Why Government Steps in Again ?A Comperative Analysis of Dominant Energy Sector SOEs              of Russia, Brasil and Ch...
Reseach Questions•   What are the reasons / motivations for re-intervention of governments    in energy sector ?•   What i...
Why government steps in again ?
A General Look atIntroduction   the Energy Prices   Gazprom                Chinese Petro-     Conclusion  Petrobras       ...
Historical Motivations for the                  Establishment of SOE’sEconomic motivations:•    Revenue Generation•    Imp...
SOE’s in History•   During the eras that preceded and that was contemporary to the World Wars,    a number of governments ...
Examples of Modern SOE sectors•   Britain – The “Workshop of the World” & the Liberal Approach. Still yielded    examples ...
SOE’s Post-War Era to 1980’s•   Following Keynesian ideology, state organs seen as driver of economy•   Large demand for p...
PrivatisationPrivatisation is understood as any transfer of state activities into the private     sector;Main Drivers of P...
Re-entry of government into enterprise activity•    The truth is, many SOE’s survived the 1980’s reform e.g., Most petrole...
A General Look atIntroduction   the Energy Prices   Gazprom                Chinese Petro-     Conclusion  Petrobras       ...
Total energy real end-use price index for industry and                     households
A General Look atIntroduction   the Energy Prices   Gazprom                Chinese Petro-     Conclusion  Petrobras       ...
Oil & Gas Industries in Russia•   Russian state followed different paths in the oil and gas industries since the    collap...
Gazprom•   It alone produces more than 20% of the world’s gas ( most recently    22%)•   8% of Russia’s GDP (in 2008)•   L...
Gazprom•   Russia is the largest market for Gazprom in terms of trade volume•   European and Chinese markets come after do...
Gazprom’s Activities at Glance
Gazprom – Brief History•   1989, Foundation , First State – Corporate Enterprise (Exercised through shares of    stock 100...
Gazprom – Gas Prices and NationalizationGazprom Shareholders as a Percentage of Capital Structure               Index of n...
Gazprom – Motivations for Re-Intervention ?•   Strategic importance of the natural gas sector•   Subsidizing local consume...
Gazprom’s Corporate Behaviour under Question ?             Instrument of State or Private Enterprise ?      Signs of behav...
Gazprom – Ratings                   Sales, EBITDA, Profit , million RUR                              (2003-2010)4.000.0003...
Gazprom – RatingsNet Margin(%) , Return on Equity (%), Return on Capital (%) 35% 30%          Re-interventation 25% 20%   ...
Gazprom – Expectations & Challenges            Expectations                                  Challenges•   Being able to c...
A General Look atIntroduction   the Energy Prices   Gazprom                Chinese Petro-     Conclusion  Petrobras       ...
Petrobras•   Founded in 1953•   It is a semi-public company, and the Brazilian Government has the majority of    the votin...
Petrobras•   Market Cap: USD 147 billion (September, 2011)•   Ebitda: USD 32 billion – 77% E&P (2010)•   2010 Oil and Gas ...
Petrobras•   Presence in 27 countries in all 5 continents                                           • Activities in all se...
Petrobras•   Phase 1 - Self-sufficiency – 1972 to mid 1990’s     Creation of the subsidiary Braspetro to be the internati...
Petrobras•   Phase 2 (cont)     2 Landmarks: 1) 1997 - Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline (with the exploration of the      majo...
Petrobras•   Phase 3 – Pre-Salt Era In 2006 / 2007, Petrobras has discovered large oil fields in Brazil, at ultra-deep wa...
Petrobras•   Phase 3 (cont) Political decision (from the State): To use the so huge Petrobras investment to  foster local...
Petrobras - Conclusion on 3 Phases•   Phase 1 - Self-sufficiency – 1972 to mid 1990’s•   Phase 2 – Going Global – mid 1990...
A General Look atIntroduction   the Energy Prices   Gazprom                Chinese Petro-     Conclusion  Petrobras       ...
Chinese Petro-Majors - Background•Responsibility for exploiting petroleum resources lay with ChinesePetroleum Industry Dep...
Motivations for reformOverseas energy acquisitions emerged as important•objective by the 21st Century“The natural resource...
But!●   Industrial structure and management systems of the    Chinese petroleum sector were outmoded, uncompetitive    and...
A Look At The Reform Process•A globalised economy required market fundamentals andthe state-run oil majors underwent ‘comp...
How was reform implemented ?●   Traditional government functions changed so state    participation in management activitie...
Overview of Stock Market Listings
Reforms cont’dMain results were:      Autonomously managed firms   Relaxing industrial structure rules to allow the firm...
Did Reform Create successful firms ?                                  Profits of CNOOC & Sinopec          120          100...
Reform Success Cont.                                          Profit Index - CNOOC & Sinopec                4             ...
Reform Success• Internal Policy Success –• External Policy Success – Chinese mining FDI  increase sevenfold between 2004 a...
Re-Interventionism?•Not a re-intervention as such: Chinese SOE’s nowhave significant shares of private ownership wherethey...
Certainly InterventionismChinese SOE’s still subject to regulation within the•state’s macroeconomic policy framework.Chine...
Subsidising Petro-Majors – The Case of                   Sinopec●   Sinopec received subsidies worth US$1.7 billion in    ...
Expectations & Conclusions●   Companies became more competitive●   Able to execute state agendas better than when the were...
A General Look atIntroduction   the Energy Prices   Gazprom                Chinese Petro-     Conclusion  Petrobras       ...
Conclusions•   What are the reasons / motivations for re-intervention of governments    in energy sector ?      Geopoliti...
Conclusions●   Re-interventation success from the market    perspective is unclear●   Re-interventation does not necessari...
Conclusions         Why governments steps in again ?Governments would consider their re-interventaion successful because t...
Thank you !
References•   OECD, ‘Corporate Governance of State Owned Enterprices, Change and    Reform in OECD Countries since 2005’, ...
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Re Interventionism In Russia,China And Brazil Under Question Emre&Edwards&Kohlman

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Re Interventionism In Russia,China And Brazil Under Question Emre&Edwards&Kohlman

  1. 1. Why Government Steps in Again ?A Comperative Analysis of Dominant Energy Sector SOEs of Russia, Brasil and China Volkan Emre Stefan Edwards Gabriel Kohlmann Bereket Asfaha
  2. 2. Reseach Questions• What are the reasons / motivations for re-intervention of governments in energy sector ?• What is the relationship of interventation and energy prices ?• Do the activities of the company reflect success in achieving their motivations / objectives ?• Do the selected SOEs behave as an instrument of state rather than a private enterprise ?• What are the main expectations and challenges for the future ?
  3. 3. Why government steps in again ?
  4. 4. A General Look atIntroduction the Energy Prices Gazprom Chinese Petro- Conclusion Petrobras Majors
  5. 5. Historical Motivations for the Establishment of SOE’sEconomic motivations:• Revenue Generation• Import SubstitutionPolitical motivations:• To create economic diplomacy and trade with other nations• To create state monopolies for strategic resourcesSecurity motivations:• To monopolize military enterprise, production and technology• A means to fulfill their interest with power and prestige
  6. 6. SOE’s in History• During the eras that preceded and that was contemporary to the World Wars, a number of governments started to play a more direct role in the economy,• The motivation for intervention often originated from a number of concepts, including:• Natural Monopoly: government intervenes in sectors they deem to be in the public interest such as the electricity, gas and the railway sectors required for the provision of goods or services.• Market failure: provision of public goods, i.e., the free rider problem. Private enterprise does not have motive to produce such goods and services.• Merit goods :limited to particular groups, but consumption is desirable even if you don’t pay a market price (for example, merit goods are health care or education).• Externalities (positive or negative) outcome of an economic activity that affects other members of a community.
  7. 7. Examples of Modern SOE sectors• Britain – The “Workshop of the World” & the Liberal Approach. Still yielded examples of nationalizations like Suez Company(1875), BBC(1927), British Airways(1939) and British Steel(1967)• France – A Long Tradition of State Involvement in the Economy, dating back to the ‘regies’ of the 18th Century. Modern examples include France Telecom and La Poste, as well as the gas and electricity industries of France.• Germany – A Late Starter and Late Developer. Railways nationalized after World War I. Renationalization of Bundesruckerei (2008).• Russia/Soviet Union - ‘Socialization of Production’, all production nationalized in 1918. Yeltsin government seized Gazprom assets in 1998 in lieu of claims of owed taxes.7
  8. 8. SOE’s Post-War Era to 1980’s• Following Keynesian ideology, state organs seen as driver of economy• Large demand for public spending• SOE’s seen as critical in closing development gapHowever…• Government failure and SOE underperformance played critical role in debt crisis among developing countries in 1980’s.• Call for fundamental shift from state driven to market driven development• Structural Adjustment era!• Calls to privatize8
  9. 9. PrivatisationPrivatisation is understood as any transfer of state activities into the private sector;Main Drivers of Privatization of SOE’s• Low efficiency, profitability and competitiveness of SOE’s• Low technological progress of SOE’s increased potential for privatisation and commercialisation e.g. utilities• Lack of adequate funds and the difficult process to “get public finances right” Privatisation emerges as a way to minimize government spending and increase revenue for government• The downfall of centrally-planned economic systems main drivers for privatization9
  10. 10. Re-entry of government into enterprise activity• The truth is, many SOE’s survived the 1980’s reform e.g., Most petroleum companies, Amtrak, Indian Rail, Enel(Italy) & CFE(Mexico)• In a way, a competitive environment has been good for SOE’s, prompting them to act more like private firms• Efficiency and competiveness, and corporate governance improved.• More governments keen to use them as tools again in order to achieve social and public interest goals, as well as industrial and technological flagships.10
  11. 11. A General Look atIntroduction the Energy Prices Gazprom Chinese Petro- Conclusion Petrobras Majors
  12. 12. Total energy real end-use price index for industry and households
  13. 13. A General Look atIntroduction the Energy Prices Gazprom Chinese Petro- Conclusion Petrobras Majors
  14. 14. Oil & Gas Industries in Russia• Russian state followed different paths in the oil and gas industries since the collapse of USSR  Oil: o Russia holds world’s 6th largest reserves o Russia is world’s second largest oil producer o Large privatization of exploration & extraction o Pipeline infrastructure kept under the state control  Gas: o Russia holds worlds largest reserves o Russian state retained the largest stake in Gazprom• Warning ! Over the last years ,with the political effect of Putin - Kremlin sought to assert greater control over the oil industry by building a large oil company within Gazprom
  15. 15. Gazprom• It alone produces more than 20% of the world’s gas ( most recently 22%)• 8% of Russia’s GDP (in 2008)• Largest and richest company in Russia - 13th largest in the world (Forbes The Global 2000 Report, 2009)• Provided 25% of its earnings to the federal budget (2008)• Supplies almost all of the gas of the households in Russia• Generates 50% of Russia’s electricity
  16. 16. Gazprom• Russia is the largest market for Gazprom in terms of trade volume• European and Chinese markets come after domestic market• World’s top gas exporter / Mainly to Europe• Gazprom also imports gas from Central Asia: Turkmenistan & Kazakhistan• Gazprom makes largest portion of its revenues by exporting gas to Europe and charges oil-linked prices which are roughly 5 times more than the prices paid by Russian consumers• Gazprom aims to become a global , vertically integrated energy company occupying a leading position on the world market• The company wants to compete with the majors on their own territories by developing upstream and downstream activities overseas
  17. 17. Gazprom’s Activities at Glance
  18. 18. Gazprom – Brief History• 1989, Foundation , First State – Corporate Enterprise (Exercised through shares of stock 100% state shares)• 1991, USSR was dissolved. Gazprom remained in Russia but there were newly created national companies like Turkmengazprom• 1993 – 1997 , Inluence of Boris Yeltsin and Privatization… Organization became a joint-stock  33% sold via voucher method to the russian citizens  15% sold to the to the employees  40% retained by state  Heavy regulations by law on the possible share of foreigners = upper ceiling was 9%• 2000, 38% downsized share of state• 1997 – 2000 , Corruption ( Tax Evasion , Asset Stripping..etc)• 2000-2003, Putin and his reforms• 2005, Establishment of government control – State owned company Rosneftgaz purchased 11% share of Gazprom and Russian state took the control• (The Russian government controls 50.002% of shares in Gazprom
  19. 19. Gazprom – Gas Prices and NationalizationGazprom Shareholders as a Percentage of Capital Structure Index of natural gas end-user prices
  20. 20. Gazprom – Motivations for Re-Intervention ?• Strategic importance of the natural gas sector• Subsidizing local consumer and producers at reasonable prices• Russia’s foreign policy approach after Putin came into force.  Export Monopoly Benefits• Increasing energy prices
  21. 21. Gazprom’s Corporate Behaviour under Question ? Instrument of State or Private Enterprise ? Signs of behaving as Signs of behaving as a an Instrument of State Private Enterprise• Suppliyng the inefficient domestic market at low prices = Low profitability in the domestic • High profits & High profitability market • Slightly increased stock prices• Economically irrational and selective business decissions on the international level • International and overseas activities• Weak corporate governance and managerial efficiency problems. Gazprom is still • Ambitious corporate aims to managed like a Soviet enterprise. become an international player• Dominant role of political connections on the • Ambitious investment projects in governance style four continents• Weak control of shareholders• Activities in the unrelated industries like media and footbal. Especially the dominant control of media• Lack of investment to keep and increase the production capacity
  22. 22. Gazprom – Ratings Sales, EBITDA, Profit , million RUR (2003-2010)4.000.0003.500.000 Re-interventation3.000.0002.500.000 Sales2.000.000 EBITDA1.500.000 Profit1.000.000 500.000 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
  23. 23. Gazprom – RatingsNet Margin(%) , Return on Equity (%), Return on Capital (%) 35% 30% Re-interventation 25% 20% Net margin (%) 15% Return on equity (%) Return on capital (%) 10% 5% 0% 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
  24. 24. Gazprom – Expectations & Challenges Expectations Challenges• Being able to compete with the majors • Progressive deregulation of the in their own territories European gas market (biggest market) . There will be most likely significant changes in the future• Keeping the market share long term contracts• Diversifying the transportation • Production is stagnant opportunities • Investments are insufficient • The biggest fields are in decline • High depence on the current pipeline system to deliver russian gas (e.g conflicts with Ukraine)
  25. 25. A General Look atIntroduction the Energy Prices Gazprom Chinese Petro- Conclusion Petrobras Majors
  26. 26. Petrobras• Founded in 1953• It is a semi-public company, and the Brazilian Government has the majority of the voting shares, being the controller: • Shares traded in Stock Exchanges in New York, Sao Paulo, Madrid and Buenos Aires • Has operations in Exploration and Production; Refining and Downstream; Gas and Power and Bio-fuels • Has activities in 27 countries with all the segments listed above
  27. 27. Petrobras• Market Cap: USD 147 billion (September, 2011)• Ebitda: USD 32 billion – 77% E&P (2010)• 2010 Oil and Gas Production: 2.6 mm/boe/day (ranked 5th)• 2010 Proven Reserves: 16 billion boe (ranked 4th) – 70% in Deep Water and Ultra-Deep Water• World Leader and Technological Reference in E&P in Deep Water and Ultra-Deep Water – 20% of global DP and DPW production in 2010
  28. 28. Petrobras• Presence in 27 countries in all 5 continents • Activities in all segments of oil and gas industry (E&P; Refining; Distribution) • Key Operations: Gulf of Mexico; Africa’s West Coast and Latin America. • Investments of USD 11.5 billion for the period 2010-2015Process divided in 3 stages, showing different demands and strategiesfrom the State. The late one could be defined clearly as a “re-intervention”,as we going to see in the next few slides.
  29. 29. Petrobras• Phase 1 - Self-sufficiency – 1972 to mid 1990’s  Creation of the subsidiary Braspetro to be the international arm on the company.  Political Decision (from the State): seek self-sufficiency of oil production after the oil crises.  Focus on Middle East (Iran and Iraq) and west Africa (Angola and Nigeria). Some investments in Latin America (Colombia and Gulf of Mexico)  To use abroad the expertise created internally on deep waters E&P. Self-sufficiency was achieved only at the early 2000’s.• Phase 2 – Going Global – mid 1990’s to late 2000’s Following the marketing opening in Brazil, and the end of the national monopoly: Seek of competitiveness, technology catch up, self- survival (of the company): Market Oriented decision. Expand to Europe, US and Japan. Consolidate presence in Africa (considered ‘natural market’) and Middle East. Being a leader in Latina America (considered ‘natural market’). In 2006 invested USD 2.6 billion abroad, and had revenues of USD 5 billion abroad, in 27 countries (excluding Brazil).
  30. 30. Petrobras• Phase 2 (cont)  2 Landmarks: 1) 1997 - Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline (with the exploration of the majority of local gas fields, it become the largest private company in Bolivia, accounting for 20% of Bolivian GDP). 2) 2002 - Acquisition of Perez Companc in Argentina (a local leader in refining and distribution) by USD 3.5 billion.  In 2003, change of government. Under Lula administration (until late 2000’s), the international expansion gained political support (from the State): To be a Brazilian MTN, and serve to the Brazilian interest abroad Re-Intervation: From market-oriented (late 1990’s) to state-led (early 2000’s). Petrobras is a tool from the State, and its foreign activities are part of the Brazilian Foreign Policy.  In South America, Petrobras was a major player in all activities from the oil industry: E&P, refining, distribution (Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela). Internally, the broken monopoly was inefficient. Petrobras still have a de facto monopoly of oil industry activities: E&P; refining and petrochemical; distribution
  31. 31. Petrobras• Phase 3 – Pre-Salt Era In 2006 / 2007, Petrobras has discovered large oil fields in Brazil, at ultra-deep water (called Pre Salt “bellow the salt layer”). Estimated reserves surpass 50 billion barrels in these new camps Technological and logistic challenge: Average distance of 300 Km from the coast, and 7,000 meters of depth. Need huge investments: expected capex – USD 224 billion in 4 years. Investments in vessels and platforms, human capital, R&D capacity and so on. So, reduce of the investments abroad to focus the money on pre salt. It is not discarded the selling of international assets to capitalize the company (company needs USD 96 billion) – it is already happening, but some small and localized operations.
  32. 32. Petrobras• Phase 3 (cont) Political decision (from the State): To use the so huge Petrobras investment to foster local industry. Requirement of local content. Intention to develop a competitive industry on material to the oil industry. Focus on R&D activities and high tech products to be produced and developed in the country. (USD 11.4 billion on R&D and USD 142.2 billion of purchases in the Brazilian market – national content of 67% of the investment). Focus on international partnership with foreign suppliers to invest in R&D and production in Brazil (expected investment of foreign partners in Brazil: USD 46.4 billion until 2014). New Re-Intervation: State Led – Petrobras is a tool to the Industrial Policy by it’s procurement of high-tech products.
  33. 33. Petrobras - Conclusion on 3 Phases• Phase 1 - Self-sufficiency – 1972 to mid 1990’s• Phase 2 – Going Global – mid 1990’s to late 2000’s• Phase 3 – Pre Salt Era
  34. 34. A General Look atIntroduction the Energy Prices Gazprom Chinese Petro- Conclusion Petrobras Majors
  35. 35. Chinese Petro-Majors - Background•Responsibility for exploiting petroleum resources lay with ChinesePetroleum Industry Department• Market-oriented reforms between 1983-1988 saw three major oilfirms emerge out of the PID : CNPC – mandated to exploit onshore petroleum reserves CNOOC – sole responsibility is exploiting offshore reserves Sinopec – refining is sole responsibility
  36. 36. Motivations for reformOverseas energy acquisitions emerged as important•objective by the 21st Century“The natural resource-seeking ODI of the Chinese energy•majors is intimately connected with the government’spursuit of a national energy security agenda to secureoverseas assets and supply agreements”. (Salidjanova,2011)
  37. 37. But!● Industrial structure and management systems of the Chinese petroleum sector were outmoded, uncompetitive and impractical.● The sector would be grossly inefficient in exercising energy policy within China, and practically useless in the pursuit of any external energy policy objective.
  38. 38. A Look At The Reform Process•A globalised economy required market fundamentals andthe state-run oil majors underwent ‘comprehensivereorganisation’.• This reorganisation was geared at:  Separating state functions from those of the enterprise Breaking the traditional upstream/downstream  monopolies by establishing a competitive environment.
  39. 39. How was reform implemented ?● Traditional government functions changed so state participation in management activities via administrative directives could no longer occur.● Between 1998-2001, assets of CNPC and Sinopec were redistributed vertically● In 2000, CNPC and Sinopec became holding companies instead of public corporations.● These restructuring efforts led to international stock market participation from 2000 onwards (i.e., public offer approach to privatisation)
  40. 40. Overview of Stock Market Listings
  41. 41. Reforms cont’dMain results were:  Autonomously managed firms Relaxing industrial structure rules to allow the firms to pursue activities outside original ‘enforced niche’ i.e., blurring the lines between upstream and downstream companies.  More efficient employment levels  Separating ‘main business from auxiliary business’.
  42. 42. Did Reform Create successful firms ? Profits of CNOOC & Sinopec 120 100 80 60 CNOOC 40 Sinopec 20Bn. RMB 0 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 -20 -40
  43. 43. Reform Success Cont. Profit Index - CNOOC & Sinopec 4 3 2 1 0Index; 1997=1 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 CNOOC -1 Sinopec -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
  44. 44. Reform Success• Internal Policy Success –• External Policy Success – Chinese mining FDI increase sevenfold between 2004 and 2010.• The three largest Chinese TNCs, ranked by outward FDI stock are PetroChına, CNPC, and CNOOC
  45. 45. Re-Interventionism?•Not a re-intervention as such: Chinese SOE’s nowhave significant shares of private ownership wherethey were entirely state owned before.•All three majors have limited liability subsidiariesthat are listed on major stock markets.PetroChina, the subsidiary of CNPC is the•company with the highest market capitalisation onearth (first trillion dollar company ever).
  46. 46. Certainly InterventionismChinese SOE’s still subject to regulation within the•state’s macroeconomic policy framework.Chinese SOE’s also entitled to significant•subsidies and low cost financing from state banks,especially if they concern foreign interests.Government still majority shareholder.•
  47. 47. Subsidising Petro-Majors – The Case of Sinopec● Sinopec received subsidies worth US$1.7 billion in 2010, worth an estimated 12% of its operating profit.● Has received direct subsidies consecutively since 2008 oil price crash.● Sinopec itself redistributes subsidies internally to satisfy national production policy.● Refiner subsidies result in consumer subsidies in gasoline and diesel between US$15-23 billion between 2005-2008 (Tan, Wolack 2009)
  48. 48. Expectations & Conclusions● Companies became more competitive● Able to execute state agendas better than when the were arms of public corporations● Subsidy and support cost is high, even in light of Chinas capital surplus● Period of easy gains might be drawing to a close, and a deepening of the current approach (further privatization) may be required to increase productivity.
  49. 49. A General Look atIntroduction the Energy Prices Gazprom Chinese Petro- Conclusion Petrobras Majors
  50. 50. Conclusions• What are the reasons / motivations for re-intervention of governments in energy sector ?  Geopolitical benefits of export monopoly  Maintaining technological investments  Security of supply• What is the relationship of interventation and energy prices ?  Generally related with a few caveats• Do the activities of the SOEs reflect success in achieving their motivations / objectives ?  Yes• Do the selected SOEs behave as an instrument of state rather than a private enterprise ?  Yes• What are the main expectations and challenges for the future ?  Sustainability  Uncertainity of energy prices
  51. 51. Conclusions● Re-interventation success from the market perspective is unclear● Re-interventation does not necessarily mean increasing the government share.
  52. 52. Conclusions Why governments steps in again ?Governments would consider their re-interventaion successful because they feel that they act in the national interest which they do not measure only in economic terms
  53. 53. Thank you !
  54. 54. References• OECD, ‘Corporate Governance of State Owned Enterprices, Change and Reform in OECD Countries since 2005’, 2011• Nadejda Makarova Victor, ‘Gazprom: Gas Giant Under Strain’, 2008• Rosner, ‘Gazprom and the Russian State’, 2006• Gazprom, ‘Annual Report’, 2010• Toral, ‘Multinational Enterprises in Latin America since the 1990s’, 2011• Program on ‘Energy & Sustainable Development Stanford University, National Oil Companies : Strategy , Performance and Implications for Global Energy Markets’, 2006

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