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Ad gov lecture m sc program SRC (Beatrice Crona's conflicted copy 2010 11-23)

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  • This lecture will mostly draw on my work in small-scale fisheries in East Africa, The rationale behind a lot of the work I’ll present is the fact that Kenyan and Tanzanian governments do not have sufficient resources to manage the coastal fisheries efficiently. In such settings public participation has been hailed as a necessary substitute. But since this course is about adaptive governance I thought it might be interesting discuss some of the that are important to take into account when discussing co-management. I will draw largely on work related to different aspects of social networks and how they interact with institutions.
  • To me fisheries is an interesting case for examining challenges to adaptive governance. Why? - Part of being adaptive is learning from experience and adapting to change. The very nature of fisheries makes them extra complex – simply for the reason that very little of what is going on beneath the surface do we actually see and understand. We large rely on observing changes by what we pull out of the system. Slide with Fisheries as a black box – someone peering in
  • Lecture outline PART I Quick recap of the role of knowledge and communication networks in adaptive governance PART II How can social relations create and interact with informal institutions? How does this mediate fishers behaviour and affect possibilities for adaptive governance? PART III Interplay between trust – leadership and governance PART IV Arrangements which facilitate adaptive governance
  • First off – When social networks are emphasized in adaptive governance discourse we need to realize that those networks will look quite different depending on which type of info or K or resources are flowing through them.
  • But before we get any further into our discussion of K and communication I want to start with a small exercise Any ideas why I showed this clip? Imagine I showed this clip w/o explaining anything more. Some of you would have seen the monkey – other not. Some of you would have noticed the curtain change color – others not. Maybe through some interaction with others in the room you would eventually have heard about the monkey or the curtain but would you have believed it? Maybe – if it was someone you knew and trusted, but what if someone new… How long would it take to have a consensus agreement about the monkey in this room? What type of network structure would have been important for facilitating that? I wanted you to think about the importance of individual perception and interpretation. And how – when we talk about knowledge being important for adaptive capacity – this knowledge is a myriad of varying perspectives of the world which can be shared or violently opposed, but where social interaction (through relational ties – SOC NETS) are critical for shaping it
  • Most of the empirical data I’ll be drawing on comes from this region
  • The issue of failure of top-down control regulation of CPR (central authority) Led Ostrom + others to propose polycentric governance structures (Ostrom 1990, 2005, Anteries et al. 2004), motivated by for ex. local knowledge held by communities and the disaggregated knowledge (of the resource) of resource users which is often conducive to an insight into natural fluctuations of the resource. There are also some factors limiting the ability of some SES to self-organize and among these are: local tyranny (hierarchies), unwillingness to organize (lack of competent leadership), limited access to scientific information (i.e. gaps/limitations in the LEK)
  • So now lets look at how we can use networks to analyze challenges to adaptive governance by looking at knowledge distribution in a social network of resource users.
  • Now I know Örjan has already presented some information from this case so I will not get into the details of the K in this here again But - there is always an interplay between the network – its structure – and what flows through it. Once cannot interpret the importance of a particular network without understanding the nature of the K or other resources flowing thru so let’s have a quick recap of what you saw in Jon’s course. This is much simplified b/c time constraints but basically this is what we found during an inventory of LEK of the stakeholders in the small-scale fishery on Kenyan coast. Above average Seine net, Gill net, Deep Sea, Middlemen, to some degree Handliners and Spear gunners Below average Shrimpers, Farmers and Businessmen
  • But when looking at the occupation of each individual a pattern emerged - subgroups which did not seem to communicate directly with each other Some groups (seine netters) were peripheral while others were central (deep sea fishermen) and enjoyed a higher status in terms of knowledge transfer because people came to them to exchange information. The heterogeneous knowledge of the different groups correlated well with the structure of the social network. - Groups that were more peripheral and had weaker ties to other groups shared less knowledge with the central ones. - Groups of non-fishermen had very little resource-related knowledge at all and also weak ties to the fishing groups. IMPORTANT: for all fishing related groups the strongest communication was inter-group, much weaker comms with other types of stakeholders
  • we argue that LEK and network are inextricably linked, in the sense that communication network structure will affect the build-up, maintenance and transfer of knowledge within a community. If think back to the principles put forth as important for successful CPR management two of them are: a common understanding of system function+ trust/reciprocity Uneven knowledge distribution, seemingly well correlated to the network structure, which may not be conducive to a common system view or consensus-building within the community Fishermen – business men, but also within the fishing community (Gill net – Seine net) 2) Effect on flow of info -> when looking to involve stakeholders in co-management it is important to involve all of these groups – not done to date
  • Before we do I want to make sure we’re on the same page This is a cartoon diagram, but puts emphasis on those feedbacks – think about how feedbacks affect the trajectory of the system. The reason I want to bring up feedbacks is because feedbacks in a system are what maintain system in a specific (desirably) state/regime. And how people interact with the resource and with institutions affect these feedbacks – and therefore are relevant for understanding challenges to AG
  • Always been an intimate relationship between small-scale producers + local MM General conditions: Important links to external markets Provided credit to producers in return for prioritized access to products once harvested - to ensure a steady supply of goods
  • But another factor makes MM particularly valuable in fisheries => fishing is exceptionally risky => inability to self-insure + lack of insurance and credit markets create the conditions by which fishermen enter into reciprocal agreements with MM => also what makes them strong persistent
  • Preferred => primarily represented by pelagic and reef associated species like Although certain species are preferred by the tourism market the highly dynamic nature of the supply has made size the primary factor determining which market becomes the destination
  • Many gears target primarily lagoon dwelling species but catch young of pelagics Although local market will absorb virtually all fish landed favored species include rabbitfish (Siganidae), seagrass dwelling and reef associated parrotfish (Scaridae) as well as emperors (Lethrinidae)
  • - Combined demand = high pressure on both higher and lower trophic levels of the fish community => influence on ecosystem dynamics The tourism market demand fluctuates with tourist season with higher demand SEM local market demand is less flexible => during the NE monsoon period when exposed reefs are not accessible constant demand is satisfied through continuous fishing pressure on lagoon and inner reefs.
  • 2- provision of credit Buffers periods of low income = beneficial to the individual and has a stabilizing effect on the social system at the village level in the short term . BUT – seems to affect individuals’ attitudes toward the need for diversification of livelihoods over time. 3 - Differential access to credit => Facilitating entrance of migrant fishermen Large Credit to migrants fishing pelagics Small credit to locals -- viewed as a larger risk because simpler gear, catch less fish and are thought to have a lower ability to pay back big loans. Developed into a vicious circle local fishers have difficulty accessing substantial capital for investment => would allow deeper water operations resort to more lagoon based but destructive fishing gears (beach seines) despite being aware of the consequences.
  • 2- provision of credit Buffers periods of low income = beneficial to the individual and has a stabilizing effect on the social system at the village level in the short term . BUT – seems to affect individuals’ attitudes toward the need for diversification of livelihoods over time. 3 - Differential access to credit => Facilitating entrance of migrant fishermen Large Credit to migrants fishing pelagics Small credit to locals -- viewed as a larger risk because simpler gear, catch less fish and are thought to have a lower ability to pay back big loans. Developed into a vicious circle local fishers have difficulty accessing substantial capital for investment => would allow deeper water operations resort to more lagoon based but destructive fishing gears (beach seines) despite being aware of the consequences.
  • Bring it back to a SES perspective. Steneck proposed ‘social ecological trap’ to describe situation where … Here illustrated as ecological feedbacks perpetuating a phase shift. Need to understand social feedbacks as well if want to avoid or escape from SE traps…
  • Now social capital is a concept with many definitions - and even though we do not have time to go into a detailed analysis of the concept itself it’s important that you all know how we have chosen to define it and relate it to CA. We adhere to the position which argues that social capital has some explanatory potential but that other factors also contribute to institutional performance and collective action. One such factor is agency which is realized through the existence of agents, i.e. leaders or influential actors, who activate a potentially latent stock of social capital and use it to produce a flow of benefits – in this case res man.
  • 2) SOCIAL CAPITAL Social capital was approached from a social network perspective. Bonding/bridging – use occup as group membership Also, mechanisms for conflict resolution and monitoring are often suggested as essential for resource management but rarely are they included in empirical studies of social capital. 3) AGENCY Agency was approached from a social network perspective by using structural network measures to identify influential actors According to theory leaders play a role in activating the social capital and make it productive in some ways. But depends on their personal characteristics and capabilities.
  • So analysis will proceed in these two components SOCIAL CAPITAL and AGENCY (color coded for convenience)
  • Structural network measures: - density for combined =3.7, support network = 1.3 links/ind = low but in range with other cases such as US GSS - One main component (157/172= 91%) of pop = conducive for SC development (Putnam/Coleman) – argue that low levels of fragmentation enhance SC by knitting together community & generating trust. - Ratio of Bonding/Bridging links between occupational groups ranged between 50-75%. = OK but relative measure bonding/ bridging ratio shows that ties between members of different subgroups provides communication that spans the whole community, even though most ties exist within subgroups.
  • Conflict resolution and sanctioning/self-monitoring Consensus on citations Large majority specify similar persons to contact for resolving conflicts. - 59% state no specific person to whom they would report NRM violations - 43% would not report any rule-breaking unless very serious crimes committed (generally did not include NRM violations)
  • KI identified by extracting the 10 top ranked individuals in three different networks all related to resource extraction (res communication, gear dependency, trade) based on degree-, betweenness- and eigenvector- centrality. Also included 2 (not top ranked but formally elected) officials. KI clearly stand out compared to rest of village E.g. they have direct social ties to 49% (80) of the other villagers in the combined support and knowledge network. AND if the reported contacts’ ties (friends’ friends) are also accounted for, KI are no more than two relational steps from reaching 82% (132 persons) of the remaining pop.
  • Other ways in which this group differs from the remainder of pop. 1) skewedness of tribal/ethnic representation 2) But more interesting for this discussion Overrepresentation of one occupation -DS Results from in depth interviews with KI shows… - Found that only17% recognized current fisheries situation as possibly jeopardizing continuation of fisheries based livelihoods. Effect of occupation – semi-migrant lower sense place, + pelagic stocks
  • Above average Seine net, Gill net, Deep Sea, Middlemen, to some degree Handliners and Spear gunners Below average Shrimpers, Farmers and Businessmen
  • So if we relate these results back to our original framework… SN measures comparable to other studies - OK Consensus on mechanisms for conflict resolution - OK Low willingness to report rule-breaking – NOT OK So it appears that, as regards self-monitoring, and subsequently sanctioning, a great part of the community have adopted a rather “laissez-faire” attitude. Links to government and NGOs - OK Lack of market/financial links – NOT OK So why – in spite of rel high levels of SC and fairly well linked KI do we not see any initiatives for resource management/regulation? Homogeneity among KI has something to do with it. Because many KI are not affected – migrant or deep sea. … the question is what the implications of this skewed rep in combination with poor problem recognition can have on NRM initiatives?? And we approach this by taking a look at the social network among the leaders themselves.
  • This is network of KI only extracted from larger network What is interesting to note that neither beach chairman nor formally appointed village sub-chief qualified for the top-ten list of identified key individuals (village chairman ranked fifth). In contrast the elected, but unauthorized as regards official authorities, village chairman is firmly embedded in the village social networks. Chairman very influential position N ot unusual, but creates situation whereby the chairman obtains a lot of power in the sense that he can 1) decide which issues to bring forward to the sub-chief (i.e. setting the agenda) 2) become a block for information flow and agency if he does not perceive the issue at hand as important, or if it conflicts with personal interests. ++ Possible benefits of the current structure is that initiation and coordination of action can be greatly enhanced because the chairman is firmly embedded and centrally positioned in both the community social networks (Crona and Bodin 2006) as well as the network of key individuals.
  • Good or bad? This is one case study, and it would be unwise to generalize until we have more cases but… For good or bad the community is seemingly highly dependent on the chairman for initiating collective action of any kind. Vulnerability, or reduction of resilience, lies in this dependency and the impact personal characteristics and interests of a single person has on prioritization and decision-making. This is perhaps an inevitable side-effect associated with boundary-spanning leadership, an issue that should be accounted for when arguing for the benefits of such kind of leadership.
  • Lessons learned… Social Capital is multifaceted concept Social Capital aloner is not enough to instigate collective action Problem awareness among influentials is crucial Homogeneity among KI influences whether perceptions of status of the resource is used to effect change. Leadership is more than the sum of influential individuals... ... related to structural relations among them and the resulting dynamic. Local is not always simple
  • If we now broaden our scope – beyond the scope of this fishing villages we have focused on for a while – and try to recall other cases of NRM that you have heard about throughout your courses. e.g. Kristianstad return back to some of the issues we started talking about in this lecture: knowledge and diverse perspectives communication networks importance of learning from others and forming a joint view of the system to be governed and the dynamics that characterize it. From the examples I’ve outlined here you have hopefully seen the rather intricate interplay between trust - social capital, and governance. But it also makes it evident that simply relying on individuals (leaders) to sort of the governing may be a mistake. So are there any other arrangements that could facilitate adatpive governance? Berkes suggest that in order to be successful biodiversity conservation needs to be multi-level and he goes on to stress the importance of networks between actors and linkages across scales. So as a topic in this lecture I thought we’d have a quick glance at something called bridging and boundary organizations and their role in AdGov. Bridging organizations – link actors
  • The idea of bridging orgs is similart to that of boundary orgs go through def I bring up boundary orgs because there is a richer theoretical and empirical literature on boundary organizations than bridging orgs.
  • an important question here is to ask how that co-production of K actually happens.
  • Take a moment to reflect which individuals you think could act as champions/key players. Why? Did you pick the same as me?

Ad gov lecture m sc program SRC (Beatrice Crona's conflicted copy 2010 11-23) Ad gov lecture m sc program SRC (Beatrice Crona's conflicted copy 2010 11-23) Presentation Transcript

  • Focusing on the interplay between social networks and institutions as a means to understand adaptive governance challenges Beatrice Crona PhD, Research Fellow (Assistant Prof), SRC
  • ?
  • PART I Quick recap of the role of knowledge and communication networks in adaptive governance PART II How can social relations create and interact with informal institutions? How does this mediate fishers behaviour and affect possibilities for adaptive governance? PART III Interplay between trust – leadership and governance PART IV Arrangements which facilitate adaptive governance Lecture Outline
  • … all social networks are not created equal!!! Structural pattern of relations (i.e. the topology) of a social network can have significant impact on how actors actually behave
  • VIDEO CLIP PART I: The role of knowledge and communication networks in adaptive governance
  •  
  • Failure of top-down control regulation of CPR Led Ostrom and others to propose polycentric governance structures (Ostrom 1990, 2005, Anderies et al. 2004) Motivated by for e.g. local knowledge, held by communities actually using resource, is often conducive to an insight into natural fluctuations of the resource
  • Photos: J. Cinner
  • ESA Conference, Aug 6-11 2006 Dept of Systems Ecology, Stockholm University Results Relative difference in LEK among occupational categories Crona 2006, Ecol & Soc
  • Crona & Bodin 2006, Ecol & Soc
    • Knowledge and network are inextricably linked
    • Common understanding + trust/reciprocity
    • Uneven knowledge distribution may not be conducive to consensus-building within the community
    • Effect on info type included in co-management initiatives => important to involve all groups
    So why is this interesting?
  • PART II: How do social relations create and interact with informal institutions? How does this mediate fishers behaviour and affect possibilities for adaptive governance?
  • ECOLOGICAL SOCIAL Local Ecological Knowledge (LEK) Fishers behavior in response to ecosystem change
  • (Dampening) feedback (Reinforcing) feedback Basin of attraction X Basin of attraction Y (Dampening) feedback Regime X Regime Y
  • How do social networks create and interact with informal institutions? How does this mediate fishers behaviour and affect possibilities for adaptive governance?
    • Fishermen have poor knowledge of market conditions
    • Products are perishable
      • fishermen often not in good position to sell themselves
      • less storage possibilities
    Conditions which make reciprocal agreements in small-scale fisheries particularly important:
    • Risk
        • Unpredictable Nature
        • Price fluctuations
        • Loss of assets (and life)
    (e.g. Platteau & Nugent 1992, Platteau & Abraham 1987)
  • What are the effects of these arrangements? Ecological Social Middlemen channel preferences and direct which species targeted Can affect fishers’ behavior in other ways? Provision of credit to fishers in return for prioritized access to products once harvested => ensuring a steady supply of goods (Platteau & Nugent 1992, Platteau & Abraham 1987)
  • In East Africa, resource dynamics are centred around two monsoon seasons Links between market demands and ecosystem dynamics Calm waters during the South East monsoon (SEM) High catches Low catches Rough weather during the North East monsoon (NEM)
  • Hotel and tourism industry = main driver governing the type and amount of fish purchased by middlemen Links between market demands and ecosystem dynamics => High demand for large fish of high quality and commercial value Piscivorous Effects on lower trophic levels Lutjanidae Red snapper Scombridae Kingfish Carangidae Jacks
  • Fish purchased for the local market = all high-value fish not marketable for the tourism/restaurants (undersized) + all other low and medium value fish of all sizes (sub-adults and juveniles) Links between market demands and ecosystem dynamics Lethrinidae Emperor Siganidae - Rabbitfish Scaridae Parrotfish Benthivores Herbivores
  • Local market Hotel/tourism + piscivores benthivores herbivores ecosystem dynamics high pressure
  • How do middlemen affect fisheries and coastal SESs in East Africa ? Direct link to external markets + Provision of credit Prioritization of certain species Which stocks targeted > diversity of fish functional groups > ecosystem dynamics Provision of credit to fishermen Buffers income variations due to seasonal fluctuations in fish catches > affects incentives for livelihood diversification > disconnects fishing pressure from seasonal dynamics > promotes constant exploitation
  • How does the role of affect resilience of coastal SESs in East Africa ? Direct link to external markets + Provision of credit > disconnects fishing pressure from seasonal dynamics > promotes constant exploitation Prioritization of certain species Which stocks targeted > diversity of fish functional groups > ecosystem dynamics Provision of credit to fishermen Buffers income variations due to seasonal fluctuations in fish catches > affects incentives for livelihood diversification
  • Social-ecological traps
    • feedback between social and ecological processes lead toward undesirable states that are difficult or impossible to reverse.
    Figure: Steneck 2009 Current Biology , Photos: T. Hughes
  • (Dampening/stabilizing) feedback (Reinforcing) feedback Healthy reef fishery Degraded reefs and overexploited fishery (Dampening/stabilizing) feedback Middlemen
    • Key agents (informal institutions) that mediate fishers behavior
    • Not included in management or governance
    • Important to recognize in order to steer away from social-ecological traps
    Why interesting for adaptive governance in small-scale fisheries in East Africa?
  • Social Capital Agency SOCIAL CAPITAL AGENCY - LEADERSHIP Collective action Krishna 2002 – Active Social Capital Burt 1999 – The social capital of opinion leaders Coleman 1990 – Foundations of social theory Borgatti 1998 – Network measures of social capital Fukuyama 1995 – Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity
  • Theoretical framework Community Social Capital Procedures to solve conflicts and enforce rules? Central positions in important networks
    • Who are they?
    • Provide linking social capital?
    • Understanding of problems facing NRM?
    • Their relations?
    Collective action Social Capital Agency Social n etw ork characteristics Influential actors Conflict resolution & m onitoring  Density  Fragmentation  Bonding/Bridging  Socio - demographics  Linkages to external resources  Relations among themselves  Etc.  Network positions  Trusted pa rties & common procedures Perceptions, knowledge and capabilities
  • Theoretical framework Collective action Social Capital Agency Social n etw ork characteristics Influential actors Conflict resolution & m onitoring Perceptions, knowledge and capabilities SOCIAL CAPITAL AGENCY - LEADERSHIP  Density  Fragmentation  Bonding/Bridging  Socio - demographics  Linkages to external resources  Relations among themselves  Etc.  Network positions  Trusted pa rties & common procedures
    • Density of social support network = 1.3 relations / ind
    • low but in range with other cases such as US GSS
    • One main network component – i.e. one coherent network
    • conducive for SC development (Putnam/Coleman) – argue that low levels of fragmentation enhance SC by knitting together community & generating trust
    • Ratio of bonding (ties within groups) and bridging (ties between groups) ranged 50% - 75%
    • OK but relative measure
    SOCIAL CAPITAL Social network characteristics
    • 59% state no specific person to whom they would report NRM violations
    • 43% villagers would not report any rule-breaking unless very serious crimes committed
    SOCIAL CAPITAL  Conflict resolution Person Number of times cited by villagers Citations for conflict resolution Chairman 143 Sub-chief 85 Deep Sea Fisherman A 17 Former Sub-chief 5 Member of elders’ council 5 Citations for report of rule-breaking Chairman 40 Sub-chief 14 Former Beach Chairman 8 Fisheries officer 6 Deep Sea Fisherman B 4
    • 10 + 2 Key Individuals identified
    • Clearly stand out in terms of centrality ranking
    • E.g. KI have direct social ties to 49% of the other villagers…
    • … AND …
    • … if reported contacts’ ties are also included, KI are no more than two relational steps from reaching 82% of entire village.
    AGENCY - LEADERSHIP Identification of Key Individuals (KI) Influential actors (Key Individuals)
  • AGENCY - LEADERSHIP Characteristics of Key Individuals (KI) Demographics Links to resources Relations amongst KI Rank order Leader attributes External Contacts Occupation Age Tribe Governmental agencies NGOs Finance Market/ Suppliers a FS b FO c AG d 1 Businessman 48 Bajuni X 2 Middleman 37 Bajuni X X 3 Retired fisherman 76 Bajuni X X X X 4 Deep sea fisherman and captain 32 Pemba X X 5 Chairman 59 Digo X X X X 6 Deep sea fisherman and captain 36 Bondoi X X X X 7 Deep sea fisherman and middleman 51 Bajuni X X X X 8 Deep sea fisherman and captain 39 Pemba X X X 9 Deep sea fisherman 40 Pemba 10 Deep sea fisherman 38 Bajuni X >10 Beach chairman and Kigumi fisherman 37 Digo X X X X >10 Subchief 41 Rabai X X X X Sum of contacts: 9 (75%) 6 (50%) 7 (58%) 4 (33%) 1 (8%) 6 (50%)
  • ESA Conference, Aug 6-11 2006 Dept of Systems Ecology, Stockholm University Results Relative difference in LEK among occupational categories Crona 2006, Ecol & Soc
  • ? Collective action Social Capital Agency Social n etw ork characteristics  Density  Fragmentation  Bonding/Bridging Influential actors  Socio - demographics  Linkages to external resources  Relations among themselves  Etc.  Network positions  Trusted pa rties & common procedures Conflict resolution & m onitoring Perceptions, knowledge and capabilities
  •  
  • The community is seemingly highly dependent on the chairman for initiating collective action of any kind. Vulnerability, or reduction of resilience, lies in this dependency and the impact personal that characteristics and interests of a single person can have on prioritization and decision-making. This is perhaps an inevitable side-effect associated with boundary-spanning leadership - an issue that should be accounted for when arguing for the benefits of such kind of leadership. Good or Bad?
  • Implications for governance
    • Social Capital alone is not enough to instigate collective action
    • Problem awareness among influential individuals is crucial
    • Homogeneity among influential individuals determines whether perceptions of status of the resource are used to effect change
    • Leadership is more than the sum of influential individuals...
    • ... related to structural relations among them and the resulting dynamic.
    • Local is not always simple
  • Bridging organizations as a way to achieve the linking of actors - horizontally and across scales (e.g. Olsson et al 2004, Berkes et al 2005, Ayles et al 2007, Eamemr 2006) PART IV: Arrangements to facilitate adaptive governance? BRIDGING ORGANIZATIONS organizations that span social gaps among actors and can facilitate (mobilize) cooperation among diverse stakeholders who cannot solve a certain problem by themselves ( Brown 1991, Bridging organizations and sustainable development)
  • Concept coined in attempt to better understand how interactions across science-policy boundary could improve policy making (Guston 1999, 2001) Developed to include a broader array of stakeholder and to also deal with divergent interests and knowledge co-production (Miller 2001, O’Mahony 2008, Klerkx&Leeuwis 2008) BOUNDARY ORGANIZATIONS
  • Boundary orgs have at least three features: i) they involve specialized roles within the organization for managing the boundary; (ii) they have clear lines of responsibility and accountability to distinct social arenas on opposite sides of the boundary; and (iii) they provide a forum in which information can be co-produced by actors from different sides of the boundary through the use of "boundary objects" (Guston 1999)
  • Mechanisms for facilitating knowledge co-production and collaboration in BORGS
    • Depoliticized space
    • Creation and use of boundary objects
    • Chamions to guide the process
    • 1) Depoliticized (neutral) space for groups to provide incentives to one another
      • helps lower cultural barriers => important for effective communication and knowledge transfer (Landry et al 2003)
      • fosters growth of social networks (Cash and Moser 2000, Cash et al 2003)
    • 2) Creation and use of boundary objects
      • explicit strategy to engage participants and promote and build shared understanding (Star and Griesemer, 1989, Cash et al 2003)
  • 3) Champions to guide the process of collaboration and knowledge co-production (e.g. Quay 2004) Key players to forge relations and ignite collaborations
  • To reflect on… Are there sysems (or situations) where knowledge sharing and consensus buidling are less important for adaptive governance? How could the establishment of a bridging/boundary organization help address some of the issues highlighted in the Kenyan community exemplified here?