Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window (EU)        Pultusk Academy of Humanities (Poland)      Rivne Institute of Slav...
CONTENTSPART I:   NEW FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNICATIONS ..... 3 Media ........................................ 16 Methods .......
Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                             3                     ...
PartI:                                                                                               4New Foreign Policy C...
Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                      5           These circumstanc...
PartI:                                                                                                    6New Foreign Pol...
Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                               7           eminent ...
PartI:                                                                                                      8New Foreign P...
Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                             9        opponent, may...
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Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                             11         Responsiven...
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Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                                13that “public dipl...
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Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                          15networks, or do both si...
PartI:                                                                                           16New Foreign Policy Comm...
Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                             17events in the past, ...
PartI:                                                                                           18New Foreign Policy Comm...
Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                 19control them. The media will be ...
PartI:                                                                                            20New Foreign Policy Com...
Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                             21speaker and listener...
PartI:                                                                                         22New Foreign Policy Commun...
Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                            23become the participan...
PartI:                                                                                          24New Foreign Policy Commu...
Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                        25                         ...
Part II:                                                                                         26GWOT. Crisis Management...
Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                            27        In January 20...
Part II:                                                                                            28GWOT. Crisis Managem...
Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                       29of rules of engagement, tr...
Part II:                                                                                       30GWOT. Crisis Management o...
Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                                31alternatives to v...
Part II:                                                                                              32GWOT. Crisis Manag...
Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                             33        In 2002 the ...
Part II:                                                                                           34GWOT. Crisis Manageme...
Crisis communicatons in global politics                                                    35how to communicate specific m...
CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS
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CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS
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  1. 1. Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window (EU) Pultusk Academy of Humanities (Poland) Rivne Institute of Slavonic studies (Ukraine)CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS RESEARCH PROJECT by Shynkaruk A.L. Assistant Professor of International relations faculty of Rivne Institute of Slavonic studies (Ukraine) - 2008 -
  2. 2. CONTENTSPART I: NEW FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNICATIONS ..... 3 Media ........................................ 16 Methods ...................................... 21PART II: GWOT. CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN MODERNBATTLE OF IDEAS .............................. 25 Messages ..................................... 31 Rapid response team .......................... 32 “New Way Forward” Case: September 2007........ 38PART III: KOSOVO CASE. EU CRISIS COMMUNICATIONSIN INTEGRATION AND ENLARGEMENT PROCESSES ...... 51 EU civilian crisis management................. 52 Come to Europe! .............................. 57PART IV: RUSSIAN FEDERATION. MODERN FOREIGNPOLICY COMMUNICATIONS IN CRISES SITUATIONS .... 70 Russian-Georgian relations.................... 76PART V: UKRAINE. FOREIGN POLICY MANAGEMENT.CRISIS COMMUNICATION APPROACH ................. 95 Foreign policy management of Ukraine.......... 95 Bistro Plan: Yushchenko post-crisis campaign .. 98 Wild Energy: “gas war” of Ukraine and Russia . 102 Echo of Dreams: Yanukovych and crisis of President foreign policy .................... 109 We’ll be the first: Tymoshenko............... 113
  3. 3. Crisis communicatons in global politics 3 PART I: NEW FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNICATIONS Statistics of modern international relations shows some associate tendencies.First of all, growth of globalization and technical revolution of ICT which have madeworld politics more transparent and increased the effects of changes in any region of theworld. Secondly, change of the system of intergovernmental relationships from bipolaron multipolar global system "peppered with fragile, failing, and failed states, and inwhich large areas have been ravaged by years of violence, contestation, and unevendevelopment"1. The third and the most important element was new features of conflictsand crises arising up between the states. Not looking on considerable reduction of thearmed (civil) conflicts as compared to the period of Cold war, social conflicts got newqualities. Foremost it was the growth of conflicts and diplomatic crises in theintergovernmental relations, related to the resources supplies, their transit and right ofownership. According Ploughshares researcher Ken Epps "some kind of uneasybalance" of small wars emerged. Researchers from HIICR also noted that non-violentpolitical conflicts have constant tendency of growth and they also indicated a change inconflict conduct. While fewer conflicts were fought out with the systematic use of large-scale violence, more and more disputes were waged with the sporadic use of violence, e.g. ambushes, guerilla attacks, bombings and the like2. Former director of Swedish SIPRI A.J. K. Bailes marked that a modern worldlinked to “risks” and “threats” for human security and survival3. The main task of thestate and society is to take into account all spectrum of risks for correct definition ofpriorities of conflict management. However such definition, according to A.Bailes, is adifficult process, as it is necessary to take into account different factors: naturalcatastrophes, social or economic instability, terrorist actions etc. for estimation,probabilities, consequences (effect of domino) of risks and crises. Besides “technical”1 Marshall M.G., Goldstone J. Global Report on Conflict, Governance and State Fragility 2007 Foreign Policy Bulletin (2007), 17: 3-21 Cambridge University Press2 CONFLICT BAROMETER 2007 // Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research [http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/index.html]3 Bailes A. A world of risk // SIPRI Yearbook 2007 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security [http://yearbook2007.sipri.org/files/YB07Intro.pdf]
  4. 4. PartI: 4New Foreign Policy Communicationsmodels of crises management should be expanded in order to cover the transnational,often global, diffusion of many major risk factors today and to assess the vulnerabilitiesor resilience of the world system as a whole. Bailes also noted that "it is tempting to act to pre-empt, as well as limit andeliminate, risk. In traditional warfare or power play, the costs of this and the ways toreduce possible backlash are relatively well understood. The post-cold war environmenthas facilitated many kinds of interventionist action (not just military) but has made theconsequences harder to assess and to master—especially when confronting non-stateactors. Views on targets and the legitimacy of various methods vary widely around theworld. Forceful approaches such as the USA’s military ‘pre-emption’ efforts can bring astronger backlash than anticipated from stubborn opponents, the domestic audience andworld opinion. Risk may also be ‘displaced’, so that the consequences affect innocentparties or rebound on the initiator by another route. Fundamentally, it is futile to addressa risk without considering how one’s own behaviour may generate or aggravate it. Thus,risk-based security analysis may actually be a useful brake on potential recklessness". The risks, threats and “unexpected” events become thus defining feature ofmodern international relations and change the structure of foreign relationsmanagement. In particular, decision-making process becomes less hierarchical andresults in enlargement of functions of diplomacy from traditional representation,reporting, and negotiation to additional facilitation and coordination. According to NetDiplomacy authors “this situation reflects a shift away from clearly defined, more orless hierarchical relationships toward a more fluid and dynamic, less hierarchical andwell-defined organization that must deal with crosscutting equities, continuallychanging boundaries and jurisdictions, and formal and informal agencies andinterests”4. The subject of international relations also broadens: besides balance ofpowers, weapons control and borders control, such issues as refugees, human rights,transnational crime and terrorism, drugs, and the environment, as well as economics,international trade, financial flows, trade, intellectual property and technology concerns,labor standards, and negotiations over technical standards and protocols pass from areaof "low politics" into international relations.4 Net Diplomacy I. Beyond Foreign Ministries. Diplomacy in the Information Age: Implications for Content and Conduct [http://www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14b.html]
  5. 5. Crisis communicatons in global politics 5 These circumstances show that modern foreign policy is far beyond the relationsbetween elites and leaders. So, development of international economic relations resultsin a necessity to strengthen efficiency in-depth interaction with broader audiences. Theactive use of ICT (important source of changes) becomes one of the tools of this co-operation, as “diplomats and MFAs have lost the monopoly on information aboutforeign affairs. They are no longer the sole voice of the sovereign and representative ofthe state, and they do not control the flow of information to and from theirgovernments”. Nature of such system-functional changes does actual so-called crisis approachfor optimization of governance. However, in this case it is important to note opinion ofJames L. Richardson5, who wrote in 1994, that diplomacy in wide sense as process offormulation of purpose and policy, decision-making and co-operation with other statescan not fully use crisis-management principles, because it hides the problem ofinternational politics, when any side wants to lose in a conflict. At the same time CM isaimed to decline conflict of divergences for different participants of internationalrelations. Author also marks that term “management” creates additional framesrequiring technical rationality and efficiency of foreign-policy decisions. Strategies of foreign-policy crisis-management arose up during Cold war (socalled nuclear crisis management) and were related to the policy of retention betweenUSSR and the USA. On a modern stage CM in international politics is considered asdevelopment of plan and actions related to the humanitarian, military, technical andother types of threats to national interests of the state or citizens. However, states-nations as traditional participants of international relations also have a system crisis: it isnecessary to modernize activity of basic participants of foreign policy and to reviseforeign priorities. Thus there is another task: internal transformation of foreign-policymaking of political leaders, MFAs and diplomatic representatives according toemergence of new forms of foreign-policy management: unofficial, media, cultural,cyber, digital, public and other forms of diplomacy. According Boin, Hart & Stern “Intimes of crisis, communities and members of organizations expect their public leaders tominimize the impact of the crisis at hand, while critics and bureaucratic competitors tryto seize the moment to blame incumbent rulers and their policies. In this extreme5 Richardson J.L. Crisis Diplomacy. Cambridge University Press, 1994. 426 p.
  6. 6. PartI: 6New Foreign Policy Communicationsenvironment, policy makers must somehow establish a sense of normality, and fostercollective learning from the crisis experience… In the face of crisis, leaders must dealwith the strategic challenges they face, the political risks and opportunities theyencounter, the errors they make, the pitfalls they need to avoid, and the paths away fromcrisis they may pursue. The necessity for management is even more significant with theadvent of a 24-hour news cycle and an increasingly internet-savvy audience with ever- 6changing technology at its fingertips . In this situation governmental institutions can not pretend on leadership (it couldbe ineffective for the management), but they are able to use experience of multinationalcorporations, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs for reacting on new crises andto revise style of the activity. Consequently, using terminology of strategicmanagement, it is possible to divide foreign-policy activity into proactive and reactive.According to I. Ansoff during reactive strategy the reaction does not begin until allpossible operative variants will not be tested. Within the framework of every class ofreactions concrete measures will be tested consistently. The behavior in this case is theprocess of tests and errors depending on past experience. At the same time, duringproactive management operative-strategic tasks are examined consistently; however forspecific measures it is used an analytical approach, namely alternative variants arecompared, and in the case of necessity the row of measures provided. For example, theelement of proactive diplomacy is projection of a ‘correct’ image of the country inadverse situations—even if in reality its capacity to radically or immediately influenceits country’s image perception abroad may be limited7. So Japanese foreign policy consider “strategic information provision as the foundation for proactive diplomacy”. White paper about Japanese foreign policy stated that in promoting Japan’s “proactive diplomacy”—that is, diplomacy in which Japan’s goals and intentions are clearly enunciated—it is critically important that Japan, as a democratic nation, gain the understanding and support of its people with regard to its diplomatic policy and the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In light of this, beyond (i) intensifying the provision of information to newspapers, television shows, and other kinds of mass media that the Japanese people interact with on a daily basis, in recent years, the Ministry has also proactively undertaken new efforts, namely (ii) publicizing information through the Internet, and (iii) providing information to6 The politics of crisis management: public leadership under pressure / Arjen Boin ... [et al.]. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 182 p.7 Rana K.S. Bilateral Diplomacy DiploProjects: Diplo Foundation, 2002. 283 p.
  7. 7. Crisis communicatons in global politics 7 eminent persons in various fields. In addition, the Ministry is making efforts to have two-way communication with the Japanese people by (iv) public relations through dialogue with the people and (v) gathering public comments and opinions. However the state is the complex system with strong probability of delays,therefore reactive strategy of saving and support of steady relations prevails in a foreignpolicy before beginning of crisis: "a postponement of start of actions after the awarenessof threat to the moment of appearance of confidence in its existence" (Ansoff). Forexample, Soviet strategy of crisis management during Cold War years considered crisisas an objective situation, corresponding to a period of threat marked by actualpreparations for war. It allowed to USSR to use weak probability of war for the conductof foreign policy. Thus, as S.Shenfield noted, once "crisis"—the very antechamber ofwar—has been reached, avoiding war takes overriding priority”. With the origin of instability there are attempts to pass to proactive strategy withthe use of preventive diplomacy for the decline of tension. At further growth of tensionthe choice of reactive (attempt of economy) or proactive (choice of optimum variants ofreaction) diplomacy depends on complication of conflict (ordinary crisis or militarycollision), and also from quality of management and understanding of situation byleaders. For this purpose crisis diplomacy and crisis management are used, based ondetermination of aims of conflict—for changing of foreign-policy strategy (crisisapproach) and initiation of conflicts or for saving of foreign-policy course andavoidance of conflicts (countercrisis approach). However specific of management in international crises is that sides plan torepresent the point of view. As a result there is the row of limitations capable toinfluence negatively on the conduct of participants of international crisis. Among them:wrong communication with different interpretations of news by different sides andmedia; psychological stress related to high intensity of international crises and causingthe wrong decisions; inadequate standards of return activity as a result of inflexibilityand inoperativeness of bureaucratic and military structures; casual events-triggers ableto result in escalation of critical statements and transition to the opened opposition8.8 Stumpf M.S. "Preventing Inadvertent War: Problems and Prospects for Sino-American Crisis Management." Cambridge, MA: Preventive Defense Project, July 2002. [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/3118/preventing_inadvertent_war.html?breadcrumb= %2F]
  8. 8. PartI: 8New Foreign Policy Communications Professor D. Caldwell described the features of US style of crisis-management during Caribbean crisis, which however can be typical for the foreign-policy behavior in any state, as related to the psychological features of president or other key political leader. For example, confidence in that it is possible to manage a crisis according to personal estimations; unexpected change in the conduct after the beginning of crisis; to lean exceptionally on the limited number of advisers for decision-making; persons who have unpopular ides are excluded from advisers of decision- makers; president’s concentration of authority over power structures; overload of informative channels during a crisis; use of threat of force (nuclear weapon) as facilities of notification about seriousness of conflict9. Post-crisis diplomacy is directed on reduction of conflict. It can be cease-firewhich enables to reduce tension and to transfer the relations in the plane of ordinarycrisis. On this stage it is made basement for proactive diplomacy according to the choiceof optimum form of relations, however if the decision of conflict was attained on thebasis of former experience, there is probability of return of reactive foreign policy. The similar specific of dynamics of international crises determines the row ofrequirements for a foreign-policy crisis management. The correct decision-making thusneeds reduction of time pressure on policymakers and commanders. “One result of thecompression of decision time in a crisis is that the likelihood of undetected attack andfalsely detected attack errors increases”. Important condition is also an offer the other asafety valve or a face-saving exit from a predicament that has escalated beyond itsoriginal expectations. The search for options should back neither crisis participant into acorner from which there is no graceful retreat. At the same time each side maintains anaccurate perception of the other sides intentions and military capabilities. Thisbecomes difficult during a crisis because, in the heat of a partly competitive relationshipand a threat-intensive environment, intentions and capabilities can change. As S.Cimbala noted further: Intentions can change during a crisis if policymakers become more optimistic about gains or more pessimistic about potential losses during the crisis. Capabilities can change due to the management of military alerts and the deployment or other movement of military forces. Heightened states of military readiness on each side are intended to send a two-sided signal: of readiness for the worst if the other side attacks, and of a nonthreatening steadiness of purpose in the face of enemy passivity. This mixed message is hard to send under the best of crisis management conditions, since each states behaviors and communications, as observed by its9 Caldwell D. The Cuban Missile Affair and the American Style of Crisis Management RAND, 1989 [http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N2943/]
  9. 9. Crisis communicatons in global politics 9 opponent, may not seem consistent. Under the stress of time pressures and of military threats, different parts of complex security organizations may be making decisions from the perspective of their narrowly defined, bureaucratic interests. These bureaucratically chosen decisions and actions may not coincide with the policymakers intent, nor with the decisions and actions of other parts of the government10. But in most cases crises emerge as a result of lack of information andcommunication, thus the choice of reactive or proactive foreign policy depends also onthe system of foreign-policy communications. Thus the key requirement of successfulcrisis management is communications transparency based on clear signaling andundistorted communications. Signaling refers to the requirement that each side mustsend its estimate of the situation to the other. It is not necessary for the two sides to haveidentical or even initially complementary interests. But a sufficient number of correctlysent and received signals are prerequisite to effective transfer of enemy goals andobjectives from one side to the other. If signals are poorly sent or misunderstood, stepstaken by the sender or receiver may lead to unintended consequences, includingmiscalculated escalation. Communications transparency also includes high fidelitycommunication between adversaries. According to E. Gilboa, “definition of diplomacy… refers to a communicationsystem through which state and non-state actors, including politicians, officials, andprofessional diplomats, express and defend their interests, state their grievances, andissue threats and ultimatums. Diplomacy is a channel of contact for clarifying positions,probing for information, and convincing states and other actors to support one’sposition”11. Consequently crisis communications became elements of management ininternational relations: issue, media, internet, rumour-management12. They could beintegrated in foreign-policy communications in different forms: traditional diplomaticactivity, preventive diplomacy, propaganda, psychological operations, publicdiplomacy, cultural, cyber and media diplomacy. As a whole crisis communications are estimated as “…dialog between theorganisation and its public prior to, during, and after the negative occurrence. The10 Cimbala S.J. Nuclear Crisis Management and Information Warfare Parameters, Summer 1999, pp. 117- 28. [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/99summer/cimbala.htm]11 Gilboa, E. 2002. Real-Time Diplomacy: Myth and Reality. In E. Potter (Ed.), Cyber-Diplomacy. Montreal: McGill-Queen University Press, 83-109.12 Naveh Ch. The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Theoretical Framework // Conflict & communication online, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2002 [www.cco.regener-online.de]
  10. 10. PartI: 10New Foreign Policy Communicationsdialog details strategies and tactics are designed to minimize damage to the image ofthe organisation…”13. K.Fearn-Banks marks also that effective CC can both eliminatethe crisis but also to influence positively on reputation of organization after a crisis.Thus the special attention is paid to work with a target audience and public relations14.However crises communications straightly depend on activity and purposefulness offoreign-policy departments and diplomats, their ability to work with media and public.Besides, not looking on the publicness, CC is often used on the stage of origin ofconflict, while by the purpose of CM in foreign policy rather to diminish possiblechannels of loss of information or change of accents with the purpose to change publicattention (Wag the Dog Principle). In addition very often the functions of crisismanagement and media planning in foreign affairs are passed to external organizations:to advertising agencies, consulting companies etc., which develop action plandepending on the features of country or geographical area of conflict. Crisis communications include strategies according to stages of crises:prevention, preparation, response and learning. These stages serve as a framework for crisiscommunication in a foreign-policy management and for effective communications ofpolitical leaders and missions abroad: Openness—information about an issue released immediately and based on internal and external opportunities to tell own side of the story. Agenda Setting—country’s values should be communicated first and only then representatives should plan reaction of the media. Relevance—leaders and diplomats should save communication of importance of the issue in the first place. Legal Limitations—all international reactions should be based on internal legal counsel which should coincide with media reaction. Legal Implications: Cultural—it is important to foresee cultural impact and the laws of the hosting country-area of conflict. Release Coordination—leaders and missions abroad should coordinate actions and not to release conflicting information. Public Think—main task for foreign affairs crisis management is public perception so diplomats should address public internally and externally what they would want to know from representatives during a crisis.13 Fearn-Banks K. Crisis communications: a casebook approach 3rd ed. Mahwah, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum, 2007. 384p.14 Responding to Crisis: A Rhetorical Approach to Crisis Communication. Eds.: Dan P. Millar, Robert L. Heath. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Mahwah, NJ. Publication, 2003.
  11. 11. Crisis communicatons in global politics 11 Responsiveness—missions should act quickly and responding to any requests for information, or requests about issues affecting crisis. Message—diplomats should be especially active in sending appropriate message during the initial phase of the crisis. Cultural—international crises should include cultural, ethnic sensitivities and language elements of communication. Single Spokesperson—there should be single source of answer during international crisis from each side. Firefighter—firefighter diplomacy include person or group, who examine issues during a crisis that can flare up and/or intensify the situation further. Understanding of crisis communications in foreign affairs could be improved asT.M.Woodyard noted that crisis communications and war principles have correlations.The shared principles are: objective; offensive; economy of force; maneuver; unity ofcommand; security; surprise and simplicity15. WAR CRISIS COMMUNICATION Objective Define the problem and objective, concern Offensive Concern, answer what happened, direct communication Economy of force Centralize information flow, crisis team Maneuver Crisis team, contain the problem Unity of command Centralize information flow, crisis team, spokesperson Security Centralize information flow, direct communications Surprise Answer what happened, concern Simplicity Centralize information flow, crisis team However it determines as well specific of crises communications in theinternational relations. In comparison with natural, humanitarian, technical catastrophes,the political conflicts of international meaning have mainly hidden goals, that influencesat choice of strategy of conduct of sides: confrontation or collaboration. As a result, thesides of international conflict follow foremost internal national interests for creation ofthe crisis program of actions at diplomatic, political or power level. Some kind ofrivalry arises up between two and more programs of activity in a crisis situation, inmainly political international conflicts the fight goes for positive perception by public ofevents, not for the decision of conflict.15 Woodyard T.M. Crisis communication: A commanders guide to effective crisis communication [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/98-307.pdf]
  12. 12. PartI: 12New Foreign Policy Communications Before crises communications were part of information work of diplomaticmissions and such activity was concentrated around informing of elites. Revolution ininformation and communications technologies (ICT) has transformed the ways in whichdiplomatic communications take place. Governments and other diplomatic actors havenew tools to communicate directly to publics without having to use traditional channelsof mediation. The emergence of these capabilities has had the effect of blurring theboundaries between three once rather distinct forms of political communication:propaganda, lobbying, and public diplomacy. Specialists define three vectors ofcommunication work used by militaries and diplomats: Public Affairs (PA),Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), and Information Operations (IO). The latter typeof work does not look to influence decisions or “buying habits”, this is primarily atechnical field. At the same time public affairs and community relations activities directedtoward both the external and internal publics. This is generally a reactive method ofcommunication designed to explain events after they occur, but not necessarily designedto influence behavior. They tend to focus on the media as its distribution channel.Public relations do not necessarily direct their message toward neutral or hostileaudiences. Thus, considering modern stage of public diplomacy we should note that itunited elements of traditional propaganda, crisis management and new technologies. There are different approaches to definition of public relations in internationalrelations. According to Bruce Gregory16 public diplomacy, public affairs, non-militaryinternational broadcasting are among core instruments of strategic communications inconflict zones17. Traditionally term “public diplomacy” has been used in USA astruthful propaganda. But critics, such as the editors of the National Security Archive atGeorge Washington University, have viewed it in more nefarious terms, as a form of"covert propaganda", when "public diplomacy" turned out to mean public relations-lobbying". Crisis management potential of public diplomacy could be shortly described byUS Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World which noted16 Gregory B. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms [http://www8.georgetown.edu/cct/apsa/papers/gregory.pdf]17 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, (Washington, D.C.: Defense Science Board, 2004), pp. 12-13. [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09- Strategic_Communication.pdf]
  13. 13. Crisis communicatons in global politics 13that “public diplomacy [was] the promotion of the national interest by informing,engaging, and influencing people around the world. Public diplomacy helped win theCold War, and it has the potential to help win the war on terror."18 Today publicdiplomacy priorities concentrated on “the management of the complex issues and fast-breaking situations”19. As Daryl Copeland argued public diplomacy nowadays aimed onthe resolution of asymmetrical conflict The intensity of interaction and the speed of events that typify counterinsurgency have created a huge opportunity for public diplomacy. This association of public diplomacy with [counterinsurgency] is not as much of a stretch as it might initially appear. Conflict situations in many ways represent the leading edge of the craft, with useful insights to be gleaned for application to mainstream public diplomacy practice. …Creative, empathetic public diplomats, fully aware of the background and details of a given conflict, can use local knowledge to learn to think like, and in certain respects identify with, the insurgents. The potential for intelligence generation to inform policy, particularly in the critically important area of human intelligence, is real and substantial. As a result Daryl Copeland concluded that “public diplomacy [i]s anindispensable tool in tackling global challenges, in particular the nexus ofunderdevelopment and insecurity”. Besides public diplomacy is seen under different angles from military anddiplomats. First one aimed to use public diplomacy elements as new tool for persuadingforeign audiences meanwhile diplomats mostly speaking about information,engagement and only then influencing people in other countries. Political anddiplomatic meaning of public diplomacy is also discussed that caused by differentmodels of foreign policy communications. Brian Hocking noted that public diplomacy“in the United States rests on state-centered models in which people are seen as targetsand instruments of foreign policy. The dominant question is how to target them moreeffectively. The answer usually involves allocating more resources to public diplomacyprograms, adopting a better-coordinated or ‘holistic’ approach, and responding morerapidly and more flexibly to crisis situations”.18 "Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World," p. 13. (October 1, 2003) [http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf]19 Copeland D. No Dangling Conversation: Portrait Of The Public Diplomat // ENGAGEMENT Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World P.138-139 [http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the- fco/publications/publications/pd-publication/dangling-conversation]
  14. 14. PartI: 14New Foreign Policy Communications At the same time, there is another model—network model of publicdiplomacy—that “rests on a fundamentally different picture of how diplomacy works…It recognises the importance of policy networks in managing increasingly complexpolicy environments through the promotion of communication, dialogue and trust”.Besides in the “network [model], the focus is on the identification of policy objectivesin specific areas and of ‘stakeholders’ who possess interests and expertise related tothem20. These stakeholders are viewed less as targets or consumers of government-generated messages than as possible partners and producers of diplomatic outcomes.Hierarchical communication flows are replaced by multidirectional flows that are notdirectly aimed at policy elites, although the ultimate goal will often be to influence eliteattitudes and policy choices”. Example of new public diplomacy was proposed by Alex Evans and David 21Steven . In particular they mentioned terrorism as form of public diplomacy andterrorist organisations that “adopt decentralised organisational structures and seek todevelop alternative sources of authority. And they are innovative communicators,weaving together the propaganda of word and deed, and exploiting the potential of newcommunication channels”. Al-Qaeda, according to Alex Evans and David Steven, has“steadily degraded from a centralised organisation to an amorphous network, has set outa simple strategy: entangle ‘the ponderous American elephant’ in conflict overseas, thusradicalising potential recruits and creating a cycle of violence that aims to ‘makeAmerica bleed to the point of bankruptcy’. Additionally Alex Evans and David Steven defined strategies of new publicdiplomacy: Engagement, Shaping, Disruptive, Destructive. Characteristics of thesestrategies show similarity to crisis communications strategies. For example, engagementstrategies based on multiple ways to initiate, feed and broaden a conversation—andsustain it until a tipping point is reached (accordingly public think and responsiveness).The aim of shaping strategies is to inject new content, change the composition of key20 Stakeholders refer to spokepersons in crisis communications. Though definitions of stakeholders vary, but the most useful is: ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives’ (R. Edward Freeman, Strategic management: a stakeholder approach, London: Financial Times/Prentice-Hall, 1983). [Bird C. Strategic Communication And Behaviour Change: Lessons From Domestic Policy // ENGAGEMENT Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World]21 Evans A., Steven D. Towards a Theory of Influence for Twenty-First-Century Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy In A Globalised World [http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the- fco/publications/publications/pd-publication/21c-foreign-policy]
  15. 15. Crisis communicatons in global politics 15networks, or do both simultaneously—given that a new narrative is the best way tobring new voices into a debate (accordingly release coordination or message). The aimof disruptive strategies is to marginalise or co-opt opposing interests, or fundamentallyto shift the terms of a debate (accordingly agenda setting). And finally destructivestrategies in public diplomacy used to deny an opponent space. “This is publicdiplomacy as propaganda or psy-ops. Deceptive tactics can be used to confuse andundermine the adversary” (accordingly relevance). Propaganda and psychological operations are used mainly on the stages oftension and opened conflicts between the states. Consequently they also are the elementof foreign-policy crises communications and can be estimated according to the featuresof strategic (persuasive) communications. It is thus necessary to indicate relationship ofstrategic communications and public diplomacy. Depending on dynamics of conflictand actor, which uses these technologies, character of information work changes. PSYOPS is a proactive event. It is defined as planned operations to conveyselected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions,motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately influence the behavior of foreigngovernments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychologicaloperations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to theoriginators objectives. Generally, PSYOPS are used in tactical or operational leveloperations to sway the actions of enemy combatants and potential combatants and notdirected to the general populace. Depending on the immediate need PSYOPS may ormay not be truthful. As a result using PSYOPs anywhere other than the tacticalbattlefield could hurt us more than help. If the message is perceived as (or is) lies thenwe lose credibility. Specialists from crisis management company Booz Allen Hamilton estimatedeight best commercial and social marketing practices for relevance to PSYOP22. - Have a strategic communications planning process. - Segment and re-segment audience. - Become a customer-centric marketing organization. - Become results-oriented; pre-test concepts and measure results.22 Lamb Ch.J. Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. September 2005 [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occassional_Papers/Lamb_OP_092005_Psyops.pdf]
  16. 16. PartI: 16New Foreign Policy Communications - Balance long-term brand image with short-term promotions. - Become a local player. - Create and engage in communities. - Use alternative channels and evaluate when to bypass traditional ones. Media Mass media, new forms of mass communications based on Internet should beconsidered as inalienable part of communication management in a modern foreignpolicy and international relations. Thus, if the traditional mass-media based on mainlythematic inertia of attention, concentrated on main events and not lighting other events,new technologies allow to the audience to take part in presentation of positions of thedifferent states and social groups, to influence on forming of public opinion and tocreate competition of news. As a result, new media besides classic functions of agenda-setting, framing, priming23 fulfill also function of mediator in the international messagestransmission. Thus often complementing events by non-existent details and distortion offacts. It often becomes the factor of complication of relations of media and MFA,because the foreign media use thoughts of national leaders in estimation of other statesand their representatives. And these estimations can’t coincide with a foreign-policycourse of the other country, especially if the countries are in conflict. Besides analysingthe last trends of media, researchers mark considerable reduction of foreignrepresentative offices of media conditioned by economic ineffectiveness of permanentpresence24. As a result R.K.Manoff discussed that medias role in conflict management isquite small. Although, as Manoff noted, media could play the roles of engaging inconfidence building, identifying underlying interests of each party involved,establishing networks to circulate information on conflict prevention, etc. Thus development of information technologies requires the constant revision ofmedia-diplomatic relations, and role of media not always estimated as positive.Especially in crises situations when, as writes M.Baum, "…media outlets cover major23 Hulme, S.J. The Modern Media: The Impact on Foreign Policy. Fort Leavenworth, KS, Army Command and General Staff College, June 1, 2001. 106 p. [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/media-hulme.pdf]24 Potter, E.H. (Ed.) Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: McGill- Queens University Press 2002
  17. 17. Crisis communicatons in global politics 17events in the past, including the entertainment-oriented soft news media. When they docover a political story, soft news outlets focus more on “human drama” than traditionalnews media—especially the character and motivations of decision-makers, as well asindividual stories of heroism or tragedy—and less on the political or strategic context,or substantive nuances, of policy debates. …[S]oft news media raise attentiveness toforeign policy crises. Because they rarely cover ‘politics as usual’, however, soft newsdoes not raise interest in foreign policy beyond crises. When public attentiveness tocrises rises, in turn, politics becomes increasingly oriented toward the interests andpriorities of the newly attentive segments of the population. In the United States, softnews reorients politics toward personalities and away from policies"25. Characterizing coverage of foreign policy Nik Goving specifies that media oftencounterproductive for diplomatic activity and crisis management. Too often during discussions or negotiations, the protagonists or delegations perform somewhat theatrically for the press corps, thereby apparently stiffening their positions and compounding the problems of mediation or confidence building…. It is misguided for diplomats, the military, and NGOs to view the "media" as a single, homogeneous grouping of journalists and broadcasters who act in a predictable, uniform way. The media are neither monolithic or homogeneous. They are a diverse, highly competitive, unpredictable lot. During foreign-policy crises unconnected with global problems and not attractingpublic as audiences of mass-media, “there is no automaticity to a uniform, internationalnews response. Indeed, the response of news organisations at all levels has becomeincreasingly variable and unpredictable”. Besides attention of media can be related tothe editorial policy, but here the selection of events takes place depending on nationalpriorities of country. Nik Goving continues that "a crisis in one part of the world can easily be viewedelsewhere as irrelevant. The level of coverage (or refusal to cover) will often be afunction of national interest and distance from the event. The lower the national interestand the greater the distance, the less likely it is that news organisations will haveanything more than a passing interest in the developing story. There is no uniformmedia response that defies international borders and national identities. Responses toconflicts depend on considerations like editorial perceptions, the nationalities of thosefighting and the forces being engaged to stop them, calculations about the interests of25 Baum M.A. Soft News and Foreign Policy: How Expanding the Audience Changes the Policies // Japanese Journal of Political Science 8 (1) 115–145
  18. 18. PartI: 18New Foreign Policy Communicationstheir audiences, and cash- availability in the news organisation. Gatekeeping theory hasnarrowed the media trends in conflicts that are a fickle and nationalistic process” 26. Media functions of agenda-setting and framing are widely used by foreign policydepartments and diplomatic missions. For example such elements of agenda setting asproblem perception, issue definition and institutional attention could be used in foreignaffairs in connection with domestic issues. As a result “the economy of attention isstable so long as issues persist and problems continue to be defined as important.Disturbances to this stability may occur, however, due to exogenous events or changingpublic perceptions of the relative importance of foreign policy problems”27. The most disputable phenomenon of media-foreign policy relations is CNNeffect which in fact arose during Somali, Yugoslavia and Iraq crises in 1990ies. In spiteof different estimations of CNN effect there are three basic variations how modernmedia could affect international relations in conflict zones. S. Livingston in particularwrote that media could be accelerant as media shortens decision-making response timeand offer potential security-intelligence risks. Another effect is impediment whengrisly coverage may undermine morale and constitute a threat to operational security.Third effect is agenda setting when emotional compelling coverage of atrocities orhumanitarian crises reorder foreign policy priorities28 . Livingston also summurised types of media behavior in different crisissituations. So, during (1) conventional warfare media and public have the biggestinterest. Experience in recent wars indicates that when and where possible, the militarywill attempt to control the movements of journalists and the content of their reports,behavior rooted in the two concerns outlined above: fear that the “wrong” pictures willundermine public or congressional support for the effort and, second, that journalistswill inadvertently disclose tactical or strategic information to the enemy. At the sametime, high public interest and the journalist’s ambition and sense of independentprofessionalism will lead to efforts to avoid and undermine the military’s attempts to26 Gowing N. Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention? New York, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, September 1997. 46 p. [http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/media/medfr.htm]27 Wood B.D., Peake J.S. The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1. (Mar., 1998), pp. 173-184.28 Livingston S. CLARIFYING THE CNN EFFECT: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention Research Paper R-18 June 1997 [http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/research_publications/papers/research_papers/R18.pdf]
  19. 19. Crisis communicatons in global politics 19control them. The media will be assisted in these efforts by the greater mobilityprovided to them by smaller, light-weight equipment capable of point-to-pointtransmissions from anywhere to anywhere on Earth. In conventional warfare, media aremost likely to serve as accelerants and impediments in the policy process. The mediaeffect of greatest concern to the military in conventional warfare is their ability toprovide adversaries sensitive information. In an era of highly mobile, decentralized,global, real-time media, the risks to operational security are considerable. During (2) strategic deterrence it is used “the persuasion of one’s opponent thatthe costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.”.Thus persuasion involves communication. Typically, media coverage of strategicdeterrent operations during times of relative stability will be highly routinized. The levelof media and public interest will vary according to the perceived stability of thesituation, that is, according to the perceived effectiveness of deterrence. Meanwhile in(3) tactical deterrence as a rapid response media interest is likely to be extremely high.Global media are often important and valuable assets to the military, particularly whentime is short and conditions are critical. (4) Special operations and low-intensity conflict (SOLIC) include counter-terrorism operations, hostage rescue, and during conventional warfare, infiltration intoenemy territory. Such operations take place in hostile environments, are usually limitedin scope, and are conducted in an envelope of extreme secrecy. Thus they are sensitiveto media coverage. (5) Peacemaking operations aimed to create the conditions necessary for theimplementation of an accord. The hostile, unstable nature of the peacemakingenvironment means media and public interest is likely to be extremely high, at leastinitially. As with peacekeeping, if and when a sense of stability is established, mediainterest will diminish accordingly. Also as with peacekeeping, the most likely potentialmedia effect with peacemaking is as an emotional impediment. (6) In Peacekeepingmissions lightly-armed forces are deployed in a “permissive environment” to bolster afragile peace. News media will show considerable interest in peacekeeping operations,though after a period of apparent stability, media interest is likely to flag. (7) Imposed Humanitarian Interventions objectives are limited to providingfood, medicine, clean, safe water, and a secure but limited geographical location. In
  20. 20. PartI: 20New Foreign Policy Communicationsthese circumstances the military is used for their technical capabilities, such as waterpurification, field medicine, and, most importantly, logistical capabilities. Mediainterest is likely to be quite high, particularly at the beginning…. This will beparticularly true if correspondents can operate safely in the secure zone established bythe military. Though media content alone is not likely to lead to an imposedhumanitarian intervention, it cannot be ruled out. The media effect of greatest potentialin imposed humanitarian missions is as an impediment. (8) Consensual HumanitarianInterventions involve the use of the military in addressing the urgent needs of adistressed population. Such interventions are relatively low-cost, not only in materialresources but also in terms of the potential political capital at stake. If truly consensual,and if it remains so, there will probably be little sustained media interest in the story. Media also have the function of framing, which can be important for thedecision-making in extreme situations, at negotiations, for determination of descriptionsof situation, actions of sides etc. According to Robinson frames offer ways ofexplaining, understanding and making sense of events29. At the same time most scholarsnoted importance of framing first of all for elites. As M.Baum noted ‘cheap framing’ isimportant for policymakers and it is made by soft news media. As a result USpoliticians using media—“that is, highly accessible, episodic coverage ofsensationalized human drama—by portraying America’s adversaries as the embodimentof evil, thereby turning virtually any foreign crises into a morality play. For instance,following 9/11, President George W. Bush repeatedly referred to the hijackers as‘evildoers’”30. Character of crisis communications in international relations transformed sincenew media based on Internet and mobile communications developed. Although newmedia meant both negative and positive consequences. As Matt Armstrong noted newmedia has more than 24/7 news cycles with such defining characteristics as“hyperconnectivity, persistence of information, inexpensive reach, and dislocation with29 Robinson P. Theorizing the Influence of Media on World Politics Models of Media Influence on Foreign Policy European Journal of Communication 2001, Vol 16(4): 523–544. [http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/1848/robinson2.pdf]30 Baum M.A. Soft News and Foreign Policy….
  21. 21. Crisis communicatons in global politics 21speaker and listener virtually close but geographically distant”31. Consequently Internetaffected and improved crisis communication in such forms as: 1) Decentralization of crisis communication. Crisis communication becomes multi- directional, more intercultural. 2) Qualification of journalism. Media communication is supplemented by personal communication. 3) Acceleration of crisis communication. The disembeddedness of Internet communication relative to time means that there is a continuous flow of information; news spreads without temporal boundaries. Internet enables distribution to an unlimited audience. 4) The Internet has become a watch dog of official and journalistic crisis communication. 5) The Internet becomes a global archive of crisis communication. 6) The Internet creates global virtual communities32. In international conflicts, as a result, Internet creates possibilities for all parts inconflict to persuade, mobilize, and facilitate action. Armstrong continues that newmedia for terrorist and insurgent amplify and increase the velocity of an issue that iscritical. “They increasingly rely on the Internet’s ability to share multiple kinds of media quickly and persistently to permit retrieval across time zones around the world from computers or cell phones. The value is the ability to not just persuade an audience to support their action, but to mobilize their support and to facilitate their will to act on behalf of the group”. However it also creates some negative side of Internet in crisis communications.H. Bucher selected among negative effects: (1) limited access to certain kinds ofinformation; (2) rumours and hoaxes; (3) false information; and, (4) bias. Methods For analysis of CC in modern foreign politics this study focuses on the coverageof three cases: USA in Iraq, Russia on Caucasus, EU in Kosovo, as well as Ukrainianforeign policy. Counter-crisis measures for change of reputation of the states and31 New Media and Persuasion, Mobilization, and Facilitation [http://mountainrunner.us/2008/08/new_media_and_persuasion_mobil.html] August 5, 200832 Bucher, Hans-Juergen Crisis Communication and the Internet: Risk and Trust in a Global Media. First Monday, vol. 7, no. 4 2002 [http://www.firstmonday.org/Issues/issue7_4/bucher/index.html]
  22. 22. PartI: 22New Foreign Policy Communicationspolitical leaders is the central concept of these events. For this purpose we estimatequality of system of the foreign-policy making and activity of foreign media. On thewhole, these concepts can be described in the basic terms of social networks analysis:degree is count of the number of different categories that connected each other;betweenness measures the importance of mentioned categories as a link between othercategories. It counts the number of the shortest communication chains throughout thenetwork that include the category; closeness measures the ability of mentioned categoryto send information out through the network or receive information back in. It reflectsthe average number of intermediaries needed to reach other categories or receive theirinformation. Thus we focus on social network analysis as core approach for definition ofevents, their coverage and effectiveness of foreign policy communications provided bymain participants or so called “speakers” (stakeholders). Adequacy of method proved byother researches of international problems. As H.Anheier and H.Katz33 noted that“network analysis is useful because global… society is a very relational, ‘networky’phenomenon. …[Among examples we could mention] Rosenau described globalgovernance as a framework of horizontal relations; Castells’ argument that actorsincreasingly form metanetworks at the transnational level and create a system of‘decentralised concentration’, where a multiplicity of interconnected tasks takes place indifferent sites. Castells points out, technologies such as telecommunications andInternet brought about the ascendancy of a ‘network society’ whose processes occur in anew type of space, which he labels the ‘space of flows’. This space, comprising amyriad of exchanges, came to dominate the ‘space of places’ of territorially definedunits of states, regions and neighbourhoods, thanks to its greater flexibility andcompatibility with the new logic of network society. Nodes and hubs in this space offlows construct the social organisation of this network society. According to M.Ratcliffe and J. Lebkowsky34 in political sphere this network process creates “extremedemocracy” (in the context of concept “emergent democracy” of J.Ito 35), when people33 Anheier H., Katz H. Network Approaches To Global Civil Society // in Anheier, Helmut, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (eds.). Global Civil Society 2004/5. London: Sage, 2004. [http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/Yearbooks/2004/NetworkApproaches2004.pdf]34 Extreme democracy. Ed. by Mitch Ratcliffe, Jon Lebkowsky [http://www.extremedemocracy.com/]35 Joichi Ito, Emergent Democracy // Extreme democracy. Ed. by Mitch Ratcliffe, Jon Lebkowsky [http://extremedemocracy.com/chapters/Chapter One-Ito.pdf]
  23. 23. Crisis communicatons in global politics 23become the participants of political process of decision-making, which is based on thegreat number of centers linked between themselves by network coalition and organizedon the base of local, national and international problems. Network metaphor, thus, can be used for the international relations. In spite ofnovelty, there are some researches about modern organization of hidden ordecentralized social structures which do not have clear scopes: internationalorganizations36, NGOs, mass media (especially so called social media), social protests,religious communities terrorist organizations. Network organizations are also analysedin military sphere, that related to the change of features of battle operations in modernconditions. RAND Corporation in 1998 proposed concept “social netwar”37 as newform of protest. It is also possible to describe international communications as networkstructures, concept of Internet includes network metaphor38, even more such approachallows to define another concept of “news”. The modern system of mass-mediarepresents the network of satellites, digital, mobile and other technologies in which themessage published by agency or national media gets an impulse as the reaction ofreaders, quoting in other, including foreign, media. So emerges glocalisation of news,when media managed by economic laws select international news with the purposeattract audience. Ritzer defines glocalization as “the interpenetration of the global andlocal resulting in unique outcomes in different geographic areas”39, as a result NelRuigrok and Wouter van Atteveldt even proposed hypothesis that: newspapers pay moreattention to local events than global events; all news is local; local news is globalized;the local media will perform a “rally around the flag” role. The reaction on news and events can be studied on the examples of socialprojects, blogs and comments which arise up in Internet. In this case not organizationsor personalities but separate words and combinations of words, which create aninformation stream, can become units of SNA. Hyperlinks in similar virtual associations36 Hafner-Burton E.N., Montgomery A.H. Power Positions. International Organizations, Social Networks, And Conflict // Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XX No. X, Month 200537 Ronfeldt D.F., Arquilla J., Center A., Fuller G., Fuller M. The Zapatista “Social Netwar” in Mexico, Rand Corporation, 1998. 168 p.38 Halavais A. National Borders on the World Wide Web New // Media & Society, Vol. 2, No. 1, 7-28 (2000) [http://nms.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/2/1/7]39 Cited: Nel Ruigrok and Wouter van Atteveldt Global Angling with a Local Angle: How U.S., British, and Dutch Newspapers Frame Global and Local Terrorist Attacks Press/Politics 12(1):68-90 2007
  24. 24. PartI: 24New Foreign Policy Communicationscan also serve as the object of analysis. In both cases, semantic and hypertext SNAallows to set a subject, activity, emotional colouring of event, estimate geographical ortemporal descriptions of news stream. Thus, taking into account modern of communications processes, we can specifyon importance of network approach: 1. it is necessary to examine the modern international relations as network of relations of traditional and new participants; 2. activity of media also finds new quality—decentralization of information generators related to development of Internet; 3. Nature of news report also changes—independent “life” of event is determined by the reaction or attention to the report, quotation or foot-note on the report about an event40. These features can be used for estimation of foreign-policy communications. Fortreatment of large volumes of information on network structures, and also for theirgraphic interpretation we can use software NetDraw41, Pajek42, Issuecrawler43.40 See also: M. Rosvall, K. Sneppen Dynamics of Opinions and Social Structures (August 2, 2007) [http://arxiv.org/abs/0708.0368]J.C. Gonzalez-Avella, V. M. Eguýluz, M. San Miguel, M. G. Cosenza, K. Klemm Information feedback and mass media effects in cultural dynamics [http://arxiv.org/abs/0705.1091]41 Hanneman, Robert A. and Mark Riddle. 2005. Introduction to social network methods. Riverside, CA: University of California, Riverside [http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/]42 Wouter de Nooy, Andrej Mrvar, and Vladimir Batagelj, Exploratory social network analysis with Pajek: New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 334 p.43 Rogers R. Mapping Web Space with the Issuecrawler [http://www.govcom.org/publications/full_list/issuecrawler_1oct06_final.pdf]
  25. 25. Crisis communicatons in global politics 25 PART II: GWOT. CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN MODERN BATTLE OF IDEAS There are few important conditions for modern public diplomacy andconsequently for foreign policy communications. As Dr. Marieke De Mooij noted that“the ‘western’ model of communication doesn’t work equally well in other parts of theworld” and “communication will be more effective if it is adapted to the communicationbehaviour of those at whom it is targeted”44. It is obvious that these conditions arevitally important for modern US foreign policy communications. Understanding of necessity of crisis management in US foreign policy arose upduring Caribbean crisis 1962, when R.S. McNamara, J.F.Kennedys defense secretary,declared that "there is no longer such a thing as strategy; there is only crisismanagement", not crisis prevention or solving45. In 21 century unipolarity of USposition in international relations created more negative than positive moments.Foremost absence of obvious opponent after Cold war complicated determination ofsource of threat to US national interests. September, 11 2001 testified growth of tensionand made crises categories significant for US foreign policy, namely national securityand war with terrorism (which is according to Bush administration proceeded fromMiddle East and Muslim world on the whole). Thus, as A. Bailes wrote “the securitybehaviour of the United States has been dominated …by its often costly effort to blocknew perceived sources of vulnerability”46. New crisis management in US foreign policy showed up in formulation of BushDoctrine in 2002 as unilateral pre-emptive/preventive war to defeat terrorism, stopnuclear proliferation and democratize global politics, starting with Afghanistan andIraq. On the first stage (2001-2004) "diplomatic, military, financial, intelligence,investigative, and law enforcement actions—at home and abroad" defined as Global44 De Mooij M. Cross-Cultural Communication in a Globalised World [http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about- the-fco/publications/publications/pd-publication/cross-cultural]45 Caldwell D. “The Cuban Missile Affair and the American Style of Crisis Management” RAND, 1989 [http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N2943/]46 SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security [http://yearbook2007.sipri.org/]
  26. 26. Part II: 26GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideaswar on terrorism, directed "against all those who seek to export terror, and a waragainst those governments that support or shelter them" (George W. Bush October 11,2001). This term was especially actual during preparation of military campaigns inAfghanistan and Iraq—operations Enduring Freedom и Iraqi Freedom. First response US actions in 2001 were directed on Afghanistan to captureOsama bin Laden, destroy al-Qaeda, and remove the Taliban regime which hadprovided support and safe harbor to al-Qaeda, however key element of US war onterrorism became war in Iraq started in 2003 G.Bush declared repeatedly, that Iraq is"the central front in the War on Terror", where chemical and biological WMD wereplaced. Bush and his officials made hundreds of false statements in an PR campaign forthe Iraq war47. For example, on at least 532 occasions top Bush Administration officialsstated unequivocally that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, or was trying toproduce or obtain them, or had links to al Qaeda, or both. U.S. media facilitated thegovernments campaign of false statements by their largely quite uncritical anddeferential coverage of USG statements, thus providing seemingly "independent"validation of the false statements in the minds of the U.S. public48. Official military campaign of encroachment and occupation of Iraq passed inMarch-May 2003—“mission accomplished”—however after escalation of tension in2004 and start of civil war it became obvious that the military stay in Iraq can delay:"The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth everyeffort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done"49. In 2005 the war was rebrandedinto Global struggle against violent extremism (G-SAVE) that has been in use sinceat least May 2005 by the Department of Defense. The New York Times reported July 26,2005 that the "Bush administration is retooling its slogan for the fight against Al Qaedaand other terrorist groups, pushing the idea that the long-term struggle is as much anideological battle as a military mission". In August 2005 US strategy was renamed into“long war” strategy—term proposed by Rumsfeld50.47 Study: Bush led U.S. to war on false pretenses // [http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22794451/]48 Public relations preparations for 2003 invasion of Iraq [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_relations_preparations_for_2003_invasion_of_Iraq]49 Mission Accomplished, 5 Years Later [http://cbs2.com/national/iraq.mission.accomplished.2.713064.html] May 1, 200850 Regan T. The rebranding of the war on terror // Csmonitor.com [http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0728/dailyUpdate.html]
  27. 27. Crisis communicatons in global politics 27 In January 2007 G.Bush declared a shift to “new strategy [that] will changeAmerica’s course in Iraq, and help [to] succeed in the fight against terror”—The NewWay Forward in Iraq51. According to WH fact sheet Iraq in this strategy remained keyelement in war on terror: “Our enemies …are trying to defeat us in Iraq. If we step backnow, the problems in Iraq will become more lethal, and make our troops fight an uglierbattle than we are seeing today”. New strategy, meanwhile, was based on sixfundamental elements: (1) let the Iraqis lead; (2) help Iraqis protect the population; (3)isolate extremists; (4) create space for political progress; (5) diversify political andeconomic efforts; and (6) situate the strategy in a regional approach. However, suchstrategy also included increase of number of troops in Iraq, that enabled opponents tocriticize G.Bush, and to compare surge and escalation of conflict. Such criticism hadcertain base. According to information of ICasualties at the end of 2006 after stage ofdisengagement (from December 15 2005 to September 23, 2006) started insurgentoffensive stage (September 23 2006 to February 3, 2007), then started period of USsurge troop buildup (February 4 2007 to June 16 2007)52. Not looking on changing ofpriorities, the change of strategy resulted in the increase of killed soldiers exactly in thefirst half of 2007 (this year became most “bloody” for US army, 961 soldiers werekilled—about 25% of all period of military actions in Iraq). US officials and militaries estimated events in 2007 as successful operationwhich dramatically improved security in Baghdad and throughout Iraq 53 54 . Butaccording to CrisisGroup “in the absence of the fundamental political changes in Iraqthe surge was meant to facilitate, its successes will remain insufficient, fragile andreversible”. In addition CrisisGroup and SIPRI reported that if before USA tried to setin Iraq some model of regional democrasy—battle for political control—in 2007-2008there was necessity to set rational relations between Sunni and Shia groups in Iraq, it51 Condoleezza Rice Iraq: A New Way Forward Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC January 11, 200752 http://icasualties.org/oif/CasualtyTrends.aspx53 Kagan K. How They Did It. Executing the winning strategy in Iraq. 11/19/2007, Volume 013, Issue 10 [http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/346ydlgo.asp]54 Surge Strategy Helping Iraqis Protect Their Country, Bush Says. President cites “hopeful signs” in dealing with sectarian violence [http://www.america.gov/st/washfile- english/2007/June/20070629171522idybeekcm0.7258112.html] 30 June 2007
  28. 28. Part II: 28GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideasneeds as well to reconfigure the fight against general enemy al-Qaeda as it wasweakened but not vanquished55 56. As a result US Army is on the stage of surge of operations (from June 17 2007 toAugust 2008). It didn’t mean stop of violence as in March-May 2008 Iraq SpringFighting exploded in southern Iraq and Baghdad, that began with an Iraqi offensive inBasra which was the first major operation to be planned and carried out by the IraqiArmy since the invasion of 2003. The whole fighting followed a lull in the civil war inIraq and was the most serious crisis since October 2007. The whole timeline of military and political events connected to US war onterrorism, and particular war in Iraq, since 2003 was provided in the frames of Bushstatement that “struggle against international terrorism is different from any other war in[US] history. [US] will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might”. Atthe same time, he defined descriptions of GWOT primary objective—terrorist networkswith global distribution. Thus, it defined key feature of GWOT and war in Iraq:combination of military and political operations, simultaneously directed on opponent—Al Qaeda and its supporters, but also on public attention in a whole world and foremoston public of countries of GWOT coalition participants, as well as on political and publicactors in Muslim world. In this case it is important to notice so called rules of engagement. These rulesare the method of crisis management uniting the political and military requirements forthe decline of vagueness in public in connection with military operations. As Bradd C.Hayes noted "tension inescapably exists in a system that subordinates armed forcesunder civilian control while retaining military command. Managing this tension bydelineating the boundaries of military action in support of political objectives is anothermajor role of ROE. Finally, ROE used in managing another related tension—centralizedversus decentralized control”57. In crisis ROE help manage the tension between defenseand political objectives. In wartime ROE are very limited because political and militaryobjectives are generally in tune. Embedded journalists in Iraq war could be an example55 Iraq after the Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy Middle East Crisis Group Report N°75 30 April 2008 [http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5418&l=1]56 Stepanova E.Trends in armed conflicts // SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security [http://www.sipri.org/contents/conflict/YB08chapter2.pdf/download]57 Hayes B.C. Naval Rules of Engagement: Management Tools for Crisis July 1989 [http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2005/N2963.pdf]
  29. 29. Crisis communicatons in global politics 29of rules of engagement, troops both embedded media into their operations and workedon topics to be discussed, conditions of interview and reporting. Rules of GWOT engagement included attack on Al-Qaeda ideology providedfirst of all through civilian field. It would help to avoid clash between USA and Islamicworld caused by lack of credibility. According to US National Strategy for CombatingTerrorism 2006: "In the long run, winning the War on Terror means winning the battleof ideas"58 so most officials, militaries, researchers etc. noted that GWOT is a struggleof ideas, based on new environment that completely different from Cold War. From oneside, this collision of different cultures and religions (Christianity and Islam), from theother side it is conflict between state and non-state formations which successfully applynew information technologies for the ideological fight, therefore there is a necessity forthe USA to review approaches to diplomatic, military and ideological activity. As aresult battle of ideas in GWOT includes basic elements of crisis communications thatwas reflected in U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and StrategicCommunication (NSPDSC) 2006.: (1) definition of main messages and ideology; (2)creation of rapid response team; (3) definition of key speakers; (4) definition of keyaudience; (5) active co-operation with media. All these elements are included in complex system of US strategiccommunications thus public diplomacy became a US national security priority and coreinstrument for GWOT communications management. Although US public diplomacyhas challenges and problems of realisation. First of all it deals with decreasinginternational image of the USA since 2003 both in Muslim and European societies59. Atthe same time critics of US Middle East policy strengthened as US fights an enemy ithardly knew. Its descriptions have relied on gross approximations and crude categories(Saddamists, Islamo-fascists and the like) that bear only passing resemblance to reality. From the other side GWOT PD strategy also needed reconsideration. AsC.Hayden stated U.S. public diplomacy is losing the "information war," because it isbeing outflanked by jihadist media campaigns. Meanwhile U.S. efforts look absurdlyanachronistic as the USA relies on message strategies rooted in Cold War models and58 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/sectionIV.html]59 Global Unease With Major World Powers Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey [http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/256.pdf] 27 June 2007
  30. 30. Part II: 30GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideasappears increasingly unresponsive to audiences in the Middle East and Islamic world 6061 . In 2008 J. Glassman, Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and PublicAffairs62 stated that "in the early 1990s, the United States, in bipartisan fashion, began todismantle this arsenal of persuasion. It was "a process of unilateral disarmament in theweapons of advocacy." As a result public diplomacy in GWOT faces row of problemswhich B.Gregory charaterised as “episodic commitment, organizational stovepipes,tribal cultures, and excessive reliance on “accidental” personalities”63 64 . J. Glassmanalso noted that strategy towards public diplomacy have already changed, “budgets haverisen, backing is bipartisan. One of the biggest enthusiasts for public diplomacy ingovernment is the secretary of defense”. Last notion shows overlap of interests between USG and DoD in definition ofobjectives and directions of public diplomacy. Glassman stressed on “war” as centralobjective for modern US public diplomacy “to create an environment hostile to violentextremism”. That’s why “war of ideas is not a radical departure from overall publicdiplomacy strategy. It is an integral part of that strategy”. He also made clear prioritiesfor war of ideas: first, the United States itself is not at the center of the war of ideas butcouldn’t as well to be a bystander in battle for power in Muslim societies; second, USwill help to destroy Al-Qaeda brand. “The effort is to help show populations that theideology and actions of the violent extremists are not in the best interests of thosepopulations“. Glassman also defined the methods for “war of ideas”. First, to confront theideology that justifies and enables the violence by identifying, nurturing and supportinganti-Islamist Muslims. Second, cooperation with the private sector and using the besttechnology including Web 2.0 social networking techniques, a full range of productive60 Hayden C. Can branding define public diplomacy 2.0? [http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_print/070209_can_branding_define_pu blic_diplomacy_20/] FEB 9, 200761 Ludowese J.C. Strategic Communication: Who Should Lead the Long War of Ideas? Strategy Research Project [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/long_war_of_ideas.pdf] 15 March 200662 Glassman J. Winning the War of Ideas [http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf.php?template=C07&CID=408] July 8, 200863 From the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy: no one in PD conducts PD overseas June 24, 2008 [http://mountainrunner.us/2008/06/from_the_us_advisory_commissio.html]64 Gregory B. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms Presentation at the American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict [http://www8.georgetown.edu/cct/apsa/papers/gregory.pdf] August 31, 2005
  31. 31. Crisis communicatons in global politics 31alternatives to violent extremism. The shorthand for this policy is powerful and lastingdiversion, the channeling of potential recruits away from violence with the attractions ofentertainment, culture, literature, music technology, sports, education, business andculture, in addition to politics and religion. Our role is as a facilitator of choice. Thethird method is to create a broad awareness of the war of ideas throughout the U.S.government, business, academia. But more than the war of ideas itself. We want tospread a culture of "active understanding". The result of such approach transformed into military and governmental interestin strategic communications. As Todd Helmus noted US military and government “hasspent the past three years studying lessons learned …in Iraq and Afghanistan, is thatlike any corporate brand, the US military must make sure its actions match its words.Otherwise, it wont receive the trust or support of the ever-critical civilian population onwhich military operations ultimately depend”. Jack Leslie added that the USgovernment is increasingly willing to study best practices from the corporate world.Keith Reinhard also agreed that government agencies are embracing corporatecommunications principles65. Messages As it was mentioned before “war on terrorism” was central element for Iraq warwhich lately transformed into “struggle against violent extremism”. Accordingly, asW.Rosenau noted, “war of ideas” is based on a coherent and powerful set of themes thatare meant to suggest in a general way what the campaign might look like and how itmight be orchestrated. The Islamic world, made up of more than one billion people, is obviously diverse, and so it will be critical to tailor these themes to Muslims in specific nations or regions and Islamic traditions. The focus here is on elite and intellectual opinion, although some of these themes might be adapted for a broader audience: (1) Jihadist-Salafism as an Alien Ideology; (2) Jihadist-Salafism as a Threat to Islam; (3) Al-Qaida and Nationalism; (4) Al-Qaida as a Threat to Key Values66.65 McKenna T. Comms pros consult on US military report // PR Week, [http://www.prweek.com/uk/news/article/673768/Comms-pros-consult-US-military-report/] July 30, 200766 Rosenau W. Waging the ‘War of Ideas’ [http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1218.pdf]
  32. 32. Part II: 32GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideas In U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication8(NSPDSC67) the quest for control of the message also exists. The report begins bysetting out a group of themes—essentially broad talking points—that are designed topromote American values and support national security objectives68. Specific attentionin NSPDSC was paid to war on terror with accents on freedom and tolerance. Themessage of public diplomacy also stressed on “clear message: that killing oneself andmurdering innocent people is always wrong”. As for international community NSPDSCshould foster debate, encourage education and provide information, to help people learnand make decisions for themselves, because “most people everywhere, of every faith,will choose freedom over tyranny and tolerance over intolerance.Rapid response team U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communicationdefined Interagency Crisis Communication Team69 for coordination of US effortsagainst extremism which included: (1) White House Communications Office; (2)National Security Council; (3) White House Press Secretary; (4) State DepartmentPublic Diplomacy and Public Affairs; (5) Defense Department Public Affairs. Though definition of most active participants, players and initiatives should beexpanded and more detailed. First initiatives on crisis reaction were made just afterSeptember 11, 2001 when under US President The Office of Strategic Influence (OSI)was "established shortly after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, a response to concerns in theadministration that the United States was losing public support overseas for its war onterrorism, particularly in Islamic countries"70. As well as The Office of StrategicInitiatives, part of the Executive Office of the White House, is "responsible forcoordinating the planning and development of a long-range strategy for achievingPresidential priorities. The office conducts research, and assists in messagedevelopment and other communications activities in conjunction with the Office ofPublic Liaison and the Office of Political Affairs."67 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication [http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87427.pdf]68 Corman, S.R.; Dooley, K.J. (2008): Strategic communication on a rugged landscape: principles for finding the right message. Consortium for Strategic Communication [CSC], January. - 16 p.69 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication…70 Ludowese ….
  33. 33. Crisis communicatons in global politics 33 In 2002 the White House temporary wartime communications were transformedinto a permanent Office of global diplomacy to spread a positive image of the UnitedStates around the world and combat anti-Americanism. In July 2002 The Office ofGlobal Communications (OGC) was established by WH "to coordinate theadministrations foreign policy message and supervise Americas image abroad." [2][3]The OGC was made official January 21, 2003, by President George W. Bush throughExecutive Order: Establishing the Office of Global Communications.. There were alsoanother The White House Iraq Group (aka, White House Information Group orWHIG)—the marketing arm of the White House whose purpose was to sell the 2003invasion of Iraq to the public. As Frank Rich noted spirit of WHIG saved in 2007 but“instead of being bombarded with dire cherry-picked intelligence about W.M.D., thistime [it] serenaded with feel-good cherry-picked statistics offering hope”71. US Department of State also had a number of initiatives and officesresponsible for public affairs, first of all provided by Undersecretary for PublicDiplomacy and Public Affairs. This undersecretary includes in particular Bureau ofInternational Information Programs—the former U.S. Information Agency. TheBureau is "the principal international strategic communications entity for the foreignaffairs community. IIP informs, engages, and influences international audiences aboutU.S. policy and society to advance Americas interests. IIP is a leader in developing andimplementing public diplomacy strategies that measurably influence internationalaudiences through programs and technologies, and provides localized context for U.S.policies and messages, reaching millions worldwide in English, Arabic, Chinese,French, Persian, Russian, and Spanish." Office of Strategic Communication (OSC),which falls within the IIP is "responsible [in particular] for countering misinformationand disinformation in the foreign press" In late 2005 Undersecretary became a platform for rapid response officecreation72. In her testimony before the House Committee on International Affairs, KarenP. Hughes, Under Secretary of State for Diplomacy and Public Affairs, said:71 Rich F. As the Iraqis Stand Down, We’ll Stand Up // New York Times [http://select.nytimes.com/2007/09/09/opinion/09rich.html?_r=1&oref=slogin] September 9, 200772 Hughes K. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Remarks at Department of Defense Conference on Strategic Communication Washington, DC [http://www.state.gov/r/us/2007/88630.htm] July 11, 2007
  34. 34. Part II: 34GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideas "We have set up a new rapid response office at the state department. It monitors global news and issues report each morning with alerts as needed so that busy policy makers focus not only on the news environment in Washington or America, but also around the world. This has already proven to be an effective early warning system that helps us respond quickly to misinformation or emerging stories. We are asking ambassadors and public affairs officers to speak out on major issues, to do more speeches and television interviews, and my office is providing tools and guidance to help them do so in ways that are clear, concise and coordinated. We’re proceeding with plans to set up regional public diplomacy platforms to expand our television presence, and make programs such as our speaker’s bureau more targeted and strategic. We are at work on a technology initiative to make greater use of web chats, graphics, streaming video perhaps even text messaging to help amplify our message and make it relevant to younger audiences."73 Among other initiatives of USG were: in 2005, IIP created its “Media Matrix,”an internal Web site and database that tracks information about key media outlets inindividual countries around the world. Embassy staff were responsible for inputting andmaintaining the information. Bureau of Intelligence and Research conducts andcontracts for public opinion polls and focus groups, in over 50 countries each year, tosupport U.S. government public diplomacy staff, as well as members of the intelligencecommunity. Research activities focused on both mass and elite audiences and examinepublic opinion of the United States, including foreign policy, as well as other issues ofimportance to foreign audiences. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)conducted focus groups, in-depth interviews, and surveys with program participants toevaluate the impact of bureau programs, including exchanges. Media ReactionDivision, Office of Research, INR that monitored print commentaries around the world,and provides daily summaries and special products. Digital Outreach Team monitoredof blog content as part of an effort to counter terrorist use of the Internet74. US Army (DoD) is, currently, the main public diplomacy institution regardingrules of GWOT engagement75. DoD closely cooperates with USG and other institutionsof public diplomacy and structure of DoD public diplomacy includes informationdepartments in each Command and besides has 4th Psychological Operations Group,Strategic Studies Detachment (SSD) which conduct target audience analysis, assessing73 http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/hug111005.pdf74 U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research [www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-904] July 200775 Wright D.P. The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005: On Point II: transition to the new campaign / Donald P. Wright, Timothy R. Reese ; with the Contemporary Operations Study Team. 720 p.
  35. 35. Crisis communicatons in global politics 35how to communicate specific messages to identified target audiences, to supportpsychological operations around the world. The Information Awareness Office is abranch of the DoD’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency whose mission is to"imagine, develop, apply, integrate, demonstrate and transition informationtechnologies, components and prototype, closed-loop, information systems that willcounter asymmetric threats by achieving total information awareness". Information, media, and public affairs work in Iraq fulfilled by severalinstitutions. The temporary offices which comprised the Bush administrations "rapidresponse team" included Coalition Information Center established shortly afterSeptember 11, 2001, as "a temporary effort to rebut Taliban disinformation about theAfghan war" and propaganda war" against Osama bin Laden. In January 2003 DefenseDepartment recommended the creation of a "Rapid Reaction Media Team" to serve as abridge between Iraqs formerly state-controlled news outlets and an "Iraqi Free Media"network. The team portrayed a "new Iraq" offering hope of a prosperous and democraticfuture, which would serve as a model for the Middle East. US, British, and Iraqi mediaexperts provided "approved USG information" for the Iraqi public as a part of "strategicinformation campaign" for "likely 1-2 years ... transition"76. Later Combined Press Information Center in Baghdad oversees the mediaoffensive, including the Iraqi Media Engagement Team (IMET, March 2004) that wasvital to spreading releases about coalition efforts in Iraq. IMET worked closely with theArabic media. The Information Operations Task Force (IOTF) was a unit -- "deeper inthe Pentagons bureaucracy" -- which assumed much of the operations of the Office ofStrategic Influence after it was shut down in February 2002. According to "Pentagondocuments, the Rendon Group played a major role in the IOTF. The company wascharged with creating an Information War Room to monitor worldwide news reports atlightning speed and respond almost instantly with counterpropaganda"77. The IraqCommunications Desk at the Pentagon—running 24/7—"to pump out data fromBaghdad — serving as what could be considered a campaign war room".76 IRAQ: THE MEDIA WAR PLAN National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 219 Ed. by Joyce Battle [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB219/index.htm] May 8, 200777 Bamford J. The Man Who Sold the War // Rolling Stone magazine [http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/8798997/the_man_who_sold_the_war/] November 17, 2005

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