Democracy comes through a desovietization process
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×
 

Democracy comes through a desovietization process

on

  • 359 views

 

Statistics

Views

Total Views
359
Slideshare-icon Views on SlideShare
266
Embed Views
93

Actions

Likes
0
Downloads
0
Comments
0

1 Embed 93

http://nanivskaschool.com.ua 93

Accessibility

Upload Details

Uploaded via as Microsoft PowerPoint

Usage Rights

© All Rights Reserved

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Processing…
Post Comment
Edit your comment

    Democracy comes through a desovietization process Democracy comes through a desovietization process Presentation Transcript

    • Democracy comes through a desovietization process
    • CorruptionCorruption is a central instrument foris a central instrument for totalitarian governmenttotalitarian government Central to totalitarianism is corruption. It is an indispensable, socially accepted and strictly regulated function of the totalitarian system that is non-accountable and non-transparent, secured with impunity and providing no room for public / private dialogue.
    • Democracy – a means of public restrainsDemocracy – a means of public restrains  Alternatively, for centuries democracy has developed as a means of public restraint that imposes boundaries on government discretion and power.  The constraints are implemented by sophisticated political, governmental and societal institutions: starting with constitutions, legislation, to Green and White policy papers, public service delivery surveys, public budget hearings and the Ethic Codes of public servants.  All these components are targeted to ensure public control over state power.
    • The New Phenomenon of ManufacturedThe New Phenomenon of Manufactured ,, Donor-GuidedDonor-Guided Transformation to DemocracyTransformation to Democracy Ukraine is now undergoing a manufactured, donor-guided transformation from totalitarianism to democracy, as opposed to the evolutionary democratization process as it developed in the West.
    • ManagementManagement of Changeof Change: the Challenge of: the Challenge of ManufacturedManufactured TransformationTransformation  Democracy in Ukraine depends upon the quality of the management of this accelerated societal change, as evidenced in: ◦ design and guidance of the reforms; ◦ assessment whether reforms produce thriving democratic institutions? ◦ creation of new skills for key actors in democracy, such as the government, private business and civil society; and ◦ access to new informational and technical resources.
    • Donor ResponsibilityDonor Responsibility Conceptual guidance and financial support for our transformation has been undertaken by the international donor community:  This calls for intellectual responsibility on the donor's side, including taking into consideration all factors in the transformation process.  Assessing the level of technical readiness to digest and implement the advised measures is only one obvious factor.  Donors must also connect the declared goals of TA to practical outputs in the context of the country's expected performance.
    • Wrong Assumptions Negatively AffectWrong Assumptions Negatively Affect TransformationTransformation  The transformation strategy currently at work in Ukraine is based on certain assumptions about what key focuses, actors and processes were required. These assumptions were applied in three sectors: government, business and civil society. The effects of this strategy have produced concrete, observable results, not all of them positive.
    • Concerning government reformsConcerning government reforms , the, the donor communitydonor community must havemust have assumed thatassumed that once the pressure of totalitarianism wasonce the pressure of totalitarianism was removed:removed:  the government would accept good advice  would make good decisions for liberalization, privatization and financial stabilization; and  would automatically: ◦ acquire the new role of public policy maker, ◦ stop interfering in businesses, ◦ begin providing quality public services, ◦ manage public finance in an effective, transparent way.
    • The result?The result? • Because the Soviet-style government machinery was left intact, Ukrainian power structures is not develop the capacity or skills to deal with the new, legitimate forces in society finding their public voice. • Untrained in the process of public policy, which provides legitimate ways and means to balance the conflicting voices that are a necessary part of democracy, the government is not effectively formulating and implementing policy, or providing services it had never previously provided. • A new, professional class of democratic government bureaucracy is not being created.
    • ConcerningConcerning 1990s1990s business reformsbusiness reforms, the, the reform consultantsreform consultants , led by the ideas of, led by the ideas of western intellectual socialism, assumed:western intellectual socialism, assumed:  Private ownership should be introduced by “fair redistribution” socialist methods;  De-facto owners will gladly give up their property and humbly disappear, not interfering with the privatization process created by donors;  Newly redistributed Soviet enterprises will behave in ways consistent with western protocols and immediately know the rules, when led by the invisible hand of the market.
    • The result?The result?  Already existing lease holders and cooperatives, deemed illegitimate by this socialist privatization concept, were destroyed.  The population's trust in democratic reform was seriously injured by this double standard.  Denied access to legitimate business some of these people who could adapt, strengthened Ukraine’s shadow economy.  In addition, neither legitimate competition systems nor investment infrastructures were ever developed.
    • Concerning civil society reformsConcerning civil society reforms , the, the donor community assumed:donor community assumed:  Once the pressure of totalitarianism was removed it would be only a matter of personal will to commence: public participation in policy processes; citizens rights movements; public monitoring of government and its management of public finance. Our citizens democratic skills are developing haphazardly, without systemic assistance; Ukraine has only ad hoc, one-off projects similar to those supporting civil society in developed democracies, where the system is already in place. The result?
    • Ukraine's Lame DemocracyUkraine's Lame Democracy In Ukraine, only one part of the democracy cycle was introduced:  The political institutions ensuring the transfer of power – a constitution providing for human rights, elections, and political parties – are essentially in place.  The other vital part of democracy, that ensures public control over the elected power between elections, has not been established. The democratic institutions ensuring daily public / private interaction are missing.
    • Ukraine's Lame DemocracyUkraine's Lame Democracy The Government of Ukraine has not developed: ◦ basic skills of policy analysis that would account for differing societal interests and their implementation ◦ skills of policy consultations and public policy dialogue The Citizens of Ukraine have not developed: ◦ "know how" to monitor the government ◦ institutions to provide feedback through civic participation
    • Missing the ObviousMissing the Obvious  Unfortunately, the public policy process, a cornerstone of democracy, is not a focus of technical assistance programs in fSU countries.  yet, public policy is ubiquitous in western democracies: ◦ university departments with specializations in public policy ◦ governments with policy analysts and policy managers ◦ procedures, standards of policy consultations and policy communication ◦ guidelines, policy document templates, green books, white books ◦ citizen participation procedures and institutions  this system enables the government / citizen partnership that builds healthy, effective states.
    • There is only one explanation forThere is only one explanation for this lack: western public policythis lack: western public policy process is taken for grantedprocess is taken for granted because it has thoroughlybecause it has thoroughly penetrated social life; it ispenetrated social life; it is therefore overlooked as atherefore overlooked as a necessary and transferable body ofnecessary and transferable body of knowledge and skills.knowledge and skills.
    • An Example of Successful TransformationAn Example of Successful Transformation What has been lacking in Ukrainian TA was provided to central European countries entering the EU:  Candidate countries were required to adopt EU institutional standards and develop necessary infrastructures;  The EU imposed technical expectations on candidate governments, businesses and societies, providing a binding framework for the transformation process;  TA effectiveness is directly tied to accession performance.
    • ConclusionsConclusions As a post-totalitarain transition country, Ukraine has shown the world that: Democratic institutions do not spring fully formed, like Athena, from out of post-totalitarian environments; Public policy processes that facilitate the accountability and transparency of elected power, through sustained government / citizen dialogue, have yet to be set up in our country. Democracy is a skill built into institutions with specific structures, procedures and standards, in both government and non-government spheres.
    • ConclusionsConclusions Unfortunately, the development of these democratic institutions has not become the target of TA programs in Ukraine. • It is fundamentally good news that democracy is not a mystery but a skill that can be taught and learned; • Central European countries have been successful at mastering this craft of democracy; • Their experience could be repeated by donors in our country and by ourselves, then the work of democratic transformation could go forward in Ukraine. • NB! PRAGUE 2001