SSTR - Opportunities and Challanges

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SSTR - Opportunities and Challanges

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SSTR - Opportunities and Challanges

  1. 1. SSTR: Opportunities & Challenges Sanjana Hattotuwa InfoShare Sri Lanka
  2. 2. Sri Lanka
  3. 3. Country details <ul><li>Population – 20 million </li></ul><ul><li>Land area – 62, 705km 2 </li></ul><ul><li>Literacy – 91% </li></ul><ul><li>Life expectancy – 72 years </li></ul><ul><li>74% Sinhalese Buddhists, 12% Tamil Hindus, 5% Muslims and 7% Christians </li></ul>
  4. 4. Overview of conflict <ul><li>70,000 dead (+ around 31,000 from tsunami) </li></ul><ul><li>Hundreds of thousands of IDPs </li></ul><ul><li>Over 3,000 civilians killed over the past year </li></ul><ul><li>Devastated the economy, livelihoods </li></ul><ul><li>Traumatised societies (Tamil, Muslim, Sinhala) </li></ul>
  5. 5. <ul><li>February 2002 – Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) between UNF and LTTE </li></ul><ul><li>Six Rounds of Peace Talks (2002 – 2003) </li></ul><ul><li>LTTE pulls out of talks in May 2003 </li></ul><ul><li>Change of Government in November 2005 brings in nationalists to power </li></ul><ul><li>Severe escalation in hostilities & human rights violations over past year </li></ul><ul><li>2007 LTTE’s air strike capacity </li></ul>Overview of conflict
  6. 6. LTTE <ul><li>The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is an armed group capable of sustainable guerrilla actions, terrorist attacks, and also fighting large conventional battles. It has a tight organizational structure (military and political) under the control of one person, and it is completely disciplined. </li></ul><ul><li>It has systematically eliminated other Tamil militant groups, controls territory in the north and east of Sri Lanka, and runs a parallel government (with a police force, judicial system, and other structures). </li></ul><ul><li>It has extensive international linkages and has created a worldwide business empire. For example, the LTTE has extensive shipping interests that are used for the delivery of weapons to the LTTE in Sri Lanka. </li></ul><ul><li>It was deproscribed as a terrorist organization in Sri Lanka, but is listed as a terrorist organisation by the US, the EU and many other countries </li></ul>
  7. 9. War and Insurgency <ul><li>Massive trauma, loss of life </li></ul><ul><li>Ethnic divide </li></ul><ul><li>No trust, polarised communities </li></ul><ul><li>Very little people to people contact </li></ul><ul><li>Media stereotypes </li></ul><ul><li>Zero sum politics, extremist nationalism, hate speech </li></ul><ul><li>Random crime by deserters </li></ul><ul><li>Domestic abuse </li></ul>
  8. 10. So what’s the fuss about SSTR?
  9. 11. SSTR Decisions based on: Sensitivity Awareness Common sense Intelligence (not intel) Enlightened self-interest Conflict prevention & mitigation Root causes of conflict, not just symptoms Long-term & holistic Key parties to the conflict incl. terrorist groups Internal divisions within parties Civil Society / Business / NGOs Grassroots / Gender / Culture External actors / Donors / INGOs SSTR
  10. 12. Nurture cohesive, holistic and sustainable information and knowledge management systems that work in austere conditions SSTR: The aim is to communicate! Grassroots Key stakeholders Moderates and Civil Society Donors, International Aid Organisations Military | Force operations
  11. 13. Links between peace, development & security <ul><li>Riga Summit Declaration: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Peace, Security and Development are now more interconnected than ever </li></ul></ul><ul><li>1991 UN General Assembly: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>There is a clear relationship between emergency, rehabilitation and development. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Kofi Anan, former UNSG, May 2006: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>UN Peacekeeping operations are now increasingly complex and multi-dimensional, going beyond monitoring a ceasefire to actually bringing failed States back to life, often after decades of conflict. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>US DoD Directive 3000.05: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Stability operations as a core mission and instructs US Armed forces to accord it the same priority as combat operations </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Essential message from above: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Building a stable peace / “positive peace” requires addressing the underlying causes of conflict, not just its symptoms </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Importance of human security - security defined as much more than military or territorial defence. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Security entwined with aspects of political, economic, social and cultural issues </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Relationships matter </li></ul></ul>
  12. 14. Formulaic approach to “conflict resolution” <ul><li>Conflict resolution in three phases: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Combat operations to secure territory (military) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Stabilisation phase (civil-military) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Reconstruction (civil) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Cycles of conflict & the bell curve: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Harmonious past </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>A single events or a series of interconnected events gives rise to violence </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Violence peeks at which point parties begin to think of ending the violence </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Peace agreement signed </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Demobilization, demilitarization, disarmament and peace </li></ul></ul>
  13. 15. Levels of violence Time Mythical past Conflict fatigue Peace agreement Peace & harmony
  14. 16. Levels of violence Time Mythical past Conflict fatigue Peace agreement Peace & harmony Combat operations Stabilisation Reconstruction
  15. 17. The Reality Levels of violence Time Conflict fatigue Peace agreement Combat operations Stabilisation Reconstruction
  16. 18. Dispute Resolution / Conflict Transformation <ul><li>A process of engaging with and transforming relationships , interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict </li></ul><ul><li>CT argues against giving primacy to settlements </li></ul><ul><li>Conflict is never resolved, but transformed to the non-violent negotiation of differences </li></ul>
  17. 20. Civilian - Military Cooperation <ul><li>A basic principle is still to keep humanitarian and military activities separate, so that each party can pursue its own objectives unimpeded by the other. </li></ul><ul><li>However , the need to share information is growing and more urgent. </li></ul><ul><li>Militaries usually have political legitimacy, power and lift capabilities, but have political objectives and the timelines are short. </li></ul><ul><li>NGOs usually have ethical legitimacy, greater maneuverability with actors on the ground, medium to long term timeframes, familiar with local culture and context </li></ul>
  18. 21. What does a relationship entail? <ul><li>Communication is at the heart of it: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Interaction: simple contact and exchange of information on the situation and activities </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Coordination: harmonisation of different actions for a common objective, while allowing each party to retain its freedom of action </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Cooperation / Collaboration: pursuit of a common objective by means of common action </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Perception is reality </li></ul>
  19. 22. Perceptions of each other: NGOs on the Military <ul><li>Cons </li></ul><ul><li>Military hears, but does not listen </li></ul><ul><li>Lack of humility / Arrogant / Intolerant of divergent views </li></ul><ul><li>Inadequate understanding of long term peacebuilding </li></ul><ul><li>Lack of gender sensitivity </li></ul><ul><li>Unaccountable to local population </li></ul><ul><li>Lack of cultural understanding </li></ul><ul><li>Speak a different language of acronyms based on force </li></ul><ul><li>Pros </li></ul><ul><li>Protect INGOs and unarmed civilians / Force protection </li></ul><ul><li>Trained and under a chain of command </li></ul><ul><li>Power and lift capacity - logistical superiority </li></ul><ul><li>Communications advanced </li></ul><ul><li>Can be sensitive to local issues </li></ul>
  20. 23. Perceptions of each other: Military on NGOs <ul><li>Cons </li></ul><ul><li>NGOs are messy to work with, no organisation on the ground, different agendas </li></ul><ul><li>Lack of appreciation for military help - whine a lot, but ask for help when in trouble </li></ul><ul><li>Chaotic communications and information exchange, no coordination, little collaboration </li></ul><ul><li>NGOs are arrogant </li></ul><ul><li>Pros </li></ul><ul><li>Local knowledge, perspective, understanding of communal dynamics </li></ul><ul><li>Positive relations with the local communities </li></ul><ul><li>Wide experience, in there for the long-haul, experienced & dedicated unarmed staff at the front-lines of conflict </li></ul><ul><li>Open to discussion </li></ul>
  21. 24. Defining humanitarian ops <ul><li>One of the sources of misunderstandings between military and humanitarian actors concerns the use of the term “humanitarian”. </li></ul><ul><li>Relief for a population can only be described as humanitarian if it meets all of the humanitarian criteria - humanity, impartiality and neutrality . </li></ul><ul><li>Obviously this does not mean that the military are not &quot;humane&quot;, and it does not detract in any way from the legitimacy of the relief actions that they may conduct during an armed conflict. </li></ul><ul><li>Relief operations are governed by another mandate, a political mandate, in which humanitarian logic may play a part but is not a priority. </li></ul>
  22. 25. Tough questions <ul><li>Do the principles of humanity and impartiality still have meaning in situations where humanitarian aid is hijacked by combatants, criminals or local potentates who use it to consolidate their power and prolong conflicts? </li></ul><ul><li>Is neutrality acceptable when one of the sides in the conflict is knowingly flouting human rights? </li></ul><ul><li>Can private humanitarian aid be separated over the long term from government development policy? </li></ul><ul><li>Does the principle of independence apply in full when a large part of an NGO’s funding comes from government or international organizations? </li></ul>
  23. 26. IASC: Civil-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies <ul><li>Differentiation: military and humanitarian actors differ in mandates, objectives, institutional cultures, working methods, community. It is important that both military and humanitarian understand and learn to respect these differences for the sake of their respective mission. It is important to maintain a clear separation between the roles of the military and humanitarian actors at all times. </li></ul>
  24. 27. IASC: Civil-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies <ul><li>Guidelines: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The decision to seek military-based security for humanitarian workers must be a last resort option; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Coordination with military must be guided by the ‘do no harm’ approach ( do not worsen the conflict and do not endanger the beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance); </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Consent of the parties to the conflict must be pursued, because it will make the cooperation with the military more acceptable ; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>To safeguard the above principles and for pragmatic reasons it is not advisable to become dependent of military assistance . </li></ul></ul>
  25. 28. IASC: Civil-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies <ul><li>Practical considerations: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Liaison arrangements: these are always necessary, but it is essential to assess in terms of local perception the level of publicity and transparency to be given to the liaison arrangement; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Information sharing: avoid any information sharing that may endanger beneficiaries or humanitarian workers; appropriate information sharing may include: security information, humanitarian locations, humanitarian activities, mine-action activities, population movements, relief activities conducted by the military, post-strike information; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Use of military assets for humanitarian operations: only as a last resort and within clear parameters: sole capability (no other means available); timeliness (urgency of the task); clear humanitarian direction (civilian control over the use of assets); limitation duration; </li></ul></ul>
  26. 29. IASC: Civil-Military Relations in Complex Emergencies <ul><li>Practical considerations: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Use of military or armed escort for humanitarian convoys: only in exceptional circumstances and only at the request of humanitarian actors; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Joint civil-military relief operations: only as last resort, given the negative perception that a joint operation of this kind may entail for humanitarian organizations; the military have different mandates and objectives that are not humanitarian as a priority; </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Separate military operations for relief purposes: to be strongly discouraged because they blur humanitarian and military roles, and jeopardize humanitarian action and safety. Only as a last resort, in exceptional circumstances; </li></ul></ul>
  27. 30. “ Strategic complementarity” <ul><li>Cultural interoperability: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Develop mutual knowledge and understanding through dialogue workshops, joint education, staff interaction towards the production of a mutually respected and understood frame of reference / framework for action / language & definitions </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Make use of the UN mechanisms & entities: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Use DPKO / OCHA / UNJLC / IASC / UNDP good offices as neutral terrain for meetings, joint planning, coordination, information sharing & trust building spaces, collaboration points </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Establish a dedicated SSTR group consisting of civilian as well as force commanders: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Avoiding cooption by either party, to serve as a sounding board for collaborative action, responses to incidents from a broader field of expertise including CT / IHL / Gender / HR / Customs and cultural traditions </li></ul></ul>
  28. 31. Strong Angel II: SSTR Lessons <ul><li>Flexibility </li></ul><ul><li>Secure </li></ul><ul><li>Transparent </li></ul><ul><li>Availability </li></ul><ul><li>As you watch the video: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Technology can help </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Look beyond Groove and at the questions, opportunities software raises for SSTR support operations & communications </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Back to basics - should there be an emphasis on training more than dependence on ICT? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>What are the assumptions in this video? </li></ul></ul>
  29. 32. Strong Angel III: Lessons identified <ul><li>Lack of Civ-Mil Communications: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Reliability, interoperability, security, off-line access and policy restrictions impede information flows </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Language impediments </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Lack of tools: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Can’t use open source, freely available tools on military networks. Wikis, blogs, mash-ups and social networking are alien concepts for most militaries </li></ul></ul><ul><li>No real understanding of SSTR: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Staff rotations, lack of conceptual understanding of long-term CT, cultural issues, and the inter-play of communal, domestic, regional and international factors confuse adoption in the field </li></ul></ul>
  30. 33. Strong Angel III: Lessons identified <ul><li>Clear guidance needed from military to cooperate with non-military partners: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Conduct meetings with partners on neutral ground, through secure virtual collaboration tools, on secure / private blogs </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Explain 3000.05: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Explain what it means, how it can help, what it facilitates, what it’s limitations are to lay-person audience, without using jargon, and sensitive to the perception of the military </li></ul></ul><ul><li>2.1.4. Train Personnel in Ethno-political Conflict Resolution </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Many geographical area of SSTR interest have long-standing, deep-rooted, complex ethno-political conflicts that are often violent and a risk to SSTR responders. Make the basic skills of ethno-political conflict resolution both a training requirement and a core competency within SSTR response agencies. Enlist current conflict resolution practitioners to assist in this training mission. </li></ul></ul>
  31. 34. Gender & SSTR <ul><li>Gender sensitivity is important: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Needs to be mainstreamed at all levels, not mere lip-service </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Hardly mentioned in SSTR literature </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Insensitivity can undermine and render useless other SSTR initiatives </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Powerfully brought out by NGOs as a key concern </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Technology design and deployment needs to take into consideration the power centres of male dominated contexts </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Gender equity and equality needs to be part and parcel of any SSTR advisory body, beyond tokenism </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Look at the ways in which the voices of women will change our approach to SSTR, the tools therein, and the technologies used </li></ul></ul>
  32. 35. Before SSTR: InfoShare <ul><li>Established in 2003 </li></ul><ul><li>To explore ways to support civil society and stakeholders in the peace process </li></ul><ul><li>To secure and strengthen justice through enhanced communications </li></ul><ul><li>To design systems to build trust, where culturally appropriate and worked in austere conditions </li></ul><ul><li>To build solutions on industry accepted open standards </li></ul><ul><li>To support communications within and between communities using new technology and new media </li></ul>
  33. 36. The Central Problem
  34. 37. <ul><li>The One-Text procedure is a systematic process to elicit underlying interests and needs of parties and providing a mechanism and space to jointly explore and develop many options and deciding on one. </li></ul><ul><li>The process is called the ‘One-Text’ because quite literally there is only one text - drawn on the texts of each of the stakeholders, including progressive thinkers from terrorist groups. </li></ul>One Text Process
  35. 38. One Text Process
  36. 39. Anti-trafficking
  37. 40. Disaster Relief Management
  38. 41. One Text Process <ul><li>A single repository for all information </li></ul><ul><li>Accountability and transparency </li></ul><ul><li>Safe spaces </li></ul><ul><li>Audio / Video / Text / Whiteboard </li></ul><ul><li>Information rich environment </li></ul><ul><li>Linked to real world processes </li></ul><ul><li>Co – owned / Lack of any central data store </li></ul><ul><li>Lack of trust within and between stakeholders suffocates discussion </li></ul><ul><li>Culture of secrecy </li></ul><ul><li>Access to technology – hardware and language </li></ul><ul><li>Embryonic technology </li></ul>Pros Cons
  39. 42. Expert systems / Decision support
  40. 43. Community Participation www.groundviews.lk
  41. 44. Community Participation radio.voicesofpeace.lk
  42. 45. ICT4Peace www.peacelibrary.org
  43. 46. Strengthening Human Rights <ul><li>World’s first to feature: </li></ul><ul><li>Any OS </li></ul><ul><li>Any browser </li></ul><ul><li>Any PC </li></ul><ul><li>Any connection </li></ul><ul><li>PC / Mobile </li></ul><ul><li>GIS </li></ul><ul><li>Multi-lingual </li></ul>
  44. 47. Thank you

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