• Share
  • Email
  • Embed
  • Like
  • Save
  • Private Content
Cournot And Stackelberg Solver Model
 

Cournot And Stackelberg Solver Model

on

  • 3,411 views

Cournot And Stackelberg Solver by Xavier Lehnhoff

Cournot And Stackelberg Solver by Xavier Lehnhoff

Statistics

Views

Total Views
3,411
Views on SlideShare
3,411
Embed Views
0

Actions

Likes
0
Downloads
44
Comments
0

0 Embeds 0

No embeds

Accessibility

Upload Details

Uploaded via

Usage Rights

© All Rights Reserved

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Processing…
Post Comment
Edit your comment

    Cournot And Stackelberg Solver Model Cournot And Stackelberg Solver Model Document Transcript

    • Cournot Demand: P = a - Q Cournot Equilibrium Firm 1 a= 100 Quantity 32.667 Marginal Cost Firm 1 MC1 = 2 Price 34.667 Marginal Cost Firm 2 MC2= 2 Profits 1067.111 Total Quantity 65.333 Stackelberg Demand: P = a - Q Stackelberg Equilibrium Firm 1 a= 12 Quantity 3.500 Marginal Cost Firm 1 MC1 = 4 Price 5.750 Marginal Cost Firm 2 MC2= 3 Profits 6.125 Total Quantity 6.250 First mover advantage: occurs in the case of capacity decisions. by Xavier Lehnhoff
    • Price must be the same for both We need to make a decision about capacity Firm 2 Product is homogeneous Quantity 32.667 Decisions are simultaneous, static game Price 34.667 Depending on what one player does and demand, we establish capacity Profits 1067.111 In Cournot equilibrium, no players have incentive to cheat. In Collusion equilibrium, we Firm 2 Quantity 2.750 Price 5.750 Profits 7.563
    • establish capacity eat. In Collusion equilibrium, we have incentive to cheat