Dr. Jon Zack - Overview of Current FMD Countermeasures

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Overview of Current FMD Countermeasures - Dr. Jon Zack, Director, Preparedness and Incident Coordination Staff at USDA – APHIS-VS, from the 2013 NIAA Merging Values and Technology conference, April …

Overview of Current FMD Countermeasures - Dr. Jon Zack, Director, Preparedness and Incident Coordination Staff at USDA – APHIS-VS, from the 2013 NIAA Merging Values and Technology conference, April 15-17, 2013, Louisville, KY, USA.

More presentations at http://www.trufflemedia.com/agmedia/conference/2013-niaa-merging-values-and-technology

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  • 1Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter can be as follows: (a) Delayed depopulation and disposal of vaccinated animals; (b) Slaughter of vaccinated animals if animals are eligible for slaughter under USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) authority and rules and/or State and Tribal authority and rules.2Stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live can be as follows: (a) Vaccinated animals intended for slaughter can go to slaughter, if animals are eligible for slaughter under USDA FSIS authority and rules and/or State and Tribal authority and rules; or (b) Vaccinated animals intended for breeding, milking, or other purposes can live out their useful lives.
  • Slide #4 :NCAHEM – Preparedness and Incident Coordination (IC)The Preparedness and Incident Coordination staff continues to improve the Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response (FAD PReP) tool box. The FAD PReP raises awareness, defines expectations and improves capabilities for FAD preparedness and response.Despite the fact that we invest a lot of man power in preparedness, we recognize that stakeholder engagement is crucial to planning and response. Therefore, we started a series of Stakeholder meetings to make our Stakeholders aware of our capabilities, listen to their concerns, and together, develop a new FMD response strategy that includes vaccination as a viable response tool. We are currently working on developing the policy. The Preparedness and Incident Coordination staff continues to work to improve preparedness and response efforts. This slide highlights three key areas—the Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan, including wider work within NCAHEM on FMD response policy, the Secure Food Supply Plans, such as the Secure Egg Supply Plan, and the National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps, or NAHERC. NCAHEM recognizes that stakeholder collaboration is crucial to planning and response, and therefore strives to engage stakeholders through many mechanisms, so together, we can improve FAD preparedness and response planning.
  • Slide #15: NVS Logistics CatalogThe NVS continues to improve its readiness. During fiscal year 2011 the unit had many significant accomplishments, including the online publishing of its logistics catalog. This catalog is posted to the NVS restricted-access Web site and helps NVS State and Tribal planners with this task.
  • Slide #16: Current Deployable CapabilitiesThe NVS current capabilities include the items listed; I will briefly talk to each in the following slides.Future acquisitions currently in the pipeline consists of:Cold Chain Packaging Solutions - Pallet Shippers, Temperature Monitoring Devices, to include Envelopes that can be used at the field levelSwine Panel Transport TrailersMobile Swine Electrocution UnitsTransport Trailers to move our current inventory of Poultry Foam UnitsCut-Resistant Gloves and Improved Nitrile GlovesBerm Systems used in decontamination operationsLarge Portable Trailer Mounted Refrigeration Unitsand Large Cattle/Bison Portable Squeeze Chute Systems. The NVS continues to improve by making sure responders have the appropriate countermeasures to respond to damaging animal disease outbreaks. If you have any suggestions feel free to email us at nvs@aphis.usda.gov. I will now let Dr. Zack finish the update.

Transcript

  • 1. FMD Preparedness and Response:Overview of CapabilitiesAnd Critical ActivitiesNIAA FMD Symposium, April 18, 2013Jon Zack, DVMUSDA APHIS Veterinary ServicesEmergency Management and Diagnostics
  • 2. Preparing for and responding to foreignanimal diseases (FADs) are critical activitiesto safeguard our nation’s animal health,public health, and food supply.2
  • 3. FMD Detection-First Steps48 – 72 HOURS24 – 48 HOURS0 – 24 HOURS• Initiate quarantine, holdorders, movement restrictionsand standstill notices (e.g.,24 –72 hours) for relevant zonesand regions• NotifyStates, Tribes, industry, tradingpartners, media• Initiate biosecurity measures• Initiate tracing activities• Initiate virus identification forvaccine• Initiate Incident Commandprocesses• Evaluate quarantine andmovement controls• Ongoing surveillance andtracing activities• Initiate coordinated publicawareness campaign• Ongoing biosecurity measures• Initiate continuity of businessplans• Continue virus identification forvaccine• Evaluate quarantine andmovement controls• Continue ramping up IncidentCommand and OperationsCenter• Ongoing surveillance andtracing activities• Ongoing biosecurity activities• Ongoing public awarenesscampaign• Continue virus identification forvaccineCritical Activities in the First 72 Hours of an FMD OutbreakFMD VirusDetectedAppropriate critical activities andtools will continue to be employedthroughout response.3
  • 4. FMD Response in the United States• Rapid diagnosis and reporting• Epidemiological investigation and tracing• Increased surveillance and disgnostic capacity• Swift imposition of effective quarantine and movement controls• Continuity of business measures for non-infected premisesand non-contaminated animal products• Biosecurity measures• Cleaning and disinfection measures• Effective and appropriate disposal procedures• Mass depopulation and euthanasia (as the response strategyindicates)• Emergency vaccination (as the response strategy indicates).• Information Management• Communications & public awareness campaignSource: ISUCritical Activities and Tools for Containing,Controlling, and Eradicating FMD4
  • 5. Quarantines, Movement Controls, and Continuity ofBusinessFMDDetectionCritical Activities Implemented as FMD Outbreak Response ProgressesControl AreaEstablishedHold Orders andStandstill Notices forRelevant Regions and ZonesQuarantineandMovementControlsManagedMovement throughContinuity ofBusiness Plans5
  • 6. Carcass Disposal
  • 7. 6 TYPES OF FMD OUTBREAKS
  • 8. Strategy or Strategies Definition of Strategy Likelihood of Use Example of ApplicationStamping-Out (noemergency vaccination)Depopulation of clinically affectedand in-contact susceptible animals.Likely (if outbreak is contained injurisdictional areas in which FMDcan be readily contained andfurther dissemination of the virusis unlikely).Stamping-out Infected Premises.Stamping-Out Modifiedwith Emergency Vaccinationto SlaughterDepopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals andvaccination of at-risk animals, withsubsequent slaughter of vaccinatedanimals.Highly likely (depending onthe type of the FMDoutbreak).Stamping-out Infected Premises; emergencyvaccination to slaughter within the Control Areain Containment Vaccination Zones.Stamping-Out Modifiedwith Emergency Vaccinationto LiveDepopulation of clinically affected and incontact susceptible animals andvaccination of at-risk animals, withoutsubsequent slaughter of vaccinatedanimals.Highly likely (depending onthe type of the FMDoutbreak).Stamping-out Infected Premises; emergencyvaccination to live outside of the Control Area inProtection Vaccination Zones.Stamping-Out Modifiedwith Emergency Vaccinationto Slaughter and EmergencyVaccination to LiveCombination of emergency vaccination toslaughter and emergency vaccination tolive (previous two rows).Highly likely (depending onthe type of the FMDoutbreak).Stamping-out Infected Premises; emergencyvaccination to slaughter within the Control Areain Containment Vaccination Zones andemergency vaccination to live outside of theControl Area in Protection Vaccination Zones.Vaccination to Live (withoutStamping-Out)Vaccination used without depopulation ofinfected animals or subsequent slaughterof vaccinated animals.Less likely (unlikely to beimplemented at start ofoutbreak).No stamping-out of Infected Premises; Vaccination to liveoutside of the Control Area in Protection Vaccination Zones.No Action FMD would take its course in the affectedpopulation; measures may beimplemented to stop spread.Highly unlikely. Quarantine and movement control measures;biosecurity measures; cleaning and disinfectionmeasures implemented. No stamping-out andno vaccination.OVERVIEW OF TRADITIONAL FMD RESPONSESTRATEGY OR STRATEGIES
  • 9. 10
  • 10. Size of Regulatory Control AreasSize of Control Area: Perimeter should be at least 10 km (~6.21 miles)beyond the perimeter of the closest Infected Premises. This area may beredefined as the outbreak continues.Small Control Area Large Control AreaCertainty that all Infected Premises arecontained in Control Area is lower.Certainty that all Infected Premises arecontained in Control Area is higher.Likelihood of disease spread to outside theControl Area may be higher.Likelihood of disease spread to outside theControl Area may be lower.Quarantine and movement controls easier tomanage; less resources required, lessanimals and premises to manage.Quarantine and movement controls harder tomanage; more resources required, morepremises and animals to manage.Potentially less impact to normal business. Potentially more impact to normal business.Examples of the Upsides and Downsides toLarge and Small Control Areas11
  • 11. 12
  • 12. FMD Outbreak in Texas—Small Control AreaNumber of Livestock Affected: ~5.7 millionNumber of Operations Affected: ~9,300Source: NASS, 200713
  • 13. FMD Outbreak in Texas—Medium Control AreaNumber of Livestock Affected: ~17.8 millionNumber of Operations Affected: ~34,000Source: NASS, 200714
  • 14. FMD Outbreak in Texas—Large Control AreaNumber of Livestock Affected: ~33.7 millionNumber of Operations Affected: ~290,000Source: NASS, 200715
  • 15. Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats OperationsInfected Zone (pink) 14,933 66,515 3,893 404Buffer Zone (blue) 143,866 1,860,968 20,107 2,525Total 158,799 1,927,483 24,000 2,929Total livestock affected: 2,110,282IOWA OUTBREAK: ONE INFECTED COUNTYUSDA APHIS Veterinary Services • National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM)4700 River Road Unit 41 • Riverdale, MD 20737 • (301) 851-3595 Data: NASS, 2007
  • 16. Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats OperationsInfected Zone (pink) 63,548 240,484 8,067 1,025Buffer Zone (blue) 463,637 3,534,164 32,844 6,245Total 527,185 3,774,648 40,911 7,270Total livestock affected: 4,342,744IOWA OUTBREAK: THREE INFECTED COUNTIESUSDA APHIS Veterinary Services • National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM)4700 River Road Unit 41 • Riverdale, MD 20737 • (301) 851-3595 Data: NASS, 2007
  • 17. Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats OperationsInfected Zone (pink) 181,106 1,567,560 18,690 3,108Buffer Zone (blue) 1,927,955 11,423,618 133,979 23,723Total 2,109,061 12,991,178 152,669 26,831Total livestock affected: 15,252,908IOWA OUTBREAK: NINE INFECTED COUNTIESUSDA APHIS Veterinary Services • National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM)4700 River Road Unit 41 • Riverdale, MD 20737 • (301) 851-3595 Data: NASS, 2007
  • 18. Where Bovine Swine Sheep/Goats OperationsInfected Zone (pink) 181,106 1,567,560 18,690 3,108Buffer Zone (blue) 1,927,955 11,423,618 133,979 23,723Vaccination Zone(yellow)1,873,283 6,225,637 101,501 19,698Total 3,982,344 19,216,815 254,170 43,799Total livestock affected: 23,453,329IOWA OUTBREAK: NINE INFECTED COUNTIES ANDVACCINATION ZONEUSDA APHIS Veterinary Services • National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM)4700 River Road Unit 41 • Riverdale, MD 20737 • (301) 851-3595 Data: NASS, 2007
  • 19. Continuity of Business (Managed Movement)FMDDetectionDiscussing Continuity of Business PlanningControl AreaEstablishedHold Orders andStandstill Notices forRelevant Regions and ZonesQuarantineandMovementControlsManagedMovement throughContinuity ofBusiness Plans20
  • 20. Critical Activities: Quarantine, Movement Control,and Continuity of Business• Quarantine and movement controls: Applied to premises in theregulatory Control Area to ensure infected animals, fomites, andproducts do not leave premises to stop the spread of FMD.• Quarantines are applied to Infected, Suspect, and ContactPremises.• Movement controls are applied to At-Risk and Monitored Premises.Consideration will be given to critical movements (i.e. feed trucks).• Continuity of business (managed movement): Intended to manage themovement for uninfected premises (At-Risk and Monitored Premises)in a regulatory Control Area to facilitate movement out of the ControlArea.Different tools, same goal: to prevent the transmission of FMD touninfected premises, especially those outside the Control Area,using science- and risk-based approaches that facilitate continuityof business for uninfected premises.21
  • 21. Benefits of Continuity of Business(Managed Movement) PlanningContinuity of business (managed movement):• Intended to manage the movement for uninfected premises(At-Risk and Monitored Premises) in a regulatory Control Areato facilitate movement out of the Control Area.• Works with quarantine and movement controls to limit disease-spread while facilitating movement of non-infected animals andnon-contaminated animal products. Protects animal health, by working to stop the spread ofFMD, limiting the number of infected premises and infectedanimals. Minimizes disruptions to interstate commerce and internationaltrade, thereby minimizing economic hardships. Guards food security, by facilitating the movement of unaffectedanimals and animal products during an FMD outbreak.22
  • 22. Continuity of Business (Managed Movement)Planning—Understanding the Specifics• Pro-Active Risk assessments: Determining transmission risk ofproduct or animal movement.• Surveillance requirements: How frequently samples will becollected, from what populations, and for how long.• Biosecurity guidance: Appropriate precautions, PPE, andspecific steps for various fomites.• Cleaning and disinfection procedures: Cleaning and disinfectionprocedures.• Epidemiological information: Information on movement on andoff a premises, as well as number of animals, species, and age.• Permitting guidance: Transparent, explicit guidance for IncidentCommand regarding movement requirements based oncommodity.23
  • 23. Planning for an FMD Outbreak is Complex24
  • 24. What Are YourFMD Response Goals?What are Your FMD PreparednessGoal?FMD Response Goals25
  • 25. Safeguarding Animal Health 26FMD Response CapabilitiesNAHERCNational Animal Health Emergency Response Corps
  • 26. Safeguarding Animal Health 27National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS)
  • 27. Safeguarding Animal HealthNVS Logistics Catalog• Posted on NVS restricted Website http://nvs.aphis.usda.gov• Accessible by NVS planners• Password protected• Describes contents of Modules1-8, large animal handling andpoultry depopulation equipment,carcass disposal supplies, andcommunication equipment28
  • 28. Safeguarding Animal HealthCurrent Deployable Capabilities• 24 Hour Push Packs ofPPE and decon supplies• PPE individual kits• Antiviral medications• Vaccine• Poultry depopulationfoaming units, CO2 carts• Mobile refrigeration/vaccine storage &transport systems• Animal handlingequipment• Response supportservices29
  • 29. Response Planning for FMD30