Vlad Tarko - Policentricitatea: Structura ordinii spontane in sistemele sociale complexe
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Vlad Tarko - Policentricitatea: Structura ordinii spontane in sistemele sociale complexe

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Pe baza articolului: D.P. Aligica & V. Tarko, 2011, “Policentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom and Beyond”, Governance, in curs de aparitie

Pe baza articolului: D.P. Aligica & V. Tarko, 2011, “Policentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom and Beyond”, Governance, in curs de aparitie

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Vlad Tarko - Policentricitatea: Structura ordinii spontane in sistemele sociale complexe Vlad Tarko - Policentricitatea: Structura ordinii spontane in sistemele sociale complexe Presentation Transcript

  • Policentricitatea
    Structuraordiniispontane in sistemelesocialecomplexe
    Pebazaarticolului: D.P. Aligica & V. Tarko, 2011, “Policentricity: From Polanyi to Ostrom and Beyond”, Governance, in curs de aparitie
  • Ordineaspontana
    Caracteristici:
    Mai multi centri de decizie
    Mecanism de agregare al alegerilorindividuale
    Opusulplanificariicentralizate
    Un singurcentru de decizie
    Structuraierarhica de subordonare
  • Ordineasocialareala
    O combinatie de ordinespontanasi management central
    Ordineacentralizata e o idealizareteoretica – nu exista de fapt – nicimacar in comunism
    Multevariante de sistemesociale cu organizarede tip bottom-up: la modul general le numimsisteme “sistemepolicentrice”
  • Istoriaconceptului de policentricitate
    Michael Polanyi (1951): filosofiastiintei; analogiestiinta-piata
    Lon Fuller (1957-9): drept, limiteleadjudecarii
    V. & E. Ostrom et al. (1960s-70s): reformaadministratieimetropolitane
    E. Ostrom (1980s-2000s): managementul common-pool resources
    V. Ostrom (1970s-90s): federalism
  • Michael Polanyi
    Cum functioneazacomunitateastiintifica
    Multecentre de cercetare
    Au un scop abstract (“adevarul”) darimposibil de operationalizat (nu exista o “metodastiintifica” unica)
    Evolutiastiintifica: prinincercaresieroare; multiplicitateacentrelorsilibertatea de cercetaresuntesentialepentru a aveaprogresstiintific
    Analogie cu altesistemesociale:
    Sistemuldreptuluicutumiar
    Cultura in general
    Piata -> argument original despreimposibilitateacalcului socialist
  • Lon Fuller, limiteleadjudecarii
    Candtrebuie un judecatorsa se abtinasaemita o deciziesisa lase problema in seamapieteisauprocesului democratic?
    Cazuri in care deciziaaraveaefectesecundaremarisinumeroase, iarterteleparti nu suntreprezentate in sala de judecata.
    Existaesecuri ale pietei, democratieisisistemuluijuridic – cheiaeste de a compensaesecuriledintr-o arie cu functionareauneialtearii.
    Cu cat crestegradul de policentricitate al uneiprobleme (ordinea emerge din activitatilemultorcentre de decizie) cu atatcresteprobalitateaeseculuijustitiei (care adjudeca un conflict intredoardouaparti).
  • V. & E. Ostrom et al.reformaadministratieimetropolitane
    Zonelemetropolitane au aparut din crestereasisuprapunereaoraselor => nu au o administrarecentrala => aparenteineficiente
    SuspiciuneaOstromiana: argumentele pro-centralizare ale administratieimetropolitanesunaufoarte similar cu argumenteledesprepretinsafezabilitatea a calculului socialist
    Studiiempirice care au demonstratcaaparentulhaosadministrativ era de fapteficient => ideeacapoateexista un fel de piata a furnizorilor de serviciipublice, “antreprenoriat public”
    Conceptul de “policentricitate” preluat de la Polanyi pentru a explicafunctionareaadministratieimetropolitane
  • Managementul CPR
    Ideeaesteapoiutilizatasipentru a explicasuccesul/insuccesulmanagementuluiCommon-Pool Resources
    Paradoxulorganizariiierarhice:
    Comportamentul la un nivelesteguvernat de regulistabilite de autoritatea de la nivelul superior
    Pentruca o regulasa se respectetrebuiesa fie monitorizatarespectareaeisipedepsitaincalcariiei
    Ceasiguracamonitorizatoriiisifactreaba? Cine-i monitorizeazapecei care monitorizeaza? => regresieinfinita
    Sistemulierarhic are o problema: nivelul superior ramanediscretionar
    Solutia paradoxului:
    Introducereasi a unui control de jos in sus.
    Participarelocala in monitorizaresistabilirearegulilor => cointeresareamonitorizatorilor de a-si face treaba cum trebuie
    Rezulta un sistempolicentricpemaimultenivele de organizare: autoritati locale cu un anumit grad de independenta
  • Federalism
    Nivelurile de organizarecapata o anumitaindependenta: federalism (V. Ostrom).
    Market-preserving federalism (Weingast):
    Hierarchy of governments (central and local) with delineated scope of authority;
    Each government’s autonomy is institutionalized in a self-enforcing manner;
    Economic regulations are conducted at local level;
    Common market (local governments are prevented by central government to engage in protectionism);
    Local governments face hard budget constraints (can’t print money and don’t have indefinite access to credit).
  • Ostrom: accent pus pelaturaempirica
    Identificareaconditiilor in care diferitesisteme de management policentricfunctioneazaeficient.
    Rezulta o conturareincipienta a atributelordefinitorii ale policentricitatii:
    Multiplicitateacentrilor de decizie
    Cum functioneazasi cum interactioneazaei
    Sistem de reguli general
    Caracteristici ale juristictieisistemului de reguli
    Cum suntimplicatiagentii in determinarearegulilor
    Competitieintremodurile de organizare
    Libertatea de intrare/iesire
    Managementulinformatieirelevantepentrudecizii
  • Lista de sistemepolicentrice
    Exemple:
    Comunitateastiintifica
    Piata
    Dreptulcutumiar
    Administratiametropolitana
    Democratiareprezentativa
    Federalismul
    Market-based management
    Exempleinrudite:
    Dreptul international
    Anarhia
  • MetodologiaGerring-Goertz
    Varianteclasice de conturare a unui concept:
    Definitia de tip “gen proximdiferentaspecifica”
    Asemanari de familie
    Formalizarealogica a celordoua:
    Un set de proprietati, {X, Y, Z, ...} , cu diverse valoriposibile {{x1, x2,...}, {y1, y2,...}, {z1, z2,...}, ...}
    Folosestedoarconjunctii:
    Conceptulspecificacevaloritrebuiesaaibaproprietatile: e.g. x1 & y2 & z5& …
    Folosesteoriceoperatiilogice:
    E.g. (x1sau x3) & y2 & (z1sauz5)
  • Aplicatia la policentricitate
    Luatediferiteexemple de policentricitatesimapatevalorileatributeloridentificate de Ostromcaimportante:
    Multiplicitateacentrilor de decizie
    Cum functioneazasi cum interactioneazaei
    Sistem de reguli general
    Caracteristici ale juristictieisistemului de reguli
    Cum suntimplicatiagentii in determinarearegulilor
    Competitieintremodurile de organizare
    Libertatea de intrare/iesire
    Managementulinformatieirelevantepentrudecizii
  • Intr-o singura formula
    𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑦𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 
    = 𝑃1 & 𝑃2 & 𝑃3 & (𝐴1#𝐴2) & (𝐵1#𝐵2) & (𝐶1#𝐶2)&
     & (𝐷1#𝐷2#𝐷3) & (𝐸1#𝐸2#𝐸3) & (𝐹1#𝐹2) & (𝐺1#𝐺2)
    where “&” denotes the logical “and”, while “#” denotes the logical “exclusive or”.
    288 de cazuridiferiteposibile
     
  • Posibilitati de disparitie a policentricitatii (1/3)
    Multiplicity of decision centers break-down:
    non-P1: active exercise of diverse opinions eliminated (monopoly)
    non-P2: the system becomes hierarchical
    non-(A1 or A2): the activity becomes considered meaningless (the goals disappear, the polycentric system disappears because it no longer serves a function)
  • Posibilitati de disparitie a policentricitatii (2/3)
    Overarching system of rules break-down:
    non-P3: rules no longer considered useful by agents
    non-(B1 or B2): agreement about territoriality disappears (decision centers fight over territorial authority)
    non-(C1 or C2): no agreement about rule design (rules are no longer considered legitimate and their enforcement becomes difficult to impossible)
    non-(D1 or D2 or D3): the rule of law breaks down - power-based decisions (authority rule)
  • Posibilitati de disparitie a policentricitatii (3/3)
    Spontaneous order break-down:
    non-(E1 or E2 or E3): no entry (monopoly)
    non-(F1 or F2): the constituency of the system is unclear (some decision centers accept X as part of the system while others do not)
    non-(G1 or G2): no available information relevant to decision making (random decisions, relation between consequences and rules unclear, spontaneous order turns into drift)
  • Care sistemepolicentricesuntcelemaivulnerabile?
    A1: common/shared goals
    B1: territorial
    C2: rules designed by outsider
    D3: majority rule
    E2: merit-based entry
    F2: constrained exit
    G2: private information
  • Design institutional
    Conceptul de policentricitateasa cum l-am definit face posibilaexistenta a 288 de sistemepolicentricediferite – in teorie.
    Analizasidezvoltareainstitutionala a unuisistempolicentricpresupuneintrebarea:
    Ce s-arintampladaca am schimbavaloareaatributului X din ceaactualaintr-unadintrecelelaltevarianteposibile?
    Posibilecriterii normative:
    Rezilienta, eficienta, echitabilitatea etc.
  • Exemple
    Social-democratii: Educatie & sanatate: 𝐷2->𝐷3 (individual decision replaced by majority rule)
    Libertarienii: sistemulbancar: 𝐷3->𝐷2 (interest rates determined by the Central Bank should be freed and left entirely at the decision of individual banks)
    Licenteocupationale: 𝐸1->𝐸2(free entry should be replaced by merit-based entry)
    Drepturileomului: 𝐵1->𝐵2 (certain rights should be territory independent)
     
  • Nu exista o regulagenerala a cum e un sistempolicentricoptim
    Exemple legate de “rules designed by outsider”:
    Sistemuljuridic optimal: 𝐶1->𝐶2 (the separation between the juridical power and the legislative and executive powers, i.e. ideally, the rules that constrain the executive power are no longer designed by the executive power itself)
    Sistemul de piata optimal: 𝐶1->𝐶2 (it is usually considered undesirable when firms and corporations get involved, mainly via lobbying, in the design of market regulations; transition from mercantilism to modern capitalism)
    Sistemul democratic ideal: 𝐶2->𝐶1 (citizens are no longer completely separated from the process of rule design)