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  • Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Window (EU) Pultusk Academy of Humanities (Poland) Rivne Institute of Slavonic studies (Ukraine)CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS RESEARCH PROJECT by Shynkaruk A.L. Assistant Professor of International relations faculty of Rivne Institute of Slavonic studies (Ukraine) - 2008 -
  • CONTENTSPART I: NEW FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNICATIONS ..... 3 Media ........................................ 16 Methods ...................................... 21PART II: GWOT. CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN MODERNBATTLE OF IDEAS .............................. 25 Messages ..................................... 31 Rapid response team .......................... 32 “New Way Forward” Case: September 2007........ 38PART III: KOSOVO CASE. EU CRISIS COMMUNICATIONSIN INTEGRATION AND ENLARGEMENT PROCESSES ...... 51 EU civilian crisis management................. 52 Come to Europe! .............................. 57PART IV: RUSSIAN FEDERATION. MODERN FOREIGNPOLICY COMMUNICATIONS IN CRISES SITUATIONS .... 70 Russian-Georgian relations.................... 76PART V: UKRAINE. FOREIGN POLICY MANAGEMENT.CRISIS COMMUNICATION APPROACH ................. 95 Foreign policy management of Ukraine.......... 95 Bistro Plan: Yushchenko post-crisis campaign .. 98 Wild Energy: “gas war” of Ukraine and Russia . 102 Echo of Dreams: Yanukovych and crisis of President foreign policy .................... 109 We’ll be the first: Tymoshenko............... 113
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 3 PART I: NEW FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNICATIONS Statistics of modern international relations shows some associate tendencies.First of all, growth of globalization and technical revolution of ICT which have madeworld politics more transparent and increased the effects of changes in any region of theworld. Secondly, change of the system of intergovernmental relationships from bipolaron multipolar global system "peppered with fragile, failing, and failed states, and inwhich large areas have been ravaged by years of violence, contestation, and unevendevelopment"1. The third and the most important element was new features of conflictsand crises arising up between the states. Not looking on considerable reduction of thearmed (civil) conflicts as compared to the period of Cold war, social conflicts got newqualities. Foremost it was the growth of conflicts and diplomatic crises in theintergovernmental relations, related to the resources supplies, their transit and right ofownership. According Ploughshares researcher Ken Epps "some kind of uneasybalance" of small wars emerged. Researchers from HIICR also noted that non-violentpolitical conflicts have constant tendency of growth and they also indicated a change inconflict conduct. While fewer conflicts were fought out with the systematic use of large-scale violence, more and more disputes were waged with the sporadic use of violence, e.g. ambushes, guerilla attacks, bombings and the like2. Former director of Swedish SIPRI A.J. K. Bailes marked that a modern worldlinked to “risks” and “threats” for human security and survival3. The main task of thestate and society is to take into account all spectrum of risks for correct definition ofpriorities of conflict management. However such definition, according to A.Bailes, is adifficult process, as it is necessary to take into account different factors: naturalcatastrophes, social or economic instability, terrorist actions etc. for estimation,probabilities, consequences (effect of domino) of risks and crises. Besides “technical”1 Marshall M.G., Goldstone J. Global Report on Conflict, Governance and State Fragility 2007 Foreign Policy Bulletin (2007), 17: 3-21 Cambridge University Press2 CONFLICT BAROMETER 2007 // Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research [http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/index.html]3 Bailes A. A world of risk // SIPRI Yearbook 2007 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security [http://yearbook2007.sipri.org/files/YB07Intro.pdf]
  • PartI: 4New Foreign Policy Communicationsmodels of crises management should be expanded in order to cover the transnational,often global, diffusion of many major risk factors today and to assess the vulnerabilitiesor resilience of the world system as a whole. Bailes also noted that "it is tempting to act to pre-empt, as well as limit andeliminate, risk. In traditional warfare or power play, the costs of this and the ways toreduce possible backlash are relatively well understood. The post-cold war environmenthas facilitated many kinds of interventionist action (not just military) but has made theconsequences harder to assess and to master—especially when confronting non-stateactors. Views on targets and the legitimacy of various methods vary widely around theworld. Forceful approaches such as the USA’s military ‘pre-emption’ efforts can bring astronger backlash than anticipated from stubborn opponents, the domestic audience andworld opinion. Risk may also be ‘displaced’, so that the consequences affect innocentparties or rebound on the initiator by another route. Fundamentally, it is futile to addressa risk without considering how one’s own behaviour may generate or aggravate it. Thus,risk-based security analysis may actually be a useful brake on potential recklessness". The risks, threats and “unexpected” events become thus defining feature ofmodern international relations and change the structure of foreign relationsmanagement. In particular, decision-making process becomes less hierarchical andresults in enlargement of functions of diplomacy from traditional representation,reporting, and negotiation to additional facilitation and coordination. According to NetDiplomacy authors “this situation reflects a shift away from clearly defined, more orless hierarchical relationships toward a more fluid and dynamic, less hierarchical andwell-defined organization that must deal with crosscutting equities, continuallychanging boundaries and jurisdictions, and formal and informal agencies andinterests”4. The subject of international relations also broadens: besides balance ofpowers, weapons control and borders control, such issues as refugees, human rights,transnational crime and terrorism, drugs, and the environment, as well as economics,international trade, financial flows, trade, intellectual property and technology concerns,labor standards, and negotiations over technical standards and protocols pass from areaof "low politics" into international relations.4 Net Diplomacy I. Beyond Foreign Ministries. Diplomacy in the Information Age: Implications for Content and Conduct [http://www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14b.html]
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 5 These circumstances show that modern foreign policy is far beyond the relationsbetween elites and leaders. So, development of international economic relations resultsin a necessity to strengthen efficiency in-depth interaction with broader audiences. Theactive use of ICT (important source of changes) becomes one of the tools of this co-operation, as “diplomats and MFAs have lost the monopoly on information aboutforeign affairs. They are no longer the sole voice of the sovereign and representative ofthe state, and they do not control the flow of information to and from theirgovernments”. Nature of such system-functional changes does actual so-called crisis approachfor optimization of governance. However, in this case it is important to note opinion ofJames L. Richardson5, who wrote in 1994, that diplomacy in wide sense as process offormulation of purpose and policy, decision-making and co-operation with other statescan not fully use crisis-management principles, because it hides the problem ofinternational politics, when any side wants to lose in a conflict. At the same time CM isaimed to decline conflict of divergences for different participants of internationalrelations. Author also marks that term “management” creates additional framesrequiring technical rationality and efficiency of foreign-policy decisions. Strategies of foreign-policy crisis-management arose up during Cold war (socalled nuclear crisis management) and were related to the policy of retention betweenUSSR and the USA. On a modern stage CM in international politics is considered asdevelopment of plan and actions related to the humanitarian, military, technical andother types of threats to national interests of the state or citizens. However, states-nations as traditional participants of international relations also have a system crisis: it isnecessary to modernize activity of basic participants of foreign policy and to reviseforeign priorities. Thus there is another task: internal transformation of foreign-policymaking of political leaders, MFAs and diplomatic representatives according toemergence of new forms of foreign-policy management: unofficial, media, cultural,cyber, digital, public and other forms of diplomacy. According Boin, Hart & Stern “Intimes of crisis, communities and members of organizations expect their public leaders tominimize the impact of the crisis at hand, while critics and bureaucratic competitors tryto seize the moment to blame incumbent rulers and their policies. In this extreme5 Richardson J.L. Crisis Diplomacy. Cambridge University Press, 1994. 426 p.
  • PartI: 6New Foreign Policy Communicationsenvironment, policy makers must somehow establish a sense of normality, and fostercollective learning from the crisis experience… In the face of crisis, leaders must dealwith the strategic challenges they face, the political risks and opportunities theyencounter, the errors they make, the pitfalls they need to avoid, and the paths away fromcrisis they may pursue. The necessity for management is even more significant with theadvent of a 24-hour news cycle and an increasingly internet-savvy audience with ever- 6changing technology at its fingertips . In this situation governmental institutions can not pretend on leadership (it couldbe ineffective for the management), but they are able to use experience of multinationalcorporations, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs for reacting on new crises andto revise style of the activity. Consequently, using terminology of strategicmanagement, it is possible to divide foreign-policy activity into proactive and reactive.According to I. Ansoff during reactive strategy the reaction does not begin until allpossible operative variants will not be tested. Within the framework of every class ofreactions concrete measures will be tested consistently. The behavior in this case is theprocess of tests and errors depending on past experience. At the same time, duringproactive management operative-strategic tasks are examined consistently; however forspecific measures it is used an analytical approach, namely alternative variants arecompared, and in the case of necessity the row of measures provided. For example, theelement of proactive diplomacy is projection of a ‘correct’ image of the country inadverse situations—even if in reality its capacity to radically or immediately influenceits country’s image perception abroad may be limited7. So Japanese foreign policy consider “strategic information provision as the foundation for proactive diplomacy”. White paper about Japanese foreign policy stated that in promoting Japan’s “proactive diplomacy”—that is, diplomacy in which Japan’s goals and intentions are clearly enunciated—it is critically important that Japan, as a democratic nation, gain the understanding and support of its people with regard to its diplomatic policy and the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In light of this, beyond (i) intensifying the provision of information to newspapers, television shows, and other kinds of mass media that the Japanese people interact with on a daily basis, in recent years, the Ministry has also proactively undertaken new efforts, namely (ii) publicizing information through the Internet, and (iii) providing information to6 The politics of crisis management: public leadership under pressure / Arjen Boin ... [et al.]. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 182 p.7 Rana K.S. Bilateral Diplomacy DiploProjects: Diplo Foundation, 2002. 283 p.
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 7 eminent persons in various fields. In addition, the Ministry is making efforts to have two-way communication with the Japanese people by (iv) public relations through dialogue with the people and (v) gathering public comments and opinions. However the state is the complex system with strong probability of delays,therefore reactive strategy of saving and support of steady relations prevails in a foreignpolicy before beginning of crisis: "a postponement of start of actions after the awarenessof threat to the moment of appearance of confidence in its existence" (Ansoff). Forexample, Soviet strategy of crisis management during Cold War years considered crisisas an objective situation, corresponding to a period of threat marked by actualpreparations for war. It allowed to USSR to use weak probability of war for the conductof foreign policy. Thus, as S.Shenfield noted, once "crisis"—the very antechamber ofwar—has been reached, avoiding war takes overriding priority”. With the origin of instability there are attempts to pass to proactive strategy withthe use of preventive diplomacy for the decline of tension. At further growth of tensionthe choice of reactive (attempt of economy) or proactive (choice of optimum variants ofreaction) diplomacy depends on complication of conflict (ordinary crisis or militarycollision), and also from quality of management and understanding of situation byleaders. For this purpose crisis diplomacy and crisis management are used, based ondetermination of aims of conflict—for changing of foreign-policy strategy (crisisapproach) and initiation of conflicts or for saving of foreign-policy course andavoidance of conflicts (countercrisis approach). However specific of management in international crises is that sides plan torepresent the point of view. As a result there is the row of limitations capable toinfluence negatively on the conduct of participants of international crisis. Among them:wrong communication with different interpretations of news by different sides andmedia; psychological stress related to high intensity of international crises and causingthe wrong decisions; inadequate standards of return activity as a result of inflexibilityand inoperativeness of bureaucratic and military structures; casual events-triggers ableto result in escalation of critical statements and transition to the opened opposition8.8 Stumpf M.S. "Preventing Inadvertent War: Problems and Prospects for Sino-American Crisis Management." Cambridge, MA: Preventive Defense Project, July 2002. [http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/3118/preventing_inadvertent_war.html?breadcrumb= %2F]
  • PartI: 8New Foreign Policy Communications Professor D. Caldwell described the features of US style of crisis-management during Caribbean crisis, which however can be typical for the foreign-policy behavior in any state, as related to the psychological features of president or other key political leader. For example, confidence in that it is possible to manage a crisis according to personal estimations; unexpected change in the conduct after the beginning of crisis; to lean exceptionally on the limited number of advisers for decision-making; persons who have unpopular ides are excluded from advisers of decision- makers; president’s concentration of authority over power structures; overload of informative channels during a crisis; use of threat of force (nuclear weapon) as facilities of notification about seriousness of conflict9. Post-crisis diplomacy is directed on reduction of conflict. It can be cease-firewhich enables to reduce tension and to transfer the relations in the plane of ordinarycrisis. On this stage it is made basement for proactive diplomacy according to the choiceof optimum form of relations, however if the decision of conflict was attained on thebasis of former experience, there is probability of return of reactive foreign policy. The similar specific of dynamics of international crises determines the row ofrequirements for a foreign-policy crisis management. The correct decision-making thusneeds reduction of time pressure on policymakers and commanders. “One result of thecompression of decision time in a crisis is that the likelihood of undetected attack andfalsely detected attack errors increases”. Important condition is also an offer the other asafety valve or a face-saving exit from a predicament that has escalated beyond itsoriginal expectations. The search for options should back neither crisis participant into acorner from which there is no graceful retreat. At the same time each side maintains anaccurate perception of the other sides intentions and military capabilities. Thisbecomes difficult during a crisis because, in the heat of a partly competitive relationshipand a threat-intensive environment, intentions and capabilities can change. As S.Cimbala noted further: Intentions can change during a crisis if policymakers become more optimistic about gains or more pessimistic about potential losses during the crisis. Capabilities can change due to the management of military alerts and the deployment or other movement of military forces. Heightened states of military readiness on each side are intended to send a two-sided signal: of readiness for the worst if the other side attacks, and of a nonthreatening steadiness of purpose in the face of enemy passivity. This mixed message is hard to send under the best of crisis management conditions, since each states behaviors and communications, as observed by its9 Caldwell D. The Cuban Missile Affair and the American Style of Crisis Management RAND, 1989 [http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N2943/]
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 9 opponent, may not seem consistent. Under the stress of time pressures and of military threats, different parts of complex security organizations may be making decisions from the perspective of their narrowly defined, bureaucratic interests. These bureaucratically chosen decisions and actions may not coincide with the policymakers intent, nor with the decisions and actions of other parts of the government10. But in most cases crises emerge as a result of lack of information andcommunication, thus the choice of reactive or proactive foreign policy depends also onthe system of foreign-policy communications. Thus the key requirement of successfulcrisis management is communications transparency based on clear signaling andundistorted communications. Signaling refers to the requirement that each side mustsend its estimate of the situation to the other. It is not necessary for the two sides to haveidentical or even initially complementary interests. But a sufficient number of correctlysent and received signals are prerequisite to effective transfer of enemy goals andobjectives from one side to the other. If signals are poorly sent or misunderstood, stepstaken by the sender or receiver may lead to unintended consequences, includingmiscalculated escalation. Communications transparency also includes high fidelitycommunication between adversaries. According to E. Gilboa, “definition of diplomacy… refers to a communicationsystem through which state and non-state actors, including politicians, officials, andprofessional diplomats, express and defend their interests, state their grievances, andissue threats and ultimatums. Diplomacy is a channel of contact for clarifying positions,probing for information, and convincing states and other actors to support one’sposition”11. Consequently crisis communications became elements of management ininternational relations: issue, media, internet, rumour-management12. They could beintegrated in foreign-policy communications in different forms: traditional diplomaticactivity, preventive diplomacy, propaganda, psychological operations, publicdiplomacy, cultural, cyber and media diplomacy. As a whole crisis communications are estimated as “…dialog between theorganisation and its public prior to, during, and after the negative occurrence. The10 Cimbala S.J. Nuclear Crisis Management and Information Warfare Parameters, Summer 1999, pp. 117- 28. [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/99summer/cimbala.htm]11 Gilboa, E. 2002. Real-Time Diplomacy: Myth and Reality. In E. Potter (Ed.), Cyber-Diplomacy. Montreal: McGill-Queen University Press, 83-109.12 Naveh Ch. The Role of the Media in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Theoretical Framework // Conflict & communication online, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2002 [www.cco.regener-online.de]
  • PartI: 10New Foreign Policy Communicationsdialog details strategies and tactics are designed to minimize damage to the image ofthe organisation…”13. K.Fearn-Banks marks also that effective CC can both eliminatethe crisis but also to influence positively on reputation of organization after a crisis.Thus the special attention is paid to work with a target audience and public relations14.However crises communications straightly depend on activity and purposefulness offoreign-policy departments and diplomats, their ability to work with media and public.Besides, not looking on the publicness, CC is often used on the stage of origin ofconflict, while by the purpose of CM in foreign policy rather to diminish possiblechannels of loss of information or change of accents with the purpose to change publicattention (Wag the Dog Principle). In addition very often the functions of crisismanagement and media planning in foreign affairs are passed to external organizations:to advertising agencies, consulting companies etc., which develop action plandepending on the features of country or geographical area of conflict. Crisis communications include strategies according to stages of crises:prevention, preparation, response and learning. These stages serve as a framework for crisiscommunication in a foreign-policy management and for effective communications ofpolitical leaders and missions abroad: Openness—information about an issue released immediately and based on internal and external opportunities to tell own side of the story. Agenda Setting—country’s values should be communicated first and only then representatives should plan reaction of the media. Relevance—leaders and diplomats should save communication of importance of the issue in the first place. Legal Limitations—all international reactions should be based on internal legal counsel which should coincide with media reaction. Legal Implications: Cultural—it is important to foresee cultural impact and the laws of the hosting country-area of conflict. Release Coordination—leaders and missions abroad should coordinate actions and not to release conflicting information. Public Think—main task for foreign affairs crisis management is public perception so diplomats should address public internally and externally what they would want to know from representatives during a crisis.13 Fearn-Banks K. Crisis communications: a casebook approach 3rd ed. Mahwah, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum, 2007. 384p.14 Responding to Crisis: A Rhetorical Approach to Crisis Communication. Eds.: Dan P. Millar, Robert L. Heath. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: Mahwah, NJ. Publication, 2003.
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 11 Responsiveness—missions should act quickly and responding to any requests for information, or requests about issues affecting crisis. Message—diplomats should be especially active in sending appropriate message during the initial phase of the crisis. Cultural—international crises should include cultural, ethnic sensitivities and language elements of communication. Single Spokesperson—there should be single source of answer during international crisis from each side. Firefighter—firefighter diplomacy include person or group, who examine issues during a crisis that can flare up and/or intensify the situation further. Understanding of crisis communications in foreign affairs could be improved asT.M.Woodyard noted that crisis communications and war principles have correlations.The shared principles are: objective; offensive; economy of force; maneuver; unity ofcommand; security; surprise and simplicity15. WAR CRISIS COMMUNICATION Objective Define the problem and objective, concern Offensive Concern, answer what happened, direct communication Economy of force Centralize information flow, crisis team Maneuver Crisis team, contain the problem Unity of command Centralize information flow, crisis team, spokesperson Security Centralize information flow, direct communications Surprise Answer what happened, concern Simplicity Centralize information flow, crisis team However it determines as well specific of crises communications in theinternational relations. In comparison with natural, humanitarian, technical catastrophes,the political conflicts of international meaning have mainly hidden goals, that influencesat choice of strategy of conduct of sides: confrontation or collaboration. As a result, thesides of international conflict follow foremost internal national interests for creation ofthe crisis program of actions at diplomatic, political or power level. Some kind ofrivalry arises up between two and more programs of activity in a crisis situation, inmainly political international conflicts the fight goes for positive perception by public ofevents, not for the decision of conflict.15 Woodyard T.M. Crisis communication: A commanders guide to effective crisis communication [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acsc/98-307.pdf]
  • PartI: 12New Foreign Policy Communications Before crises communications were part of information work of diplomaticmissions and such activity was concentrated around informing of elites. Revolution ininformation and communications technologies (ICT) has transformed the ways in whichdiplomatic communications take place. Governments and other diplomatic actors havenew tools to communicate directly to publics without having to use traditional channelsof mediation. The emergence of these capabilities has had the effect of blurring theboundaries between three once rather distinct forms of political communication:propaganda, lobbying, and public diplomacy. Specialists define three vectors ofcommunication work used by militaries and diplomats: Public Affairs (PA),Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), and Information Operations (IO). The latter typeof work does not look to influence decisions or “buying habits”, this is primarily atechnical field. At the same time public affairs and community relations activities directedtoward both the external and internal publics. This is generally a reactive method ofcommunication designed to explain events after they occur, but not necessarily designedto influence behavior. They tend to focus on the media as its distribution channel.Public relations do not necessarily direct their message toward neutral or hostileaudiences. Thus, considering modern stage of public diplomacy we should note that itunited elements of traditional propaganda, crisis management and new technologies. There are different approaches to definition of public relations in internationalrelations. According to Bruce Gregory16 public diplomacy, public affairs, non-militaryinternational broadcasting are among core instruments of strategic communications inconflict zones17. Traditionally term “public diplomacy” has been used in USA astruthful propaganda. But critics, such as the editors of the National Security Archive atGeorge Washington University, have viewed it in more nefarious terms, as a form of"covert propaganda", when "public diplomacy" turned out to mean public relations-lobbying". Crisis management potential of public diplomacy could be shortly described byUS Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World which noted16 Gregory B. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms [http://www8.georgetown.edu/cct/apsa/papers/gregory.pdf]17 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication, (Washington, D.C.: Defense Science Board, 2004), pp. 12-13. [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09- Strategic_Communication.pdf]
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 13that “public diplomacy [was] the promotion of the national interest by informing,engaging, and influencing people around the world. Public diplomacy helped win theCold War, and it has the potential to help win the war on terror."18 Today publicdiplomacy priorities concentrated on “the management of the complex issues and fast-breaking situations”19. As Daryl Copeland argued public diplomacy nowadays aimed onthe resolution of asymmetrical conflict The intensity of interaction and the speed of events that typify counterinsurgency have created a huge opportunity for public diplomacy. This association of public diplomacy with [counterinsurgency] is not as much of a stretch as it might initially appear. Conflict situations in many ways represent the leading edge of the craft, with useful insights to be gleaned for application to mainstream public diplomacy practice. …Creative, empathetic public diplomats, fully aware of the background and details of a given conflict, can use local knowledge to learn to think like, and in certain respects identify with, the insurgents. The potential for intelligence generation to inform policy, particularly in the critically important area of human intelligence, is real and substantial. As a result Daryl Copeland concluded that “public diplomacy [i]s anindispensable tool in tackling global challenges, in particular the nexus ofunderdevelopment and insecurity”. Besides public diplomacy is seen under different angles from military anddiplomats. First one aimed to use public diplomacy elements as new tool for persuadingforeign audiences meanwhile diplomats mostly speaking about information,engagement and only then influencing people in other countries. Political anddiplomatic meaning of public diplomacy is also discussed that caused by differentmodels of foreign policy communications. Brian Hocking noted that public diplomacy“in the United States rests on state-centered models in which people are seen as targetsand instruments of foreign policy. The dominant question is how to target them moreeffectively. The answer usually involves allocating more resources to public diplomacyprograms, adopting a better-coordinated or ‘holistic’ approach, and responding morerapidly and more flexibly to crisis situations”.18 "Changing Minds Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World," p. 13. (October 1, 2003) [http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf]19 Copeland D. No Dangling Conversation: Portrait Of The Public Diplomat // ENGAGEMENT Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World P.138-139 [http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the- fco/publications/publications/pd-publication/dangling-conversation]
  • PartI: 14New Foreign Policy Communications At the same time, there is another model—network model of publicdiplomacy—that “rests on a fundamentally different picture of how diplomacy works…It recognises the importance of policy networks in managing increasingly complexpolicy environments through the promotion of communication, dialogue and trust”.Besides in the “network [model], the focus is on the identification of policy objectivesin specific areas and of ‘stakeholders’ who possess interests and expertise related tothem20. These stakeholders are viewed less as targets or consumers of government-generated messages than as possible partners and producers of diplomatic outcomes.Hierarchical communication flows are replaced by multidirectional flows that are notdirectly aimed at policy elites, although the ultimate goal will often be to influence eliteattitudes and policy choices”. Example of new public diplomacy was proposed by Alex Evans and David 21Steven . In particular they mentioned terrorism as form of public diplomacy andterrorist organisations that “adopt decentralised organisational structures and seek todevelop alternative sources of authority. And they are innovative communicators,weaving together the propaganda of word and deed, and exploiting the potential of newcommunication channels”. Al-Qaeda, according to Alex Evans and David Steven, has“steadily degraded from a centralised organisation to an amorphous network, has set outa simple strategy: entangle ‘the ponderous American elephant’ in conflict overseas, thusradicalising potential recruits and creating a cycle of violence that aims to ‘makeAmerica bleed to the point of bankruptcy’. Additionally Alex Evans and David Steven defined strategies of new publicdiplomacy: Engagement, Shaping, Disruptive, Destructive. Characteristics of thesestrategies show similarity to crisis communications strategies. For example, engagementstrategies based on multiple ways to initiate, feed and broaden a conversation—andsustain it until a tipping point is reached (accordingly public think and responsiveness).The aim of shaping strategies is to inject new content, change the composition of key20 Stakeholders refer to spokepersons in crisis communications. Though definitions of stakeholders vary, but the most useful is: ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives’ (R. Edward Freeman, Strategic management: a stakeholder approach, London: Financial Times/Prentice-Hall, 1983). [Bird C. Strategic Communication And Behaviour Change: Lessons From Domestic Policy // ENGAGEMENT Public Diplomacy in a Globalised World]21 Evans A., Steven D. Towards a Theory of Influence for Twenty-First-Century Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy In A Globalised World [http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-the- fco/publications/publications/pd-publication/21c-foreign-policy]
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 15networks, or do both simultaneously—given that a new narrative is the best way tobring new voices into a debate (accordingly release coordination or message). The aimof disruptive strategies is to marginalise or co-opt opposing interests, or fundamentallyto shift the terms of a debate (accordingly agenda setting). And finally destructivestrategies in public diplomacy used to deny an opponent space. “This is publicdiplomacy as propaganda or psy-ops. Deceptive tactics can be used to confuse andundermine the adversary” (accordingly relevance). Propaganda and psychological operations are used mainly on the stages oftension and opened conflicts between the states. Consequently they also are the elementof foreign-policy crises communications and can be estimated according to the featuresof strategic (persuasive) communications. It is thus necessary to indicate relationship ofstrategic communications and public diplomacy. Depending on dynamics of conflictand actor, which uses these technologies, character of information work changes. PSYOPS is a proactive event. It is defined as planned operations to conveyselected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions,motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately influence the behavior of foreigngovernments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychologicaloperations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to theoriginators objectives. Generally, PSYOPS are used in tactical or operational leveloperations to sway the actions of enemy combatants and potential combatants and notdirected to the general populace. Depending on the immediate need PSYOPS may ormay not be truthful. As a result using PSYOPs anywhere other than the tacticalbattlefield could hurt us more than help. If the message is perceived as (or is) lies thenwe lose credibility. Specialists from crisis management company Booz Allen Hamilton estimatedeight best commercial and social marketing practices for relevance to PSYOP22. - Have a strategic communications planning process. - Segment and re-segment audience. - Become a customer-centric marketing organization. - Become results-oriented; pre-test concepts and measure results.22 Lamb Ch.J. Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. September 2005 [http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occassional_Papers/Lamb_OP_092005_Psyops.pdf]
  • PartI: 16New Foreign Policy Communications - Balance long-term brand image with short-term promotions. - Become a local player. - Create and engage in communities. - Use alternative channels and evaluate when to bypass traditional ones. Media Mass media, new forms of mass communications based on Internet should beconsidered as inalienable part of communication management in a modern foreignpolicy and international relations. Thus, if the traditional mass-media based on mainlythematic inertia of attention, concentrated on main events and not lighting other events,new technologies allow to the audience to take part in presentation of positions of thedifferent states and social groups, to influence on forming of public opinion and tocreate competition of news. As a result, new media besides classic functions of agenda-setting, framing, priming23 fulfill also function of mediator in the international messagestransmission. Thus often complementing events by non-existent details and distortion offacts. It often becomes the factor of complication of relations of media and MFA,because the foreign media use thoughts of national leaders in estimation of other statesand their representatives. And these estimations can’t coincide with a foreign-policycourse of the other country, especially if the countries are in conflict. Besides analysingthe last trends of media, researchers mark considerable reduction of foreignrepresentative offices of media conditioned by economic ineffectiveness of permanentpresence24. As a result R.K.Manoff discussed that medias role in conflict management isquite small. Although, as Manoff noted, media could play the roles of engaging inconfidence building, identifying underlying interests of each party involved,establishing networks to circulate information on conflict prevention, etc. Thus development of information technologies requires the constant revision ofmedia-diplomatic relations, and role of media not always estimated as positive.Especially in crises situations when, as writes M.Baum, "…media outlets cover major23 Hulme, S.J. The Modern Media: The Impact on Foreign Policy. Fort Leavenworth, KS, Army Command and General Staff College, June 1, 2001. 106 p. [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/media-hulme.pdf]24 Potter, E.H. (Ed.) Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century: McGill- Queens University Press 2002
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 17events in the past, including the entertainment-oriented soft news media. When they docover a political story, soft news outlets focus more on “human drama” than traditionalnews media—especially the character and motivations of decision-makers, as well asindividual stories of heroism or tragedy—and less on the political or strategic context,or substantive nuances, of policy debates. …[S]oft news media raise attentiveness toforeign policy crises. Because they rarely cover ‘politics as usual’, however, soft newsdoes not raise interest in foreign policy beyond crises. When public attentiveness tocrises rises, in turn, politics becomes increasingly oriented toward the interests andpriorities of the newly attentive segments of the population. In the United States, softnews reorients politics toward personalities and away from policies"25. Characterizing coverage of foreign policy Nik Goving specifies that media oftencounterproductive for diplomatic activity and crisis management. Too often during discussions or negotiations, the protagonists or delegations perform somewhat theatrically for the press corps, thereby apparently stiffening their positions and compounding the problems of mediation or confidence building…. It is misguided for diplomats, the military, and NGOs to view the "media" as a single, homogeneous grouping of journalists and broadcasters who act in a predictable, uniform way. The media are neither monolithic or homogeneous. They are a diverse, highly competitive, unpredictable lot. During foreign-policy crises unconnected with global problems and not attractingpublic as audiences of mass-media, “there is no automaticity to a uniform, internationalnews response. Indeed, the response of news organisations at all levels has becomeincreasingly variable and unpredictable”. Besides attention of media can be related tothe editorial policy, but here the selection of events takes place depending on nationalpriorities of country. Nik Goving continues that "a crisis in one part of the world can easily be viewedelsewhere as irrelevant. The level of coverage (or refusal to cover) will often be afunction of national interest and distance from the event. The lower the national interestand the greater the distance, the less likely it is that news organisations will haveanything more than a passing interest in the developing story. There is no uniformmedia response that defies international borders and national identities. Responses toconflicts depend on considerations like editorial perceptions, the nationalities of thosefighting and the forces being engaged to stop them, calculations about the interests of25 Baum M.A. Soft News and Foreign Policy: How Expanding the Audience Changes the Policies // Japanese Journal of Political Science 8 (1) 115–145
  • PartI: 18New Foreign Policy Communicationstheir audiences, and cash- availability in the news organisation. Gatekeeping theory hasnarrowed the media trends in conflicts that are a fickle and nationalistic process” 26. Media functions of agenda-setting and framing are widely used by foreign policydepartments and diplomatic missions. For example such elements of agenda setting asproblem perception, issue definition and institutional attention could be used in foreignaffairs in connection with domestic issues. As a result “the economy of attention isstable so long as issues persist and problems continue to be defined as important.Disturbances to this stability may occur, however, due to exogenous events or changingpublic perceptions of the relative importance of foreign policy problems”27. The most disputable phenomenon of media-foreign policy relations is CNNeffect which in fact arose during Somali, Yugoslavia and Iraq crises in 1990ies. In spiteof different estimations of CNN effect there are three basic variations how modernmedia could affect international relations in conflict zones. S. Livingston in particularwrote that media could be accelerant as media shortens decision-making response timeand offer potential security-intelligence risks. Another effect is impediment whengrisly coverage may undermine morale and constitute a threat to operational security.Third effect is agenda setting when emotional compelling coverage of atrocities orhumanitarian crises reorder foreign policy priorities28 . Livingston also summurised types of media behavior in different crisissituations. So, during (1) conventional warfare media and public have the biggestinterest. Experience in recent wars indicates that when and where possible, the militarywill attempt to control the movements of journalists and the content of their reports,behavior rooted in the two concerns outlined above: fear that the “wrong” pictures willundermine public or congressional support for the effort and, second, that journalistswill inadvertently disclose tactical or strategic information to the enemy. At the sametime, high public interest and the journalist’s ambition and sense of independentprofessionalism will lead to efforts to avoid and undermine the military’s attempts to26 Gowing N. Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention? New York, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, September 1997. 46 p. [http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/media/medfr.htm]27 Wood B.D., Peake J.S. The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 1. (Mar., 1998), pp. 173-184.28 Livingston S. CLARIFYING THE CNN EFFECT: An Examination of Media Effects According to Type of Military Intervention Research Paper R-18 June 1997 [http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/research_publications/papers/research_papers/R18.pdf]
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 19control them. The media will be assisted in these efforts by the greater mobilityprovided to them by smaller, light-weight equipment capable of point-to-pointtransmissions from anywhere to anywhere on Earth. In conventional warfare, media aremost likely to serve as accelerants and impediments in the policy process. The mediaeffect of greatest concern to the military in conventional warfare is their ability toprovide adversaries sensitive information. In an era of highly mobile, decentralized,global, real-time media, the risks to operational security are considerable. During (2) strategic deterrence it is used “the persuasion of one’s opponent thatthe costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits.”.Thus persuasion involves communication. Typically, media coverage of strategicdeterrent operations during times of relative stability will be highly routinized. The levelof media and public interest will vary according to the perceived stability of thesituation, that is, according to the perceived effectiveness of deterrence. Meanwhile in(3) tactical deterrence as a rapid response media interest is likely to be extremely high.Global media are often important and valuable assets to the military, particularly whentime is short and conditions are critical. (4) Special operations and low-intensity conflict (SOLIC) include counter-terrorism operations, hostage rescue, and during conventional warfare, infiltration intoenemy territory. Such operations take place in hostile environments, are usually limitedin scope, and are conducted in an envelope of extreme secrecy. Thus they are sensitiveto media coverage. (5) Peacemaking operations aimed to create the conditions necessary for theimplementation of an accord. The hostile, unstable nature of the peacemakingenvironment means media and public interest is likely to be extremely high, at leastinitially. As with peacekeeping, if and when a sense of stability is established, mediainterest will diminish accordingly. Also as with peacekeeping, the most likely potentialmedia effect with peacemaking is as an emotional impediment. (6) In Peacekeepingmissions lightly-armed forces are deployed in a “permissive environment” to bolster afragile peace. News media will show considerable interest in peacekeeping operations,though after a period of apparent stability, media interest is likely to flag. (7) Imposed Humanitarian Interventions objectives are limited to providingfood, medicine, clean, safe water, and a secure but limited geographical location. In
  • PartI: 20New Foreign Policy Communicationsthese circumstances the military is used for their technical capabilities, such as waterpurification, field medicine, and, most importantly, logistical capabilities. Mediainterest is likely to be quite high, particularly at the beginning…. This will beparticularly true if correspondents can operate safely in the secure zone established bythe military. Though media content alone is not likely to lead to an imposedhumanitarian intervention, it cannot be ruled out. The media effect of greatest potentialin imposed humanitarian missions is as an impediment. (8) Consensual HumanitarianInterventions involve the use of the military in addressing the urgent needs of adistressed population. Such interventions are relatively low-cost, not only in materialresources but also in terms of the potential political capital at stake. If truly consensual,and if it remains so, there will probably be little sustained media interest in the story. Media also have the function of framing, which can be important for thedecision-making in extreme situations, at negotiations, for determination of descriptionsof situation, actions of sides etc. According to Robinson frames offer ways ofexplaining, understanding and making sense of events29. At the same time most scholarsnoted importance of framing first of all for elites. As M.Baum noted ‘cheap framing’ isimportant for policymakers and it is made by soft news media. As a result USpoliticians using media—“that is, highly accessible, episodic coverage ofsensationalized human drama—by portraying America’s adversaries as the embodimentof evil, thereby turning virtually any foreign crises into a morality play. For instance,following 9/11, President George W. Bush repeatedly referred to the hijackers as‘evildoers’”30. Character of crisis communications in international relations transformed sincenew media based on Internet and mobile communications developed. Although newmedia meant both negative and positive consequences. As Matt Armstrong noted newmedia has more than 24/7 news cycles with such defining characteristics as“hyperconnectivity, persistence of information, inexpensive reach, and dislocation with29 Robinson P. Theorizing the Influence of Media on World Politics Models of Media Influence on Foreign Policy European Journal of Communication 2001, Vol 16(4): 523–544. [http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/1848/robinson2.pdf]30 Baum M.A. Soft News and Foreign Policy….
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 21speaker and listener virtually close but geographically distant”31. Consequently Internetaffected and improved crisis communication in such forms as: 1) Decentralization of crisis communication. Crisis communication becomes multi- directional, more intercultural. 2) Qualification of journalism. Media communication is supplemented by personal communication. 3) Acceleration of crisis communication. The disembeddedness of Internet communication relative to time means that there is a continuous flow of information; news spreads without temporal boundaries. Internet enables distribution to an unlimited audience. 4) The Internet has become a watch dog of official and journalistic crisis communication. 5) The Internet becomes a global archive of crisis communication. 6) The Internet creates global virtual communities32. In international conflicts, as a result, Internet creates possibilities for all parts inconflict to persuade, mobilize, and facilitate action. Armstrong continues that newmedia for terrorist and insurgent amplify and increase the velocity of an issue that iscritical. “They increasingly rely on the Internet’s ability to share multiple kinds of media quickly and persistently to permit retrieval across time zones around the world from computers or cell phones. The value is the ability to not just persuade an audience to support their action, but to mobilize their support and to facilitate their will to act on behalf of the group”. However it also creates some negative side of Internet in crisis communications.H. Bucher selected among negative effects: (1) limited access to certain kinds ofinformation; (2) rumours and hoaxes; (3) false information; and, (4) bias. Methods For analysis of CC in modern foreign politics this study focuses on the coverageof three cases: USA in Iraq, Russia on Caucasus, EU in Kosovo, as well as Ukrainianforeign policy. Counter-crisis measures for change of reputation of the states and31 New Media and Persuasion, Mobilization, and Facilitation [http://mountainrunner.us/2008/08/new_media_and_persuasion_mobil.html] August 5, 200832 Bucher, Hans-Juergen Crisis Communication and the Internet: Risk and Trust in a Global Media. First Monday, vol. 7, no. 4 2002 [http://www.firstmonday.org/Issues/issue7_4/bucher/index.html]
  • PartI: 22New Foreign Policy Communicationspolitical leaders is the central concept of these events. For this purpose we estimatequality of system of the foreign-policy making and activity of foreign media. On thewhole, these concepts can be described in the basic terms of social networks analysis:degree is count of the number of different categories that connected each other;betweenness measures the importance of mentioned categories as a link between othercategories. It counts the number of the shortest communication chains throughout thenetwork that include the category; closeness measures the ability of mentioned categoryto send information out through the network or receive information back in. It reflectsthe average number of intermediaries needed to reach other categories or receive theirinformation. Thus we focus on social network analysis as core approach for definition ofevents, their coverage and effectiveness of foreign policy communications provided bymain participants or so called “speakers” (stakeholders). Adequacy of method proved byother researches of international problems. As H.Anheier and H.Katz33 noted that“network analysis is useful because global… society is a very relational, ‘networky’phenomenon. …[Among examples we could mention] Rosenau described globalgovernance as a framework of horizontal relations; Castells’ argument that actorsincreasingly form metanetworks at the transnational level and create a system of‘decentralised concentration’, where a multiplicity of interconnected tasks takes place indifferent sites. Castells points out, technologies such as telecommunications andInternet brought about the ascendancy of a ‘network society’ whose processes occur in anew type of space, which he labels the ‘space of flows’. This space, comprising amyriad of exchanges, came to dominate the ‘space of places’ of territorially definedunits of states, regions and neighbourhoods, thanks to its greater flexibility andcompatibility with the new logic of network society. Nodes and hubs in this space offlows construct the social organisation of this network society. According to M.Ratcliffe and J. Lebkowsky34 in political sphere this network process creates “extremedemocracy” (in the context of concept “emergent democracy” of J.Ito 35), when people33 Anheier H., Katz H. Network Approaches To Global Civil Society // in Anheier, Helmut, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor (eds.). Global Civil Society 2004/5. London: Sage, 2004. [http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Publications/Yearbooks/2004/NetworkApproaches2004.pdf]34 Extreme democracy. Ed. by Mitch Ratcliffe, Jon Lebkowsky [http://www.extremedemocracy.com/]35 Joichi Ito, Emergent Democracy // Extreme democracy. Ed. by Mitch Ratcliffe, Jon Lebkowsky [http://extremedemocracy.com/chapters/Chapter One-Ito.pdf]
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 23become the participants of political process of decision-making, which is based on thegreat number of centers linked between themselves by network coalition and organizedon the base of local, national and international problems. Network metaphor, thus, can be used for the international relations. In spite ofnovelty, there are some researches about modern organization of hidden ordecentralized social structures which do not have clear scopes: internationalorganizations36, NGOs, mass media (especially so called social media), social protests,religious communities terrorist organizations. Network organizations are also analysedin military sphere, that related to the change of features of battle operations in modernconditions. RAND Corporation in 1998 proposed concept “social netwar”37 as newform of protest. It is also possible to describe international communications as networkstructures, concept of Internet includes network metaphor38, even more such approachallows to define another concept of “news”. The modern system of mass-mediarepresents the network of satellites, digital, mobile and other technologies in which themessage published by agency or national media gets an impulse as the reaction ofreaders, quoting in other, including foreign, media. So emerges glocalisation of news,when media managed by economic laws select international news with the purposeattract audience. Ritzer defines glocalization as “the interpenetration of the global andlocal resulting in unique outcomes in different geographic areas”39, as a result NelRuigrok and Wouter van Atteveldt even proposed hypothesis that: newspapers pay moreattention to local events than global events; all news is local; local news is globalized;the local media will perform a “rally around the flag” role. The reaction on news and events can be studied on the examples of socialprojects, blogs and comments which arise up in Internet. In this case not organizationsor personalities but separate words and combinations of words, which create aninformation stream, can become units of SNA. Hyperlinks in similar virtual associations36 Hafner-Burton E.N., Montgomery A.H. Power Positions. International Organizations, Social Networks, And Conflict // Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XX No. X, Month 200537 Ronfeldt D.F., Arquilla J., Center A., Fuller G., Fuller M. The Zapatista “Social Netwar” in Mexico, Rand Corporation, 1998. 168 p.38 Halavais A. National Borders on the World Wide Web New // Media & Society, Vol. 2, No. 1, 7-28 (2000) [http://nms.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/2/1/7]39 Cited: Nel Ruigrok and Wouter van Atteveldt Global Angling with a Local Angle: How U.S., British, and Dutch Newspapers Frame Global and Local Terrorist Attacks Press/Politics 12(1):68-90 2007
  • PartI: 24New Foreign Policy Communicationscan also serve as the object of analysis. In both cases, semantic and hypertext SNAallows to set a subject, activity, emotional colouring of event, estimate geographical ortemporal descriptions of news stream. Thus, taking into account modern of communications processes, we can specifyon importance of network approach: 1. it is necessary to examine the modern international relations as network of relations of traditional and new participants; 2. activity of media also finds new quality—decentralization of information generators related to development of Internet; 3. Nature of news report also changes—independent “life” of event is determined by the reaction or attention to the report, quotation or foot-note on the report about an event40. These features can be used for estimation of foreign-policy communications. Fortreatment of large volumes of information on network structures, and also for theirgraphic interpretation we can use software NetDraw41, Pajek42, Issuecrawler43.40 See also: M. Rosvall, K. Sneppen Dynamics of Opinions and Social Structures (August 2, 2007) [http://arxiv.org/abs/0708.0368]J.C. Gonzalez-Avella, V. M. Eguýluz, M. San Miguel, M. G. Cosenza, K. Klemm Information feedback and mass media effects in cultural dynamics [http://arxiv.org/abs/0705.1091]41 Hanneman, Robert A. and Mark Riddle. 2005. Introduction to social network methods. Riverside, CA: University of California, Riverside [http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/]42 Wouter de Nooy, Andrej Mrvar, and Vladimir Batagelj, Exploratory social network analysis with Pajek: New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 334 p.43 Rogers R. Mapping Web Space with the Issuecrawler [http://www.govcom.org/publications/full_list/issuecrawler_1oct06_final.pdf]
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 25 PART II: GWOT. CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN MODERN BATTLE OF IDEAS There are few important conditions for modern public diplomacy andconsequently for foreign policy communications. As Dr. Marieke De Mooij noted that“the ‘western’ model of communication doesn’t work equally well in other parts of theworld” and “communication will be more effective if it is adapted to the communicationbehaviour of those at whom it is targeted”44. It is obvious that these conditions arevitally important for modern US foreign policy communications. Understanding of necessity of crisis management in US foreign policy arose upduring Caribbean crisis 1962, when R.S. McNamara, J.F.Kennedys defense secretary,declared that "there is no longer such a thing as strategy; there is only crisismanagement", not crisis prevention or solving45. In 21 century unipolarity of USposition in international relations created more negative than positive moments.Foremost absence of obvious opponent after Cold war complicated determination ofsource of threat to US national interests. September, 11 2001 testified growth of tensionand made crises categories significant for US foreign policy, namely national securityand war with terrorism (which is according to Bush administration proceeded fromMiddle East and Muslim world on the whole). Thus, as A. Bailes wrote “the securitybehaviour of the United States has been dominated …by its often costly effort to blocknew perceived sources of vulnerability”46. New crisis management in US foreign policy showed up in formulation of BushDoctrine in 2002 as unilateral pre-emptive/preventive war to defeat terrorism, stopnuclear proliferation and democratize global politics, starting with Afghanistan andIraq. On the first stage (2001-2004) "diplomatic, military, financial, intelligence,investigative, and law enforcement actions—at home and abroad" defined as Global44 De Mooij M. Cross-Cultural Communication in a Globalised World [http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about- the-fco/publications/publications/pd-publication/cross-cultural]45 Caldwell D. “The Cuban Missile Affair and the American Style of Crisis Management” RAND, 1989 [http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N2943/]46 SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security [http://yearbook2007.sipri.org/]
  • Part II: 26GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideaswar on terrorism, directed "against all those who seek to export terror, and a waragainst those governments that support or shelter them" (George W. Bush October 11,2001). This term was especially actual during preparation of military campaigns inAfghanistan and Iraq—operations Enduring Freedom и Iraqi Freedom. First response US actions in 2001 were directed on Afghanistan to captureOsama bin Laden, destroy al-Qaeda, and remove the Taliban regime which hadprovided support and safe harbor to al-Qaeda, however key element of US war onterrorism became war in Iraq started in 2003 G.Bush declared repeatedly, that Iraq is"the central front in the War on Terror", where chemical and biological WMD wereplaced. Bush and his officials made hundreds of false statements in an PR campaign forthe Iraq war47. For example, on at least 532 occasions top Bush Administration officialsstated unequivocally that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, or was trying toproduce or obtain them, or had links to al Qaeda, or both. U.S. media facilitated thegovernments campaign of false statements by their largely quite uncritical anddeferential coverage of USG statements, thus providing seemingly "independent"validation of the false statements in the minds of the U.S. public48. Official military campaign of encroachment and occupation of Iraq passed inMarch-May 2003—“mission accomplished”—however after escalation of tension in2004 and start of civil war it became obvious that the military stay in Iraq can delay:"The transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth everyeffort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done"49. In 2005 the war was rebrandedinto Global struggle against violent extremism (G-SAVE) that has been in use sinceat least May 2005 by the Department of Defense. The New York Times reported July 26,2005 that the "Bush administration is retooling its slogan for the fight against Al Qaedaand other terrorist groups, pushing the idea that the long-term struggle is as much anideological battle as a military mission". In August 2005 US strategy was renamed into“long war” strategy—term proposed by Rumsfeld50.47 Study: Bush led U.S. to war on false pretenses // [http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22794451/]48 Public relations preparations for 2003 invasion of Iraq [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_relations_preparations_for_2003_invasion_of_Iraq]49 Mission Accomplished, 5 Years Later [http://cbs2.com/national/iraq.mission.accomplished.2.713064.html] May 1, 200850 Regan T. The rebranding of the war on terror // Csmonitor.com [http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0728/dailyUpdate.html]
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 27 In January 2007 G.Bush declared a shift to “new strategy [that] will changeAmerica’s course in Iraq, and help [to] succeed in the fight against terror”—The NewWay Forward in Iraq51. According to WH fact sheet Iraq in this strategy remained keyelement in war on terror: “Our enemies …are trying to defeat us in Iraq. If we step backnow, the problems in Iraq will become more lethal, and make our troops fight an uglierbattle than we are seeing today”. New strategy, meanwhile, was based on sixfundamental elements: (1) let the Iraqis lead; (2) help Iraqis protect the population; (3)isolate extremists; (4) create space for political progress; (5) diversify political andeconomic efforts; and (6) situate the strategy in a regional approach. However, suchstrategy also included increase of number of troops in Iraq, that enabled opponents tocriticize G.Bush, and to compare surge and escalation of conflict. Such criticism hadcertain base. According to information of ICasualties at the end of 2006 after stage ofdisengagement (from December 15 2005 to September 23, 2006) started insurgentoffensive stage (September 23 2006 to February 3, 2007), then started period of USsurge troop buildup (February 4 2007 to June 16 2007)52. Not looking on changing ofpriorities, the change of strategy resulted in the increase of killed soldiers exactly in thefirst half of 2007 (this year became most “bloody” for US army, 961 soldiers werekilled—about 25% of all period of military actions in Iraq). US officials and militaries estimated events in 2007 as successful operationwhich dramatically improved security in Baghdad and throughout Iraq 53 54 . Butaccording to CrisisGroup “in the absence of the fundamental political changes in Iraqthe surge was meant to facilitate, its successes will remain insufficient, fragile andreversible”. In addition CrisisGroup and SIPRI reported that if before USA tried to setin Iraq some model of regional democrasy—battle for political control—in 2007-2008there was necessity to set rational relations between Sunni and Shia groups in Iraq, it51 Condoleezza Rice Iraq: A New Way Forward Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, DC January 11, 200752 http://icasualties.org/oif/CasualtyTrends.aspx53 Kagan K. How They Did It. Executing the winning strategy in Iraq. 11/19/2007, Volume 013, Issue 10 [http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/014/346ydlgo.asp]54 Surge Strategy Helping Iraqis Protect Their Country, Bush Says. President cites “hopeful signs” in dealing with sectarian violence [http://www.america.gov/st/washfile- english/2007/June/20070629171522idybeekcm0.7258112.html] 30 June 2007
  • Part II: 28GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideasneeds as well to reconfigure the fight against general enemy al-Qaeda as it wasweakened but not vanquished55 56. As a result US Army is on the stage of surge of operations (from June 17 2007 toAugust 2008). It didn’t mean stop of violence as in March-May 2008 Iraq SpringFighting exploded in southern Iraq and Baghdad, that began with an Iraqi offensive inBasra which was the first major operation to be planned and carried out by the IraqiArmy since the invasion of 2003. The whole fighting followed a lull in the civil war inIraq and was the most serious crisis since October 2007. The whole timeline of military and political events connected to US war onterrorism, and particular war in Iraq, since 2003 was provided in the frames of Bushstatement that “struggle against international terrorism is different from any other war in[US] history. [US] will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might”. Atthe same time, he defined descriptions of GWOT primary objective—terrorist networkswith global distribution. Thus, it defined key feature of GWOT and war in Iraq:combination of military and political operations, simultaneously directed on opponent—Al Qaeda and its supporters, but also on public attention in a whole world and foremoston public of countries of GWOT coalition participants, as well as on political and publicactors in Muslim world. In this case it is important to notice so called rules of engagement. These rulesare the method of crisis management uniting the political and military requirements forthe decline of vagueness in public in connection with military operations. As Bradd C.Hayes noted "tension inescapably exists in a system that subordinates armed forcesunder civilian control while retaining military command. Managing this tension bydelineating the boundaries of military action in support of political objectives is anothermajor role of ROE. Finally, ROE used in managing another related tension—centralizedversus decentralized control”57. In crisis ROE help manage the tension between defenseand political objectives. In wartime ROE are very limited because political and militaryobjectives are generally in tune. Embedded journalists in Iraq war could be an example55 Iraq after the Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy Middle East Crisis Group Report N°75 30 April 2008 [http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5418&l=1]56 Stepanova E.Trends in armed conflicts // SIPRI Yearbook 2008: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security [http://www.sipri.org/contents/conflict/YB08chapter2.pdf/download]57 Hayes B.C. Naval Rules of Engagement: Management Tools for Crisis July 1989 [http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2005/N2963.pdf]
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 29of rules of engagement, troops both embedded media into their operations and workedon topics to be discussed, conditions of interview and reporting. Rules of GWOT engagement included attack on Al-Qaeda ideology providedfirst of all through civilian field. It would help to avoid clash between USA and Islamicworld caused by lack of credibility. According to US National Strategy for CombatingTerrorism 2006: "In the long run, winning the War on Terror means winning the battleof ideas"58 so most officials, militaries, researchers etc. noted that GWOT is a struggleof ideas, based on new environment that completely different from Cold War. From oneside, this collision of different cultures and religions (Christianity and Islam), from theother side it is conflict between state and non-state formations which successfully applynew information technologies for the ideological fight, therefore there is a necessity forthe USA to review approaches to diplomatic, military and ideological activity. As aresult battle of ideas in GWOT includes basic elements of crisis communications thatwas reflected in U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and StrategicCommunication (NSPDSC) 2006.: (1) definition of main messages and ideology; (2)creation of rapid response team; (3) definition of key speakers; (4) definition of keyaudience; (5) active co-operation with media. All these elements are included in complex system of US strategiccommunications thus public diplomacy became a US national security priority and coreinstrument for GWOT communications management. Although US public diplomacyhas challenges and problems of realisation. First of all it deals with decreasinginternational image of the USA since 2003 both in Muslim and European societies59. Atthe same time critics of US Middle East policy strengthened as US fights an enemy ithardly knew. Its descriptions have relied on gross approximations and crude categories(Saddamists, Islamo-fascists and the like) that bear only passing resemblance to reality. From the other side GWOT PD strategy also needed reconsideration. AsC.Hayden stated U.S. public diplomacy is losing the "information war," because it isbeing outflanked by jihadist media campaigns. Meanwhile U.S. efforts look absurdlyanachronistic as the USA relies on message strategies rooted in Cold War models and58 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nsct/2006/sectionIV.html]59 Global Unease With Major World Powers Rising Environmental Concern in 47-Nation Survey [http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/256.pdf] 27 June 2007
  • Part II: 30GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideasappears increasingly unresponsive to audiences in the Middle East and Islamic world 6061 . In 2008 J. Glassman, Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and PublicAffairs62 stated that "in the early 1990s, the United States, in bipartisan fashion, began todismantle this arsenal of persuasion. It was "a process of unilateral disarmament in theweapons of advocacy." As a result public diplomacy in GWOT faces row of problemswhich B.Gregory charaterised as “episodic commitment, organizational stovepipes,tribal cultures, and excessive reliance on “accidental” personalities”63 64 . J. Glassmanalso noted that strategy towards public diplomacy have already changed, “budgets haverisen, backing is bipartisan. One of the biggest enthusiasts for public diplomacy ingovernment is the secretary of defense”. Last notion shows overlap of interests between USG and DoD in definition ofobjectives and directions of public diplomacy. Glassman stressed on “war” as centralobjective for modern US public diplomacy “to create an environment hostile to violentextremism”. That’s why “war of ideas is not a radical departure from overall publicdiplomacy strategy. It is an integral part of that strategy”. He also made clear prioritiesfor war of ideas: first, the United States itself is not at the center of the war of ideas butcouldn’t as well to be a bystander in battle for power in Muslim societies; second, USwill help to destroy Al-Qaeda brand. “The effort is to help show populations that theideology and actions of the violent extremists are not in the best interests of thosepopulations“. Glassman also defined the methods for “war of ideas”. First, to confront theideology that justifies and enables the violence by identifying, nurturing and supportinganti-Islamist Muslims. Second, cooperation with the private sector and using the besttechnology including Web 2.0 social networking techniques, a full range of productive60 Hayden C. Can branding define public diplomacy 2.0? [http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/newsroom/pdblog_print/070209_can_branding_define_pu blic_diplomacy_20/] FEB 9, 200761 Ludowese J.C. Strategic Communication: Who Should Lead the Long War of Ideas? Strategy Research Project [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/long_war_of_ideas.pdf] 15 March 200662 Glassman J. Winning the War of Ideas [http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf.php?template=C07&CID=408] July 8, 200863 From the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy: no one in PD conducts PD overseas June 24, 2008 [http://mountainrunner.us/2008/06/from_the_us_advisory_commissio.html]64 Gregory B. Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication: Cultures, Firewalls, and Imported Norms Presentation at the American Political Science Association Conference on International Communication and Conflict [http://www8.georgetown.edu/cct/apsa/papers/gregory.pdf] August 31, 2005
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 31alternatives to violent extremism. The shorthand for this policy is powerful and lastingdiversion, the channeling of potential recruits away from violence with the attractions ofentertainment, culture, literature, music technology, sports, education, business andculture, in addition to politics and religion. Our role is as a facilitator of choice. Thethird method is to create a broad awareness of the war of ideas throughout the U.S.government, business, academia. But more than the war of ideas itself. We want tospread a culture of "active understanding". The result of such approach transformed into military and governmental interestin strategic communications. As Todd Helmus noted US military and government “hasspent the past three years studying lessons learned …in Iraq and Afghanistan, is thatlike any corporate brand, the US military must make sure its actions match its words.Otherwise, it wont receive the trust or support of the ever-critical civilian population onwhich military operations ultimately depend”. Jack Leslie added that the USgovernment is increasingly willing to study best practices from the corporate world.Keith Reinhard also agreed that government agencies are embracing corporatecommunications principles65. Messages As it was mentioned before “war on terrorism” was central element for Iraq warwhich lately transformed into “struggle against violent extremism”. Accordingly, asW.Rosenau noted, “war of ideas” is based on a coherent and powerful set of themes thatare meant to suggest in a general way what the campaign might look like and how itmight be orchestrated. The Islamic world, made up of more than one billion people, is obviously diverse, and so it will be critical to tailor these themes to Muslims in specific nations or regions and Islamic traditions. The focus here is on elite and intellectual opinion, although some of these themes might be adapted for a broader audience: (1) Jihadist-Salafism as an Alien Ideology; (2) Jihadist-Salafism as a Threat to Islam; (3) Al-Qaida and Nationalism; (4) Al-Qaida as a Threat to Key Values66.65 McKenna T. Comms pros consult on US military report // PR Week, [http://www.prweek.com/uk/news/article/673768/Comms-pros-consult-US-military-report/] July 30, 200766 Rosenau W. Waging the ‘War of Ideas’ [http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2006/RAND_RP1218.pdf]
  • Part II: 32GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideas In U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication8(NSPDSC67) the quest for control of the message also exists. The report begins bysetting out a group of themes—essentially broad talking points—that are designed topromote American values and support national security objectives68. Specific attentionin NSPDSC was paid to war on terror with accents on freedom and tolerance. Themessage of public diplomacy also stressed on “clear message: that killing oneself andmurdering innocent people is always wrong”. As for international community NSPDSCshould foster debate, encourage education and provide information, to help people learnand make decisions for themselves, because “most people everywhere, of every faith,will choose freedom over tyranny and tolerance over intolerance.Rapid response team U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communicationdefined Interagency Crisis Communication Team69 for coordination of US effortsagainst extremism which included: (1) White House Communications Office; (2)National Security Council; (3) White House Press Secretary; (4) State DepartmentPublic Diplomacy and Public Affairs; (5) Defense Department Public Affairs. Though definition of most active participants, players and initiatives should beexpanded and more detailed. First initiatives on crisis reaction were made just afterSeptember 11, 2001 when under US President The Office of Strategic Influence (OSI)was "established shortly after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, a response to concerns in theadministration that the United States was losing public support overseas for its war onterrorism, particularly in Islamic countries"70. As well as The Office of StrategicInitiatives, part of the Executive Office of the White House, is "responsible forcoordinating the planning and development of a long-range strategy for achievingPresidential priorities. The office conducts research, and assists in messagedevelopment and other communications activities in conjunction with the Office ofPublic Liaison and the Office of Political Affairs."67 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication [http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87427.pdf]68 Corman, S.R.; Dooley, K.J. (2008): Strategic communication on a rugged landscape: principles for finding the right message. Consortium for Strategic Communication [CSC], January. - 16 p.69 U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication…70 Ludowese ….
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 33 In 2002 the White House temporary wartime communications were transformedinto a permanent Office of global diplomacy to spread a positive image of the UnitedStates around the world and combat anti-Americanism. In July 2002 The Office ofGlobal Communications (OGC) was established by WH "to coordinate theadministrations foreign policy message and supervise Americas image abroad." [2][3]The OGC was made official January 21, 2003, by President George W. Bush throughExecutive Order: Establishing the Office of Global Communications.. There were alsoanother The White House Iraq Group (aka, White House Information Group orWHIG)—the marketing arm of the White House whose purpose was to sell the 2003invasion of Iraq to the public. As Frank Rich noted spirit of WHIG saved in 2007 but“instead of being bombarded with dire cherry-picked intelligence about W.M.D., thistime [it] serenaded with feel-good cherry-picked statistics offering hope”71. US Department of State also had a number of initiatives and officesresponsible for public affairs, first of all provided by Undersecretary for PublicDiplomacy and Public Affairs. This undersecretary includes in particular Bureau ofInternational Information Programs—the former U.S. Information Agency. TheBureau is "the principal international strategic communications entity for the foreignaffairs community. IIP informs, engages, and influences international audiences aboutU.S. policy and society to advance Americas interests. IIP is a leader in developing andimplementing public diplomacy strategies that measurably influence internationalaudiences through programs and technologies, and provides localized context for U.S.policies and messages, reaching millions worldwide in English, Arabic, Chinese,French, Persian, Russian, and Spanish." Office of Strategic Communication (OSC),which falls within the IIP is "responsible [in particular] for countering misinformationand disinformation in the foreign press" In late 2005 Undersecretary became a platform for rapid response officecreation72. In her testimony before the House Committee on International Affairs, KarenP. Hughes, Under Secretary of State for Diplomacy and Public Affairs, said:71 Rich F. As the Iraqis Stand Down, We’ll Stand Up // New York Times [http://select.nytimes.com/2007/09/09/opinion/09rich.html?_r=1&oref=slogin] September 9, 200772 Hughes K. Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Remarks at Department of Defense Conference on Strategic Communication Washington, DC [http://www.state.gov/r/us/2007/88630.htm] July 11, 2007
  • Part II: 34GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideas "We have set up a new rapid response office at the state department. It monitors global news and issues report each morning with alerts as needed so that busy policy makers focus not only on the news environment in Washington or America, but also around the world. This has already proven to be an effective early warning system that helps us respond quickly to misinformation or emerging stories. We are asking ambassadors and public affairs officers to speak out on major issues, to do more speeches and television interviews, and my office is providing tools and guidance to help them do so in ways that are clear, concise and coordinated. We’re proceeding with plans to set up regional public diplomacy platforms to expand our television presence, and make programs such as our speaker’s bureau more targeted and strategic. We are at work on a technology initiative to make greater use of web chats, graphics, streaming video perhaps even text messaging to help amplify our message and make it relevant to younger audiences."73 Among other initiatives of USG were: in 2005, IIP created its “Media Matrix,”an internal Web site and database that tracks information about key media outlets inindividual countries around the world. Embassy staff were responsible for inputting andmaintaining the information. Bureau of Intelligence and Research conducts andcontracts for public opinion polls and focus groups, in over 50 countries each year, tosupport U.S. government public diplomacy staff, as well as members of the intelligencecommunity. Research activities focused on both mass and elite audiences and examinepublic opinion of the United States, including foreign policy, as well as other issues ofimportance to foreign audiences. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)conducted focus groups, in-depth interviews, and surveys with program participants toevaluate the impact of bureau programs, including exchanges. Media ReactionDivision, Office of Research, INR that monitored print commentaries around the world,and provides daily summaries and special products. Digital Outreach Team monitoredof blog content as part of an effort to counter terrorist use of the Internet74. US Army (DoD) is, currently, the main public diplomacy institution regardingrules of GWOT engagement75. DoD closely cooperates with USG and other institutionsof public diplomacy and structure of DoD public diplomacy includes informationdepartments in each Command and besides has 4th Psychological Operations Group,Strategic Studies Detachment (SSD) which conduct target audience analysis, assessing73 http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/hug111005.pdf74 U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research [www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-904] July 200775 Wright D.P. The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005: On Point II: transition to the new campaign / Donald P. Wright, Timothy R. Reese ; with the Contemporary Operations Study Team. 720 p.
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 35how to communicate specific messages to identified target audiences, to supportpsychological operations around the world. The Information Awareness Office is abranch of the DoD’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency whose mission is to"imagine, develop, apply, integrate, demonstrate and transition informationtechnologies, components and prototype, closed-loop, information systems that willcounter asymmetric threats by achieving total information awareness". Information, media, and public affairs work in Iraq fulfilled by severalinstitutions. The temporary offices which comprised the Bush administrations "rapidresponse team" included Coalition Information Center established shortly afterSeptember 11, 2001, as "a temporary effort to rebut Taliban disinformation about theAfghan war" and propaganda war" against Osama bin Laden. In January 2003 DefenseDepartment recommended the creation of a "Rapid Reaction Media Team" to serve as abridge between Iraqs formerly state-controlled news outlets and an "Iraqi Free Media"network. The team portrayed a "new Iraq" offering hope of a prosperous and democraticfuture, which would serve as a model for the Middle East. US, British, and Iraqi mediaexperts provided "approved USG information" for the Iraqi public as a part of "strategicinformation campaign" for "likely 1-2 years ... transition"76. Later Combined Press Information Center in Baghdad oversees the mediaoffensive, including the Iraqi Media Engagement Team (IMET, March 2004) that wasvital to spreading releases about coalition efforts in Iraq. IMET worked closely with theArabic media. The Information Operations Task Force (IOTF) was a unit -- "deeper inthe Pentagons bureaucracy" -- which assumed much of the operations of the Office ofStrategic Influence after it was shut down in February 2002. According to "Pentagondocuments, the Rendon Group played a major role in the IOTF. The company wascharged with creating an Information War Room to monitor worldwide news reports atlightning speed and respond almost instantly with counterpropaganda"77. The IraqCommunications Desk at the Pentagon—running 24/7—"to pump out data fromBaghdad — serving as what could be considered a campaign war room".76 IRAQ: THE MEDIA WAR PLAN National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 219 Ed. by Joyce Battle [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB219/index.htm] May 8, 200777 Bamford J. The Man Who Sold the War // Rolling Stone magazine [http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/8798997/the_man_who_sold_the_war/] November 17, 2005
  • Part II: 36GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideas Besides crisis communication functions were made by other US stateorganisations. Broadcasting Board of Governors that includes InternationalBroadcasting Bureau responsible for Voice of America, Radio/TV Marti, and theMiddle East Broadcasting Networks, as well as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty andRadio Free Asia. U.S. Agency for International Development has missions inColombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, and West Bank/Gaza and others tosupport specific, targeted public awareness campaigns through the DevelopmentOutreach and Communications Program. Central Intelligence Agency includes GlobalInformation and Influence Team (GIIT) that conducts polling with an undisclosedfocus in an undisclosed number of countries7879. NSPDSC 2006 also foresaw closer cooperation between governmental andprivate organisation in foreign policy communications, although this cooperationexisted during Iraq invasion in 2003. There are several reasons for private organisationsparticipation, as US Army operates in areas where culture and language are not well-understood, it causes misinformation and rumours. Work involves a wide range ofcommunications activities, including monitoring and analyzing Arabic and Westernmedia; spokesperson training; and development and dissemination of TV, radio,newsprint, and Internet “information” products80. The general contractors of US publicdiplomacy are Rendon and Lincoln Groups, who mainly work in Iraq. The Rendon Group is a secretive public relations firm that has assisted a numberof US military interventions in nations including Argentina, Colombia, Haiti, Iraq,Kosovo, Panama and Zimbabwe. Company founder John Rendon described himself heis "an information warrior and a perception manager81. Rendons activities includedorganizing the Iraqi National Congress, a PR front group designed to foment theoverthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.78 U.S. Public Diplomacy. Actions Needed to Improve Strategic Use and Coordination of Research [www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-904] July 200779 U.S. Public Diplomacy. Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by the Lack of a National Communication Strategy [www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-323] April 200580 McKenna T. Military to select firm for info ops initiative in Iraq // PRWeek [http://www.prweekus.com/Military-to-select-firm-for-info-ops-initiative-in-Iraq/article/115740/] August 21, 200881 Gerth J., Gall C., Khapalwak R. The reach of war: propaganda; Militarys Information War Is Vast and Often Secretive [http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9500E6DF1E31F932A25751C1A9639C8B63&sec= &spon=&pagewanted=print] December 11, 2005
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 37 The Lincoln Group is "business intelligence company that handles servicesfrom political campaign intelligence to commercial real estate in Iraq.". In June 2005The DoD Special Operations Command awarded three five-year contracts, totaling $300million, for articles, broadcasts, advertisements, T-shirts, bumper stickers, and othermessages meant to win international support for the U.S. government, including one tothe Lincoln Group, which claims "select relationships in Congress, the Administrationand the U.S. Department of State." According to the New York Times, Lincoln becomes"the main civilian contractor for carrying out an aggressive propaganda campaign inAnbar Province82. In November 2005, the firm was outed for covertly planting articleswritten by U.S. military officers in Iraqi newspapers. Another element for information work in the region was AL-Hurra channel,created in the frames of Middle East Broadcasting Networks, Inc., which in turn was apart of Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). AL-Hurra, as well as AL-Hurra Iraq,was created in February-March 2004. As Dafna Linzer83 wrote President Bush in hisState of the Union address, just three weeks before the network went on air, announcedthat the United States was launching a television station for the Middle East andexpanded radio broadcasts in Arabic and Farsi. According to Bush such an audaciousstrategy would “cut through the barriers of hateful propaganda” that his administrationhad come to blame for the loss of global support for the United States. He wasproposing what would become the largest and most expensive effort in America’s longhistory of public diplomacy. Unlike Al Jazeera, Bush said, this new, U.S.-fundednetwork “will begin providing reliable news and information across the region.” According to GAO Report84 the main objective of the channel (as well as RadioSawa) corresponds with key priorities of BBG “to support antiterror broadcastinginitiatives in the Middle East and counter media campaigns used by terrorists byproviding accurate reporting and analysis of the news and by explaining U.S. policies”.However these channels have difficulties of realization of information policy. Besidescomplication of collection of information and shortage of personnel, these channels are82 Cloud D.S. Quick Rise for Purveyors of Propaganda in Iraq // New York Times [http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/15/politics/15lincoln.html?pagewanted=print] February 15, 200683 Linzer D. Lost in Translation: Alhurra—America’s Troubled Effort to Win Middle East Hearts and Mind [http://www.propublica.org/feature/alhurra-middle-east-hearts-and-minds-622] June 22, 200884 U.S. International Broadcasting Management of Middle East Broadcasting Services Could Be Improved [http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-762] August 4, 2006 P.9
  • Part II: 38GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideasforced to operate in the conditions of competition with the such Arabic media channelsas Al Jazeera and others. How Mark Linch marked, the state of Al Hurra in 2008showed the state of fight for minds and hearts on Middle East. In particular, not lookingon considerable investments, the channel did not become popular among targetaudience. And its opacity only strengthened complication of realization of informationstrategy, in fact according to Smith-Mundt Act such channel is considered as a mean ofpropaganda which must not work in the USA8586. In 2008 management of channel was critised, as Alhurra’s reporters andcommentators operate with little oversight. Besides “U.S. experts on the Arab worldhave long worried that the network was doing little to help America’s image in theregion. Unpublished reports, audits and internal government e-mail show a steadystream of concern inside the State Department, in Congress, at the government’sbroadcasting headquarters and even inside the network itself that Alhurra and Sawa areundermining U.S. policy goals while sometimes promoting the interests of Iran and itsallies”87. “New Way Forward” Case: September 2007 According to official White House release in 2007 Bush discussed theimportance of defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq in more than 40 public appearances:“President Bush has consistently argued that Iraq is the central front in the War onTerror. Al Qaeda leaders describe it the same way, which is why they are trying to usemurder and mayhem to provoke sectarian violence, foment chaos, and create a safehaven for terror. Defeating al Qaeda has been central to our new strategy in Iraq fromday one and will continue to be”88. Apparently it set a response communication strategy for Bush foreign policyactivity in August-September 2007. During that period Bush made statements andpublic addresses every week and they were aimed mainly on US audience. Bush used85 U.S. Public diplomacy. State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant Challenges [www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06- 535]. May 200686 Lynch M. The failure of public diplomacy. What the downfall of al-Hurra, Americas Arabic language television station, says about US efforts to win hearts and minds in the Middle East. Guardian.co.uk, June 16, 200787 Linzer D. …88 Setting the Record Straight: Targeting Al Qaeda [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070725-2.html]
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 39results of “New Way Forward” strategy and proposed initiative to continue presence ofUS troops in Iraq and saving of influence in Middle East. According to crisiscommunications these actions must be considered as crisis issue management, when“organization has the luxury of foreknowledge of the impending crisis and theopportunity, to some extent, to choose the timing of its revelation to stakeholders andthe public and reveal the organization’s plan to resolve the issue. …[T]he organizationis central to the event”89. Besides issue management depends on communicator who isinterested in timing of messages and the main goal for communicator is to persuade andto explain. However it is necessary to note that research of news volume and search archiveof Google showed that this period had not become central for Bush, on the contrarydynamics of mentioning of Bush on the Iraqi subject decreased during 2007, and thekey events of campaign did not influence considerably on media coverage. It wasconfirmed in particular by the dynamics of basic themes in Bush’s activity. Forexample, if concepts “Iraq” and “war” had permanent link, after September 2007 thediscussion of war and Iran began to prevail and attention to Iraq gradually went down.The publication of Bin Laden video became the important event of this period as it wasfor first time for a few years and coincided with the visit of Bush to Iraq and on APECsummit. The interest to the tape was two times higher than visit of Bush to Iraq90. According to D.R. Matchette it is possible to consider actions of US presidentand government as marketing of Freedom, Democracy, Security and Stability91.Consequently any statements, actions or visits of official US representatives, and alsoinformation work in the areas of national interests of the USA is part of campaign onpromotion of these concepts. GWOT and events related also aren’t exception. Theauthors of book Enlisting Madison Avenue also mention importance of these terms.“Words cause similar cultural confusion. Some serve as cultural shorthand for value-laden concepts that seem clear in translation but lose something essential. Freedom anddemocracy are two examples of English words that imply more than they denote in89 Reynolds B. Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication [http://www.orau.gov/cdcynergy/erc/CERC%20Course%20Materials/CERC_Book.pdf]90 http://www.google.com/insights/search/#cat=&q=bush%20iraq%2Cjihad%2Cbush%20war%2Cbush %20iran%2Cbin%20laden%20video&geo=&date=1%2F2007%2012m&clp=&cmpt=q91 Matchette D.R. Marketing as an Element of Strategic Communication. Civilian Research Project (CRP) [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/marketing_stratcomm.doc] 6 April 2006
  • Part II: 40GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideascertain cultural contexts, and perhaps less in others”92. Thus authors make an exampleof US military formulation of the terms: Thus when American public diplomacy talks about bringing democracy to Islamic societies, this is seen as no more than self-serving hypocrisy. Moreover, saying that “freedom is the future of the Middle East” is seen as patronizing, suggesting that Arabs are like the enslaved peoples of the old Communist World—but Muslims do not feel this way: they feel oppressed, but not enslaved93. As a result, according to John Stauber, August-September 2007 became"brilliant campaign using deception and nonexistent links between Iraq and 9/11"94aimed to save presence of US troops in Iraq as long as possible. This campaign wasforemost directed on the internal US discussion about war in Iraq, however it gotinternational attention as well95. The feature of network analysis in US case was comparison of reaction of media(mainly English-language) as reaction on the statements and releases of G.Bushrepresented on the official site of US president during August-October 2007. The modelof network analysis, thus, includes comparison of results of news search (by relevance)with the use of Issuecrawler Link Analysis. Link between key terms can be described asamount of articles where pairs of key terms were mentioned simultaneously.Additionally, the “cloud” of key terms is formed and showed how mentioning is relatedto importance of terms. This model allows to set the dynamics of accents in Bush’srhetoric. Key terms include 61 words and combination of words, which have chronologicbinding. Basic data for the network analysis were presented as the VNA format, wherethe amount of articles was the distinctive feature of every node with mention of relevantterm.92 Helmus T.C., Paul C., Glenn R. Enlisting Madison Avenue. The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of Operation RAND 2007 [http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG607.pdf]93 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (2004, p. 40).94 From Freedom Watch to Petraeus, A Look at the Bush Administration’s Iraq War PR Campaign [http://www.democracynow.org/2007/9/13/from_freedom_watch_to_petraeus_a] September 13, 200795 The techniques of "spin" include: Selectively presenting facts and quotes that support ones position (cherry picking); Non-denial denial; Phrasing in a way that assumes unproven truths; Euphemisms to disguise or promote ones agenda; Ambiguity; Skirting; Rejecting the validity of hypotheticals; Appealing to internal policies. Another spin technique involves careful choice of timing in the release of certain news so it can take advantage of prominent events in the news.
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 41 General description of the received network model showed that media coverageof Bush actions had homogeneous character, intensity of links between categorieschanged only. It can mean exponential nature of news communications and identicalvalue of most nodes-categories. Analysing appearances and statements of Bush on Iraq during August-September 2007 it is possible to define that by his basic messages both for internal andfor external audience were success of US troops of the last months, impossibility towithdraw from Iraq and to do not support of official Maliki government, necessity tostrengthen the fight with Al Qaeda. Among main descriptions of campaign that the"surge" is "working" and it is premature to commence withdrawal it is important to notethat “(1) many in the media have been complicit in the administrations PR offensive:ignoring that a crucial criterion for the success of the administrations strategy --political progress in Iraq—has in the assessment of people inside and outside theadministration not occurred; (2) repeating administration claims of military progresswhile ignoring evidence to the contrary; (3) repeating distortions of comments byDemocrats to claim that they acknowledge the surge is working; (4) characterizingproponents of a withdrawal timeline as calling for a "precipitous" withdrawal; and (5)uncritically repeating the widely dismissed claim by Bush and administration supportersthat the terrorists will follow us home if the U.S. withdraws from Iraq” 96. Suchestimation also confirmed by definition of blocks and cutpoints: first of all generalnetwork map defined Iraqi Security Forces, while analysing key terms without basicmassages of freedom, security etc. It turned out that Middle East and Iran were of firstimportance. Thus, presidential campaign can be divided into external and internal phases.The internal one foresaw activation of pro-war propaganda and rhetoric of Bush,supported by increased television advertising. Basic accent was made on Iraq. In theUSA this campaign foresaw the emergence of a new White House front groupFreedom’s Watch, headed up by Ari Fleischer, the former White House PR flak, whowas on duty in the White House in the selling of the war in 2002, 2003. Freedom’sWatch was sort of a number of Republican front groups, along with Vets for Freedom,Move America Forward, organizations that held pro-war rallies and ran TV96 Myths and falsehoods about progress in Iraq [http://mediamatters.org/items/200709090001]
  • Part II: 42GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideasadvertisements that used wounded Iraq veterans and equate winning the war in Iraq withthe terror attacks of 9/11. Additionally there was an element of Petraeus hearings. According to SNA termof “General Petraeus” was linked with term of “surge” in Bush’s speeches and mediacoverage. Egonetwork for “General Petraeus” had 27 nodes and index of degree 26,index of betweenness 79,6. US media noted that General Petraeus was the perfectperson for the Bush administration, as New York Times/CBS survey showed thatoverwhelmingly six of ten Americans look to Petraeus and other commanders to takecharge of Iraq, and those are the people who they think are best equipped to end thewar. Harper’s magazine’s Ken Silverstein provided far away the best analysis of whatPetraeus said. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH GEN. DAVID PETRAEUS - the surge is meeting its military objectives, - The military objectives of the surge are, but we need more time. in large measure, being met. It will take - US Marines and Special Operation forces time. have been striking terrible blows against al- - Coalition and Iraqi forces have dealt Qaeda. significant blows to al-Qaeda - Anbar province was al-Qaeda’s base in Iraq - A year ago the province was assessed as and was written off by many as lost. lost. - The consequences of withdrawal would be - A premature drawdown of our forces disastrous. would likely have devastating consequences. Finally, Bush’s scheduled prime time address on September 13 culminated acarefully orchestrated PR campaign to win support for the continuation of the war inIraq.97 The analysis of network media map showed that changing of foreign-policypriority of Bush happened in September 2007: September 2007—Iraq, in October 2007Iran prevailed. The network analysis allowed to trace changing of political discourse onconcepts mentioned by Matchette. Most covered concept was security and it got thebiggest network support and consequently the most essential. For comparison theconcepts of freedom, democracy and stability, not looking on a structural closeness97 From Freedom Watch to Petraeus….
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 43between themselves, had the less developed network structures. Statistics of links alsoconfirmed the network structure of coverage: it is thus necessary to mark that fordifferent concepts the set of key terms is typical. For example, "Iraqi Security Forces","success | progress", "troops cut" became the most essential concept for security asbasic term. At the same time, security included the term of stability as well (one of fourkey terms). Stability became a second term by value with a main accent on “surge” and“sectarian violence”. Freedom and democracy became the least used terms. Judging on chronology of basic terms:- freedom had the strongest link with "Address by the President to the Nation" (14.09.2007), terrorism (28.08., 15.09., 25.09.);- stability—security (14.09., 20.09.), surge (13.09.), “oil revenue” (22.08., 20.09.), success or progress (14.09.);- democracy linked with "Middle East" (22.08, 28.08., 20.09), "Address by the President to the Nation" (14.09.), “important to the future” (25.09.), security (14.09., 20.09.);- security linked with "Iraqi Security Forces" (28.08., 13.09., 20.09., 25.09.), success or progress (14.09.), Maliki (22.08., 28.08., 14.09., 20.09., 25.09.), surge (28.08., 14.09., 20.09.), "sectarian violence" (24.07., 11.08., 28.08., 14.09., 20.09.) Other peak data were marked for the pairs of such terms as surge-stability (themost relevant value got on the end of August- start of September), surge-Gen.Petreaus(14.09., 20.09.), Iran-Middle East (end of August), Iran-nuclear (28.08., 19.09., 25.09.,17.10.), Gen.Petreaus-Anbar Province (28.08., 03.09., 13.09., 20.09.). Thus it is obviously, that most saturated by the statements and events wasforeign-policy phase at the end of August-September 2007. In this period in theconditions of hard criticism from the side of Democrats about failed strategy in IraqBush has argued that the USA need enough time to quell the sectarian and terroristviolence that has wracked the country. As a result Bush in speeches to U.S. militaryveterans, has signaled he wanted to keep his 30,000 troop-buildup in place to defeatinsurgents and terrorists amid some signs that security conditions are improving, thoughno final decisions have been made. According to PEJ research in August and September 2007 topic of Bush Iraqspin was among the key in US media. For instance in August 2007 Bush used
  • Part II: 44GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideascomparison with Vietnam. “By injecting the V-word into the debate over strategy inIraq, Bush not only triggered memories of America’s most controversial war (at leastbefore the conflict in Iraq). He also generated a heated response from several quarters,including opponents of his Iraq strategy… The President’s Vietnam comparison wasonly one factor that helped propel coverage of the debate over Iraq policy last weekafter a summer in which the subject had been noticeably more muted”98. “Today, speaking before a supportive audience of veterans, Mr. Bush found a comparison to Vietnam he embraced” declared ABC correspondent Martha Raddatz on August 22. The newscast then aired a clip of the President warning that the «price of America’s withdrawal [from Southeast Asia] was paid by millions of innocent citizens,” including those slaughtered by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. As S.L.Myers noted that campaign was a strategy for a crisis of faith—first of allfrom US public99. And Bush just continued his way to solve such crises: with arelentless campaign to persuade people to see things his way. Myers called suchstrategy in military terms as “preparing the battlefield—in this case for the series ofreports and hearings scheduled on Capitol Hill … to debate the wisdom of struggling onin the midst of sectarian chaos and bloodshed in Iraq”. Important element of this company was surprise, unannounced visit of G.W.Bush to Iraq on an air base in the Iraqi Anbar province100. It was his third surprise visit:in Nov. 27, 2003, and the other on June 13, 2006, a week after a U.S. air strike killedAbu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaedas leader in Iraq. It is another proof of Bush’spreemptive communication strategy. Mr. Bush pre-empted pressure for withdrawal, expected at Congressional hearings…, by hailing what he called successes in Iraq and contending that only a stable Iraq would allow American forces to pull back.98 PEJ News Coverage Index: The V-Word Heats Up the Iraq Debate [http://www.journalism.org/node/7281] August 19-24, 200799 Myers S.L. Bush renews PR blitz for the war in Iraq // International Herald Tribune August 27, 2007100 Runningen R. Bush Makes Unannounced Iraq Visit on Way to APEC (Update2) [http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aIi7x9fE4Ri0&refer=home] September 3, 2007
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 45 Fig. 1. Network media-map for Bush’s Iraq keywords in July-August 2007 This visit was made before the U.S. Congress intensified the debate on Bushsstrategy in the conflict and the efforts of Prime Minister Nuri al-Malikis government tomeet benchmarks toward unifying the nation. An assessment by U.S. intelligenceagencies released Aug. 31 concluded that Iraqs political leaders still cant governeffectively even as the addition of 30,000 more U.S. troops this year is helping curbsectarian violence. The report has increased pressure on Bush from congressionalDemocrats and some Republicans, who are calling for the administration to begin agradual withdrawal of forces. Before Bush also went to the Pentagon on Aug. 31 to get reports from the JointsChiefs of Staff and top military advisers about troop strength, the effect of 15-monthdeployments in Iraq on military personnel and the global condition of U.S. forces. The stakes in Iraq are too high and the consequences too grave for our security here at home to allow politics to harm the mission of our men and women in uniform. It is my hope that we can put partisanship and politics behind us and commit to a common vision that will provide our troops what they need to succeed and secure our vital national interests in Iraq and around the world. As a result, president Bush got the headlines he wanted with his Labor Daydrop-by in Iraq. New York Times: "Bush, In Iraq, Says Troop Reduction is Possible."Los Angeles Times: "Bush Hints at Troop Reduction." Washington Times: "In Anbar,Bush Optimistic for Pullout."… It was obviously a PR coup for the president to be
  • Part II: 46GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideasphotographed with the troops in Anbar, a place where the military has clearly achievedresults, and to dominate a slow news day101. According to media coverage network we could observe significant shift in Bushrhetoric from “surge” to “Iran” with its nuclear program and “General Petreaus”.Besides it turned out that both networks had different centrality: before visit to Iraqmedia-coverage network was balanced, meanwhile media-discussion after visit wasdisbalanced that could be caused by another latent reason—framing of new issue ofamplification of US forces in Middle East and improving of Bush image in Iraq.Although according to December 2007 report of Lincoln Group it turned out that Bushbecame a uniter of … Iraqis as they "describe the negative elements of life in Iraqbeginning with the U.S. occupation in March 2003" and Iraqis interviewed had "farmore commonalities than differences," including that they "see the departure ofoccupying forces as the key to national reconciliation."102 Fig. 2. Network media-map for Bush’s Iraq keywords in September 2007 Counterinformation component of Bush campaign was reaction on Bin Ladenvideo tapes. These materials were published in Internet and in global media in a fewdays after the visit of Bush to Iraq, but also before his official address to Americanpeople on September, 13 2007 Bin Laden Appearance caused a considerable publicinterest and, accordingly, there was the necessity of G.Bush to react on the Bin Laden101 Kurtz H. Falling for the Spin // Washington Post, September 5, 2007102 Bush a Uniter - of Iraqis, Against the U.S. // Washington Post, December 19, 2007
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 47statements. It should be noted that, according to SITE data, information about BinLaden new video appeared at the beginning of July, 2007. In his massage Bin laden pulled out no threats in the address of the USA and theWest on the whole. Al Qaeda leader concentrated on a situation in Iraq and traditionallydemanded to withdraw US contingent out of country, "to end the war between us". Byestimations of specialists this videoappeal, foremost, must prove that it was Al Qaeda isstill alive. As for G.Bush such appearance of Bin Laden became an additional argumentin a dispute with US democrats. Fig. 3. Intersection of network media-maps for Bush’s Iraq keywords in July-August 2007 (blue) and September 2007 (red) As a result G.Bush immediately reacted on APEC summit in Australia markingthat statements of "terrorist number 1" remind for all that how dangerous world we livein. Bush underlined that now the main task of terrorists consists of forcing of the USAout of Iraq, to create there a "reserve base" and to carry out from there the attacks on theUSA and its allies. The words of president were supported by the head of CIA, whodeclared that "Al Qaeda" planned new acts of terrorism on territory of the USA. The tape is a reminder of the dangerous world in which we live and it is a reminder that we must work together to protect our people… I found it interesting that on the tape Iraq was mentioned, which is a reminder that Iraq is part of the war against extremists. If Al-
  • Part II: 48GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideas Qaida bothers to mention Iraq, its because they want to achieve their objectives in Iraq, which is to drive us out103. It should be noted that Al Qaeda information strategy was an important elementfor the Bush campaign. According to D. Kimmage “recent controversies surroundingU.S. efforts to influence media in Iraq and the Middle East signal increasing interest in awar of ideas that is part of the conflict between the West and the worldwide jihadimovement104. Jihadis pursue strategies of legitimation, propagation of their movementsas well intimidation of opponents by using sophisticated, modern methods ofcommunication and public relations. They segment audiences and adapt their messageto the audience, apply some of the same PR techniques used by large corporations,conduct disinformation campaigns, and coordinate communication with operations.They do this using a variety of sophisticated means, including traditional mass mediaand new media channels, especially the Internet, to understand the implications of a“virtual jihad”105. **** The problem of the future of war in Iraq became actual for US foreign policy ofthe last years. Actually the USA had to run into the new model of propaganda, whichdiffers from Cold war by both the model of intercultural conflict and new technologiesand methods of information work from the side of Muslim countries. As a result, havingthe complex of institutions and methods of public diplomacy, the USA run into lowefficiency of information operations in Iraq. At the same time there was a necessity forBush in 2007-08 to resist internal criticism of democrats. Example of the “New wayforward” was considered as variant of crisis management and decision of military tasks.Network mediamap showed thus, that the reaction of international and US media mainlyhad been directed on the problem of security in Iraq, and also it is necessary to note theorigin of new theme—Iran nuclear program as a method to distract attention of public.And appearance of Bin Laden new records only complemented preemptive strategy onthe distraction of attention.103 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/images/20070908-5_d-0114-1-515h.html]104 Corman S.R., Schiefelbein J.S. Communication and Media Strategy in the Jihadi War of Ideas April 20, 2006 Report #0601 Consortium for Strategic Communication Arizona State University105 Kimmage D. The Al-Qaeda Media Nexus: The Virtual Network Behind the Global Message An RFE/RL Special Report March 2008
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 49 Fig. 4. Concepts cloud for Bush activity in July-September 2007
  • Part II: 50GWOT. Crisis Management ofModern Battle of Ideas Fig.5. Media connections of key concepts for New Way Forward in July-September 2007
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 51 PART III: KOSOVO CASE. EU CRISIS COMMUNICATIONS IN INTEGRATION AND ENLARGEMENT PROCESSES For today EU became one of the basic geopolitical actors, that have “saving ofsecurity and peace in a region” among the main tasks. Thus the special attention shouldbe paid to both the internal aspects of EFSP and EU role as a global peacemaker. Andthe modern tendencies of EU enlargement form a dynamic agenda for Europeansecurity. As A.Bailes noted “…enlargement also widens the spread of our securityresponsibilities and brings Europe’s frontiers closer to some still very unstable areas”.In addition to old problems such as unsolved “stubborn internal security challenges”like Northern Ireland and Basque extremism, there are “problems of Balkan instability[solved] by full European integration one day” and currently Balkans for Europe arelike “a very noisy and violent baby” in that region (as shown by the latest incidents inKosovo). Besides EU and Russia “seem to lack a clear and convincing strategy” as wellas “enlargement made it impossible for [EU] to ignore the unresolved problems of theCaucasus and Central Asia, the Middle East and Northern Africa”106. At the same time development of EU is also on critical stage. According toLuxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker "The European Union is goingthrough a crisis… the French and Dutch no votes "did not cause this crisis, but simplymade it more visible."107. IHT also noted that EU crisis of confidence is also seen in theway momentum for expansion — the chief way Europe has been able to use itsphilosophy of "soft power" to engineer democratic reforms in former dictatorships —has all but petered out. The solving of Kosovo case in 2008 became the example of crisis managementof EU security policy and foreign policy. From one side, EU must make decision aboutfuture status of Kosovo, which was under the actual mandate of UN for the last decadeand created the threat to the further integration processes. On other hand proclamation106 Bailes A.J.K. Security challenges for the EU CIDOB Foundation, Barcelona, [http://www.sipri.org/archive/ab/2004041701.html] 16 April 2004107 EU turns 50 but celebrations dampened by uncertainty over future February 17, 2008 [http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/02/17/europe/EU-GEN-EU-at-50.php?page=1]
  • Part III: 52Kosovo case.EU Crisis communicationsin integration and enlargement processesof independence of Kosovo created new precedent for international relations and law,consequently it could result in growth of tension as between supporters and opponentsof such decision both in EU and in relations of EU, the USA and Russia, as basicgeopolitical actors of this region. As the solving of Kosovo case foresaw activity of such complex internationalformation as EU, thus network analysis requires use of several participants, each ofthem has position of support or criticism of decision about Kosovo independence. As aresult the dynamic field of speeches was formed, and they were simultaneously linkedto several participants. The network analysis was realized with the use of row ofcategories: country, participant, date that allows to analyse these campaigns and to setquality descriptions of links between positions of separate political leaders, states, or totrace the dynamics of changes. The participants of network analysis were “the speakers”: Serbia (Boris Tadic,Vuk Jeremic), Kosovo (Hashim Taci), Russia (Putin, S. Lavrov, D.Rogozin,V.Churkin), the USA (G.Bush, K.Rice), France (Sarkozy, Couchner), Germany(Merkel, Steinmeier), Great Britain (Milliband), Slovenia (Rupel), and also UN (B.KiMun), EU (Barroso, Solana, O.Rehn) and NATO (Scheffer). They used 147 categoriesfor presentation of the positions during February, 2008. Information for the networkanalysis was represented as the VNA format with indication of quality of relations andnodes.EU civilian crisis management In 1999 NATO bombed Serbia for prevention of military actions between Serbiaand Kosovo Army of liberation. Then, military operation of NATO Allied Forceincluded the information component, directed both on Serbian population and onEuropean and global public as well108. As M.A. Schoenberger-Orgad noted “NATO’spublic relations campaign was successful in maintaining both credibility and popularsupport for a 78-day bombing campaign within the 19 nations of the Alliance. Thecampaign allowed NATO to claim that it was the only organisation that could providesecurity and stability, as well as be the main bulwark of the defense of Western valuesin a rapidly globalising and changing world. Moreover, by framing the Kosovo air108 Berinsky A.J., Kinder D.R. Making Sense of Issues Through Media Frames: Understanding the Kosovo Crisis // The Journal of Politics (2006), 68:640-656 Cambridge University Press
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 53campaign as a humanitarian intervention, NATO was not only able to legitimise itsactions but transform its military might with an acceptable human face in order toachieve its broader ideological goals in Europe”109. As well as NATO at the end of 1990s, EU’s problem in 2008 was legitimation ofKosovo independence decision as a part of EU Enlargement policy for South EastEurope as this region became a priority one for EU after 2004. However in comparisonto Eastern Europe, the level of economic and political development of South Europewas lower and the decision-making about new members was more political decision. Atthe same time it is possible to select different approaches to SEE in EU: such states asBulgaria and Romania were accepted in 2007, the active preparation phase of Europeanintegration of the Yugoslav republics started after this event. In 2003, the countries of the Western Balkans received the promise of EU membership. Surrounded by other EU members—a kind of enclave within the enlarged Union— these countries effectively constitute the EUs next frontier110. However, the basic problem of Yugoslavia—in addition to economic situation—was interethnic tensions between Serbians and Kosovo Albanians. Actually solving ofthis problem was central for EU in definition of the future of Serbia. After theYugoslavia conflicts in 1990s it was important for modern EU not to allow excrescenceof new conflicts, however in Serbia which did a lot for European integration, lately athesis about incompatibility of national interests and European future of Serbia becameto sound more frequently. Some kind of legitimacy gap emerged when "the behavioursand actions of the organisation do not conform to the expectations of key publics”.Different views on reality of Serbia’s EU future made possible “perceptionmanagement”. Larabee contends that “the theory behind perception management is thatin a crisis, ‘perception’ is out of synch with ‘reality’ and successful managers mustbring the two together, asserting control over the external and internal ‘chaos’ createdby a disaster”. As a result, the decision of the Serbian question is simultaneously in thearea of responsibility of a several EU departments:109 Schoenberger-Orgad M.A. Communicating Strategically: Public Relations And Organisational Legitimacy University of Waikato 2007 [http://adt.waikato.ac.nz/uploads/approved/adt- uow20070614.114249/public/01front.pdf]110 Avery G. Europe and the Balkans: Whats to be done? European Policy Centre [http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/europe-balkans-done/article-173423] 17 June 2008
  • Part III: 54Kosovo case.EU Crisis communicationsin integration and enlargement processes- EU Common Foreign and Security Policy: The solving of the Yugoslavian case was one of key elements of EU crisis management, actually the first conceptions about creation of policy of the crisis reacting and prevention of conflicts appeared after the end of military actions in Yugoslavia at the end of 1990s within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). According to A.Nowak definitions of CCM appeared in EU documents in 1999 though its definition wasn’t clear. Different organisations, multiple stages and actors influenced the gap of understanding CCM at EU level. Broadly EU civilian crisis management (EU CCM) is defined as the intervention by non-military personnel in a crisis that may be violent or non-violent, with the intention of preventing a further escalation of the crisis and facilitating its resolution. However, experts in this field usually draw a distinction between ‘conflict prevention’ and ‘crisis management,’ with the former generally being used to refer only to activities that take place before any hostilities have occurred, whereas the latter usually refers to intervention only after violence has erupted111. Firstly EU CCM was realised through Rapid Reaction Mechanism, later in 2007Instrument for Stability (IfS) replaced it. Crisis response projects under the Instrumentfor Stability focus on a wide range of issues, such as support to mediation, confidencebuilding, interim administrations, strengthening Rule of Law, transitional Justice or therole of natural resources in conflict. Under the IfS, these activities can be supported insituations of crisis or emerging crisis, when timely financial help cannot be providedfrom other EU sources. As a whole EU CCM seen as system of missions that prevent military conflictsor humanitarian crises. In most cases these missions aimed on regions of conflict andcommunication in these cases is based on public affairs campaigns for reducing tensionsin conflict societies. In most cases EU CCM has reactive strategy that, probably, causedby the role of EU as “regional pacifier” and “mediator of conflicts”112 113.111 Lindborg C. European Approaches to Civilian Crisis Management BASIC Special Report 2002 [http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2002ccm.pdf] 1 March 2002112 Rodt A.P., Wolff S. EU Reactive Crisis Management in the Western Balkans [http://www.psa.ac.uk/2007/pps/Rodt.pdf]113 Civilian Crisis Management: the EU way Challiot Paper n90 [http://www.weltpolitik.net/attachment/0644a930ba1074b5cca2acd4809cbed5/558ce96132a4c781df5 65773f49dac49/chai90.pdf] June 2006
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 55 Importance of crisis approach in EU foreign policy in South Europe alsosupported by the fact of creation of the first and the biggest EU mission in Bosnia andHerzegovina, and also in Macedonia (Operation Concordia), former Yugoslavia(Operation Proxima), other missions.- EU DG Communication: As a new enlargement strategy was accepted by EU in 2005 it defined basic concepts of further enlargement—consolidation, conditionality, communication—as important elements of "carefully managed enlargement process" communication: the EU wants to improve its communication to the citizens on the process of enlargement, which is defined as "one of the EUs most powerful and most successful policy tools" Communication with EU citizens and those of membership-aspiring countriesrepresents a significant share of the Commission’s public diplomacy efforts. Theresponsibility of engaging with publics in member-countries is assumed by theDirectorate General (DG) Communication. It serves as the main planning entity andcoordinates the efforts of all other DGs communication units into one joint output. Toensure that its programs are not disconnected from popular sentiments and that citizensare properly socialized into its policies, the Commission is careful to place an emphasison the two-way aspect of its communications. As stated in the Action Plan,"communication is more than information: it establishes a relationship and initiates adialogue with European citizens, it listens carefully and it connects to people … It is notjust about EU institutions informing EU citizens but also about citizens expressing theiropinions so that the Commission can understand their perceptions and concerns.Europe’s citizens want to make their voices in Europe heard and their democraticparticipation should have a direct bearing on EU policy formulation and output." EU Medium Term Communication Strategy 2005-2009, as it was adopted forthe period of new wave of Enlargement (Bulgaria, Romania, Western Balkans) alsoincludes elements of crisis communications. For instance, among main objectives wecould find topics of Enlargement and future of EU. This strategy should be based onvariety of forms and processes as it has different stakeholders and target audiences114.114 DG Development Unit A/5 Information And Communication Strategy 2005—2009 [http://www.dgdc.be/documents/en/topics/european_conference_public_awareness/DG_Development _Information_Communication_Strategy_2005-2009.doc]
  • Part III: 56Kosovo case.EU Crisis communicationsin integration and enlargement processes- EU DG Enlargement. The implementation of enlargement policies is carried out by the DG Enlargement which is also heading all related communication and information work within the framework of the Communication Strategy for Enlargement115. The Strategy follows a decentralized approach and is implemented in cooperation with various sectors of society at the EU and national level. In order to explain new integration initiatives CSE include three key objectives for member states: 1) to communicate the reasons for enlargement to the public including its likely impact and the challenges it poses. The outcome should be improved understanding of the enlargement process, which in turn should assuage apprehensions about its impact; 2) to promote dialogue at all levels of society between policy-makers and the public on issues related to enlargement. This should ensure that progress through the negotiations towards enlargement is accompanied by public understanding and support; and 3) to provide information about the candidate countries to help promote general understanding. As for content CSE in member states covered: 1) reasons why the EU hasundertaken a new round of enlargement; 2) The enlargement process (negotiations,preparations in the EU and in the candidate countries); 3) The relationship betweenenlargement and the strengthening of the EU; etc. In comparison CommunicationStrategy in Serbia seeks to raise awareness and eventually change attitudes. In thisparticular, the chosen approach should ensure that progress towards the EU membershipis based on adequate and reliable supply of information. The main strategic objective ofthe communication strategy as support to the Stabilisation and Association Process ofSerbia-Montenegro is to ensure that the citizens of Serbia-Montenegro are familiar withthe SAP, that they understand the general objective of the EU association, have abalanced view about its consequences and possess sufficient and reliable information totake up their role and responsibilities in the SAP116.115 http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50008.htm116 Communication strategy of the Republic of Serbia about the stabilisation and association process of the State Union Serbia Montenegro. Government of the Republic of Serbia. European Integration Office 2004
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 57 Come to Europe!117 Frames for the solving of Kosovo case was offered in March, 2007 in the wellknown Ahtisaari Plan. Among the terms of the plan was proposition of internationallysupervised sovereign entity that provoked international discussions. As Toksdorf noted“it does not specifically use the word “independence”, the Ahtisaari proposal envisagesan internationally supervised sovereign entity that is committed to ensuring minorityrights and special protection for all minorities in Kosovo. At the same time, the proposalwould provide Kosovo with the rights to apply for membership in internationalorganizations such as the World Bank and the IMF, to create a lightly armed securityforce, and to adopt national symbols (such as a flag and seal). It would thus allowKosovo to become a functional state”118. As a result at the end of 2007 different countries in EU and the USA where ondifferent stages of readiness to declare Kosovo independence according to AhtisaariPlan.119 Almost all EU states supported development of law-enforcement mission withinthe framework of the EU security and defence policy (ESDP)120. The USA declared aboutthe support of Kosovo independence. Serbia and Russia deprecated categorically.According to The Economist Russia insisted that the resolution should be a compromisebetween the two sides, rather than the "one-sided" Ahtisaari plan121. Independence of Kosovo was declared on February 17, 2008 that caused thedissidence in opinions of international community and also ethnic collisions in Kosovo.News statistics in February 2008 shows that declaration of Kosovo independencebecame a world headline event. At the same time it is necessary to specify on thegradual increase of attention of public to this subject, that can mean understanding of117 The ‘Come to Europe campaign was launched on 19 th May, 2008. It is a joint campaign organised by EULEX, EUSR, ICO and the European Commission. The aim is to explain the role of the EU presences in Kosovo to the people of Kosovo. The heart of the campaign is a dynamic Roadshow travelling to 20 towns across Kosovo. [http://www.cometoeuropeks.eu/]118 Tolksdorf D. Implementing the Ahtisaari Proposal: The European Union’s Future Role in Kosovo Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research No. 1 · May 2007 [http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2007/CAP-Policy-Analysis-2007-01.pdf]119 See: Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan. ICG Europe Report N°182 14 May 2007 [http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=login&ref_id=4830]120 Kosovo Countdown: A Blueprint for Transition. ICG Europe Report N°188 [http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=login&ref_id=5201] December 6, 2007121 Russias politics // The Economist [http://www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9278316] June 1, 2007
  • Part III: 58Kosovo case.EU Crisis communicationsin integration and enlargement processesimportance of all elements and stages of crisis management from the side of maininitiators of independence: prevention, preparation, response and learning. Fig. 6. GoogleInsight data on Kosovo independence Prevention and Preparation. EU Missions on Balkans were the method ofprevention of ethnic conflicts in a region. While Ahtisaari Plan became actually theform of preventive diplomacy for Kosovo case to decline vagueness and ethnic tensions.Thus development of similar scenario was related to complication eccentricness of thisdecision, consequently there was the mechanism of reacting on possible “unexpected”events. In particular before declaration of independence EU leaders gathered to discusspotential unrest in Serbia, but failed to reach a common position on how to react ifKosovos ethnic Albanian majority were to declare independence in the coming months.The bloc did, however, decide to send 1600 peacekeepers to Kosovo 122. Slovenia presidency in EU in the first half of 2008 also was a symbolical forKosovo case. In particular official site of Slovenian presidency in EU mentioned thatafter proclamation of Kosovo independence “[Slovenia] succeeded to maintain unity inall major issues and prevent destabilisation of the region”. At the same time, Sloveniacame forward as mediator between EU and Serbia in its integration initiatives.122 http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,522366,00.html
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 59 Google data and network analysis showed gradual growth of public attention tothe question of proclamation of Kosovo independence. At the beginning of February2008 basic attention of international speakers on the Serbian and Kosovo cases wasconcentrated on parliament elections in Serbia, which were considered as importantstage of integration of Serbia. In particular according to network estimation of category“elections” European Union was considered as above all result of the conductedelections, and victory of pro-western candidate meant certain facilitation in EU.However, already on this stage (start of February 2008) a political rhetoric was relatedto the problem of decision of Kosovo future. Fig. 7. Network map of election period in Serbia 2008 Further preparation to declaration of Kosovo independence resulted inappearance of political statements from the side of all participants of process, except forUN, Kosovo and France. So, network research of period of 01-15.02.2008 showedrapprochement of categories EU and Serbia, where the closest categories to EU weremembership of Serbia, future and question of EU mission in Kosovo. Categories ofKosovo and independence were maximally drawn together and were complemented bythe requirement of “recognition” from the side of Kosovo. However, such rhetoric wasaccompanied by criticism of the Serbian politicians about possible interethnic tensionand conflicts creating the problem of EU security. Besides in reply to the statements of
  • Part III: 60Kosovo case.EU Crisis communicationsin integration and enlargement processesKosovo politicians about possible fast recognition of Kosovo independence, Serbiacalled such actions a mistake and direct intervention. Response. Period 16.02.-22.02.2008 became most tense, as the reactions of allbasic speakers were disturbed by a situation in Kosovo and possible growth of violence.On the whole the network map of this period got considerable expansion of categories,however much European Union became the primary site of network as source ofdecision about independence and the most interested speaker. Rapprochement ofcategories of EU and Kosovo and also removal of category Serbia was the basictendency of this period. Thus, if the statements about considerable success of mission toKosovo and also appeals to calm from the side of the EU leaders were important forrapprochement of EU and Kosovo, the relations between Serbia and EU wereconsidered through the statements about violation of international law, illegality of theaccepted decision and worsening of relations between EU and Serbia. The USA and EU became main support of Kosovo. According ICG recognition ofindependence of Kosovo by the EU states actually legimised decision of EU and provided“political space for the maneuver of EU missions, and gave Kosovo clear prospect to joinEU, and confirmed realism of EU plans to provide large financial and politicalinvestments in Kosovo”. At the same time “EU operated with remarkable unity, even in face of oscillationof some its members about recognition of Kosovo. On February 18 EU adopted commonstatement about declaration of independence and undertook the obligation to play aleading role in helping to the young state. Before EU authorised EULex mission toKosovo and also EU Special Representative. J. Solana, as well as Minister for foreignaffairs of Sweden K.Bildt and NATO Secretary General J. de Hoop Scheffer were aunique high public servants visiting Kosovo in the first month after declaration ofindependence. On February, 28 in Vienna EU states and the USA undertook initiative oncreation of International working group on Kosovo for control of independence ofKosovo”. Position of NATO, and KFOR in particular, was based on UN resolution 1244,that gave these forces authority on providing of "terms of safety and guard" on allKosovo territory and defence of territorial integrity of region. KFOR named it thepolicy of "neutrality in relation to status", but NATO, however, intended to add a
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 61learning component to the presence and to form new Kosovo security forces instead ofKosovo Corps of Defence, as it was foreseen by Ahtisaari plan. Network estimation, in particular confirmed priorities of main supporters ofKosovo independence: the USA, ЕU and NATO. For example, for USA recognition ofindependence was considered as historical possibility, which at the same time hadseveral vectors—in the relationships with Russia it was the precedent-warning, forNATO it was solving of security questions in Europe, for EU it was peace support. Atthe same time, EU aimed to balance between Serbia and Kosovo (as a feature of crisismanagement) and offered for Serbia a proEuropean rhetoric about the “European way”,“collaboration”, “key actor for stability on Western Balkans” etc.; for Kosovo a basicrhetoric was concentrated around importance of event and fixing of new status, and alsonecessity to satisfy the opponents of independence inside EU. Rhetoric of NATO wasconcentrated around stability in a region. If to considers the rhetoric of European and US leaders, it is possible to selectdifferent priorities in the statements. So, for the president of Slovenia EU, Kosovo andunique situation became the most essential categories; position of B.Couchner, Ministerfor foreign affairs of France, was not centralized, it had two blocks—Serbian withconnections to EU mission in Kosovo, and also Kosovo block with an accent on “greatsuccess” of the accepted decision. Position of the President of France Sarkozy, as wellas Germany prime minister A. Merkel, was less public—Sarkozy marked importance of“inevitability” of the accepted decision, and Merkel named independence of Kosovo as“sui generis”. Minister for foreign affairs of Great Britain Milleband defined maintheme of the statements as Kosovo with an accent on security and stability in Europe.Germany Minister for foreign affairs Steimeier did a greater accent on “optimalsolution” and “relief”, which the decision will bring for EU and Serbia. Position ofSolana possibly was most complex from EU side as it had two blocks—Serbian with theappeal to calmness and negotiations, and Kosovo one with an accent on importance ofsecurity and saving of stability. Position of Scheffer was also linked to security. Thestatements of EU Commissar on integration of O.Rehn were mainly about integrationplans of Serbia, therefore in addition to concepts of EU, Serbia and Kosovo hementioned such categories as “membership” and “real and tangible”.
  • Part III: 62Kosovo case.EU Crisis communicationsin integration and enlargement processes Table 1 Degree and betweenness of concepts used by key speakers during response phase Terms Degree Betweenness Kosovo 12 220,9 independence 10 116,9 USA bring peace 5 153,5 recognition 5 83,6 Kosovo 24 366,3 EU 22 324,4 Serbia 19 201,0 EU European path 6 15,0 Kosovo mission 6 86,9 EU 16 183,1 Kosovo 16 135,9 Serbia 13 117,6 independence 11 54,9 France, GB, Germany, Slovenia great success 6 26,7 optimal solution 6 42,3 unique situation 5 28,5 Serbia 7 49,0 Kosovo 5 21,3 NATO Summit 5 20,5 appeal to calm 4 14,2
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 63 Fig. 8. Network map of terms used by EU representatives Fig. 9. Network map of terms used by USA and NATO representatives
  • Part III: 64Kosovo case.EU Crisis communicationsin integration and enlargement processes Thus realization of Ahtisaari plan, IWG activity and EULEX mission could notoperated without UNSC, mainly, because of counteraction of Russia. UN Secretariatand NATO felt that they will not be able to move up farther than "status neutrality" 123.At the same time Serbia also began to critise EU and USA. The network map of Serbian position showed that it had three blocks ofcategories. At first, position of Serbia about territorial integrity, that it was addressedabove all to the EU officials. Secondly, illegality of decision about independence andrequirements to consider a question about Kosovo on UNSC. The third block was aquestion about legality of activity of EU mission in Kosovo, for which Serbia requiredthe UN mandate. According to ICG Belgrade considered Kosovo as inalienable part of Serbia, butat the same time the reaction of Serbia was in a greater degree tactical and diplomaticcharacter. Serbia didn’t launch any military moves but certainly did its best to boycottKosovo while trying to support the Serb minority there. The attacks were accomplishedon embassies in Belgrade, and also on the representative office of mission of UNO.From point of Serbia the attacks are directed not against actually UN mission, andcaused by aspiration to halt any transmission of state prerogatives of UN to the newgovernment of Kosovo. Statements of Serbian Minister for foreign affairs V.Jeremic inUNSC, and also comments of Kostunica and Samardzic, specified, that Belgradeconsidered UN mission a unique legal international civil presence in Kosovo andcontinued to support its work to the certain degree. But Serbia renounced toacknowledge the plenary powers of UN on institutional construction, given by UNResolution 1244. At the same time, Belgrade categorically renounced to co-operate withEULex. In the speech, pronounced on February, 17 after the declaration ofindependence, Kostunica declared: "Serbia also nullified the EU decision whichillegally sent the mission in the region that became possible as a result of deficit ofpower in Europe"124.123 Kosovos First Month ICG Europe Briefing N°47 [http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=login&ref_id=5335] 18 March 2008124 www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest.php? id=83981.
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 65 Table 2 Degree and betweenness of concepts used by key speakers of Serbia and Russia during response phase Terms Degree Betweenness Kosovo 41 654,9 EU 38 733,3 independence 36 564,4 recognition 19 86,3 Russia Serbia 12 67,9 long standing ally Russia 11 78,9 Kosovo mission 10 45,1 Kosovo 26 319,2 EU 25 256,6 Serbia 25 188,8 Serbia territorial integrity 14 38,5 independence 12 33,7 Kosovo mission 12 186,1 membership 10 33,6 Russia estimated negatively declaration of Kosovo independence, realization ofAhtisaari plan and development of EU mission. Putin reproached the EU states inapplication of "double standards for settlement of the same problem in different parts ofworld [by different ways]"125. …Constantly asserting that Kosovo independence violates an international law, and that recognition creates an international precedent, it, however, compelled many states to hold back from recognition of Kosovo independence and was instrumental in conducting by Serbia of hard line about this question. Russia’s veto of draft resolution of UNSC about Ahtisaari plan also limited possibilities of UN to carry out effective co-operation with EU. Adopting on March 2008 chairmanship in UN Security Council, Russia put pressure on Secretary General in order to save financing of UN mission in Kosovo, and to prevent to transition of plenary powers from UN to EULex.125 http://kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/02/14/1011_type82915_ 160266.shtml.
  • Part III: 66Kosovo case.EU Crisis communicationsin integration and enlargement processes Thus, Russia actively supported position of Serbia, and it showed up in anetwork map. According to the analysis, the process of confession became for Russiamore important event than Kosovo itself. Actually the question was about thediplomatic fight of Russia in UN, diplomatic missions in Europe and the USA. Analysisof positions of the key Russian speakers showed that the categories of Putin’s positionhad the high level of betweenness, and concentrated mainly on the negativeconsequences of decision and “double standards” of EU policy; EU also was main topicfor Russian Minister for foreign affairs S. Lavrov; and the representatives of RussianFederation in UN (Churkin) and NATO (Rogozin) required abolitions of EU decisionand named it an error and violation of international law. Fig. 10. Network map of terms used by Russian representatives
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 67 Fig. 11. Network of key speakers in Kosovo case
  • Part III: 68Kosovo case.EU Crisis communicationsin integration and enlargement processes Fig. 12. Network map for key concepts used in Kosovo independence case
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 69 Ban-Ki-moon Bush Rice Barroso Solana Scheffer Olli-Rehn Sarkozy Kouchner Merkel Steinmeier Miliband Ban-Ki-moon Vuk-Jeremic Bush Rice Boris-Tadic Barroso Solana Dimitrij-Rupel Scheffer Olli-Rehn Hashim-Thaci Sarkozy Kouchner Churkin Merkel Steinmeier Lavrov Miliband Vuk-Jeremic Putin 8 Boris-Tadic .0 08 8 02 2. .0 08 8 Dimitrij-Rupel Rogozin 1. 2.0 .02 .02. 2.0 .08 .08 8 0 0 3 Hashim-Thaci 0 04 5.0 .02 .02 2.0 2.08 .08 8 8 Churkin 0 06 7 .0 .0 2 .0 .0 8 8 0 08 9 .0 .02 2 .0 .0 8 Lavrov 0 10 1 .0 .02 2 .0 .08 8 1 12 3 .0 .02 2 .0 .08 8 Putin 1 14 5 .0 .02 2 .0 .08 8 1 16 7 .0 .02 2 .0 08 8 Rogozin 1 18 9 .0 02 2. .0 08 8 1 20 1. .0 02 2. .0 08 8 2 22 3. .0 02 2. .0 08 8 2 24 5. .0 02 2. .0 2 26 7. .0 02 2 28 9 . 2 Fig. 13. Dynamics of key speakers activity during Kosovo case
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 70 PART IV: RUSSIAN FEDERATION. MODERN FOREIGN POLICY COMMUNICATIONS IN CRISES SITUATIONS President elections 2008 in Russia designated the results of activity of Putin,including a foreign-policy sphere. In particular, Russia began to use energy lever asstrategic instrument of influencing on an international scene, especially at regionallevel—in Eastern Europe. According to SIPRI Yearbook 2007 “Russia used its energywealth to revive national pride, to restore its influence in its ‘near abroad’ and tomaximize its geopolitical power. In doing so, it has shown a disregard for other states’goodwill that may work against it in the longer term. One consequence of Russia’scurrent course is the emergence of a—still not geographically precise—‘soft’ divisionbetween the new, expanded West and the under-reformed, less-integrated parts ofEastern Europe. Additionally using natural resources as a successful political weapon,Russia has returned to its traditional policy of playing its European partners against eachother—seeking to weaken the transatlantic ties and to reassert its influence over theformer Soviet states”126. In 2007 at Munich conference Putin defined aspiration ofRussia to multiply its geopolitical position: Everybody should understand that Russiatoday is not that state it is possible to glue on labels or to put pressure. Who will do this,lose and feel bitterly sorry about it127. Estimation of future foreign policy of Russia divided after the actualtransmission of power from Putin to Medvedev. Most experts marked that Medvedevwould continue the line of Putin, though he will be a more liberal politician. From theother side Putin became a prime minister, actually a main executor and manager offoreign policy of Russia. According to Kommersant new Russian foreign policydoctrine included chapter “Forming and realizing foreign policy” with special provisionpoints that “government of the Russian Federation takes measures to realize foreign126 Dunay P., Lachowski Z.Euro-Atlantic security and institutions SIPRI Yearbook 2007 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security [http://yearbook2007.sipri.org/files/YB0701.pdf]127 Американская стратегия по дискредитации России ("Al Waqt", Бахрейн) ИноСМИ.Ru[http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/241739.html]
  • Part IV: 71Russian Federation.Modern foreign policy communicationsin crises situationspolicy”. Before in Putin’s doctrine 2000 there was no role of the government at all inthe document128. In addition Medvedev-Putin doctrine 2008 included few more differences. Firstof all it was mentioning that “West’s losing its monopoly on global processes”, andEurope needs new system of security. Among European partners Medvedev definedcountries which are Russia’s partners in the gas sphere: Germany, France, Italy, Spain,Finland, Greece, the Netherlands and Norway The process of the international strengthening of Russia is indissolubly related tothe origin of political and economic conflicts, contradictions between Russia, EU andthe USA. As a result the Medvedev doctrine strengthens the security vector of thestate129, however the factor of force can not be main, and the more a unique.“Economic, scientific and technical, ecological, demographic and information factorsconsidered as main factors of influencing of the states on an international policy”,—stated in Russia’s Conception of foreign policy130. In addition, according to D.Trenin, modern Russian diplomacy changed thestyle. After successful, but exhausting, tactics of “storm and onslaught” of Putin inMunich, a new problem got up before Moscow: not to comment actions, but to tellitself131. However, attention to communications in the Russian foreign policy was paidyet by Putin, so in 2005-07 RF activated external information vector. As a result it ismarked in Medvedev conception that world public must know about opinion of RussianFederation on global questions and to get complete and exact information about foreign-policy initiatives and actions of Russian Federation. “Within the framework of public diplomacy Russia will insist on objective perception in the world, to develop the personal effective tools of information influence on public opinion abroad, to provide strengthening of positions of Russian media in external information space, giving them necessary state support, to participate actively in international cooperation in information sphere, to take measures against information threats to its sovereignty and safety”132.128 To MFA in the Whole World. Dmitry Medvedev urged Russian ambassadors to be more aggressive [http://www.kommersant.com/p912790/r_527/Dmitry_Medvedev_delivered_a_keynote_speech_on_f oreign_policy/] July 16, 2008129 Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации 12 июля 2008 года, Пр-1440 [http://www.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2008/07/204108.shtml]130 Доктрина Медведева // [http://www.vz.ru/politics/2008/7/15/187046.html] 15 July 2008131 Тренин Дм. Внешняя политика Медведева: пора ставить задачи [http://www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=8216] 10.07.2008132 Концепция внешней политики РФ….
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 72 About possibility of crises in realization of Russian foreign-policy coursemarked also the fact of creation of crisis center in the frames of Russian MFA for co-ordination of work of all MFA in extraordinary and crises situations of differentcharacter. For example, in the case of terrorist threat, military operations, naturalcataclysms, and also for evacuation of Russians. The basic task of center was collectionof necessary information, its analysis and making of variants of decision of problem133. The elements of crisis approach to information activity of Russian MFA weremarked also in reports about foreign-policy and diplomatic activity of RF in 2006 and2007134 135 . The peak of new initiatives was in 2007, when Russian MFA specified onimportance of information component: The key of perception of results of negotiations, one or another facts, events and tendencies in the field of international relations in a great deal is formed not so much by the accepted documents, but by their information background—comments, expert appearances, publications in media. Then description was given to foreign-policy communications of RussianFederation. At first, it was marked a necessity to strengthen counteraction tostereotypical anti-Russian thought in the West. Thus efficiency of “purposeful officialpropaganda” must be increased to Russian MFA in mastering of new world informationspaces jointly with foreign media. At the same time it was noted absence of the arrangedsystem of forming of international image of Russia: “Taking into account the calls… itneeds to create co-ordinating center on information work. Insufficient attention of itwas also noted by international partners of Russia”. At the same time the informationconstituent of diplomatic activity was appraised as offensive, that, in opinion of theRussian diplomats, must not mean “returning to confrontation and ideologicalopposition”. A discussion on key international issues, not acquittal for the actions andposition, must become main strategy of foreign-policy communications of RussianFederation.133 Полетаев В., Сорокина Н.МИД создал кризисный центр // Российская газета №4404 4 июля 2007 г.134 Обзор внешней политики Российской Федерации 431-27-03-2007 [http://www.ln.mid.ru/ns- osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/d925d1dd235d3ec7c32573060039aea4?OpenDocument ]135 Внешнеполитическая и дипломатическая деятельность Российской Федерации в 2007 г. Обзор МИД России, март 2008 г. [http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/itogi/9B6D03B7DC298E37C325741000339BEC]
  • Part IV: 73Russian Federation.Modern foreign policy communicationsin crises situations The use of foreign PR-campaigns became an important element of foreign-policy communications for promotion of RF, in particular the US company Ketchumand its European representative office GPlus (both are included in Omnicom group). Acontract with this company became the first case of appeal of Russian authorities toservices of foreign PR-agency, and the idea belonged to Putin136. The basic task ofcampaign was to help in adjusting of contacts of Russian leaders with western mediaduring G8 summit in S.-Petersburg in 2006 and, on the whole, chairmanship of Russiain this informal club. Description of Ketchum activity in Russian case related first of all to the crisismanagement and it is necessary to consider it as combination of reactive (in 2006) andproactive (from 2007) strategies of foreign-policy communications for destruction ofstereotypes about Russia, folded in the West before 2006137. Among key tasks forKetchum were research of public opinion about Russia, opening direct lines ofcommunication between Russian ministers and the media, educating influencers to tellthe Russian story, and capitalizing on new media channels to increase visibility. Inaddition Ketchum arranged a global webcast with the BBC and produced the Russiangovernment’s first-ever podcasts featuring senior Russian officials. Ketchum alsoupgraded the G8 Web site and managed a series of high-profile print, radio, andbroadcast placements around the world. According to Russian PR-edition Sovetnik “it is difficult to estimate theveritable results of collaboration… Basic activity of agency was work with media, butthe mechanism of this work was not showed, except for adjusting of channels ofoperative delivery of information”. In particular, Ketchum succeeded in helping makethe once-obscure news of the Kremlin open to the world and shift global views ofRussia to recognize its more democratic nature. As a result percentage of positivecoverage more than doubled during Summit, negative coverage cut in half. TheFinancial Times commented on Russias "re-emergence as a world force" while TheWashington Post observed “normally opaque Kremlin put on an extravagant show ofWestern-style openness to the international media.”136 Товар лицом. Кремль продлил контракт с пиар-агентством Ketchum [http://www.sostav.ru/news/2007/06/06/13r/]137 Opening Its Doors to the World: Russia’s Presidency of the G8 Summit [http://www.ketchum.com/russia_g8_summit_case_study?service_type=196] 2007-09-05
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 74 In 2007 it was decided to continue the contract with Ketchum, and its workaccording to Jack ODwyers Newsletter, was “lobbying for Putin to be Time’s “Personof the Year” and dozens of media briefings in Moscow, New York and Washington,D.C. for both Russia and Gazprom 138… [In addition to G8 Summit Ketchum alsosupported] a Moscow visit by US Defense Secretary R. Gates and C. Rice. The firmarranged dozens of meetings with media like Washington Post editorial board, NewYorker editor David Remnick, and Wall Street Journal editorial board”. As a resultRussian rebranding strategy developed into publicity storm likely to surround the 2014Winter Games in Sochi 139. Another Ketchum’s “message” of Kremlin was, accordingS.Lock, to play rough with NATO, EU and the USA and without obligation to conformto Western standards of democracy and human rights. The reanimation of Russian news agencies and channels became other importantdirection of foreign-policy communications140. For example, one of the largest newsagencies RIA Novosti participated in a large-scale campaign on creation andpresentation to the world of image of Russia as a country, where economics grows anddemocracy develops141. It was used to counteract… to criticism of the West during thetransmission of power from Putin to Medvedev. RIA Novosti are also financed the information and analytical siteRussiaprofile.org, which is marked in a number of western commentators as clever,fascinating resource which the wide spectrum of opinions represented on, including,enough hostile opinion in regard to Kremlin. Additionally, RIA Novosti conductsmeetings of Russian and foreign experts, so called Valdai club. In 2005 English-language channel for foreign audiences was launched—RussiaToday—‘Russian CNN’, however channel has uncritical position in relation to Kremlin.Anna Badkhen, in SFGate.Com said that the channel has ‘a pro-Kremlin slant and feel-good features about Russian culture to Asia, Europe and North America on a $40million annual budget.’ In 2007 Arabic analogue of the TV channel started to work and138 Ketchum Outlines Russia Work // Jack ODwyers Newsletter Internet Edition, February 27, 2008139 Brian Whitmore Spinning the Kremlin // RFE/RL (06/11/07)140 John Brown Public Diplomacy Media Overview. Public diplomacy as a global phenomenon, 2006: An internetbased overview of Englishlanguage world media reports on public diplomacy — Part III: Europe and the Americas (excluding the United States) Place Branding and Public Diplomacy (2007) 3, 337 –347.141 Питер Финн (Peter Finn) Россия тратит десятки миллионов на полировку своего имиджа за рубежом ("The Washington Post", США), 06 марта 2008
  • Part IV: 75Russian Federation.Modern foreign policy communicationsin crises situationsit cost 35 million dollars. Russia Today also used social network YouTube—RuTube—as an additional channel. The Governmental Rossijskaya gazeta creates the monthly appendixes to theIndian, British, Bulgarian and American newspapers. "Russia: Beyond the Headlines"was the appendix to Washington Post and cover numerous soft themes: for example,about Christmas in Russia and Russian tennis stars. Also Russian foreign-policy communication includes counter propagandameasures. In particular, ‘Russian regulators have forced more than 60 radio stations tostop broadcasting news reports produced by Voice of America and Radio FreeEurope/Radio Liberty’. Thus, Russia aims to use new technologies and models for internationalcommunication. According to V.Novikov “Russians study experience of USnongovernmental agencies on distribution of certain opinions in the world [although]we are very far from that Americans do... We are novices.”142. As a result Russianforeign-policy communication has the row of lacks and discussable moments.1) Activation of information direction of foreign policy of RF was directed mainly on Western Europe and Islam world, at the same time former USSR republics still remain in the area of cultural, religious and media influencing of Russia. A linguistic closeness allows to conduct the Russian foreign-policy decisions on the most difficult directions in relations with Ukraine, Georgia, and also Baltic states. Penetration of Russian media also enables to conduct information operations.2) According to theses of Medvedev and Putin that most important relations of RF are with next-door neighbours—it is possible to assume that foreign-policy information operations could be more successful for Russia exactly on “home” field. As Marat Gelman noted “Russia must do more to battle its negative image abroad, particularly in neighboring countries".3) At the same time stereotypes about Russia as “world bear” still negatively effect on efficiency of Russian foreign-policy communications. In the West, Russia was critized for its efforts to improve image as Europe and USA saw Russia’s campaign more as a form of propaganda rather than legitimate public diplomacy. Aleksandr Grigoryev, editor-in-chief of the news and information agency Washington Profile,142 leader of organization Russian world which get from Russian government $20 million a year on propaganda of Russian language
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 76 claims that reasons for the West’s criticisms lie in the fact that Russia’s external change, must first come from a change within. Russian-Georgian relations In Russian foreign policy it is possible to name relations of RF and Georgia asan example of the crisis reacting, especially after Roses revolution in Georgia in 2003.The basic problem of Russian-Georgian relations was recognition of Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia independence, which de jure are parts of Georgia, and de facto havestrong support of Moscow. At the same time Georgia, declaring integration in NATOand getting financial and material sponsorship of the USA, became the area of politicalconflict between Russia and the USA. As possible reason of interest to the region ofthese two countries it is called energy transit corridors, which are alternative for transitcorridors going through RF. The statements of Georgia about military integrationbecame the additional lever of political pressure of RF which repeatedly declared aboutmilitarization of Georgia and, as a result, possibilities of military conflict in Abkhaziaand South Ossetia. For the analysis of foreign-policy management of Russia during conflict withGeorgia it was used personalised network approach. As a crisis management foreseesparticipation of so called “speakers”, it allows to analyse an international conflict as theseries of utterances and statements of group of people which got coverage in media.Thus, the network of basic terms is formed. At the same time it is necessary to mark thatthe analysis of media in this case is not considered, as the “frames” of message are herecreated by “speaker”. History of the conflict Gradual escalation of the frozen conflict in Georgia took place in 2007-2008,period of changing of president of Russian Federation. Thus Abkhazia was the basicarea of conflict, in particular Georgia accused Russia of two attacks — a helicopter andground-to-ground rocket attack in the Kodori Gorge in March 2007, and an attack froma Russian jet with an air-to-ground missile in August 2007. However Russia rejected theaccusations of the Georgian side and named them as “fake attacks”.
  • Part IV: 77Russian Federation.Modern foreign policy communicationsin crises situations In 2008 there was an accident with downing of Georgian drone. As New YorkTimes noted Georgia firstly denied Abkhaz reports that it had lost a drone, but thenchanged opinion and declared that drone was used for estimation of situation in aborder-line area between Abkhazia and Georgia. Meantime, Russian side didn’t disputethat a Georgian drone had been downed by an air-to-air missile. But it said an AbkhazL-39 training plane had flown the mission, not a Russian MIG-29. Besides Russiadenied claim, saying that none of its military planes flew in or near southwestern Russiaon Sunday and that its pilots were not working that day. But Georgia released the videorecording of the final live feed received from the drone before it was struck by an air-to-air missile. Buoyed with what it called clear evidence, Georgia countered with a diplomaticand public relations offensive. President Mikheil Saakashvili appeared on nationaltelevision and said he had spoken with President Vladimir V. Putin and demanded anend to what he called “unprovoked aggression against the sovereign territory ofGeorgia.” Georgian officials said the video had been shared with foreign embassies inTbilisi. Also M.Saakashvili insisted to consider this tape on UN Security Council and inOSCE143144. Video from downed drone was shown most TV channels and widespread inInternet. Thus, from the Georgian side it was used the model of event management withelements of event—reaction—statement for world media—appeal to internationalorganizations. Every phase got the coverage, as a result before appeal to internationalorganisations public already had proof image of culprit and victim. At the same time, it is impossible to underestimate Russian position. Russian“bewildered” position (statement of Putin "bewilderment" about plane) and the wholeepisode occurred only days after several Western countries, including the United States,criticized Russia’s announcement that it would expand its support for the breakawayregions. Consequently, a similar conflict was not a surprise for Russia, in fact crises inthe relationships with Georgia arose up periodically, and decision to down the dronewasn’t spontaneous. Position of basic “speakers” of foreign policy of Russia—Putin,143 Chivers C. J. Georgia-Russia Tension Escalates Over Downed Drone // NYT April 22, 2008144 Georgia Pushes Drone Downing at OSCE // Civil Georgia, 4 June 2008 Georgia Wants UN Security Council Session over Drone Downing // Civil Georgia 29 May 2008
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 78Lavrov, Churkin and others—it is possible to estimate as homogeneous and principle ofcrisis management of unity of the outspoken opinion was consequently stored. Growth of tension in August 2008 meant a necessity to strengthen co-ordinationof foreign-policy and defense departments of Russian Federation. At the same time,August 2008 became the symbolic 100-daily border of Medvedev ruling who needed tofasten the image as a new president of Russian Federation. Exactly interdepartmental co-ordination between president, government,ministry of defence and MFA became basis of crises communications in the “five-daywar” with Georgia and defined the verge of political and military value of foreign-policy communications. However, as Kommersant noted that “war in Ossetia put anabsolute record on the amount of lie accompanying. Every event had three-four variantsof interpretations, sides all the time gave very different information, whereupon manageto refute itself and however to reject all prosecutions of opponents. The informationgiven by Russian, Georgian and western media were so different, as though the questionis about different events, different countries and different intervals of time”145.Themilitary decision of conflict meant set of rules of engagement for media, and alsoopening of active phase of the international information confrontation. Began the “opened” phase of conflict was often determined by start of fire ofTshinvali by Georgian military on August, 8, 2008. However a latent phase arose up atleast 7-10 days earlier, when appeared the messages about the victims and refugeesfrom Tshinvali. Then the central message of each of sides was formed. As T. McKennanoted “clearly, both countries had a “narrative” they aim to tell”: - Russia claimed its responding to an unprovoked attack on the independent, though disputed, territory of South Ossetia; and also for defence of habitants and citizens of Russian Federation (South Ossetins, having the passports of Russian Federations, and Russian peacemakers). - Georgia said its the victim of a bullying Russia, using the dispute as a pretext to an attempted takeover of the Georgian territory146. During the conflict Saakashvili remained main newsmaker, actually creating forRussia the primary terms of reactive crisis communications. At the same time, the basic145 Пятидневная война // Власть № 32(785) 18.08.2008146 McKenna T. Countries count on comms during a war // PRWeek [http://www.prweekus.com/issue/August/25/2008/1334/] August 25, 2008
  • Part IV: 79Russian Federation.Modern foreign policy communicationsin crises situationsspeakers of Russia in a conflict were Minister for foreign affairs S.Lavrov, UNAmbassador of Russian Federation Churkin, representative of Russian Federation inNATO Rogozin, and also General Nogovitsyn from the Russian Ministry of defense. 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 03.08.2008 10.08.2008 17.08.2008 24.08.2008 31.08.2008 Lavrov Churkin Rogozin Nogovitsyn Fig. 14. GoogleInsight search volume (Latin, mostly English): Lavrov vs. Churkin vs. Rogozin vs. Nogovitsyn (Worldwide; Aug 2008) 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 03.08.2008 10.08.2008 17.08.2008 24.08.2008 31.08.2008 Лавров Чуркин Рогозин Ноговицын Fig. 15. GoogleInsight search volume (Cyrillic): Лавров vs. Чуркин vs. Рогозин vs. Ноговицын (Worldwide; Aug 2008) Public attention can be estimated according to GoogleInsight. In particular, itshould be noted the difference of Cyrillic and English variant: activity of Lavrov andChurkin prevailed in English variant, and also importance of position of Nogovitsynwas noticeable, attention to whom achieved activity of Churkin. It should be noted
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 80circumstance that Nogovitsyn appeared in Russian media on August 9 (according toRIAN and Yandex.News), and in foreign media he appeared only on August 10, at theend of the open phase of conflict. As Kommersant noted, it was possible to notice thatthe reaction of Moscow was unhurry. “In all previous cases Russia immediately ordered to fly up the airplanes and declared, that Georgian encroachment succeeded to be prevented. This time it seemed nobody tried to prevent war. Russian Ministry of Defence was quiet. The UN representative of Russia Churkin call the urgent meeting of UNSC only in the morning by Moscow time, that around midnight by New York. And the sharp statement of the president Medvedev sounded only in 15:00. When a 58th army already moved up to Roki tunnel”147. At the same time, summarising military operation on the meeting of Valdai clubon September 13, 2008 Nogovitsyn marked that creation of press-club of RussianMinistry of Defence and co-ordination of activity of media substantially distinguishedstyle of conduct of Russians and Georgians: the last assumed journalists in the region,while Russians aimed to create the “embedded journalism”. It allowed Russians toobtain the break in the information policy of western countries in regard to coverage ofsituation in Georgia and South Ossetia which in the beginning was fully on the side ofGeorgia. "By guidance of the state and Ministry of Defence the decision was initially accepted about maximal transparency for media and public of actions of Russian troops about peacemaking objectives, and this model of co-operation between Ministry and public …proved the utility and efficiency"148. Main stages and elements of opposition Start of open conflict The first signs of military decision of relations between Georgia and Russia wereset after declaration of Kosovo independence and conducting of Summit of NATO inBucharest. The first event became the source of statements of Russia about the revisionof the system of international law and international relations. Second was the cause for adiscussion between the representatives of NATO, Russia, Ukraine and Georgia aboutthe prospects of NATO east enlargement. Thus basic accent in Georgian actions was147 Пятидневная война…148 РФ добилась перелома в освещении Западом ситуации на Кавказе—Генштаб // РИА Новости. 13.09.2008
  • Part IV: 81Russian Federation.Modern foreign policy communicationsin crises situationsdone on Abkhazia. And development of the Russian-Georgian relations, according toICG looked like: In February 2008, after conducting of negotiations on Georgian-Abkhazianconflict with participation of UN, Saakashvili met Putin for the “improvement ofrelations”, however Russia criticised aspiration of Georgia in NATO. At the beginningof March 2008 South Ossetia and Abkhazia demanded to recognise independence onthe basis of “Kosovo precedent”, that caused growth of tension and first displays ofmilitary variant. In April 2008 it was discussed the opinion about “military reaction”, ifGeorgia will intrude to Abkhazia. In June 2008 NATO head de Joop Scheffer saidRussia "escalating situation" as it deployed 400-strong railway force in Abkhazia.Saakashvili and Medvedev met 6 June in St. Petersburg at CIS summit, no agreementreached. Moscow warned of “bloodshed” if “provocations” continued after 4peacekeepers briefly detained 17 June in Zugdidi district (Abkhazia). In South Ossetia 1soldier left dead in 14-15 June clashes between Georgian, South Ossetian forces. In July2008 appeared the first messages about evacuation of refugees from the area of possiblemilitary conflict in South Ossetia. 120 Medvedev 100 Saakashvili 80 60 40 20 0 30.07.2008 31.07.2008 01.08.2008 02.08.2008 03.08.2008 04.08.2008 05.08.2008 06.08.2008 07.08.2008 08.08.2008 09.08.2008 10.08.2008 11.08.2008 12.08.2008 13.08.2008 14.08.2008 15.08.2008 16.08.2008 17.08.2008 18.08.2008 19.08.2008 20.08.2008 21.08.2008 22.08.2008 23.08.2008 24.08.2008 25.08.2008 26.08.2008 27.08.2008 28.08.2008 29.08.2008 30.08.2008 31.08.2008 01.09.2008 02.09.2008 Fig. 16. Dynamics of public attention to Medvedev and Saakashvili (Google Insight data)
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 82 However information of network analysis of activity of the basic Russianspeakers on the theme of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia showed (on the basis ofreports of RIAN and Reuters), that Russia to August, 8 did not aim to fasten ownposition in media and public opinion (06.06.-04.08.2008). For example, Churkin in thisperiod came forward with “critics of the West” about question of Kosovo, the Russianrepresentative in NATO Rogozin was considered in the West foremost as ferventnationalist, however his basic message for NATO was “improvement of links” and onceagain confirmed importance of ideas of development of security on continent. Mostaggressive rhetoric was used by Lavrov, his main opponent was the head of ESDPJ.Solana, and “warning”, “open aggression”, “bombing”, “Abkhazia” became the basicterms of Larvov. On August, 8—after the fire of Tshinvali by the Georgian troops—soundedstatements of Russian leaders. As it noted before, this reaction did not look efficient.Taking into account circumstance that Putin was in Beijing, his statements that theattacks of Georgia will "cause return actions" coincided with the official statement ofMedvedev. Besides at this time Russian troops already moved toward Tshinvali. In 15.00 Dmitry Medvedev declared on Security Council: "We will shut out unpunished death of our compatriots". According to western observers, at this time the «primary purpose ofinformation support of actions of Russia on Caucasus was internal, Russian audience.And only the second level task was influence on western public opinion”149. Network analysis testified that actual function of crisis manager of militaryoperation made by S.Lavrov. Main accent of his appearances this day was the attack onthe Russian “peacemakers” and ethnic cleanings of South Ossetins. As Zhuravlev notedat the beginning of conflict Lavrov and other Russian politicians, “suddenly began topronounce the name of city of Tshinvali on Ossetin manner—Tshinval. It immediatelyspecified, on whose side they were”. At the same time Saakashvili began the active bringing in of international mediafor advancement of Georgian estimation of events, in particular he declared in the149 Журавлев А. Уроки информационной войны на Кавказе // BBC 26 августа 2008 г.
  • Part IV: 83Russian Federation.Modern foreign policy communicationsin crises situationsinterview of CNN: "Russia wages war with us on our territory". It caused the row ofstatements of western countries about the necessity to stop military operation againstGeorgia. As a result, the reactive campaign of Russia began in NATO and UN: Rogozinand Churkin cast aside the accusations of the beginning of military actions. Accordingto Y.Levine “All the Russians did was call an emergency meeting of the U.N. SecurityCouncil to try to pass a resolution demanding that Georgia and the S. Ossetia lay downtheir arms. It wasn’t much of a psychological operation, one that the U.S. didn’t evenback”150. In the first days of war Russian militaries in Tshinvali shut out westernjournalists, that made sharply negative impression in a whole world. As Robert Coalsonwrote “independent journalists have been denied visas, meaning that media reports fromthe ground have come largely from Russian state-media journalists, including reportersfrom Russia Today and the Russian state military channel Zvezda”151. Coalson also stated that during first days of conflict Russia Today channel wasthe main international media-channel for Russia. “Russia Today has reported a steadystring of Russian government statements, including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrovsassertion that he has received reports of "ethnic cleansing" by Georgian troops in SouthOssetia. On August 9, Russian Emergency Situations Minister Sergei Shoigu arrived inthe South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali, bolstering Russia Todays narrative that theRussian incursion is a "peacekeeping operation" intended to restore order and providehumanitarian relief”. Despite the imperatives of breaking news in a fluid situation, Russia Today onboth August 8 and 9 found time to run a half-hour report called "The Fragile State" onthe political situation in Georgia in general, emphasizing the countrys political crisislast winter. During that time, the government cracked down harshly on oppositionrallies and briefly shut down all nonstate broadcasters. The tone of the Russia Todayreport was both that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili is willing to do anything tomaintain an increasingly tenuous hold on power and that the 1994 Rose Revolution is afailure, with Georgians in general pining for the prerevolutionary period and, in some150 Levine Y. The CNN Effect: Georgia Schools Russia in Information Warfare [http://exiledonline.com/the-cnn-effect-georgia-schools-russia-in-information-warfare/]151 Coalson R. South Ossetia Sinks Into The Spin Zone [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/08/mil-080809-rferl02.htm] August 09, 2008
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 84cases, even Soviet times. The channel scheduled "The Fragile State" for broadcast sixtimes on August 9. Coverage of the conflict in world and Russian media was not co-ordinated,although there was some initiative from the side of Russian MFA. For example,information about the downed Russian airplanes was covered in media as follows152. The message about downed airplanes appeared in headlines on August, 8 in11:19 with reference to the Georgian TV channel “Rustavi-2”. Georgia: the Russian airplanes bomb Gori. Four airplanes flying from the side of Russia, whipped off bombs on Gori approximately in 11:00 on August, 8, the Georgian broadcasting company “Rustavi-2” reports. According to TV channel, one of airplanes was already shut down by the Georgian troops. // News Georgia. In an hour, in 12:21, refutation appeared from the side of Russian MFA about abluff from the side of Georgia about the downed Russian airplanes. MFA of Russia named the report about the downed Russian airplane as a “delirium”. MFA of Russia named the “delirium” and “provocation” of report of Georgian media about the downed Russian military airplane. “This is delirium, next infamous provocation of Georgian authorities”,—the representative of Department of information of MFA of Russia said, commenting the report of Rustavi-2 that the Georgian troops allegedly downed the Russian airplane bombing Gori. // RIAN In an hour—in 13:43—the official comment of Department of defense ofRussian Federation appeared: Ministry of defence refuted information about the downed Russian airplanes. Ministry of defence of Russia refuted information about the Russian airplanes downed in South Ossetia. As reported in the press-service of ministry, “any downed Russian airplanes is out of the question. This is next information provocation”. // ITAR-TASS However already on August, 9 in 12:41 Nogovitsyn officially confirmed the lossof the Russian airplanes. Ministry of defence acknowledged the losses of two airplanes in Georgia. Ministry of defence of Russia acknowledged the losses of two airplanes during operation on maintenance of peacemakers and population of South Ossetia, the general Nogovitsyn declared today. “Information about the losses change constantly. I can acknowledge one—we lost two airplanes”,—he said. General specified, that the decision about use of force from the Russian side had been accepted on August 8 in 11.00 by Moscow time, when the Georgian troops took152 Информационная война на Кавказе, или Как из черного делали белое [http://forum2.km.ru/Forum.aspx?id=2a3fce10-cebe-429b-a50f-1ec5b70c638c]
  • Part IV: 85Russian Federation.Modern foreign policy communicationsin crises situations small towns “North” and “South” of the Russian peacemakers. “At this time the decision was accepted”,—he said. // ITAR-TASS Central phase The most active battle actions were on August, 9-11 and were accompanied bythe massive information campaign both by Russia and Georgia. For example, onAugust, 9 in Georgian media appeared the statements about bombing of the Georgiancity Gori located south of Tshinvali and 10 downed Russian airplanes. Georgian TVshowed the captive Russian pilots and one killed. Russian Ministry of defenceacknowledged the loss of SU-25 and TU-22. The Georgian media also reported aboutthe explosion of Roki tunnel, being part of a unique way conducting from Russia toSouth Ossetia. However this information was not confirmed. This day the basic speaker of Russia were Rogozin, who continued the theme ofgenocide by Georgians and noted that Russia would not conduct negotiations withGeorgia; and Lavrov who marked that Russia does not wage war, and only “answers onaggression”. On August, 10 the Georgian side declared about numerous airshots. RussianMinistry of defence specified, that airplanes attacked military objectives only. Thus,military campaigns went on the first plan and Nogovitsyn appeared, which did in thebeginning an accent on peacemaking forces in the district of conflict between Georgiansand Ossetins. Thus Lavrov uttered personalised declaration that Saakashvili no more apartner for the solving of situation, and the western media were accused in biasedcoverage. Position of Lavrov was “retransmitted” by Churkin, who marked, that thewestern media misinformed public. Also Lavrov marked possibility of withdrawal oftroops. However on August 11 the Russian troops began to move up from territory ofAbkhazia deep into to Georgia. Without a fight they entered in Zugdidi, Senaki and Poti"with the purpose of non-admission of regrouping of Georgian forces and concentrationof the additional armed formings". In the second half of day the Russian troops beganadvancement to the border with Georgia southward, westward and eastward. In theevening the Georgian troops began retreat with positions in a Gori district, giving up amilitary equipment and property. The Georgian president in presence the heads of MFAof France and Finland signed a document about the cease-fire. At the same time,
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 86Saakashvili declared that Russian troops controlled greater part of territory of Georgia.It turned out soon, that the Russian army stopped, taking the village Nikozi not far awayfrom Gori, and there were no threat for Tbilisi. It is possible to consider August 11 as apogee of campaign, when all basicspeakers of Russian Federation commented events and uttered declarations. In this dayexactly Nogovitsyn became a basic information generator about actions of Russianarmy, although his basic messages were the denials or refutation of information that theRussian airplanes bombed out civil objects or international oil pipeline. At the political“front” Lavrov stated about the revision of relationships with the West and participationin a club G7, additionally he rejected the accusations about encroachment of Russia andmilitary help to self-declared Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In this day Lavrov andChurkin commented the French variant of peace agreement between Georgia andRussia. Table 3 Degree, betweenness and closeness of concepts used by key Russian speakers at the beginning of open conflict phase Degree Betweeness153 Closeness154 no mediation 0 0 100 not all out war 1 0 83 Lavrov OSCE head 0 0 100 09.08.2008 triggering the violence 1 0 83 genocide 1 0 83 Rogozin no talks 1 0 83 bias 1 0 84 not partner 2 0 83 Lavrov regime change 0 0 121 10.08.2008 Saakashvili 2 0 83 withdraw 1 0 84 peacekeeping forces 1 0 102 Nogovitsyn Tskhinvali 1 0 102 11.08.2008 Churkin French resolution 2 13 50 Lavrov G7 1 0 56153 Index of importance154 Ability to influence
  • Part IV: 87Russian Federation.Modern foreign policy communicationsin crises situations no military assistance 1 0 56 bombing Georgian oil pipelines 2 0 54 denies 3 0,5 53 Georgia 6 46 43 Nogovitsyn no orders to go beyond 1 0 55 rejected 1 0 55 Russia invasion 1 0 56 Russian jets had bombed 2 0 54 S Ossetia 4 60 39 This period became the peak of information cyber-war. There are a few opinionsthat active counteraction to the electronic resources was the element of militarycampaign of both sides. From one side, experts named events in Ossetia as the firstcoincidence of cyber-attacks and real battle actions155. As IWM noted the main questionin this case was: were the attacks in cyberspace part of deliberately planned campaign,or did they happen spontaneously, inspired by events? The cyber aspects of the RussianGeorgian conflict may not look like any existing doctrine of information operations orpsychological warfare, but they have proven effective at achieving similar outcomes156.As G.Evron noted cyber-attacks were conducted by nationalistic hacker groups,however often the information resources of the sides simply did not get along theinterest of users and with the stream of queries. At the same time, locking of information resources became the importantelement of conflict. According to IWM the basic stages of electronic war were157:1) Employment of “military” bot-net to attack critical Georgian government websites and routers. Commercial bot-nets linked to known “black net” providers (possibly, Russian Business Network) were responsible for the most serous attacks against Georgian government websites that occurred after August 8. The website of the President of Georgia remained under denial of service despite being moved to a service provider in the United States. Webtie of Georgian MFA was moved to international blogspot.com platform.155 Lamb G.M. Anatomy of a cyberwar in Georgia [http://features.csmonitor.com/innovation/2008/08/13/anatomy-of-a-cyberwar-in-georgia/] 13.08.08156 Russia-Georgia Cyberwar [http://www.infowar-monitor.net/] 15 August 2008157 Russia-Georgia Cyberwar…
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 882) Active route hijacking by Russian hackers, redirecting traffic to Russian telecom operators. If confirmed it would suggest that Russia ISPs are capable of enforcing an information blockage against a “cyber-locked” Georgia.3) Script kiddies and on-line partisans join the campaign against Georgian websites. The Russian "patriotic" hacker site stopgeorgia.ru , for example, provides anyone connected to the Internet with the opportunity to launch denial of service attacks against Georgian websites.4) Web 2.0. Global Voices reports that information attacks have spread to ICQ and social network sites that are being targeted with pro-Russian messages.5) Attacks against regional new portals. In addition to attacks against the Azeri news sites, Day.Az and ANS.Az, several Ukrainian websites (delo.ua and vosvoboda.info) have now been affected by denial of service attacks allegedly by pro-Russian hackers Russian approach to electronic warfare caused ambiguous estimations amongexperts. According to Morozov the amount of publications of Russian bloggersincreased as far as advancement of the Russian troops, mainly that the western mediabiased represented events in Ossetia. Later one of the founders of Runet, the founder of many internet-projects AntonNosik marked that during a conflict in South Ossetia some people were purposefullyengaged in festering of atmosphere around this theme in the Internet and created thecertain background of information. "During war in South Ossetia we saw in blogosphere purposeful work of people which in the morning came on work and sat down to wire certain looks in all places, where they saw the unprovoked discussion of subject. They in the morning began and late at night finished, and then the second changing came. Before invasion of the Russian troops to Georgia 80% of readers of my magazine said that it is not necessary to invade Georgia, but 20% said that it is necessary. And in subsequent days these 20% made 120% of political comments. Everybody which was at execution, he offered an opinion ten times from ten different names. As a result I, in the own magazine, got feeling, that no point of view in general was except for that which exists on state TV. And it was done by facilities of the Internet, this was done in a free competition environment, we usually think that such manipulations in it are impossible"158. Georgian answer for electronic war were:158 Блогосфера стала ареной войны за общественное мнение—эксперт // РИА Новости 12.09.2008
  • Part IV: 89Russian Federation.Modern foreign policy communicationsin crises situations1) Filtering of Russian media sites and closing down domain .ru. Inaccurate and inflammatory reports by Russian media sites are apparently behind the decision by major Georgian ISPs to implement limited Internet filtering. The limited filtering of Russian media sites appears to be part of the governments declared state of emergency. At least two Georgian ISPs have implemented limited filtering this week as a "defensive measure" aimed at protecting the population and reducing the potential for panic during a time of national crisis.2) Attacks on Russian media sites. Several leading Russian media sites, including Izvestia and RIA Novosti, were inaccessible on 11 August due to massive denial of service attacks.3) Cyber-sniping—Targeting of cell phones in Ossetia. Georgian forces allegedly used EW to strike at targets using cell/sat phones in Ossetia causing casualties among journalists and reporters. End of conflict With the help of Couchner and Sarkozy (Kommersant marked actual diplomaticcompetition of French diplomats and Lavrov) on Tuesday, on August, 12, President ofRussian Federation Dmitry Medvedev reported that he made decision about completionof operation on urging to the peace. Then he met with N.Sarkozy and declared aboutachievement of agreement on the settlement of conflict. Sarkozy was a mediator andbrought in Tbilisi proposition about the cease-fire, which was adopted by Saakashvili.However, tension was saved as Georgian troops expected possible encroachment of theRussian troops in Tbilisi. As Nogovitsyn said, summarizing military campaign within the framework ofValdai club, according the results of military operation "Russian side was succeeded tobreak tendentious, one-sided opinion, that Russia aggressor, as the Georgian sidedeclared" . A proactive phase began for the Russian side as it was confirmed bystrengthening of misinformation statements from Georgian officials. So, on Tuesdayappeared the statement that the Russian troops took Gori and move on Tbilisi. Alreadythe next day Georgian authorities admitted that this was a misinformation — no Russiantanks near capital appeared.
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 90 Also up to Tuesday Georgia was considered by western media as a side initiatinga conflict. In numerous appearances on CNN and ВВС Michael Saakashvili had toanswer question, why he gave order to attack Tshinvali. To break information war, theGeorgian side began actively use image of victim. Lavrov stated that Russia does not aim to displace the president Saakashvili.Fully probably, that the similar statements became a component on Russian message onAugust, 12, as Nogovitsyn also refuted information about advancement of the Russiantroops to Tbilisi and bombardments of Gori. On Wednesday, August, 13, the media reported two Georgian drones weredowned in South Ossetia. Later Russian soldieries refuted this information. During aday Georgian officials repeatedly reported about a capture of Gori by the Russian troopsand advancement of tanks on Tbilisi. Russian Ministry of defence refuted theseinformation and declared about beginning of withdrawal of troops from South Ossetiaand Abkhazia. In the evening Lavrov acknowledged the presence of Russian troops onthe territory of Georgia — around Gori and Senaki. According to his statements,Russian troops guard the ammunitions and military technique abandoned by theGeorgian army, and also give humanitarian help to the local population. The active information campaign of Russian officials began at the same time.According to Reuters data, before signing of cease-fire with participation of France,Medvedev, who has steered Russia towards the biggest dispute with the West since theCold War, had not given a single interview to foreign media since the crisis began159.But on Tuesday Medvedev gave, in short order, interviews to CNN, the BBC, TF1, AlJazeera and Russia Today. He also wrote an opinion piece for the Financial Times thatappeared on Wednesday morning. Network analysis showed more international context on August, 13. So, Lavrovin reply to appearance of the US ships in the Black sea and statements of Rice about thehelp to Georgia, named Saakashvili regime as “virtual project” of the USA. Also heopened the question of sovereignness of territories in the “dangerous game”. Hisrhetoric was continued by Rogozin, who marked importance of moment for thecounterterrorist fight. Nogovitsyn, in turn, refuted information about advancement ofthe Russian troops to Tbilisi.159 ANALYSIS-Kremlin fights back in PR battle over Georgia [http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSLQ433217] Aug 29, 2008
  • Part IV: 91Russian Federation.Modern foreign policy communicationsin crises situations An international discussion proceeded on August, 14, when Sarkozy cameforward as a mediator in the search of peaceful decision of conflict. So, Lavrov in thisday declared that Georgia must forget about Abkhazia and Ossetia. These statementssounded on a background of signing of plan of solving of conflict signed by thepresidents of unrecognized republics of North Ossetia and Abkhazia in presence ofDmitry Medvedev in Moscow. Thus, speaking about status of unrecognized republics,Medvedev declared that Russia would support "any decision which signs people ofSouth Ossetia and Abkhazia". Nogovitsyn then declared that not ready to name a date,when Russia will begin the withdrawal of troops from with Georgia. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin continued the blitz on Thursday, giving a robustinterview to CNN, in which he accused U.S. officials of provoking the whole conflict."Yes, naturally, certain conclusions will be made from this situation," a Kremlin sourcetold Reuters. "Practice has shown that a confrontation in such situations is not limited toarmed conflict and diplomatic battles but is carried through into the communicationssphere. "Unlike the Georgian side, which has been praised by some for a successfulinformation campaign, Russia had not prepared for this war and was concerned aboveall not with the polemics of Saakashvili, but with the defence of its citizens." Putin toldCNN that the United States had been much better at managing media coverage of theconflict than Russia. "We have got a lot to learn," he said. After demonstrative propagandist actions followed both from Russian andGeorgian sides. Russian television showed the concert of V.Gergiev given in SouthOssetia. This was a symbolic gesture. Thus many British newspapers, as, for example,Times, marked that unlike D.Barenboim, who often makes concerts before Palestinianaudience with the orchestra with both Israel and Palestinian musicians. But Gergievobviously declared the pro-Russian position in this conflict. In that day Parliament of Georgia abolished all documents about including ofGeorgia in CIS. Georgian officials continued to come forward with the statements aboutmoving of the Russian tanks deep into the country. Russian troops declared thetransmission of Gori under the control of Georgian police. Post-conflict phase
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 92 Actions of speakers after completion of active phase had such networkdescriptions (August 15-30, 2008). Medvedev became the main category of this period,to which three speakers refer at once—Lavrov, Churkin and Rogozin. Thus Lavrovprovided political position in relation to the withdrawal of troops and future security inthe region, Rogozin specified on worsening of relationships with NATO and stopping ofmilitary collaboration. The least influential was Churkin who marked the necessity of apeaceful plan. Nogovitsyn continued though less actively, to comment actions ofRussian army and possibility of withdrawal of troops. Already after a conflict the messages appeared about PR companies working forGeorgia and Russia. Authors marked foremost, that Georgia won the information battle.Main PR agency for Saakashvili was Aspect Consulting (in Brussels and London),Orion Strategies and Squire Sanders Public Advocacy (in Washington). On August 8,Aspect sent its consultant Patrick Worms160 to Tbilisi to brief journalists. Equally, thefirm inundated the world press with over 200 handouts. In Washington, OrionStrategies, founded by Randy Scheunemann161, managed to arrange a telephone callbetween McCain and Saakashvili in April, after which McCain publicly came out infavour of Georgia’s sovereignty. Reporters covering the conflict have been showered daily with emails providing news, contact details, mobile phone numbers of officials, video footage, background material, and tele- conference access to Georgians from Saakashvili down. Highly efficient, highly effective, usually punctual162. For its part, Russia has been using firms belonging to the communications giantOmnicom to burnish its image since 2006. At the same time it was a mystery anuncertainty of actions of companies which worked before a conflict for internationalimage of Kremlin more than two years. They are Ketchum in London, the office ofGavin Anderson in Japan, GPlus in Brussels and the Washington Group in theUnited States. Moscow can also call on the fire power of its pro-government press in160 A former European Commission staffer (communication department) who subsequently worked for Ogilvy Public Relations office in Brussels. In Brussels Goergian action was supported by James Hunt—British, co-founder of Aspect. He is ex-managing director for international corporate communications at Hill & Knowlton. Previously worked with Weber Shandwick and Ketchum.161 foreign affairs adviser to the Republican candidate for the presidency, John McCain162 Traynor I. Plucky little Georgia: Saakashvilis PR agency wins on second front // The Guardian, August 16 2008
  • Part IV: 93Russian Federation.Modern foreign policy communicationsin crises situationsRussia and recently set up think-tanks in Paris, Brussels and Washington to get itsmessages across. The Kremlins account is held by another Brussels agency, GPlus. It insists it is not in the business of peddling propaganda, far less falsehoods, but merely facilitates international media access to Russian policy-makers and advises the Russians on their media strategies. "We give them logistical support," said Tim Price of GPlus. Even the Russians are complaining that their side is losing in the publicity stakes. "You cant fail to notice that Russian leaders are ignoring the opportunity to convey their point of view to the world," wrote the Moscow pundit, Aleksei Arbatov. "Saakashvili is really never off American TV screens. I suspect that if Medvedev decided to talk to foreign journalists, they would, of course, respond."163 ***163 Traynor I. Plucky little Georgia…
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 94 Fig. 17. Network map for key Russian speakers in Russian-Georgian conflict
  • Part V: 95Ukraine. Foreign Policy Management.Crisis Communication approach PART V: UKRAINE. FOREIGN POLICY MANAGEMENT. CRISIS COMMUNICATION APPROACH164 Phenomena of conflict and turbulence became inalienable part of moderninternational processes and accompanied the processes of political defragmentation andintegration (Rosenau). These tendencies showed up especially brightly in transitionsocieties which must combine forming of political institutions with the dynamicchanges of international environment. For example, Ukraine is in the field of activetransformations of post-Soviet space which is accompanied from one side by growth ofauthoritarian tendencies in Russia and Belarus, and from other side—EU enlargement.It creates new dilemmas for Ukrainian foreign policy: internal opposition of nationalelites shows political transformations, but slows formulation of state foreign-policystrategy. Thus it is more difficult for international public to define where Ukraine goeshaving important geopolitical position between Western Europe and Russia. As a result international public attention binds Ukraine mostly to the crises,conflicts, unexpected events. For example elections 2004 got the special attention ofmedia and public, doing Ukraine an international top-news. Or such “unexpected”events as gas crisis in the relations of Ukraine and Russia in 2005 and World FootballChampionship 2006 in Germany, where Ukrainian team reached to ¼ final165. Theseevents were out of activity of foreign-policy department, but at the same time wereimportant in forming of political and public estimations of Ukraine abroad. Foreign policy management of Ukraine Foreign-policy management in Ukrainian case can be divided into two levels. Alower (diplomatic) level includes activity of embassies, representative offices and othermissions on the most essential vectors of foreign policy of Ukraine. General estimations164 Research of this part was supported in part by the Carnegie Research Fellowship Program, which was funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and administered by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER). The opinions expressed herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily express the views of either the Carnegie Corporation of New York or NCEEER165 According GoogleTrends data
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 96of such activity mainly positive and related to names of definite diplomats conductingnegotiations and lobbying interests of Ukraine. However, quality and style of higher level of foreign-policy management inUkraine are determined by geopolitical position and internal political instability. And ifgeopolitics is a source of multivector foreign-policy strategy, it is necessary to consideran internal situation as basis of foreign-policy tactic of fight between political forces inUkraine. Such situation for last years is caused by constitutional reform with weakeningof presidential power, including foreign policy. It might provide transparency ofprocedures of decision-making foreign-policy, but on a modern stage resulted inabsence of single center of decision-making in foreign-policy and complications withco-ordination of foreign policy activity of President, Prime Minister and Minister forforeign affairs. As a result, as during Kuchma’s period, personification and opacity ofpractical realization of foreign policy only increased166. Evolution of foreign-policy management can be estimated on appointments ofMinister for foreign affairs, their relationships with president or premier. So till the endof 2004 triumvirate of Kuchma-Yanukovich-Gryshchenko provided a primaryobjective—to change the negative image of Kuchma in Europe. In particular it wasdecided to create Governmental program of providing of positive international image ofUkraine 2003-06, which was rather directed on the improvement of image of definiteofficials. At the same time MFA didn’t have considerable role in the first Yanukovitchgovernment and implemented a tactical task (under Gryshchenko) on stableaccompaniment of actions of Yanukovitch as Kuchma’s successor, but without activeparticipation in information accompaniment of his official visits. In 2004 MFA of Ukraine and diplomats (without Gryshchenko) became one ofthe first state institutions which supported Yushchenko during OR. However his victoryand forming of “technical” government of Tymoshenko in 2005 only complemented thevagueness of the functional distributing and organizational crisis of MFA of Ukraine.So, during parliament elections 2006 Secretariat of President had key influence onForeign-policy Department. Key foreign-policy managers of this period were vice-prime-minister of European integration Oleg Rybachuk and Minister for foreign affairsBoris Tarasyuk, which represented Euroatlantic vector of foreign policy of Yushchenko.166 Чалый В., Пашков М.Внешняя политика внутреннего пользования // Зеркало недели http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/ie/show/420/36837/ (23 октября 2002 г.)
  • Part V: 97Ukraine. Foreign Policy Management.Crisis Communication approachStyle of their activity was estimated as “offensive” and was basis for activation ofYushchenko’s foreign-policy, who made more foreign visits twice then his predecessorKuchma. But if in the first Tymoshenko government B.Tarasyuk still represented politicalposition of President, a situation about MFA in the transition Yekhanurov governmentstrengthened the lack of initiative and uneffectiveness of MFA to protect nationalinterests. For example, Ukrainian-Russian gas conflict at the end of 2005167 showed thatMFA was actually excluded from system of executive power. Besides Tarasyuk’spolitical dependence was confirmed in 2006 during parliament elections, when he (atthe same time leader of right-center party Narodny Rukh of Ukraine) spared moreattention to campaign. The results of elections and consequent forming of Yanukovitch governmentactually meant stopping of Tarasyuk activity as a minister. It had negative effect on ofUkrainian foreign-policy activity, on the diplomatic contacts of Kyiv: because ofvagueness with status of Tarasyuk there were cancelled his visits to Belgium, onmeeting of Council of ministers for foreign affairs of OSCE countries, and also toAlgiers and Switzerland. Ambiguity of situation with Tarasyuk complicated co-operation of MFA with other Ukrainian ministries and departments168. Among scandals,accompanying the relations of Tarasyuk and Yanukovitch, the refusal of Ministry offinance in January 2007 to finance diplomatic work of Tarasyuk—his foreign journeysand also to adopt financial documents, signed by Tarasyuk on position of Minister forforeign affairs169. Yanukovitch, taking into account the tense relationships with MFA of Ukraineand diplomats, became more attentive to the skilled providing of foreign policy activity.He formed “shadow MFA” with people who worked before in MFA and became hisbasic advisers: K.Gryshchenko worked as basic moderator between Yanukovich andWest. A. Zlenko which got the title of "adviser on special international questions". Two167 According to four Ukrainian ex-ministers for foreign affairs (Zlenko, Chaly, Gryshchenko, Tarasyuk) gas agreements with Russia were the general foreign policy lost of Ukraine, activisation of relations on regional level and with the USA was the general succes (Внешнеполитический квартет: какофония тактики, гармония стратегии? // Дзеркало тижня № 50 (629) 30 декабря — 5 января 2007)168 Кравченко В. Чинник Тарасюка // № 49 (628) 23 — 29 грудня 2006 http://www.dt.ua/1000/1550/55459/169 Мінфін не дасть жодної копійки Тарасюку // http://www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/domestic/story/2007/01/070123_azarov_tarasyuk_oh.shtml
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 98more advisers A. Fialko and A. Orel worked before in Kuchma’s administration. Fialkohad pro-western views, while Orel—prorussian170. Situation about management of MFA of Ukraine became more complicatedwhen Yanukovitch government with support of parliament majority fired Tarasyuk.Thus during first two months 2007 MFA of Ukraine remained without actualmanagement. V.Ohryzko, former first deputy minister of MFA who dealt with questionsof delimitation of Ukrainian border and Black Sea Fleet and known by pro-Ukrainianposition. Firstly Ohryzko was a basic candidature for minister for foreign affairs,however parliament refused to adopt him. As a result political opponents supportedYatsenyuk who wasn’t a professional diplomat and his appointment rather meantstrengthening of role of Secretariat of President in the management by a foreign policy. Ohryzko returned on position of minister of MFA in the new Tymoshenkogovernment from the end of 2007 MFA. However, in this case MFA of Ukraine onlyconfirmed the second-rate complementary function. The basic foreign-policy managerwas H.Nemyrya—before the Tymoshenko adviser on international questions, now vice-prime on Eurointegration. By estimations of the Ukrainian experts, Nemyrya wasknown by pro-European rhetoric and had considerable influence on the management ofTymoshenko foreign visits, he was engaged in organization of her interviews andpublications, analytical support of her foreign-policy decisions. His appointmenttestified aspiration of Tymoshenko to strengthen an own pro-European policy and tocompete with Yushchenko in determination of foreign-policy vector of Ukraine. Bistro Plan: Yushchenko post-crisis campaign Impulse of Orange revolution might improve image of Ukraine and actually tofulfill the main function of foreign-policy communications. It happened at the level ofpublic perception, while political leaders aimed to fasten new direction in Ukrainianpolicy at official level. As a result Yushchenko—as main OR hero—just afterinauguration accomplished visits to Moscow, Brussels, Strasbourg, Berlin, Washingtonto carry new position of Ukraine about integration to Euro-Atlantic structures. Actually,every such visit was logical continuation of previous and created a certain informationfield which showed up in international and national media.170 Сушко О. Хто виводить провідних політиків України на міжнародну сцену? // Дзеркало тижня № 22 (651) 9-15 червня 2007
  • Part V: 99Ukraine. Foreign Policy Management.Crisis Communication approach Comparing the media-coverage of these visits (January-April 2005) it is possibleto trace how Yushchenko rhetoric changed depending on the aim of visit and from thereaction of officials in Russia, EU and the USA. For example, visit to Moscow onJanuary, 24, 2005 was accompanied by positive articles in Russian media aboutYushchenko, who did not “afraid to arrive to Russia”. However the topic of his meetingwith Putin moved on the second plan by the Yushchenko about appointmentTymoshenko as the prime minister, who was under criminal case in Russia. At the sametime European and US press, considering primariness of Yushchenko visit to Moscowfor renewal of relations between countries, noted importance of Tymoshenkoappointment. Topical network analysis of foreign media specified that the term“Tymoshenko” in this period contacted above all with possibilities of overcoming ofmanipulations in the relations of two countries. Discussion of economic integration waslinked with Tymoshenko and Putin. The theme of “renewal of relations” also wasstrategically important, related to the necessity of removal of shadow relations andrevision of economic integration. The topic of European integration of Ukraine, here,remained in direct dependence on the “delicate balancing” between Russia and Europe,and also related to success of democratic reforms. Nevertheless, the short-term of visit allowed to develop this theme and mediaautomatically switched on coverage of Yushchenko visit to Strasbourg on January, 25.Not looking on less coverage, this visit and its continuation in Auszwitz and Davos,Yushchenko succeeded to attain a greater international effect. In particular, purpose ofvisit to Strasbourg was to provide a dialog between the European MPs and newpostsoviet elites. Visit to Auszwitz became the informal meeting with the leaders ofEurope and the USA. Meeting with Cheney became the central topic of this visit, andaccording to network data Ukraine was considered as partner of Europe and the USA.The question of European integration was estimated as key task of Tymoshenkogovernment and on initial stage was seen as fight against corruption and carrying outstate reform. The key term of visit to Davos was “investments”—according to foreignmedia it depended both on co-operation with EU and USA and from position of Putinwhich could slow the entry of Ukraine to WTO. Visit on the World economic forum inDavos allowed Yushchenko to meet with world economic leaders and to representUkraine as a stable economic partner. However, already on this stage European press
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 100began to publish doubts about positive reaction of EU on aspiration of Ukraine tobecome by the member of European Union. So, The Times described position of Europeas “careful avoiding” when Yushchenko “wanted to awaken this asleep elephant[Ukraine] and to ride him into EU”. Visit to Brussels took place at the end of February, 2005, though it was plannedas part of the first European tour of Yushchenko. The purpose of visit was discussion ofUkraine membership in WTO and NATO. For this purpose it was foreseen to conductmeetings with the US president, the leaders of EU Barroso and Solana. In addition itallowed again to confirm intention of Ukraine to join WTO already in 2005, and in2008 to begin negotiations about the joining EU. The network analysis showed thatNATO, Bush, “western family”, “barrier” were central concepts during visit. Inparticular, the category of NATO was important for the concepts of the actions relatedto Plan Ukraine-EU. Category “western family” was more problematic, related to theconcept of “barrier”, “search of near links”. Relations of Ukraine and EU here wereunder the special influence of Russia. For example, such category as “opened forUkraine”, mentioned in context about position of NATO about Ukraine dependedRussian position. The subject of European integration continued in Berlin, however in the contextof preparation to joining WTO. Key events of visit were speech before Bundestag andmeeting with Germany Minister of foreign affairs J. Fischer171. In particularYushchenko uttered “balanced” declaration about necessity to support aspiration of hiscountry to enter in EU, simultaneously assuring Berlin, that Kyiv wanted to support thegood relationships with east neighbour—Russia. However information support of visitwas complicated by “visa scandal” in relation to illegal issue of German visas toUkrainians. According to media-analysis Yushchenko visit contained two thematicconstituents: integration of Ukraine and Gongadze case as the index of democratictransformations. Central message of Yushchenko was “we are the family” and it wasconsidered as basis for co-operation of Germany and Ukraine first of all by conservative171 Disagreements in activity of President of Ukraine and embassies of Ukraine appeared in Berlin. The visit of Yushchenko to Berlin foresaw meeting with the president of Germany H. Koeller. Ceremony included the formal meeting with the hymns of two countries. When glows the hymn of Ukraine Yushchenko laid a hand on a heart. It is not the requirement of protocol, but similarly did Minister for foreign affairs Tarasuk, Vice-prime Kinakh and State secretary Zinchenko. Only ambassador of Ukraine Farenyk continued to stand dropping hands. He was appointed at Kuchma and did not know how new authorities differed from an old one.
  • Part V: 101Ukraine. Foreign Policy Management.Crisis Communication approachCDP, which was at that time in opposition. Actually, according to media OR and visascandal were used for the distraction of attention of public from internal problems. Inparticular, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung considered a visit from view point ofGerman internal policy and noted that minister for foreign affairs J. Fischer was thepressure of visa policy. The network analysis specifies also, that it is necessary toconsider category “EU joining” depending on Russia which can influence onstrengthening of category “strong European links”, as most German politiciansrenounce to admit that Ukraine is part of Europe. After restrained European estimations, the US visit in April, 2005 wasconsidered as “triumphal”, symbolizing the fight of Ukrainian people for democracy(may be it was coincidence but before the visit of Yushchenko to the USA a smallUkrainian girl who rescued a sister from a fire and getting strong burns N.Ovchar wastransported to USA for treatment. Yushchenko met her and it created an additionalinformation coverage. However, this visit passed on a background of death of the PopeJohn Paul ІІ, that distracted attention of press and public). According to Googleinformation visit to the USA got wide coverage in press, comparable with visit toMoscow. In particular press estimated it as search of financial and material support fordevelopment of democracy and integration aspirations of Ukraine. Category“democratic changes” was related to possibility of tacking to alliances. And this notlooking on that Ukraine after OR came forward for withdrawal of the Ukrainiancontingent from Iraq. The “economic lobbying” also had link with solution ofintegration tasks. Category “strategic partnership” was first of all related with joiningUkraine to NATO. Neue Zuercher Zeitung quoted appearance of Yushchenko in USCongress: “He one more time expressed the desire about joining NATO and WTO.Besides he demanded Americans to acknowledge Ukraine as country with marketeconomy and to abolish the Jackson-Wenick amendment. It would eliminate existenttrade barriers. “Tear Down These Walls!”,—called Yushchenko, using the famousphrase of US president Reagan about Berlin wall 172.172 Beifall im US-Kongress fuer den ukrainischen Praesidenten // [http://www.nzz.ch/2005/04/08/al/articleCPW62.html]
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 102 Wild Energy: “gas war” of Ukraine and Russia Gas dispute 2005 was first of all conflict between two business structures—Gazprom and Naftogaz—although they have strong links with governments. Both MFAof Ukraine and Russia didn’t take part in dispute, only once A.Butejko claimed Russiawith unfriendly politics using energy factor. At the same time representation of Ukrainein Moscow during the crisis was weak as just before the conflict Yuschenko changedformer ambassador in Russia O.Biloblotsky on O.Diomin. He was estimated aspolitically neutral person however without experience in diplomatic work. Nevertheless the conflict was strongly politicized and had enormous mediacampaign conducted against Ukraine in general, not Naftogaz. Although European andUS media reacted this dispute, their coverage was most likely an echo of events whenmedia tried to analyse the situation according to national interests. As a result Russianand Ukrainian media remained main field of conflict, at the same time foreign mediawere used by both sides (mostly by Russians) as place to appeal emotions of Europeansfirst of all. For example the concept that “Ukraine steal gas” was spread first of allthrough European media. In terms of CM this dispute could be considered according to event managementtechniques when issues “evolve in a predictable manner, originating from trends andevents and developing through a sequence of identifiable stages that are not dissimilarto the cyclical development of organisation”. Thus gas crisis had 4 stages of issuemanagement, it means that at least one organization planned its action better then other:STAGE 1—ORIGIN—POTENTIAL ISSUE—price for gas and transit conditions—issue arises when organization attaches significance to a perceived problem that is a consequence of a developing political or social trend. Issue begins to gain definition when organization plans to do something that has a consequence for another organization. Network analysis showed that on these stages such category as “price on gas”(economic category) was one of general for Russian media, while western mediaforemost marked such category as “power independence” (political category). The potential theme topic of “price on gas” arose up in Russian politics and mediaas reaction of Kremlin on the relationships with new political leaders of Ukraine. The
  • Part V: 103Ukraine. Foreign Policy Management.Crisis Communication approachRussian analysts named this “war” as PR-campaign to discredit Ukraine using roughpropaganda cliches, PR, notoriously unreliable information distributed simultaneouslyfor internal (Russian) user and for external audience. “Stealing” became the main themeof campaign173. Thus first deputy of Gazprom A.Medvedev and press secretaryS.Kupriyanov became main newsmakers. While top leaders were not involved inconflict. The Russian First channel became the basic information channel of gas conflict.Here the key participants of “war” uttered program declarations, propaganda cliches ofFirst channel were duplicated by other state and private broadcasting companies and inpress, for example in newspapers which belong to Gasprom and is included inconsortium Gasprom-Media: one of central Russian newspapers Izvestia174. At the sametime statistics of European and US media showed that the topic of gas conflict arose upat the beginning of December 2005 after the statement of Putin about market price forgas. At the beginning of the opened phase European media divided in estimations ofsituation. German media became a source for ordered articles and publications ofopinions of German and Russian experts about energy security. So, German Weltrepresented opinion, actual reflection of position of Gasprom that the serious problem ofgas deliveries to Europe was caused by Ukrainian side. “Unstructural” approach ofUkraine—according to Welt—will result in violation of gas deliveries to Germany, and“…Ukrainian side actually sabotages signing of documents which are the basis for thereliable supply of Russian gas to European buyers”.STAGE 2—EMERGING ISSUE—price of energy supply to Ukraine—increasing pressure on organization to accept the issue. In most cases it is a result of activity of interested groups who are trying to push their own issue. First statements about gas deliveries appeared in Russian media in summer 2005,when appeared a necessity to decide the question of “buffer gas” placed on Ukrainianterritory during Kuchma ruling. Media actually became the main mediator and field ofpolitical manipulations about the statements of both sides. For example Gasprom173 Ивженко Т., Самедова Е., Наумов И. Газовая PR-атака // Независимая газета 24.11.2005174 Освещение «газовой войны» в российских СМИ: основные сюжеты и пропагандистские клише [http://lenta.ru/articles/2006/02/20/memorandum/a1.htm_Printed.htm]
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 104accused Ukrainian Naftogaz in the unauthorized use and demanded compensations oflosses at “European market price”. Then the themes of future gas conflict were firstused in state Russian media. “…Conflict can complicate not only the relations of Russiaand Ukraine. But also can harm to our collaboration with Europe. There trust lostUkrainians…” (07.06.2005). Mutual decision wasn’t found and Gasprom declaredUkraine the owner of the disappearing gas got on account of payment of services intransit. Representatives of Gasprom declared that is going to fill in the deficit of gasalready at price $160. The second component of gas war was the theme of building of North-Europeangas pipeline, where Ukraine got a negative role. The “unreliability” of “continental”way of transporting of gas and Ukraine as transit country became the basic informationthesis of this theme. Thus in Russian media published unreliable information about theimportance of Ukraine as transit country. After this period Ukrainian theme becamegeneral in Russian state media. Ukraine was accused in intentional sabotage ofnegotiations, all Ukrainian proposals were estimated as “notoriously unacceptable” and“ridiculous”. Price of Gasprom ($160) was “offered” in a maximally sharp categoricalform. The European subject in state Russian media appeared at the beginning ofDecember 2005 with the threat to rise up the “European market price” for Ukraine from$160 to $230. This stage included two components: at first, critical comments of theUkrainian politicians in the address of the Ukrainian government and companyNaftogas. Secondly, by the attempt of Fradkov to attract the EU representatives forpressure on Ukraine. Then the first selections of comments from foreign media,testifying the “catastrophic consequences for Europe” of further escalation of conflict ofGasprom with Ukraine, appeared in Russian media. Actually Russian side beganintimidation of “European partners”. However the refusal of EU to support position ofRussia Gasprom was interpreted by Russian state media as their benefit.STAGE 3—ORGANIZATION—official statements of Russian and Ukrainian political leaders, media-coverage—public or other groups should be considered as dynamic. Increased public attention motivates leaders to become a part emerging
  • Part V: 105Ukraine. Foreign Policy Management.Crisis Communication approach conflict that also could mount the pressure. To affect the issue becomes enduring because of its intensity. New attack of Gasprom started on December 11 with the use of Putin whichnamed the losses of Gasprom from deliveries of gas to Ukraine. And reported that“domestic users in Ukraine got today gas at prices lower than the price which thecitizens of Russian Federation pay for natural gas". In a video accompanying Putin’sappearance and comments of journalists of the “First channel”, for the time were usedmocking intonations which afterwards became “firm style” of Russian state media incoverage of this theme. "…For the first time our leader openly and in public, not formal, but essentially acknowledged independence of the Ukrainian state. Because only by absence of this independence it is possible to account for all previous policy of Russia in relation to Ukraine… It seems that Ukraine must rejoice—age-old matter of hetman Mazepa, Petlura and Bandera won at last. But reaction of Kyiv was absolutely opposite. That points on the simple reflection—own stateness—the same as language or culture—for any nation it is very burdensome, requiring superefforts in national scale. Actually all history of independence of Ukraine divides in two unequal historical stages— four years independence from Russia together with Germany and 300 years of independence from Germany together with Russia. Alike, next year in Ukraine, in connection with gas scandal, is unique historical chance—simultaneously to be independent both from Russia and from Germany—scarcely Germans will like technical extraction of their gas from the Ukrainian pipe..." (11.12.2005). With the same moment started a negative campaign against Yushchenko,government of Ukraine and Naftogas. “Positive heroes” such as “simple Ukrainians”(damning the authorities for “unstructuralness”) and “opposition Ukrainian politicians”(stamping operating authorities for “Rusophobia” and “incompetence”) became thepermanent elements of information campaign. Another important event of this stage of “gas war” were “trainings” ondisconnecting of gas-supplying for Ukraine, declared by A.Miller. The vocabulary ofcommentators became more hard. Dominant style was “military”. The Ukrainian side incomments looks almost as “military enemy”. A.Medvedev became basic officialnewsmaker which gave program interview in the Sunday news of “First channel”. Herepeated propositions about transition of Ukrainian gas pipelines into Gasprom propertyand declared about willingness “to go to Swedish court if Ukraine goes on it”. Aninterview was accompanied by demonstration how gas went out in a portable gas burner
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 106with comment “the same will be with Ukraine”. Arguments of Yekhanurov about theright of Ukraine for 15% of gas transported by Ukrainian territory remained withoutobjections. Irony and “opinion of simple people” were used for comments. Alexander Verevkin, mechanic: "Why we must suffer from it. I consider that any services must be paid. And why Ukraine mustn’t pay for gas at price which it costs. Why we must pay for them". Konstantin Reshetnikov, engineer: "I can’t understand. Ukraine considers itself European country. Nevertheless—conduces an unfriendly policy to Russia. I think, how the European countries pay, so they must pay". According to the last questioning, approximately the same thoughts have more than 80 percents of Russians. Many experts marked: Ukrainians were stealing our gas before, but even blushing and being sorry. But, alike, for the past year stealing unnoticed transformed into state policy of Ukraine.". (27.12.2005) Last stage of “gas war” began by the promised “stopping of deliveries of gas toUkraine”. It ensued from information of Russian state media that literally in the day ofdisconnecting the European buyers began to receive less gas. Representatives ofGasprom immediately declared about “stealing”. This theme became central duringthose days of disconnecting. Gasprom attracted an international audition firm for thereceipt of exact information about what volume of gas is in pipes to crossing of theRussian-Ukrainian border, and what the European users get. Representatives ofGasprom underlined especially that there was no “Turkmenian gas in pipes”. At thesame time, the representatives of Ukraine declared that take away from pipesexceptionally the Turkmenian gas. The theme of “stealing” by the end of the first day of“gas blockade” of Ukraine was complemented by the theme of “noble compensation toEuropeans of the missed gas due to Gasprom”. Results of international publicaccountants which the Ukrainian side renounced to acknowledge were not promulgated.Volumes of “stolen gas” on territory of Ukraine the representatives of Gaspromdeclared without references to the international public accountants. Other key themewas next wave of appeals to EU before meeting of the EU commission on energy onJanuary 4. M.Fradkov sent to the chairman of EU Council a letter with “appeal EU toconvince Ukraine to halt stealing of gas and to provide trouble-free deliveries of fuel toEurope”. The last news on Russian state channels were almost wholly addressed to theofficials of European Union, going the next day to discuss “Russian-Ukrainianconflict”. An attempt to do any imposing selection of “pro-Russian” opinions from theEuropean sources resulted in almost fully of remarks of personnel of German
  • Part V: 107Ukraine. Foreign Policy Management.Crisis Communication approachcompanies-partners of Gasprom and structures related to them. B.Bergmann (Rurhgaz):"In the conditions of prices advance on power supply in the world to support prices forUkraine at former level—unacceptable". Company Wingaz, one of importers of theRussian energy sources to Germany: "Gasprom during many years was a reliablepartner in providing of Germany and Western Europe by natural gas, and throughout theyears without interruption discharged the duties on deliveries". A.Rahr: "If Kyivaccepted idea of a consortium, Ukraine would be integrated in the energy system ofEurope. Transit of Russian gas would be internationalized, and Kyiv was deprivedpossibility to steal Russian blue fuel". (03.01.2006). At the same time were used thetricks of “demonizing” of operating Ukrainian authorities (mainly “Rusophobic”utterances of employee of MFA of Ukraine), “pre-election theme”, “simple people” etc.STAGE 4—RESOLUTION DORMANT ISSUE—Ukraine and Russia reached deal but issue remained (Black Sea fleet, problem of Russian language etc.) The international media-reaction on solution of conflict on January 4 showed thedifference of accents and speed of information streams, and also dependence of mediafrom geographical position in relation to conflict. On the whole, Russian media becamethe main field for comments showing the agreement as victory of Gasprom 175. At thesame time, the network analysis showed that besides importance of gas agreements, anew conflict between Ukraine and Russia emerged: problem of lighthouses of Black seanavy in Crimea. Network research of Western and Russian media showed a substantialdifference—for western media discussion about lighthouses and language question(category of “Russification”) became more important, that indicated foremost on thespecific selection of news related first off all to the political aspects of development ofrelations. In Russian media discussion about lighthouses linked first of all with basing ofBlack sea navy and was not primary, rather was complementary to gas conflict (at thattime Crimea was basic field for reporting of the Russian First channel with an accent ondisconnecting of gas first of all for the habitants of Crimea. Thus it wasn’t mentionedthat the amount of gas on the shelf of Crimean peninsula is sufficient for providing bythe heat of its habitants)175 Российские СМИ по-разному комментируют итоги "газовой войны": от провала до задела нового конфликта 03.02.2006 09:57 [http://www.grani.kiev.ua/]
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 108 The lighthouse of Yalta trade port became the reason of new conflict. As manyother hydrographical objects, this lighthouse was at disposal of Black Sea Navy, butMFA and Ministry of transport of Ukraine for several years tried to put in orderpresence of Russian BSF. As the question of BSF placing was considered as element offoreign policy, MFA of Ukraine became the basic source of statements about thenecessity of assignation or repair of these objects (The Yalta lighthouse (as well as othersimilar objects) is in the area of active navigation, therefore Ukraine responsible forfunctioning of such objects). The Russian side considered actions of Ukraine as thecapture of lighthouse which was in Russian property according to agreements.Aggressive information campaign started when Russian politicians feeling free in theutterances, again blamed official Kyiv for the failure to observe of the signedagreements. At the same time the commanders of Russian BSF escalated of conflict: itwas decided to strengthen the guard of those 35 navigation-hydrographical objects inCrimea, which Russian BSF still use. And not only by marines but also by armouredunits. In summer 2006 Ukraine planned to conduct the next trainings with participationof NATO forces. Not looking that similar trainings were provided for several years, thistime they caused the series of anti-NATO protests in Crimea. The statements of theRussian politicians about impossibility of entry of Ukraine in NATO became media-accompaniment of this event. Modern components of Ukrainian foreign policy? Music and soccer also become the part of Ukraine’s international activity and judging from timeline and media coverage these issues were more interesting for foreign media than Ukrainian politics. At the same time these issues could be estimated as reflection of reality in Ukraine. First of all it was Ruslana’s Wild Energy single. It was a business project as she is known in Europe and one of the Ukrainian singers who makes showbiz not only in Ukraine. But… teazer in English was issued in mid-2006 before Ukrainian variant of song was done. Words of “energy crisis” and “energy police”, “crisis of human relations” etc. could be transformed to real world of 2006—gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine. It is an example of “viral diplomacy” without any participant of officials, politicians, driven by cultural and musical events distributed in Internet, youtube, without any links with reality. Although these events (gas dispute and single release) couldn’t be linked directly but now it could be considered as reaction, not answer but action.
  • Part V: 109Ukraine. Foreign Policy Management.Crisis Communication approach Eurovision—cultural diplomacy in Europe—it is not a secret that EV is called as political-cultural contest, as Serbia got first place in 2007 to activate relations of EU with South Europe, and Serduchka… won 2nd place and provoked scandal about the words “lasha tumbaj” or “Russia Good bye”. Eurovision is probably the unique place where singer live could say “Ukraine is cool” for the audience about 100 mln. people… It is an example of funky-diplomacy that has the biggest effect—as fun could be interesting for others to participate and media will react on it. Another unexpected event in Ukrainian foreign policy coincided with political crisis. In April 2007 Poland and Ukraine were selected to host EURO2012. Importance of the event was proved by Polish and Ukrainian delegations headed by presidents of Poland and Ukraine. Decision for Poland and Ukraine was a surprise and had a “political background”: impulse for two states—new EU member and new neighbor. But… political crises effected harmfully the process of preparation for EURO2012, if Poland receives support from EU, Ukraine should find investments itself. Echo of Dreams: Yanukovych and crisis of President foreign policy If Yushchenko visits in 2005 were rather political, Yanukovitch visits can beconsidered as visits of executive power representative. He was more successful inRussia, while in Europe or the USA his visits did not get proper coverage in media oronly national politicians (in Germany and the USA) published their opinions. Thenetwork analysis of media showed that the visits of Yanukovitch before political crisis2007 were related foremost to the problems of deliveries of gas to Europe, althoughhere Yanukovitch made political declarations which caused irritation in Yushchenkoteam (Tarasyuk, Grytsenko) and misunderstanding in Europe. International activity of В.Yanukovitch started in August 2006 from the visit ofEconomic forum in Krynica (Poland), where pipeline Odessa-Brody-Plock became thebasic theme of discussion. Energy topic proceeded on August 15-17, 2006, whenYanukovitch accomplished the first visit as prime-minister on the informal summit ofEurAzES in Sochi and tried to agree with Russia about prices on gas. "Russia adoptedYanukovitch as friend and partner",—Izvestia wrote in article about negotiations of theRussian premier Fradkov with Yanukovitch: "Agiotage raised among journalists aboutarrival of Yanukovitch in Sochi, the impression was—it was not premier of Ukrainewho arrives, but at least, president of the USA". The network analysis showed that thequestion of gas price was primary for a new premier which wanted to “smooth out acute
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 110angles” and “to revise gas agreement with Russia”. Although, not looking on the fact ofnegotiations, Russian media marked that the agreements of Yanukovitch with Putin andMiller was very conditional, as decision about a price on gas anymore depends onCentral Asia not Russia. "Yanukovitch’s hope on a result were initially doomed to thefailure,—wrote Izvestia and added, that Russia after January scandal with deliveries ofgas could not go on price abatement, even if wanted. This would be equivalent todeclaration that prices on gas for Ukraine are dictated by a politics not market". In September 2006 Yanukovitch made two visits to Brussels with an interruptionin one week. The main task of visits—participation of Yanukovitch in work ofcommission Ukraine-NATO and meeting with an Eurocommissar B. Ferrero-Waldner.Thus the rhetoric of Yanukovitch about eurointegration of Ukraine was self-possessedand did not cause severe criticism. The situation differed during his visit intoCommission Ukraine-NATO. Before this visit Yushchenko made several conditionsamong them official statement of Yanukovitch for Action Plan Ukraine-NATO.However during a visit to Brussels Yanukovitch officially declared about unreadynessof Ukraine to join NATO. This became main theme of discussion in European mediawhich considered Yanukovitch as a pro-Russian politician. The minister of defence ofUkraine Grytsenko commented statements of Yanukovitch and named the utterances ofpremier an “error”. Yanukovitch again visited Brussels on September, 21, 2006 anduttered declaration about saving of intentions of Ukraine to co-operate actively with EU.It was an attempt to neutralize an internal conflict between president and premier, andsimultaneously to form position of Ukraine as stable supplier of energy sources fromRussia. Assuring EU in stable energy deliveries, Yanukovitch visited Moscow onSeptember 22, 2006, where he was accepted by Putin. Continuing the theme begun theday before in Brussels, Yanukovitch marked also, that “we would be a predictablepartner for Russia”. The Russian media marked that Yanukovitch was independentpolitician able to form the positive relations between Ukraine and Russia. Y.Boyko, minister of fuel and energy in the government of Yanukovitch, went to Moscow on the third day after appointment on position, warning nobody about it. As a rule, if such high public servant, as minister, goes somewhere with an official visit, diplomatic service in a proper country as a rule must know about it.
  • Part V: 111Ukraine. Foreign Policy Management.Crisis Communication approach However the ambassador of Ukraine in Russia Oleg Diomin didn’t have information about the visit of Y.Boyko to Moscow. Diomin: "Unfortunately, I don’t know about a visit of Boyko to Russia, possibly, this was private journey". But press-service of Republican party of Ukraine reported to information agency UNIAN, that "minister of fuel and energy of Ukraine Y.Boyko with the first working visit visited Moscow, where he met with the minister of industry and energy of Russia Victor Khistenko and chairman of Gasprom Alex Miller". In fact before press-service of RPU asked all information agencies to rescind information about Boyko journey which they got from anonymous sources. Information was rescinded, nevertheless Gasprom using his speaker Kuprijanov confirmed the fact of the formal meeting between Boyko and Miller. "Sides discussed current issues of collaboration in a gas sphere",— said Kupriyanov reporting no other details. During the third visit to Russia at the end of November 2006 Yanukovitch metwith Putin and declared that Kyiv was interested in participation in EES. After it he leftto Washington for meeting with a vice-president Cheney, U.S. State Secretary K.Riceand national security adviser of US president Hadley. According to Russian media theprimary objective of premier during the US visit was to prang a negative stereotypeabout him in the West after OR. “Journey to the USA must add him points in theintensifyed fight against president, to prove that he is also interested in democracy, andpresent the idea that exactly he today represents the real power in Ukraine”—Kommersant wrote. However, estimation of US media testified showed his visit asworking, official one which did not attract public attention. Cheney and Rice waslimited to the restrained official statements, and Ukrainian diaspora organized only abusiness forum and came forward with the requirement to explain of political actions ofpremier. Not looking on the relatively positive comments of Russian media about activitythe Yanukovitch problem of energy mediation of Ukraine between Russia and Europestill remained actual. If the Russian media mainly wrote about premier’s personalqualities, in western media he was not so popular. As a result during his visit to Davosin January, 2007 Yanukovitch appeared in situation when the comments of otherparticipants of forum had greater resonance. It should be noted that the energy conflictof Gasprom and Belarus happened the day before, created possibility to name Ukraine(as well as Belarus) the blackmailer of Europe and Russia and thus to make doubts ingas security of Europe. As a result, the similar statements of representatives of Gaspromcaused careful estimations of economic development of Ukraine before its WTO join.
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 112 The next was visit of Yanukovitch to Berlin and meeting with Merkel. It isimportant to note that on February 8, 2007 Yushchenko visited Berlin to activatecollaboration of Ukraine and EU. On the whole, Merkel made some optimisticstatements marking that Germany will support development of free trade zones betweenEU and Ukraine. After 20 days Yanukovitch came to Germany and judging oncomposition of official delegation, a visit was rather a working one. He once againconfirmed the statement about intention of European integration and declaredcollaboration with Yushchenko in foreign-policy questions. But during meeting Merkelgave a hint that Ukraine shouldn’t to be seduced by the excessive hopes of Ukraine tojoin EU, besides it is important to make clear energy questions [26]. Not looking onbusiness descriptions a visit got coverage exceptionally in German media and it wasdifficult to select a central media topic. Main information event of the visit was article Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung:Yanukovitch: from marionette to leader. The newspaper is considered as pro-Merkel.In particular newspaper wrote that “Victor Yanukovitch has a lot of staff that post-Soviet grandees like to have: personal photographer who regards that during kissing thekids Yanukovitch was in the center, biographer who glorifies his labor and finally titleof professor he easily received when he was the governor of Donets’k region. Besideshe has political designer from West, who consulted US presidents from Ford to Bush aswell as Philippines dictator Marcos and leader of Angola rebels Sawimbi...". Ukrainianpremier tries to get rid of his past as “dependence of corrupted oligarchs and Russianpresident Putin created his image as remote control laughing-stock”. Visit also included interviews for German media, however selection of editionwasn’t successful. For example, he planned an interview for Die Welt, that few daysbefore published positive article of A.Rahr, German expert of Eastern Europe. Also hemet with Deutsche Welle—media-channel to promote Germany abroad. Ukrajins’kaPravda noticed that it would be more effective to make interview for FrankfurterAllegemeine, but Ukrainian embassy answered that right for interview got edition thatasked first, i.e. Die Welt. Meanwhile FA saved critical voices: Yanukovitch speakswhat he wants to hear, and his visit to Berlin just adds new unclear questions about hisgovernment.
  • Part V: 113Ukraine. Foreign Policy Management.Crisis Communication approach The US and German visits of Yanukovitch reflected the fight between premierand president for foreign-policy course. This conflict situation eventually resulted inretirement of Tarasyuk and appointment of Yatsenyuk as minister for foreign affairs. Onthe whole this candidature satisfied both foreign partners of Ukraine and smoothed outinternal opposition. For this purpose Yatsenyuk made foreign visits to Europe, Moscowand the USA and their traditional order was accompanied by a main thesis aboutstability of Ukraine as partner in current projects. Estimation of media coverage EMMshows that Yatsenyuk was known enough politician, which balanced contacted bothwith the representatives of NATO, the USA and with Russians—Putin Medvedev,representatives of Gasprom. We’ll be the first: Tymoshenko Tymoshenko was central actor of political crisis 2007 who used the foreignvisits for presentation of alternative view on events in Ukraine and opinion forming ofleaders in foreign countries and organizations. So, visits to Brussels and Berlin inNovember 2006 coincided with the visits of Yanukovitch to Washington and visit ofYushchenko on Summit of CIS to Minsk, and visits in the USA and France in March,2007 coincided with the visit of Yanukovitch to Berlin and visit of Yushchenko toGeorgia. Actually, this was a crisis campaign based simultaneously on the necessity ofchange of the personal image of Tymoshenko and changing of foreign-policy prioritiesof Ukraine. So Tymoshenko reinforced her foreign-policy principles during her uniqueofficial foreign visit to France in May, 2005. First of all, France and Germany becameher foreign-policy priorities, simultaneously she aimed to build the pragmaticrelationships with Russia according to national interests of Ukraine. Secondly, as wellas during OR, the European media variously named Tymoshenko and she used positivepopularity among media. So in France “Slav Madonna” made interviews for Frenchnational TV and leading papers, Figaro published almost 1-page interview with her,even free paper Metro wrote few words about visit. Third, personal meetingscomponent—during the visit she met not only with French officials (Tymoshenko was
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 114the first Ukrainian PM who met French President) but also she met with Ukrainianswho live in France176. Participation of the such US companies as Dezenhall and TD Internationaltestified that activity of Tymoshenko in 2006-07 was considered as crisis campaign, forinstance TD International specialized on the crisis consulting, in particular on crisis PR.Its tasks consist in decreasing the risks of reputations. US visit of Tymoshenko wasprovided by The Glover Park Group company, which unites former political consultantsof US democrats. At the same time, an ideological change was provided by the foreign-policy adviser H.Nemyrya (after elections 2007 a vice-prime minister of Ukraine onEuropean integration). According to Ukrainian experts he was responsible for visits ofTymoshenko to Brussels and Berlin, orientation of BYUT on Popular party inEuroparliament, and also publication of the fundamental article “Containing Russia” inthe prestige magazine Foreign Affairs. This article caused reaction of MFA of Russiaand series of discussions among political experts in Europe and the USA. Thus, unlike a post-Orange period with mass coverage of Tymoshenko in a duetwith Yushchenko, the campaign 2007 was oriented to expert estimations and forming ofopinion of foreign leaders. As T.Kuzio wrote her image contrasted to the image of otherUkrainian politicians which were with visits abroad and, unlike Tymoshenko, was notable to manage skillfully with complex questions during the public meetings. In theUSA her opened manner complemented by knowledge of question, changed her image.In Europe her image of the elegantly dressed eastern revolutionary and hard positionhelped to change her image in relation to the European hopes of Ukraine and powersafety. The special attention to the leaders also confirmed informal meeting ofTymoshenko with Thatcher before elections 2007. Such meeting became an addition toTymoshenko image as radical reformer just like Thatcher’s Conservative party. Definition of foreign-policy position became the second stage of Tymoshenkocrisis program after her appointment as a premier. Ideologically, Yushcenko andTymoshenko had no foreign-policy disagreements, nevertheless Tymoshenko aimed to176 In June 2005 V. Yushchenko and P. Poroshenko also visited Paris, Tymoshenko organized so called Ukrainian Days in France. But, according to diplomatic rules so many events during short period could cause at least misunderstanding, “it needs to start from minister for foreign affairs, then President in a month and later PM who will fill in the agreements made by both presidents”
  • Part V: 115Ukraine. Foreign Policy Management.Crisis Communication approachintercept initiative of realization of foreign policy. It is possible, that it was related toher primary foreign-policy objectives: in the relationships with EU her main messagewas—Ukraine itself should give sign to EU that we decided to integrate. Louder thissignal is, greater will be the echo; the relationships with Russia were examined in thecontext of energy independence and revision of prices on gas. These priorities were declared during her first foreign visit to Brussels inFebruary 2008, which became an information occasion uniting both priorities ofTymoshenko and defining her relationships with the president of Ukraine. Chronologyof attention (according to Yandex) showed also, that there was probability thatTymoshenko in January 2008 could arrive to Moscow and then to Europe for thedecision of energy questions. However on Yushchenko insistency a visit was moved onFebruary—after Ukrainian-Russian intergovernmental commission with Yushchenkoparticipation. According to Ukrainian business edition Delo the main reason of it wasposition of Yushchenko who wanted to reserve question of revision of prices on transitof Russian gas to Europe. A visit to Brussels became the first attempt to pursue an independent policy,when actually Tymoshenko violated the directives on negotiations, given out byYushchenko. So, in particular, during meeting with the NATO secretary generalTymoshenko was obliged to mark importance of deepening of dialog of Kyiv withAlliance, positive hopes about consideration of Ukrainian initiatives in this direction onthe April summit of NATO in Bucharest. “Improvisations during the bilateral meetings are assumed, but exceptionally within the framework of presidential directives” from the directive of Secretariat of President of Ukraine177. However Tymoshenko in every way tried to avoid the theme of NATO replacingit by initiative of White stream and other events. Media-framing of this visit specifiedthe main function of “White stream”—to form new discussion of energy dependence ofEU. So, at the beginning it was proposed an idea about advantage of additional pipelinefor EU safety (an idea was declared by Tymoshenko in Brussels, though she markedthat practical realization of such project while is not realised). At the same time, thesisabout absence of any prospect of Nabucco pipeline if Russia will pursue a successful177 Already in 2006 the president directives about foreign visits became the reason of conflict between Yushchenko and Yanukovitch. Non-fulfillment of directives was considered as the reason not to allow Yanukovitch to visit the USA.
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 116power policy appeared in Azerbaijanian media (Azerbaijan was considered asparticipant of White stream). As a result European and US editions defined energysafety of Europe in the context of relations of Ukraine with Russia and NATO as thecentral element of visit. The energy subject of conflict president-premier continued in March-April 2008,when Gasprom using scheme of “untwisting” created the key topic of discussion inRussian media: question about the order of mutual payments in gas sphere. Accordingto media-monitoring service Medialogia Yushchenko and Tymoshenko became keypolitical leaders of other state, covered in Russian media. However, quality of suchcoverage differed. As Yushchenko supported saving of existent agreements on gas,often he got positive or neutral coverage (twice more than Tymoshenko). Visits ofYushenko presented as decision of crisis, and visit of Tymoshenko to Moscow in mid-February, had active discussion in media but it did not make any corrections in theagreement of Yushchenko and Putin. The Ukrainian political experts presented a few reasons of failure ofTymoshenko’s Moscow visit. First of all, probably illness of Tymoshenko neutralizedher energetic and influence in negotiations. It was hardly to notice her persistence andnegotiation shrewdness (V.Karasiov). Secondly, impossibility of independentstatements in Moscow. The whole visit looked like produced by Russian side to showlack of independence of Ukrainian premiere in negotiations. On the contrary,achievements of Yushchenko looked much better and important than “technical” trip ofTymoshenko (O.Medvedev). Third, if to compare trip of Yushchenko and Tymoshenkoit is possible to note that president’s trip was covered by both pro- and anti-PutinRussian media that gave sometimes controversial but in general objective information.In Tymoshenko case it is not so clear. It was full of mysteries and not much covered(V.Nebozhenko). Afterword April 2008 became the next stage of crises communications in the foreign policyof Ukraine with the central theme of Ukraine joining to NATO. It is known that thistheme was one of basic for Yushchenko and got active discussion in Tymoshenkogovernment. It is necessary to note that theme of NATO for Ukraine was
  • Part V: 117Ukraine. Foreign Policy Management.Crisis Communication approachsimultaneously in foreign and internal policy, however MFA of Ukraine was the main“manager” of this question. However conflict with Tymoshenko and retirement ofGrytsenko (minister of defence) substantially loosened political possibilities of MFA ofUkraine to use the NATO theme for foreign policy. Yushchenko also had twopossibilities for advancement of question of NATO: visit of G. Bush to Ukraine onApril 1, 2008 and summit of NATO in Bucharest. Visit of G.Bush became “strengthening” preparatory ground for position ofPresident of Ukraine on NATO summit in Bucharest. However summit results becamesurprise for Yushchenko. First off all, acceptance of Action Plan for Ukraine andGeorgia was postponed. And although Yushchenko considered summit as “next”victory of foreign policy of Ukraine, he dismissed the ambassadors in Russia andGermany. Official explanation—for the necessity of rotation of diplomatic personnel. The special attention to Yushchenko policy on summit was shown by Russianpoliticians and media. The question was, foremost, about the phrase said as though byPutin in conversation with G. Bush: “Ukraine is the not a state…”. Such occasionbecame a basis for the wave of counter-Ukrainian utterances of Russian opinion-makers(Lavrov, Luzhkov, Solzhenitsyn and others) which was distributed in Russian media.From other side, as this phrase was unverified information, the Ukrainian diplomatswere not able to get official explanation from Russian MFA. Tymoshenko visit toStrasbourg for PACE also loosen political position of President of Ukraine, when sheanswering the question of Russian representative assured public that Ukraine wouldn’tjoin NATO, if people would vote against it on referendum. Her speech was positivelyestimated by many Russian media. Similar situations and personification of foreign-policy management of Ukraineat the level of President and Premier considerably worsen quality of work of diplomaticmissions. Actually, Ukrainian ambassador (in Russian Federation or other countryimportant for Ukraine) is not an information generator about position of the state, thejournalists of foreign media are foremost oriented on Yushchenko, Tymoshenko,Yanukovitch. The analysis of events framing showed besides that the media often hadclear political position, especially among Russian media. It results in displacement ofpolitical accents, necessity of permanent defence of the Ukrainian position. Theinformation policy of MFA of Ukraine also complicates a situation. For example, State
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 118program on forming of positive image of the state in 2005-6 foresaw a PR campaignand advertising of the state, however attempts to attract private agencies through thetender of MFA in 2005 ended with scandal, when participants blamed its organizers forgarbling of results178. The participants of tender marked also that diplomats hadperceived the task of forming of image foremost as process of placing of advertising inWestern media.178 Позитивный имидж Украины в мире под вопросом // Корреспондент.net 11 Января 2006 [http://www.korrespondent.net/main/141718]
  • Part V: 119Ukraine. Foreign Policy Management.Crisis Communication approach Fig.17. Ukrainian foreign policy crises zones
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 120 Fig.18. Network visualisation of Yushchenko’s foreign activity in 2005
  • Part V: 121Ukraine. Foreign Policy Management.Crisis Communication approach Table 4 Degree Index of foreign and Russian media coverage of gas conflict 2005/2006
  • Crisis communicatons in global politics 122 Fig. 19. Network map of Yanukovitch foreign activity in 2006/2007