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  • TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT – WEAVING OF RESERVISTS AND NATIONAL GD

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  • 1. REFERENCE MATERIAL• OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM – COL WALTER J BOYNE, USAF (RETD). – OTHER BOOKS BY AUTHOR • DAWN OVER KITTY HAWK • CLASH OF TITANS • BEYOND THE WILD BLUE • SILVER WINGS• THE IRAQ WAR – WILLIAMSON MURRAY & MAJ GEN ROBERT H SCALES,Jr. – OTHER BOOKS BY AUTHORS • A WAR TO BE WON: FIGJTING THE SECOND WORLD WAR • GULF WAR AIR POWER SURVEY. • CERTAIN VICTORY • YELLOW SMOKE : THE FUTURE OF LAND WARFARE FOR AMERICA’S MILITARY.• CSIS, WASHINGTON REPORT BY ANTHONY CORDESMAN ON THE ARLEIGH A BURKE CHAIR FOR STRATEGY.• WAR DESPATCHES – MA J GEN ASHOK MEHTA (RETD).• TIME MAGAZINE – MAR - APR - MAY 04.• BOOK REVIEW- MIL STRAT DIMENSIONS OF IRAQ WAR – JASJIT SINGH .• PAPERS BY – KAPIL KAK, BRIG GURMEET KANWAK,V PATNEY & BRIG GD BAKSHI, DA ( Turkey)
  • 2. PARTS OF THE STUDY
  • 3. OP IRAQI FREEDOM1. INTRODUCTION2. US OBJECTIVES AND REASONS FOR WAR.3. THE WAR – OVERALL STRAT. – CONCEPT. – FORCE LEVELS – OUTLINE PLAN AND FORCES4. CONDUCT OF OPS: OIF – PHASE I : AIR CAMPAIGN. – PHASE II: SHOCK & AWE CAMPAIGN – PHASE III: ADV TO OUTER TIER – PHASE IV : CAPTURE OF BAGHDAD AND IMP CITIES – CAS ANALYSIS. – WINNERS AND LOSERS – NEW CONCEPTS
  • 4. 5. LESSONS – COMBINED ARMS – AIR – NAVY – MISC6. EMERGING SIT7. CONCLUSION – SIGN POSTS TO THE FUTURE
  • 5. PART 1 : INTRODUCTION
  • 6. STRAT IMPERATIVES
  • 7. GEO – STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
  • 8. THE STRATEGIC HIGHWAY IRAQ•GATEWAY BETWEEN GULF, EASTERNMEDITERRANEAN AND THE CASPIAN SEA. •JUNCTION OF ASIA, AFRICA AND EUROPE. STRAT LOC – HEART OF WEST ASIA AND HEAD OF PERSIAN GULF.
  • 9. EUPHRATES TIGRIS •SHATT-AL-ARAB ONLY ACCESS FOR IRAQ TO THE SHATT SEA. CONTROL OF THE RIVERS CONTESTED FROM ANCIENT AL ARAB TIMES.
  • 10. IRAQ - RESOURCES• HAS 11% OF WORLDS OIL RESERVES.• CHEAPEST OIL TO EXTRACT.• IRAQ’S OIL IS MORE PROFITABLE THAN GULF OF MEXICO/ NORTH SEA.• 50% OF THE LAND - ARABLE.• HEAVY FOREIGN INVESTMENT.• HAS UN LTD SUP OF FRESH WATER FRM RIVERS
  • 11. IRAQI OIL RESERVES
  • 12. US STRAT
  • 13. PROJECT FOR THE NEW AMERICAN CENTURY (PNAC)• GOES BACK TO 1992, DEF POLICY GUIDELINES PREPARED BY BUSH ,Sr, DICK CHENEY, PAUL WOLFOWITZ, JEB BUSH AND DONALD RUMSFELD – REAGANITE POLICY OF MUSCULAR MIL STRAT. – STRAT CONSISTENT WITH US UNQUESTIONABLE STATUS, INTERVENE ANYWHERE IN WORLD. – ENFORCEMENT OF US WILL AMONG NATIONS TO SHAPE THE WORLD IN AMERICAN IAMGE.• THIS CALLED FOR – INCR DEF SPENDING FOR GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES. – FIGHT AND DECISIVELY WIN, MULTIPLE SIMULTANEOUS MAJ THEATRE OF WARS. – CONT THE ‘INTERNATIONAL COMMONS‘ OF SPACE AND CYBERSPACE. – TAKE ON ‘CONSTABULARY DUTIES’ AROUND THE WORLD THAT WOULD DEMAND US RATHER THAN UN PRESENCE. – EXPAND US BASES IN THE WORLD.
  • 14. OVERALL US STRAT• STRAT FOR WAR A PRODUCT OF TRANSFORMATIONAL WARFARE, REFLECTED AS A ‘NEW WAY’ OF WAR CONSEQUENT TO THE ‘RMA’ OF GULF WAR I.• GOALS: QUADRENNIAL DEF REVIEW 02 – DEF US HOMELAND AND OTHER BASES OF OPS AND DEFEAT NBC WPNS AND THEIR MEANS OF DEL. – DENY EN SANCTUARY – DEPRIVE THEM ABILITY TO RUN AND HIDE. – PROJ AND SUSTAIN FORCES IN DISTANT THEATRES IN FACE OF ACCESS DENIAL THREATS. – CONDUCT EFF OPS IN SPACE. – CONDUCT EFF INFO OPS. – LEVERAGE INFO TECH TO GIVE US FORCES A COMMON OP PICTURE.
  • 15. PART 2 : US OBJECTIVES AND REASONS FOR WAR
  • 16. REASONS LEADING TO GULF WAR II
  • 17. THE Q FACTOR ?
  • 18. “WE DON’T WANT THESMOKING GUNTO BECOME A MUSHROOM CLOUD”
  • 19. LIKELY US REASONS TO INVADE IRAQ• ILLUSTRATE TO THE WORLD THAT IT WOULD NOT TOLERATE ANY THREATS TO US INTERESTS WORLDWIDE.• DEMO THEIR SUPERIOR WAR WAGING CAPABILITY.• GIVE A MAJ FILLIP TO THE US ECO AND ARMS INDUSTRY, WHICH WOULD BE A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE TO THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ AND CONT OF ITS OIL.• STRENGTHEN THE WEAKENING $ AGAINST THE EURO.• ACHIEVE A QUICK MIL VICTORY PRIOR TO THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN 2004, GIVING ENOUGH TIME FOR THE POSITIVE IMPACT OF THE WAR TO BE ABSORBED.
  • 20. LIKELY US REASONS TO INVADE IRAQ• NEED A FOOTHOLD IN THE ENERGY RICH WEST ASIAN REGION & UNDERBELLY OF RUSSIA.• ANTI US SENTIMENT IN SAUDI ARABIA WOULD COMPEL PULL OUT.• CONTAIN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM BY DRIVING WEDGE BETWEEN IRAN & SYRIA.• ‘DOMINO THEORY’ - A DEMOCRATIC, SECULAR IRAQ WOULD EVENTUALLY ENCOURAGE OTHER ARAB NATIONS TO FOLLOW SUIT.• IMPOSE PERMT PEACE IN ISRAEL & ALSO ENSURE ITS SHARE OF MIDDLE EAST WATER.
  • 21. PART III THE WAR• OVERALL STRAT.• CONCEPT.• FORCE LEVELS.• OUTLINE PLAN AND FORCES
  • 22. OVERALL STRATEGY
  • 23. SHOCK AND AWE STRAT• CONCEPT – POSTULATES EMP MASSIVE FIRE FROM AIR TO PSYCHE THE EN. – EMP REDUCED- LIGHTLY EQUIPPED GRND TPS - PERMTING RAPID ADV. – ATTAIN WAR OBJ W/O RESORTING TO ATTRN WARFARE.
  • 24. SHOCK AND AWE STRAT• BASICS OF CONCEPT. – PARALLEL WAR. SIMULTANEOUS AIR STRIKES ON NO OF TPS. OBJECT ALL ENCOMPASSING DESTR OF TGTS IMPINGING ON THEIR LIVES WILL CAUSE SURRENDER. SPEED OF ESSENCE. – EFFECT BASED OPS • OPS AIMED TO REACH DESIRED OBJS W/O GOING THOUGH INTERMEDIATE STGS. GRND WAR WON BY DESTR OF COMD CONT SET UP RATHER THAN GRADUAL WEAKENING EN. • FORCE COLLAPSE BY TECH SUPERIORITY WITH LEAST COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO INFRASTRCTURE AND CIV POPULATION. • CARRY OUT PSY OPS CONCURRENTLY.
  • 25. • END THE REGIME OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. US MIL OBJS• IDEN, ISOLATE AND ELIMINATE WMDs.• SEARCH, CAPTURE AND DRIVE OUT OP IRAQI FREEDOM TERRORISTS.• COLLECT INT RELATED TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST NETWKS AND OSTENSIBLE LINKS BETWEEN SADDAM AND THE AL-QUAIDA.• COLLECT INT RELATED TO GLOBAL NETWK OF ILLICIT WMDs.• END SANCTIONS AND IMDT DEL HUMANITARIAN SP TO DISPLACED AND NEEDY CITIZENS.• SECURE OIL FIELDS AND RESOURCES .• CREATE CONDITIONS FOR A TRANSITION TO A REPRESENTATIVE SELF GOVT.
  • 26. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS• SUBVERT SADDAM’S REGIME.• PRECISE ATTACKS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTRES.• SHAPE THE BATTLE FIELD.• CAPTURE BAGHDAD.• BYPASS OPPOSITION.• INCITE LOCAL REBELLION.• CAPTURE LOGISTICS BASES.• HUMANITARIAN AID.• RAPID DECISIVE OPS BASED ON:- – FAST MOVING LT FORCES WHICH CAN BE MOV QUICKLY INTO BATTLE. – QUICK DECISION MAKING, ALLOW FD FORCE CDRs TO REACT QUICKLY TO CHANGES IN BATTLE. – JT OPS INVOLVING ARMY, NAVY, AF AND MARINES. – USE STRAT AIR POWER TO ATTACK HUNDREDS OF TGTS SIMULTANEOUSLY. – USE HIGH TECH SMART BOMBS AND BATTLE FD INT GATHERING SYS. – SPEED AND MVRE. – FLEXIBILITY IN EXEC. – HY USE OF SOGs, PRECISION BOMBING, INTEGRATION OF DIFFERENT SERVICES / BRANCHES – UNPRECEDENTED JOINTNESS. – TAKE ADVANTAGE OF NEWER TECHS PROVIDING REAL TIME PICTURE OF BATTLE FD. – INCREASED CONNECTIVITY IN NETCENTRIC WARFARE.
  • 27. IRAQI CONCEPT OF OPS• IRAQI CORRECTLY ANTICIPATED MAIN COALITION THRUST FROM KUWAIT IN NW DIRECTION. HENCE DPLY WAS – – III CORPS – WEST OF BAGHDAD. – IV CORPS – EAST OF BAGHDAD. – I CORPS - NORTH OF BAGHDAD. – II CORPS - SOUTH OF BAGHDAD.• INITIAL PLAN – DELAY , DISRUPT BY GUERILLA WARFARE. – GIVE PITCHED BATTLE ONLY IN CITIES WHERE ALLIES ARMR AND Ahs SUPERIORITY IS NULLIFIED GREATLY. – SADDAMS DESIRE TO TURN BAGHDAD INTO A ‘MESOPOTAMIAN STALINGRAD’ WAS WELL KNOWN AND THIS WAS ONE TRAP THE COALITION WAS READY FOR.
  • 28. FORCE LEVELS
  • 29. COALITION FORCES • USA. • UK. • AUSTRALIA. • POLAND
  • 30. US COMD AND CONT, GULF NATIONAL COMD AUTH SECY OF DEF (DONALD RUMSFELD) C IN C CENTCOM ( TOMMY R FRANKS /J ABIZIAD)CDR COMBINED FORCE CDR COMBINED FORCE CDR COALITION FORCEMARITIME COMPONENT SPEC OPS COMPONENT LAND COMPONENTVICE ADM TJ KEATING BRIG GEN GL HARRELL LT GEN DD MCKIERNAN CDR COMBINED FORCE AIR COMPONENT LT GEN TM MOSLEY 1 MARINE V CORPS EXPEDITIONARY FORCE LT GEN WS WALLACE LT GEN JT CONWAY
  • 31. ORBAT COALITION FORCES
  • 32. ORBAT AT COMMENCEMENT OF OPS• US V CORPS – 3 INF DIV. – BDE EX 82 AB DIV. – 101 AB DIV. – 173 AIS ASLT BDE. – 1 MEF• UK – 7 ARMD BDE. – 3 CDO BDE. – 16 AIR ASLT BDE. – 102 LGS BDE.• AUSTRALIAN – 2000 TPS INCL 100 SAS.• TOTAL 1.1 LAC SOLDIERS
  • 33. FMNS INDUCTED LATER• 4 INF DIV.• 2 MEF.• 1 CAV DIV• GERMAN 1 INF DIV.• US 2 CAV REGT.• US 3 CAV REGT.
  • 34. IRAQI FORCES
  • 35. ORBAT- IRAQI ARMY• 1 CORPS. 2, 8, 38 INFANTRY DIVISIONS & 5 MECHANISED DIVISION. HEADQUARTERS AT KIRKUK.• 2 CORPS. 15 AND 34 INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND 3 ARMOURED DIVISION. HEADQUARTERS AT DEYALA.• 3 CORPS. 11 INFANTRY DIVISION, 51 MECHANISED DIVISION AND 6 ARMOURED DIVISION. HEADQUARTERS AT AL-NASIRIYAH.• 4 CORPS. 14 AND 18 INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND 10 ARMOURED DIVISION. HEADQUARTERS AT AL-AMARAH.• 5 CORPS. 4, 7 AND 16 INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND 1 MECHANISED DIVISION. HEADQUARTERS AT MOSUL.
  • 36. STATE OF IRAQI FORCES• ARMY STRENGTH APPROXIMATELY FOUR LACS.• FIVE CORPS COMPRISING 17 DIVISIONS.• REPUBLICAN GUARDS - SEVEN DIVISIONS.• OLD VINTAGE EQUIPMENT.• HARD HIT BY ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SANCTIONS.• MOTIVATION OF REGULAR ARMY SUSPECT.
  • 37. IRAQI ARMY• CONSIDERABLY DOWNSIZED POST GULF WAR OF 1990-91• DEPLETION OF AFVS FROM 6000 DURING ‘DESERT FOX’ TO 2000 – 2500• ARMD DIV OF REPUBLICAN GUARDS REDUCED TO 120 T-72 TKS• ALL DIVs OTHER THAN REPUBLICAN GUARDS REPORTED TO BE AT 50% COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AND 50% OF ALL EQPT LACK SPARES
  • 38. DEPLOYMENT : IRAQI ARMY xxx 5 xxx 1 xxx 2 Deyala xxx IRAQ NC xxx SC xxx 4 xxx 3
  • 39. REPUBLICAN GUARDS• NORTHERN CORPS – ONE ARMOURED DIVISION. – ONE MECHANISED DIVISION. – TWO INFANTRY DIVISIONS.• SOUTHERN CORPS – ONE INFANTRY DIVISION. – ONE MECHANISED DIVISION. – ONE ARMOURED DIVISION. OTHER FORCES •SPECIAL REPUBLICAN GUARDS. •SADDAM FIDAYEEN. •AL QUDS ARMY ( PALESTINIAN GUERILLAS).
  • 40. OUTLINE PLAN & FORCES
  • 41. GRND PLANOP PLAN 1003 VICTOR
  • 42. COALITION GRND PLAN• SOUTHERN THRUST: SECURING FAW PENINSULA AND ADV TOWARDS BASRA BY UK 7 ARMD BDE AND 3 COMMANDO BDE.• RUSH TO BAGHDAD BY- – SW THRUST: US 3 INF DIV FROM KUWAIT TOWARDS AL NAJAF – KARBALA GAP & ONTO BAGHDAD FROM WEST. – CENTRAL THRUST: US 1 MEF ADV FORM KUWAIT TO AL NASARIYA- AL KUT 7 ONTO BAGHDAD FROM EAST.• NORTHERN THRUST : AIRBORNE ASLT NEAR MOSUL AND MOV SOUTHWARDS TO TIKRIT.
  • 43. TURKEY COALITION GRND PLAN IRAN 173 AIR ASLT BDE (EX V CORPS/ITALY) EMP IN NORTHERN IRAQ SECURE MOSUL / KIRKUK & TIKRIT SYRIA 1 MARINE DIV/ 1 MEF ADV TO CAPTURE IRAQ BAGHDAD UK -7 ARM D BDE 16 AIR ASLT BDE 3 CDO BDE US SECURING FAW HQ V CORPS PENINSULA AND ADV TOWARDS BASRA 3 INF DIV (MECH) ADV TO CAPTURE BAGHDADJORDAN 101 AND 82 AB DIVS EMP IN THE WAKE OF 3 INF DIV (MECH) D 2 MARINE DIV/ 1 MEF PA DIVERTED TO WESTERN H AXIS NCSAUDI ARABIA AU KUWAIT
  • 44. PART 4 : CONDUCT OF OPS
  • 45. OP IRAQI FREEDOM• PHASE 1 : AIR WAR – JUL 2002 – MAR 2003.• PHASE 2 : SHOCK AND AWE – 20-21MAR 03.• PHASE 3 : INITIAL GRND ADV: SECURING THE OUTER TIER .• PHASE 4 : INVESTMENT AND CAPTURE OF BAGHDAD 31 MAR – 14 APR 03 (AND OTHER CITIES)• CAS ANALYSIS• NEW CONCEPTS
  • 46. PHASE 1: AIR WAR• OP SOUTHERN FOCUS.• MAIN AIR CAMPAIGN.
  • 47. PHASE 1 : AIR WAR OP SOUTHERN FOCUS• COMMENCED - JUL 2002.• 9 MONTHS DURATION FOR UNDECLARED AIR WAR.• TOTAL SORTIES – 21,236 ( JUL 02 – MAR 03).• AIM – TO DEGRADE IRAQI AD & DEFS.• IRAQI AD & DEFS THICKENED SOUTH OF BAGHDAD LATE 1990s.• ON PRETEXT OFTHREAT TO NO FLY ZONES ,US ATTACKED THESE DEFS REGULARLY.• IRAQI OFC NETWORK FOR C2 BETWEEN BAGHDAD – BASRA – NASARIYA. SINCE ALL UG – REPEATER STNS SEARCHED AND BOMBED.• IMDT BEFORE G DAY, 606 PGMs ON 391 SELECT TGTS
  • 48. PHASE 1 : MAIN AIR CAMPAIGN• 1800 AC – 20,000 SORTIES – CAS – 15,800 – SEAD – 1,400 – POLITICAL / GOVT – 1,800 – SUSPECTED WMD LOC – 800• TOTAL OF 29,000 BOMBS / CRUISE MSLS.• 70 % OF ALL WPNS – PGMs.• CARGO DELIVERED BY AF – 40,000 TONNES.
  • 49. PHASE 2 : SHOCK AND AWE• AIM WAS MORE PSY THAN PHY.• PREPONED TO 19 MAR SINCE CIA HAD INPUT OF SADDAM & SONS AT DERA FARMS.• TWO F 117s DROPPED FOUR 2000 LBS BUNKER BURSTING BOMBS.• SIX WARSHIPS FIRED 36 TOMAHAWKS AT BAGHDAD ON LEADERSHIP.• AF CDR LATER CONFIRMED NO BUNKER EXISTED.• ATTACK CAUSED SPIN OFF AIDED BY MEDIA – RUMORS – SADDAM DEAD.
  • 50. PHASE 2 : SHOCK AND AWE• 20 MAR 03 – – 700 TOMAHAWKs FIRED. – 2000 PGMs FIRED. – SALVO COVERED WIDE AREA OF BAGHDAD / BASRA. – PENTAGON EXPECTED IRAQI ARMY TO FOLD UP. – COUPS’ DID NOT HAPPEN. – SHOCK AND AWE PASSED WITHOUT ANY VISIBLE DRAMATIC RESULTS ON THOSE TARGETTED.
  • 51. SHOCK & AWE CAMPAIGN• POSTULATES THAT IF MASSIVE FIRE POWER FROM AIR IS USED, THE WAR CAN BE WON WITH CONSIDERABLY REDUCED NO OF TPS. TPS COULD ALSO BE LT EQUIPPED PERMITTING RAPID ADV.
  • 52. SHOCK AND AWE• REASONS FOR ITS PARTIAL SUCCESS – IRAQI MIND NOT CONDITIONED TO DESIRED DEGREE. – PSY OPS DID NOT YIELD DESIRED RESULT. IRAQIS UNCONVINCED ABOUT STATED INTENTIONS OF USA. – TURKEYS REFUSAL TO ALLOW USE OF ITS TERRITORY
  • 53. TURKEY COALITION PROG 19/20 MAR IRAN US - 1 MEF UK SYRIA DECAPITATION STRIKES 7 ARMD BDE 16 AIR ASLT BDE 3 CDO BDE IRAQ US HQ V CORPSJORDAN 3 INF DIV (MECH) D PA H 101 AND 82 AB U NC KUWAIT DIVS HELD IN RES LA SAUDI ARABIA
  • 54. 19/20 MAR – G-DAY
  • 55. PHASE 3 : INITIAL GRND ADV: SECURING THE OUTER TIER• US 3 INF DIV – 200 MIAI ABRAMS,260 BRADLEYS,20,000 TPS. – ADV ALONG SE AXIS – KUWAIT – NASARIYAH – NAJAF – KARBALA.• 101 AB DIV IN FOLLOW ON SP ROLE.
  • 56. TURKEY SW THRUST OP IRAQI MOSUL. .BASHUR FREEDOM . IRBIL DEVP OF COALITION - 2,75,000 OFFENSIVE KIRKUK IRAQ - 3,75,000 07 APR OIL FIELD KIRKUK . KARBALA WAS SECURED 04APR . TIKRIT 21 MAR HADITHAH AN NAJAF WAS •3 DIV SECURES . AL QAIM . MONDHARIYA SECURED BY 101 THARTHAR . BRIDGES OVER AB DIV EUPHRATES . DEYALA •IRAQI 51 MECH DIV SURRENDERS 29 APR H2 . •UMM QASR ISOLATED 3 DIV ADV & CONTACTED NAJAF & KARBALA AR RAMADI . BAGHDAD •3 CDO BDE AND 15 MEU SECURE UMM QASR FACING STIFF RESISTANCE & FIERCE HINDIYAH AL KUT FIGHTING H3 . . . FORCES WERE 80 KM KARBALA . AL-HILLAH . 01 APR SHORT OF BAGDAD 4 INF DIV WAS 23 MAR AN NAJAF . .AL FAJR . QAL AT SUKKAR INDUCTED . AL AMARAH AN AD DIWANIYAH . . NASIRIYA CONTACTED ARAR . .. . AS SAMAWAH TALIL AIR FD SECURED 25 MAR . AL NASIRIYAH FIGHTING STOPED 26 MARDISTANCE FROM BAGHDAD BASRA .BASRA PAUSE SAND TAC - 467 KMAN STORM SEIZED ALL NASIRIYAH - 315 KM LEGEND UMM QASR .AN ACTIVITES 150 KM 28 NAJAF - TILL OIL FIELDS 3 INF DIV . AL FAW MARKARBALA - 90 KM OIL PIPELINE IRAQIS REINFORCEDMOSUL - 360 KM 7 CAV REGT 20 MAR THEMSELVES KMKIRKUK - 240 MAIN ATTACKS BEGINSTIKRIT - 160 KM 101 AB DIV KUWAIT
  • 57. PHASE 3 : INITIAL GRND ADV: SECURING THE OUTER TIER• US 1 MEF – – ADV ALONG CENTRAL APCH – KUWAIT – AL KUT – BAGHDAD. – 100 x F 18 & AV 8 b AC, 50 x AHs.• 4 INF DIV LATER EMP IN FOLLOW ON SP ROLE DURING ADV FROM BAGHDAD TO TIKRIT.
  • 58. PHASE 3 : INITIAL GRND ADV: SECURING THE OUTER TIER• UK 1 ARMD DIV – ADV TO BASRA – CAPTURE PORT CITY OF UMM QASR – ONLY PORT CITY OF IRAQ – CAPTURE VITAL FOR LGS SP. – FAW PENINSULA INHERENT IN TASK.
  • 59. TURKEY CENTRAL & SOUTHERN OP IRAQI THRUST MOSUL. .BASHUR FREEDOM . IRBIL 05 APR DEVP OF COALITION - 2,75,000 OFFENSIVE 01 APR ISOLATED BAGDAD KIRKUK IRAQ 1 • - 3,75,000 MEF ADV ON OIL FIELD CENTRAL AXIS BETWEEN TIGRIS & KIRKUK . EAST OF EUPHRATES EUPHRATES • CONTACTED AL DIWANIYAH . TIKRIT HADITHAH 02 APRIL . AL QAIM . MONDHARIYA FORCES THARTHAR . WERE WESTSYRIA . DEYALA OF KARBALA 08 APR H2 O4 APR . BASRA FALLS . • AN NAJAF AR RAMADI BAGHDAD SECURED • FORCES REACHED . HINDIYAH SOUTH OF BAGDAD H3 . . KARBALA . AL-HILLAH . SECURE BR INTACT AT AN NASIRYA AN NAJAF . AL FAJR . . QAL AT SUKKAR IRAN AD DIWAN IYAH . AL . . AMARAH . . .. RUMAILIAH . AN NASIRIYAH OIL FIELD21 MAR• UMM QASR WAS ISOLATED .BASRA• UMM QASR SECURED (22APR) UMM QASR .• UK 3 CDO BDE SECURED . AL FAWFAW PENINSULA• STIFF RESISTANCE AT 1 MEFBASRA KUWAIT UK 7 ARMD BDE
  • 60. PHASE 3 : INITIAL GRND ADV: SECURING THE OUTER TIER• 173 AB REGT / 82 AB DIV – NORTHERN IRAQ – AIDED BY SFs• TASKED FOR CAPTURE OF – – KIRKUK. – MOSUL. – AID CAPTURE OF TIKRIT LATER.
  • 61. TURKEY NORTHERN THRUST 173 AIR ASSAULT BDE OP IRAQI & 50,000 KURDISH PESHMARGAS MOSUL. . BASHUR FREEDOM 11 APR . IRBIL 22 MAR US & KURDISH DEVP OF OFFENSIVE SECURITY TPS ENTERED FORCES MOSUL SECURED KIRKUK. KURDISH 13 APR 27 MAR ZONE SECURITY US FORCES 173 AB BDE ENTERED DROPPED AT TIKRIT TIKRIT . BASHUR HADITHAH . AL QAIM . MONDHARIYA 31 MAR THARTHAR . 173 AB BDE . DEYALA COMPLETED H2 DEPLOYEMENT . . AR RAMADI BAGHDAD 10 APR . HINDIYAH AL KUT KURDISH H3 . FIGHTERS . KARBALA . AL-HILLAH . SEIZED THEJORDAN NOTHERN CITY OF KIRKUK AN NAJAF . .AL FAJR . . QAL AT SUKKAR IRAN AD DIWANIYAH . . AL AMARAH WITH FALL OF ARAR . TIKRIT COALITION .. . AS SAMAWAH SAUDI ARABIA OPS EFFECTIVELY COMPLETE . AN NASIRIYAHDISTANCE FROM BAGHDAD . BASRABASRA - 467 KMAN NASIRIYAH - 315 KM LEGEND UMM QASR .AN NAJAF - 150 KM OIL FIELDS . AL FAWKARBALA - 90 KM OIL PIPELINEMOSUL - 360 KMKIRKUK - 240 KMTIKRIT - 160 KM KUWAIT
  • 62. PHASE 3 : INITIAL GRND ADV: SECURING THE OUTER TIER• SFs – – CAPTURE H1 & H2 AIRFDS IN WESTERN IRAQ. – SANITISE AREAS FROM WHERE SCUDS COULD BE FIRED ON ISRAEL. – SECURED OIL WELLS AND GEOPLATS TO PREVENT IRAQI TORCHING THEM.
  • 63. TURKEY SF OPS OP IRAQI FREEDOM1. TOTAL STR – 40002. OVERALL COMD – SPECIAL OPS TASK FORCE 20. MOSUL. . BASHUR . IRBIL • US 5 th & 10 th SF GP. DEVP OF IRAQ •NORTH OFFENSIVE • UK SAS. –US 10 th SF GP. • AUSTRALIAN SAS. KIRKUK. –SUCCEEDED IN MOB KURDS. • ONE RANGER REGT(LESS BN). –DESTR OF AL QAEDA NEST. • BN EX 82 AB DIV. –CAPTURE KIRKUK AND3. EQPT TIKRIT . MOSUL. • FEW M1A1 ABRAM TKs. HADITHAH • . AL QAIM HIMARS (TRUCK MTD MLRS). . MONDHARIYA THARTHAR . . DEYALA •CENTRAL IRAQ H2 –SEIZED HADITHA DAM. . –HADITHA DAM RESERVOIR HAD . AR RAMADI BAGHDAD CAPACITY TO FLOOD KARBALA GAP AND BEYOND. . HINDIYAH AL KUT –THUS AIDED MOV OF V CORPS. H3 . . KARBALA . AL-HILLAH .JORDAN •WESTERN IRAQ –CAPTURE H2 & H3 AIR FDS. AN NAJAF . .AL FAJR . . QAL AT SUKKAR IRAN –SANITISE AREAS FROM WHERE IRAQI AD DIWANIYAH . . AL AMARAH SCUDS FIRED AT ISRAEL. ARAR . .. . AS SAMAWAH SAUDI •SOUTH IRAQ ARABIA . –AUSTRALIAN & UK SAS. AN NASIRIYAH –ONLY 09 OUT OF 1057 OILDISTANCE FROM BAGHDAD WELLS TORCHED. THIS DUE TO . BASRABASRA - 467 KM ACTION OF SF TEAMS. TIMELY LEGENDAN NASIRIYAH - 315CAPTURE IRAQI AL ASAD AIR – KM UMM QASR .AN NAJAF OIL FIELDS - 150 KM AND 50 UNDAMAGED MIG . AL FAW BASEKARBALA - 90 KM OIL PIPELINE FIGHTER AC.MOSUL - 360 KMKIRKUK - 240 KMTIKRIT - 160 KM KUWAIT
  • 64. PHASE 4 : CAPTURE OF BAGHDAD LAYOUT OF DEFS • OUTER RING - 3 & 4 CORPS . • INNER ARC – 48 KM LONG – FROM YUSUFIYAH TO SEWARYAH BETWEEN EUPHRATES AND TIGRIS. OCCUPIED BY SPECIAL REPUBLICAN GUARD UNITS. • OUTER ARC – 160 KM LONG - FROM KARBALA TO KUT ; WESTERN FLK ON LAKE RAZZAH. MANNED BY MEDINA , NEBUCHADNEZZAR, BAGHDAD AND HAMMURABI DIVs.
  • 65. INNERARC
  • 66. BATTLE OF BAGHDAD• SERIES OF SMALL BATTLES.• MASSIVE DAMAGES BY AIR.• COMMAND & CONTROL INFRASTRUCTURE DEGRADED.• 5 CORPS PUSHED THROUGH THE KARBALA GAP.• DEFENCES OF BAGHDAD LAY OPEN.• REPUBLICAN GUARD SHATTERED.• WEAKNESS OF IRAQI FORCES EXPOSED.• DEEP ARMOURED PENETRATION.• THUNDER RUNS BY ARMR INTO BAGHDAD
  • 67. BATTLE OF BAGHDAD• SPEED OF 5 CORPS AND SPECIAL FORCESOPERATIONS PARALYSED IRAQI RESISTANCE.• SADDAM UNABLE TO CONDUCT URBAN WARFARE.• COALITION CHOSE LINES OF ATTACK.• SADDAM LOYALIST RESISTANCE DISPERSED AFTER INITIAL DEFEAT.• FIGHTING BECAME A PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN.• BAGHDAD AIRPORT CAPTURED.• AIR STRIKES ON: • MUTHENA MIL AIRPORT. • INTELLIGENCE SERVICE HQ. • TELECOM CENTRE. • AL SALAM PALACE. • PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT
  • 68. CAPTURE OF BAGHDAD• SADDAM’S REGIME CEASED TO FUNCTION – 09 APR 03.• OPERATIONS TO ELIMINATE RESISTANCE CONTINUED.• BUILDING OCCUPIED BY SADDAM’S HALF BROTHER TARGETED BY JDAM.• OUTER CORDON COMPLETED.• STATUE OF SADDAM PULLED DOWN - 09 APR.• ORGANISED RESISTANCE IN BAGHDAD DEFEATED.• 11 APR - US FORCES COMMENCED DEPLOYMENT TOWARDS TIKRIT.
  • 69. TURKEY OP IRAQI CAPTURE OF MOSUL. .BASHUR FREEDOM . IRBIL BAGDAD DEVP OF COALITION - 2,75,000 OFFENSIVE KIRKUK IRAQ - 3,75,000 OIL FIELD 10/11 APR KIRKUK . COALITION FORCES 04/06 APR BEGIN TO DEPLOY CAPTURE OF INTL FORCES TOWARDS AIRPORT TIKRIT . TIKRIT CORDON BY 3 INF DIV HADITHAH . AL QAIM . MONDHARIYA THARTHAR . SYRIA . DEYALA 09 APR STATUE OF SADDAM H2 . DEMOLISHED B RIGADE EX 101 A IRB ORNE AR RAMADI . BAGHDAD DIVISION SECURED H2 & H3 AIRFIELDS HINDIYAH AL KUT . H3 . . KARBALA . AL-HILLAH .JORDAN AN NAJAF . AL FAJR . . QAL AT SUKKAR IRAN 03 APR AD DIWAN IYAH . . . AL AMARAH INVESTED ARAR . .. . AS SAMAWAH SAUDI ARABIA RUMAILIAH . AN NASIRIYAH OIL FIELDDISTANCE FROM BAGHDAD . BASRABASRA - 467 KMAN NASIRIYAH - 315 KM LEGEND UMM QASR .AN NAJAF - 150 KM OIL FIELDS 3 INF DIV . AL FAWKARBALA - 90 KM OIL PIPELINEMOSUL - 360 KM 7 CAV REGTKIRKUK - 240 KMTIKRIT - 160 KM KUWAIT 101 AB DIV
  • 70. US CASUALTY UPDATE • US DEATH TOLL APR 03 = 37 (FALL OF BAGHDAD) • US DEATH TOLL APR 04 = 129 WINNING A WAR CAN BE DEADLIER THAN FIGHTING IT. CAS ANALYSIS• BATTLE PERIOD CAS ANALYSIS – WW I / WW II / VIETNAM - 01 CAS / 15 SOLDIERS – GULF - 01 CAS / 480 SOLDIERS• 19 MAR – 20 APR ( OFFICIAL TRANSITION TO PEACEKEEPING ROLE) - 128 DEAD• 19 MAR – TO DATE - 501 DEAD• ODS - AVERAGE – 40 CAS / DAY• OIF - AVERAGE – 3 CAS / DAY• TOTAL COALITION CAS UPTO 19 APR 04 – 494 + 5 = 499
  • 71. WINNERS• TKS• ICVs – BRADLEY / WARRIOR CLASS.• MED ARTY – 155 mm.• FD ARTY – 105 mm.• WIRE GUIDED ATGMs.• RLs / RPGs.• MULTI ROLE WELL TRAINED INF.• HEPTRS FOR HB ROLE
  • 72. LOSERS• VULNERABILITY OF THE TAIL.• LT ARMD VEH.• IFF SYS.• DIGITISATION.• AHs.• AIR MOB BY HEPTRS
  • 73. NEW CONCEPTS• DISTRIBUTED OPS.• EBO• FOCUSSED LGS.• 3D LGS.• VELOCITY MANAGEMENT.• REVOLUTION IN DIPLOMATIC AFFAIRS AIDED BY RMA ( PGM DIPLOMACY).• NET CENTRIC.• INTEGRATED SPACE BASED TECHNOLOGY.• EFFECTS BASED OP V/S OVERWHELMING USE OF FORCE.• KILL CHAIN.• TIME CRITICAL TARGETTING.• TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT.
  • 74. DISTR OPS• WHERE GRND FORCES ARE WILLING TO BE TOTALLY DEPENDENT ON TAC AC FOR FIRE SP AND CONSEQUENTLY MOV WITHOUT HY ARTY. THIS ENABLES SWIFT MOV AS WELL AS GREATER AGILITY.• FORCES DO NOT SWEEP THE EN TERRITORY TO HOLD IT; INSTEAD THE DISTR UNITS FORM LILY PADS THAT CONTROL CRITICAL POINTS AND KEY INTERSECTIONS.
  • 75. EBO• INCR RELIANCE ON PGMs.• MOV TO AN ALL STEALTH AF.• FIELDING NEW GENERATION OF ISR – NETCENTRIC.• JT FIGHTING FORCE & ADAPTIVE PLG.• ABILITY TO REACT IN NEAR REAL TIME
  • 76. RDA BY MILITARY COERCION “I SURRENDER”
  • 77. PGM DIPLOMACY• “…fly the bomb directly onto the tgt…”• THE INCR NUMBER OF BOMBS COMPOUNDS THE DIFFICULTY OF AN EN CONFRONTING AMERICN POWER. IF SOME ROGUE NATION WERE TO CREATE A CRISIS THAT REQD MIL INTERVENTION, TEN B-2s COULD ARR UNANNOUNCED, CARRYING EIGHT SMALL DIAMETER BOMBS (SDBs) EACH, AND WITH EXCELLENT C4I2 SR EFFECTIVELY SNUFF OUT THE MIL CAPABILITY OF THE EN WITH 800 LETHAL STRIKES IN A MATTER OF MINUTES.• …thus RMA has paved the way for RDA.
  • 78. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE
  • 79. NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE• IMPLIES HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION OF INFO FROM ALL SENSORS AND SOURCES AND MAKING IT AVAILABLE WHEREVER REQD.• NETWK CONT COULD ALSO QUERRY A FD FMN FOR MORE INFO AND VICE VERSA. THUS A REAL TIME INTERACTIVE APCH WAS POSSIBLE.• EG. F/A – 18 C SUPER HORNET AC RECCE SYS ALLOWS AIR CREW TO CAPTURE , ASSESS , RECEIVE AND DESPATCH INFO. A PICTURE COULD BE BEAMED TO A FAC FOR DETAILED MARKING AND BEAMED BACK TO THE TGT FOR ENSURING CORRECTNESS OF THE COORDINATES, WHICH COULD THEN BE FED IN.• NOT ONLY WAS INFO ‘ AVAILABLE’ , IT WAS ON CALL AND READY TO USE.
  • 80. KILL CHAIN• TGT CYCLE CONCEPT.• FIND / FIX / TRACK / TGT / ENGAGE / ASSESS.• GRND WORK FOR EXACT GRID REF OF TGTS WORKED OUT BY WPNS INSPECTORS FROM UNSCOM OVER 10 YRS, UPDATED ON A WEEKLY BASIS.
  • 81. TIME CRITICAL TARGETTING • THE INTERVAL OF TIME IT TAKES TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO STRIKE A TGT THAT HAD BEEN FOUND FIXED AND TRACKED.
  • 82. PART 5 : LESSONS LEARNT
  • 83. LESSONS• THE GOOD… – JOINT WARFIGHTING – INTEGRATION OF CONVENTIONAL & SFs. – COMMAND EFFECTIVENESS. – FIRE SP. – COMBINED ARMS TEAMS. – INNOVATIVE TRG.
  • 84. JOINT WARFIGHTINGFINDING : OIF WAS A COHERENT, JOINT FIGHT WITH OTHER SERVICE, SF AND COALITON.UNPRECEDENTED LEVEL OF JT INTEGRATION FROM THEATRE LEVEL TO TAC LEVEL.CONTEXT : TREMENDOUS JT EFFORT TO INTEGRATE AND SP EACH OTHER. HOWEVER,JT CAPABILITY IS MOVING FROM STRAT TO OP TO TAC LEVEL FASTER THAT OUR ORG,TRG AND EDN CAN ADAPT.WHY IT HAPPENED :•TRUST AMONG JT TEAM MEMBERS•JT DOCTRINE UNDERSTOOD BY SERVICES•CENTCOM / CFLCC EXS BUILT THE TEAM•AIR GRND INTEGRATION EFFORTS POST – OEF PAID OFF•CFLCC PREPARATION OF THEATRE INFRASTRUCTURE•ARMY PATRIOT PROTECTED ENTIRE THEATRE•V CORPS AND MEF OPERATED SIDE-BY-SIDEWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :•EDN – MORE, JT& EARLIER IN SERVICE SCHOOLS•JT TRG•ARMY ORGS – MORE MODULAR, MORE ADAPTIVE
  • 85. SF AND CONVENTIONAL INTEGRATIONFINDING : MULTIPLE, EFFECTIVE SF/CONVENTIONAL FORCE COMBINATIONS INCR THERG OF COALITION CAPABILITIES, INCR IRAQI PROBLEM AND ENABLED VICTORIES.CONTEXT : INTEGRATION TREND BEGUN IN THE BALKANS, ACCELERATED INAFGHANISTAN AND BORE FRUIT IN IRAQ. COALITION, JT, AND SERVICE CDRS, STAFFSAND OPERATORS DETERMINED TO MAXIMIZE SF AND CONVENTIONAL INTEGRATION.SUPERB INTEGRATION AT LOWEST LEVELS.WHY IT HAPPENED :•THOROUGH PLG AND COORD•STRONG LIASION EFFORTS•INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO INTEGRATION•REDUCTION OF CULTURAL BARRIERS•CAMPAIGN REQMTS FOR ECONOMY OF FORCE AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFAREWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :•INCR INTEGRATED TRG•INTEGRATE CONVENTIONAL / SF DOCTRINE•IMPROVE ARMY LGS SP CAPABILITIES FOR SF GROUPS•LIASION CAPABILITIES
  • 86. BATTLE COMMANDFINDING : CDRS FROM CORPS THROUGH PL LEVELS MADE TIMELY AND EFFECTIVEDECISIONS, AND PROVIDED EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP IN COMPLEX AND AMBIGUOUS SIT.CONTEXT : CONTINUOUS, HIGH-TEMPO, RAPIDLY CHANGING, FULL-SPECTRUM OPSAGAINST ASYMMETRIC AND ADAPTABLE THREAT.WHY IT HAPPENED :•LDR DEVELOPMENT, EDN AND TRG•MOB, EFFECTIVE ASLT COMD POSTS•NETWORKED BATTLE COMD SYS•BLUE FORCE TRACKING – IFF SYS•WIDE-BAND SATL COMNSWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :•MOVE TO SPACE AND / OR AIR-BASED VOICE/DATA COMNS•CREATE A MOB BATTLE COMD SYS ( BETTER THAN AREN) CAPABLE OF BEING JOINEDIN BY MORE UNITS.•INVEST IN IFF SYS TO REDUCE FRATRICIDE.•PROPOND DOCTRINE OF SINGLE FORCE CDR WITH CONT OVER NAVAL / AIR OPS•USE IRAQI FREEDOM EXPERIENCES FOR OFFICER / NCO EDUCATION
  • 87. FIRE SPFINDING : ARMY VASTLY IMPROVED ITS HIGHLY EFFECTIVE 24/7 CAPABILITYTO CONDUCT LONG-RANGE PRECISION STRIKE AND TIME SENSITIVE, HIGHVOLUME FIRES IN SP OF THE CLOSE FIGHT.CONTEXT : POST DESERT STORM BATTLE LAB AND FORCE XXI INITIATIVES INDEPTH AND SIMULTANEOUS ATTACK LED TO MATERIAL, ORG AND OPINVESTMENTS THAT PRODUCED AN ENHANCED CAPABILITY AT BOTH OP ANDTAC LEVELS.WHY IT HAPPENED :•STREAMLINED, DIGITAL FIRE CONTROL PROCESS (PRECISION FIRES INMINUTES, NOT HOURS)•ATACMS – MLRS, ARTILLERY, AHs•JOINT FIRES – CAS•ATACMS UNITARY ROUND ; SENSE AND DESTROY MUNITIONS VASTLYIMPROVED ACCURACY & LETHALITY•ROBUST INTERWAR EXPERIMENTATION; INVESTMENTWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :•LAY DOWN JT FIRE DOCTRINE.•INTER SERVICES JOINT EXPERIMENTATION ; DEVELOPMENT.
  • 88. COMBINED ARMS TEAMFINDING : COMINED ARMS, HY/LT, SF, AND JT TEAMS WERE OVERWHELMINGLY LETHAL.RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF 173D AIRBORNE, 2nd CAV AND TEAM TANK DEMONSTRATEDSTRAT FLEXIBILITY. GREAT SUCCESS IN COMBINING CAPABILITIES OF COMB ARMS.CONTEXT : LEADER DEVP PROGRAMS AND DOCTRINE EMPHASIZE COMBINED ARMSSOLUTIONS TO THE WARFIGHT. COMB TRG CENTER EXPERIENCES ENABLED CDRS TORAPIDLY CHANGE TASK ORG AND MAXIMIZE THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF EVERY ELEMENTIN THE FORCE.WHY IT HAPPENED :•EFFECTIVE, UP FRONT BATTLE COMMAND•ISR BY SCOUTS, SF AND HUMINT•AGGRESSIVE MOUNTED / DISMOUNTED MVRE•ACCURATE, RAPID FIRE BY ALL WEAPONS•INDIRECT FIRES; ON TIME, ON TGT (MORTARS THRU MLRS)•COORDINATED, TIMELY, EFFECTIVE CAS•3-DIMENSIONAL; ARMED RECCE AND CLOSE ATTACK•RESPONSIVE MOBILITY/COUNTER-MOBILITY UNDER FIREWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :• DESIGN AND FD MODULAR CAPABILITIES-BASED COMBAT ORGS•ENHANCE COMBAT TRG CENTRES•INCR TRG AMN, FLYING HOURS
  • 89. INNOVATIVE TRG• TRG FOR BROWNOUT. DESERT EQUIVALENT OF SIACHIN WHITEOUT – WAS OVERCOME IN 3 DAYS BY A UK SOFTWARE FIRM WHICH MODIFIED THE SIMULATOR PGMES FOR TRG IN SIMILAR OCEANIC CONDITIONS. US ARMY DATABASE OF LAST 10 YRS WAS USED TO PRAC HEPTR PILOTS.• OWN PILOTS CAN BE TRAINED WITH SIMULATORS AND EXACT TRN FEATURES PRIOR TO OPS.
  • 90. IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGYFINDINGS• HAD A MAJ IMPACT ON OUTCOME OF WAR AND DOCTRINE OF EBO.CONCEPT• ALLOWED COALITION TO GET INSIDE IRAQI DECISION LOOP.• ACTED AS THIRD EYE WHEN VISIBILITY WAS DOWN BY NI / SHAMALS.• INTEGRATED BATTLE PICTURE.• ALLOWED CENTRALISATION OF CONT AND DECENTRALISATION OF EXEC.• ALLOWED TPS TO FLOW WHERE COMB SIT PERMITTED.• COMMON OP PIC (COP) PREVENTED CENTRALISATION OF INFO, AIDED DECENTRALISATION OF EXECUTION. COP WAS A GIFT OF C4I2SR.• INVESTMENT IN PGM R&D. US PGM CAPABILITY COMPOUNDS THE DIFFICULTY OF ‘ROGUE’ NATIONS ANY FUTURE IRAQ TYPE OF CONFLICT COULD BE B-2ed , ‘TOMAHAWKED’ INTO SUBMISSION AND TOEING US LINE.
  • 91. IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGYWHY IT HAPPENED• ENHANCED RGS. NO LOSS OF LETHALTY ACCURACY DUE TO ENHANCED RGS. INERTIAL NAVIG SYS (INS), GPS, TERCOM, SMART WPNS.• FIREPOWER. EARLIER MEASURED IN TONNAGE NOW EFFECT. PRECISION WPNS FOR SURGICAL STRIKES.• ACCURACY. SMART, BRILLIANT, WPNS, LASER GUIDED WPNS.• DAMAGE ASSESMENT. SATL IMAGERY, TI, STATE OF ART OPTICAL CAMERAS ENABLED ACCURATE DAMAGE ASSESMENT.• INTEGRATION. SYSYEMS INTERGRATION, MODERN INTERGRATIVE TECH HAS REVOLUTIONISED WARFARE.
  • 92. IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY• FORCE MULTIPLIERS. MULTI ROLE COMB AC, AAH, CONVERTING CARGO PLANES INTO WARFIGHTING MACHINES, EW ACT AS FORCE MULTIPLIERS.• EW. AWACS, JSTARS, SATLS, IT EQPT. EW PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE EVEN THOUGH THERE WAS HARDLY ANY PARITY IN CAPABILITIES OF ADVERSERIES.• URBAN WARFARE. AIR POWER USED TO TARGET AND STRIKE CITIES. UAVS FOR SVL AND TARGETTING NEW FUZES FOR BUNKER BURSTING.• ASYMMETRY IN POTENTIAL. USAGE UNILATERAL SAME EQPT USED AGAINST AN OPPONENT OF COMPARABLE POTENTIAL WOULD PERHAPS BRING OUT PITFALLS.• JSTARS. INVESTMENT IN JSTARS, DECADES EARLIER PAID OFF WHEN DESPITE ‘SHAMALS’ THE COALITION SYNERGISED THEIR PGM AND TI CAPABILITY BY JSTARS AND DIAL A WPN READINESS TO DESTROY ALL WPN PLATFORMS WHILE IRAQIS WERE TAKEN BY SUSPRISE.
  • 93. IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGYAPPLICABILITY IN INDIAN CONTEXT• NEED TO GO IN FOR MODERNISATION.• ACQUIRE PGMS THOUGH AT A LTD SCALE.• SPEND ON R&D TO DEVP NEW TECH.• INFO WARFARE.
  • 94. MEDIAFINDINGS. COALITION AND IRAQIS MADE SKILFUL USE OF MEDIA. COALITION HAD ELABORATE SYS IN PLACE INCL EMBEDDED JOUNALISTS, ACCOMPANYING FRONTLINE TPS. EXTENSIVE MEDIA CAMPAIGN TO MOULD PERCEPTIONS OF THE EN, OWN PEOPLE AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.CONTEXT• MORAL JUSTIFICATION FOR INVASION OF IRAQ – LIBERATION FROM A DESPOTIC RULER, RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY.• EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO PULLING DOWN SADDAM’S STATUE AND RESCUE OF JESSICA LYNCH.• DAILY MEDIA BRIEFING AT CENTCOM.• EXTENSIVE USE OF MEDIA BY BOTH BUSH AND SADDAM.• IRAQI MINISTER, AL SAHHAF DENIED ALL WESTERN CLAIMS.
  • 95. MEDIAWHY IT HAPPENED• MEDIA FORMS PART OF PSY OPS, IT IS A REALITY WHICH WE CAN FIGHT OR EXPL.• IN FUTURE CONFLICTS DEMAND FOR EMBEDDING JOURNALISTS WITH COMB UNITS WILL BE PRONOUNCED.• MEDIA BRIEFINGS PORTRAYED A VIEW PT WITH THE AIM OF SHAPING WORLD OPINION.OWN• MEDIA MUST BE EXPL AND MADE USE OF IN ANY FUTURE CONFLICT.• WE HAVE A VERY MATURE AND RESPONSIBLE PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA WITH A LARGE NO OF INDEP TV CHANNELS WE MUST MAKE USE OF THEM.• SHAPING OF PUBLIC OPINION MUST BE DONE THROUGH SKILFULL USE OF MEDIA.• EMBEDDING OF JOURNALISES IN OPS IS RECOMMENDED THEY SHOULD INTERACT AND ATTEND TRG WITH DEF FORCES IN PEACE.
  • 96. MEDIA USED TO BOOST TP MORALE
  • 97. LESSONS• THE NOT SO BAD… – JT THEATRE & TAC MSL DEF. – URBAN OPS. – INFO WARFARE / INFO OPS. – NON - CONTIGUOUS 360 DEGREE WARFIGHTING.
  • 98. JT THEATER AND TAC MSL DEFFINDING : PATRIOT ACQUIRED AND DESTROYD ALL INCOMING IRAQI LONG-RG MSL.CHALLENGES REMAIN IN DEFEATING CRUISE MSL, SHORT-RG BALLISTIC MSL ANDAVOIDING FRATRICIDE.CONTEXT : POST DESERT STORM MISSILE DEFENCE INVESTMENTS PAID OFF INACCURACY, LETHALITY, AND INTEGRATION WITH JT / NATIONAL SENSORS ANDNETWORKS. MSL DEF GREW INTO OP PROTECTION MSN FOR ENTIRE THEATER,INCLUDING NBC DEF AND FORCE PROTECTION.WHY IT HAPPENED :•FIRST EVER JT THEATER AIR / MSL DEF•DEDICATED EFFORT BY MSL DEF COMMUNITY•JOINT EFFORT (NAVY, AIR FORCE, NATIONAL SENSORS)•RAPID, EARLY FIELDING OF LETHAL, ACCURATE SYSTEMS•COALITION EFFORT (KUWAIT KILLED 3 TBM)•BALANCE STRAT AND TAC DEF•PATRIOT MANEUVERED WITH GRND FORCES•COALITION OP PROTECTION CELLWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :•INDEGENEOUS CRUISE MSL CAPABILITY AND SATL LAUNCHES•CREATE NATIONAL DEF NETWORK WITH SP FROM CIVIL AGENCIES – SATL / COMN
  • 99. URBAN OPERATIONSFINDING : ARMY FORCES, SUPPORTED BY CAS AND SF, DOMINATED THE URBAN FIGHTAGAINST THIS EN; USED COMBINED ARMS FORCE MIX – HY/LT OR LT/HY; SF, (NOFORTRESS BAGHDAD, BUT TOUGH PLATOON TO BRIGADE ENGAGEMENTS).CONTEXT : NEW URBAN OPS DOCTRINE, INNOVATIVE APPROACHES, AND THOROUGHPREP ENABLED ARMY FORCES TO WIN AGAINST THIS .EN WITHOUT THE EXPECTED HYCAS AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE. FULL-SPECTRUM ENVIRONMENT, WITH RAPIDTRANSITIONS FROM WARFIGHTING TO STABILITY OPS, OR BACKWHY IT HAPPENED :•NEW SYS APPROACH TO PLG•URBAN OPS SEMINARS FOR CORPS AND DIV PREPARED LEADERS•THOROUGH TRG AT BDE AND BELOW•RAPID DISTR OF WPNS AND EQUPT FOR URBAN OPS•HY/LT/SF INTEGRATED OPS•ISR CHALLENGES UNTIL CONTACT IN CITIES•ENEMY FAILURE TO CAPITALISE ON URBAN TRNWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :•ENHANCE URBAN OPERATIONS TRAINING CAPABILITIES•JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS ROADMAP FOR THREE SERVICES
  • 100. INFO OPSFINDING : MIXED RESULTS; DECEPTION AND TAC PSY OPS EFFECTIVE. LITTLE ARMYOFFENSIVE EW; IRAQI COMD AND CONT AFFECTED, BUT NOT NEGATED. DESPITE INFOCAMPAIGN, SURRENDER OF IRAQI REGULAR ARMY UNITS FELL SHORT OFEXPECTATIONS.CONTEXT : DESPITE DECADE-LONG JT AND ARMY EFFORT, INFO OPS DOCTRINE, ORG,AND PRACTICE HAVE NOT REALISED POTENTIAL OF “INFORMATION AGE”.WHY IT HAPPENED :•PLANNED AND RESOURCED DECEPTION AT MULTIPLE ECHELONS; SYNCHRONIZEDWITH MVRES / FIRE SP•FEEDBACK SYS NOT EFFECTIVE•SYNCHRONISATION BETWEEN AND WITHIN JT AND ARMY ECHELONS POOR•NO DOCTRINE FOR EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS(EBO)•FAILURE TO LINK INFO OPS PLAN WITH SCHEME OF MVRE•CENTRALISATON V/S ”ALL POLITICS ARE LOCAL”WHAT SHOULD BE DONE :•STANDARDIZE INFO OPS COMD , STAFF AND SP RELATIONSHIPS•ALLOW PSY OPS CAPABILITIES AT DIVS AND BDES•PROVIDE TAC RADIO AND TV CAPABILITIES AT OPERATIONAL LEVELS
  • 101. NON-CONTIGUOUS 3600 WARFIGHTINGFINDING : COMB ELEMENTS WITHIN DIV WERE TRAINED FOR AND MASTERED NON-CONTIGUOUS COMB. COMB SUPAND COMB SERVICE SP FMNS REQUIRE TRG EMPHASISAND EQUPT FOR BOTH TAC AND SP WARFIGHTING TASKS.CONTEXT : ARMY ANTICIPATED IRAQI OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, WITH FULL-SPECTRUM OPS ACROSS THE BATTLESPACE (NO SANCTUARY); DIVS QUICKLY ADAPTEDTO ASYMMETRICAL ATTACKS.WHY IT HAPPENED :•NON-CONTIGUOUS COMB TRG CENTER ROTATIONS; COUPLED WITH NEW DOCTRINE(FM 3-0)•ARMY TRG AND MSN TEMPO FOCUSES LGS COMMUNITY ON SP AT EXPENSE OF TACSKILLS•LGS OFFICER / NCO DEVELOPMENT DID NOT UNIFORMLY PREPARE LEADERS FOR 3600WARFIGHTING•WARFIGHTING TRG FOR LOGISTICIANS WEAK; NOT ENOUGH FOCUS, TIME RESOURCESWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :•TRG AT YO LEVEL ONWARDS•OIF EXPERIENCES SHOULD FORM PART OF BATTLE STUDIES FOR PROMOTION EXAMS
  • 102. LESSONS• THE UGLY… – MULTI NATIONAL FORCE INTEGRATION. – TAC INT. – LGS.
  • 103. COALITION OPERATIONSFINDING : DESPITE EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS, THE INTEGRATION OF AMERICAN-BRITISH-CANADIAN-AUSTRALIAN (ABCA) PARTNERS INTO PLG AND EXEC WAS HINDERED BY INFONAND APPLICATIONS LOCATED O US-ONLY SYSTEMS.CONTEXT : OIF PLG AND EXEC CONDUCTED PRIMARILY ON US-ONLY SIPRNET. PERSONNELINTENSIVE WORK-AROUNDS WERE IMPLEMENTED, BUT RESULTED IN LESS THAN REAL-TIMEACCESS TO ALL NECESSARY INFO, POTENTIALLY MARGINALIZING ALLIED COMD/STAFFPARTICIPATION.WHY IT HAPPENED :•KEY PLG OCCURRED ON US-ONLY SYSTEMS•SIPRNET IS US-ONLY; NOT DESIGNED FOR COALITION OPS•CURRENT POLICIES PREVENT REQUIRED PORTING FROM US-ONLY TO COALITION SYSTEMS•INFO RELEASE WAS BY EXCEPTION•CENTCOM/s MULTI-TIERED APPROACH: – CENTRIX FOR ABCA PARTNERS – MULTIPLE NETWORKS FOR OTHER COALITION PARTNERS – RESTRICTED SIPRNET ACCESS – US-MANNED SIPRNET WORKSTATIONSWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :•APPLY TECHNOLOGY AND POLICY CHANGES FOR GREATER INDIA APIRATIONS IN 2050.•DEVP AND WARGAME SOFTWARE CAPABLE OF HANDLING MULTI NATIONAL FORCE OPS.•INVEST IN R & D
  • 104. TACTICAL INTELLIGENCEFINDING : THE ABILITY TO STRIKE, MVRE AND GENERATE EFFECTS GENERALLYEXCEEDED CAPABILITIES TO OBSERVE EN ACTIONS, DETERMINE INTENTIONS, SEE ENADAPTATIONS, SP TARGETING OR MEASURE EFFECTS. ALL SATLS , MANNED AC UAVs &UUVs WORKED IN CONCERT WITH REAL TIME INFO ON VIS FORMATS. TRANSITION OFTHIS INFO INTO INT GAVE INPUTS FOR A COMB CUTTING EDGE. THE COLATION THUSHAD AN UNFAIR ADVANTAGE OF ‘ INSIDE THE ENS DECISION LOOP’ – THEREBY PRE-EMPTING EVERY IRAQI TAC.CONTEXT : OP CDRS AND STAFF BELIEVED INT WAS ADEQUATE FOR BATTLE COMMAND. TAC CDRS (CORPS AND BELOW) DESCRIBED EVERY BATTLE AS A MOV TO CONTACTDUE TO INSUFFICIENT, TIMELY INFO ON THE EN AND ON EFFECTS ACHIEVED IN SETTINGTHE CONDITIONS.WHY IT HAPPENED :•BEST TAC INT WAS UAV, KIOWA AND LONGRANGE SURVEILLANCE (NETWORKED)•SOME SUCCESSES IN HUMINT (SF, OGA)•ISR PRIORITISED TO HIGHER HQ•LTD TAC SENSORS (FEW UAVs)•POOR ASSESSMENT PROCESSES AND MEANSWHAT SHOULD BE DONE :•PROCURE UAVs UPTO BDE LEVEL.•PRIORITIZE TIME SENSITIVE TARGETING NEEDS•DEVELOP SYSTEMS APPROACH TO ASSESSMENT
  • 105. LOGISTICSFINDING : LGS DISTR AND MGMNT SYS, WEAKNED BY LATE DEPLOYMENT OF SP UNITS, FAILED TOADEQUATELY SP THE REQMTS OF OIF FORCES. V CORPS & 1 MEF OUTRAN SUP LINES.CONTEXT : DECADE-LONG EFFORT TO DIGITISE LGS, ADOPT “BUSINESS PRACTICES” AND PROMOTEEFFICIENCY OVER EFFECTIVENESS INSUFFICIENT FOR CONTEMPORARY OP ENVIRONMENT.WHY IT HAPPENED :•THEATER SP VESSEL BIG SUCCESS•LGS OVER THE SHORE WORKED WELL•LGS UNITS AND ENABLERS DEPLOYED LATE•POOR IN – TRANSIT VISIBILITY OF SUP•INSUFFICIENT STOCKS IN THATER (FOOD)•REPAIR PARTS CYCLE INEFFECTIVE FOR HIGH TEMPO, OFFENSIVE OPS•LGS AUTOMATION TOO COMPLEX•SUP AND SERVICE FUNCTIONS STOVEPIPED•EXTENDED – LOCs (NEARLY 700-MILE SUPPORT OF MEF)WHAT SHOULD BE DONE :•REVIEW LGS DOCTRINE•LGS AUTOMATION•INHERENT SURGE CAPACITY TO BE BUILT IN LGS SYS.•DEPLOY LGS NODES AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.
  • 106. SPECIAL FORCES
  • 107. EMP OF SF• CREATING DIVERSION TO MAIN ASLT.• PRECISION TARGETTING.• INT GATHERING.• SCUD HUNTING.• QUAIL HUNTING.• UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE.• PSY OPS
  • 108. LESSONS ON EMP OF SF• EST COMD AND CONT STRUCTURE AT HIGHEST POL – MIL LEVELS• EVOLVE A JT DOCTRINE FOR SF OS..• GREATER JT TRG WITH THREE SERVICES.• JT EQPT PROCUREMENT SHOULD BE PROMOTED FOR SF.• QUALITY OVER QTY
  • 109. LESSONS FOR THE AIR FORCE
  • 110. LESSONS FOR THE AIRFORCE• INTEROPERABILITY-NEED FOR INTEGRATED COMD STRUCTURE.• COMD AND CONTROL – NEEDS TO BE NET CENTRIC.• EFFECT BASED BOMBING – CMPT TGT MODELLING FOR WPN EFFECT ASSESSMENT.• MIN COLLATERAL DAMAGE – USE PGMs, C4I2SR.• USE OF J-STARS - SCALED DOWN VERSION FOR INDIA REQD.• PGMs.• INTERDICTION(AIR WAR) v/s CLOSE AIR SP(GRND WAR) .• BOMBING – DIAL A BOMB- SENSOR-SHOOTER TIME 4-7 MINS.• HEPTRS- MVRE ARM- TAC OF HOVER & FIRE; LACK OF SPARES & VINTAGE• UAVs – LOOK OVER THE FENCE CAPABILITY.• SPACE POWER – GRND CDRS HAD PORTABLE DEVICES FOR DIRECT TGT IMAGE.• STEALTH – EXPENSIVE IN PRESENT STAGE FOR INDIA.• AWACS – BIG EYE LOOKS AT ALL.• AE FUELLING – ENHANCE RG (PARTICUALRLY OPS IN NORTH) AND NO OF SORTIES – LACK OF COMPATABILITY – NAVY – PROBE AND DROGUE TYPE V/S USAF – BOOM TYPE
  • 111. LESSONS FOR THE AF• INNOVATIVE TACS – F 18 SUPER HORNET OR SUPER TANKER USED IN DUAL ROLE – STRIKE AC AND TANKER. – USE FWD OP BASE BY HARRIER FOR REFUELLING AND REARMING INSTEAD OF RETURNING TO AC CARRIER.• FRATRICIDE – PATRIOT MSL SYS ( THREE INSTANCS) • 23 MAR – RAF TORNADO SHOT NEAR KARBALA. • 25 MAR – LOCKED ONTO F 16;AC RESPONDED BY HARM – RDR DESTR. • 2 APR – F 18 SHOT DOWN.
  • 112. LESSONS FOR THE NAVY
  • 113. LESSONS FOR NAVY• SEA LIFT HY EQPT/ SUP & SUBSTITUTE FOR LAND BASES ( AVOID TURKEY LIKE SIT).• CARRIERS USED AS AIR BASES.• JOINT FIRES ( OP MVRES FROM STRAT DISTANCES.• SF (SEALS) PREVENTED DESTR OF GAS & OIL PLATFORM..• BLOCKING SLOCS IMPORTANT.• FLEXIBILITY FOR MVRE AND APPLICATION OF COMB POWER.• INNOVATIONS – USE OF DOLPHINS AND UUVs(UNMANNED UNDERWATER VEHS) FOR DEMINING OPS. SAVED TIME BY DISCRIMINATING BETWEEN MINES AND DEBRIS.
  • 114. MISCELLANEOUS LESSONS(THE SEARCH FOR WMDs IN BACKGRND )
  • 115. MISCELLANEOUS LESSONS• UNITY OF COMMAND.• TECHNOLOGY.• COMMUNICATIONS.• PSY OPS INCL MEDIA MGMT.• WAR INITIATION AND END STATE• ASYMMETRY.• SPACE WARFARE• POLITICAL / DIPLOMATIC ROLE OF UN.
  • 116. UNITY OF COMD• SINGLE THEATRE CDR – TOMMY FRANKS.• LAND / AIR / NAVAL FORCE COMPONENT CDRS HANDLED OIF UNDER TOMMY – THUS MACRO LEVEL SYNERGY.• PERMITTED GREATER JOINTNESS / INTERACTIVE OPS.• INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY OF US ARMY v/s USAF v/s US NAVY v/s US MARINES WAS MITIGATED GREATLY DUE TO SINGLE THEATRE CDR -
  • 117. MISCELLANEOUS LESSONS• COMMUNICATIONS. . INTEGRATION OF INTER SERVICE C4I2 AT OP AND THEATRE LEVEL. . INDIGENOUS BACK UP. . ELECTRONIC WARFARE IN NON COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT.
  • 118. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ANALYSIS• PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ANDPROPAGANDA – MAJOR COMPONENT OFUS WAR FIGHTING CONCEPT.• MAJOR FUNDS AND CONSIDERABLE INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTED.• US HAS A PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS COMMAND ANDPSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS UNITS ATCORPS LEVEL.
  • 119. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS APPLICABLITY• TARGET THE MINDS OF ENEMY – GLORIFY STRENGTH OF OWNARMED FORCES.• DEDICATED PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS CELL AT CORPSLEVEL.
  • 120. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS APPLICABLITY• PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONSCONCEPTS AT NATIONAL LEVEL.• PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONSTHEMES - PROJECT INDIAN STANCE.• STRENGTHEN THE REACH ANDCREDIBILITY OF OWN PRINT ANDELECTRONIC MEDIA.
  • 121. SPACE WARFARE IMP OF SPACE BASEDSENSORS WAS AMPLYDEMO . DESPITEDOMINATION OF THISREALM BY THECOALITION, IRAQCONTINUED TO HAVEACCESS TO SATL FOR TVTXN AND MADE GOODUSE OF ARAB FRIENDLYMEDIA TO PROPOGATEITS CASE.
  • 122. STATUS OF THE UN RECONSTRUCTION POST WAR : THE UN CAN DO THINGS BETTER
  • 123. POLITICAL / DIPLOMATIC ROLE OF UN• INFLUENCE OF UN APPARENT• AMERICAN USAGE OF UN WPNS INSPECTORS TO GAIN INT – ALLOW UNMOGIP INTO FWD AREAS WITH CARE AND DUE THOUGHT AND INDO US JT EXS.• EFFORTS APPARENT ? MAYBE THERE WAS POLITICAL WILL TO CONDUCT OIF COME WHAT MAY.• UN ROLE IMP FOR DPLY OF IMF / WB / MNCs FOR DEVP OF IRAQ TO PREVENT US / UK GOBBLING UP MAJ SHARE OF IRAQ PIE.• NEED TO BUILD IN SAFEGUARDS INTO UN PROCEDURES TO OBVIATE RECURRENCE OF SUCH DOORMAT TREATMENT OF UN BY AMERICA.
  • 124. EMERGING SIT• SOCIO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS• ROAD MAP.• PLAYERS• UN ASSISTANCE• PROBLEMS• SOLUTIONS / OPTIONS
  • 125. SOCIO POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS • RESURGENCE OF SHIAS IN IRAQ. • ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM. • ARAB - KURD HOSTILITIES. • IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL. • AYATULLAH SISTANI GENIE
  • 126. AYATULLAH SISTANI• INSISTED ON A SPEEDED UP TIMETABLE FOR ELECTIONS.• BRUSHED ASIDE BREMERS SCHEME OF SELECTION OF INTERIM RULERS IN DEC 03.• OBJECTED ON TWO CLAUSES IN THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION – LAST MINUTE KILL.• SISTANIS’ SHOW OF POWER WITHOUT APPEARING PUBLICALLY.
  • 127. ROAD MAP EVENT ACHIEVED• 19 MAR 03 – G DAY. YES• 09 APR 03 – OIF COMPLETE YES ( SADDAM CAPTURED)• 12 MAR 04 – RATIFICATION OF STYMIED BY INTERIM CONSTITUTION BY IRAQI AYATULLAH GOVERNING COUNCIL.• 30 JUN 04 – US TO HANDOVER ???? SOVREIGNETY
  • 128. PLAYERS• UPSTART – MUQTADA AL SADR.• MODERATE CLERIC AYATULLAH SISTANI – WIELDING REAL POWER.• US OIL INTERESTS.• OTHER G 7 NATIONS INTEREST IN THE OIL PIE OF IRAQ.
  • 129. UN ASSISTANCE / ROLE• US NEED TO LEGITIMISE DEPLOYING IMF / WB FUNDS.• DEVP PROJECTS FOR INFRATRUCTURE.• RE-ENGAGE NEW IRAQ IN WORLD ECONOMICS AT ZERO INTENSITY CONFLICT.
  • 130. PROBLEMS• CONTINUING LOW INTENSITY URBAN CONFLICT (LIUC) – OP VIGILANT RESOLVE. • 1 MEF OPS IN FALLUJAH – SUNNI STRONGHOLD. • HY CAS • FALLUJAH SEIGE SEEMINGLY UNITED SUNNI TO SHIA AGAINST COMMON EN AMERICANS. – MAHDI ARMY OPS. • 04 APR 03 – WITHIN HRS OF SADDAMS CAPTURE, SADR MILITIA SWARMED EASTERN BAGHDAD, TOOK OVER CONT OF MOSQUES, HOSPITALS, CIVIC OFFICES, REOPENED SCHOOLS, ORG SECURITY, RAIDED WPNS FACTORIES FORMERLY UNDER BAATH CONT. • MONEY NOW FLOWS IN FOR SADR FROM THE MOSQUES IT CONTROLS. • BREMERS ORDER TO SIEZE AL HAWZA NEWSPAPER OFFICE AND ARREST YACOUBI (SADRS’ DY), PROVIDED MUQTADA AL SADR THE OPPORTUNITY TO LAUNCH MASS MAYHEM. WITH A 6-10,000 STRONG FORCE SADR CAN BE A MAJ THORN FOR THE US.
  • 131. PROBLEMS (LIUC)– IFF ( IRAN – FOE OR FRIEND). • TEHRAN GIVES SP TO THE SUPREME COUNCIL OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ, THE ANTI SADDAM EXILE GP NURTURED FOR 20 YRS. THIS WILL GIVE ADDL FUNDS TO SADR .
  • 132. PROBLEMS• SELECTION OF IRAQI GOVERNING COUNCIL – PATTERENED ON LOYA JIRGA.• NON ACCEPTANCE OF CLAUSES IN INTERIM CONSTITUTION BY THE AYATULLAH.• OVERALL RESENTMENT AGAINST US OCCUPATIONAL FORCES.• FAST APCH SELF DECLARED DEADLINE OF 30 JUN BY US ADM.• BOOTS ON GRND TOO FEW.• CASUALTY FIGS.
  • 133. MOLDOVA 24 MACEDONIA 28KAZAKHSTAN 29 PROBLEMS: TOO FEW ESTONIA 55 BOOTS ON GRND NEW 60 GEORGIA 70 • TPS TO CIVILIANS RATIO ALBANIA 70 – NORTHERN IRELAND – 20 : 1000 CZECH REP 80 PHILIPPINES 96 – IRAQ REQUIRES – 50,000 TPS. SLOVAKIA 105 – PROBLEM FOR US LITHUANIA 105 • PRESENTLY DPLY – 120,000 ( 135,000 FOR LATVIA 121 ROTATION OF TPS) PORTUGAL 128 • NO MORE TP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS NORWAY 150 FORTHCOMING AZERBAIJAN 151 MONGOLIA 180 SINGAPORE 200 NICARAGUA 230 DOMINICAN 300 HUNGARY 300 EI SALVADOR 360 HONDURAS 370 THAILAND 460 BULGARIA 470 TROOPS DENMARK 496 JAPAN 560 LEAVING ROMANIA 700 IRAQSOUTH KOREA 700 AUSTRALIA 850NETHERLANDS 1100 CRACKS IN THE COALITION SPAIN 1300 UKRAINE 1700 • SPAIN’S DEFECTION FROM IRAQ, ALONG WITH POLAND 2400 ESCALATING VIOLENCE, HAS LED OTHER ITALY 2700 ALLIES TO RETHINK THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE COALITION. 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
  • 134. SOLUTIONS / OPTIONS• OPTION I – INCR DPLY – UK HAS DECIDED TO SEND IN 4000 ADDL TPS FOR FALLUJA.• OPTION II – DELAY SELF IMPOSED DEADLINE OF 30 JUN 04. SIKDAR BRAHIMI SAYS LET THE IRAQI BE DESPARATE FOR A SOLUTION; THEN THEY WILL WANT AND THEY WILL ENSURE IT.• OPTION III - DECLARE MSN ACCOMPLISHED AND LEAVE – VIETNAM FORMULATION.
  • 135. “Building democracy in a post war Iraq willrequire a dramatic change of attitude forall those concerned. If done right, theMiddle East will never be the same. Ifdone wrong, the world won’t ever be thesame”. - New York Times 26 Feb 03
  • 136. CONCLUSION
  • 137. SIGNPOSTS TO THE FUTURE• INTERDEPENDECE – JT WARFIGHTING.• CONVERGENCE – USAF/NAVY – NO GLOBAL CHALLENGE ; THEREFORE SP US ARMY IN FUTURE.• ADHOCERY – SETTING UP AD HOC FMNS - NEED BASED.• SPECIAL OPS – S-G-A SEQUENCE.• SPEED – DISLOC EN BY REACHING WELL BEFORE HE ANTICIPATES – 350 MILES IN 3 WEEKS.• KNOWLEDGE – A NEED TO KNOW THE GROUND TRUTH.
  • 138. SIGNPOSTS TO THE FUTURE• PRECISION – PGMs : GULF I – 7 % ; GULF II – 65 %• SIMULTANIETY – SIMULTANEOUSLY STRIKE FWD / DEPTH AREAS – LAND / AIR / SEA – PHY / PSY.• DISPERSION – WITH PGMs DEFENDER WILL DISPERSE , SO WILL THE ATTACKER. VOIDS IN SPACE & TIME NEED TO BE FACTORED IN.• ADAPTABILITY – ABILITY TO MOV WITHIN EN’S DECISION MAKING CYCLE DETERMINES VICTORIES.• QUALITY – IN MEN , MTRL AND DECISIONS.• TRG, LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION – BOYNE SAYS THAT THE GREATEST STRENGH OF THE US FORCES WAS ITS EDUCATED NCO CADRE, CAPABLE OF INTELLIGENT DECISIONS.
  • 139. PROBABLY…• CIA BRIBES DID WORK IN SUBVERTING MANY IRAQI CDRS / TPS IN SECOND TIER DEFS.• SADDAMS UBIQUITOUS REPUBLICAN GDS SIMPLY NEVER FOUGHT THE MOTHER OF ALL BATTLES AS THEY SAW THE WRITING ON THE WALL… AND A CHANCE TO MELT WITH THE CIV.• IRAQI AC WERE FLOWN OFF TO IRAN / SYRIA AND THE LEFT OVER WERE SIMPLY UNUSABLE – PILOTS / US AIR SUPERIORITY.• MEDINA DIV WAS IN PEACE TIME TASKED TO QUELL SHIA REVOLTS NEAR BAGHDAD – SO WHERE DID IT HAVE THE TRG TO WARD OFF THE US MIGHT.• UNIFORMED IRAQI SOLDIERS WAS A DECEPTION – THERE WAS NO TRG TO MOST, EXCEPT PLEDGING ALLEGIANCE TO SADDAM WAS CONSIDERED ENOUGH.• IRAQI 5 CORPS WAS WAITING TO SURRENDER EN MASSE…IT MADE SENSE TO LIVE ON AFTER THEY WERE DELIVERED FROM THE DEVIL ( TO THE DEEP SEA OF UNCERTAINITY AS POST OIF IRAQ GRAPPLES WITH LIC).