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Shimon Naveh's presentation on Systemic Operational Design at Fort Leavenworth, January 2007.

Shimon Naveh's presentation on Systemic Operational Design at Fort Leavenworth, January 2007.

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Shimon Naveh PowerPoint Shimon Naveh PowerPoint Presentation Transcript

  • Transforming the Triad Extending the Potential Shimon Naveh Fort Leavenworth January 2007 Operational Art Operational Command S ystemic O perational D esign
    • The Limits of Operational Art (meta-discipline)
    • What is operational art?
    • Which determinants define its unique nature?
    • What is the structure of its historical evolution from the point of view of the present?
    • What are the difficulties in applying it to our strategic culture?
    • The Morphology of Operational Learning (Heuristics)
    • What are the principal failures of our strategic epistemology?
    • What are the cognitive challenges of operational understanding (sense making)?
    • What is the logical structure of operational learning?
    • What is the nature of the thinking tools applied in processes of operational learning?
    • The Architecture of Operational Command
    • What are the traditional roots of our misconception of operational command?
    • What is the functional logic of operational command?
    • Which essential conditions enhance the utility of operational command?
    • What are the principal considerations in the organization of operational command?
    • The Mental Modeling of Generalship (operational command agent)
    • What are the failures of western strategic discourse in conceptualizing generalship?
    • What are perspectives structuring the construction of a mental model for op. com.?
    • Which qualities enable the general to perform the logic of operational command?
    • What may be the institutional value of such a mental model?
    Operational Discourse Principal Themes – Critical Questions
  • Modesty Skepticism Idealism Heresy Me’tis Generalship as a Mental System The Rhomboid Concept of Me’tis
  • The defining characteristic of warfare is precisely the inevitable distance that separates the reality of it from its model . In short, to think [operationally] about warfare is to think about the extent to which it is bound to betray the ideal concept of it . All this forces us to ask point blank what conditions are necessary for a science of the conduct of warfare to be possible … And we are bound to recognize that, of all the forms of logic that rule the world of action (which are, however copied from those that rule the world of knowledge), the most rigorous of them, that of the “law”, is inapplicable to the conduct of warfare because of the changeable and variable nature the phenomena involved . (Francois Jullien, A Treatise on Efficacy pp. 11-12) … While the kind of intelligence designated by me’tis is deployed at many different levels, the emphasis is always on “practical efficacy” , that is to say, on “the pursuit of success in a particular field of action”. Me’tis is characterized in particular by the fact that, through some more or less fundamental maneuver and by making the most of circumstances, it is possible to win out over brute strength. As the field of application for me’tis is the world of all that is shifting, multiple, and ambivalent, this kind of intelligence is infinitely adaptable and nimble; it is said to be “lithe” and “multicolored”. Because the realities that it affects are usually tugged this way and that by contrary forces, it has to remain polymorphous and mobile; because it needs to control a constantly changing situation, it remains open to all possibilities and itself changes constantly in order to adapt to circumstances. Even more ungraspable and elusive than the world in which it operates , thanks to its malleability it is able to triumph where there are no hard and fast rules for success. Its model – or at least its favorite bestiary – combines the roles of the fox and the octopus . Like the former, it is adept at turning back on its tracks; like the latter it is able to seize hold of its victim and paralyze it. Similarly, Odysseus is so devious that he can foil the attacks of any opponent and ensnare him with his eloquence. (Francois Jullien, A Treatise on Efficacy, pp. 8-9) Me’tis : A Descriptive Explanation
  • Modesty Skepticism Idealism
    • Aware of the limits of his knowledge
    • Understands that his ability to “produce” ideas relevant to the emerging context depends on deliberate confrontation with opinions different from his own
    • Realizes that his appropriate functioning depends on a rigorous discourse with his subordinate warfighting COs
    • Functions in the virtual and leaves the exploration of the actual to the forward subordinate warfighters
    • Practices discoursive rather than autocratic command & is aware on his dependence on the interpretations of his forward TACOMs
    • Not intimidated by intellectualism
    • Relates to every phenomenon as complex
    • Oriented toward generation of questions rather than answers
    • Focuses on the unknown and the implicit
    • Understands the dialectical relations between methodology and content in relation to a problematized context
    • Always Questions the limits of the institutional paradigm
    • Defines every problem he frames as simple for understanding yet difficult for execution
    • Operates through problematization & hypothesis
    • Regards everything that works as obsolete
    • Rationalizes every complex emergence by constructing a system frame
    • Pursues potential for transformation through operation
    • Applies action as a learning tool broadening his knowledge
    • Betrays his initial frame once confronting it with the emerging operational reality
    • Frames patterns serving both as a basis for rational planning and a reference for his reflective learning
    • Perpetuates the tension between synthesis and analysis , form and logic , the recognizable and the possible
    • Employs tactical vocabulary in his rhetorical interactions with his warfighting subordinates
    • Affects trust in the prevailing paradigm while expediting to unexplored territories
    • Protects his subordinate COs & defends existing tactical patterns
    • Articulates his operational concepts to be understood by TACOMs
    Because the realities that it affects are usually tugged this way and that by contrary forces, it has to remain polymorphous and mobile; because it needs to control a constantly changing situation, it remains open to all possibilities and itself changes constantly in order to adapt to circumstances Heresy Metis
  • Design Planning
    • Is about sense making & Learning
    • Is based on synthesis
    • Provides referential framework for re-design (shifts)
    • Rationalizes emergence & fabricates context
    • Perpetuates critical dialogue & rigorous thinking
    • Defines potential & sets forth transformation
    • Questions the limits of existing knowledge
    • Observes st. reality outside prevailing paradigm
    • Frames operations & creates new/unique patterns
    • Centers on discourse
    • Rationalizes complexity by utilizing system logic
    • Initiates paradigm-shifts (deconstruction)
    • Functions in the virtual & based on abstract mediation
    • Creates through exploitation of difference
    • Sets logical boundaries for planning
    • Is holistic, yet incomplete & un-detailed (open construct)
    • Exploits the methodology-content dialectics
    • Synthesizes multi disciplines in context
    • Is about action & use of existing knowledge
    • Is based on analytical procedures
    • Provides a working-frame for action
    • Depends on universal logic & relates to physical situation
    • Employs formal patterns, uniform templates & vocabulary
    • Pursues defined missions by utilizing action
    • Functions within the boundaries of existing paradigm
    • Examines physical reality through existing templates
    • Adapts generic mission categories to physical situation
    • Centers on hierarchic decision-making
    • Contest randomness by manipulating existing patterns
    • Produces a closed construct ending with mission’s life
    • Functions in the actual and is based on reflection in action
    • Adapts through exploration of similarity
    • Operates within the logical bounds set by design
    • Is complete within its partiality
    • Depends exclusively on existing contents
    • Is uni-disciplinary and based on homogeneity
    M M M Synthesis through Difference System Framing Rival as Rationale Command as Rationale Logistics as Rationale Operation Framing Functions Forms
    • System Framing
    • Structuring the Inquiry (Thinking about thinking )
    • Strategic Context
    • Strategic Narrative
    • Strategic Trending
    • System limits – Transformation potential
    • Rival as Rationale
    • Learning the rival system
    • Rival as cultural system
    • Rival as political system
    • Rival as economic system
    • Rival as social system
    • Rival’s strategic system
    • Rival’s command system
    • Rival’s logistical system
    • Rival’s maneuvering system
    • Disruption conditions
    • Command as Rationale
    • Learning challenges – Differential gaps
    • Interfacing NCA
    • Interfacing warfighting commanders
    • Organizational architecture
    • Staff arrangement
    • Logistics as Rationale
    • Learning challenges – Structural gaps
    • System mobilization (campaign potential)
    • System deployability (operation boundaries)
    • System sustainment (warfighting abilities)
    • Control arrangements
    • Operation Framing
    • Learning problematization – Operational Heuristics
    • Terminating configuration
    • Systemic shock manifestation
    • Time constitution
    • Space production
    • System of functions (operational conditions)
    • Forms of maneuver
    Patterns Of Learning Patterns of Language Patterns of Space Patterns of Events SOD Depth Structure System Framing Rival as Rationale Command as Rationale Logistics as Rationale Operation Framing Functions Forms
  • System Framing: Principal Themes & Key Questions
    • Structuring the Inquiry
    • What differentiates the current emergence from the prevailing national strategy?
    • What are the sources for potential obstructions affecting our ability to understand the complexity we are facing, and to learn the possible courses of its flow?
    • What adaptations are required in the logic & structure of the design inquiry process
    • Which references can serve as a basis for critical thinking & reflective learning?
    • Strategic Context
    • What are the strategic implications of the differences between the “emerging reality” and the “routine” we have been experiencing?
    • Which elements in the strategic directive affect our thinking about the emerging context?
    • Which circumstantial factors motivate us to re-consider the uniqueness of the emergence?
    • Strategic Narrative
    • What is the structure (plot) of the “story” that has brought to our recent realizations?
    • Who are the key actors in the emerging strategic play, and how do they fit in our narrative?
    • How do we map our strategic narrative into a system model?
    • Strategic Trending
    • What are the logical trends implied by the strategic directive?
    • What are the strategic conditions for the transformation of the current system into an alternative one?
    • What is the strategic potential lying in such a transformation?
    • System Limits – Transformation Potential
    • What are the principal tensions between the strategic narrative, our perceptions of the present and our understanding of the potential embodied in a “future reality”?
    • What are the strategic implications of these tensions?
    • What are the principal approaches for organizing our strategy in time and space?
    System Framing Rival as Rationale Command as Rationale Logistics as Rationale Operation Framing Functions Forms
  • Rival as Rationale: Principal Themes & Key Questions
    • Learning the Rival System
    • Which unique characteristics differentiate the rival as a system, both from our institutional experience and prevailing strategic discourse, and what learning measures are implied by these differences?
    • Which “implicit variables” (components exceeding the boundaries of our existing knowledge) enhance the complexity of the rival system, and under what conditions can these variables be illuminated?
    • Which conceptual references offer a basis for critical thinking & reflective learning of the rival as a system?
    • What subject matter specialists can promote our understandings by being integrated into our learning system?
    • The Rival as Cultural System
    • What are the cultural sources of the rival’s “otherness” ?
    • What are the rival’s primary patterns of culture, and how are they manifested in his political discourse, and strategic practice?
    • What are the essential functions of the rival’s cultural system, what are the relations between them, and how are they reflected in the development of his common narrative/discourse?
    • What are the tensions between the rival system’s cultural heritage and his current strategy?
    • The Rival as Political System
    • What are the principal differences between the rival system and our political cultures, and how these differences may affect the competing strategies?
    • What are the principal power groups in the rival’s political system, and how are the relations between them manifested in the common strategic discourse, organization and practice?
    • What are the intrinsic as well as extrinsic, sources of the rival system political strength and legitimacy?
    • What are the “generators” of tension in the rival’s political system?
    • The Rival as Economic System
    • What are the key functions in the rival’s economic system, and how does his current economic agenda reflect the relations between them?
    • What are the characteristics of the rival system’s economic food chain, and how are they manifested in the security nets structure of the welfare apparatuses?
    • What are the tensions between the rival’s economic system and strategy?
    System Framing Rival as Rationale Command as Rationale Logistics as Rationale Operation Framing Functions Forms
  • Rival as Rationale: Principal Themes & Key Questions
    • The Rival as Social System
    • What is the organizing logic of the rival’s social system, and what are the sources of its cohesion?
    • What are the power groups and functional components of the rival’s social system, and how do the political structure, military apparatus and economic organization reflect the relations between them?
    • What are the elements of self-regulation in the rival’s social system, and where lies the potential for transformation?
    • The Rival ‘s Strategic System
    • What is the organizing logic of the rival’s strategy, and what are the key functions of his strategic system?
    • What are the historical sources of the rivals’ current strategic logic, what are the landmarks in the evolution of the rival’s strategic discourse?
    • What are the principal tensions in the rival’s strategic system and how they affect his positioning, deployment and maneuvering?
    • Which implicit variables in the rival’s strategic system require investigation in operation?
    • The Rival ‘s Command & Learning System
    • In what respects the differences in the structure of command, between our system and the rivals’ imply differences in the approach to institutional learning?
    • What is the organizing logic of the rival’s command system, and how the tensions between its key components have been manifested in its functioning?
    • What are the elements of self-regulation in the rival’s command system?
    • Which conditions facilitate the disruption of the rival’s command system, and what are its elements of self-regulation?
    • The Rival ‘s logistical System
    • What are the organizing logic, structural characteristics, and functional components of the rival’s logistical system?
    • How is the rival’s logistical logic manifested in his strategic deployment and operational organization?
    • Which logistical components in the rival’s system can be deliberately exploited in favor of our operational maneuvering system?
    System Framing Rival as Rationale Command as Rationale Logistics as Rationale Operation Framing Functions Forms
  • Rival as Rationale: Principal Themes & Key Questions
    • The Rival’s Operational Maneuvering System
    • What can we learn about the rival’s unique operational logic from the apparent differences in doctrine, organization, deployment and activity between our and his strategic systems?
    • What are the “implicit variables” in the rival’s operational system, what are the systemic implications of their “invisibility”, and what are the operational conditions for their “cognitive disclosure”?
    • How does the rival’s organization of space reflect the strategic dialectics of geography-rationale and operational dialectics of form-logic?
    • In what respects do the relations between the rival’s strategy and his operational deployment reflect perceptions of space and time different from ours?
    • Which formal characteristics of the rival operational configuration reflect systemic logic?
    • Disruption Conditions
    • What are the tensions between the rival’s strategy and his operational maneuver system, and how can these be manipulated to serve our pursuit of strategic potential?
    • Under which operational conditions will the rival’s maneuver system loose its systemic coherence?
    • What are the conditions for suppression of the rival’s learning system and operational ability to adapt (his ability to appreciate critically the discrepancy between his perception of the operational reality and the actual operational occurrence)?
    System Framing Rival as Rationale Command as Rationale Logistics as Rationale Operation Framing Functions Forms
  • Command as Rationale
    • Learning Challenges – Differential Gaps
    • What can we learn about the organizing logic of our learning command system through the reflections on the differences between the “system framing”, “rival as rationale” and our institutional command patterns?
    • Which particular learning processes are supposed to cope effectively with the unique problems and concrete challenges deriving from our critical observations?
    • What should be the structure of the process enabling our command system to appreciate emerging changes in the operational logic through reflection in action?
    • Which novel aspects of warfare, that are implied by the uniqueness of the context, require special attention in terms of learning, both prior and in the course of the campaign?
    • Interfacing NCA
    • Which unique conceptual ambiguities, political sensitivities and strategic problems, implied by the uniqueness of the context, require special tailoring of learning processes, working procedures, organizational structures, and deployment of facilitating agencies to enable effective interfacing between NCA and our combatant command, both during the design & planning, and in the course of the campaign?
    • Which singularities of the unique constellation imply special arrangements of functioning relations between our combatant command and other associate combatant commands?
    • Which special strategies of integration and interfacing with non-military agencies are required to enable our combatant command to effect the unique logic implied both by the system framing and the rationalization of the rival?
    • Interfacing Warfighting Commanders
    • Who should be the key warfighting command agents that will enable the combatant commander, from their forward positioning and through their critical interpretations, to explore the hidden variables, answer the open questions, consider “emerging differences”, and define changes in the operational logic, in the course of the campaign?
    • What behavioral conditions and organizational measures can structure the process of command discourse in a manner promising critical (reflective) learning?
    • Organizational Architecture
    • What architectural changes should be introduced to meet the tension between existing organizational patterns and the heuristic challenges implied by the context, to assure the networking of all relevant service elements, coalition contingents, non-military governmental agencies, and NGOs into the operational command system?
    • Staff Arrangements
    • What institutional and personal staff arrangements should be introduced in the combatant command HQ to support protracted systemic inquiry and operational learning all along the campaign?
    System Framing Rival as Rationale Command as Rationale Logistics as Rationale Operation Framing Functions Forms
  • Logistics as Rationale
    • Control arrangements
    • Which method of striation supports the control of deployment of the logistical system in space?
    • Which method of striation supports the control of the development of the logistical system in time?
    • Learning Challenges – Structural Gaps
    • What are the experiential frameworks that can provide a reference for asking the critical questions defining the logical boundaries of the logistical problem relating to the current strategic context?
    • What positive insights concerning the organizing logic of the logistical system can we gain from observing the difference between the emerging context (ecology) and the existing logistical paradigm?
    • What are the knowledge gaps affecting our ability to define the campaign’s strategic potential (calculus) in terms of space-time & resources-method (“ends-means”)?
    • System Mobilization (campaign potential)
    • What system of logistical (meta-logistics) conditions (terms of resources mobilization & concentration, space organization, arrangements of political & economic cooperation) must be set in order to assure potential for the application of a system of operations (campaign) capable of transforming the constellation in compliance with our strategic interests?
    • What are the operational challenges implied by the specific genre/form of warfare we encounter that require special logistical measures and concrete organizational answers?
    • What are the relevant space-time frameworks (definitions) that serve the regulation of our functioning at the strategic, operational, and tactical spheres, both prior and in the course of the campaign?
    • System Deployability (operation boundaries)
    • What complex of resources is required to produce a constant “flow of energy” for the development of the operational maneuver in time and space to create essential conditions for transformation?
    • What method of organizing these resources in the operational space-time will enable the maneuver to evolve in a logical continuum departing from a deterministic line and descending into an emergent one?
    • System Sustainment (warfighting abilities)
    • Which organizational structure/arrangement provides warfighting units with freedom of action for both accomplishment of their tactical missions, and adaptation to changing circumstance in the course of fighting?
    • How does the “operational geography” affect decisions on lines of approach, staging bases, and LOCs, organization of transportation means, patterns of delivery and evacuation, and the formation of supply packages?
    System Framing Rival as Rationale Command as Rationale Logistics as Rationale Operation Framing Functions Forms
  • Operation Framing
    • Learning Problematization – Operational Heuristics
    • What are the open questions, operational ambiguities and conceptual problems that can only be illuminated through “reflection in action” and command discourse in the course of the campaign?
    • What are the relevant experiential references that can facilitate critical conceptualization of the terminating configuration, systemic shock manifestation, and form of operational maneuver, and how do we refrain from self-imprisonment within the prevailing patterns?
    • What are the essential parameters for critical observation of compatibility between the way the operational maneuver develops and the initial operational logic we have set, and under what conditions we will be able to appreciate significant change in the logic of the running operation?
    • What particular tensions between the design process and the pattern of planning should be regulated to assure a continuum of critical learning between the operational commander and his tactical subordinates?
    • The logic of which observed operational trends/phenomena cannot be expressed through the prevailing operational vocabulary, and how should we regulate the discoursive relations between the existing tactical jargon and the patterns of language embodying the logic of our new operational observations?
    • Terminating Configuration
    • What is the formal manifestation of the logic embodying the conditions for the effectuation of the transformation?
    • Which operational conditions are essential to the materialization of the terminating configuration in space and time?
    • Systemic Shock Manifestation
    • Under what conditions we may control the development of the rival form of maneuver?
    • The deliberate implementation of which operational conditions deprives the rival of his synergetic functioning ability, and what operational circumstances provide indications for the divergence of his system logic?
    • What is the operational setting precipitating disparity between the apparent form of maneuver and the rationale it strives to effectuate?
    • What are the measures for disguising our form of maneuver from the rival, and how can we manipulate learning disparities between our competing systems?
    • Time Constitution
    • What is the operational setting harmonizing our contextual perceptions of strategic-operational-tactical time, what are the time ( chronos ) boundaries of the operation, and what are the conditions for defining an emerging opportunity ( kairos ) in the course of the running operation?
    • How should we orchestrate the rhythm of operational actions ( tempo ) to comply with the logical space extending between the terminating configuration and the state of rival system shock?
    • What is the timing of the various activities enabling the comprehension of emerging logic (learning) at every stage of the operational process development?
    System Framing Rival as Rationale Command as Rationale Logistics as Rationale Operation Framing Functions Forms
  • Operation Framing
    • Space Production
    • What is the operational setting harmonizing our contextual perceptions of strategic ( expanse )-operational ( latitude )-tactical ( distance ) space, what are the spatial boundaries of the operation, and what is the geographical constellation for defining an opportunity?
    • What arrangement of operational efforts produces a spatial system harmonizing the tensions between punctum and continuum, contiguity and non-contiguity, presence and absence, unipresence and omnipresence, echeloning and simultaneity, “striation” and “smoothening”?
    • What are the spatial conditions enabling the operational command system to appreciate changes in logic of the operation in the course of its conduct?
    • System of Operational Functions
    • What are the essential functions supporting the learning of the logical difference between the initial system-operation framing and the actual emergences (heuristic conditions) in the course of the operation/campaign?
    • What are the functions of the operational system that provide the cognitive beacons for its coherent development within the logical poles of terminating configuration and state of rival system shock?
    • What are the unique characteristics of each function concerning its relative bearing to the limits of the prevailing paradigm, its alignment in regard to the terminating configuration and the state of rival system shock, and its relations to other operational functions?
    • Forms of Maneuver
    • What is the formative outline synthesizing various organizational components (arms, services, governmental agencies and NGOs) into an operational unity capable of accomplishing a particular operational function?
    • What are the institutional implications of the observed disparity between the prevailing organizational paradigm and the requirements stipulated by the effectuation of particular forms or patterns of maneuver within the overall operational frame?
    • What should be the structure of the operational reserve, in the light of the foreseen problems and anticipated challenges?
    • What are the relations between visible and invisible patterns of action within the overall frame of operational maneuver form?
    System Framing Rival as Rationale Command as Rationale Logistics as Rationale Operation Framing Functions Forms
  • Key References: A Concise Reading List
    • Operational Art: The Discipline of Martial Architects
    • G.S. Isserson, (Tr. Bruce Menning), The Evolution of Operational Art , Fort Leavenworth, 2005, pp. 1-82.
    • Francois Jullien, A Treatise on Efficacy – Between Western and Chinese Thinking , Hawai’i University Press, 2004.
    • T.E. Lawrence, “Science of Guerrilla Warfare”, Encyclopedia Britannica , 14 th Edition, 1929.
    • Sun Tzu, (Translation and introduction Roger Ames), The Art of Warfare , New York, 1993, pp. 39-96 (“Analysis of Sun Tzu).
    • Strategic Epistemology – Operational Heuristics
    • Humberto R. Maturana & Francisco J. Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding , Boston, 1998, pp. 33-54 (“The Organization of Living Things”), 73-92 (“The Life of Metacellulars”).
    • David Bohm, and F. David Peat, Science, Order, And Creativity , London, 2000, pp. 15-62 (“Revolutions, Theories, and Creativity in Science”), 151-91 (“The Generative Order and the Implicate Order”).
    • Gerald Edelman, Bright Air Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind , New York, 1992, pp. 42-51(“Morphology and mind: Completing Darwin’s Program”), 99-110 (Memory and Concepts: Building a Bridge to Consciousness”), 188-96 (Is it Possible to Construct a Conscious Artifact”).
    • Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy? , Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 15-34 (“What is a Concept”).
    • Gregory Bateson, Sacred Unity – Further Steps to an Ecology of Mind , New York, 1991, pp. 161-74 (“Mind/Environment”).
    • Margaret A. Boden, The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms , Bungay, Suffolk, 2004, pp. 54-87 (“Maps of the Mind”).
    • Niklas Luhman, Theories of Distinction – Redescribing the Descriptions of Modernity , Stanford University Press, 2002, 94-112 (“Deconstruction as Second-Order Observing”).
    • Between Subversion and Discourse: Critical Thinking and Autopoietic Systems
    • Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia , London, 1988, pp. 351-423 (“Treatise on Nomadology – The War Machine”).
    • Jean Francois Lyotard, The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge , University of Minnesota Press, 1984, pp. 3-6, 14-18, 27-36, 53-60.
    • David Bohm, On Dialogue , Bungay, Suffolk, 2006.
    • 2 nd Order Cybernetics: Systems of Observation, Systems of Inquiry, Systems of Learning
    • Peter Checkland, Systems Thinking – Systems Practice , New York, 2004, pp. 125-48 (“Hard Systems Thinking – The Engineers’ Contribution”), 149-91 (“The Development of Soft Systems Thinking”), 192-240 (“T he Systems Methodology in Action”).
    • Stafford Beer, Diagnosing the System for Organizations , New York, 2003, pp. 1-134.
    • Gordon Pak, The Cybernetics of Human Learning and Performance , London, 1975, pp. 258-99 (“Learning Strategies, Teaching Strategies, Matching and Mismatching”).
    • Ervin Laszlo, The Systems View of the World , Broadway, NJ, 1996, pp. 59-94 (“The Systems View of Ourselves”).
    • George Klir, Facets of Systems Science , New York, 2001, pp. 24-7 (“Classification of Systems”), 37-46 (“Systems Thinking”), 63-87 (“Epistemological Categories of Systems”), 123-32 (“Systems Knowledge”), 154-70 (“Simplification Strategies”).
    • Alicia Juarrero, Dynamics in Action , MIT Press, 1999, pp. 151-62 (“Dynamical Constraints as Landscape: Meaning and Behavior as Topology”), 215-44 (“Explaining Human Action: Why Dynamics Tells Us That Stories are Necessary?”).
    • John Mingers, Realizing Systems Thinking – Knowledge and Action in Management Science , New York, 2006, pp. 33-61 (“Living Systems – Autopoiesis”), 65-99 (“Observing Systems: The Question of Boundaries”), 103-27 (“Cognizing Systems”), 167-92 (“Social Systems”), 217-53 (“The Process of Multi-Methodology”).
    • Tony Clementson, Strategy and Uncertainty: A Guide to Practical Systems Thinking , Amsterdam, 1988, pp. 10-36 (“Defining the System”, “Operations”), 167-92 (“On the Assessment of Systems”, “Strategy and Change”).
    • Operational Commander as System Designer
    • Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Life of Nelson – The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain , Naval Institute Press, 2001, pp. 229-36 (“The Battle of St. Vincent”), 293-305 (“The Battle of the Nile”),694-96 (“Plan of Attack, May 1805”), 696-99 (“Memorandum, 9 October 1805).
    • Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki, (translation and editing), Truppenfuhrung , Boulder, Colorado, 2001, pp. 22-38 (“Command”).
    • Ralph D. Sawyer, (translation), The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China , pp. 60-75 (“The Dragon Secret Teaching”), 292-300 (“Superior Strategy”).
    • Frank O. Gehry, “Reflections on Designing and Architectural Practice”, In Richard J. Boland, and Fred Collopy, (eds.), Managing as Designing , Stanford University Press, 2004, pp. 19-35.
    • Barbara Czarniawska, “Management as the Designing of an Action Net”, in Richard J. Boland, and Fred Collopy, (eds.), Managing as Designing , Stanford University Press, 2004, pp.102-05.
    • Design: Problematization of a Complementing Methodology
    • Richard Buchanan, “Wicked Problems in Design Thinking”, in Victor Margolin and Richard Buchanan , (eds.), The Idea of Design – A Design Issues Reader , MIT Press, 1995, pp. 3-20.
    • Klaus Krippendorff, “On the Essential Contexts of Artifacts or on the Proposition that ‘Design is Making Sense (of Things)’ “in Victor Margolin and Richard Buchanan, (eds.), The Idea of Design – A Design Issues Reader , MIT Press, 1995, pp. 156-86.
    • Victor Margolin, “The Product Milieu and Social Action”, in Richard Buchanan and Victor Margolin, (eds.), Discovering Design – Explorations in Design Studies , Chicago University Press, 1995, pp. 121-45.
    • Carl Mitchman, “Ethics into Design”, in Richard Buchanan and Victor Margolin, (eds.), Discovering Design – Explorations in Design Studies , Chicago University Press, 1995, pp. 173-89.
    • Victor Papanek, Design for the Real World , Chicago, 2000, pp. 151-85 (“Rebel with a Cause: Invention and Innovation”).
    • Howard Margolis, Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition – A Theory of Judgment , Chicago University Press, 1987, pp. 169-87 (“Cognitive Dynamics: Paradigm Shifts”).
    • Herbert A. Simon, The Science of the Artificial , MIT Press, 1996, pp. 111-38 (“The Science of Design: Creating the Artificial”).
    • John Thackara, In the Bubble – Designing in a Complex World , MIT Press, 2005, pp. 135-60 (“Learning”).
    • Design: Setting The Boundaries for the Operator’s Praxis
    • Bernard Tschumi, Architecture and Disjunction , MIT Press, 1999, pp. 101-20 (“Architecture and Limits”), 191-206 (“Abstract Mediation and Strategy”).
    • Christopher Alexander, The Timeless Way of Building , Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 55-74 (“Patterns of Events”), 75-100 (“Patterns of Space”), 167-210 (“Our Patterns of Language”).
    • Peter G. Rowe, Design Thinking , MIT Press, 1998, pp. 39-114 (“Aspects of Design Thinking”).
    • Donald A. Schon, The Reflective Practitioner – How Professionals Think in Action , New York, 1983, pp. 76-104 (“Design as Reflective Conversation with the Situation”), 128-67 (“The Structure of Reflection in Action”).
    • Brian Lawson, How Designers Think – The Design Process Demystified , Architectural Press, 2005, pp. 29-50 (“Route Maps of the Design Process”), 51-61 (“The Components of Design Problems”), 113-30 (“Problems, Solutions and the Design Process”), 185-204 (“Design Strategies”).
    • John Chris Jones, Design Methods , New York, 1992, pp. 45-60 (“The New Methods Reviewed”), 272-92 (“Methods for Searching for Ideas”).