternational space. In this article we will attempt to prove this relationship. In terms of structure and subjects the arguments will be presented in the followingfashion: 1) First of all, let us be clear about basic in this context notions of "identity","identities" and criteria of identity classification in the Ukrainian context; establishmarkers for identities, specifically national identities. It should be borne in mind that
these markers just as identities have different expressions, at least in threedimensions: a) in theoretical applications of scientists researching problems of social,cultural and ethno-political identities; b) in the ways they function in practice; c) inthe way they (markets and finally the identities) are interpreted and implemented byelite, at least, its composite part that in one way or another establishes or regulatesthe process of Ukraines cooperation and integration into European and transatlanticstructures; 2) consider factors and reasons that affect the content and dynamics ofidentities; 3) design ways of overcoming dissensions and strengthening bases ofconsolidated Ukrainian identity and coordination of its functioning in the context ofcurrent globalization processes, or in a narrower sense, integration processes; 4) frommultiple transatlantic and European structures for the purposes of this analysis letsselect European Union, European Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization(NATO) and others. These days, the socio-humanitarian sciences abound with numerous notions of"identity" and its varieties . Having done an in-depth analysis, we suggest using ageneralized definition, which can be used in the context of this discussion, namely inperspective of Ukraines prospects of cooperation with international structures and,undoubtedly, its participation in these structures. It should be noted that identity is an umbrella term that, on one hand, is used bythe bearer of this identity to express his perception (understanding) of himself as acomplex and special being, and on the other hand as an expression of this individualperception by other persons. Properly speaking, identity has two facets: internalrelated to self-identification of a person and external: its identification by others.Noteworthy, the other facet is important from perspective of having a possibility tomanipulate the process of building public opinion with regard to any given situation,in our case, the behavior of individuals developing their position to a set of differentalternatives and also their decision to cast votes for any particular alternative. The prevailing definition of identity, at least in social and humanitarian sciences isthe following: identity is the process or result of individuals self-identification (byothers) with respect to any given group, territory, country, nation, ethnicity or beingreferred to these categories by others . In the framework of external identification
identities are usually constructed artificially, very often, depending on the purposepursued by those who identify the individual. How well this identification matchesthe real state of things depends on level of information and knowledge about thesubject and opportunities of the field where the identification object is located.Depending on field and classification criteria several types of identities can bedifferentiated: 1) spatial and territorial identity: correlation to a concrete place ofresidence (local), region (regional), country (geo-political), continent (continental),the entire world (self-identification as a citizen of the world); 2) political and civicidentity: self-perception as a citizen of a concrete state (civil), being part of a nation:political nation, nation-state (national), being a member or partisan of politicalstructures in society (political); 3) social, cultural identity: involvement in socialstructures and social relations (social), identification with a certain system of culturalvalues (cultural), affinity with a certain ethnic community or quality (ethno-cultural)characteristics, attributable to this community (ethnic); 4) religious identity:professing certain religion, beliefs. For our study most important are two first types of identities, if only from a standpoint that they portrait the results of their generation, i.e., enable us to assess attitudesof individual citizens and correlate them with real prospects of getting closer to orfarther from international structures. In our context it is important to take intoaccount another classification of identities: depending on the subject and number ofpeople aware of their belonging to a certain group identity can be categorized asindividual and collective. This categorization plays a critical role in Ukrainesposition toward possibilities of joining international structures since collective be-havior prevails over the aggregate of individual thoughts. This becomes extremelyclear during surveys, referenda etc. Another important circumstance is that identity isalways a product of social cooperation between individuals in spatial and territorial,social, psychological, ethno-cultural, political and civic fields resulting in at least twoessential consequences: 1) production of new identities and, therefore, new types ofgroups and institutions; 2) creation of environment where the actors of social processcan engage in a dialogue or confront each other. These specific traits must bereflected in tie analysis of public opinion surveys and elucidation of their possible
impacts on authorities decision-making process regarding joining (association,integration) certain international structures or cooperation with them. I suggest selecting from the multiple factors affecting formation of identities and,therefore, determination of interactive desires among people and, accordingly, thepressure they produce on decision making process the following: 1) ethniccomposition (specifics of population structure); 2) residential structure of populationby taking into consideration the ethnic factor; 3) geographical boundaries within themodern territory of Ukraine (some of its composite parts belong to different ethno-political bodies – states); 4) political orientation (politization of social life), divisionof the Ukrainian territory into different spheres of political influence; 5) migration(internal and external): 6) extent of cooperation between components of Ukrainianethno-national population groups and the countries where these ethnicities areoriginated; 7) possibility of raising population awareness on essence of transatlanticand European structures (regional, ethnic specifics). The following significant factors should be borne in mind with regard to the ethniccomposition of the Ukrainian population, its residential structure and prevailingdynamics: 1) availability of autochthonous and allochthonous population (their heirs). Thefirst group is the category of people who have been permanently living within theboundaries of todays Ukraine, strictly speaking the Slavic tribes that have laid afoundation of Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian ethnoses. The Ukrainian ethnos(ethnic group) has virtually completely settled down in the territory of Ukraine withinits present boundaries, along with small portions of the Russian and Belarusianethnoses. The second category is the ethnic groups who have arrived to Ukraine atdifferent points of time (Jews, Poles, Armenians, etc). The current multiethnic com-position of the Ukrainian society was affected by two factors: a) migration, b)emergence of new independent nations from the ancient Slavic tribes that had residedin the territory of Kyivan Rus. 2) since consistent patterns and singularities in formation and dynamics of theUkrainian ethnic composition can be traced back on the example of differentethnoses settling down in this territory at different historical periods this factor must
be considered in this study. The overall color of ethno-national palette is undoubtedlydetermined by the most numerous ethnic communities and communities with well-rooted cultural and ethno-demographic traditions. In this context it should bementioned that the residential structure of Ukrainian ethnic communities arecharacterized by their predominantly disperse settlement pattern although in someregions there are still some densely populated areas where representatives of certainethnoses make up a significant percentage of the regional populace. We focusedmostly the ethnic communities that have a potential of affecting attitude of theUkrainian society toward Ukraines cooperation with international structures and atthe same time are subject of informational impact from interested circles in ethnicmotherlands: Poles, Russians, Romanians, Slovaks, Hungarians and Moldovans. According to recent statistic censuses today compact settlements of the Russiansare most spread in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Sumy and Donetsk Oblasts and in the south ofMikolaiv, Kherson and Odesa Oblasts. The regions with considerable concentrationof the Russian include also Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia and Kyiv. These are seats ofpredominant Russian ethnic community. The most prominent concentration of theRussians among other ethnicities can be observed the Autonomous Republic ofCrimea (over 50%). Belarusians reside mostly in the border areas between Republicof Belarus and Ukraine. Historically, the Poles in Ukraine have been living in theWestern Galicia and sporadically across the Dnieper River. These days the most partof Ukrainian Poles reside in the mixed Ukrainian-Polish villages of Vinnitsa,Khmelnitsk and Zhitomir Oblasts and in cities of Kyiv, Lviv, Rivne and Chernivtsi.Another Ukrainian minority are Moldovans: the compact Moldavian settlements canbe found in the border Ukrainian regions. Representatives of other large minorities such as Hungarians, Romanians, Greeksand Armenians appeared in Ukraine under different circumstances. For example theHungarians settled down in the territory of todays Transcarpathian Oblast(Zakarpattya) in 9th century. Interethnic relations in the regions where Hungarianmentality and traditions remain quite prominent are still characterized by a specificimpression that can be traced back to the multiethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire. Thefirst Romanians settlements in Ukraine have been founded by the villagers who came
from the south-western Wallachia and southern Transylvania. As in the aboveexample, ethnic Romanian communities play an important role in the currentpolitical life of the region. It should be remembered that ethno-national dynamics can not be measuredexclusively by quantitative parameters; qualitative characteristics must also beconsidered. The latter are related to ethnocultural traditions that tend to change andtransform as the result of cooperation between representatives of different ethniccommunities within the same ethno-political body (EPB), the Ukrainian state in ourcase. We are talking about characteristics that have been acquired in the process ofcommunitys historical evolution and shaped predominantly by their affiliation with acertain group, community of nations. Noteworthy in Ukraine the natives of 14communities of nations (of total 58 across the globe) and 18 groups (of total 300) can be found. This represents a factor significant for this analysis: polyethnicity of Ukrainianpopulation and compact settlement pattern of some of its components (Poles,Russians, Rumanians, Hungarians). The following factor to be considered is that some parts of present-day Ukrainianterritory belonged to different ethno-political bodies at different historical periodsand their proximity or considerable distance from the ethnic origin counties. Forinformation, throughout different time periods the territories of the modern Ukrainehave been part of the following states: Austria-Hungary, Poland, Russia, Romania,Czechoslovakia. Today Ukraine borders: with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary in thewest; Moldova and Romania in south-west; with Belarus and Russia in the north andsouth east. The fact that historically different parts of Ukrainian population resided inother states whose "neighborly" cooperation impacts the attitude of Ukrainiancitizens toward international structures is hard to overestimate. Consequently wehave to deal with another factor that influences formation of identities (consolidatedand individual, i.e., situational): the existence of border areas where differentidentities arise as a product of an intensive cooperation between bearers of differentethnicities ; these identities, according to our observations, prevent the Ukrainian
population from building a solid perspective toward potential Ukraines integrationwith international bodies. Dependence of attitudes although possibly of different nature on the party andpolitical factors cannot be discounted either. The recent sociological surveys(especially those that are held in the eve of presidential and parliamentary elections)clearly demonstrate the existence of "party and political influence zones" correlatingpredominantly with certain regions if not in form of a well-defined (stable) umbrellaidentity at least by situational one. In this article I will not dwell on these politicalforces and will limit myself only by stating this fact as a given. This argumentappears all too important for the logic of weighting different factors affecting for-mation of identities (artificial to some extent – as in this case), attitude of populationthroughout geographical regions and finally the prospects of Ukraines entry(integration) into transatlantic and European structures. This is especially evident incases (such as NATO) where people find themselves at opposite extremes and theonly way out is to hold a referendum. Systematic research made by sociologists fromInstitute of Sociology, the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences (Ukrainiansociety. Sociological monitoring) and Olexander Rozumkov Center or Economic andPolitical Studies provides a vast amount of data that can be used to draw conclusionson the prospect of Ukraines cooperation with international bodies. This issue wasscrutinized in a number of concrete studies, first of all surveys, such as: 1) researchproject "Lviv-Donetsk" authored by Lviv researchers in 1994, 1999 and 2004; 2)project "Polyvalent identities in modern Ukraine: can they close the gap betweenEast and West?» performed in 2010 jointly by the Ivan Franko Lviv State Universityand Michigan State University (USA); 3) survey of Ukrainian ethnic communitiesheld in 2003 under the supervision of Professor Volodymyr Yevtukh (then at theTaras Shevchenko Kyiv National University) and Professor Vicki L. Hesli (IowaState University, USA); 4) research project "Regions in Ukraine: dynamics,movements and politics"; 5) joint project of the Ukrainian NAS Institute ofSociology and the Institute of Sociology (Russian Academy of Sciences) "NationalCivil Identities and Tolerance. Experience of Russia and Ukraine in theTransformation Period"; 6) Rozumkov Center analytical report "Crimean AR:
people, problems, prospects" (societal, political, inter-ethnic and inter-confessionalrelations in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea); 7) project "Social transformationsin border areas – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova"; 8) project "Interaction of European,national and regional identities: nations between states along new eastern borders ofthe European Union" that is performed by researchers from ten countries: seven fromthe EU and three from Commonwealth of Independent States. The results of thisresearch make it possible to establish certain vectors in preferences among thepopulation of these ethnic regions, in particular to what extent these regions (viaopinion of their population) associate their future with an independent state or withneighboring states; how they perceive prospects of cooperation between Ukraine andEuropean or transatlantic structures. Migration factor has always been conspicuous in the formation processes ofUkrainian nation [9, 51-68], and today its impact on different areas of social life inour country becomes even more prominent; this impact can be felt also in the areaunder analysis. In this sense closer attention should be paid to relations betweenmigration processes and the prospects on Ukraines entry into the European andinternational social, cultural spaces, specifically by joining structured institutionsthat define predominant if not absolute development trends (especially for Europeancountries). Two observations can be made in this conjecture: a) Ukraine becomes aneven more active player in these processes, meaning it is simultaneously the countrythe migrants enter and the country the migrants exit. By the way, for this analysisUkraine is more attractive as a county of entry; b) a rather significant number ofpeople prone to migration tend to be more open-minded with respect to euro-inte-gration prospects of Ukraine than those who are not considering immigration as anoption. The certain potential of strengthening Europe- and transatlantic-centertrends should be looked for among people who are predisposed to migration or –strictly speaking – emigration since the most of those individuals who think aboutemigration think about going to European countries, the United States of Americaand Canada. Lets now review the analysis of interface between components of ethno-nationalstructure in Ukrainian society (ethnic communities – national minorities) and their
origin countries in the context of the problem in question. The question is how thesefactors influence consolidation of Ukrainian society in terms of building theUkrainian political (related to the single Ukrainian ethno-political body – the state)identity, which determines its unity and opens the possibilities of addressing urgent,sometimes controversial issues of social development. Historically the mostintensive this cooperation was with the origin countries sharing with Ukraine thesame border. In this sense, two group of countries and consequently two groups ofinfluence can be identified (we are talking first of all about ethnic factor – aninfluence that is produced by supporting certain ideas generated in these countries);1) north-eastern: Russia and Belarus; 2) western and south-western: Poland,Romania, Slovakia, Hungary. We exclude from this list Moldova, which holds astand-alone position since it hardly affects to any noticeable extent the progress ofUkraine (in political meaning of this word) process of identity consolidation. In thiscontext its influence (i.e., the influence that can be expressed through the Moldavianethnicity in Ukrainian society) is conflict breeding: on one side there is Russia(through factor of Dniester region that is totally suppressed by Russia) who wants toshape the public opinion of Ukrainian Moldavians on a number of issues, on theother side there is a significant Romanian dominance in the mindset of Moldaviansresiding in Ukraine. The analysis of these two influence groups leads to conclude that they operate inopposite directions. The Russian side is keen on severing Ukraine from Europeanintegration processes (or at least interfere with them) and isolating it fromtransatlantic opportunities. The other side (especially, Poland) quite on the contraryis set on strengthening integration ambitions of certain Ukrainian population groupsand Ukrainian authorities. The most obvious this desire could be felt when Polandassumed the presidency of the European Union (second half of 2011). These days theexamples of such political divergences are abundant; one has only to compare someofficial declarations and concrete actions made by different players and the reactionsamong ethnic communities related by their origin to the above countries and to lookat pro-Russian politicians.
The awareness of Ukrainian population, in particular of other ethnic affiliationsalso plays a significant role in formation of consolidated identities, primarily withregard to the attitude toward Ukraines integration with European and transatlanticinstitutionalized structures. Information can be provided in two basic ways: either 1)directly in Ukraine by mediation of the Ukrainian public and non-governmentalorganizations and international centers operating under the auspices of EuropeanUnion, European Council, NATO center etc., or 2) through representatives of ethnichomelands visiting Ukraine or through communication with representatives of theethnoses residing either in their homeland or in Ukraine, usually, the Russianethnoses since this kind of communication is most widely spread among the nativesof the Russian ethnic community in Ukraine. It should be mentioned that theinformation influence related to integration attitudes is only a part, possibly notsubstantial one, of the entire body of data that are created by the above means.Contrary to information from the first source which is measurable the second sourceis out of control since here information is generated from different points of origin:meetings between Russian politicians and the Russian diaspora in Ukraine, provisionof nongovernmental organizations run by the Russian national minority with massmedia means, convening the global meetings of Russian diaspora in Russia etc. Thesame situation can be observed also among representatives of diasporas whose ethnichomelands lie west of Ukraine. The distinction between the two is that in the firstcase bulk of information data is directed at forging an image of internationalstructures, first of all, NATO that does not stimulate the euro- and transatlanticaspirations, in particular among the representatives of pro-Russian portion of theUkrainian society, and in the second case quite on the contrary: integration ofPoland, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary in the international structures objectivelypromotes maintaining and strengthening such aspirations. However in any event theflows of information generated within respective ethnic communities have adistinctive regional color: compact residence seats of various ethnic communities(Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Transcarpathian and Chernivetska Oblasts). In our context it hardly makes sense to dwell on the quality of information, let ustake just a few examples instead. For the purpose of this study it is sufficient to
account for this factor in measurement of problems associated with formation of asingle (we consciously do not apply the word "unified") Ukrainian identity, at leastwith regard to the problem that is debated in this article. Let us provide several excerpts of social monitoring research that the Institute ofSociology, the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences has been performing since1992 to illustrate dependence of Ukrainian identities, in particular consolidatedidentity, on the above factors. 1. What direction of national development do you think is preferential forUkraine? (lets differentiate four positions inter-related with the proposed analysis(1994 – 2010): focus on relations within framework of CIS countries: 40.5 to 12.5%;develop relations predominantly with Russia: 16.6 to 10.5%; strengthen eastern-Slavic block (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus): 23.7 (1998) to 29.8% (the highest index wasin 2004 – 34.3%); establish relations with the developed countries of the West: 12.6 –17.7%. 2. What is your position to ... Ukraine joining the European Union (2000-2010):rather agree: 56.0 to 44.1%; rather disagree: 9.6 to 18.8% (the highest index was in2005: 19.9%); hard to say: 34.4 to 36.9% (the highest index was in 2002: 40.1%). 3. What is your position to ... Ukraine joining NATO (2000–2010): rather agree:24.9 to 12.7%; rather disagree: 33.5 to 64.4% (the highest index was in 2006: 64.4%);hard to say: 42.6 to 24.1% (the highest index was in 2002: 42.6%) [10, 494-496]. So far the Ukrainian sociology lacks sufficient data to draw generalizedconclusions about the extent of influence produced by regional or ethnic factors onvariations in identities building process that is directly related to the prospects ofUkrainian cooperation with international structures. However they are sufficient todiscover some consistent patterns. The research project "Lviv-Donetsk" performedby the Lviv researchers in 1994, 1999 and 2004 is sufficiently representative tomirror mindsets predominant across different regions with regard to cooperation withinternational structures [8, 317-334]. In the context of this study, most indicative are responses to the question: "Whatpossible options of the future national development are preferential to you?": Ukraineremains completely independent, non-block state (apparently not a NATO member):
Lviv (62.2; 43.2; 41.6%), Donetsk (13.3; 18.5; 25.8%); Ukraine becomes a large partof the union that comprises Russia: Lviv (5.4; 2.3; 2.5%), Donetsk (57.0; 47.0;55.6%); Ukraine becomes a part of the European Union: Lviv (25.2; 47.3; 47.4%),Donetsk (18.0; 21.5; 6.1%); Ukraine becomes a part of the large union comprisingCentral and Eastern European countries: Lviv (5.9; 6.7; 8.3%), Donetsk (6.6; 12.7;8.1%). Similarly significant is the response to the question about the extent ofpossible cooperation with differently oriented structures. Closer relations with Russiaand CIS are regarded as priority in Lviv by 14.1% (1999) and 9.4% (2004), inDonetsk by 73.8 and 87.2%; Closer relations with the USA and NATO countries areregarded as priority in y Lviv by 59.2 and 51.5%, in Donetsk by 10.5 and 1.6%. Some researchers looking for other arguments in the discourse on the issues ofcooperation between Ukraine and international structures choose to use the data ofsociological surveys on the attitudes of Ukrainian citizens to such important (in ouropinion) phenomena of the social life (social thought) as "national idea" and "culturaltradition". The first (as we think) is a virtual notion (nurtured mostly by politiciansand researchers and rather weakly, systematically, accepted by the public opinion);the other one is rather real and more comprehensible to great number of Ukrainians. One of the recent similar studies (2007) (as was demonstrated above) shows thatmost Ukrainians (65%) believe that today the national idea is nothing but a notion.For our case it is interesting to observe the difference in responses across regions: asit appears the differences are almost non-existent. The divergence emerges betweenrespondents who believe that the national idea really exists: western oblasts: 15%;center and eastern oblasts: approximately 8-9%. Lets not go too deep into whatUkrainians residing in different regions believe the "national idea" is about but noteinstead that understanding (perception) of this word remains unclear: to 30%Ukrainians in western and 43% in south-western oblasts . Speaking about thenational idea it is worthwhile to consider it in conjunction with such phenomenon as"patriotism". The responses to the question posed in Olexander Rozumkov Centerssurvey held in the eve of the 2009 Independence Day: "Do you consider yourself thepatriot of Ukraine?" the clearly positive answers across regions were distributed inthe following fashion: West – 56.3, Center – 35.2, South – 31.8, East – 33.4% .
On the other hand, the prospects of building the solid system of cultural traditionlook somewhat brighter, which can positively influence the attitude of Ukrainiantoward various phenomena of the countrys social development. The reasons for thisassertion are provided by the above mentioned survey "Culture and arts": 60 percentof respondents identify themselves as representatives of the Ukrainian culturaltradition; to say the truth, however, this opinion is not shared equally across differentregions: 84% in the West, 77% in Center, 39% in South-East. Another survey(Olexander Rozumkov Center, December 2005) confirms the previous findings andprovides new ones that define more specifically our reflections with regard topossible influence of cultural tradition on building consolidated identities amongUkrainian citizens. This path apparently remains strenuous: one year after, thenumber of "Soviet cultural tradition" proponents grew to 19.4% (as opposed to16.4%); among ethnic Ukrainians only 43.1% believe that the "Ukrainian nationalcultural tradition" will prevail in future; 21.0% believe that in different regionscultural traditions are also different and 18.7 prefer the "pan-European tradition" . Identification matrix of the Ukrainian population can be supplemented by otherdata showing what territories and political and territorial formations Ukrainiansresiding in different regions believe they belong to. These data can be found in theresearch done by the Olexander Rozumkov Center or Economic and Political Studies(they are most trustworthy): the following percentage of respondents believethemselves to be the residents of area or city/town where they live: 39.4 in the West,43.1 in the Center, 29.8 in the South, 37.0% in the East (38.2% across Ukraine); thefollowing percentage of respondents believe themselves to be the residents of theregion where they live: 15.4, 22.9, 24.5, 19.1% (20.4%) respectively; or residents ofUkraine as a country: 34.8, 25.2, 35.8, 32.0% (30.7%); or residents of Europe: 2.4,1.8, 3.3, 0.2% (1.6%); or residents of the world: 4.0, 1.4, 1.0, 3.3% (2.9%) . The sociological research performed jointly by the Ukrainian and AmericanUniversities has also provided interesting data: they confirmed our thesis about directrelationship between three factors (ethnic origin, residential structure and politicaland party preferences) and the nature of Ukrainian identity formation and content.The survey targeted representatives from seven ethnic communities (Ukrainians,
Russians, Crimean Tatars, Poles, Hungarians, Jews, Gypsies) in four social, culturalregions (Western Ukraine, Center Ukraine, Eastern Ukraine, Southern Ukraine).Regarding the residential structure, it was discovered that: 1) the most compactresidence pattern is characteristic for Crimean Tatars (Autonomous Republic ofCrimea – almost 99%) and Hungarians (Transcarpathian Oblast – almost 97%); 2)the average level of compact residence pattern is characteristic for the Poles andGypsies; 3) rather dispersed residence pattern is characteristic for the Russians (insome oblasts however their residence concentration was rather high: 33 to 56 %(Kharkiv, Donetsk, Lugansk Oblasts and Crimea); 4) the highest level of dispersionis characteristic for Ukrainians. For our analysis two groups of questions have beenmost relevant: 1) questions related to respondents attitude toward group of countriesand international organizations (USA, Russia, Germany, European Union, NATO);2) questions related to assessment of relations with European countries, USA andRussia. The general typology looks as follows: Ukrainians, Hungarians, CrimeanTatars, Poles across all regions tend to be by far more (as compared with Ukrainesaverage) attached to the idea of joining international structures and NATO (the dataof this ethno-sociological research have been compared with data of the above men-tioned research); Russians gave most of their preferences to Russia, favored less theidea of joining the European Union and almost completely rejected the idea ofjoining NATO; the Jews across all indices remained in the middle of the preferentialhierarchy; the Gypsies have been uncertain in most cases. Special perspective wasexhibited by the Crimean Tatars when they have been asked about their attitude tothe Middle East countries: their preferences have been rather high [13, 1-28]. To summarize, the analysis of concrete sociological data, historical factors, natureof political process, logical substantiation of interrelations between differentphenomena and events, their interface and analysis of some other factors allowsdrawing the following conclusion about relations between Ukrainian identities andprospects of Ukraines cooperation with international structures, in particular itsintegration into some of these structures: 1) Polyethnic structure of Ukrainian population has not as yet become, as it isbelieved in Europe , the factor of ethno-political health and strength. Ethnic
communities in Ukraine remain in the middle of their restoration (such possibilityhas appeared after Ukraine has acquired independence and launched democraticprocesses, in particular those in the area of ethno-national development), whichstimulates disintegration processes, impels ethnic communities to focus most effortson their internal problems and compete for more comfortable (more prestigious)niches in a social (and sometimes political) hierarchy of the Ukrainian society. Thelatter results sometimes in hidden, if not open, confrontation preventing Ukrainiansfrom adopting a consolidated decision about Ukraines cooperation with Europeanand Transatlantic structures and deferring the prospect of its integration with thesestructures; 2) The Ukrainian society exhibits two clearly defined trends in the attitudestoward Ukraines cooperation with international structures: a) promotingcollaboration with Russia and integration into structures inspired by Russia; b)making further progress to mutual understanding with and participation in Europeanand Transatlantic organizations. In the first case the trend gets all the morepronounced from West to East and in the other case on the contrary from East toWest. A very important role in this process is played by regional factor and to someextent by ethnic composition of Ukrainian population; 3) The relatively significant Russian component in the ethno- nationalcomposition of the Ukrainian population, and in a broader sense, the so-calledRussian-speaking community apparently remaining under influence of Russiasideology (rejecting the Ukraines euro-integration aspirations) is not willing to seeout country at the head of these processes, decreases Ukraines integration potentialand reinforces the pro-eastern trends in the Ukrainian society; 4) A clearly defined regional aspect of political factor resulting in differentpreferences and loyalties to Ukraines development, as confirmed by the abovesociological surveys, does not contribute to consolidation of efforts in Ukrainiansociety toward support of euro – and transatlantic aspirations and defers Ukrainesentry into international structures; 5) Outflow of Ukrainian citizens, especially those who support westernorientation, undermines the process of building integral identity of population
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