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  • 1. Information Operations Newsletter Compiled by: Mr. Jeff Harley US Army Strategic Command G3 Plans, Information Operations BranchThe articles and information appearing herein are intended for educational and non-commercial purposes to promote discussion of research inthe public interest. The views, opinions, and/or findings and recommendations contained in this summary are those of the original authors andshould not be construed as an official position, policy, or Table of the United States Government, U.S. Department of the Army, or U.S. decision of ContentsArmy Strategic Command.
  • 2. Table of Contents Vol. 7, no. 10 (19 – 28 January 2007)1. A Counter-Revolution in Military Affairs? Notes on US High-Tech Warfare2. Light Boosts Destructive Power of Microwave Weapons, Sensors3. NATO Reveals Dark Arts of Psy-Ops4. Chinas Anti-Satellite Weapon Fuels Anxiety5. Freedom of Information, the Wiki Way6. Wikis a New OPSEC Threat?7. Defense Domain, Civilian Awareness8. Signals Foil IEDs But Also Troop Radios9. Pentagon to Contractors: Meet DOD Infosec Standards10. China Confirms Firing Missile to Destroy Satellite11. China Internet Market Grows To 137 Million Users12. Google Blots Out Iraq Bases On Internet13. UNH Geeks Unveil a Cyber Threat Calculator14. Iraqis Hold Reopening Celebration for School15. LTG David Petraeus: A Military Leader Bringing “Soft Power” to Iraq16. Camp Lemonier Soldier Recalls Heart-Warming Experience In Kenya Page ii
  • 3. A Counter-Revolution in Military Affairs? Notes on US High-Tech WarfareBy Jacob Levich, Aspects of India’s Economy, Issue 42, December 2006[Aspects of India’s Economy] Editors IntroductionThe recent report of the Iraq Study Group appointed by the US Congress, as well as candid remarks by top officials of the US and UK, revealthe depth of the crisis of the US military occupation of Iraq. The crisis has exposed the limitations of the very area which is the USs forte,namely, its military strength.In December 2002, three months before the United States invaded Iraq, we concluded a brief sketch of the history of modern Iraq thus:The Iraqi armed forces may not be able to put up extended resistance to the onslaught. But the Iraqi people have not buckled to Americandictates for the past more than 11 years of torment. They will not meekly surrender to the imminent American-led military occupation of theircountry. And that fact itself carries grave consequences for American imperialisms broader designs.1Those broader designs were not restricted to Iraq. In a separate section we described those designs, why US imperialism was driven toundertake them, and the hurdles in its way:The exact shape of things is hard to predict. Yet it is clear that it is not the sophisticated military technology of the US, but the response ofpeople worldwide that will play the crucial role in determining that shape.The following essay shows, with remarkable concreteness, how the people of West Asia have met the worlds most sophisticated militarytechnology, and held their own. This analysis is particularly important in times when the ruling media worldwide project that technology,rather than human organisation, determines the course of historical development.— The Editor.When Colonel Harry Summers told a North Vietnamese counterpart in 1975 that "[y]ou know younever defeated us on the battlefield," the reply was: "That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.2News stories surrounding the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq proclaimed the arrival of a long-promised "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA), a new system of warfare that was said to combineinnovative battlefield tactics with high-tech weaponry, networked communications, andsophisticated surveillance technology. The US military promoted its latest toys as "force multipliers"— factors that promised dramatically to increase US combat effectiveness without requiringadditional troops. Advanced weapons systems publicly acknowledged by the Department ofDefense included unmanned spy drones, powerful "bunker buster" explosives, and precision-guidedmunitions; additionally, the US arsenal was rumored to contain fearsome new weapons from therealm of science fiction: battlefield death rays, "E-bombs", even devices that would allow GIs tosee through walls."Wired" or "postmodern" warfare, it was widely claimed, would transform the 21st-centurybattlefield and assure American supremacy for generations to come. As one televisioncommentator gushed: "It is hard to imagine a technological change that has had a similar impacton international affairs. The development of the tank? The first flight of a military aircraft? Theinvention of gunpowder? It is somewhere at that level."3This degree of enthusiasm for RMA did not long survive the first flush of triumph. After severalyears of grueling guerrilla warfare in the Middle East, US strategists are now re-learning thefundamental lessons of Vietnam: that guerilla war is a political, not merely a military, struggle; thattechnology, no matter how sophisticated or lethal, cannot defeat a determined popular resistance;that resistance fighters draw their power from the sympathies and co-operation of the people.4The following, a re-evaluation of RMAs most highly-touted weapons in light of the realities ofcombat, reaffirms that it is people, not armaments, that remain decisive.Precision Munitions"Afghanistan will be remembered as the smart-bomb war," predicted the New York Times in afront-page article that touted the "swiftness and accuracy of … a new kind of American airpower."5In fact US "smart bombs" has already been used during the 1991 Gulf War and the 1999 attack onYugoslavia, and their performance was in some ways unsatisfactory. Not only were laser-guidedweapons far less accurate than contemporary propaganda suggested; they proved unusable in badweather (cloud cover or sandstorms prevent laser guidance systems from "painting" the target.)6The new JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munition), a compact satellite navigation system that converts afree-falling 2,000-lb. bomb into a guided smart weapon, was designed to solve the weather Page 1
  • 4. problem. Reports from Afghanistan and Iraq suggest that the JDAMs GPS guidance technologyworked well in sandstorms and through cloud cover, resisted jamming, and was in general"remarkably good and remarkably consistent," though its accuracy probably falls short of DefenseDepartment claims.7 Relatively quite cheap at a cost of about $20,000 per bomb, the JDAM willlikely remain a lethal threat to fixed, observable targets for years to come.Far more expensive, at $500,000 apiece, is the US Navys Tomahawk cruise missile, a ship-launched, radar-guided flying bomb that debuted in the 1991 Gulf War and was also used in Iraqand Afghanistan. Because of its high cost and inaccuracy relative to the JDAM, it is somewhat outof fashion as a conventional battlefield weapon, though nuclear cruise missiles remain an importantpart of the US arsenal.8 The Tomahawk is essentially unchanged since its introduction in the late1970s, but a new high-tech "tactical Tomahawk" is in development. Promised improvementsinclude networked on-board computers capable of processing targeting data from multiple sources,as well as a TV camera for battlefield observation. Originally scheduled for delivery in 2004, theTactical Tomahawk has been delayed repeatedly and may not appear in combat anytime soon.At least one of the Pentagons "spy drones" is now used extensively for the delivery of precisionmunitions, and can therefore be discussed in this section. The Predator, an unmanned aerial vehicle(UAV) designed for surveillance and reconnaissance, began carrying laser-guided Hellfire missilesduring the US invasion of Afghanistan and continues to fly combat missions in Iraq and elsewherein Asia. The object of especially breathless praise from Western journalists, the Predator is inpractice slow, relatively inaccurate, and virtually unusable in rainy weather.9 A Defense Departmentstudy dating from late 2001 found "serious deficiencies in reliability, maintainability and humanfactors design" and reported that by late 2001, 22 of the 50 Predator aircraft built for the U.S. AirForce [at a cost of $25 million each] had been shot down or crashed.10 The Predator is neverthelessvalued in its reconnaissance role and is credited with detecting enemy mortar positions andwarning convoys of potential ambushes.11Overall, the US estimates the accuracy of precision munitions used in Iraq and Afghanistan atabout 90 percent.12 However, the 2006 Lancet study of civilian mortality in Iraq attributes 13% ofcivilian deaths to airstrikes — i.e., out of 601,027 estimated deaths from violent causes, nearly80,000 Iraqis had been killed by US bombs as of June, 2006.13 Yet military analysts seem satisfiedwith the performance of high-tech bombs and missiles, despite their evident failure to reducecivilian casualties. This is because the purpose of precision-guided munitions is not to avoid"collateral damage," despite contrary claims by US propagandists. The real importance of theweapons is that they protect planes and pilots from anti-aircraft fire; long-distance precisionairstrikes mean fewer sorties and less exposure to enemy guns.14 Measured strictly in terms of lostaircraft per sortie, performance appears to have been superb.15 Thus the fact that precisionmunitions have, if anything, increased civilian casualties is not of great concern to militaryplanners, except insofar as the US is occasionally embarrassed by newspaper accounts of"unnecessary" killings.Of far greater concern to imperialist countries is the demonstrated impotence of precision weaponsin the face of determined guerilla resistance. During the invasion of Lebanon, Hezbollah fighterswere able to counter Israels US-supplied smart bombs using classic guerilla tactics, digging in (anetwork of reinforced underground bunkers consistently thwarted precision weapons) or blendinginto the population as circumstances required. Nor were Israels high-tech targeting systemseffective in locating small, easily portable weapons like Hezbollahs Katyusha rockets.16 Despite itsoverwhelming success in applying pre-emptive firepower in the context of full-scale invasions, theUS and its allies have discovered the futility of "firing precision munitions from attack aircraftagainst … phantoms or ghosts — shadowy groups blended into existing society without respect tointernational borders."17As a result, the air war in Iraq has undergone a distinct shift over time from precision tacticalbombing to strategic bombing intended to punish the people for their support of the resistance.18 A Page 2
  • 5. similar trajectory was followed, much more rapidly, in Lebanon, where the Israeli Air Forceresponded to the failure of its initial precision strikes against Hezbollah by widening the air war tocivilian targets, including apartment buildings, airports, bridges, highways, and human beings.19 Inboth cases the aggressors disastrously underestimated the courage of the people, whose supportfor the resistance and willingness to sacrifice grew stronger than before. As a Beirut mother told anAmerican reporter in July 2006:If Israel and America want to do this to us, all we can do is to bear the situation, so if we have tostay underground we will. We don’t mind staying here as long as the boys are O.K. [a reference toHezbollah’s fighters] and as long as Sheikh Nasrallah is fine. We can bear anything.20The strength and breadth of popular support for Hezbollah remains an embarrassment to US andIsraeli propagandists, who have sought to portray the party and its militia as mere cats-paws forSyrian interference in Lebanese affairs. Polls taken in the aftermath of Israels invasion, showingthat 87% of Lebanese supported the resistance,21 were dismissed or ignored by Western media,but Hezbollahs surprise victory is in itself sufficient proof of popular support. The tactics thatdefeated Israels high-tech munitions — construction of elaborate underground command centersand hardened missile sites throughout the country, lightning transfers of armaments and fighters inthe face of Israeli bombardment, even the fighters ability to melt at will into the civilian population— required the sympathy and coordinated assistance of the people, often over years of painstakingpreparation.Bunker bustersOfficial sources have been putting out mixed messages about the bunker buster, a bomb designedto penetrate and destroy hardened underground command centers. Although military spokesmenhave uniformly praised the performance of bunker busters in the current wars, the DefenseDepartment has never ceased to demand bigger and more potent versions of the weapon, fromwhich it might be surmised that existing models are not as effective as claimed.The latest generation of conventional bunker busters, thermobaric weapons purportedly able topenetrate reinforced concrete to a depth of 3.4 meters, were extensively used in both Iraq andAfghanistan. (Thermobaric bombs, also known as fuel-air explosives, use atmospheric oxygen toignite a metallic fuel such as aluminum, creating a more powerful and sustained shock.22) It is notyet clear how effective these weapons were, since hard data remains classified. However, in 2005 acontroversy over US plans to fast-track development of a "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator"required officials to admit that "[p]otential adversaries increasingly are building hardened retreatsdeep beneath the earth, immune to conventional weapons."23 More recently, a rough evaluation ofthe bunker busters performance could be derived from the IDFs 2006 attack on Lebanon. In July,the US rushed 100 bunker busters to Israel as part of an effort to kill Hassan Nasrallah and the restof Hezbollahs leadership. The assassination targets, concealed to a depth of 40 meters in anetwork of hardened bunkers, emerged unscathed.24Intelligence and reconnaissanceThe US militarys dominance of the traditional battlefield owes much to its sophisticated systemsfor electronic warfare, especially its capacity for virtually instantaneous collection and coordinationof electronic intelligence. In theory, US C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers andIntelligence) is fully integrated from top to bottom — i.e., the US is already engaged in "network-centric" warfare.25 In space, GPS satellites determine the location, speed, and direction of targetsand relay the information to cruise missiles and other precision munitions. High in the sky, theconverted Boeing 707 known as JSTARS collects and combines radar, infrared, and videoinformation to create real-time electronic maps for the use of battlefield commanders. Closer to theground, a dozen varieties of reconnaissance drones, ranging from the airliner-sized Global Hawk tothe tiny, hand-launched Raven, use electronic imaging to identify and track targets. Electronicinformation is instantaneously distributed to command posts, laptops, and Strykers (high-speedarmored ground vehicles equipped with 50-cal. heavy machine guns and the latest in battlefield Page 3
  • 6. technology) — and may soon be made available to individual soldiers through the "Land Warrior"concept discussed below.In practice, network-centric warfare is far from seamless. During the invasions of Afghanistan andIraq, electronic surveillance succeeded in locating objects of potential military interest, but couldnot generally distinguish among enemies, friendlies, and civilians.26 The result was considerable"collateral damage" and several well-publicized friendly-fire incidents, including the death ofAmerican football star Pat Tillman.27 High-tech equipment was unevenly distributed on thebattlefield, prone to breakage due to its delicacy, and highly dependent on the logistical supplyline.28 Field commanders were often overwhelmed with the sheer amount of information available,while generals discovered that vast knowledge of enemy dispositions does not guarantee correctstrategic and tactical decisions.29 Still, despite its flaws, high-tech C4I has worked well enough insupport of the motorized maneuvers, massive airstrikes, and setpiece battles in which the USmilitary continues to excel.In the context of guerilla warfare, however, the latest surveillance gadgets have little availed USforces. Iraqs resistance fighters have learned to maneuver in small, lightly equipped groups thatare virtually undetectable by US drones, or at worst indistinguishable from civilian traffic. Small-scale, highly efficient "hit and run" attacks (e.g., IEDs and sniper fire) are calculated to thwart USdrones; cellular organization and face-to-face communications are relied upon to outflank signalsintelligence.30 Indeed, because the high-tech, high-flying apparatus of US electronic signalsintelligence is oriented toward monitoring and destroying the highest levels of a unitary commandstructure (hence the Defense Departments public obsession with "decapitation strikes"), it is alsoespecially inadequate for the penetration of small, disciplined guerilla cells.31 As a result the US hasyet to achieve a useful intelligence picture of the Iraqi resistance, and appears to be doing littlebetter in Afghanistan.32Thus military analyst Anthony Cordesman, in a bleak and exhaustive assessment of UScounterinsurgency efforts in Iraq, finds that network-centric warfare has been trumped by what hecalls "human-centric warfare":[S]ensors, UAVs, and IS&R [information seeking and retrieval] can have great value in Iraq, just asthey did in Vietnam and South Lebanon, but they are anything but "magic bullets." The unattendedground sensor program in Vietnam was once touted as such a magic bullet but took less than ayear to defeat.33Even more disturbing to US theoreticians, Hezbollahs successful defense of southern Lebanon in2006 provided evidence that a well-organized guerilla force can beat the high-tech West at its owngame. Hezbollah flummoxed Israels satellite and overflight intelligence with decoys, developedcounter-signals technology that cracked encrypted radio communications, and intercepted keybattlefield information simply by listening in on IDF soldiers cell phone calls to their families.34Jamming technology, possibly supplied by Iran, blocked anti-missile missiles aboard Israeli vessels,allowing Hezbollah to disable at least one Israeli warship.35 Although Israeli electronic intelligence is"close to, or superior to, that available to US forces," Cordesman finds that "modern technologydoes not provide the kind of sensors, protection, and weapons that can prevent a skilled urbanforce from forcing Israel or the US to fight it largely on its own terms."36Infantry equipmentThe theoretical "Land Warrior" — an infantryman equipped with 17 lbs. of high-tech gear includingmini-computer, GPS receiver, battlefield wi-fi, and heads-up visual display — has yet to appear incombat, though some elements of this wearable ensemble were finally appearing on a limited basisin Iraq as of May, 2006.37 Apart from this untested system, technology has made little surprisinglylittle difference to the US front-line soldier. Thirty years after Vietnam, US infantrymen continue torely on the M-16 automatic rifle, which they still regard as inferior to the AK-47 generally used byguerilla fighters. (Soldiers in Iraq report that the M-16s notorious jamming problems areexacerbated by sand.38) GIs are much fonder of the M240 medium-weight machine gun, a versatile Page 4
  • 7. and highly mobile weapon which has largely replaced the Vietnam-era M60, and the reliable M2 .50-cal. heavy machine gun, dating from WWII and described by one Marine as "the ultimate fightstopper" and "the most coveted weapon in-theater."39 Shoulder-mounted rocket launchers like theSMAW (Shoulder-Launched Multipurpose Assault Weapon) employ technology that is decades oldand no better than that used by resistance fighters. 40The most important innovations in infantry kit are not weapons as such. Recent advances in nightvision and infrared sensing now give US troops a distinct advantage after dark; in particular,standard-issue night goggles now employ futuristic image-enhancing technology that boosts verysmall quantities of light into the visible range. In the same Marines words: "Our guys see in thedark and own the night. Very little enemy action after evening prayers. More and more enemybeing whacked [i.e., killed] at night during movement by hunter-killer teams."41 At present,resistance fighters have no way to counter night vision apart from courage and prudence;presumably US superiority will erode over time as advanced night-vision technology enters thearms black market.Also highly rated by US troops is state-of-the-art "Interceptor" body armor. Relatively light (though"hotter than hell") at six lbs., the ceramic-plated equipment has lived up to manufacturers claims,consistently stopping AK-47 rounds and light shrapnel.42 Together with improved battlefieldmedicine, the new body armor has undoubtedly saved many American lives and thereby enhancedmorale. However, since the armor protects only the torso, it cannot greatly reduce the number ofdisabling injuries due to attacks from snipers and IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices).43 Thereforeit presents no insurmountable obstacle to traditional hit-and-run guerilla tactics.ChimerasAfter five years of war in the Middle East, the most fantastic new devices purportedly in the USarsenal, reminiscent of Hollywood science fiction, have yet to appear on the battlefield. Some ofthese weapons may still be in development; some exist but have not been used for political ortactical reasons; some may never have existed except as journalistic fancies or black propaganda.A quick review of these mostly chimerical weapons is instructive.Despite prewar fears, the US is unable to "see through walls," except in a very limited sense. Themilitarys inability to identify hidden human targets was made plain during the April 2004 siege ofFallujah, where the US eschewed house-to-house fighting; instead, Marines called in air strikes orfired shoulder-mounted rockets to flatten every building that could conceivably be used to shelterresistance fighters. Reportedly, a handheld radar system intended for use in house searches is onlynow ready for deployment in Iraq. It will allow GIs to detect the presence of human beings througha concrete wall, but its range is limited to 50 feet. Moreover, the device must be held – by hand –adjacent to the wall that is to be seen through, suggesting that its use against well-defendedguerilla positions would be suicidal.44The E-bomb, an explosive weapon designed to overwhelm electrical circuitry by generating anintense electromagnetic field, is undoubtedly real.45 However, there is as yet no evidence that theUS has used E-bombs in combat. (Not E-bombs but precision munitions were used to disrupt anddestroy Iraqi communications during the 2003 air assault.) Because the weapons effective rangecannot be reliably controlled, the E-bomb is essentially useless in low-intensity guerilla wars exceptas a "strategic weapon" to be used against the people in general.46 In the context of "asymmetricalwarfare" — a think-tank catchphrase for struggles between Western superpowers and Third Worldnations or irregulars — the E-bomb is discussed primarily as a threat to the West. The technologyrequired to build a simple E-bomb is apparently so straightforward that US counter-terrorismexperts are alarmed: "Knock out electric power, computers and telecommunication and youvedestroyed the foundation of modern society. In the age of Third World-sponsored terrorism, the E-bomb is the great equalizer."47 Meanwhile, guerilla forces can defend against E-bombs with relativeease: potential targets can be "hardened" by means of low-tech metal enclosures known as Page 5
  • 8. Faraday cages.48 The E-bomb, then, is one high-tech weapon that is potentially more advantageousto the weak than the strong.By contrast, only wealthy nations can afford to invest in laser weapons.49 The US is activelyresearching a variety of space-based high-energy laser systems, mostly in the context of missiledefense, but true space-to-ground laser cannons are said to be decades away.50 Battlefield laserguns, designed to blind enemy soldiers, have been developed by several countries including theUS, but no country has yet dared to use them, presumably because they are explicitly bannedunder international law.51 However, a new class of "directed energy" beam weapons may soon bedeployed in Iraq. This purportedly humane weapon fires a beam of electromagnetic energy that"flash-heats human targets from a distance [and creates] an unbearably painful burning sensationby instantaneously heating moisture under the skin."52 The beam may also cause blindness andbirth defects.53 Designed to be mounted on military trucks, directed energy weapons are intended,not for combat as such, but for crowd control — specifically the "Black Hawk Down scenario" inwhich GIs do battle against angry civilians. One such weapon, Raytheons Active Denial System, isreportedly ready for use in Iraq, but Defense Department officials have expressed concern over"public perception" (read: news footage of children and pregnant women shrieking in agony) and"legal issues" (read: illegality.)54Rumors that the US used horrific "secret weapons" to inflict atrocities in Afghanistan and Iraq stillsurface from time to time. In the aftermath of Fallujah, for example, numerous witnesses reportedthat the US had used a mysterious anti-personnel weapon that "melted" the flesh of its victimswhile leaving their bones, and sometimes clothing, intact. The reports were accurate, but theweapon was neither new nor secret. As an Italian television documentary later revealed and StateDepartment officials eventually admitted, the US had deliberately used white phosphorus — aspontaneously flammable chemical intended for battlefield illumination — to burn fighters andtrapped civilians alive.55 Overall, no convincing evidence has emerged of high-tech "secretweapons"; rather, the record suggests that the US remains quite capable of inflicting atrocities withits vast, well-publicized store of traditional weaponry.ConclusionThe current US dilemma is in the Middle East is encapsulated in its struggle to cope with IEDs(Improvised Explosive Devices), homemade bombs typically concealed under roads used by USsupply convoys. In Iraq, IED attacks began in July 2003 and have increased steadily thereafter inboth numbers and proficiency. The US logged 10,953 separate IED attacks in 2005, accounting for674 deaths (or 61.6% of all combat deaths) and 4,256 wounded (or 71.6% of all combatwounds).56 The IEDs effectiveness as a guerrilla weapon cannot be measured in casualties alone;these cheap, easily constructed booby traps57 also disrupt logistical support, tie down manpower,and undermine troop morale. Recognizing the grave threat posed by IEDs, the US launched aseries of high-tech counter-measures, each of which was inventively nullified by a continuouslyevolving resistance:The first IEDs were triggered by wires and batteries; insurgents waited on the roadside anddetonated the primitive devices when Americans drove past. After a while, U.S. troops got good atspotting and killing the triggermen when bombs went off. That led the insurgents to replace theirwires with radio signals. The Pentagon, at frantic speed and high cost, equipped its forces withjammers to block those signals, accomplishing the task [in Spring 2005]. The insurgents adaptedswiftly by sending a continuous radio signal to the IED; when the signal stops or is jammed, thebomb explodes. The solution? Track the signal and make sure it continues. Problem: the signal isencrypted. Now the Americans are grappling with the task of cracking the encryption on the fly andmimicking it—so far, without success.58The story is a vivid illustration of the swiftness and flexibility with which resistance forces haveadapted to high-tech warfare. Applying human intellect to cheap, widely available technology,resistance fighters have found ways of defeating some of the most sophisticated devices in the Page 6
  • 9. American arsenal. Meanwhile US analysts, traditionally prone to underestimating Third Worldadversaries, have been forced to acknowledge the guerrillas superior ability to learn,communicate, and adapt; the Armys new counter-insurgency manual teaches that "[a] skillfulcounter-insurgent must be able to adapt at least as fast as the opponent."59What the high-tech military cannot hope to emulate, however, is the guerrillas most powerfulresource: the assistance and protection of the people. The tactical initiatives that have stymied theworlds most powerful military machine are in every case underpinned by popular support andcooperation. Even in the absence of a coherent political program, the people of the Middle Easthave never doubted the need to resist foreign occupation, and have remained steadfast despite theimmense human sacrifices exacted by the American style of warfare. Above all, they have refusedto be intimidated either by high-tech paraphernalia or by the staggering lethality of US munitions.Their courage and persistence have entirely affirmed a military truth well enunciated by retiredMajor-Gen. Robert Scales Jr.: "If the enemy can see you, and range you with his weapons, hedoesnt need a UAV to locate you or a precision weapon to kill you. All he needs is a 13-centbullet."60Notes:1. Behind the Invasion of Iraq, Aspects 33 & 34.2. E. Cohen, Lt. Col. C. Crane, Lt. Col. J. Horvath & Lt. Col. J. Nagl, "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency,"Military Review (March-April 2006), p. 53, usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr06/Cohen.pdf.3. "Hi-Tech War," Innovation, PBS, aired 2/3/04, transcript at www.pbs.org/wnet/innovation/episode4_essay1.html. For anenthusiastic overview of RMA, see Steven Metz, Armed Conflict in the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and Post-ModernWarfare (Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College March 2000), webdoc.sub.gwdg.de/ebook/p/2002/carlisle/conflict.pdf.4. In the wake of the US debacle Iraq, fashionable military thinking now emphasizes political operations, human intelligence,propaganda, and joint action with indigenous forces — essentially a retread of the counterinsurgency doctrine of the 1960s. SeeEliot Cohen et al., "Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency," Military Review, March-April 2006; "Military Honesa New Strategy on Counterinsurgency," New York Times, Oct. 4, 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/10/05/washington/05doctrine.html.Ironically, Maos On Guerilla Warfare has become required reading for US military analysts. See, e.g., Ralph Masi, "Mao as Guide toFight in Iraq," RAND Corp., Jan. 4, 2004, www.rand.org/commentary/010404SFC.html; Thomas X. Hammes, "Countering EvolvedInsurgent Networks," Military Review, July-Aug. 2006,www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume4/october_2006/10_06_2.html.5. "Use of pinpoint air power comes of age in new war," New York Times, Dec. 24, 2001.6. Peter Grier, "The JDAM Revolution," Air Force Magazine, Sept. 2006, www.afa.org/magazine/Sept2006/0906JDAM.asp.7. "Afghanistan: First Lessons," Janes Defense Weekly, Dec. 19, 2001. The US measures the accuracy of its bombs by means of amisleading formula known as "circular error probable" or CEP. The CEP is simply the radius of a circle in which 50% of fired weaponscan be expected to strike. Therefore, JDAMs widely-reported CEP of 13 meters means that only one-half of JDAMs fall within 13meters of the target. "Planned JDAM Upgrade Boosts Accuracy to 10 Feet," National Defense, Dec, 2001,www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2001/Dec/Planned_JDAM.htm. This is one reason large numbers of civilians are routinelykilled by "precision" airstrikes.8. See "BGM-109 Tomahawk," Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network,www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/bgm-109.htm. The Navy insisted on using all of its Tomahawks during the 2003 air assault onIraq and had difficulty persuading Congress to order more. Cpt. Steve Morrow, "What Comes After Tomahawk," Proceedings of theUS Naval Institute, July 2003, www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_Tomahawk_0603,00.html.9. Project on Governmental Oversight, Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, March 25, 2000, www.pogo.org/p/defense/do-020311-failures-predator.html.10. Jeffrey St. Clair, "Flying Blind," Counterpunch, Oct. 30, 2001, www.counterpunch.org/predator1.html. The CIA uses the Predatoras an assassination weapon, in which role it has performed erratically and sometimes disastrously. It is responsible for many of themost highly-publicized killings of civilians in the current wars, including the CIA massacre of at least 80 schoolboys in an October2006 attack on a madrassa in Pakistan. This was supposedly an unsuccessful attempt on the life of al-Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. "Questions Surround Pakistan Strike," Council on Foreign Relations Daily Analysis, Nov. 1, 2006,www.cfr.org/publication/11883/questions_surround_pakistan_strike.html.11. "U.S. Drones Crowd Iraqs Skies to Fight Insurgents," New York Times, April 5, 2005.12. James Dunnigan, "The Continuing Air War in Iraq," Strategy Page, Feb. 15, 2005,www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/200521423.asp. The 90% figure, presumably inflated for propaganda purposes, designates thepercentage of bombs that hit their targets, and does not reflect bombs wrongly targeted due to bad intelligence.13. G. Burnham, R. Lafta, S. Doocy, & L. Roberts, "Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-sectional cluster samplesurvey," The Lancet, Oct. 11, 2006, www.thelancet.com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf. The high numberof civilian deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan is due in part to US willingness to bomb heavily populated areas (even a high-tech weaponprecisely targeted at, say, an urban anti-aircraft emplacement will still kill everyone within the weapons considerable lethal range).Additionally, faulty intelligence continues to cause numerous civilian deaths, as in the air strike that wiped out an Afghan wedding Page 7
  • 10. party in July 2002. See Marc Herold, A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan: A ComprehensiveAccounting (2002), www.cursor.org/stories/civilian_deaths.htm.14. See Carlo Kopp, "JDAM Matures," Australian Aviation, Dec. 2002, www.ausairpower.net/TE-JDAMPt1.html.15. E.g., the US Air Force did not lose a single aircraft during the 2001-02 invasion of Afghanistan. Daniel Haulman, USAF MannedAircraft Combat Losses 1990-2002, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Dec. 9, 2002, abstracted atwww.stormingmedia.us/48/4804/A480434.html.16. Pepe Escobar, "The Spirit of Resistance," Asia Times Online, July 26, 2006,www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HG26Ak02.html; Lin Xu, "A Repeat of the Iraq War? Hezbollah Wins the Assymetric Warfare,"Washington Observer, Aug. 2, 2006, www.washingtonobserver.org/en/document.cfm?documentid=62&charid=3.17. G.Wilson, J. Sullivan & H. Kempfer, "Fourth Generation Warfare: How Tactics of the Weak Confound the Strong," Defense and theNational Interest (Dec. 24, 2005), www.d-n-i.net/fcs/comments/c490.htm.18. Seymour Hersh, "Up in the Air," New Yorker, Nov. 28, 2005.19. Philip H. Gordon, "Air Power Wont Do It," Washington Post, July 25, 2006; Human Rights Watch, Fatal Strikes: Israel’sIndiscriminate Attacks Against Civilians in Lebanon (Aug. 2006), hrw.org/reports/2006/lebanon0806/index.htm.20. Jon Lee Anderson, "Letter from Beirut: The Battle for Lebanon," New Yorker, Aug. 7, 2006,www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/060807fa_fact.21. "As Fighting Continues, Lebanese Author Says New Poll Shows Overwhelming Support For Hezbollah," Democracy Now!, airedJuly 27, 2006, transcript at www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/07/27/1423248.22. These weapons, which typically result in massive civilian casualties, have been used for decades by the US and the formerSoviet Union. During the first Gulf War, the US used thermobaric bombs primarily as anti-personnel weapons. "Behind the Invasionof Iraq," Aspects Nos. 33 & 34, www.rupe-india.org/34/torment.html. Counter-terrorism analysts fear they will eventually employedagainst the US by resistance fighters and/or terrorists. "Thermobaric Terrorists?" Defense Tech, Jan. 28, 2004,www.defensetech.org/archives/000747.html.23. "Bush admin. drops bunker-buster plan," USA Today, Oct. 26, 2005, www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-10-26-bunker-buster_x.htm. Officially, the US no longer intends to build a nuclear bunker buster, but investigative journalist Seymour Hershbelieves the weapon already exists and may be used against Iran. Hersh, "The Iran Plans," New Yorker, April 17, 2006,www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/060417fa_fact.24. "U.S. sends Israel bunker buster bombs to kill Nasrallah," Al Jazeera.com, July 25, 2006, www.aljazeera.com/me.asp?service_ID=11783; Alastair Crooke & Mark L. Perry, “How Hezbollah Defeated Israel Part One: Winning the Intelligence War,” AsiaTimes, Oct. 12, 2006, www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HJ12Ak01.html. (Italys RAI News has reported that Israel used aradioactive bunker buster against the Lebanese village of Khiam. This was apparently not a fission weapon, but it may haveemployed enriched uranium to increase penetration, much like the notorious US anti-tank ammunition tipped with depleted uranium.RAI News, "Israel Detonated a Radioactive Bunker Buster Bomb in Lebanon," Nov. 11, 2006, www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20061111&articleId=3813.)25. Network-centric Warfare, or NCW, has been defined as a "concept of operations … that translates information superiority intocombat power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the battlespace." D. Cammons, J. Tisserand III, D. Williams, A. Seise &D. Lindsay, Network Centric Warfare Case Study Volume I (US War College Center for Strategic Leadership), June, 2006, p. 13. Likemuch recent military theory, NCW is modeled on innovations in the corporate sector, which has successfully used networkingtechniques in the workplace to extract greater surplus value from a smaller labor force. For an overview, see Vice Adm. Arthur K.Cebrowski, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," Proceedings of the US Naval Inst., Jan., 1998,www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles98/PROcebrowski.htm.26. John Luddy, The Challenge and Promise of Network-Centric Warfare, Feb. 2005 (Lexington Institute white paper),www.lexingtoninstitute.org/docs/521.pdf.27. The platoon that killed Tillman was directed from a remote high-tech Forward Operating Base using real-time satellite data."Startling findings from Pat Tillman investigations," Associated Press, Nov. 10, 2006.28. A Marine lieutenant vividly captured the limitations of technology on the battlefield: "If you put a hole in a paper map, you havea map with a hole in it. You put a bullet through a computer screen, what do you have? A piece of junk." "Point, Click … Fire,"Business Week, April 7, 2003, www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_14/b3827608.htm.29. John Luddy, op. cit.30. US intelligence can easily intercept radio transmissions, e-mails and, in occupied or cooperative countries, landline telephonecalls. Its ability to monitor cell-phone conversations remotely is well-known; less known is the fact that the US can often pinpointthe location of a given mobile phone, and hence track its user — even when the phone is apparently powered off. Colombian drugsmuggler Pablo Escobar and alleged Al Qaeda kingpin Abu Musab al-Zarqawi were both assassinated in this fashion. Mark Bowden,Killing Pablo (2002); "Cell phone tracking helped find al-Zarqawi," CNN News, June 10, 2006,www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/06/09/iraq.al.zarqawi/index.html. By contrast, US "HUMINT" (human intelligence) is notoriouslyinadequate in the Middle East. Nearly four years into the Iraq War, the US still cannot recruit the required numbers of Arabicspeakers, let alone reliable informants, and is bedeviled by double agents. See "The Enemy Spies," Newsweek, June 27, 2005,www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8272786.31.US Congresswoman Jane Harman put her finger on the problem in a March 2004 panel hosted by the Council on ForeignRelations: "My bottom line is, we have to penetrate these cells. The only ways we will know the plans and intentions of these peopleis to have somebody in the room, or as close to the room as we can get it. Signals intelligence — what we can hear flying aroundwith very impressive air and satellite power … — is not enough." After Iraq: New Direction for U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Policy(CFR Mar. 8,2004), transcript at www.cfr.org/publication/6862/after_iraq.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F5%2Frichard_k_betts. Page 8
  • 11. 32. See John Prados, "Blind in Baghdad," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Jan-Feb 2005, p. 18, www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=jf05prados. US inability to gather useful intelligence on Iraqs cellular resistance groups has been cited as a major reasonfor its resort to mass detention and torture. Seymour Hersh, "The Gray Zone: How a secret Pentagon program came to Abu Ghraib,"New Yorker, May 24, 2004, www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/040524fa_fact?040524fa_fact. Cellular organization, however,is designed to resist torture. As an Iraqi resistance officer advised an American reporter: "I think my organization has about 2,500men. … But I only know the names of my men and two men: the one above me and [another cell commander based nearby]. If theytorture me, I can only tell them two names of commanders. Each of those commanders only knows a few names and none of mymen or the other men in the cells." P. Mitchell Prothero, "Leader of terror cell reveals data on command structure," WashingtonTimes, Dec. 8, 2003, washingtontimes.com/world/20031208-111942-6488r.htm.33. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iraqs Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War (Center for Strategic and International Studies),draft revised June 22, 2006, p. xviii, www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/060622_insurgency.pdf.34. Alastair Crooke & Mark L. Perry, op. cit.35. Iason Athanasiadis, "How hi-tech Hezbollah called the shots," Asia Times, Sept. 9, 2006,www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HI09Ak01.html.36. Cordesman, Preliminary Lessons of the Israeli-Hezbollah War (Center for Strategic and International Studies), draft revised Aug.17, 2006, p. 12, www.mafhoum.com/press9/284P51.pdf.37. "Science Fiction Gets Left Behind," Strategy Page (May 19, 2006), www.strategypage.com/htmw/htinf/articles/20060519.aspx.38. "A Marine reports from Iraq," Washington Times, Nov. 22, 2005, www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20051121-093501-9601r.htm.39. Ibid.; "M240G Medium Machine Gun," Federation of American Scientists Military Analysis Network,www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m240g.htm.40. Although it is not yet widely available in the field, a shoulder-mounted thermobaric assault weapon, the SMAW-NE, wasreportedly used to destroy entire buildings during the 2004 siege of Fallujah, crushing any fighters or civilians inside. However,"[d]ue to the lack of penetrating power of the NE round, we found that our assaultmen had to first fire a dual-purpose rocket inorder to create a hole in the wall or building." "Marines Quiet About Brutal New Weapon," DefenseTech.org, Nov. 14, 2005,www.defensetech.org/archives/001944.html.41. "A Marine reports from Iraq."42. Ibid.; 2005 US Army Weapons Systems Handbook pp. 138-39, reprinted in Federation of American Scientists Military AnalysisNetwork, www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/wsh/138.pdf.43. Among US forces in Iraq, the ratio of wounded to killed among US forces in Iraq is about 8 to 1; in Vietnam it was 3 to 1. Nearly3000 US troops have been killed in Iraq, but more than 20,000 have been wounded; of these, only half have returned to duty.Military analysts concede that "wounded are a much better measure of the intensity of operations than killed." "U.S. Casualties inIraq Rise Sharply," Washington Post, October 8, 2006. While there may be less impact on homefront morale when soldiers arewounded and not killed, from a purely military point of view there is little difference. To the resistance fighter, the US preoccupationwith wartime death tolls reflects a weakness: while demoralized Western armies must go to extraordinary lengths to hold downcasualties, the guerillas greater willingness to sacrifice for his cause means that losses are more easily sustainable without damageto morale.44. "New Device Will Sense Through Concrete Walls," American Forces Information Services, Jan. 3, 2006,www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2006/20060103_3822.html.45. Nuclear bombs are known to generate an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that can destroy electrical and electronic equipment,particularly computers and radios, over a large radius. Although the US has not yet dared to use nuclear weapons in the Middle East,it is widely believed to have developed conventional E-bombs that use high-powered microwaves to generate EMPs. See Carlo Kopp,"The Electromagnetic Bomb – A Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction," Chronicles Online Journal (U.S. Air Force 1996),www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/kopp/apjemp.html.46. By now, of course, the value of strategic E-bombing in Iraq or Afghanistan would be nil, since neither country has much in theway of electronic infrastructure left to destroy.47. "E-Bombs And Terrorists," Popular Mechanics, September 2001,www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military_law/1281421.html. India is among the nations believed to have tested E-bombs.Ibid.48. "The Electromagnetic Bomb - a Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction."49. Not to be confused with laser-guided bombs. The total cost of the laser-based component of the Strategic Defense Initiative,commonly known as "Star Wars," has been estimated at $194 billion through 2015. Economists Allied for Arms Reduction, The FullCosts of Ballistic Missile Defense, January 2003, p. 60, www.epsusa.org/publications/papers/bmd/bmd.pdf.50. Defense Science Board Task Force, High Energy Laser Weapons Systems Applications, June 2001, www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/rephel.pdf.51. "Blinding Laser Weapons," BMJ 1997; 315:1392 (29 November), www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/315/7120/1392.52. Jacob Levich, "John Kerrys World of Hurt," Counterpunch, June 10, 2004, www.counterpunch.org/levich06102004.html.53. Stew Magnuson, "Directed Energy Weapons Face Hurdles," National Defense, March 2006,www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/march/directed_energy.htm.54. Ibid.55. "US used white phosphorus in Iraq," BBC News, Nov. 16. 2005, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4440664.stm. The use ofchemical weapons against human beings is, of course, a war crime.56. Cordesman, Iraqs Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War, p. vi. Page 9
  • 12. 57. It has been estimated that the total cost of every IED used in Iraq through 2005 is lower than the replacement cost of a singledowned Cobra attack helicopter. Cordesman, Iraqs Evolving Insurgency and the Risk of Civil War, p. xxv.58. "The Enemy Spies," Newsweek, June 27, 2005.59. E. Cohen, Lt. Col. C. Crane, Lt. Col. J. Horvath & Lt. Col. J. Nagl, p. 51.60. "Battle Plan Under Fire," Nova, PBS, aired May 4, 2004, transcript at www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/3110_wartech.html.Table of ContentsLight Boosts Destructive Power of Microwave Weapons, SensorsBy David A. Fulghum, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 21 January 2007Electronic warfare is becoming less a science of developing new technologies and more a process ofsensor fusion, target networking and finding new ways to manipulate existing tools of the trade. Acase in point--lasers and high-power microwave devices long have been eyed as competingdirected-energy attack options. However, researchers are now combining the two to producesmaller, cheaper, more powerful, nonkinetic weapons. Electronic attack has taken a new path aswell, shifting from covering enemy emissions with noise to finding, penetrating and exploitingenemy networks from low-power cell-phone networks to sophisticated air defense systems. Thefollowing articles explore some of those changes.High-power microwave weapons may be on the verge of a high-speed turn toward the practical.An advanced concept, pioneered by BAE Systems researchers, uses light to multiply the speed andpower at which HPM pulses--powerful enough to destroy enemy electronics--can be producedwithout the need for explosives or huge electrical generators.Researchers predict leaps of 10-100 times in power output within two years. That advance couldpush the beam-weapon technology far beyond the 1-10-gigawatt limit of current tactical-size HPMdevices. Long-standing industry estimates are that it would require a 100-gigawatt pulse for a fewnanoseconds to disable a cruise missile at a useful range.BAE Systems is not alone in the chase. Northrop Grumman and Raytheon are also buildingdistributed array radars that can produce air-to-air and surface-to-air HPM weapons effects,contend longtime Pentagon radar specialists. In particular, the F-22, F-35, F/A-18E/F and newestF-15 radars are designed to accept modifications that would focus their beams to produce HPMenergy spikes powerful enough to disable cruise, anti-aircraft, air-to-air and emitter-seekingmissiles. Germanys Diehl is developing suitcase-size HPM devices that could be placedsurreptitiously in a target building to damage electronics such as computers.In addition, the U.S. military is giving classified briefings on the threat of HPM weapon technologiesbeing developed in China and Russia. The Russians are believed to be developing radio-frequencymicrowave weapons for air defense, and the Chinese are developing HPM and electromagneticpulse weapons for information warfare.However, BAE Systems researchers claim they have made a singular leap in HPM weaponstechnology by combining the use of lasers and radar-like microwaves. Furthermore, the technologyis scalable through the use of 4-in.-square arrays, each an integrated structure of dielectrics andelectrical conductors. One hundred of them distributed over a square meter, for example, cangenerate up to 10 gigawatts of power, says Robert DAmico, BAE Systems director of advancedprograms."We have shown everything we claimed with a laboratory testbed," says Oved Zucker, director ofphotonics programs for BAE Systems advanced concepts facility here. "We are in the process ofdemonstrating total power substantially above 10 gigawatts, and we have plans to test [thesystem] further in an airborne mode."The power bandwidth product--how much power and how fast you manipulate it--is potentially thelargest of any technology around. Having the bandwidth with larger power is where the money is,"he says. Theres no dearth of missions for HPM technology, including detecting and detonatingimprovised explosive devices, finding suicide bombers or hidden explosives, and attackingshoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. Page 10
  • 13. Theres also the appeal of weapons that can rob a foe of communications, power and mobility--while largely eliminating collateral damage to people and structures--which is a high priority for theU.S. military.The development of HPM weapons has been hobbled for the last 30 years by seemingly intractablecost, size, beam-control and power-generation requirements. Tests of modified air-launched cruisemissiles carrying devices to produce explosively generated spikes of energy were considered bigdisappointments in the early 1990s because of an inability to direct pulses and predict effects. Newactive electronically scanned array (AESA) radars can jam emitters or possibly cause damage toelectronic components with focused beams. But power levels and ranges are limited by aperturesize.BAE Systems photonically driven technology could open the way to much smaller and morepowerful electronic jammers, nonkinetic beam weapons for cruise and anti-ship missile defenses,and stealth-detecting sensors."You could put a [sensor] system on a fighter-size aircraft that could generate enough power, witha 1-ft. resolution, to see stealthy objects at 100 mi." DAmico says. "You can defeat stealth withenough power. If stealth takes the signature [of an aircraft or missile] down a factor of 10, youhave to increase the [sensors] power by a factor of 10." Most current fighter-size radars have lessthan a megawatt of peak power. Detecting stealth would require tens of gigawatts, which is nowimpossible in fighter-size packages.What effects can HPM produce as an electronic warfare weapon?"At one end, it can fry anything [electronic] thats out there," Zucker says. "The levels of EWextend from the sledgehammer to just making the [computers] brain a little bit befuddled so itcant think for a moment. At a lower level, you can kill the detector of the other guys radar as partof the suppression of enemy air defenses. You dont need much power because youre going afterthe most sensitive part. Youre blinding the system."The level below that is to momentarily stop electronics from functioning. A radar will try to defenditself by using a chain of circuits to "blink," and thereby shut out intruding signals. One method ofexploitation is to do something during the blink. But if an intruding signal is fast enough, the radarcant react in time to keep out the invader."You can put energy in there and it wont be able to respond," Zucker says. "Another low-leveleffect is to make the computer skip bits so that its not processing efficiently for the moment. Allthese games have to do with how much power [can be applied] and how fast."BAE researchers envision HPM pulse weapons that are powerful enough to disable a tank, a missile,perhaps a helicopter or aircraft, but at the same time are small and light enough to function as partof a microwave radar sensor designed into the skin of an aircraft.Alternatively, the HPM weapons could be scaled up to shipboard size--perhaps 100 sq. meters--toproduce terawatt-size energy pulses. Thats theoretically a large enough energy spike to stopanother ship."You kill the brains by aiming at the bridge area because of all the computers and control systemsthere that run the ship," Zucker says.This brute-strength scaling up of the technology involves installing a distributed array on the sideof a ship. The elements would work together to form a large virtual antenna and then pull enoughpower from the ships electric engines to concentrate a beam on vulnerable areas. From a fewhundred yards, predictions are that the energy spike--focused in a beam several feet wide--coulddisable all the electrical equipment, including propulsion, leaving the ship a darkened, drifting hulk.Researchers have some unusual techniques in mind for the associated antenna arrays."We are integrating a large number of transverse electromagnetic [TEM] apertures," to produce thedistributed transmitter arrays, he says. "To produce a large number of TEM antennas is sensibleonly if you can make each one sing to the same tune through this coherence [or synchronization]that comes from using [the speed of] light. That allows us to spread the source [of HPM pulse Page 11
  • 14. production] across the whole wing of an airplane. Moreover, TEM doesnt have a cutoff frequency,which gives us flexibility."Because the high-speed switches modulate the HPM, they match the circuitry to the antenna.Composite skins for fuselages could have the conductors and switches built into them. At themoment, BAE is looking at new, 20-cm.-thick aircraft wings, tapered at the leading and trailingedges, with imbedded antenna structures instead of using a bolt-on system."That is my radiator, and it is a phased array," Zucker says. "It can be a radar, communications,receiver or HPM transmitter. The wing is the source with more gain than any aperture thats beenavailable before. I dont have to pump the energy through wave guides. More area means morepower and gain. Instead of megawatts, were talking about gigawatts of peak power."Researchers say the antennas, photoconductive switches and transformer blocks can be built intoconformal skins for unmanned combat aircraft as well. Unmanned designs are favored initiallybecause of the vagaries in distribution of HPM side lobes, the effects of HPM on humans, and thedisturbances that energy spikes can create in fly-by-wire flight control systems.Zucker also is designing fly-by-light flight control systems for UAVs. With fly by light, actuators aretriggered by simple blobs of light that cant be disrupted by spikes of electrical energy produced bythe aircrafts payload.Table of ContentsNATO Reveals Dark Arts of Psy-OpsBy Jerome Starkey, The Times (UK), 22 January 2007British troops in southern Afghanistan are battling to break the will of the Taleban by splitting hard-line commanders from their troops.The psychological warfare, or “psy-ops”, experts work alongside the SBS and American specialforces. During a recent operation to retake Taleban strongholds in Kandahar they preyed on theinsurgents’ worst fears — such as being captured — to make them abandon strategic positions.Major Kirsty McQuade, the top Nato psy-ops officer in southern Afghanistan, said: “We exploitpsychological vulnerabilities. Being captured is a big fear for the Taleban. Most of them want to liveto fight another day. But they would rather die than be captured.”Psy-ops are normally shrouded in secrecy, but Major McQuade gave The Times an insight into Natotactics.Commanders believe that there are two types of Taleban insurgents in the war-ravaged south: Tier1 Taleban are the leaders, some of whom are foreign; Tier 2 are the rank and file.Major McQuade said that Tier 1 wanted to regain control of the country. “Some of them have powerand prestige and they like that. Some of them are just psychopaths.“Tier 2 are often motivated by factors such as debt. Some are very poor and uneducated and theydo as they are told.”In Operation Baaz Tsuka, in which Canadian, British and American forces routed hundreds ofTaleban from two districts that they had been using as platforms for assaults on Kandahar, the psy-ops troops targeted the two groups with separate messages.Leaflets showing the bloody body of a dead gunman and a hooded prisoner of war warned Tier 1:“Enemies of Afghanistan leave now. Capture and death await you.” The footsoldiers were told:“Choose peace, return to your homes and meet with your elders.” More than 88,000 leaflets weredropped.In a separate operation in Helmand province, Royal Marines hauled a loudhailer into battle to talkto the Taleban. “We explain to Tier 2 that their commanders don’t care about them, they are justusing them for their own aims,” Major McQuade said.“If you can clear the debt or give them an alternative way of making money they are often willingto give up.” Page 12
  • 15. A day after the leaflet drops Canadian forces took control of Howz-e Madad, a former Taleban-heldvillage, without firing a shot. However, analysts suspect that many fighters fled to Pakistan toprepare for a spring offensive.Fear is the keyGenghis Khan, 13th-century leader of the Mongols, would leave a few people in each village heattacked alive to allow them to tell stories about his ferocity to other villages and create anatmosphere of fear.Table of ContentsChinas Anti-Satellite Weapon Fuels AnxietyBy Geoffrey York, the Globe and Mail, 22 January 2007BEIJING -- With a dramatic display of its power to destroy a satellite in space, China is warning theworld that its military arsenal is modernizing much faster than expected and could challenge theUnited States for global dominance by the middle of this century.The successful test of Chinas anti-satellite technology is a major victory for Beijings militarystrategy, which aims to use high-tech weaponry and "asymmetric warfare" to bridge the gapbetween itself and the United States.China has not yet confirmed the test, but the reports of the Jan. 11 incident are now widelyaccepted as accurate. Beijing used a ground-based medium-range ballistic missile to destroy anaging Chinese weather satellite that was orbiting Earth at an altitude of 865 kilometres, accordingto U.S. intelligence reports.The satellite was only about a metre in length, so its destruction by a ballistic missile was a highlyimpressive show of precision targeting.It was the first successful test of anti-satellite weaponry in more than 20 years, breaking anunofficial moratorium that began in the Cold War. It immediately elevated China to the top ranks ofspace technology, making it one of only three countries (along with the United States and theformer Soviet Union) to prove its ability to shoot down an object in space.Other countries are watching with concern. The satellite-killing missile test has fuelled anxietiesabout a Chinese military buildup that has already shocked the experts with some remarkablebreakthroughs. It could trigger a new arms race in space. And it has exposed a key vulnerability inthe U.S. military doctrine, with its mounting dependence on satellite communications and satellitespying.The test has prompted a wave of protests and concerns from Canada, the United States, Japan,Britain, Australia and South Korea. "Canada has expressed its strong concerns to the Chineseauthorities over the reported anti-satellite test and the possible negative effects," the ForeignAffairs Department said in a statement.Canada has long been opposed to the weaponization of space and was among the leaders of aninternational campaign against an arms race in space.The Chinese missile test is certain to give political ammunition to U.S. hawks who support the so-called Star Wars technology of space-based weaponry and ballistic-missile defence systems. Itraises the spectre of a global arms race in space, especially since satellites are increasingly seen ascrucial to modern warfare and intelligence operations.Last summer, the U.S. administration declared space vital to national security. The statement was astrong signal that Washington has no intention of accepting Chinese and Russian proposals for thedemilitarization of space.Shortly afterward, China used a ground-based laser to "paint" a U.S. satellite, showing its spacetechnology to be more powerful than expected. China also surprised many analysts by unveilingthe Jian-10 fighter-bomber jet, said to be superior to its Russian counterparts and putting China atthe leading edge of military aviation. Page 13
  • 16. Chinas military budget increased from $31.3-billion (U.S.) in 2005 to $35.9-billion last year,according to official numbers. But its true military budget -- including high-tech research by othergovernment departments -- is at least double this amount, and perhaps more.Chinas latest defence "white paper," released by the Central Military Commission at the end of lastmonth, contains some ambitious goals for military modernization. With a focus on high-tech"information warfare," the paper proclaims that China must be "capable of winning digitalizedwarfare" by the middle of this century."Although no direct reference is made to competition with the United States, it seems clear that theCMC is determined that China must increase its military power over the next few decades to a levelcomparable to that of the worlds superpower," political analyst Willy Lam wrote in a recent reporton the Chinese military.Table of ContentsFreedom of Information, the Wiki WaySite to Allow Anonymous Posts of Government DocumentsBy Elizabeth Williamson, Washington Post, January 15, 2007Youre a government worker in China, and youve just gotten a memo showing the true face of theregime. Without any independent media around, how do you share what you have without landingin jail or worse?Wikileaks.org is a Web-based way for people with damning, potentially helpful or just plainembarrassing government documents to make them public without leaving fingerprints. Modeled onthe participatory, online encyclopedia Wikipedia, the site is expected to go live within the next twomonths.Organizer James Chen said that while its creators tried to keep the site under wraps until itslaunch, Google references to it have soared in recent days from about eight to more than 20,000."Wikileaks is becoming, as planned, although unexpectedly early, an international movement ofpeople who facilitate ethical leaking and open government," he said.The site, whose FAQs are written in flowery dissident-ese -- "What conscience cannot contain, andinstitutional secrecy unjustly conceals, Wikileaks can broadcast to the world" -- targets regimes inAsia, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, but not exclusively. It was founded and partiallyfunded, organizers say, by dissidents, mathematicians and technologists from China, the UnitedStates, Taiwan, Europe, Australia and South Africa. The site relies on a worldwide web of volunteersand contributors to post and vet the information, and dodge any efforts to shut it down. To protectdocument donors and the site itself, Wikileaks uses its own coded software combined with, for thetechies out there, modified versions of Freenet and PGP."I think its an intriguing effort," said Steven Aftergood, an open-government advocate who runsthe Federation of American Scientists Secrecy News blog."Its significant that their emphasis seems to be on relatively closed societies rather than the U.S.or Europe, that have a rather robust media sector."They have the potential to make a difference," he said.But for now, Aftergood has declined Wikileaks invitation to serve on its advisory board."I want to see how they launch and what direction they go in," he said. "Indiscriminate disclosurecan be as problematic as indiscriminate secrecy."The thought that a nations defense plans could turn up as "youve got mail" across the globe is achilling one. So, too, is the potential for a miscreant to sow mayhem by "leaking" documents, realor fake."Unless there are some kinds of editorial safeguards built into the process, it can be easilysabotaged. That was the concern I was trying to raise," Aftergood said. "Well have to see." Page 14
  • 17. Wikileaks organizers say the site is self-policing. "Wikileaks will provide a forum for the entireglobal community to examine any document relentlessly for credibility, plausibility, veracity andfalsifiability," they wrote in response to e-mailed questions. "If a document is leaked from theChinese government, the entire Chinese dissident community can freely scrutinize and discuss it; ifa document is leaked from Somalia, the entire Somali refugee community can analyze it and put itin context. And so on."Because organizers are scattered around the globe, "In the very unlikely event that we were toface coercion to make the software censorship friendly, there are many others who will continuethe work in other jurisdictions."For a review of Wikileaks first document, a weirdly worded memo titled "Secret Decision" said tobe issued by the Somalia Islamic court systems Office of the Chief of the Imams, go tohttp://www.wikileaks.org/inside_somalia_v9.html.Table of ContentsWikis a New OPSEC Threat?By Steve Field, dring.wordpress.com, 21 Jan 07It seems as if the Department of Defense is focused on blogs as the biggest threat to OPSEC in thenew media realm. It may be, however, that they overlooking another possibility — wikis. From the Washington Post: Wikileaks is developing an uncensorable Wikipedia for untraceable mass document leaking and analysis. Our primary interests are oppressive regimes in Asia, the former Soviet bloc, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, but we also expect to be of assistance to those in the west who wish to reveal unethical behavior in their own governments and corporations. We aim for maximum political impact; this means our interface is identical to Wikipedia and usable by non-technical people. We have received over 1.2 million documents so far from dissident communities and anonymous sources… Wikileaks opens leaked documents up to a much more exacting scrutiny than any media organization or intelligence agency could provide. Wikileaks will provide a forum for the entire global community to examine any document for credibility, plausibility, veracity and falsifiability. They will be able to interpret documents and explain their relevance to the public. If a document comes from the Chinese government, the entire Chinese dissident community can freely scrutinize and discuss it; if a document arrives from Iran, the entire Farsi community can analyze it and put it in context.For those not familiar, wikis, such as the popular wikipedia, are information sharing sites that arecompletely maintained and updated by visitors — the community controls the wiki’s content.Granted, wikileaks.org is designed to ferret out unethical behavior in government, but this exposesanother problem — how difficult would it be to set up a wiki to lead information about DoDoperations? Or other government secrets for that matter?Something to keep an eye on…Table of ContentsDefense Domain, Civilian AwarenessBy Patience Wait, Government Computer News, 22 Jan 07Elder, Garcia walk two sides of the cybersecurity beatThe world of combat has expanded to include cyberspace as a battlefield. Two men are nowresponsible for protecting the United States in cyberspace—Air Force Lt. Gen. Robert Elder, who Page 15
  • 18. heads the Pentagon’s strategic efforts in waging cyberwar, and Gregory Garcia, who handles thedefense of the nation’s cyberassets.Garcia is the first assistant secretary for cybersecurity and telecommunications at the HomelandSecurity Department. It is he who worries about how to prepare American society—government,commercial interests and individual citizens—to protect themselves from assaults on theirelectronic assets, whether home computers or nationwide networks.The White House appointed Garcia, a former vice president for information security programs atthe Information Technology Association of America trade association in Arlington, Va., inSeptember. His former colleagues were pleased with the pick, but did not hesitate to suggest hispriorities. “I think the first thing is to do the job of making the department more aware of cyber issues andof being a champion for cybersecurity,” said Joe Tasker, ITAA’s senior vice president of governmentaffairs. “We’re now at a place where 90 percent of American businesses are on the Internet ... Theubiquity and power of the networks is becoming inescapable.”On the offensive side of the equation, Air Force secretary Michael Wynne made it clear when heapproved the creation of a Cyber Command that combat already is taking place in cyberspace.“[T]he cyberspace domain contains the same seeds for criminal, private, transnational andgovernment-sponsored mischief as we have contended with in the domains of land, sea, air andnow contemplate as space continues to mature,” Wynne said in November. “In cyberspace, ourmilitary, America and indeed all of world commerce face the challenge of modern-day pirates, ofmany stripes and kinds, stealing money, harassing our families and threatening our ability to fighton ground, air, land and in space.”Elder, commander of the 8th Air Force, based at Barksdale Air Force Base, La., is the first head ofthe Cyber Command. The 8th Air Force already had many cyberspace capabilities, includingintelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and electronic warfare, and the creation of this majorcommand gives Elder the responsibility for creating “cyberspace warriors,” who can react to anythreats 24/7, he said.ROBERT ELDERGCN: What are your two or three top priorities for establishing this new command?ELDER: Our first priority is to establish cyberspace as a warfighting domain, characterized by theuse of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum.Today, cyberspace operations are generally viewed as network operations, information operations,or use of the Internet as an enabler for military operations in physical domains. The Air Force nowrecognizes that cyberspace ops is a potential center of gravity for the United States and, much likeair and space superiority, cyberspace superiority is a prerequisite for effective operations in allwarfighting domains.Our second priority is to present Air Force cyberspace forces and capabilities to U.S. StrategicCommand for their global missions, and to other combatant commanders through their Air Forcecomponent commanders for theater operations. This includes establishment of a 24/7-airoperations center.Our third priority is to develop a plan to organize, train and equip the Air Force to effectivelyconduct cyberspace operations. We intend to build capacity to conduct cyberspace operationsacross all aspects of [doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personneland facilities]. We must develop a robust capability to manage risk for operations in cyberspace.GCN: Can you elaborate on the role the Air Force will play in providing cybersecurity, and how itrelates to the roles of other governmental offices (civilian and DOD)?ELDER: There are many government agencies involved in cybersecurity. Air Force NetworkOperations is the service component to the Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations and willcontinue in that role. Page 16
  • 19. However, as a warfighting domain, cyberspace is much more than computer networks, it is adomain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum. Although wedidn’t call it cyberspace before, we’ve been operating in this domain at least since World War II,with radar, chaff curtains and telephone networks. ... Superiority in cyberspace will be defined inmuch the same way as we define air or space superiority—maintaining freedom of action for theUnited States and its allies, while denying freedom of action to our adversaries.Our Air Force command-and-control networks and other cyberspace capabilities must be capable ofoperating in a contested environment, and we will seek to deny the advantages cyberspaceprovides to our adversaries. Air Force Cyberspace Command will focus its efforts on militaryoperations in and through cyberspace, but in support of JTF-GNO, will work closely with othergovernment agencies. ... [We] will be postured to support homeland security, critical infrastructureprotection and civil support operations using cyberspace.GCN: Establishing this command implies there are real threats in cyberspace. Can you describewhat’s happening on this frontier?ELDER: Our adversaries operated in cyberspace in the past, are doing so today, and will do soeven more in the future. Your readers are well aware of the attacks they experience with theirnetworked computers every day. The Air Force can’t afford to disconnect a [command-and-control]system to purge itself of malware; as a result, we are very aggressive in our efforts to protect anddefend these networks.Al-Qaida coordinated the 9/11 strike with international and cellular communications, and theytrained their pilots on simulators. Additionally, there are now hundreds of anti-U.S. Web sites,including ones actively used for planning and coordinating attacks on U.S. interests, and ouradversaries can communicate freely via text messaging and e-mail. If we can establishcybersuperiority, we can inhibit the adversary’s ability to use cyberspace as an enabler.We have very few peer competitors or entities with similar capabilities, in air, on the ground or atsea. However, we have many potential peer competitors in cyberspace due to its low entry costs.And the cyberdomain is also very attractive to both state and nonstate rogue actors because of itspotential to achieve high-impact effects with low probability of detection or retribution. We can’tafford to lose the initiative in this area.Our dependence on cyberspace demands an even greater emphasis on our ability to ensurefreedom of maneuver in the domain. This will entail more than just “sitting guard” at workstations.It will mean approaching the problem just like we approach defending other physical domains. Weneed to be prepared to operate in cyberspace while our dominance is being contested.GREGORY GARCIAGCN: As the first assistant secretary for cybersecurity at Homeland Security, a lot of folks in thebusiness community have high expectations for you. What are your immediate priorities?GARCIA: The first is that this function, cybersecurity and telecommunications, is going to lead inthe national effort to prepare ... our networks, our information and communications systems, [to]make them more robust against cyberattacks.Second, when incidents do happen, we need to have a strong, national coordinated responsecapability ... in partnership with the private sector, a strong level of incident response that linksover to state and local first responders. Over time, the next year or so, I’ll be working toward reallyintegrating cyber and communications functions to better reflect the convergence that’s takingplace in the marketplace. We’re looking to secure both the pipes—the transport—and the content—the info.Finally, the third strategic priority is to build awareness. This function is a bully pulpit. I want tohelp develop a well-informed public at both the enterprise level and individual consumer level. ...That’s a matter of getting out and talking, doing a lot of talking.GCN: Does it really make a difference whether this is done at the assistant-secretary level or lowerin the DHS organizational chart? Page 17
  • 20. GARCIA: It has made a difference already, just simply by virtue of there being somebody at thislevel. It sends a clear [message] of the priority that this administration places on cybersecurity,communications security. I have briefed the secretary a couple of times now; he is engaged andconsiders this a priority.GCN: How have you been working on these priorities?GARCIA: One of the first things that I pushed for, and that we’re close to having done now, is co-locating the U.S.- Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) and the National CoordinationCenter, the communications industry/government partnership for watch and warning. That’s goingto facilitate the information sharing we need between industry and government [and] build ourincident response capability. ... That is one of the reasons I was brought on to DHS, in recognitionof my strong ties with industry.A couple of the high-level things we really need to do [are] work with [the Office of Managementand Budget] to raise the bar for federal agencies, to strengthen all of our security.Secondly, [we need to] really work with the private sector to get that coordinated incident responsecapability that we need to be able to move quickly and decisively. [And] we need a mature, real-time information sharing capability.GCN: What are the pitfalls, the things you worry about?GARCIA: The threats are constantly evolving against our cyber and communications infrastructure.We’re going to build upon this shared responsibility ... by industry, by government—all levels ofgovernment—by consumers [and] academia. And if we can put in place the structures and systemsthat will prepare us and deter against those threats, [if we] build incident response capability andawareness, then we’ll be better able to protect ourselves. The pitfall is that we don’t reach the levelof partnership that we all know is necessary.The one thing that I worry about is lack of awareness. I think that will be one of our biggestchallenges, to be able to articulate ... how important everybody’s role is, that one computer or onenetwork of computers can be the portal through which an attack is launched.Table of ContentsSignals Foil IEDs But Also Troop RadiosBy Tom Vanden Brook, USA TODAY, 23 January 2007WASHINGTON — The Pentagon has launched an urgent effort to develop radio systems immune tothe jamming signals that troops use to foil homemade bombs planted by insurgents in Iraq.The jammers, which block signals that detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs), have becomeso powerful they can "cause the loss of all communications" for U.S. troops, a Pentagon solicitationto contractors says. It calls for information on devices that will allow troops to use jammers andradios at the same time. The Pentagon said the information is needed "to support urgent, ongoinginitiatives" for jammers.Jammers have been a lifesaver by disabling IEDs, the leading cause of death of U.S. troops in Iraq.Bombs have killed at least 1,168 U.S. troops, according to an analysis of Pentagon data byiCasualties.org. The total is probably higher, the website says, because the Pentagon does notinclude details of each death. The site noted that the highest monthly death toll for IEDs occurredin December, when bombs killed 71 U.S. troops. All told, more than 3,000 U.S. servicemembershave died in Iraq.Communication has been a historic advantage for the U.S. military, allowing it to send troops wheretheyre needed most and to avoid "friendly fire" casualties. The jammers that protect troops fromroadside bombs can keep them from knowing the location of enemies and allies. In close-quartersurban warfare, ensuring communication can be a life-or-death matter. Page 18
  • 21. "It is a nightmare," said John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, a military think tank. "Any part ofthe spectrum we can use to communicate is part of spectrum that the enemy can use to detonatean IED."IEDs have killed 20 U.S. troops in Iraq this month, according to iCasualities. Adding 21,500 U.S.troops — as President Bush has announced — would be complicated by poor communication."Twice as many combat troops means twice as big a problem," Pike said.The Pentagon posted the urgent notice on Jan 4. Jammers are a large portion of Pentagon effortsto fight IEDs. In 2006, the Pentagon spent $3.5 billion to counter IEDs, $1.4 billion of that onjammers.The military has dealt with the communication problem for years. Troops initially kept power tojammers low enough to avoid interfering with communication, Marine Lt. Gen. James Mattis toldCongress in 2005. But detonators for the bombs have grown more sophisticated, requiring morepowerful jammers.Christine DeVries, a spokeswoman for the Pentagons Joint Improvised Explosive Device DefeatOrganization — the militarys lead agency in fighting IEDs — said she could not provide details onthe urgency of the request.The Army has ramped up efforts to deal with electronic communication and warfare. Since Jan. 1,each Army battalion headed to combat has been required to have an electronic warfare operator,said Col. Laurie Moe Buckhout, chief of Army electronic warfare. Rendering IEDs harmless by anelectronic signal will be one of the operators responsibilities, Buckhout said.The Army has put electronic warfare on par with learning to fire a weapon or administer first aid.Army electronic warfare operators disrupt enemy communication, ensure U.S and coalition troopscan talk to one another and prevent the enemy from knowing what friendly forces are doing,Buckhout said. A large portion of their responsibilities will be dealing with IEDs.Table of ContentsPentagon to Contractors: Meet DOD Infosec StandardsBy Patience Wait, Government Computer News, 22 January 2007The Defense Department is proposing to amend the Defense Federal Acquisition RegulationSupplement to address training requirements that apply to contractor personnel who performinformation assurance functions for DOD.The proposed rule change provides that contractor personnel accessing information systems mustmeet applicable training and certification requirements.The changes would apply DOD Directive 8570.1, Information Assurance Training, Certification andWorkforce Management, and DOD Manual 8570.01-M, Information Assurance WorkforceImprovement Program, to contractors.The deadline for comments to be submitted in writing is March 23; all comments should referenceDFARS Case 2006-D023. Comments may be submitted using the federal e-rulemaking portal athttp://www.regulations.gov or via e-mail to dfars@osd.mil.Comments also can be submitted via fax to (703) 602-0350, or by mail to the Defense AcquisitionRegulations System, Attn: Felisha Hitt, OUSD(AT&L)DPAP(DARS), IMD 3C132, 3062 DefensePentagon, Washington, DC 20301-3062; or hand-delivered or couriered to Defense AcquisitionRegulations System, Crystal Square 4, Suite 200A, 241 18th Street, Arlington, VA 22202-3402.Table of Contents Page 19
  • 22. China Confirms Firing Missile to Destroy SatelliteBy Edward Cody Washington Post, 24 January 2007BEIJING, Jan. 23 -- Breaking 12 days of silence, China confirmed Tuesday that it had fired a guidedmissile into space to destroy one of its satellites in a test that generated protests from the UnitedStates and other nations.A Foreign Ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao, said the United States and other governments havenow been informed about the secret test through diplomatic channels. He emphasized that the useof anti-satellite technology does not mean China has abandoned its long-standing opposition to themilitary use of space."I should stress at this time that the test was not targeted against any country and does not pose athreat to any country," Liu said at a ministry briefing. He added that he knew of no plans foranother such test by the Chinese military.The Chinese test shot, which culminated in the destruction of an overage weather satellite 537miles above Earth, was detected by U.S. monitors Jan. 11, but the Chinese government refused todiscuss it. The test raised concern in Washington, where officials and analysts interpreted it as asignal by China that U.S. military satellites could be vulnerable to attack.With the U.S. military heavily reliant on satellites for reconnaissance, navigation, weaponsguidance systems and anti-missile defenses, Chinas ability to shoot down satellites could pose anadded threat in the event of hostilities over Taiwan. In addition, Chinas newly demonstrated abilitycould threaten Taiwanese satellites monitoring Chinese short- and medium-range missiledeployments along the Taiwan Strait.U.S. officials said they were also dismayed by the Chinese test because the United States andRussia, after testing anti-satellite technology in the 1980s, more recently have abstained from suchtests, partly because destroying satellites creates debris that could damage satellites in nearbyorbits. Liu declined to address questions on this danger.Experts estimate that several hundred thousand debris fragments were created by the destructionof the satellite, which orbited in a section of space where as many as 125 other satellites fly.China, which has embarked on an accelerated military modernization program, has repeatedlyemphasized its desire to be able to compete in 21st-century warfare. The military, which runs thespace program, has identified space-based communications and sensing systems as key to suchefforts. Some Chinese military theorists also have advocated asymmetrical warfare, in whichpinpoint weapons would be used to disrupt the more advanced and better-equipped U.S. military.At the United Nations, China has consistently advocated the peaceful development of space andpushed for an international agreement to prevent it from becoming the theater for a new armsrace. The Bush administration has opposed Chinas suggestion for an international conference topursue such an accord, arguing there is no need for it.In that light, Liu was asked whether the anti-satellite test violated the spirit of Chinas proclaimedposition and, in any case, why China kept silent for nearly two weeks while officials around theworld were discussing it on the basis of U.S. intelligence reports."We have nothing to hide," he responded. "After the relevant parties expressed their concerns, wemade our response about the test quickly. We stressed that China opposes weaponization and anarms race in outer space."Table of ContentsChina Internet Market Grows To 137 Million UsersBy Steven Schwankert, IDG News Service, January 23, 2007China added another 14 million Internet users in 2006, retaining its status as the worlds secondlargest Internet market with 137 million total users, the China Internet Network Information Centre(CNNIC) announced Tuesday. Page 20
  • 23. Of those, 90.7 million access the Internet using a broadband connection, a 15 percent jump over2005, although total broadband use held steady at two-thirds of the Internet population. Also, 17million users now access the Internet primarily via a wireless device.Beijing residents accounted for 30.4 percent of the nations total Internet use. Shanghai placedsecond with 28.7 percent of total Internet users. By contrast, the Tibet Autonomous Regionaccounted for only 0.1 percent of Chinas total Internet users, with 160,000. At present, only about10.5 percent of Chinas 1.4 billion people use the Internet.According to the 122-page report, 58.3 percent of Chinese Netizens are men, with 41.7 percentwomen. The two largest age groups for users are between the ages of 18 and 24 with 35.2 percentand between 25 and 30 with 19.7 percent. The report also noted that 57.8 percent of Internetusers said they are not married.Although many in the Internet industry, especially online advertising, like to point to Internet usersas a more affluent group, the opposite seems to be true in China. The largest income group, 25.3percent of respondents, earns less than Chinese renminbi 500 ($64) per month. Only 1.6 percenthad a monthly income of more than renminbi 10,000 ($12,800).Seventy-six percent of Chinese Internet users access the Internet primarily from home. Theirprimary online activity is sending and receiving e-mail (56.1 percent), followed closely by readingnews (53.5 percent) and search (51.5 percent).Users whose primary access point was a mobile device did so to send or receive e-mail (72.2percent). Those who chose not to use their mobile device to access the Internet said the biggestobstacle was the high cost (69.6 percent). China does not yet have 3G (third generation) mobileservice outside of test areas and pilot programs, but China Mobile Communications Corp. and ChinaUnited Telecommunications Corp. offer 2.5G GSM (Global Standard for Mobile Communications)and CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) services, respectively, that allow for Internet accessfrom mobile devices and computers with compatible modem PC cards.Chinese Internet users also expressed deep concerns over giving out their private informationonline. Sixty-two percent said they were "totally unwilling" to give out private information online,with another 28 percent saying they were "not very willing" to do so. Only one percent said theywere "very willing" to provide such information over the Internet.CNNIC, a quasi-government organization, defines an "Internet user" for the purposes of the reportas someone over the age of six who uses the Internet on average at least one hour per week. Itdoes not release the size of its sample for the report.Table of ContentsGoogle Blots Out Iraq Bases On InternetBy Thomas Harding, the Telegraph (UK), 21 Jan 07British military bases in Iraq have been "blotted" out from Google Earth maps at the request of theGovernment to hinder terrorist attacks, it can be revealed.Sensitive installations such as the Trident nuclear submarine pens in Faslane, Scotland, and theeavesdropping base at GCHQ Cheltenham have also been obscured, a search of the site shows.Google was first alerted to the security breaches after personnel at the British headquarters atBasra Air Station in Iraq were astonished at the clarity with which all their positions were shown onthe popular internet site.The pictures, which were either aerial or satellite shots, showed the large number of vulnerabletent locations, vehicle parks and were clear enough to show tank tracks.After coming under almost daily mortar barrages, including one round that hit the divisionalheadquarters where the British general in charge of troops in Iraq is based, the Army contactedGoogle to have the pictures of the camp blurred so that details were obscured. Page 21
  • 24. Following negotiations, Google agreed to blot out British bases in Iraq after the company waspersuaded they would be helpful to terrorists.But it was not done early enough to stop insurgents obtaining copies of the pictures which, with thelongitude and latitude given, help them co-ordinate mortar and rocket attacks.As revealed in The Daily Telegraph last week, an insurgent arrested by British troops in Basra wasfound with a Google Earth map of the Shatt Al Arab base, home for 1,000 soldiers.The satellite photographs show in detail the various buildings inside the bases including vulnerableareas, such as tented accommodation, lavatory blocks and where lightly-armoured Land Rovers areparked.An intelligence officer said: "This is evidence as far as we are concerned for planning terroristattacks. Who would otherwise have Google Earth imagery of one of our bases?"We have never had proof that they have deliberately targeted any area of the camp using theseimages but presumably they are of great use to them."We believe they use Google Earth to identify the most -vulnerable areas such as tents."One soldier has been killed in the last six months following a mortar attack and there have beenseveral injuries.There have also been reports that the images were being sold to members of rogue militias in themarketplace in Basra.Google said it had opened channels of communication with the military in Iraq "but we will not gointo the details of those conversations"."Google gets information from third-party providers so all the pictures are publicly available," aspokesman said."We do of course listen to requests from government but we dont comment on the details of any ofthose discussions."It takes just 30 seconds to log on to the Google Earth website and look for sensitive locations.Research by The Daily Telegraph has provided some interesting images. In addition to Faslane andGCHQ the entire aerial footage of Hereford, home to the SAS, has been fuzzed out. But the SpecialForces Support Group headquarters, which provide additional troops for the SAS, in St Athan,Wales, is shown vividly with airstrip and barracks. Similarly, pictures of the Royal Navy base inPortsmouth show with some clarity aircraft carriers, frigates and destroyers in the harbour.Other clearly visible sites that could be useful to terrorists include MI6 headquarters in London.One website even set up a "Spot the Black Helicopter" competition where users were asked to findsensitive military bases using Google Earth.Table of ContentsUNH Geeks Unveil a Cyber Threat CalculatorBy Clynton Namuo, Union Leader, 26 January 2007DURHAM – The University of New Hampshire unveiled a cyber threat calculator at a conference inSt. Louis, Mo., yesterday that will aid the government and business in fighting terrorism.The calculator evaluates how big a danger a certain person, group or nation poses. It uses a slidingscale of up to 140 points; the higher the number, the greater the threat."We wanted people who were really geeks essentially to be able to take this information to theirbosses and say Hey, this is what we should be looking at," said Andrew Macpherson, an assistantprofessor of research in justice studies, who along with his students developed the calculator.Once fully developed, the calculator will be a powerful intelligence tool that will help identify howlikely an attack is, who the attacker may be and where the attack may occur. Page 22
  • 25. Such a tool will be of greater use in the future when major cyber attacks are more likely to occur,Macpherson said. So far, terrorists simply do not have the capability to launch large-scale,devastating cyber attacks."We have very few indications that terrorists are looking to use cyber attacks against the UnitedStates of America," he said.Macpherson also said he hopes the calculator will shed light on the threat of cyber attacks andpossibly bring more funding and attention to the growing problem. He unveiled the calculatoryesterday at the Department of Defense Cyber Crime Conference 2007.Cyber attacks are put in two main categories, said Macpherson, who also spearheaded the stateattorney generals Cyber Crime Initiative to educate more law enforcement officials on how to fightthe crimes.The first category is tactical and includes attacks that law enforcement would deal with such asfraud or identity theft. The second type of cyber attack is strategic and includes larger attacks thatthe government would respond to, such as terrorists trying to fell the power grid.The threat calculator will help identify the larger strategic attacks using a set of 28 variables,Macpherson said. Each person, organization or nation is judged on each variable.Those variables also fall into two categories €" intent and capability €" and include things such aswhether or not the country is stable and has been hostile to the U.S. before and whether or not itsmilitary has the ability to execute such attacks.Surprisingly, the calculator makes all its computations based solely on information readily availableto the public. No classified data is used, Macpherson said. He said 80 to 90 percent of intelligenceis done using just such open-sourced data.For example, if an intelligence agency gets a tip on a possible train attack somewhere at a certaintime, it will first check if the train actually goes to that area and if so, whether or not it will bethere at the given time. That is all information anyone can get, Macpherson said."We feel we are one of the few academic institutions in the nation that is conducting this type ofresearch," he said.Macpherson will discuss more cyber threats on a Discovery Channel show titled "Future 2057"airing Sunday (27 January) at 8 p.m.Table of ContentsIraqis Hold Reopening Celebration for SchoolBy Multi-National Force - West PAO (via Blackanthem Military News), Jan 25, 2007AR RAMADI, Iraq - An Iraqi neighborhood north of Ramadi celebrated the reopening of itscombined primary and secondary school Tuesday by sharing the moment with visiting Iraqi ArmySoldiers and Coalition Forces.Community leaders asked Maj. Derek Horst, civil affairs team leader with the 4th Civil AffairsGroup, to cut the ribbon for the Al Haitham School, which provides classes for the Abu Jassim tribe.The school was temporarily closed in November for renovations. Tribal leader Sheik Taher, whooversaw the renovations, led a group of community leaders and military personnel on a brief tourof the building after the ribbon cutting.First Lt. Stuart Barnes, a civil affairs team leader with B Company, 486th Civil Affairs Battalion, saidattendance at the school shows stability in the area continues to increase."We’re making progress day after day," he said.The school, which began holding classes again earlier this month, hosts an estimated 200 to 300students, Barnes said.Table of Contents Page 23
  • 26. LTG David Petraeus: A Military Leader Bringing “Soft Power” to IraqBy James Forest, Ph.D., Family Security Foundation, 26 January 2007Iraq is a mess. The good news is that of all the military leaders this administration could choose totackle the complexities in Iraq, few would be as perfect for the task as Lieutenant General (LTG)David Petraeus. He commanded the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in Iraq during the firstyear of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and led the team that successfully pacified and reconstructed thenorthern city of Mosul. At one point during this period, a group of West Point faculty (includingmyself) were treated to a conference call with Petraeus, who described the vast diversity of theircivil affairs efforts, and I was struck by his incredible grasp of critical infrastructure challenges,local cultural nuances, and the non-kinetic dimensions of effective counterinsurgency. He and histeam demonstrated the political savvy of the best mayoral administrations in the U.S., and theirresults of their efforts spoke volumes. We brought his observations and lessons learned from thefield into our classrooms, where our cadets—Army officers of the future—surely benefited.In June 2004, he became the first commander of the Multi-National Security Transition-Iraq, andlater that year was chosen as the first commander of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq. Hisleadership and experience are unquestioned. But it his impressive intellect and enormous grasp ofthe non-kinetic aspects of military conflicts which will be of greatest assistance to our men andwomen deployed in Iraq. You see, LTG Petraeus is one of a rare breed of senior scholar-soldierswho knows—and can convince others, drawing on extensive historical facts and solid academictheory—that military power of even the greatest magnitude cannot resolve a complexcounterinsurgency on its own.For example, in the January-February 2006 issue of Military Review, Petraeus offered fourteenobservations from his experiences in Iraq. This article has become required reading in severalmilitary education programs, and warrants a brief summary and paraphrasing for a broaderaudience, particular as it relates the application of soft power toward countering insurgencies.These observations are: 1.“Do not try to do too much with your own hands.” 2. Act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life. 3. Money is ammunition. 4. Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success. 5. Analyze “costs and benefits” before each operation. 6. Intelligence is the key to success. 7. Everyone must do nation-building. 8. Help build institutions, not just units. 9. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier. 10. Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations. 11. Ultimate success depends on local leaders. 12. Remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants. 13. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders. 14. A leader’s most important task is to set the right tone.Observations 7 through 11 are particular important for our understanding of how the Iraq conflictwill (if ever) be resolved, because they emphasize the non-military, soft power dimensions of anysuccessful counterinsurgency strategy. Indeed, his observation number 10, that success in acounterinsurgency requires more than just military operations, raises critical questions about whythe military continues to bear the overwhelming brunt of the current counterinsurgency efforts inIraq. The Departments of States, Agriculture, Education, Energy—all the arms of the federalgovernment should be heavily engaged in the reconstruction process, through financial and humanresource commitments. In their absence, military officers and their soldiers are tasked with the Page 24
  • 27. broadest array of civil affairs, construction, and development projects imaginable, projects whichare absolutely necessary for rebuilding a nation torn apart by decades of corrupt dictatorship and,more recently, war and sectarian violence.According to Joseph Nye, a former dean of Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government,the term soft power encompasses the realm of economics as well as the nuanced world ofnegotiated relationships among nations and transnational actors (like multinational corporations,non-governmental organizations, and multinational regimes like NATO, the European Union, andOPEC). It also accounts for the non-warfighting, nation-building activities that our soldiers andofficers conduct on a daily basis (but which almost never receive coverage in the media). UnderPetraeus, these types of activities became a responsibility of everyone, not just the Civil Affairsunits. For example, he tells the story (in his Military Review article) of how reopening the Universityof Mosul demonstrates the importance of soft power. After assessing the extent of the damage andlooting, he organized a combination of civil affairs and aviation brigade personnel (individuals whoclearly did not have “Rebuild Foreign Academic Institutions” in their mission essential task list), andput them to work repairing and reopen this symbol of considerable national pride, with over 75buildings, some 4,500 staff and faculty, and approximately 30-35,000 students.LTG Petraeus also sent his Signal Battalion to help reestablish the local telecommunicationsstructure. Their work including assisting the Ministry of Telecommunications element in northernIraq with a deal that brought a satellite downlink to the central switch and linked Mosul with theinternational phone system. Other components of his division were assigned similar tasks. TheChaplain and his team linked with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Engineer Battalion with theMinistry of Public Works, the Division Support Command with the Ministry of Youth and Sports, theCorps Support Group with the Ministry of Education, the Military Police Battalion with the Ministryof Interior (Police), the Surgeon and his team with the Ministry of Health, the Staff Judge Advocatewith Ministry of Justice officials, the Fire Support Element with the Ministry of Oil, and so on. At theend of the day, everyone and every element, not just Civil Affairs units, was engaged in nation-building. The results among the community were palpable—Mosul remained one of the mostpeaceful areas in Iraq throughout Petraeus’ command.According to Petraeus, counterinsurgency strategies must include “above all, efforts to establish apolitical environment that helps reduce support for the insurgents and undermines the attraction ofwhatever ideology they may espouse. In certain Sunni Arab regions of Iraq, establishing such apolitical environment is likely of greater importance than military operations, since the rightpolitical initiatives might undermine the sanctuary and assistance provided to the insurgents.Beyond the political arena, other important factors are economic recovery (which reducesunemployment, a serious challenge in Iraq that leads some out-of-work Iraqis to be guns for hire),education (which opens up employment possibilities and access to information from outside one’snormal circles), diplomatic initiatives (in particular, working with neighboring states through whichforeign fighters transit), improvement in the provision of basic services, and so on. In fact, thecampaign plan developed in 2005 by the Multinational Force-Iraq and the U.S. Embassy with Iraqiand Coalition leaders addresses each of these issues.” (Of course, an immediate question that hisobservation reveals is why there was no comparable plan to address these issues before theoriginal invasion of Iraq in March 2003.)In his Military Review article, Petraeus describes how his team saw beyond the need to developIraqi Army and Police units, and began working as well to rebuild the institutions that support theseunits in the field—the ministries, the administrative and logistical support units, the professionalmilitary education systems, admin policies and procedures, and the training organizations. “A lackof ministry capability and capacity,” he notes, “can undermine the development of the battalions,brigades, and divisions, if the ministries, for example, don’t pay the soldiers or police on time, usepolitical rather than professional criteria in picking leaders, or fail to pay contractors as required forservices provided.”In addition, he notes, understanding key cultural aspects—the viewpoints of various ethnic groups,tribes, religious elements, political parties, and other social groupings; the relationships among the Page 25
  • 28. various groups; governmental structures and processes; local and regional history; and, of course,local and national leaders—is essential if one is to help the people build stable political, social, andeconomic institutions. Beyond the intellectual need for the specific knowledge about theenvironment in which one is working, it is also clear that people, in general, are more likely tocooperate if those who have power over them respect the culture that gives them a sense ofidentity and self-worth. These observations reflect the sort of understanding about human behaviorand commitment to cultural awareness that have provided (and will continue to provide) animportant beacon for guiding his subordinates toward success in Iraq.Finally, he emphasizes the critical importance of local leadership in forging a successful future inIraq. “Success in Iraq is, as time passes, increasingly dependent on Iraqi leaders—at four levels: – Leaders at the national level working together, reaching across party and sectarian lines tokeep the country unified, rejecting short-term expedient solutions such as the use of militias, andpursuing initiatives to give more of a stake in the success of the new Iraq to those who feel leftout; – Leaders in the ministries building the capability and capacity necessary to use the tremendousresources Iraq has efficiently, transparently, honestly, and effectively; – Leaders at the province level resisting temptations to pursue winner-take-all politics andresisting the urge to politicize the local police and other security forces, and; – Leaders in the Security Forces staying out of politics, providing courageous, competentleadership to their units, implementing policies that are fair to all members of their forces, andfostering loyalty to their Army or Police band of brothers rather than to specific tribes, ethnicgroups, political parties, or local militias.Iraqi leaders are, in short, the real key to the new Iraq, and we thus need to continue to do all thatwe can to enable them.”This last point—enabling the Iraqi people to take control of their country and build a prosperousdemocracy—is an oft-cited mantra of the current administration, and yet highlights the debateabout sending more troops to Iraq to quell the violence. The Bush administration has (perhapsbelatedly) recognized that before soft power can be applied to build a stable democracy, absolutesecurity must be provided, and this requires a greater force presence than initially approved.However, critics are loathe to see the U.S. bear the brunt of the responsibility for providing thissecurity. A professional Iraqi military and police force, whose members are loyal only to thenation’s constitution and laws (and willing to abandon their historical ethnic or tribal influences), isparamount to the security of the country. To the degree that this proposed surge in troop strengthcan enable such developments, it is a good thing, but it remains to be seen—despite the hugesacrifices being made every day by the men and women (many of them fathers and mothers) ofthe American armed forces—whether the Iraqi people will rise to the occasion. This may very wellbe their last, best chance to prove the critics and skeptics wrong.Overall, LTG David Petraeus—a graduate of West Point who happens to hold a M.P.A. and Ph.D.from Princeton University—has a profound understanding that the military is not the solution to aninsurgency. He, perhaps more than most senior officers and civilian leaders in this administration,has demonstrated his grasp of the global conflict of ideologies, and seems to offer a pragmatic,comprehensive response to the Iraqi stage on which the conflict is being played out. We willundoubtedly give him our full support. So should the people of Iraq.AcknowledgementsThe views expressed are those of the author and not of the Department of the Army, the U.S. Military Academy,or any other agency of the U.S. Government.Table of Contents Page 26
  • 29. Camp Lemonier Soldier Recalls Heart-Warming Experience In KenyaBy U.S. Army Sgt. Eric Hayes, CJTF – HOA Civic Action Team, 28 Jan 07LAMU DISTRICT, Kenya – During my tour as a civil affairs specialist on a civic action team forCombined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa, I worked on several Medical and Veterinary Civic ActionPrograms, better known as MEDCAPS and VETCAPS. I shared the excitement of being a wanderingexplorer with a driving focus to accomplish a specific task. The brightly-colored kikois and collaredshirts contrasted with a landscape alien to me. The smell of roasted curried goat, unfamiliar to me,permeated the air.For a MEDCAP in the Lamu District in Kenya from July 8-24, our team arrived with plans in hand tohelp as many people as possible. The first barriers for us to cross were language and culture. Itwas difficult at first, but by learning a few words and using an interpreter, we were able to build arelationship unlike any I’ve experienced before. This was the connection between two cultures thatmakes civil affairs successful and awe-inspiring.During a MEDCAP in the Lamu District in Kenya, I discovered many things about the people in thatarea. Getting to know some of the locals, I witnessed the respect family members showed eachother and how these families often traveled together. When people were too sick to travel to theMEDCAP, they would often send their children in their place, walking barefoot for miles on wild dirtpaths hoping to pick up some medicine to treat their family members.The Kenyan volunteers working with us were some of the friendliest people I had ever met. Theywere quick to greet us, to chat with us and to make us feel welcome. As they got to know usbetter, the Kenyans were as curious about American culture as we were about Kenyan culture.One of the greatest challenges we faced during the MEDCAP was getting medical treatment to themost people in an effective manner. When villagers heard that a MEDCAP was taking place nearby,they showed up expecting some form of treatment for their ailments.Facing these expectations, we worked tirelessly, seeing as many patients as possible. It wasfrustrating at times trying to help people when we struggled to understand what they were tryingto tell us.However, through the long hours of toil, the rewards were priceless. Watching complete strangersleave your sight smiling, walking down a dusty path with an arm full of medicine and vitamins, surethat the treatments would make their families healthier and happier, made our efforts worth whileMaking new friends and improving the lives of other people for the sake of peace has been themost gratifying experience I could ever have.Table of Contents Page 27