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Economic Model of Copyleft

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  • 1. Economic Model of Copyleft Vira Lyubchenko Odessa National Polytechnic University
  • 2. Basic Definitions
    • Copyleft is a notice giving the public legal permission to redistribute a program or other work of art. The particular form of copyleft used by the GNU project is called the GNU General Public
    • GNU ’s Not Unix, an organization devoted to the creation and support of Open Source software
    • Open Source describes practices in production and development that promote access to the end product's sources
  • 3. Model of Software Development The development stage Programmers choose their occupation The monopolist sets the wage Programs are produced and sold Consumers evaluate programs and the monopolist determines the price The output stage
  • 4. Model Notation
    • R , L are subscripts for copyright and copyleft programs
    • M consumers
    • valuations of program is distributed on [0; V { R , L } ]
    • p is a price of copyright program
    • c { R , L }  0 is implementation cost of program
  • 5. Model Assumptions
    • The implementation costs are equal
    V Rj c R = c L = c
    • The ratio of the valuations is constant for all consumers
    V Lj V R V L =
    • The marginal consumer j buys the copyright program if
    V Rj – p – c  V Lj – c  V Rj = 1 – p V L V R (>0)
  • 6. Market for Copyright and Copyleft Programs Valuation Consumers M OR represents the number of consumers buying the copyright product V R V R – p – c = V L – c L R V Rj V L V R – p – c V L – c O RL represents the number of consumers acquiring the copyleft program
  • 7. Market for Copyright and Copyleft Programs Valuation Consumers M V R V L V R – p – c V L – c O There are no consumers who would receive positive surplus from the copyleft program and the negative one from the copyright program. L R
  • 8. Condition for Using Copyleft V Lj – c > 0 V Rj – p – c = 0  p > V Rj – V Lj V Rj = V Lj V R V L V Lj > c V R V L – 1 p > c
  • 9. Statistical data (http://stats.iatp.org.ua)
  • 10. Statistical data (cont.) (http://stats.iatp.org.ua)
  • 11. Thank You!
    • Presenter reserve the right not to answer silly and provocative questions

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