Risky Borrowers Or Risky Mortgages 10.2.2008


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  • Risky Borrowers Or Risky Mortgages 10.2.2008

    1. 1. Risky Borrowers or Risky Mortgages? Lei Ding, Roberto G. Quercia, Janneke Ratcliffe Center for Community Capital, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA Wei Li Center for Responsible Lending, Durham, NC, USA September 13, 2008
    2. 2. <ul><li>Serving LMI/minority borrowers… </li></ul><ul><li>Traditionally: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>FHA </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Starting in the 1990s: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Community reinvestment type products are mostly FRM with flexible but carefully underwritten standards. Lenders’ knowledge of their community important. Limited due to liquidity concerns. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Starting in the late 1990s: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Subprime loans are products characterized by risky underwriting—reliance on rapid appreciation, low doc or no-doc, low-down or no-down, high debt ratios, originated by brokers. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Starting in the late 2000s: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>FHA loans has gained market share after the inset of the current crisis (~30% of originations in 2008?) </li></ul></ul>
    3. 3. Performance of Community Lending is to Prime FRM Subprime Products have the worse Performance Source: Mortgage Bankers Association and Self-Help. 90+day delinquencies include loans in different foreclosure stages. N=44,973 for the CAP portfolio. Sub ARM Sub FRM FHA prime_arm Community Lending Prime FRM
    4. 4. <ul><li>Risky borrowers? Risky products? </li></ul><ul><li>Borrowers holding subprime loans are generally weaker across key underwriting criteria: collateral (down payment), credit history (credit score), and repayment capacity (debt ratios). Yet, many of these borrowers qualify for a prime mortgage (Freddie Mac 2005) </li></ul><ul><li>Subprime loans have features found to significantly add to risk </li></ul><ul><ul><li>adjustable rates (Calhoun and Deng, 2002) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>prepayment penalties and balloon payments (Quercia, Stegman, and Davis, 2007; Danis and Pennington-Cross, 2005) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>hybrid ARMs (Ambrose, LaCour-Little, and Huszar, 2005; Pennington-Cross and Ho, 2006) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>It is difficult to isolate the impact of loan features unless we are comparing borrowers with similar risk characteristics. </li></ul><ul><li>This study compares the relative risk of loan products in a community lending program (Community Advantage Program) and a sample of subprime loans from a proprietary dataset (McDash Analytics) for similar borrowers. </li></ul>
    5. 5. <ul><li>Subprime Data </li></ul><ul><li>McDash Analytics </li></ul><ul><li>Loan level info about 15 residential mortgage servicers; </li></ul><ul><li>Tracking over 20 million active loans on a monthly basis </li></ul><ul><li>Good coverage on conventional prime loans and FHA market </li></ul><ul><li>Modest coverage in the subprime market </li></ul><ul><li>Definition of subprime loans </li></ul><ul><li>B&C loans </li></ul><ul><li>High-cost ARMs (arm margin greater than 300 basis points) </li></ul>
    6. 6. <ul><li>Community Reinvestment Data </li></ul><ul><li>Community Advantage Program (CAP) </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Partnership between Ford Foundation, Self-Help, Fannie Mae </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Started in 1998, over 50,000 loans </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Secondary market outlet for CRA-type loans </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Prime mortgage products serving borrowers with </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>• Low- to moderate- income </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>• Weak credit history and/or low down-payments </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>In this study, a sample of 9,221 CAP loans originated during 2003-2006 </li></ul></ul>
    7. 7. <ul><li>Propensity Score Match: focusing on borrowers with similar risk characteristics but holding different products: CAP or subprime </li></ul>CAP Subprime Prime Loans Subprime Loans Prime Borrowers Subprime Borrowers
    8. 8. Matched Sample – Subprime Loans Do Worse Predicted Serious Delinquency 24 Months after Origination Note: Estimation is based on a borrower with a FICO score between 580-620 with the mean value of other regressors. Controlling variables include borrower DTI, FICO_score, home equity, loan age, loan size, area credit risk, area unemployment rate, and interest rate environment.
    9. 9. Predicted Serious Delinquency 24 months after Origination Community Lending (CAP) and Retail Subprime loans Note: Estimation is based on a borrower with a FICO score between 580-620 with the mean value of other regressors. sub_arm represents retail originated subprime ARMs without prepayment penalties; sub_arm&ppp represents retail originated subprime ARMs with prepayment penalties.
    10. 10. Predicted Serious Delinquency 24 Months After Origination Community Lending and Broker Originated Subprime Loans Note: Estimation is based on a borrower with a FICO score between 580-620 with the mean value of other regressors. sub_bro&ppp and sub_bro represent broker-originated subprime FRMs with and without prepayment penalties respectively; sub_bro&arm&ppp and sub_bro&arm represent broker-originated subprimeARMs with and without prepayment penalties respectively.
    11. 11. <ul><li>For similar borrowers, subprime loans, ARMs, loans with prepayment penalties, and loans originated by brokers have significantly higher risks than community lending loans </li></ul><ul><li>So it is risky borrowers or reckless lenders? The study suggest that the latter plays the central role. </li></ul><ul><li>Subprime crisis have us believing that homeownership may be a bad idea for low income households. This is not the case. Done right, done responsibly, low-income homeownership can still be a viable and sustainable asset building tool. </li></ul>Summary and Implications