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# Auctions 1

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• Australia auction for houses. A house you like is on auction now. Should you bid now or wait for that dream house which may be on auction later?
• Divide the class into even number of teams.Ask each team to write the maximum that they are willing to pay for this can of coinsAsk them also to write their actual bids they are willing to pay for the can of coins.Set the rules of the game, The first half of the teams
• Examples: StampseBay
• When is Japanese used against English
• ### Auctions 1

1. 1. SIGNALING QUALITY IN LABORMARKET
2. 2. Education as a Signal• Two Groups- Group 1 (Average Product= 1)• Group 2 (Average Product = 2)• Each output sells at Rs 1 lakh• If you knew each firm’s quality what would be the salary of Group 1 . Group 2?• What if you did not know the quality of the two?
3. 3. Education as a Signal• Y: years of education• Higher education , higher costs• Each group has different costs of education• Group 1, C1 (Y) = Rs 4,00,000 Y• Group 2, C2 (Y) = Rs 2,00,000 Y
4. 4. Education as a Signal• Assume the following decision rule is followed by the firm“ Anyone with education higher than y* or more is a Group 2 person and will be given an income of Rs 2lkh. Anyone with education less than y* will be given an income of Rs 1lkh.”
5. 5. Value of Education as a Signal education 10,00,000 B(y)0 y*
6. 6. Education as a Signal• No education level between 0 and y* will be chosen• No education level more than y* will be chosen
7. 7. Choice of Education• Group 1Benefit: Rs 10,00,000Cost: 4,00,000y*Choose that y* such that Group 1 does not educate him self• y*> 2.5
8. 8. Choice of Education• Group 2Benefit: Rs 10,00,000Cost: 2,00,000y*Choose that y* such that Group 1 does not educate him self• y*<5• Any y* such that 2.5 <y*< 5 would do
9. 9. Value of Education as a Signal education C1 (y) = 40,000y 1,00,000 B(y)0 y* Group 1 Optimal Choice
10. 10. Value of Education as a Signal education C2 (y) = 20,000y 10,00,000 B(y)0 4 Group 2 Optimal Choice
11. 11. Education as a Signal• Low productivity people do not get education• High productivity people get education• On observing education level of 4 years the employers rightly believe the person to be of High productivity• Even if education does nothing to increase productivity, some people may want to differentiate themselves by education.
12. 12. Warranties and Service Plans• What is the use of Warranties?• Can Warranties act as signal?• Signal to what?
13. 13. Warranties• Problems with the car led consumers to loose faith in Audi in late 1970s.• In response Audi introduced “ Audi Card” or “ bumper to bumper” warranty scheme• Audi sales increased• Besides improving the benefit of having an Audi, what else could have been the effect of this warranty?
14. 14. Audi’s Warranty• Warranty a signal that Audi is reliable.• If Audi was not reliable or of high quality, the probability of repair would be high, leading to high costs for Audi (because of the warranty)• Any other car maker with probability of defect higher than that of Audi would not have offered this warranty.• Warranties of gadgets, battery life. Duration
15. 15. Other Examples• Appearance a signal of wealth• Advertising as a signal:- Carorder.com: 50,000 , \$3 metro cards for NYC subway and paid tolls for 100 cars at all area bridges- “ Your commute brought to you by Carorder.com”
16. 16. Auction Theory“Everything is worth what its purchaser will pay for it.” - Publilius Syrus (Maxim 847, 42 B.C.)
17. 17. Auction• Mechanism to allocate resources• Competing against other bidders• How much they value the product?
18. 18. What is an Auction?• Definition: – A market institution with rules governing resource allocation on the basis of bids from participants• Over 30% of US GDP moves through auctions:  IPOs  Wine  Emissions permits  Art :Sotheby’s,  Radio Spectrum Chiristie’s  Import quotas  Flowers  Advertisement slots:  Fish Google, Yahoo!  Houses: Australia  Procurement  Treasury bills  Books: eBay, Amazon
19. 19. Procurement Auctions• Government takes bids for building a road• Lowest bid wins the auction• One Buyer, many sellers• Issues of quality, reputation , efficiency
20. 20. Strategy in Auctions• How much to bid?• When to bid?• Whether to bid at all ?• How to avoid winning but not regretting?
21. 21. Can of Coins on Auction• Write the number of coins you think are in the can• Write the bid that you would like to make.• Make a personal note of these and hand over the chit
22. 22. Auction of CoinsRule for Group I:• Highest Bid wins the pot• Pays the second highest bidRule for Group II:• Highest Bid wins the pot• Pays the your bid
23. 23. Valuation• Highest price at which you are indifferent between winning and losing the object.• Can includeI. Excitement from winning the objectII. Premium that you put on the object not landing in your rivals hands.III. Expected resale value
24. 24. Private V/S Common Valuation• Common Value Auction – True value of the good for sale is same for all – Bidders differ in their estimates of the true value – e.g., FCC spectrum, drilling,• Private Value Auction – Each bidder knows his or her value for the object – Independent Valuation – Bidders differ in their values for the object – e.g., Houses, consumption items
25. 25. Private Value Auction• Dinner 25
26. 26. Common Value Auction• Unproven oil fields 26
27. 27. Common and Private Value Auctions• Each good is a composite of both Common and Private Value goods.• Oil Fields: Different costs of drilling the oil field• Houses: Resale value
28. 28. Auction of Coins• Winner: How did you bid for this can?• How do you feel you have done?• How did others bid for the can?
29. 29. Bidding in Common Value• Bid your estimate?• Bid less than your estimate?• What if everyone bid their estimate?
30. 30. Auction as a Game• Payoff in an Auction• Estimate yi  v  • If v is the true value of the object and ε is the error• ε is standard normally distributed• yi has an unbiased normal distribution
31. 31. Winner of Auction• If everyone bids their estimate• Winner is the one who has the highest estimate• And the one with the highest error
32. 32. Winner’s Curse• If the average bid in an auction is the actual value of the object (Law of Large Numbers)• If everyone bids according to their estimate• Winner of the highest estimate would be the one with highest error.
33. 33. Examples• After WW II, US govt auctioned out rights to drill in Gulf of Mexico.• Those who won where constantly loosing money• IPL (??)
34. 34. Auction 1Rules:• Highest Bid wins the pot• Pays the own bid
35. 35. Sealed-Bid First Price Auctions• All buyers submit bids• Buyer submitting the highest bid wins and pays the price he or she bid WINNER! Pays \$700 \$700 \$500 \$400 \$300 35
36. 36. Auction 2: Dutch (Tulip) Auction Descending Bid• “Price Clock” ticks down the price• First bidder to “buzz in” and stop the clock is the winner• Pays price on clock 36
37. 37. Examples of Dutch Auctions• Amsterdam’s flower market• US T-bills• Google IPO
38. 38. Auction 3: Sealed-Bid Second Price Auctions• All buyers submit bids• Buyer submitting the highest bid wins and pays the second highest bid WINNER! Pays \$500 \$700 \$500 \$400 \$300
39. 39. Auction 3: Vickery Auction• Attributed to William Vickery, Nobel Laureate, 1961• Also called, Second price sealed bid auction• Bids placed in a sealed bid• Highest bidder wins• Pays second highest bid
40. 40. Examples of Vickery Auctions• Stamps• eBay• Google and Yahoo! : GSP
41. 41. Auction 4: Japanese Auction• Let us change the game now.• All teams will drop/fold their hands to indicate no participation in the auction• Price will rise.• Auction will end at the price when only one team remains in auction• Once you drop out you can not re enters
42. 42. Comparing Vickery and Japanese Auction• What is a strategy in this case?• The bid at which you will lower your hand.• Who wins? The one who has the highest intended bid.• When does it stop? When the 2nd highest bidder stops.
43. 43. Comparing Vickery and Japanese Auction• Are the winners same in Vickery and Japanese Auction?• Is the price that the winner pays same in both?
44. 44. English Auction• Variation of Japanese Auction• Price is raised• Interested parties can raise the price• Auction ends when no one raises the price• Houses and Antique, Cattle
45. 45. Difference between English and Japanese Auction• Knowledge of who is in the auction• Knowledge of when a player drops outUnknown in English AuctionKnown in Japanese Auction
46. 46. Comments• Optimal Bidding strategy• Which type of auction should be chosen? First or Second Price Auction• Should the products be sold sequentially or simultaneously
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