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    pact carbon transition pact carbon transition Document Transcript

    • PACT: Pathways for Carbon Transition Deliverable D6 3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions September 2011 EC/DG Research Project 225 503 Authors: B. Château, B. Bougnoux Dissemination level: PU
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"Table of content1 Abstract .............................................................................................................. 42 Introduction ........................................................................................................ 0 2.1 Limits to the development of the current energy system ............................... 0 2.2 Post-carbon transition.................................................................................... 1 2.3 Defining, designing and quantifying post-carbon transition scenarios ........... 23 Outlines and main features of the 3 post-carbon transition scenarios ......... 3 3.1 The social expectations as regard welfare .................................................... 3 3.2 The social balance between environment and wealth ................................... 5 3.3 Two visions of long term EU post-carbon situations ...................................... 6 3.4 Three transition scenarios to post-carbon for the EU .................................... 8 3.5 Scenario outlines ........................................................................................... 0 3.5.1 International context ................................................................................ 0 3.5.2 EU context .............................................................................................. 1 3.5.3 Local transitions ...................................................................................... 34 Spacecraft........................................................................................................... 5 4.1 International context ...................................................................................... 5 4.1.1 Governance of global issues ................................................................... 5 4.1.2 Policies, opportunities and constraints of major World players ............... 6 4.2 The EU and member countries context ......................................................... 8 4.2.1 Economic model ..................................................................................... 8 4.2.2 The social balance between environment and wealth ........................... 11 4.2.3 Technology, energy efficiency and stake-holders strategies ................. 13 4.3 Local transitions........................................................................................... 14 4.3.1 Local players policies and actions......................................................... 15 4.3.2 changes in urban schemes ................................................................... 16 4.3.3 Daily life in post-carbon societies in the EU .......................................... 185 Smartphone ...................................................................................................... 21 5.1 International context .................................................................................... 21 5.1.1 Governance of global issues ................................................................. 21 5.1.2 Policies and constraints of major World players.................................... 22PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 0
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" 5.2 The EU and member countries context ....................................................... 24 5.2.1 Economic model ................................................................................... 24 5.2.2 The social balance between environment and wealth ........................... 26 5.2.3 Technology, energy efficiency and stake-holders strategies ................. 28 5.3 Local transitions........................................................................................... 30 5.3.1 Local players policies and actions......................................................... 30 5.3.2 Changes in urban schemes .................................................................. 32 5.3.3 daily life in post-carbon societies in the EU ........................................... 346 Hard Way .......................................................................................................... 38 6.1 International context .................................................................................... 38 6.1.1 Governance of global issues ................................................................. 38 6.1.2 Policies and constraints of major World players.................................... 39 6.2 The EU and member countries context ....................................................... 41 6.2.1 Economic model ................................................................................... 41 6.2.2 The social balance between environment and wealth ........................... 43 6.2.3 Technology, energy efficiency and stake-holders strategies ................. 44 6.3 Local transitions........................................................................................... 46 6.3.1 Local players policies and actions......................................................... 47 6.3.2 Changes in urban schemes .................................................................. 48 6.3.3 Daily life in post-carbon societies in the EU .......................................... 507 Quantifying carbon transition pathways ........................................................ 52 7.1 From scenario storylines to quantitative models inputs ............................... 53 7.1.1 Identification of relevant exogenous inputs of the models ..................... 53 7.1.2 Linking the storylines to the relevant exogenous inputs of the models . 58 7.1.3 Quantifying the relevant exogenous inputs of the models ..................... 58 7.2 Socio-economy, energy and CO2 projections in PACT transition scenarios 70 7.2.1 Socio-economy, EU-27 ......................................................................... 70 7.2.2 End-use technologies and energy needs, EU-27 .................................. 76 7.2.3 Global energy outlook ........................................................................... 79 7.2.4 CO2 emissions outlook ......................................................................... 838 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 869 Annex 1: brief description of VLEEM/TILT ....................................................... 010 Annex 2: brief description of the POLES model ......................................... 411 Annex 3: linkage between scenario statements and models inputs ....... 11PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 1
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"12 Annex 4: scenario projections .................................................................... 14 12.1 EU-27 as a whole ..................................................................................... 14 12.1.1 Socio-economy .................................................................................. 14 12.1.2 End-use technologies and energy needs........................................... 16 12.2 Core cities ................................................................................................ 18 12.3 1st rings.................................................................................................... 19 12.4 Small/medium cities ................................................................................. 20 12.5 Sparse settlements................................................................................... 21PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 2
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"List of figuresFigure 3-1: Visions of the post-carbon transitions .................................................................................................. 6Figure 7-1: VLEEM/TILT overview .......................................................................................................................... 53Figure 7-3: GDP assumptions, PACT scenarios ...................................................................................................... 66Figure 7-4: assumptions on oil availability, PACT scenarios .................................................................................. 66Figure 7-5: Biomass potentials in PACT scenarios ................................................................................................. 67Figure 7-6: Biomass use in PACT scenarios............................................................................................................ 67Figure 7-7: Improvements in carbon intensities, PACT scenarios .......................................................................... 68Figure 7-8: Carbon values, PACT scenarios ........................................................................................................... 69Figure 7-9: EU-27 demography, PACT scenarios ................................................................................................... 71Figure 7-10: EU-27 urbanization, PACT scenarios ................................................................................................. 72Figure 7-11 : EU-27 dwellings, PACT scenarios ..................................................................................................... 73Figure 7-13: EU-27 car use and technology, PACT scenarios ................................................................................ 77Figure 7-15: EU-27 dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios ....................................................................... 78Figure 7-18: Oil prices on World markets, PACT scenarios .................................................................................... 80Figure 7-19: EU primary energy, PACT scenarios .................................................................................................. 81Figure 7-21: Electricity generation mix, world, PACT scenarios ............................................................................ 82Figure 7-22: Electricity generation mix, EU-27, PACT scenarios ............................................................................ 83Figure 7-26: CO2 emissions by sector, EU-27, PACT scenarios .............................................................................. 85Figure 9-1: VLEEM overview .................................................................................................................................... 0Figure 10-1 : Overview of the POLES model ............................................................................................................ 5Figure 10-2 : Oil and gas production module .......................................................................................................... 9List of tablesTable 7-1: Quantitative assumptions for the 3 scenarios, VLEEM-TILT ................................................................. 60Table 7-2: UN-2008 population medium projections ............................................................................................ 65Table 7-3: EU-27 demography, PACT scenarios .................................................................................................... 71Table 7-4: EU-27 urbanization, PACT scenarios .................................................................................................... 72Table 7-3: EU-27 economy and welfare, PACT scenarios ...................................................................................... 73Table 7-6: EU-27 dwellings, PACT scenarios .................................................................... Erreur ! Signet non défini.Table 7-7: EU-27 mobility indicators, PACT scenarios ..................................................... Erreur ! Signet non défini.Table 7-8: EU-27 car use and technology, PACT scenarios .............................................. Erreur ! Signet non défini.Table 7-9: EU-27 car energy consumption and CO2 emissions, PACT scenarios ............. Erreur ! Signet non défini.Table 7-10: EU-27 dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios .................................. Erreur ! Signet non défini.Table 7-11: EU-27 useful energy of buildings, PACT scenarios ........................................ Erreur ! Signet non défini.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 3
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"1 AbstractPost-carbon transition scenarios for the European Union (EU) are based on the 3following observations:a) because of limits in oil and gas resources, and because of climate change, theWorld will not have the possibility to continue for long developing on fossil fuels as itdid in the past;b) something else (energy efficiency/thriftiness, renewables, nuclear, carbon captureand sequestration (CCS), either forced or anticipated, will take the lead well beforethe end of the century;c) because of time delays for nuclear and CCS to prove sustainability on largeamounts, renewables and efficiency/thriftiness might well be the core of the"something else".What is called "post-carbon transition" is precisely the process through which"something else" will substitute progressively and massively for fossil fuels, and startshaping new technological clusters, new economic and social organisations, newbehaviours and preferences, i.e. new energy-technology paradigm.Depending on its social and political dimensions, at local, national and internationallevels, the post-carbon transition may take very different routes, with differentconsequences as to the green house gases (GHG) emissions trajectories up to 2050.3 scenarios are therefore elaborated and quantified to capture three "extreme" routestowards post-carbon EU. Welfare expectations More GDP focussed Spacecraft Growth Business with as usual anticipation of limits Balance wealth More attention to Smartphone More attention to / environment wealth environment Hardway Limits to New growth welfare More « beyond GDP » focussedThese scenarios do not necessarily include quantitative targets for GHGs mitigationor fossil fuels market shares by 2050: PACT focuses more on post-carbon transitionsand less on the description of future post-carbon worlds, which may be achieved in amore or less distant future. But for easing the comparison among transition routes,PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 4
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"and clarifying their consequences for policy making, we have assumed similar GHGsconcentration in 2050 for all scenarios, around 500 ppmv for energy CO2.Scenario 1, "Spacecraft" : a highly centralized while cooperative project, thewedding of speed and technology, working well with absolute physical limitation inresources."Spacecraft" (SC) describes a centralized transition process duly planned andmanaged by governments and big industrial and financial stakeholders, in a ratherconsensual movement among main GHGs emitting countries worldwide. In particular,they agree to commit themselves to mandatory reduction objectives of the carbonintensity of the GDP, accounting for carbon content of imported and exported goods."Spacecraft" is highly technology oriented. Centralized technologies and innovationdriven by big industries, in particular the "green" ones, are the pillars of a fast Worldeconomic development, respectful of the limits in natural resources and climate inthis transition process.The EU is expected to experience a moderate-to-high GDP growth in this scenario,thanks to a high World demand for its high value products and services, despite thefierce competition of China and Emerging Countries for current goods and services,and the technology leadership of the USA.Maximizing the GDP on the long term within a globalized World remains the priorityof national and EU policies. "Spacecraft" is a scenario where the demographicdecline stops, immigration is encouraged and the human capital increases steadily inthe EU-27. The consumption model and the behaviours remain roughly unchanged.Local transitions are mostly driven by policies and strategies decided andimplemented by Governments and big players. Local players still play an importantrole, but limited to the practical implementation of the national and EU policies andmeasures.Urban sprawl is stopped in relative terms (share of the total population concerned),but continues in absolute terms. Small/medium cities, in particular close to big cities,expand rapidly. Spatial networking among these dynamic cities and with big cities isdeveloping fast, in particular thanks to new fast rail infrastructures.Electric and plug-in hybrid cars chase out the conventional ICE cars in the stockaround 2040; together with biofuels, this contribute to decrease by a little more than85% the direct specific CO2 emissions per km of cars. Very energy efficient buildingconcepts are generalized in the construction everywhere after 2015, while newretrofitting techniques allow for drastic energy savings in existing buildings.On-shore and off-shore wind, Concentrated Solar Power (CSP), biomass and othercentralized renewables contribute to roughly 40% of electricity generated in the EU,and nuclear 35%.The total primary energy consumption of the EU-27 will grow by 20% between 2000and 2050, but the contribution of fossils will decrease in the same time by 1/3.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 5
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"The World CO2 emissions related to energy will peak up at 38Gt around 2020 andthen decrease steadily, with a 2050 level close to that of 2000. Thanks to CCS, CO2concentration in the atmosphere will stabilize around 500 ppmv in 2035. In the EU-27, the CO2 emissions related to energy will decrease by almost a factor 2 from 2000to 2050.Scenario 2, "Smartphone ": a bottom-up carbon transition process in which socialnetworking and ICTs plays a critical role."Smartphone " starts more or less as "Spacecraft", but diverge rapidly when itbecome obvious that Governments and big stakeholders will fail to implement a realand effective governance of the problems related to oil/gas resources and climatechange. Instead, EU and member states governments, which are fully aware of thenature and urgency of the climate and resources problems, rely as much as possibleon local / regional authorities, NGOs and citizens to address these issues. Althoughthere is no global commitments on GHG mitigation, most cities in Europe, US, Chinaand other main emerging countries adopt and implement drastic energy and climateplans.The EU is expected to experience a low - but smart, much better distributed - GDPgrowth in this scenario, for two reasons: a weak World demand for its high valueproducts and services, and a weak internal demand resulting from moderatedemographic perspectives and deep changes in people preferences andconsumption pattern ("beyond GDP" perspective). There is a clear social preferencefor a life more balanced between jobs, family and self-accomplishment in thisscenario."Smartphone " is oriented on small and smart technologies, which are supported by asocial movement towards more autonomy, more connectivity and more self-reliance.Consumers want to become more and more actors as well, which is enabled bynetwork operators investing in smart grids. Nevertheless, few believe that technologywill "save the world". Individual behaviours and social organization appear asimportant. ICTs, decentralized "green" technologies (photovoltaïcs for instance) andinnovation driven by new, small size, industries accompany this "grass root"phenomenon.Local transitions are the bulk of the overall transition movement, and they are mostlydriven by local and regional authorities in the one side, citizens and NGOs in theother side. Local players play a critical role, both in the design and the practicalimplementation of policies and measures mostly decided at the local and regionallevels. These local and regional policies take fully account of changes in socialbehaviours and consumption preferences to reach climate change objectives withinlocal energy and climate plans.Urban sprawl is stopped and then regresses, both in relative and absolute terms. Bigcities, both cores and 1st rings, are strongly densified, and small/medium citiesnearby expand rapidly. Isolated small/medium cities continue to loose population.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 6
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"Spatial networking among big cities and with medium cities nearby is developing fast,in particular thanks to new fast rail infrastructures.Electric and plug-in hybrid cars chase out the conventional ICE cars in the stockaround 2040; together with biofuels, they contribute to decrease by almost 75% thedirect specific CO2 emissions per km of cars. Very energy efficient building conceptsare generalized in the construction everywhere after 2015, associated with PV inzero-energy and +energy buildings in many cases. Thermal retrofitting in existingbuildings is generalized, although less efficient than in "Spacecraft".Electricity needs will increase by 50% between 2000 and 2050; wind power,photovoltaïcs, limited CSP, biomass and other decentralized renewables willcontribute to more than half the electricity generated in the EU in 2050, and nuclear25%.Total primary energy consumption of the EU-27 will decrease by almost 30%between 2000 and 2050, while the contribution of fossils will decrease in the sametime by 2/3.The World CO2 emissions related to energy will peak up at a little lower level than in"Spacecraft" (37Gt), and later (around 2030), and then decrease steadily, with a 2050level close to that of 2000. Thanks to CCS, CO2 concentration in the atmosphere willalso stabilize around 500 ppmv after 2035. In the EU-27, the CO2 emissions relatedto energy will decrease by almost a factor 3 from 2000 to 2050.Scenario 3, "Hard Way": a Business-as-usual scenario, that account fordevelopment/adjustment through violent/brutal crises."Hard Way" describes a carbon transition process which is imposed by the growingproblems and crises resulting from the un-ability of countries and societies to addressin due time the question of the limits in natural resources and environment.Globalization and international relations are driven mostly by national interestconsiderations, paving the way for increasingly conflicting relations among nations.No global governance mechanisms neither for climate change, nor for oil and gasresources.Depletion policies of main oil and gas producing countries (Gulf countries, Russia, ...)are mostly driven by domestic considerations and geo-political aspects. This meansin particular production ceilings in many countries, in particular in the Persian Gulf.This results in increasing tensions on oil and gas markets, with fast rising and highlyfluctuating prices, possible physical shortages in the case of EU, which, after a while,convince an increasing number of persons and industries to switch away from theseenergies and turn to renewables and electricity as fast as possible.In this scenario, the EU is expected to experience first an economic recession,followed by a slow recovery, for three reasons: a weak World demand for its highvalue products and services, a depressed internal demand resulting from a fearconcerning the future (savings first) and supply crisis on oil, gas and main importedminerals.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 7
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"In general terms, "Hard Way" is similar to "Spacecraft" as regard life styles andconsumption model for the two first decades. But afterwards, the long lasting badeconomic conditions and the resulting social tensions, force an increasing number ofpeople, in particular with low income, to change their way of life and consumptionpattern towards something closer to "Smartphone ".EU sticks to its on-going CO2 mitigation efforts. Environmental concerns remainstrong, but the bad economic context and the absence of clear public support makethe adoption and implementation of drastic measures against CO2 emissions ratherdifficult."Hard Way" is not so favourable for technology innovation and development of newinfrastructures that are capital intensive, basically for economic and financial reasons.Nevertheless, the increasing lack of reliability of centralized energy systems favoursthe supply and demand of decentralized solutions.Local transitions participate to a large extent to the overall carbon transitionmovement, and they are mostly driven by the changes in attitudes in a growing partof the population, because the difficult economic conditions in the one side, andbecause an increasing lack of confidence in the conventional energy system in theother side. But local and regional authorities remain mostly followers in this process,partly for policy reasons, partly because of financial constraints .Urban sprawl continues, core cities and 1rings are stabilized and remainingpopulation and households are absorbed by small/ medium towns, in particular in theperiphery of core cities. Spatial networking among big cities continues to bedeveloped, but at a low pace. Investment in new motorways and airportinfrastructures is strongly reduced.Electric and plug-in hybrid cars chase out the conventional ICE cars in the stockaround 2040, but with a lower electricity/motor fuel ratio for hybrids as compared tothe previous scenarios; altogether, with the contribution of biofuels, the specific CO2emissions per km of cars decrease by almost 70%. There are no significant changesin existing standards for buildings construction in all EU countries. Competitiveness,in a context of high prices for oil and gas, remains the main driver of the constructionof low energy and very low energy buildings beyond the actual regulations. Same forzero / +energy buildings. Thermal retrofitting in existing buildings is rather moderatefor financial reasons.Electricity needs fluctuate around 2000 level up to 2050; wind power, photovoltaic,limited CSP, biomass and other decentralized renewables will contribute to morethan half the electricity generated in the EU in 2050, and nuclear 20%.Total primary energy consumption of the EU-27 will decrease by almost 35%between 2000 and 2050, while the contribution of fossils will decrease in the sametime by 2/3.The World CO2 emissions related to energy will peak up still at a little lower levelthan in "Smartphone " (35Gt), and before (around 2025), and then decrease steadily,PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 8
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"with a 2050 level close to that of 2000. Thanks to CCS, CO2 concentration in theatmosphere will also stabilize around 500 ppmv after 2035. In the EU-27, the CO2emissions related to energy will decrease by almost a factor 3 from 2000 to 2050.ConclusionThe 3 scenarios describe very different pathways to post-carbon situations in Europe,resulting in very contrasted social, economic and technology panoramas in 2050.Demography, economic growth, World tensions on resources and climate, policies,behaviours and life styles, technologies, are the main discriminating factors amongscenarios.Nevertheless, these very different routes could lead to similar reduction in CO2emissions of the EU, and similar levels of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, by2050. But with very different prices for oil and gas, and very different values (i.e.constraint) for CO2:- "Hard Way" is the scenario in which the oil prices will reach the highest levels (closeto an average 250 US$2005/bbl in 2050, with the highest fluctuations), but the lowestcarbon value (lowest constraint, around 100 US$2005/t), and the lowest GDP/capita;- "Smartphone " is the scenario with the highest carbon value (constraint), around800 US$2005/t in 2050, with also high oil prices (around 200$2005/bbl in 2050) andhigher GDP/capita than in "Hard Way";- "Spacecraft" is the scenario in which the increase of oil prices is the slower (around140 US$2005/bbl in 2050), with a rather high carbon value (around 400 US$2005/bblin 2050) and a much higher GDP/capita as compared to the other two scenarios.These scenarios do not attempt to indicate to policy makers and stakeholders whatroute must be chosen, but to give them two clear messages:- The EU may reduce in any case by large amounts its consumption of fossils in thenext 40 years, and therefore reduce its CO2 emissions in the same proportion, butthe social, economic and policy costs would be very high if this transition is notproperly planned and implemented;- There not one single way for planning and implementing properly the transition.Indeed, social forces are currently pushing in two very different directions: some tendto reproduce the recipes that have cooked the economic growth of the OECDcountries during the last 50 years (even if this economic model seems a bit tiredthese days), while others consider this model obsolete and fight for inventing a new"beyond GDP" model. Depending on which social forces will become predominant,the transition pathways, even if duly planned and managed, will be very different.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 9
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"2 Introduction2.1 Limits to the development of the current energy systemBefore the turn of the century, oil and gas resources will prove to be too limited toallow production to meet World demand growth at current trends. Coal, whichdisplays much larger resources in the ground, can easily substitute for oil and gas forbig, highly concentrated heat production: electricity generation, energy intensiveindustries,...Substituting for oil and gas in transport is technically feasible (throughsynthetic fuels), but much more difficult and very costly. Coal has already been usedextensively in buildings in the past (and still currently in some countries), but at theexpense of great inconvenience for people, and of severe local pollutions, notacceptable any more in most countries. Altogether, getting back to coal on such alarge extent, even with modern technologies, would create very severe environmentaldamages, both local (SO2, dust,...) and global (green house gases emission), unlesscarbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is mastered in due time at a sufficient scale.Indeed, as shown by the results of the Very Long Term Energy EnvironmentModelling (VLEEM) study1 (fig below), such a movement back towards coal wouldmake CCS at a very large scale a pre-condition to avoid most likely climaticdisasters. If CCS is not timely mastered at such a large scale, the social, economicand political consequences of these climatic disasters would plunge the World in agreat turmoil, with dramatic consequences on wealth and welfare2. Figure 2-1: CO2 emissions and storage in Europe in the fossil paradigm, VLEEM 8 7 CO2 Emissions [Gt CO2] 6 5 Emissions 4 Stored 3 Total 2 1 0 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120The question is: could nuclear replace coal for electricity generation on a very largescale at the global level in case CCS cannot develop beyond well-known but ratherlimited geological storages? In principle, yes, as shown by the VLEEM study. Butunder very strict conditions as to the security and wastes aspects. Hence, the recentaccident at the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan has enlighten worldwide the natureand the magnitude of the security and waste aspects, and this will probably slow1 www.VLEEM.org2 On this matter, see "Stern review"PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 0
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"down for years, maybe decades -if not stop - the recent rebound of the electro-nuclear industry. It has become therefore most unlikely that nuclear might offer asolution to the replacement of coal at the magnitude and speed requested to avoidclimatic disasters.On paper, renewable energy (solar, wind, biomass,...) seems to be more thanabundant in regard to future World energy demand levels, and could well substitutefor fossil fuels in all end-uses of energy. But when getting into the details of costs,location and intermittency of the energies, the picture is much less appealing. Asshown by the VLEEM study, renewables could solve the resource shortage andclimatic problems raised by the fossil fuels, but only under very drastic conditionsincluding energy efficiency, storage (daily and seasonally) and international trade. Itis not just a matter of changing the primary energy inputs in the same processes andappliances to supply the same needs, but to change the whole energy-technologyparadigm.To summarise, it is becoming more and more obvious that:a) the World will not have the possibility to continue for long developing on fossil fuelsas it did in the past;b) the turn to "something else (energy efficiency/thriftiness, renewables, nuclear,CCS)", either forced or anticipated, will take place well before the end of the century;c) because of time delays for nuclear and CCS to prove sustainability on largeamounts, renewables and efficiency/thriftiness might well be the core of the"something else": this is one of the basic assumption of this study.2.2 Post-carbon transitionWhat is called "post-carbon transition" is precisely the process through which"something else" will substitute progressively and massively for fossil fuels, and startshaping new technological clusters, new economic and social organisations, newbehaviours and preferences, i.e. new energy-technology paradigm.Depending on its social and political dimensions, at local, national and internationallevels, the post-carbon transition may take very different routes, with differentconsequences as to the GHG emissions trajectories up to 2050.3 scenarios are elaborated and quantified to capture three "extreme" routes towardspost-carbon EU.- "Spacecraft" (SC) describes a transition process duly planned and managed bygovernments and big stakeholders in a rather consensual movement worldwide,driven by the recognition of the limits (resources and climate), and the willingness toanticipate and manage them in due time.- "Smartphone " (SP) describes a bottom-up managed transition process, wheremunicipalities, NGOs and citizen networking play a leader role in redesigning welfareand security values.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 1
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"- "Hard Way" (HW) describes a transition process poorly managed, imposed by therecurrent and more and more severe crises resulting from the competition for scarceoil resources and from growing extreme climatic events; to some extent, "Hard Way"looks like a business-as-usual scenario without a "happy ending".2.3 Defining, designing and quantifying post-carbon transition scenariosThe purpose of the scenarios is twofold:- to recognize that there is not a unique "post-carbon" EU and a unique path to it, andto draw the consequences of the uncertainties on these matters as to the futurepossible energy systems;- to account for the interactions between the various dimensions of the post-carbontransition as investigated in phase 1 of the PACT project, within consistent visions ofthe transition.As mentioned above, the definition of the scenarios is driven by the willingness tocapture the extreme routes that frame the field of possibilities in matter of post-carbon transitions. This definition has taken the form of scenario outlines which havebeen circulated, and discussed and challenged within a 2 days seminar held inPadova (September 2010).Based on these outlines, a skeleton for scenario story-lines has been elaborated withthree purposes:- provide a common structure for the story-lines of the 3 scenarios, highlighting the 3main levels for appraising policies and consequences (international, national, local),and pointing out the critical points to be addressed in the story-lines for robustness,consistency and transparency purposes;- provide a framework for comparing the main features of the post-carbon transitionsconsidered in the three scenarios;- provide a clear and understandable linkage between the qualitative statements tobe developed in the story-lines and the corresponding quantitative inputs to beplugged into the models to quantify the consequences of the scenarios as regardenergy and GHG emissions (VLEEM/TILT3 and POLES4).Once the skeleton has been adopted, the story-lines have been written, using asmuch as possible the findings of the analytical work of phase 1 (deliverables D1, D2,D3 and D4).3 Very Long Term Energy Environment Model / Transport Issues on the Long Term; short descriptionin annex 14 Propective Outlook of Long term Energy Systems; short description in annex 2PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 2
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"Then, the main exogenous inputs of the models related to the qualitative features ofthe scenarios story-lines have been quantified in 4 steps:a) collection of data on historical values of these exogenous inputs, including that ofthe base year of the modelsb) assessment of the boundary values of these inputs (range of uncertainty) withinthe frame of the 3 scenarios, for 2025 and 2050, mostly based on the quantitativeinputs of phase 1c) allocation of specific values within these boundaries to each scenario according tothe scenario story-linesd) run of the models, check of the consistency and likelihood of the results, finetuning of the values allocated to the exogenous inputs.It must be noted that the scenarios do not necessarily include quantitative targets forGHGs mitigation or fossil fuels market shares by 2050: PACT focuses more on post-carbon transitions and less on the description of future post-carbon worlds, whichmay be achieved in a more or less distant future. But for easing the comparisonamong transition routes, and clarifying their consequences for policy making, wehave assumed similar GHGs concentration in 2050 for all scenarios, around 500ppmv for CO2.The comprehensive storylines of the scenarios, including the quantitative elements,are presented in chapters 4 to 6 hereafter.3 Outlines and main features of the 3 post-carbon transition scenariosThe analytical work developed in the phase 1 of the PACT project has clearlyidentified two main dimensions that will shape the post-carbon transitions in the EU:the social expectations as regard welfare, the social trade-off between environmentand wealth.3.1 The social expectations as regard welfareThe discussion about the social expectations as regard welfare could be summarizedas follows.a) The current economic model assimilates welfare to GDP/capita and thereforetends to maximize the GDP/capita, in particular through the diversification of goodsand services.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 3
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"b) When considering the value of time in addition to the price of goods and services(as currently done in transport models with global cost functions or as suggested byG Becker in the nineteen-sixties5), the perception of the mix of goods and servicesthat maximizes the global individuals utility (= welfare) may change significantly.Indeed, each consumption opportunity for goods and services has a monetary cost,but also a time cost: eating a pre-cooked frozen meal takes less time, but it is moreexpensive, than purchasing the ingredients and cooking the meal at home. The mixof goods services that maximizes the utility for a given income when accounting justfor market prices, may be rather different from the mix that maximizes the utility whenconsidering the value of time.c) Among goods and services, a distinction worth to be made between twocategories: those which do correspond to a logic of maximisation of opportunities perunit of time (the logic of hypermarkets), and those which escape this logic andcorrespond to another rationale where utility is proportional to time spent (sailing orfishing for instance).d) The current productive and economic model (so-called "economy of variety")undoubtedly focuses more on the first kind of goods and services, assuming thatmore diversity means at the same time more value as well as more utility, andtherefore more welfare.e) Many of the alternative views on welfare consider implicitly or explicitly that welfareis more complex, that the quality of the opportunities really matters, in particular forthe second category of goods and services above, and that maximizing valuethrough diversity of goods and services may well not correspond to maximization ofutility if quality -and time in particular - is accounted for in the utility.f) Practically, the GDP growth in the coming decades will be driven by the balancebetween the two above categories of goods and services in peoples preferences, i.e.by the dominant expectations as regard welfare.In practical terms, the consequences of the expectations as regard welfare on thetransition process will be addressed through several input variables of the models,among which:- structure of the time budgets- equipment of households (in particular private vehicles)- GDP- travel speed elasticity to GDP....5 Gary S. Becker (1965) “A Theory of the Allocation of Time,” Economic ]ournal 75 (299), pp. 493-517PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 4
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"3.2 The social balance between environment and wealthThe discussion about the social balance between environmental quality and materialwealth could be summarized as follows.a) Obviously, sustainability as regard greenhouse gases emissions and climatechange is a major dimension of "post-carbon": therefore, the true nature of thetransition issue is that of the trade-off between maximizing wealth and mitigatingGHGs emissions to respect minimum thresholds of sustainability.b) First question then: how is socially defined the "minimum threshold ofsustainability"? There are two possible answers to this question, according to socialpriorities: - either an absolute ceiling for GHG concentration, as that advocated by the EU with the objective of keeping earth temperature increase below 2°C; - or a macro-economic optimum that pretends to balance the alleged costs of GHGs mitigation and adaptation with their macro-economic feed-backs (Nordhaus’ perspective).Depending on the answer to this question, e.i. the social priority, the level of carbonconstraint accepted by the society would be more or less severe, as the social valueof the carbon reflecting this constraint.c) Second question: how the society operates the trade-off between wealthmaximisation and respect of the carbon constraint, in particular to which extent thecarbon constraint (and the related social value of carbon) should and could beintegrated in market signals through any internalization mechanism (tax, tradingsystem,..). Again two answers, reflecting social priorities: - the carbon constraint is not negotiable, and market signals (carbon tax, ETS,...) can and must be used, but only as a complementary means to other policies and measures in order to respect the constraint at the minimum cost; - reaching the macro-economic optimum is the priority, the level of carbon constraint and the related carbon social value are consequences of this optimum; this indicates the optimal price for carbon wherever this price can be internalized in energy prices (carbon tax, ETS,..) and the necessary complementary policies and measures to be implemented wherever the carbon value cannot be internalized in energy prices.d) Practically, the nature, speed and magnitude of the transition will be dependent onhow the societies, in particular in the EU, will answer these questions. This is amatter of awareness and values of the population, of democracy in decision makingprocess, of perception of risks, of stake-holders game, etc...In practical terms, the consequences of this social trade-offs in the transition processwill be addressed through several input variables of the models, among which:PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 5
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"- carbon price/value in the various sectors- climate policies and measures: energy efficiency standards, support to renewablesand nuclear, discount rates, investments in public transport,...- technology options: buildings, transport, electricity generation,...- land-use options: urbanization, renewable energy production,...- life styles and consumption preferences- transport options: soft modes, cars, public transport,.....3.3 Two visions of long term EU post-carbon situationsThe considerations above can be summarized in the following scheme, showing whatthe situation of post-carbon EU might be in the long term. Figure 3-1: Visions of the post-carbon transitions Welfare expectations More GDP focussed Spacecraft Growth Business with as usual anticipation of limits Balance wealth More attention to Smartphone More attention to / environment wealth environment Hardway Limits to New growth welfare More « beyond GDP » focussedVision 1 of post carbon EU: Growth with anticipation of limitsThis vision corresponds to the more commonly accepted one as regard post-carbonEU. To some extent it is where the "Lisbon strategy" is heading. The main features ofthis vision are:- the current economic model still dominates in the EU in the long term- the main industrial stake-holders and policy makers have become fully aware thatthe market signals do not reflect properly the physical limits (natural resources andenvironment) that the World will face in a foreseeable futurePACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 6
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"- international governance of climate change and hydrocarbon resources scarcity isin place, ambitious climate change objectives are reached, based on appropriateinternational mechanisms to mitigate GHG emissions- national climate change policies and measures that go far beyond usual marketmechanisms have been implemented soon enough to be fully effective in 2050- technologies and services that bring micro energy end-uses and electricitygeneration out from fossils are mostly based on centralisation and networks, and theyare fully available and competitive- economic growth is boosted by innovation and productivity within a new Kondrattief-Schumpeter Cycle based on "green" technologies.Vision 2 of post carbon EU: New welfareThis vision of the post-carbon EU is more challenging as compared to the previousone, because it involves deep changes in individual behaviours, social preferencesand economic organization as compared to today situation. It merges current ideasabout "beyond GDP" with low carbon issues.The main features of this vision are:- industrial stake-holders and policy makers have become fully aware that the marketsignals do not reflect properly the physical limits that the World will reach in aforeseeable future;- but central governments have failed to implement national climate change policiesand measures that go really far beyond usual market mechanisms, prices of fossils(including taxes) are very high in the EU;- demand by individuals and local authorities for technologies and services that bringmicro energy end-uses and electricity generation away from fossils has resulted in anew offer, mostly decentralized and competitive of such technologies and services,with "paradigm" effects (i.e. effects on behaviours and organisation);- considerable awareness about limits in resources and environmental problemsamong common people, with very tangible consequences on behaviours,consumption pattern and life styles;- strong desire of autonomy with large amounts of micro energy consumers-producers having a strong perception of limits;- the income per capita increase slowly, but people compensate the lack of growth ofconsumption opportunities by more attention to daily life quality and less stress ontime.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 7
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"3.4 Three transition scenarios to post-carbon for the EUThree transition scenarios to the 2 future post-carbon EU (the two "visions" above)are investigated:- one transition scenario leading to "growth with anticipation of limits", named"Spacecraft", more or less a successful "Lisbon strategy";- two transition scenarios leading to "new welfare", one rather positive, named"Smartphone ", where the transition is socially desired and implemented, and onerather negative, named "Hard Way", where the transition is imposed by the limits,and suffered by the people. The storylines of these 3 scenarios are displayed in the sections 4, 5 and 6 of thereport."Spacecraft""Spacecraft" (SC) describes a centralized transition process duly planned andmanaged by governments and big industrial and financial stakeholders, in a ratherconsensual movement among main GHGs emitting countries worldwide, driven bythe recognition of the limits (resources and climate), and the willingness to anticipateand manage them in due time.Centralized technologies (economies of scale) and innovation driven by bigindustries, in particular the "green" ones, are the pillars of a fast World economicdevelopment, respectful of the limits in natural resources and climate in this transitionprocess.The scenario is named "Spacecraft" for three main reasons: a highly centralizedwhile cooperative project, the wedding of speed and technology, working well withabsolute physical limitation in resources."Smartphone""Smartphone " describes a smooth bottom-up transition from BAU to new welfare. Itstarts more or less as "Spacecraft", but diverge rapidly when it become obvious thatGovernments and big stakeholders will fail to implement a real and effectivegovernance of the problems related to oil/gas resources and climate change. Instead,EU and member states governments, which are fully aware of the nature andurgency of the climate and resources problems, rely as much as possible on local /regional authorities, NGOs and citizens to address these issues.ICTs, decentralized "green" technologies (economies of series) and innovation drivenby new, small size, industries accompany this "grass root" phenomenon.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 8
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"More generally, globalization and multi-lateralism are more and more contested bycountries populations in this scenario, paving the way to increased protectionism andbilateral relations, within regional blocks.The scenario is named "Smartphone " because it describes a bottom-up carbontransition process in which social networking and ICTs plays a critical role both inraising the awareness of the common people as regard limits in resources andclimate, and in designing and imposing local, decentralized solutions to theseproblems."Hard Way""Hard Way" describes a carbon transition process which is imposed by the growingproblems and crises resulting from the un-ability of countries and societies to addressin due time the question of the limits in natural resources and environment. To someextent, Hard Way can be considered as a Business-as-usual scenario that accountfor development/adjustment through violent/brutal crises.It supposes the continuation of the current trends as regard selfishness of nations,without emergence of citizens movement against it. More generally, globalization andinternational relations continue to be driven exclusively by national interestconsiderations in this scenario, paving the way for increasingly conflicting relationsamong nations.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 9
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"3.5 Scenario outlines3.5.1 International context Spacecraft Smartphone Hard way High international cooperation, Weak international cooperation1 International context worldwide worldwide, regional blocks Isolationism and protectionism1.1 Governance of global issues Global governance Local governance No governance Binding targets on carbon intensity of Local climate plans with voluntary1.1.1 Climate change and GHG mitigation No target the GDP for main world players targets of GHG emission per capita1.1.2 Availability and Accessibility to oil Oil and gas markets highly regulated Oil/gas production ceilings and bilateral Oil/gas production ceilings and marketand gas resources worldwide agreements Globalisation efficient to boost the1.1.3 World trade Restrictions to globalisation High protectionism world economy and trade1.1.4 World finance No restriction to financial flows Some restrictions to financial flows Recurrent financial crises1.2 Major world players policies and US and China heading, main emerging China and major emerging countries China and major emerging countriesconstraints countries and EU doing well heading, US resists, EU follower resisting, US and EU in crisis Technology leadership challenged by Continued leadership on technology,1.2.1 US China and some Emerging Countries, Isolationism and low GDP growth high GDP growth medium GDP growth Exports based economic model Successful continuation of the current Rising the internal demand is a top1.2.2 China challenged by moderate world economic economic model, high GDP growth priority, moderate GDP growth growth Sucessful economic strategy based Moderate exports perspective slow Low exports perspective slow down1.2.3 Other Emerging Countries partly on internal demand, high GDP down the economic development, further the economic development, growth medium GDP growth low/medium GDP growth Success on some niche technologies,1.2.4 EU EU follower, low GDP growth Recurrent economic crises medium/high GDP growthPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 0
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"3.5.2 EU context Spacecraft Smartphone Hard way Medium/high GDP growth, Low GDP growth, sustainability low/negative GDP growth, escape2 EU and member countries context competitivity first first from "hell" first Successful continuation of the current Organized switch towards "beyond Reccurent crises imposing de-facto a2.1 Economic model model, successful "Lisbon strategy" GDP" model "beyond GDP" model GDP maximization under severe2.1.1 Macro-economic objective function GDP maximization Welfare maximization constraints EU, member sates government and big EU and member sates government EU, member sates government and big2.1.2 Role and intervention of EU and stake-holders holding sucessfully the relying increasingly on local/regional stake-holders failing to hold or transmitmember countries Governments leadership actors the leadership2.1.3 Utility functions, consumption Working more to earn more and More time for oneself, welfare is not Unemployment and low salaries imposemodel, preferences, life styles,... consume more only quantity a change in life styles2.2 The social balance between Looking for a macro-economic desparate, but unsuccessfull, quest for Environmental sustainability firstenvironment and wealth optimum wealth, for more and more people2.2.1 Environment policies and ETS and taxation first Regulation and subsidies first A little bit of everything Social inequity & exclusion increasing, Social inequity & exclusion increasing,2.2.2 Equity, social exclusion, social but limited social unrest because of Social inequity & exclusion decreasing with recurrent social unrest and "systemprotection, pensions increasing wealth D" Education is at the core of the social More authoritarian policies, democracy2.2.3 Education, values, icons, democracy As usual transformation towards new values, suffers new iconsPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 1
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Spacecraft Smartphone Hard way2.3 Technology, energy efficiency and Centralized technologies and De-centralized technologies and Conflictual balance between centralizedstake-holders strategies economies of scale, big players economies of series, new comers and de-centralized technologies Increasing average speeds for New technology clusters with Switching away from gasoline and diesel2.3.1 Transport passengers and freight within the decentralized electricity generation, high as fast as possible carbon constraint speed trains New energy-efficient concepts for new Zero-energy and +energy building Zero-energy and +energy building2.3.2 Buildings buildings, standardized solutions for concepts for new construction, drastic concepts for new construction after a retrofitting of existing buildings retrofitting of existing buildings while, energy switch2.3.3 Materials Mostly decentralized: PV, biomass for Mostly decentralized: PV, biomass for Mostly centralized: off-shore wind, CSP,2.3.4 Renewables CHPs, geothermy; limited centralized CHPs, geothermy; limited centralized 2nd generation biofuels renewables renewables Heat/cool systems, local electricity2.3.5 Network energy systems (electricity, As usual, smart grids to shave the peak As usual but less and less reliable, smart demand/supply balance thanks togas, heat/cool) demand grids to shave the peak demand smart grids, gas stoppedPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 2
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"3.5.3 Local transitions Spacecraft Smartphone Hard way Driven by EU and MS Poorly driven by institutional3 Local transitions governments Driven by local/regional actors actors, peoples decisions first Key role in designing and implementing3.1 Local players policies and actions As usual As usual the post-carbon transition3.1.1 Municipalities and other Mostly implement policies and measures Decide and implemente successfully As usuallocal/regional authorities decided by governments climate plans New local and regional energy players Mostly "as usual", but some new local3.1.2 Utilities and services As usual and services and regional energy players and services Strong weight in local and regional Little weight in major decisions, except Little weight in major decisions, except3.1.3 NGOs and citizens associations decisions, active in implementation of through national votes & politics through votes & politics local "solutions" Urban sprawl continues, 1st rings Urban sprawl continues, core cities & Urban sprawl reduced, core cities, 1st3.2 changes in urban schemes stabilized, densification of growing 1st rings stabilized, densification of rings and larger medium cities densified cities growing small/medium cities More high income small households, More balanced social structures in all High income small households in core3.2.1 transport and energy networks, less jobs in core cities; more jobs and urban areas; masstransit system cities, families in sparse settlements,spatial distribution of dwellings less poors in 1st ring; large & dense between core cities, 1st rings and main poors in 1st ring; mass transit systems masstransit systems around core cities surrounding small/medium cities between core cities and 1st rings Driven by density and fiscal policies; New rules for new premisses, for3.2.2 distribution of urban functions business services going out from core education, commerces and personal As usual cities services Fast city networking among core cities, Fast city networking among core cities, Fast city networking among core cities,3.2.3 city spatial networking and between core cities, 1st rings and and between core cities, 1st rings and and between core cities & 1st rings; surrounding medium/small cities main surrounding medium cities limited elsewhere Local/regional energy demand / supply3.2.4 land-use and cities energy Cities more energy balanced with solar Not an issue balancing, a resilience target for mostdemand/supply balancing harvesting and biomass citiesPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 3
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Spacecraft Smartphone Hard way3.3 daily life in post-carbon societies in Time value for oneself very high, less Unemployment and lack of money force No significant changethe EU material and more cultural/intelectual people to change Transport time budget unchanged, Transport time budget increases, speed Transport time budget unchanged,3.3.1 How people move speed increases steadily driven by high almost stabilized due to low GDP, speed stabilized, distances shortened GDP distances unchanged Social standards down because of new Social standards unchanged, gap with Social standards up with income, gap3.3.2 Indoor comfort behaviours, gap with social standards social standards increases because with social standards reduced reduced economic context Increasing labour time budget and Decreasing labour time budget and slow Decreasing labour time budget because productivity are the driving forces; tele- progress in productivity; substitution lack of jobs, and increasing labour3.3.3 How people work working and tele-meeting when transport/ICTs very active, tele-working, productivity, tele-working and tele- economically justified tele-meeting meeting popular for economic reasons Significant development because of the The core of the new energy/technology3.3.4 Micro energy consumers producers Marginal development increasing lack of reliability of paradigm conventional systems Time budget reduced, strong Time budget increased by choice, Time budget increased by force,3.3.5 Leisure development of long distance out-door reduction of % of long distance out-door reduction of % of long distance out-door leisure activities leisure activities by choice leisure activities by forcePACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 4
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"4 Spacecraft" Spacecraft": a highly centralized while cooperative project, the continuation of thewedding of economic growth, speed ("doing fast6") and technology, working well withabsolute physical limitation in resources.4.1 International contextA rather consensual and cooperative context worldwide, driven by the recognition ofthe limits (resources and climate), and the willingness to anticipate and manage themcollectively in due time.4.1.1 Governance of global issuesThe PACT analytical work on governance which support this section is available inthe PACT deliverable D4.2: "Risks and governance in the transitionprocess towards post-carbon societies". Climate change and GHG mitigationAfter some hesitations, the UN negotiation process overcome the main difficulties atthe occasion of the post-2012 Kyoto Protocole discussions. IPCC is not challengedanymore, and its conclusions and warnings are taken very seriously by all majorcountries around the World.Most countries of the World, including Emerging Countries, North America, Europeand Asian and Pacific OECD, agree on a common position on how to achieve amacro-economic optimum, which is: a) to commit themselves to mandatory reductionobjectives of the carbon intensity of the GDP, accounting for carbon content ofimported and exported goods; b) to use extensively flexible mechanisms to tradecarbon internationally.In counterpart for the adhesion of the poorest countries to the new Protocole, richcountries (mostly OECD) accept to pay for their adaptation to climatic change. Availability and accessibility to oil and gas resourcesDepletion policies of main oil and gas producing countries (Gulf countries, Russia, ...)are mostly driven by prices on international and regional markets. In order to secure6 The concept of "doing fast" is developed in PACT deliverable D1PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 5
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"the return on exploration-production investment and avoid turbulences on the marketprices, long term contracts constitute the main trading mechanism. Oil and gasproducers and consumers reinforce their relations in order to prevent price shocks.This could be done within an international, well-balanced institution that couldemerge from a renewed IEA, or/and through upstream/downstream re-integration ofoil and gas industries. World tradeWTO is strengthened and all World countries join progressively the institution.Protectionism decreases everywhere, which favours World trade dynamics. Nobarriers are settled to compensate for international discrepancies in GHG mitigationefforts, although GHG embodied in imports/exports is accounted for in CO2 intensitytargets. On the contrary, countries are allowed to partly compensate, through importtaxes, differences in social protection costs. World financeThe role of IMF is increased, in particular for avoiding major financial crisis that couldjeopardize the World economic development, and for paying for adaptation in poorcountries. Financing investment in developing countries becomes progressivelyeasier and more secure, for an increasing number of countries, high financialresources being available and more controlled worldwide.4.1.2 Policies, opportunities and constraints of major World playersIn this scenario, major international players are assumed to continue more or lesstheir policies and adapt to constraints and opportunities in a rather "business-as-usual" perspective. USAIn such an international environment, the USA is expected to enjoy a high GDPgrowth, mostly due to the continuation of their technology leadership which booststheir high value exports.Binding targets on GHG intensity appear therefore rather easy to reach, thanks to ahigh GDP growth mostly supported by low energy/GHG intensity goods and services.The US doctrine as regard energy security is almost unchanged, although theirforeign policy turns progressively to multi-lateralism along with the overall movementof increased international cooperation.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 6
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" ChinaThe dynamism of World trade continues to boost Chinese exports of manufacturedproducts, resulting in high economic growth perspectives for China for severaldecades in this scenario.To maintain their export potentials, enterprises in China succeed in moderating theincrease of wages, thanks to the huge reserves of workers coming from rural areas;this would moderate therefore the increase of the internal demand.Targets on GHG intensity may prove rather difficult to reach, despite a high GDPgrowth, because the growth is still supported by the production of manufacturedgoods, some of them being rather energy/GHG intensive. Indeed, the accounting ofGHG embodied in imports and exports released the constraint, but, because of themoderate increase of the internal demand, manufactured goods will still constitute thebulk of this demand.China will continue to give a great importance to energy independence targets, inparticular to make sure that energy shortage wont threat its industrial developmentand its export policy.Multilateralism will be enhanced in China, while the Yuan will be progressively re-evaluated to avoid major clash with big importing countries and World financinginstitutions. Other Emerging CountriesThe other Emerging Countries are expected to continue to suffer from thecompetition of China on exports of manufactured goods, but they succeedimplementing high GDP growth strategies mostly supported by internal demands.Targets on GHG intensity are more or less difficult to reach according to countries,because of the actual content of the GDP growth in the various countries.For these countries, in the international environment of this scenario, energy securityis not so much a critical issue.All these countries work out to develop tighter relations with the USA, China andEurope. Regional economic relations (Mercosur and ASEAN) are developing slowly. The European UnionThe EU is expected to experience a moderate-to-high GDP growth in this scenario,thanks to a high World demand for its high value products and services. But thefierce competition of China and Emerging Countries for current goods and services,PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 7
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"as well as the technology leadership of the USA, do not allow the EU to hope for veryhigh GDP growth rates in the coming decades in such a scenario.East/West socio-economic discrepancies within the EU are expected to decline underthe combined effect of economic growth and EU political reinforcement.Targets on GHG intensity are rather easy to reach for the EU, thanks to the speedand content of the GDP growth, and because the on-going mitigation efforts.No major changes should be expected in this scenario for the EU, as regard energysecurity issues and international partnership.4.2 The EU and member countries contextAs already said, "Spacecraft" (SC) describes a top-down transition process dulydriven by governments and big stakeholders, who at the same time decide what isgood for the common people (what welfare is) and how to provide it.4.2.1 Economic modelIn "Spacecraft", the EU as a whole and member countries are doing rather well inGDP growth. How this is achieved, what policies are implemented, to whatconsumption model it corresponds, these are the questions that we will addresshereafter to describe the economic model supporting the favourable GDP growthperspectives. A particular focus is put on three main aspects as regard modellingpurposes: human capital, role of state, values and preferences. Human capitalPolicies dedicated to immigration, birth rate and women activity, working time andretirement, education, are driven by considerations of GDP maximization within ainternational context of fierce economic competition.Combining a revitalized birth rate with a high level of women participation in thelabour market, as in France today, becomes rapidly a shared objective for the EUand all the member countries. Measures such as high allowances for 2 to 3 childrenfamilies, widespread government supported daycares, social promotion of mothers atwork, etc...may help reaching such an objective. The EU as a whole is back to 1,9children per woman between 2030 and 2050, while the percentage of women in thelabour market reaches 80% in 2050 (46% in 2000).Immigration, in particular of high skill people from Emerging Countries and otheremergent countries, is highly supported in the EU, despite residues of nationalismthat fade out along with the resuming economic growth. The growing trend inPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 8
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"immigration from outside the EU speeds up to reach some 2 million people annuallyin 2050.The historical declining trend of the average annual working time in Europe isexpected to smooth down and then to reverse between 2020 and 2030: in 2050,people will work a little more (2%) than in 2000. This increase is the same for theaverage retirement age: the declining historical trend reverse between 2000 and2020 (already achieved in many countries), the average retirement age reaching 69years in 2050 against 60 in 2000.Education policies are mostly focused on the objective to get the appropriate labourforce with the appropriate education and skill levels at the right time to operate themost efficiently the economic machine. In particular, these policies aim at boostingthe participation level of the youngsters in the university: in 2050, it is expected that70% of a 25-50 years age class would be graduated from university, against 22% in2000. Role and intervention of EU and member states governments"Spacecraft" is a scenario in which innovation and clean technology development arethe back-bone of the economic growth. This implies a strong support to innovationand clean business development from EU and member states governments.More generally, this scenario is characterized by a strong leadership of Governmentsand main industrial and financial stakeholders in the transition process. Onemanifestation of this leadership is a strong movement of re-regulation of all energyrelated businesses, energy being the main source of GHGs emissions.Another manifestation, that the re-regulation would certainly ease considerably, is astrong investment policy in strategic capital intensive technologies & infrastructures,both in energy production and in main energy end-uses (strategic according to the"Spacecraft" logic). This means in particular a vigorous policy support to nuclear andcentralized renewables (off-shore wind, CSP,...), and to EU high speed trainnetworks.In the POLES model, this is captured through two main exogenous inputs which drivethe competition between these capital intensive technologies and infrastructures, andalternative solutions:- the discount rates associated with these investments, which are used to translateboth a higher security for private investment due to public guarantee, and asignificant share of public investment;- the investment costs of the capital intensive technologies and infrastructures beingpromoted, which are used to translate both a reduction in private costs due to lowertransaction costs and accelerated investment procedures, and to learning and serieseffect.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 9
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"Taxation, subsidizing and pricing are the main policy instruments used by EU andnational Governments to make sure that the huge investments in capital intensivetechnologies and infrastructures will be cost-effective, and to orient consumersdecisions towards targeted technologies and services. The key measures taken byGovernments in this scenario, which can be quantified through POLES exogenousinputs, are: CO2 taxation, feed-in tariffs for nuclear and renewables, subsidizingenergy efficiency. Life styles and consumption modelIn general terms, "Spacecraft" is a scenario in which Governments and mainstakeholders succeed in fostering a "green economic growth" with high economicperformances, that minimize behavioural and life-styles impacts on common people,except as regard environmental aspects. Practically, this means that environmentalawareness will be included in education programmes at an early stage, resulting inan increasing share of the environmental friendliness dimension in utility functions.But for the rest, only little change can be expected in these utility functions.In particular, attitudes towards wasting are not expected to change a lot, except whenthe relation to environment is immediate (tap water waste for example).Human capital is the main fuel of the economic performances in this scenario: whichmeans, as already seen, increasing education and skill in the one side, andincreasing the size and intensiveness of the labour force in the other side. Thisresults in limitations for increase of the time budget for self-accomplishment, and inparticular for leisure, but more money will be spent on leisure activities: this is likely toboost low cost air transport for outdoor leisure activities, electronic devices andservices for in-door leisure.But such constraints on time-budget for self-accomplishment can be durablyaccepted by the European population only if it emerges that the marginal benefit ofnot working an extra hour (= the value attached to leisure) becomes lower than themarginal earnings (salary) from this extra work hour. In other words, as PresidentSarkozy suggested to the French people, if common people agree to work more toearn more. Although this was not historically the case in European countries, theNorth-American experience shows that this may well happen also in Europe in thecoming decades.In the VLEEM model, time budget for self-accomplishment is directly impacted bytime-budget for paid work. Two exogenous inputs are nevertheless used to specifyhow the time-budget for self-accomplishment is used, and how it impacts the needsof energy services:- the share of activities outside the home (out-door) versus inside (in-door) in thistime-budgetPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 10
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"- the share of long distance mobility in out-door activities.In general terms, "Spacecraft" is a scenario where people are doing things faster andfaster: because the marginal value of time increases substantially, and because thenumber of consumption opportunities "within 24hours a day" also increasesdramatically.4.2.2 The social balance between environment and wealthIn "Spacecraft", EU and member countries are committed to binding targets on GHGintensity of the GDP, that include GHG content of imports, but also flexibilityinstruments allowing them to purchase GHG credits from abroad on a rather largescale. The resulting level of carbon constraint is primarily internalized through carbonprices, with complementary policies and measures where such internalization is notfeasible or inefficient. Environment policies and instrumentsGHG quotas are imposed to all big emitters: electricity generation, industries,transport companies, big tertiary. Their magnitude is calibrated according to thebinding targets.The emission trading system (ETS) is expanded in scope and modalities. It isgeneralized to all emitters subject to quotas, and includes possibilities of purchasinglarge amounts of GHG credit from abroad or through flexibility mechanisms (CleanDevelopment Mechanisms -CDM- for example). The carbon price on this Europeancarbon market is therefore highly correlated to other carbon markets and bindingtargets worldwide.GHG taxation is implemented for small emitters not subject to quotas, and its level isderived from the trading system (which does not mean that the tax level must benecessarily identical to the carbon price on the ETS). There is no taxation of carbonembodied in imports, although this carbon has to be included in binding targets.In POLES model, this is captured with the exogenous inputs "carbon price", whichcan be differentiated among countries, and among sectors within each country.Regulations and norms on energy and GHG performances are generalized to newbuildings and road vehicles, but rather limited for other existing or new devices.In VLEEM, this is captured through exogenous inputs related to either specific usefulenergy consumption levels (new buildings mainly), or through new technologiesdeployment (vehicles mainly).As already said, feed-in tariffs for nuclear and renewables, and subsidies/tax creditfor energy efficiency are also part of the policy instruments in this scenario.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 11
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"In addition, green and white certificates are generalized for small emitters as a meanto force third party financing of households investments in renewables and energyefficiency. Equity, social exclusion, social protection, pensionsThere is no particular policy targeted on households income/affluence structure:governments and major stakeholders continue to believe that a high GDP growth isenough to solve the social problems related to inequity.On the same line, nothing is done to modify the on-going trend as regard the sociallodging of poor people, often concentrated in high rise buildings in suburbs of bigcities and small/medium towns.Social/health expenses coverage systems continue to work as they are today, withvery little change, in the western part of Europe, while they progress moresignificantly in the eastern part.The pension systems reflect both the policies as regard retirement, and thewillingness of the governments not to change too much the rules of the game asregard social issues. Practically, this means the continuation of a mixed pensionsystem based partly on repartition, partly on capitalization, with altogether rather highpension levels calibrated on average salaries.In VLEEM, this is captured through the diversities in the consumption pattern of thehouseholds according to the age of households head (in particular retired people),and through the dwellings location according to the households categories. Education, values, icons, democracyLittle change in this scenario as regard the content of basic education of children,except environment and climate change.As a result, such values as "thriftiness" or "going slow" hardly diffuse in thepopulation and remain limited to marginal categories. Getting higher income, as fastas possible, remains the objective function of a large majority of the population.The main social icons are still related to technology and innovation.Democracy continues working as usual, with national and EU parliaments playing adominant role in the transition process, and with little social control on major choiceson technologies and infrastructures.This is captured in the models by high speeds of development of these newcentralized technologies and infrastructures and low transaction and implementationcosts.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 12
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"4.2.3 Technology, energy efficiency and stake-holders strategies"Spacecraft" is highly technology oriented. The common belief among decisionmakers and common people is that technology will "save the World": it is mostly amatter of getting the appropriate technologies at the right time.This section is based partly on the analytical work of PACT phase 1, which isaccessible in the PACT deliverables D2, chapter 2 (transport), chapter 3 (buildings),chapter 4 (renewables) and D3, chapter 4 (industry and materials). TransportSpeed is a master-word in this "doing fast" scenario. This means in particular that astrong effort is put on high speed infrastructures for long distance transport:motorways in Eastern Europe, European high speed trains network for passengersand freight, airports development for low cost companies.Road transport is one of the most important area for technology innovation in thisscenario. The European car industry succeeds in keeping a leading role in the Worldcompetition thanks to its innovation strategy in car concepts, fuels and motorization:electric urban cars, high efficiency and biofuels for conventional vehicles (ICE 7), plug-in hybrids for cars and light vehicles, hydrogen and fuel cells, hybrid trucks forelectrified highways8.Except for high speed trains, the public support to non road transport remains "asusual". BuildingsLow energy buildings become mandatory in construction after 2015 in all EUcountries in this scenario. Among them, passive buildings remain limited until 2025everywhere: between 0% for small and high rise buildings up to 20% for single familyhouses. Afterwards, passive housing concept develop rapidly for single family houses(SFH), except in Northern Europe: they account for more than half of the SFH builtbetween 2025 and 2050 in West, East and South Europe. For small and high risebuildings, this "passive" concept remains at low levels everywhere.For existing buildings, there is no mandatory targets for thermal retrofitting, except forsocial housing. Nevertheless, the combined effect of price incentives (in particularcarbon tax) , "white certificates" and innovation in retrofitting techniques, result in adrastic reduction of energy consumption for space heating in all kinds of dwellings,everywhere in Europe.7 Internal Combustion Engine8 B. Bougnoux: "Demain, des autoroutes électrifiées ?" in Futuribles, to be publishedPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 13
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" MaterialsThere is no particular change in the on-going trends as regard the inclusion of softmaterials (wood, straw,...) in buildings construction in this scenario.The substitution among materials in new buildings, vehicles and packaging stillremains driven by costs/prices, without particular public incentives.Recycling of major used materials (steel, aluminium, plastics, glass, paper) isgeneralized.. RenewablesIn "Spacecraft" scenario, there is a strong public and private support to thedevelopment of centralized renewables dedicated to electricity generation andsubstitutes for oil based motor-fuels.Off-shore wind-power is expected to develop at a high speed, to a high magnitude.CSP (Concentrated Solar Power) is also expected to develop quickly and in largeamounts in southern Europe and Maghreb mostly, with interconnections with the restof Europe. Photovoltaïcs and direct solar heat would develop mostly in low densityareas, in particular in South Europe.Thanks to a strong R&D public support, 2nd generation biofuels can be producedextensively in cost-effective conditions after 2030. Other energy uses of biomass(direct use, biogas,...:) will remain driven mostly by costs and prices. Network energy systems (electricity, gas, heat/cool)As in other scenarios, electricity will increase significantly its market share in finalenergy demand, raising increasing peak demand problems. Smart grids and smartmetering will then be developed essentially to allow increasingly demand responsesolutions to shave this peak demand.Gas networks are expected to continue their deployment in all EU member countrieswithout particular constraints.District heating and cooling networks are also expected to continue their deploymentin a business-as-usual (BAU) perspective, where applicable (from an economicviewpoint).4.3 Local transitionsPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 14
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"In "Spacecraft" scenario, local transitions are mostly driven by policies and strategiesdecided and implemented by Governments and big players. Local players still play animportant role, but limited to the practical implementation of the national and EUpolicy measures. As said earlier, these policies and strategies aim at changing atleast as possible the current rules of the game of the economy and the society.4.3.1 Local players policies and actionsThis section is partly supported by the analytical work carried out in PACT phase 1on "anticipatory experiences", and accessible in PACT deliverable D4.1.2 "SocietalDynamics of Energy Transition".The scope of the local players interventions and the instruments at their disposal forsuch interventions are supposed to remain mostly unchanged in this scenario ascompared to the existing situation. Municipalities and other local/regional authoritiesThe fields of intervention of municipalities and other local/regional authorities aresupposed to remain limited to buildings (construction rules and retrofitting), urban andregional transport infrastructures and services, and local energy supply (mostlydistrict heating and cooling).The main instruments are economic (local taxation, pricing and subsidies mostly),local/regional infrastructure investment and partly regulation.The logic of theses interventions is basically to finance subsidies and investment withthe revenues of local taxes and infrastructure prices (parking fees, tolls,...).Their main targets are: building retrofitting, development of public transport for urbanand regional passengers transport, and use of wastes and biomass in local CHPs(Combine Heat and Power) connected to district heat networks where applicable. Utilities and servicesDistrict heating and cooling services continue to be developed "as usual", withinunchanged market structures.Electricity continues to be mostly supplied from national grids and large power plants,with nevertheless some contributions from local CHPs.There is little development of new integrated energy supply/efficiency services, withstill a clear separation between energy suppliers and demand services in most cases.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 15
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and citizens associationsInnovative experiences in the field of sustainable urban development, includingenergy, continue to be implemented here and there, driven by local/regionalinstitutions, NGOs and citizen association, but they fail to initiate a widespreadreplication movement. They remain mostly isolated experiences, because a too widegap with the preferences and values of common people in this scenario.The national policy burden on local authorities as regard climate change remainssmall in this scenario, since the focus is massively on technology, which is largelybeyond the scope of intervention of local/regional authorities.As a consequence, there is only limited monitoring, evaluation and follow-up at thelocal and regional levels, the bulk of it being under the responsibility of nationalauthorities, and submitted to polls constraints.Education and public awareness as regard environment remains limited, except forclimate change issues.4.3.2 changes in urban schemesAnalysis of urban schemes to be considered in post-carbon studies and relateddefinitions of urban areas considered to capture evolutions in urban schemes are tobe found in PACT deliverable D1, chapter 3: "Urbanization and land-use pattern".Four main evolutions characterize the "Spacecraft" scenario as regard urbanschemes: urban sprawl continues, 1st rings are stabilized, growing cities aredensified (population and jobs) and fast networking among cities is developed. transport and energy networks, spatial distribution of dwellingscore citiesThere is first a large movement of requalification of public space in core cities, aimingat giving more space for fast public transport and easing the extension /implementation of district heating / cooling networks where applicable.There is also a movement towards the requalification of buildings, in particular toincrease the ratio residents / jobs, without necessarily an increase in the averagedensity (residents + jobs per km²). In other words the resident population and thenumber of dwellings are expected to increase in core cities, while the number of jobswould decrease.1st ringThis scenario is characterized in particular by a densification of residents and jobspopulation in the 1st rings of core cities. This densification results from the migrationPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 16
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"of jobs from the core cities while the resident population remains stable. It ispermitted by the re-construction of industrial and commercial waste land mostly, andpartly from the reconstruction, with small and big buildings, of areas previously builtwith single family houses .The other main characteristics of this scenario is a comprehensive integration ofrapid mass transit systems with core cities, and with most small/medium cities in theperiphery.Extension of district heating / cooling networks remains mostly driven by prices andcosts, with a driving force coming from the densification.small/medium citiesAs in 1st ring, a key aspect of this scenario is the increase and densification ofresidents and jobs in small/medium cities, which is permitted by the development ofrapid mass transit system among these cities, and with core cities and 1st ringsnearby (for cities not totally isolated).Another characteristic is a widespread development of gas networks even in smallcities, which is driven by the attractiveness of this energy for residents and tertiaryservices, and allowed by the densification.sparse settlementsThe main feature of "Spacecraft" is the continuation of the increase of the residentpopulation in sparse settlements, permitted by the average speed increase in dailytransport and the growing income of active people. Nevertheless, this increase ismoderated by three factors: social (aging population), economic (high transportcosts) and political (increased administrative difficulties to build new houses in sparsesettlements).Another feature of this scenario is the development of car/mass transit platforms atsmall/medium city points, in order to avoid car trips from sparse settlements to corecities and 1st rings. Spatial distribution of urban functionsFor commerce and education, no major change is to be expected as regards theexisting relation between population density and location of premises.For health and services to the public (post, banks,...), it is expected that the locationof premises will remain driven by costs per person in the catchment area: therefore,density is likely to be also one of the main drivers of the location.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 17
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"For other services, whose location is also driven by costs, local fiscal policies areexpected to contribute to a movement from core cities to 1rings and small/mediumcities nearby. city spatial networkingAs said earlier, widespread fast city spatial networking is a particular feature of"Spacecraft" scenario.At national and EU level, this means that most EU core cities will be connectedamong themselves with either high speed trains or/and low-cost airlinesAt regional level, this means that fast mass transit systems will be expanded /developed first to connect core cities and 1st rings to surrounding small/mediumcities (star development), and then to connect small/medium cities amongthemselves (ring development).Within core cities and 1st rings, the regional mass transit systems is expected to befully interconnected to the urban fast public transport systems. land-use and cities energy supply balancingEnergy supply is mostly centralized in this scenario. This means that energy supply /demand is expected to remain deeply unbalanced at city level, cities being massivelynet energy importers and rural areas massively net exporters. The only noticeableexceptions are:- for core cities and 1st rings, the use of geothermal energy (where available) andwastes to supply district heating networks, when applicable.- for small and medium cities, and in sparse settlements, the direct use of solarenergy (PV, water heaters), in particular in south Europe.In general terms, there is no particular land-use conflict raised by energy harvestingin urban and peri-urban areas in this scenario. This might not be the case elsewhere,in particular in regions supplying feedstocks for biofuels and where CSP are installed.4.3.3 Daily life in post-carbon societies in the EUThis section is partly supported by the analytical work carried out in PACT phase 1,and more precisely by PACT deliverable D2, chapter 5: "Life-style in post-carbonsocieties in different urban forms and European countries".There is little change expected in this scenario as regard current trends in daily life.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 18
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" How people moveThe historical correlations between GDP/capita and average travel speeds areexpected to continue in this scenario, both for passengers and freight. In VLEEM, thisis captured in keeping constant the elasticities of travel speed to GDP.Daily transport time budget is expected to remain mostly constant, as in the past(Zahavis conjecture9), while utility of time spent in transport is expected to increase,in particular in fast trains and fast mass transit. This is captured in VLEEM throughassumptions on daily transport time budget per person according to residencelocation. For long distance trips, the time-budget is related to the time budget foroutdoor leisure activities: week-ends and holidays (see below).The image of transport modes and the perception of their quality remain mostlydriven by speed, autonomy, convenience and comfort. Therefore, the currentmotorization trends continues up to saturation levels, which only depends on wherethe people live, their age and the structure of the households. This is captured inVLEEM with assumptions on saturation levels according to households categoriesand residence location.Nevertheless, for long distance trips, as well as for part of the daily trips, high speedtrains, low cost airlines and fast mass transit systems progressively outset the use ofcars, for two reasons: speed and convenience (utility of transport time). This iscaptured in VLEEM in the following way:- for long distance, assumptions on the average speed of cars- for urban and regional trips, assumptions on the share of cars in trips. Indoor comfortThe social standards regarding thermal comfort, for winter and summer, are assumedto be mostly driven by income and age. The intensity of the needs, i.e. the ability tomeet the social standards, is assumed to be driven only by income and prices.As regard sanitary comfort (bathrooms,...), social standards are assumed to bedriven mostly by income and age.Life comfort at home is assumed to be mostly determined by equipment variety andpattern of use, which are assumed to be mostly driven by income. How people work9 Y. ZAHAVI, J.M. RYAN, 1980a, « Stability of travel components over time »,Transportation research record, n°750, pp. 19-26PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 19
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"There is little change expected in the way people work, except a continuation of thecurrent transformations brought about by the information technologies. Tele-workingis assumed to remain driven mostly by productivity concerns, while tele-meetingremains driven mostly by travel costs. Micro energy consumers producersThere is only a little development of distributed energy generation in this scenario,mostly located in South Europe.This concerns first PV on buildings, which continues to be connected to the nationalgrid directly. Indeed, electric cars and plug-in hybrids develop, in particular in corecities and suburbs, but there is no particular linkage between batteries loading andPV installations. More generally, there is no global management of the batteries as acomponent of the electricity system.Other self-generation of electricity in buildings, continue developing slow along thecurrent trends. LeisureIn the leisure time budget structure, the most striking feature of this scenario is theincrease of the share of outdoor leisure, week-ends and short holidays mostly.Week-ends outside, which means 3 hours travel maximum, increase in frequencyand length, thanks to the increasing availability of fast modes, fast trains and air (inparticular low cost).Evolutions of holidays are expected to be characterized by three main features:- time spent in holidays is expected to decrease (higher value of time in relation tohigher income)- but their frequency is expected to increase (higher income);- the share of very long distance holidays is expected to increase, thanks to theeconomic growth and more peaceful international environment.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 20
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"5 Smartphone"Smartphone " : a bottom-up carbon transition process in which ICTs and socialnetworking plays a critical role both in raising the awareness of the common peopleas regard limits in resources and climate, and in designing and imposing local,decentralized solutions to these problems.5.1 International context"Smartphone " starts more or less as "Spacecraft", but diverge rapidly when itbecome obvious that Governments and big stakeholders will fail to implement a realand effective governance of the problems related to oil/gas resources and climatechange. More generally, globalization and multi-lateralism are more and morecontested by countries populations in this scenario, paving the way to increasedprotectionism and bilateral relations within regional blocks.5.1.1 Governance of global issues Climate change and GHG mitigationThe UN negotiation process cannot overcome the main difficulties at the occasion ofthe post-2012 Kyoto Protocol discussions and no new quantitative targets are settled,despite IPCC warnings.This means in particular that a) despite a considerable awareness about climatechange issues, almost no country accept to commit itself to mandatory carbonreduction objectives b) the flexible mechanisms to trade carbon internationallydisappear.Instead, in particular in the EU, there is a strong movement at the level ofmunicipalities, regional authorities, NGOs and common citizens, in favour of drasticreductions in fossil fuels consumptions and CO2 emissions, supported and eased bycentral governments. The percentage of people living and working in cities andconurbations adopting and implementing climate plans with drastic reductions in CO2emissions is increasing steadily.Rich countries (mostly OECD) accept to pay for the adaptation to climatic change ofthe poorest countries, but under drastic conditions. Availability and accessibility to oil and gas resourcesPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 21
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"Depletion policies of main oil and gas producing countries (Gulf countries, Russia, ...)account more and more for domestic population claims and geo-political aspects.This means in particular production ceilings in many countries, in particular in thePersian Gulf.Bilateral long term contracts constitute the main trading mechanism. Oil and gasproducers and consumers reinforce bilateral relations. The role of internationalorganizations like IEA or OPEP remains mostly as it is today. World tradeWTO is more and more challenged, but continues "as-usual" with some adaptation.Nevertheless protectionism tends to increase, which slows down World tradedevelopment. Barriers are settled to compensate for international discrepancies inGHG emissions performances. Rich countries tend to protect themselves against thesocial dumping through import taxes. World financeThe role of IMF is "as-usual", mostly focused to avoid major financial crisis that couldjeopardize the World economic development. Financing investment in developingcountries is becoming easier and less risky, but financial resources are limited. TheUS becomes more and more challenged, and they cannot continue to increase theirdebt thanks to international transfers.5.1.2 Policies and constraints of major World players USAIn such an international environment, the USA are expected to enjoy a moderate-to-low GDP growth, because of a low World economic growth and because theirtechnology leadership is being challenged by China and Emerging Countries.There is no federal quantified objective as regard climate change, but an increasingnumber of states and big cities commit themselves with very ambitious climate plans.The US doctrine as regard energy security is "back to independence".There is a privileged economic partnership with China.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 22
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" ChinaThe stagnation of the World trade moderate the economic growth perspectives ofChina in this scenario. To compensate, Chinese companies are expected to targetmore and more the domestic market.Therefore, wages have to increase more rapidly, in order to the increase the internaldemand in China.After some successful experiments of ambitious city climate plan based on carbonceilings per capita, the Chinese government decides to impose such ceilings to allChinese cities. In addition, a quota-trading system for CO2 is implemented, with alsoambitious targets.China will continue to give a great importance to energy independence targets.Bi-lateral relations with the USA will be enhanced. Other Emerging CountriesThe other Emerging Countries are expected to follow with success GDP growthstrategies mostly supported by internal demands, but the weakness of the Worldeconomy slow down somehow their GDP growth perspectives.As in "Spacecraft" rapid increases in wages and incomes are expected.Environmental concerns are expected to increase a lot in these countries, forcingmunicipalities and Governments to adopt ambitious climate policies.Because of the international environment of this scenario, energy security isbecoming a critical issue in these countries, leading to the adoption of ambitiousindependence targets.Regional economic relations (Mercosur and ASEAN) are expected to develop rapidlyand deeply in this scenario. The European UnionThe EU is expected to experience a low -but smart, much better distributed- GDPgrowth in this scenario, for two reasons: a weak World demand for its high valueproducts and services, and a depressed internal demand resulting from deepchanges in people preferences and consumption pattern.East/West socio-economic discrepancies within the EU are expected to decreaserather quickly, mostly because the more depressed internal demand in the richerwest countries.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 23
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"EU sticks to its on-going CO2 mitigation efforts. In addition, there is a strong socialmovement towards environmental concerns that ease the adoption andimplementation of drastic measures against CO2 emissions.Energy security issues are on the top of the EU political agenda as regard energy.5.2 The EU and member countries contextAs already said, "Smartphone " (SP) describes a bottom-up transition process drivenby a widespread social movement in favour of a new consumption model and a newrelation to the natural environment.5.2.1 Economic modelIn "Smartphone ", the EU as a whole and member countries are not doing so well inGDP growth. How this can work from a social point of view, what consumption modelis behind, these are the questions that we will address hereafter to describe theeconomic model supporting the low GDP growth perspectives. Human capitalThere is a clear social preference for a life more balanced between jobs, family andself-accomplishment in this scenario. Policies dedicated to immigration, birth rate andwomen activity, working time and retirement, education, are driven by these welfareconsiderations, within a international context with more protectionism.Birth rate is expected to increase again slowly to reach stability levels around 2050(1,9 children / woman) while women participation in the labour market tends to reacha saturation level around 60% after 2030 (46% in 2000). As in Germany today,participation in the labour market is often seen as not compatible with children care.The labour market is progressively adapted to allow one of the parents to take longleaves for children care, and come back to job afterwards. Which means that thesaturation level (60%) does not mean that 40% of women keep out from jobs all theirlife, but that altogether, 20% of the total labour force is on leave for children care.Immigration, in particular of high skill people from Emerging Countries and otheremergent countries, is expected to be welcome in the EU, but residues of nationalismand increased protectionism moderate the immigration flows. The growing trend inimmigration from outside the EU slows down, to reach some 1,5 millions peopleannually in 2050 (1,1 in 2000).The historical declining trend of the average annual working time in Europe isexpected to continue steadily: in 2050, people would work almost 20% less than in2000. Same for the average retirement age: after a reverse trend between 2000 and2020 (already achieved in many countries), the declining historical trend wouldPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 24
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"resume, the average retirement age reaching in 2050 the same level than in 2000(60).Education policies aim at boosting the participation level of the youngsters in theuniversity: in 2050, it is expected that 65% of a 25-50 years age class would begraduated from university, against 22% in 2000 (a bit less than in "Spacecraftscenario for economic reasons). These policies are expected to be more balancedthan today between the still predominant economic objective (to get the appropriatelabour force with the appropriate education and skill levels at the right time to operatethe most efficiently the economic machine), and enhanced objectives in culture (inrelation to the increasing social preference and time-use for self-accomplishment)and social link (in relation to the growing importance of collective goods). Role and intervention of EU and member states governments"Smartphone " is a scenario in which the transition is a bottom-up process. Thismeans that the role of EU and member states is not so much to lead the transition,but to create the appropriate conditions for this bottom-up process to happen anddevelop.This means first a change in the balance of power and financial means betweencentral governments and local / regional ones, in favour of the latter.This means also a strong policy support to the equipment and appropriate use ofinformation technologies by the people, starting at school.Last, the laws are adapted to encourage and protect decentralized initiatives inenergy and environment services, while subsidizing mechanisms are systematicallyimplemented by EU and national governments to support these initiatives. Oneconsequence would be a re-regulation, if not a re-nationalisation, of big electricityand gas utilities.The role of central governments will be also to create the appropriate economicconditions for energy efficiency technologies and behaviours to develop massively.This would imply in particular a radical reform of energy pricing (increasing priceswith consumption) and taxation.The economic and financial context of this scenario is not so favourable for capitalintensive technologies & infrastructures to develop on a large scale, and there is noclear policy support for this except for EU ICTs and high speed train networks.In the POLES model, this is captured through:- high discount rates associated with these investments, which translate both a higherrisk for private investment, and a low level of public investment;- high investment costs of the capital intensive technologies and infrastructures,which translate both higher private costs due to high transaction costs and longerinvestment procedures, and to very limited earning and series effect.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 25
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"Subsidizing and regulation are the main policy instruments used by EU and nationalGovernments to make distributed energy supply cost-effective, and to orientconsumers decisions towards local / regional energy services. The key measurestaken by Governments in this scenario, which can be quantified through POLESexogenous inputs, are: subsidizing energy efficiency and distributed renewables,norms for energy efficiency in buildings and cars. Life styles and consumption modelIn general terms, "Smartphone " is a "beyond GDP" scenario type in which the usualquest for economic performances is more balanced by growing concerns about otheraspects of the quality of life, including time-use, goods quality and environmentalfriendliness.Practically, this means drastic changes in utility functions, which would account moreand more for new dimensions as time-use, environmental friendliness,...In particular, attitudes towards wasting are expected to change a lot, with dueconsequences on materials recycling and waste management.Education less focused on productivity in the one side, and decreasing size andintensiveness of the labour force in the other side, will result in rather low economicgrowth perspective. Therefore, an increasing share of the active population willexperience more time-budget for self-accomplishment, in particular for leisure, whilechanges in income redistribution will result in less money to spend in leisure activitiesfor the wealthier part of the population: this is likely to reduce drastically the share ofexpensive outdoor leisure activities (in particular long distance).This requires a) that peoples consumption preferences move towards leisure andcultural goods and services for which utility depends more on time spent than onvariety b) that the marginal benefit of not working an extra hour (= marginal value ofleisure) grows more rapidly than the marginal earnings (salary) from this extra workhour, which has been the case in most European countries over the 20th century..5.2.2 The social balance between environment and wealthIn "Smartphone", EU and member countries are fully aware of the problems relatedto oil/gas resources and climate change, but fail to convince other main countries toadopt drastic targets on GHG emissions. Consequently, they refuse to committhemselves unilaterally to something else than moderate targets. Instead, theyencourage and facilitate the strong voluntary movement at the local and regionallevels towards much more drastic reductions of GHG emissions.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 26
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Environment policies and instrumentsThe ETS is supposed to continue more or less as it is today, with increasingconstraints on GHG quotas imposed to big emitters: electricity generation, industries,air transport companies, big tertiary. Their magnitude is calibrated according to thebinding targets, which are rather moderate.The European carbon market remains mostly isolated, with almost no more flexibleinstruments; the price of carbon on this market is therefore not correlated to othercarbon markets worldwide.The Governments fail to impose GHG taxation where it does not exist, and fail toincrease CO2 tax where it already exist.Regulations and norms on energy and GHG performances are generalized to newbuildings and road vehicles at national levels, but almost inexistent for other existingor new devices.Instead, as a consequence of ambitious local climate plan, there is a strong local andregional movement in favour of buildings retrofitting, with ambitious targets, partiallysubsidized, but submitted to financial constraints due to the low economic growth.Subsidies for energy efficiency and distributed renewables are also part of the local /regional policy instruments in this scenario.In addition, green and white certificates are generalized for small emitters as a meanto force third party financing of households investments in distributed renewables andenergy efficiency. Equity, social exclusion, social protection, pensionsSocial policies targeted on households income/affluence structure are implementedin most EU countries to compensate for the low GDP growth and avoid an explosionof inequity.On the same line, improving the social lodging of poor people and favouring thesocial mix within cities, is also considered by policy makers as a pre-requisite forsocial peace.Social/health expenses coverage systems is generalized everywhere in Europe.Everybody is expected to become protected but the coverage of the social/healthexpenses is reduced due to relatively low GDP. In parallel, thanks to moreappropriate and healthy people behaviour, and to the use of new health caretechnologies that will reduce the need (and cost) of hospitalization, future health careexpenses are also expected to slow down despite people aging.The pension systems have to adapt deeply to cope with retirement age anddownsizing of the labour force. Practically, this means the generalization of a flatPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 27
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"participation pension system combined with a reinforcement of capitalization, withaltogether rather slow pension levels increase calibrated on price indexes. Education, values, icons, democracySome changes in this scenario as regard the content of basic education of children,with more importance given to environment and climate change in the one side,culture in the other side.Values such as "thriftiness" or "going slow" become more and more popular throughthe whole population. Getting higher income remains obviously an objective of alarge majority of the population, but less and less confused with the quality of life:getting more time for oneself, living in a cleaner environment, eating more "natural",... become more and more important for the common people .The main social icons are less and less related to technology and innovation, andmore and more to "cleanliness" and "sustainability".National and EU parliaments appear to be unable to lead the transition process, andthere is a strong reinforcement of role of the local / regional bodies, with a strongreinforcement of the social control on major choices on technologies andinfrastructures.5.2.3 Technology, energy efficiency and stake-holders strategies"Smartphone " is oriented on small and smart technologies, which are supported by asocial movement towards more autonomy, more connectivity and more self-reliance.Consumers want to become more and more actors as well, which is enabled bynetwork operators investing in smart grids. Nevertheless, few believe that technologywill "save the world". Individual behaviours and social organization appear asimportant. TransportMitigation of average travel speed increase is a key policy objective in this scenario.Investment in new motorways and airport infrastructures is strongly reduced. OnlyEuropean high speed trains network for passengers and freight continue to bedeveloped.Road transport is one of the most important area for GHG mitigation in this scenario,both through speed limitations on road and through promotion of car concepts, fuelsand motorization with very low CO2 emissions "at the exhaust pipe": electric urbanPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 28
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"cars, plug-in hybrids for cars and light vehicles, hybrid trucks for electrifiedhighways10.At local and regional levels, there is a strong public support to the fast developmentof public transport both road and rail.For freight, new infrastructures in ports and waterways are developed. BuildingsIn this scenario, low energy buildings become mandatory in construction after 2015 inall EU countries. After 2020, very low energy buildings (passive) and/or zero / +energy buildings become mandatory for single family houses almost everywhere, andfor other buildings where it makes sense from an economic viewpoint.For existing buildings, targets for thermal retrofitting are established within climateplans of most cities, with subsidizing procedures. Nevertheless, the low economicgrowth context slows down the speed of implementation and reduces the technicalpossibilities. MaterialsInclusion of soft materials (wood, straw,...) in buildings construction becomes verypopular, and generalized in this scenario.Some substitution among materials in new buildings, vehicles and packaging still aresubject to public incentives, when life cycle analysis prove their relevance as regardclimate change.Recycling of used materials is generalized for metals (steel, aluminium,..), plastics,glass and paper. RenewablesIn "Smartphone " scenario, there is a strong public (local and regional) and privatesupport to the development of renewables dedicated to direct use and distributedelectricity generation.PV on buildings is expected to develop at a high speed, to a high magnitude, alongwith the regulations on zero / + energy buildings in construction. Same for heatpumps, solar water heaters and direct use of biomass for heating purposes.For zero / + energy buildings, it is expected that the electricity consumption of thebuilding is sized so as to be compatible with the solar input: this means in particularthe development of new electrical appliances, whose performances allow to get the10 B. Bougnoux: "Demain, des autoroutes électrifiées ?" in Futuribles, to be publishedPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 29
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"same service with the limited available solar amount (as the Smartphone with thebattery).CSP (Concentrated Solar Power) is also expected to develop in some amounts insouth Europe and Maghreb mostly, with interconnections with the rest of Europe,when economic conditions are favourable without specific public support. Same forwindpower in Northern/Western Europe.Biofuels are submitted to binding targets, but at a rather moderate level. Network energy systems (electricity, gas, heat/cool)This scenario is characterized in particular by a rapid and high deployment of thedistributed electricity generation, combined with a reinforcement of local / regionalgovernance. The structure of the national electricity networks is expected to changedrastically, with the emergence and development of new grid concepts combininglocal balances between consumers and micro-suppliers and national interconnection.Smart grids and smart metering concepts would play a key role in this evolution, aswell as car batteries managed as storage facilities for the local grids.Gas networks are expected to slow down their deployment in all EU membercountries.District heating and cooling networks, supported by local authorities, are expected todevelop rapidly in core cities and 1st rings, in particular as a mean to reinforce theuse of non-CO2 fuels (biomass and residues).5.3 Local transitionsIn "Smartphone " scenario, local transitions are the bulk of the overall transitionmovement, and they are mostly driven by local and regional authorities in the oneside, citizens and NGOs in the other side. Local players play a critical role, both in thedesign and the practical implementation of policy measures mostly decided at thelocal and regional levels. These local and regional policies take fully account ofchanges in social behaviours and consumption preferences to reach climate changeobjectives within local climate plans.5.3.1 Local players policies and actionsThe scope of the local players interventions and the instruments at their disposal forsuch interventions are supposed to change a lot in this scenario as compared to theexisting situation.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 30
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Municipalities and other local/regional authoritiesIn addition to buildings (construction rules and retrofitting), and urban and regionaltransport infrastructures and services, the field of intervention of municipalities andother local/regional authorities as regard energy management, supply anddistribution is widely opened.Climate plans become mandatory for all conurbations and cities above 50000inhabitants.Retrofitting existing buildings, both dwellings and tertiary, become mandatory withinthese climate plans, with an appropriate mechanism for subsidizing and sanctions.Thanks to changes in national tax system, the financial availabilities of municipalitiesand other local/regional authorities are drastically increased, and allow for ambitiousactions for subsidizing building retrofitting and local renewables, and for developinglocal/regional infrastructure in transport and energy distribution and management.National laws are adapted so as to allow local regulations to be implemented tochase away all sources of diffused emissions of GHG above certain thresholds, forvehicles and buildings.These actions, incorporated in the local climate plans, do reflect the pressure thatcitizens and NGOs put on the local and regional elected decision makers.Their main targets are:- building retrofitting, systematization of zero / +energy concepts in new constructionwherever relevant,- development of public transport for urban and regional passengers transport,- eradication of the use of Internal Combustion Engines (ICE) within the cityboundaries,- generalization of local smart grids concepts, in particular to make distributedelectricity generation possible on a large scale and to manage the electricity storagecapacity created by the batteries of electric and hybrid vehicles,- use of wastes and biomass in local combined heat and power plants (CHPs)connected to district heat networks where applicable,. Utilities and servicesDistrict heating and cooling services experience a strong development and mergeprogressively with energy efficiency services within the buildings, which results in abetter optimization of the whole system.New service companies show up and develop in relation to the deep changes of theenergy market structures at the local and regional levels:PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 31
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"- management of the local smart grids and their relation with national grids and largepower plants,- relations between the local grid and the micro energy consumers-producers- maintenance and optimization of distributed electricity supply and direct use ofrenewables (solar heaters, biomass,..)- local and regional CHPs- centralized management of batteries.The usual separation between energy suppliers and demand services is expected todisappear progressively in most cases, paving the way for new services combining inan optimal way energy supply and energy efficiency. NGOs and citizens associationsMore and more innovative experiences in the field of sustainable urban development,including energy, show up here and there, driven by local/regional institutions, NGOsand citizen association. They initiate a widespread replication movement all overEurope, since they cope more and more with the preferences and values of commonpeople in this scenario.National policies, which fail to drive the transition movement, are mostly focused togive to local/regional authorities the power and means to "do the job".In that respect, for equity reasons, monitoring, evaluation and follow-up at the localand regional levels become mandatory, and it is under the responsibility of nationalauthorities to check that this is done effectively.Education and public awareness as regard environment become very important, inparticular for climate change and natural resources issues.5.3.2 Changes in urban schemesThree main evolutions characterize the "Smartphone " scenario as regard urbanschemes: urban sprawl is stabilized, then reduced, core cities and, mostly, 1rings aredensified (population and jobs) and networking among cities is developed. transport and energy networks, spatial distribution of dwellingscore citiesThere is first a large movement of requalification of public space in core cities, aimingat giving more space for pedestrians and bicycles in the one side, public transport inthe other side. Extension / implementation of district heating / cooling networks arecarried out wherever relevant.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 32
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"There is also a movement towards the requalification and reconstruction of existingbuildings, aiming at increasing the average density of resident population togetherwith an increase of the ratio residents / jobs. In other words the resident populationand the number of dwellings are expected to increase significantly in core cities,while the number of jobs would stabilize.1st ringThis scenario is characterized also by the densification of residents and jobspopulation in the 1st rings of core cities. This densification results from the re-construction of industrial and commercial waste land and from the reconstruction,with small and big buildings, of areas where single family houses were builtpreviously.The other main characteristics of this scenario is a comprehensive integration ofmass transit systems with core cities, and with some important small/medium cities inthe periphery.Extension of district heating / cooling networks is financially supported by the localauthorities, and benefit from the densification of the area.small/medium citiesIn this scenario, only the small/medium cities around core cities experience anincrease and densification of residents and jobs, which is permitted by thedevelopment of mass transit system between these cities and with core cities and 1strings nearby. For the other small/medium cities, the current declining trends areexpected to continue. Altogether the overall population of small/medium citiesstabilizes.Gas networks are expected to develop only in the small/ medium cities close to corecities, thanks to the densification.sparse settlementsThe main feature of "Smartphone " is the stabilization, then the decrease of theresident population in sparse settlements, for three reasons: social (agingpopulation), economic (high transport costs, high property tax, low incomes) andpolitical (severe restriction in permits to build new houses in sparse settlements).Another feature of this scenario is that nothing is done to increase the accessibility ofpeople living in sparse settlements, all the reverse. This is nevertheless wellaccepted because of the increasing importance of ICTs, which enable people tospent an increasing part of their time in their homes, while remaining connected tobusiness and consumption opportunities.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 33
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Spatial distribution of urban functionsFor education, commerce, health and services to the public (post, banks,...), it isexpected that new rules are established for the location of new premises, based onthe concept of accessibility: therefore, density, availability of public transport andtravel speeds are likely to become the main drivers of the location.For other services, location remains driven by costs, i.e. local fiscal policies. city spatial networkingCity spatial networking is also an important feature of "Smartphone " scenario.At national and EU level, this means that most EU core cities will be connectedamong themselves mostly with high speed trains.At regional level, mass transit systems are expected to be expanded / developedmostly to connect core cities and 1st rings to surrounding main medium cities (stardevelopment).Within core cities and 1st rings, the regional mass transit systems is expected to befully interconnected to the urban public transport systems. land-use and cities energy supply balancingIn this scenario, energy supply / demand is expected to become progressively morebalanced at city level first, regional level second.Cities are expected to become less and less energy importers along with thecombination of drastic reduction in energy consumption with systematic developmentof the local harvesting of solar energy and ambient heat (heat pump) and the use ofgeothermal energy and waste.In peri-urban areas, wind power and biomass are expected to play an increasing role;the conflicts that this would raise, from a landscape and land-use viewpoints, arenevertheless rapidly solved, thanks to the change in population mentality.Elsewhere, in particular in regions supplying feedstocks for biofuels and where off-shore wind is installed, possible land-use conflicts are supposed to be overcomethanks to the public support to renewables.5.3.3 daily life in post-carbon societies in the EUThere is a lot of changes expected in this scenario as regard current trends in dailylife.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 34
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" How people moveThe historical correlations between GDP/capita and average travel speeds areexpected to fade out progressively in this scenario, both for passengers and freight.In VLEEM, this is captured in bringing the elasticities of travel speed to GDP down tozero.In such a context, progress in accessibility is mostly due to a reduction in the traveldistances, which is permitted by a better location of dwellings and urbanfunctionalities.Thanks to progress in accessibility, daily transport time budget is expected to remainmostly constant, as in the past (Zahavis conjecture), despite the slowing down ofspeed increase. Utility of time spent in transport is expected to increase, in particularin fast trains and mass transit. This is captured in VLEEM through assumptions ondaily transport time budget per person according to residence location. For longdistance trips, the change in the time-budget is related to the change in the timebudget for outdoor leisure activities: week-ends and holidays (see below).The image of transport modes and the perception of their quality become more andmore influenced by environmental considerations (and less and less by power andspeed), even if autonomy, convenience and comfort remain attractive qualities. Thecurrent motorization trends continues up to saturation levels, which not only dependson where the people live, their age and the structure of the households, but also bycultural changes as regard car ownership. This is captured in VLEEM withassumptions on lower saturation levels (as compared to current views from today)according to households categories and residence location.For long distance trips, as well as for part of the daily trips, high speed trains andmass transit systems progressively outset the use of cars, for two reasons: speedand convenience (utility of transport time). Indoor comfortThe social standards as regard thermal comfort, for winter and summer, are assumedto reflect new attitudes as regard health and relation to environment: lowertemperature in bedrooms in winter for example, higher cooling temperature insummer.... The intensity of the needs, i.e. the ability to meet the social standards, areassumed to be driven not only by income and prices, but also by "thriftiness"attitudes: better management of the heating/cooling system, day/night, part time/partspace,....As regard healthy comfort (bathrooms,...), social standards are assumed to be drivenmostly by income and age, but with an increasing attitude against wasting.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 35
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"Life comfort at home is assumed to be more and more determined by in-door accessto cultural goods through internet, and to be increasingly less related to the numberand variety of appliances, mostly driven by income. How people workCurrent transformations brought about by the information technologies, in particularas regard social networking, make teleworking and telemeeting more and morepopular and well accepted. This is considered as a mean to respect the GHG quotasfor companies submitted to the ETS. Micro energy consumers producersThere is a strong development of distributed energy generation in this scenario,everywhere in Europe, with some exception in Northern part.This concerns first PV on buildings, which tend to become the core of the localelectricity systems, but also other self-generation of electricity in big buildings (inparticular CHPs).Along with the development of electric cars and plug-in hybrids vehicles, a stronglinkage is established between batteries, PV and CHP installations, and local smartgrids, which create a lot of opportunities for new services. A global management ofthe batteries as a component of the electricity system is implemented, and participateto the supply / demand balance at the local level. LeisureIn the leisure time budget structure, there are two striking features in this scenario:- the reduction of the share of long distance outdoor leisure, in particular longdistance weed-ends and short holidays,- the increasing share of cultural activities, both in-door and out-door.Long distance week-ends and short holidays (3 hours travel maximum), which areconstrained by a lower accessibility to fast trains and low availability of low cost airtransport, are expected to stabilize and to focus more on cultural goods.Long holidays are expected to be characterized by three main features:- time spent in long holidays is expected to re-increase (higher expectation for "doingslow" and for culture)- and therefore their frequency is expected to re-decrease (a matter of overall timeavailable);PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 36
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"- the share of very long distance holidays is expected to decrease, because lessavailability and higher costs of air transport, and because less favourableinternational context.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 37
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"6 Hard Way"Hard Way": a carbon transition process which is imposed, at least in the EU, by thegrowing problems and crises resulting from the un-ability of countries and societies toaddress in due time the question of the limits in natural resources and environment.To some extent, the Hard Way can be considered as a Business-as-usual scenario,that account for development/adjustment through violent/brutal crises.6.1 International context"Hard Way" supposes the continuation of the current trends as regard selfishness ofnations, without emergence of citizens movement against it. More generally,globalization and international relations continue to be driven exclusively by nationalinterest considerations in this scenario, paving the way for increasingly conflictingrelations among nations.6.1.1 Governance of global issues Climate change and GHG mitigationThe UN negotiation process cannot overcome the main difficulties at the occasion ofthe post-2012 Kyoto Protocole discussions and the Protocole is abandonned. IPCCdisappears, and information on climate change related issues become extremelyconfusing. Extreme climatic events multiply, but relation to GHGs emissions continueto be discussed.This means in particular that a) no country commits itself to mandatory carbonreduction objectives b) the flexible mechanisms to trade carbon internationallydisappear.Rich countries do not accept to pay for the adaptation to climatic change of thepoorest countries. Availability and accessibility to oil and gas resourcesDepletion policies of main oil and gas producing countries (Gulf countries, Russia, ...)are mostly driven by domestic considerations and geo-political aspects. This meansin particular production ceilings in many countries, in particular in the Persian Gulf.Oil and gas are more and more traded through market places. The role ofinternational organizations like IEA or OPEP in market regulation is more and morechallenged. There are no global governance mechanisms for oil and gas resources.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 38
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"This results in increasing tensions on oil and gas markets, with fast rising and highlyfluctuating prices, possible physical shortages in the case of EU, which, after a while,convince an increasing number of persons and industries to switch away from theseenergies and turn to renewables and electricity as fast as possible. World tradeWTO is more and more challenged, as protectionism tends to increase, which slowsdown World trade development. Nevertheless, big trans-national companies succeedin avoiding barriers against social dumping to be implemented. Carbon embodied inimports and exports is not an issue. World financeIMF is more and more challenged, being unable to avoid financial crisis thisjeopardizes the World economic development. Financing investment in developingcountries is becoming more risky, with less financial resources. The US remains asecure place for international funds, but the financial leadership switches from the USto China.6.1.2 Policies and constraints of major World players USAIn such an international environment, the USA is expected to have a rather badeconomic growth perspectives, because of a low World economic growth andbecause a steady decrease of the value of the dollar against other major internationalcurrencies. In addition, their technology leadership is being challenged by China andEmerging Countries.There is no federal quantified objective as regard climate change, and the number ofstates and big cities that commit themselves with very ambitious climate plans remainrather small. But the conjunction of extreme climatic events with difficult lifeconditions of an increasing part of the population oblige progressively the federalgovernment, the states and municipalities to take "visible" actions.The US doctrine as regard energy security is "back to independence".Isolationism is back again strongly.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 39
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" ChinaThe economic growth perspectives of China are rather bad in this scenario, firstbecause of the depressing World market, and because difficulties in raising thedomestic market.Indeed, Chinese and foreign companies competing on the World market succeed inmoderating steadily the increase of the wages in order to maintain/increase thecompetitiveness of Chinese products in a context of depressed World demand.Concern of the Chinese Government on climate issues remain rather strong in thisscenario, in particular due to the high sensitivity of China to the consequences of theclimate change. After some successful experiments of ambitious city climate planbased on carbon ceilings per capita, the Chinese government decides to imposesuch ceilings to all Chinese cities. In addition, a quota-trading system for CO2 isimplemented, with also ambitious targets.China will continue to give a great importance to energy independence targets.No major change of the Chinese foreign policy is expected in this scenario; inparticular the Yuan should remain at low levels against major foreign currencies inorder to protect the competitiveness of Chinese products on international markets. Other Emerging CountriesThe economic perspectives of the other Emerging Countries are also darkened bythe weakness of the World economy and the slow increase of the internal demand.As a matter of fact, to remain competitive on depressed World markets and in acontext of stronger price aggressivity of China, increase in wages and incomes haveto be slowed down.In this difficult economic context, environmental concerns mostly fade out, andclimate change is no more on the political agenda, neither of the central government,nor of the local/regional authorities.Because of the international environment of this scenario, energy security isbecoming a critical issue in these countries, leading to the adoption of ambitiousindependence targets.No major change is to be expected in the international relations, including regionaleconomic relations. The European UnionThe EU is expected to experience first an economic recession, followed by the slowrecovery in this scenario, for three reasons: a weak World demand for its high valuePACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 40
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"products and services, a depressed internal demand resulting from a fear concerningthe future (savings first) and supply crisis on oil, gas and main imported minerals.East/West socio-economic discrepancies within the EU are expected to widen,mostly because selfish attitudes of the richer west countries.EU sticks to its on-going CO2 mitigation efforts. Environmental concerns remainstrong, but the bad economic context and the absence of clear public support makethe adoption and implementation of drastic measures against CO2 emissions ratherdifficult.Energy security issues are on the top of the EU political agenda as regard energy.Independence becomes the master word, nuclear, renewables, unconventional gasand energy efficiency being the main tools.Movement toward isolationism is strong.6.2 The EU and member countries contextAs already said, "Hard Way" (HW) describes a transition process mostly forced bythe circumstances, without due preparation and organization.6.2.1 Economic modelIn "Hard Way", the EU as a whole and member countries are doing rather bad inGDP growth, although income maximization remain iconized in the population. Howthis can work from a social point of view, what it means as to the consumption model,these are the questions that we will address hereafter to describe the economicmodel supporting the bad GDP growth perspectives. Human capitalPeople clearly claim for jobs and money in this scenario, that are more and moredifficult to find. Policies dedicated to immigration, birth rate and women activity,working time and retirement, education, are driven by these considerations, within atemptation towards isolationism.Policy attempts to revitalize birth rate fail because of the fear about the future in thepopulation: fertility ratios remain at the same low levels as today (1,4 children /woman for the EU average). Women participation in the labour market tends to reacha saturation level around 60% after 2030 (46% in 2000), mostly because a structurallack of job opportunities: this is not the result of a social choice, but of the economicconstraints.Immigration, in particular of high skill people from Emerging Countries and otheremergent countries, is expected to remain welcome in the EU, but revitalizednationalism and increased isolationism oblige government to limit the immigrationPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 41
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"flows. The growing trend in immigration from outside the EU reverse down, tostabilize around 1 million people annually (1,1 in 2000).As a consequence of the difficult conditions of the labour market, the historicaldeclining trend of the average annual working time in Europe is expected to continue,but more slowly: in 2050, people would work almost 8% less than in 2000.Conversely, to save the pension system as it is, the declining historical trend of theaverage retirement age is expected to reverse (already the case in many countries),the average retirement age reaching 69 in 2050 (60 in 2000).Education policies aim at boosting the participation level of the youngsters in theuniversity, but within severe economic constraints: in 2050, it is expected that 55% ofa 25-50 years age class would be graduated from university, against 22% in 2000(much less than in "Spacecraft scenario for economic reasons). These policies areexpected to remain driven by the predominant economic objective to get theappropriate labour force with the appropriate education and skill levels at the righttime to operate the most efficiently the economic machine. Role and intervention of EU and member states governments"Hard Way" is a scenario in which the transition process is suffered and not driven.This means that the role of EU and member states is merely to adapt to events whenthey happen and to find solutions when problems and crisis arise.Basically, this scenario is a "business-as-usual" one as regard this aspect11.This means that current policies as regard energy and transport are expected tocontinue, in particular the on-going movement towards de-regulation.No drastic changes are expected in pricing and taxation policies. Life styles and consumption modelIn general terms, "Hard Way" is similar to "Spacecraft" as regard life styles andconsumption model -more or less what is experienced today by a majority of people-at least for the two first decades. But afterwards, the long lasting bad economicconditions and the resulting social tensions, force an increasing number of lowincome people to change their way of life and consumption pattern towardssomething closer to "Smartphone ".Practically, this means changes in utility functions occurring after 2030, which wouldaccount more and more for new dimensions as time-use, quality rather than variety,...Attitudes towards wasting are expected to change, but mostly for economic reasons.11 History teaches us that when countries, especially the EU is up against the wall, it reacts at theproper level! Up to a point, of course…PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 42
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"In a general context of a hard socio-economic context, people are expected to spendless time at work mostly because a lack of job opportunities, with decreasing orslowly increasing incomes, and a lack of confidence in the future. In fact, the gapbetween poor and rich people is expected to widen, with an increasing number ofpeople in the first category, those beyond retirement age, autonomous youngstersand people out of the job market or unemployed in particular. Life styles andconsumption pattern of rich people do not really change, while those of low incomepeople are forced to change for economic reasons. In particular these low incomepeople are expected to have more time for themselves, but with bad economic andpsychological conditions to benefit this increasing time.One of the consequences is that the share of the population that can enjoy expensiveoutdoor leisure activities (in particular long distance) is expected to decrease sharply.In the VLEEM model, this is captured in the following way:- the share of out-door versus in-door activities in this time-budget, which is supposedto go down- the share of long distance mobility in out-door activities, which is also supposed todecrease.6.2.2 The social balance between environment and wealthIn "Hard Way", EU and member countries are not committing themselves any moreto binding targets on GHG emissions, mostly because of the bad socio-economiccontext. GHG mitigation is mostly a consequence of the policies implemented to getrid of imported oil and gas because of the very tense situation of the World andregional markets of these commodities. Environment policies and instrumentsThe ETS is supposed to collapse before 2020, as well as the carbon market based offlexibility instruments (CDM, JI).Taxing carbon is not on the political agenda any more.In POLES model, this is captured with a carbon price on the ETS that decreasesdown to zero and zero carbon price outside the ETS, in the EU..Regulations and norms on energy and GHG performances for new buildings androad vehicles are kept as they are in all countries, and never concern other existingor new devices.Buildings retrofitting remains mostly limited to current renovation movement, which isexpected to slow down due to the low economic growth.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 43
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"Feed-in tariffs for centralized renewables remain, but with decreasing levels, as wellas subsidies for energy efficiency and distributed renewables.Green and white certificates are more or less stabilized at current levels. Equity, social exclusion, social protection, pensionsAs said earlier, "Hard Way" is a scenario where un-equity and social exclusionworsen significantly, the gap between rich and low income people widening a lot.The reason why this does not turn into a major social explosion is the combination of"withdrawal into oneself" and progressive changes in values and preferences amonglow income people. But this makes the whole European society less integrated andmore fragile.In particular no change is to be expected in the social lodging of poor people, moreand more confined in high rise buildings "ghettos" in the suburbs of big cities.Social/health expenses coverage systems exclude more and more people in Europe,as the unemployment ratio and the share of the population out of the job marketincrease. In addition, the coverage of the social/health expenses is reduced due torelatively low GDP.The pension systems remain more or less at it is, with altogether an increasing shareof the population out of it, and rather slow pension levels increase mostly calibratedon price indexes. Education, values, icons, democracyBasic education of children does not change so much, with nevertheless moreimportance given to environment and climate change issues.Values such as "thriftiness" or "going slow" start becoming more and more popularthrough the low income population after a while. Getting higher income remainsobviously the objective function of the rich people, but more and more people, inparticular among the income ones, become adepts of the new philosophy "gettingmore (satisfaction) with less (money)".The main social icons are still related to fashion, technology and innovation for awhile, but those related to "new welfare" concept start expanding rapidly after 2030.Democracy becomes more and more rigid as the economic and social conditionsworsen in the EU. Temptation for authoritarian systems show up here and there.6.2.3 Technology, energy efficiency and stake-holders strategiesPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 44
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions""Hard Way" is not so favourable for technology innovation and development of newinfrastructures that are capital intensive, basically for economic and financial reasons. TransportInvestment in new motorways and airport infrastructures is strongly reduced. TheEuropean high speed trains network for passengers and freight continue to bedeveloped, but a low pace.Because the fast increasing number of people with low income in the one side, andsoaring oil prices in the other side, car industry and related services adapt to proposelow-cost individual mobility, mixing car downsizing, alternative energy and newservices (car sharing, renting,..). This result in a fast development of the competitivesupply of electric urban cars and plug-in hybrids for cars and light vehicles.At local and regional levels, support to public transport (road and rail) suffers a lot ofthe lack of financial availabilities.For freight, nothing particular is done. BuildingsIn this scenario, there are no significant changes in existing standards forconstruction in all EU countries. Competitiveness, in a context of high prices for oiland gas, remains the main driver of the construction of low energy and very lowenergy buildings beyond the actual regulations. Same for zero / +energy buildings.For existing buildings, thermal retrofitting is mostly driven by renovation programmes,which are likely to be slowed down because of the low economic growth context ,with reduced technical possibilities. MaterialsInclusion of soft materials (wood, straw,...) in buildings construction remains "asusual".Substitution among materials in new buildings, vehicles and packaging, as well asrecycling of used materials, remain mostly driven by prices and costs, in a contextwhere oil and gas prices are expected to be very high. RenewablesIn "Hard Way" scenario, there is a strong public (local and regional) and privatesupport to the development of renewables as a mean to get rid of oil and gas imports,but within severe financial constraints.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 45
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"In particular, off-shore wind development is strongly supported, but slowed down bythe financial constraints.Despite bad economic and financial conditions, PV on buildings is expected todevelop at a high speed, to a high magnitude, as an individual response to theincreasing un-reliability of the grid. Solar heat and direct use of biomass are alsoexpected to develop fast, partly for economic reasons, partly because an increasinglack of confidence in centralized energy supply.From the grid viewpoint, PV is considered as a complementary source of electricitythat has to be managed, and which contribute, along with windpower, to theincreasing lack of reliability of the whole electricity system. One of the reason for thisis that smart grid concept and technologies do not develop fast enough, due tofinancial constraints.CSP (Concentrated Solar Plant) is also expected to develop in some amounts insouth Europe and Maghreb mostly, with interconnections with the rest of Europe,when economic and financial conditions are favourable.Biofuels are mostly driven by prices and costs. Network energy systems (electricity, gas, heat/cool)In this scenario, electricity supply remain mostly centralized, even if renewablesdevelop significantly. Despite an increasing share of nuclear in the electricity supply(for energy security reasons), the random nature of solar and wind, and theintermittence of these energies, make the peak demand problems more and morecritical. Smart grids and smart metering are developed to allow increasingly demandresponse solutions to solve these problems, but at a too slow path for financialreasons: this makes the overall system more and more fragile and less and lessreliable.In particular, the too slow evolution of the grid concept and management make italmost impossible to organize a centralized management of the car batteries as astorage component of the electricity system.Gas and district heating and cooling networks are expected to continue theirdeployment in all EU member countries at current trends.6.3 Local transitionsIn "Hard Way" scenario, local transitions participate to a large extent to the overallcarbon transition movement, and they are mostly driven by the changes in attitudesin a growing part of the population, because the difficult economic conditions in theone side, and because an increasing lack of confidence in the conventional energyPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 46
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"system in the other side. But local and regional authorities remain mostly followers inthis process, partly for policy reasons, partly because of financial constraints .6.3.1 Local players policies and actionsThe scope of the local players interventions and the instruments at their disposal forsuch interventions are supposed not to change significantly in this scenario ascompared to the existing situation. Municipalities and other local/regional authoritiesBuildings (construction rules and retrofitting), urban and regional transportinfrastructures and services, and district heating/cooling remain the bulk of the field ofintervention of municipalities and other local/regional authorities.Local and regional climate plans are progressively abandoned.There are no particular local policies towards the retrofitting of existing buildings,beyond the current renovation programmes, except for social housing.Municipalities and other local/regional authorities are subject to increasing financialdifficulties that jeopardize the development possibilities for local/regionalinfrastructures in transport and energy.Under the pressure of citizens and NGOs, no restriction is put on the installation ofPV on the roofs of buildings Utilities and servicesDistrict heating and cooling services continue developing at current trendsBecause of the growing importance of PV on buildings, there is an increasingdemand for local low voltage micro grids and appliances, which drives thedevelopment of new related products and services.The usual separation between energy suppliers and demand services is expected toremain as it is in most cases, with little integration of energy supply and energyefficiency. NGOs and citizens associationsPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 47
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"Innovative experiences in the field of sustainable urban development, includingenergy, driven by local/regional institutions, NGOs and citizen associations, remainscarce and fail to initiate a widespread replication movement.National policy burden on local/regional authorities as regard climate change is weak,and monitoring, evaluation and follow-up is not an issue, neither at the national level,nor at the local and regional levels.Education and public awareness as regard environment are given some importance,not very much.6.3.2 Changes in urban schemes"Hard Way" scenario is in the continuation of historic trends as regard urbanschemes, in a context of declining EU population after 2025: urban sprawl continues,core cities and 1rings are stabilized and remaining population and households areabsorbed by small/ medium towns, in particular in the periphery of core cities. transport and energy networks, spatial distribution of dwellingscore citiesAlthough population is not expected to increase so much in existing core cities, thereis a requalification of existing dwellings towards high income people, chasing out lowincome people.This dwelling and social structure change supports a continuous increase in the costof land, that goes against the location of new jobs in core cities.Extension / implementation of district heating / cooling networks are carried outwherever cost effective.1st ringConversely, there is a progressive change in the dwellings and social structure of the1st rings, in favour of low income people, with first a significant growth of the totalpopulation, then a decline.A comprehensive integration of mass transit systems with core cities is carried outalmost everywhere.Extension / implementation of district heating / cooling networks are carried outwherever cost effective.small/medium citiesIn this scenario, small/medium cities around core cities experience an increase anddensification of residents and jobs, mostly for economic reasons (land and propertyPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 48
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"costs), but other small/medium cities experience a rapid and sharp decline.Altogether, the global population of these small/medium cities decreases significantly.Gas networks develop in cities nearby core cities along with current trends.sparse settlementsThe main feature of "Hard Way" is that the resident population in sparse settlementscontinues to increase, in particular families with children, mostly for economicreasons (lower land and property costs) and because no adverse policies (norestriction in permits to build new houses in sparse settlements).This is likely to happen despite aging population and worsening accessibilityconditions of people living in sparse settlements, and increased transport costs. Spatial distribution of urban functionsFor education, commerce, and services to the public (post, banks,...), location rulesremain mostly unchanged.For health and other services, location remains driven by costs, i.e. local fiscalpolicies. Spatial city networkingSpatial city networking remain rather limited in the "Hard Way" scenario.At national and EU level, this means that only major EU core cities will be connectedamong themselves with high speed trains.At local/regional level, mass transit systems are expected to be expanded /developed mostly to connect core cities and 1st rings, but extensions to surroundingimportant medium cities (star development) would concern only the periphery ofmajor core cities. Land-use and cities energy demand/supply balancingIn this scenario, energy supply / demand is expected to become progressively morebalanced at city level first, regional level second, thanks to local renewablesdevelopment.Cities are expected to become less energy importers along with the combination ofreduction in energy consumption (for economic reasons) with a large development ofthe local harvesting of solar energy and ambient heat (heat pump) and the use ofgeothermal energy and waste.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 49
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"In peri-urban areas, the development of wind power and biomass is slowed down dueto landscape and land-use conflicts. But single family houses in sparse settlementstend to become more and more self-sufficient thanks to solar (PV and water heater),roof windpower and direct use of biomass, for two reasons: deficiency of theconventional energy supply, and high prices of conventional energies.6.3.3 Daily life in post-carbon societies in the EUIn this scenario, high income people are not expected to change so much their wayof life, while low income people, which population would grow faster, are forced aftersome time to change radically their way of life. How people moveThe historical correlations between GDP/capita and average travel speeds areexpected to fade out progressively in this scenario, both for passengers and freight.In VLEEM, this is captured in bringing the elasticities of travel speed to GDP down tozero.In such a context, progress in accessibility is slow because of the economic context,and mostly due to an increase in the transport time budget, in particular for peopleliving in small cities and in sparse settlements..Utility of time spent in transport is expected to increase a little, in particular in fasttrains and mass transit.The image of transport modes and the perception of their quality remain driven byspeed, autonomy, convenience and comfort for high income people, but economicand environmental considerations become more and more important for low incomepeople. The current motorization trends continues up to saturation levels, which notonly depends on where the people live, their age and the structure of the households,but also by cultural changes as regard car ownership for an increasing part of thepopulation.For long distance trips, as well as for part of the daily trips, high speed trains andmass transit systems progressively outset the use of cars, for two reasons: speedand convenience (utility of transport time). Indoor comfortThe social standards as regard thermal comfort, for winter and summer, are assumedto remain driven by income and prices for high income people, while low incomepeople are forced progressively to adopt new attitudes for economic reasons: lowerPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 50
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"temperature in bedrooms in winter for example, higher cooling temperature insummer.... The intensity of the needs, i.e. the ability to meet the social standards, areassumed to be driven only by income and prices.As regard healthy comfort (bathrooms,...), social standards are assumed to be drivenmostly by income and age, but with an increasing attitude against wasting for lowincome people.Life comfort at home is assumed to remained determined by equipment variety andpattern of use, which are assumed to be mostly driven by income and prices. How people workTele-working and tele-meeting develop along the current trends. Micro energy consumers producersThere is a strong development of distributed energy generation in this scenario,everywhere in Europe (with some exception in Northern part for PV)..This concerns PV on buildings and other self-generation of electricity in big buildings(in particular CHPs), which are considered as appropriate responses to theincreasing lack of reliability of the grid.Despite the development of electric cars and plug-in hybrids vehicles, the linkagebetween batteries, PV and CHP installations in the one side, the grid in the otherside, remain marginal. There is no global management of the batteries as acomponent of the electricity system, although the nexus PV-batteries participate tothe supply / demand balance at the micro level. LeisureIn the leisure time budget structure, there are two striking features in this scenario:- an increasing share of low cost leisure activities, both in-door and out-door, mostlyresulting from the increasing share of low income people,- the reduction of the share of long distance outdoor leisure, in particular longdistance weed-ends and short holidays, which remain the privilege of high incomepeople, whose population is decreasing.Long holidays are expected to be characterized by three main features:- their frequency is expected to re-decrease for low income people, mostly foreconomic reasons, while it continues increasing for high income people,PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 51
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"- time spent in long holidays is expected to stabilize for low income people, while itwould continue to decrease for high income people- the share of very long distance holidays is expected to decrease, mostly becausethe decreasing population that can afford it, and because less favourableinternational context.7 Quantifying carbon transition pathwaysTwo models are used to quantify the carbon transition pathways:- VLEEM/TILT (Very Long Term Energy Environment Model / Transport Investigationon the Long Term), which aim at quantifying the long term impacts of the transitionscenarios on the needs of energy services in the EU12;- POLES (Prospective Outlook of long term Energy Systems), which aim attranslating the long term needs of energy services into energy balances for the EU,accounting for the relations with the rest of the world, in particular World and regionaloil, gas and coal markets13.There are three main steps in the quantification procedure: identification of theexogenous inputs of the models impacted by the scenario storylines, quantification ofthese inputs according to the qualitative statements of the storylines, run of themodel. This quantification procedure is iterative, so that a global consistency can beachieved between the storylines, the models inputs and the long term energy andGHGs projections.As seen earlier, none of the scenarios is bound to specific global GHGsconcentration target in 2050. It is assumed that most countries worldwide, inparticular the big ones, are aware that dividing by 2 the World anthropogenic GHGsemissions by 2050 would keep the GHG concentration around 450ppmv and avoidmajor climatic problems, and that this would imply for industrialized countries toreduce their own emissions by a factor 4. But at the same time, the socio-economicand political conditions that prevail in each scenario are more or less far away fromthose actually required to reach such objectives, both globally and for industrializedcountries, in due time: either this remain the objective, but likely to be reached in thelonger term (mostly consistent with "Smartphone " philosophy), or there is a kind ofWorld consensus on the optimal trade-off between mitigation and adaptation that canbe reached in 2050 (mostly consistent with "Spacecraft"), or even no one careanymore with global objectives, each country trying to solve alone its own problems,low GDP growths and turmoil on oil and gas markets doing the job (mostly consistent12 A brief description of VLEEM / TILT model is given in annex 1.13 A brief description of POLES model is given in annex 2.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 52
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"with "Hard Way"). Therefore, the distance to this 450ppmv concentration target in2050 vary according to scenarios, and this gap is one of the result that must beconsidered when assessing the overall consistency of the scenario.7.1 From scenario storylines to quantitative models inputsTo quantify the carbon transition pathways described by the above scenarios with thehelp of the models, it is necessary to translate the qualitative information from thestorylines into quantitative assumptions on appropriate exogenous variables andparameters of the models. This is done in two steps: identification of the exogenousinputs of the models likely to be impacted by the scenario storylines, formalization ofthe linkage between both.7.1.1 Identification of relevant exogenous inputs of the models VLEEM/TILTThe comprehensive description of the model and its development during the PACTproject is available in PACT deliverable D5.The figure below summarizes how VLEEM/TILT works, and the main influences onthe needs of energy services, some of them being dependant on where the peoplelive: climate, urban zone mostly. Figure 7-1: VLEEM/TILT overview Demography Education - information Activity Production, wealth Time - use Needs of energy services «Food-feeding» « Shelter » « Transport» « Self-accomplishment » « Other production»Scenario storylines do impact all the boxes in this figure, but the red ones areparticularly important as regard carbon transitions as captured in the scenarios.The tables hereafter point out the exogenous inputs that mostly drive, within thesered boxes:- the total population and number of households, and their distribution amonghouseholds categories and living areas (urban schemes)PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 53
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"- the production, economic growth and wealth- passengers accessibility and mobility, modal structure and transport technology- dwelling stock structure and characteristics, and technologyDEMOGRAPHY, HOUSEHOLDS, URBAN DEVELOPMENT Categories Exogenous inputsFertility Urban Fertility rate 0-24 years Rural Fertility rate 25-49 yearsSocial structure Urban % Singles in population below 75 Rural % of population below 50 living in two persons households % population more than 75 living with their children or in community % population 25-49 single with one childMigrations from outside EU Persons (millions/year) Households (millions/year) of which singles (millions/yar)Urban sprawl Sparse settlements Share of population in sparse settlementsDistribution of urban households according to urban zones Singles, no child % in core cities 2 pers. households, no child % in 1st ring suburb Singles with 1child % in small/medium cities households more than 2 persECONOMIC GROWTH, PRODUCTION, WEALTH Exogenous inputsTime use at work hours/yearActivity level retirement age % active (2nd hhs adult)Education-information % tertiary education (25-45 years old)Production, wealth Utilisation rate of production potential Elasticity of labour productivity to informationPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 54
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"MOBILITY, passengers Categories Exogenous inputscar equipment saturation levels core cities % households, singles, no child 1st ring suburb % households, 2 pers. households, no child small/medium cities % households, singles with 1child sparse settlements % households, households more than 2 persSpeed control elasticity speed/GDP, passengers average car speedModal split Short distance km per day per person in soft modes km/car/year % car in urban mobility (pkm) % car in regional mobility (pkm) Loading factor of cars (car pooling) Long distance %pkm normal trains in rail % air in pkm (outside extra Europe)time budget core cities daily mobility time budget (h/day/person) 1st ring suburb small/medium cities sparse settlements share of mobility long distance in increase in time budget for self accomplishmentDistance / speed calibration* urban Calibrated annual mobility per capita (% decrease per period) regional Car speeds (km/h) Average transport speed, all modes core cities average speed, car urban 1st ring suburb average speed, public urban small/medium cities sparse settlements average speed, car regionalTechnology long distance % vkm in elec mode for plug-in hybrid regional urban Hybrids plug-in date introduction to market Elec urban cars Market deployment logistic parameters Fuel cells-H2* Iterative calibration procedure untill distance / speed fits with time budgetPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 55
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"BUILDINGS, Households Categories Exogenous inputsHousing replacement and renovation core cities percentage of the stock of dwelling replaced yearly 1st ring suburb percentage of the stock of dwelling renoved-maintained per year small/medium cities sparse settlementsStructure of construction core cities % single family houses 1st ring suburb % small flats buildings (<5floors) small/medium cities % big flats buildings (=>5floors) sparse settlementsDeployment of new efficient buildings according to climatic/geographic zones (%) Nordic % Low energy houses single family houses % Low exergy houses small flats buildings (<5floors) % Passive houses (very low energy) big flats buildings (=>5floors) % Zero energy houses Eastern % Plus energy houses single family houses small flats buildings (<5floors) big flats buildings (=>5floors) South single family houses small flats buildings (<5floors) big flats buildings (=>5floors) West single family houses small flats buildings (<5floors) big flats buildings (=>5floors)Technology Nordic Efficiency gains through retrofitting (%) single family houses small flats buildings (<5floors) big flats buildings (=>5floors) Eastern single family houses small flats buildings (<5floors) big flats buildings (=>5floors) South single family houses small flats buildings (<5floors) big flats buildings (=>5floors) West single family houses small flats buildings (<5floors) big flats buildings (=>5floors)PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 56
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" POLESThe comprehensive description of the model and its development during the PACTproject is available in PACT deliverable D5.The figures below summarize how POLES works, and the main influences on thesupply/demand equilibria of the World regions/countries considered and on theworld/regional markets for oil, gas, coal and CO2. Figure 7-2: POLES overview Fossil Fuel Primary Energy Supply Supply Fossil Fuels Imports / Exports Electricity Transformation Total Energy Demand System New & Renewable Net Final Energy Demand Energies Sectoral Final Final Energy Demand Energy DemandScenario storylines, through assumptions on GDP, demography and resources andcarbon constraints do impact all energy demand / supply balances of all regions andcountries all over the world, and therefore the tensions on the World and regionalenergy and CO2 markets, that in turn impact the EU.But in addition, these storylines impact directly the drivers of the energy demand andsupply evolutions in the EU. For EU energy demand, VLEEM / TILT already providePACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 57
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"details on the future evolutions for passenger transport and for buildings: for thecorresponding POLES exogenous inputs, it is just a matter of re-calibration of thesesinputs and of the corresponding demand functions parameters.The table below summarize the POLES exogenous inputs that are involved in thescenario quantification. Exogenous POLES variables and parameters for translation Demand GDP Population Technology trends, demand functions per sector CO2 value Ultimate ressouces oil & gas Recovery rate of Ultimate oil resources Production capacity Gulf Supply Potentials for renewables Costs of energy supply technologies nuclear coal Discount rates, public (supported) investments Gas penetration7.1.2 Linking the storylines to the relevant exogenous inputs of the modelsThe next step is link the above exogenous models inputs to the correspondingqualitative statements of the storylines. For that purpose, the storylines have beenproperly structured in standard sections, sub-sections, and bullet points, either tomake a direct link between the bullet point and the corresponding quantitative inputswhen relevant (direct impact), or to point out an indirect influence that participates tothe overall consistency of the scenario and has to be considered in the quantification.The comprehensive tables showing the linkage between the qualitative statements ofthe scenario storylines and the quantitative inputs of the models are displayed inannex 3.7.1.3 Quantifying the relevant exogenous inputs of the modelsThe next step is to translate the qualitative scenario statements corresponding to thebullet points into quantitative assumptions on the corresponding exogenousvariables/parameters of the models. For that purpose, the following method wasadopted:PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 58
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"a) For each exogenous input considered, a range of likely values for future targetyears (2025 and 2050) is estimated within the boundaries of the 3 scenarios,b) Within these boundaries, a specific value of the input is associated to eachscenario.This method does not pretend to result in the most accurate assumption for oneparticular input in one particular scenario, but to keep an overall consistency withineach scenario first, across the 3 scenarios second. Uncertainty and range of variationMaking an assumption on an exogenous input of a model means that the futurevalues of this input are uncertain, and that there is no formal mean to reduce thisuncertainty. This assumption can be understood as the most likely value that wouldtake this variable/parameter at that time in the future, because of the variousinfluences impacting it in that particular scenario.In that sense, the scenarios considered in the study frame the range of uncertaintyabout the various exogenous variables / parameters of the models, and therefore therange of values that the assumptions can take.Practically, the estimation of the range of values for each exogenous inputs for thefuture target years is done in three steps:- assessment of the historical evolution and actual trends of the exogenous variable /parameter,- assessment of the possible inflexions of these trends in the future due to theinfluences of the scenario,- assessment of the extreme values (minimum, maximum) that can be taken by theexogenous variables / parameters in 2025 and 2050 within the 3 scenarios. Linking values to qualitative statements of scenario storylines, VLEEM/TILTThe next step consists in linking firmly one particular value within the above range toone particular scenario, for each exogenous input of VLEEM / TILT considered.When only 3 scenarios are considered, this is rather straightforward. Each extremevalue (min / max) is attached to one particular scenario, by definition of the range oflikely values. The only thing to do therefore, is to attached an intermediate valuewithin the range to the third scenario. This is done comparing the qualitativestatements of the 3 scenarios for the same item (bullet point) and deducting whetherthe intermediate value is identical or closer to one of the extremes, or just in themiddle of the range.The synthetic tables summarizing the quantification of the exogenous inputs for thethree scenarios, and for the EU-27 as a whole, are displayed below.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 59
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Table 7-1: Quantitative assumptions for the 3 scenarios, VLEEM-TILT Maximum Minimum Mean Balance Intermediate valueDEMOGRAPHY, HOUSEHOLDS, URBAN DEVELOPMENT 2025 2050 Spacecraft Smartphone The hard way 2000 Min Max Min Max 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050FertilityUrban Fertility rate 0-24 years 0,1 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 Fertility rate 25-49 1,46 1,30 1,70 1,30 1,90 1,70 1,90 1,50 1,70 1,30 1,30Rural Fertility rate 0-24 years 0,1 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 Fertility rate 25-49 1,46 1,30 1,70 1,30 1,90 1,70 1,90 1,50 1,70 1,30 1,30Social structureUrban % Singles in population below 75 12% 13% 15% 14% 18% 13% 14% 14% 15% 15% 18% % of population below 50 living in two persons households 16% 14% 18% 12% 20% 14% 12% 16% 15% 18% 20% % population more than 75 living with their children or in5% community 3% 7% 1% 10% 3% 1% 7% 10% 3% 1% % population 25-49 single with one child 3% 3% 5% 3% 7% 3% 3% 5% 7% 3% 3%Rural % Singles in population below 75 8% 11% 13% 11% 15% 11% 11% 12% 12% 13% 15% % of population below 50 living in two persons households 22% 20% 22% 18% 22% 20% 18% 21% 19% 22% 22% % population more than 75 living with their children or in5% community 3% 7% 1% 10% 3% 1% 7% 10% 3% 1% % population 25-49 single with one child 2% 3% 5% 3% 7% 3% 3% 5% 7% 3% 3%Migrations from outside the EU Persons (millions/year) 1,1 1,0 1,4 1,0 2,0 1,4 2 1,2 1,5 1,00 1,00 Households (millions/year) 1 0,95 1,30 0,90 1,80 1,30 1,80 1,13 1,35 0,95 0,90 of which singles 0,8 0,90 1,20 0,80 1,60 1,20 1,60 1,05 1,20 0,90 0,80Share of population in sparse settlements 33% 30% 34% 25% 35% 33% 33% 30% 25% 34% 35%Distribution of urban households according to urban zonesM1 - Single core cities 38% 35% 45% 35% 50% 40% 43% 35% 35% 45% 50% 1st ring suburb 29% 25% 35% 25% 40% 25% 25% 35% 40% 25% 25% small/medium compact cities 34% 30% 40% 25% 40% 35% 33% 30% 25% 30% 25%M2 - 2 pers. Households, no child core cities 24% 25% 35% 25% 40% 30% 33% 25% 25% 35% 40% 1st ring suburb 33% 30% 40% 30% 45% 30% 30% 40% 45% 30% 35% small/medium compact cities 44% 35% 45% 25% 45% 40% 38% 35% 30% 35% 25%M3 - 2 pers. Households, 1child core cities 28% 25% 35% 25% 40% 30% 33% 35% 40% 25% 25% 1st ring suburb 37% 35% 45% 35% 50% 30% 28% 45% 35% 45% 50% small/medium compact cities 36% 30% 40% 25% 40% 40% 40% 20% 25% 30% 25%M4 - >2 pers. Households core cities 20% 15% 25% 10% 25% 20% 18% 25% 25% 15% 10% 1st ring suburb 39% 35% 45% 30% 45% 30% 23% 35% 35% 45% 45% small/medium compact cities 41% 40% 50% 40% 60% 50% 60% 40% 40% 40% 45%ECONOMIC GROWTH, PRODUCTION, WEALTH 2025 2050 Spacecraft Smartphone The hard way 2000 Min Max Min Max 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050hours/year 1796 1692 1739 1472 1833 1739 1833 1692 1472 1716 1653retirement age 59,9 65 67 60 69 67 69 65 60 67 69% active, 2nd households adult 46% 55% 65% 60% 80% 65% 80% 55% 60% 55% 60%% tertiary education (25-45 years old) 22% 50% 60% 55% 70% 60% 70% 55% 65% 50% 55%Utilisation rate of production potential 91% 85% 92% 80% 92% 92% 92% 92% 92% 85% 80%Elasticity of labour productivity to information 1,5 1,5 2,2 1,3 2,5 2,2 2,5 2,0 2,1 1,5 1,3PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 60
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"MOBILITY, passengers: car equipment, modal split, speed and time budget 2025 2050 Spacecraft Smartphone The hard way 2000 Min Max Min Max 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050car equipment ratios, saturation levels core cities single househods 35% 40% 53% 39% 52% 53% 52% 40% 39% 47% 39% 2 persons households, no child 92% 90% 120% 90% 120% 120% 120% 90% 90% 105% 90% 2 persons households, one child 57% 50% 67% 50% 67% 67% 67% 50% 50% 58% 50% households with more than 2 pers. 109% 100% 133% 100% 133% 133% 133% 100% 100% 117% 100% 1st ring suburb single househods 45% 53% 60% 52% 59% 60% 59% 53% 52% 57% 52% 2 persons households, no child 105% 135% 150% 135% 150% 150% 150% 135% 135% 143% 135% 2 persons households, one child 75% 75% 100% 75% 100% 100% 100% 75% 75% 88% 75% households with more than 2 pers. 122% 100% 167% 100% 167% 167% 167% 100% 100% 133% 100% small/medium compact cities single househods 50% 60% 80% 59% 78% 80% 78% 60% 59% 70% 59% 2 persons households, no child 117% 150% 180% 150% 180% 180% 180% 150% 150% 165% 150% 2 persons households, one child 82% 100% 120% 100% 120% 120% 120% 100% 100% 110% 100% households with more than 2 pers. 134% 167% 200% 167% 220% 200% 220% 167% 167% 183% 167% sparse settlements single househods 59% 64% 80% 62% 78% 80% 78% 64% 62% 72% 62% 2 persons households, no child 146% 162% 180% 162% 180% 180% 180% 162% 162% 171% 162% 2 persons households, one child 96% 100% 120% 100% 120% 120% 120% 100% 100% 110% 100% households with more than 2 pers. 158% 180% 210% 180% 220% 210% 220% 180% 180% 195% 180%elasticity speed/GDP, passengers 0,19 0,00 0,37 0,00 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,00 0,00 0,19 0,00km per day per person in soft modes core cities 0,82 0,80 1,00 0,75 1,20 0,80 0,75 1,00 1,20 0,90 1,20 1st ring suburb 0,55 0,50 0,70 0,40 1,00 0,50 0,40 0,70 1,00 0,60 1,00 small/medium compact cities 0,66 0,60 0,80 0,50 1,00 0,60 0,50 0,80 1,00 0,70 1,00 sparse settlements 0,33 0,30 0,40 0,25 0,50 0,30 0,25 0,40 0,50 0,35 0,50km/car/year core cities 11533 10000 10500 8500 9500 10500 9500 10000 8500 10250 8500 1st ring suburb 17557 16000 16500 14000 15000 16500 15000 16000 14000 16250 14000 small/medium compact cities 12975 11500 12000 10000 11000 12000 11000 11500 10000 11750 10000 sparse settlements 11070 9500 10000 9000 10000 10000 10000 9500 9000 9750 9000% car in urban mobility (pkm) core cities 58% 50% 65% 40% 70% 65% 70% 50% 40% 58% 40% 1st ring suburb 79% 70% 85% 60% 85% 85% 85% 70% 60% 78% 60% small/medium compact cities 72% 65% 80% 60% 85% 80% 85% 65% 60% 73% 60% sparse settlements 77% 75% 85% 70% 85% 85% 85% 75% 70% 80% 70%% car in regional mobility (pkm) core cities 75% 70% 80% 60% 75% 80% 75% 70% 60% 75% 60% 1st ring suburb 84% 80% 85% 75% 90% 85% 90% 80% 75% 83% 75% small/medium compact cities 83% 80% 85% 75% 90% 85% 90% 80% 75% 83% 75% sparse settlements 83% 80% 85% 75% 90% 85% 90% 80% 75% 83% 75%Relative increase of car load factor due to car pooling All trips 0% 2% 0% 5% 0% 0% 2% 5% 0% 2%time budget transport (h/day/person >6, daily) core cities 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1,11 1st ring suburb 1,23 1,23 1,29 1,23 1,35 1,23 1,23 1,23 1,23 1,29 1,35 small/medium compact cities 1,07 1,07 1,18 1,07 1,29 1,07 1,07 1,07 1,07 1,18 1,29 sparse settlements 1,00 1,00 1,15 1,00 1,30 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,15 1,30share of long distance mobility in increase oftime budget for self accomplishment 20% 20% 20% 20% 5% 8% 4% 2% 7% 0%Modal split for long distance travel % air in pkm (outside extra Europe) 10% 13% 17% 10% 20% 17% 20% 13% 10% 15% 10%PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 61
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"MOBILITY, passengers: technology, calibration speed, time budget, distance 2025 2050 Spacecraft Smartphone The hard way 2000 Min Max Min Max 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050% vkm in elec mode for plug-in hybrid long distance 0% 5% 0% 10% 5% 10% 5% 10% 0% 0% regional 5% 20% 10% 50% 20% 50% 10% 20% 5% 10% urban 20% 40% 40% 80% 40% 80% 30% 60% 20% 40%date introduction to market for new technologies Hybrids plug-in 2012 2015 2015 Elec urban cars 2012 2015 2015 Fuel cells-H2 2050 2050 2050Market deployment logistic parameters B 10 10 10 r 0,65 0,75 0,85Calbration speed, time and distanceAnnual mobility per capita (% decrease per period) urban 0% 0% 5% 5% 0% 0% regional 0% 0% 15% 15% 0% -8%Car speeds (km/h) average 28,5 29,0 28,2 27,9 26,5 27,1 26,2 urban 21,6 21,5 20,0 19,5 16,7 18,2 18,2 regional 27,0 26,6 27,5 21,8 19,0 25,0 25,2 long distance 102,3 105,0 105,0 95,0 90,0 100,0 100,0Transport speed, all modes urban 18,7 18,2 17,8 15,8 16,6 15,5 regional 27,4 28,1 23,5 21,8 26,0 26,0Transport speed, Core cities (km/h)Individual urban 16,2 16,0 14,0 12,0 16,2 16,0Public urban 16,5 16,0 19,0 19,0 18,0 19,0Transport speed, 1st ring (km/h)Individual urban 23,0 23,0 20,0 18,0 22,5 22,0Public urban 17,0 16,0 25,0 26,0 18,0 22,0Transport speed, Other cities (km/h)Individual urban 23,0 20,0 23,0 15,0 17,0 14,0Public urban 15,0 15,0 20,0 30,0 16,0 15,0Transport speed, Sparse (km/h)Individual regional 26,5 28,0 20,5 18,5 22,4 22,0%pkm normal trains in rail 11% 2% 6% 5% 6% 14%PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 62
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"BUILDINGS, Households, construction and renovation 2025 2050 Spacecraft Smartphone The hard way 2000 Min Max Min Max 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050Housing replacement and renovationpercentage of the stock of dwelling replaced yearly core cities 0,1% 0,2% 0,1% 0,2% 0,1% 0,1% 0,2% 0,2% 0,1% 0,1% 1st ring suburb 0,1% 0,5% 0,1% 0,5% 0,1% 0,1% 0,5% 0,5% 0,1% 0,1% small/medium compact cities 0,1% 0,3% 0,1% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,2% 0,2% 0,1% 0,1% sparse settlements 0,1% 0,3% 0,1% 0,3% 0,3% 0,3% 0,1% 0,1% 0,3% 0,3%percentage of the stock of dwelling renoved-maintained per year core cities 0,5% 3,0% 0,5% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 1,8% 1,8% 0,5% 0,5% 1st ring suburb 0,5% 3,0% 0,5% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 1,8% 1,8% 0,5% 0,5% small/medium compact cities 0,5% 3,0% 0,5% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 1,8% 1,8% 0,5% 0,5% sparse settlements 0,5% 3,0% 0,5% 3,0% 3,0% 3,0% 1,8% 1,8% 0,5% 0,5%Structure of constructionCore cities % single family houses 0% 5% 0% 5% 5% 5% 0,0% 0,0% 3% 3% % small flats buildings (<5floors) 10% 20% 10% 20% 20% 20% 10% 10% 15% 15% % big flats buildings (=>5floors) 80% 90% 80% 90% 75% 75% 90% 90% 83% 83%1st ring % single family houses 5% 15% 5% 15% 15% 15% 5,0% 5,0% 10% 10% % small flats buildings (<5floors) 30% 60% 30% 60% 60% 60% 30% 30% 45% 45% % big flats buildings (=>5floors) 35% 65% 35% 65% 25% 25% 65% 65% 45% 45%other cities % single family houses 20% 50% 20% 50% 50% 50% 20% 20% 35% 35% % small flats buildings (<5floors) 40% 80% 40% 80% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% % big flats buildings (=>5floors) 10% 40% 10% 40% 10% 10% 40% 40% 25% 25%BUILDINGS, Households, technology retrofitting 2025 2050 Spacecraft Smartphone The hard way 2000 Min Max Min Max 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050Efficiency gains through retrofitting according to climatic/geographic zones (%)Single family houses Nordic 10% 30% 10% 30% 30% 30% 20% 20% 10% 10% Eastern 15% 40% 15% 40% 40% 40% 28% 28% 15% 15% South 15% 40% 15% 40% 40% 40% 28% 28% 15% 15% West 20% 60% 20% 60% 60% 60% 40% 40% 20% 20%small flats buildings (<5floors) Nordic 10% 20% 10% 20% 20% 20% 15% 15% 10% 10% Eastern 15% 30% 15% 30% 30% 30% 23% 23% 15% 15% South 15% 30% 15% 30% 30% 30% 23% 23% 15% 15% West 20% 50% 20% 50% 50% 50% 35% 35% 20% 20% big flats buildings (=>5floors) Nordic 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% Eastern 15% 20% 15% 20% 20% 20% 18% 18% 15% 15% South 15% 20% 15% 20% 20% 20% 18% 18% 15% 15% West 30% 40% 30% 40% 40% 40% 35% 35% 30% 30%PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 63
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"BUILDINGS, Households, technology new buildings 2025 2050 Spacecraft Smartphone The hard way 2000 Min Max Min Max 2025 2050 2025 2050 2025 2050Deployment of new efficient buildings according to climatic/geographic zones (%)Nordic single family houses Low energy houses 50% 80% 0% 80% 80% 80% 50% 0% 50% 40% Low exergy houses Passive houses (very low energy) 20% 50% 20% 100% 20% 20% 50% 100% 20% 60% Zero energy houses Plus energy houses small flats buildings (<5floors) Low energy buildings 50% 80% 0% 80% 80% 80% 50% 0% 50% 40% Low exergy buildings Passive buildings (very low energy) 20% 50% 20% 100% 20% 20% 50% 100% 20% 60% big flats buildings (=>5floors) Low energy buildings 50% 80% 0% 80% 80% 80% 50% 0% 50% 40% Low exergy buildings Passive buildings (very low energy) 20% 50% 20% 100% 20% 20% 50% 100% 20% 60%Eastern single family houses Low energy houses 50% 90% 0% 90% 80% 45% 50% 0% 50% 5% Low exergy houses 0% 10% 0% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Passive houses (very low energy) 10% 30% 10% 100% 20% 55% 30% 20% 10% 55% Zero energy houses 0% 10% 0% 50% 0% 0% 10% 50% 0% 25% Plus energy houses 0% 10% 0% 30% 0% 0% 10% 30% 0% 15% small flats buildings (<5floors) Low energy buildings 50% 100% 50% 100% 100% 100% 60% 60% 50% 80% Low exergy buildings 0% 10% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Passive buildings (very low energy) 0% 40% 0% 40% 0% 0% 40% 40% 0% 20% big flats buildings (=>5floors) Low energy buildings 50% 100% 50% 100% 100% 100% 60% 60% 50% 80% Low exergy buildings 0% 10% 0% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Passive buildings (very low energy) 0% 40% 0% 40% 0% 0% 40% 40% 0% 20% South single family houses Low energy houses 50% 90% 0% 90% 80% 45% 45% 0% 50% 0% Low exergy houses 0% 30% 0% 60% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Passive houses (very low energy) 10% 30% 10% 100% 20% 55% 30% 0% 10% 20% Zero energy houses 0% 15% 0% 100% 0% 0% 15% 40% 0% 50% Plus energy houses 0% 10% 0% 60% 0% 0% 10% 60% 0% 30% small flats buildings (<5floors) Low energy buildings 50% 100% 0% 100% 100% 100% 70% 0% 50% 50% Low exergy buildings 0% 20% 0% 40% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Passive buildings (very low energy) 0% 30% 0% 100% 0% 0% 30% 100% 0% 50% big flats buildings (=>5floors) Low energy buildings 70% 100% 0% 100% 100% 100% 80% 50% 70% 75% Low exergy buildings 0% 10% 0% 40% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Passive buildings (very low energy) 0% 20% 0% 50% 0% 0% 20% 50% 0% 25%West single family houses Low energy houses 50% 90% 0% 90% 80% 45% 50% 0% 50% 15% Low exergy houses 0% 20% 0% 30% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Passive houses (very low energy) 10% 30% 10% 100% 20% 55% 30% 40% 10% 55% Zero energy houses 0% 10% 0% 40% 0% 0% 10% 40% 0% 20% Plus energy houses 0% 10% 0% 20% 0% 0% 10% 20% 0% 10% small flats buildings (<5floors) Low energy buildings 65% 90% 30% 90% 90% 90% 80% 60% 65% 75% Low exergy buildings 0% 15% 0% 30% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Passive buildings (very low energy) 10% 20% 10% 40% 10% 10% 20% 40% 10% 25% big flats buildings (=>5floors) Low energy buildings 75% 90% 50% 90% 90% 90% 85% 70% 75% 80% Low exergy buildings 0% 10% 0% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Passive buildings (very low energy) 10% 15% 10% 30% 10% 10% 15% 30% 10% 20%PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 64
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Linking values to qualitative statements of scenario storylines, POLESThe method is a little different for POLES inputs, for two reasons.First, many of the so-called exogenous inputs that drive the energy demand andsupply for the EU-27 in POLES, have to be calibrated with the detailed projections ofVLEEM / TILT, and cannot be considered anymore as pure exogenous.Second, it was not in the scope of the PACT project to investigate in details themodalities and consequences of the carbon transition for the other countries outsidethe EU. Although, as shown earlier, the World context is an important component ofthe scenarios as regard the EU.For this reason, the assumptions considered for the other World countries / regionsoutside the EU-27 have been taken from previous scenarios designed and quantifiedfor the European Commission and for the World Energy Council in the recent years14,and from internal Enerdatas forecasts15.The tables below display the most important exogenous assumptions taken for thesecountries / regions for the 3 scenarios.The demographic assumptions are based on UN 2008 Medium projections for allscenarios and all countries / regions except the EU (see above). Table 7-2: UN-2008 population medium projectionsPopulation (Million) 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050OECD 1 138 1 219 1 283 1 324 1 345 1 350North America 415 456 503 537 561 577 US 286 314 346 370 389 404Europe 519 551 567 576 579 576Pacific 204 212 213 211 205 197 Japan 127 128 124 117 110 102Non OECD 4 931 5 613 6 392 6 985 7 456 7 800E Europe / Eurasia 342 338 337 331 321 311 Russia 146 141 135 129 122 116Asia 3 199 3 579 3 998 4 275 4 451 4 538 China 1 263 1 340 1 439 1 471 1 464 1 426 India 1 016 1 171 1 367 1 485 1 565 1 614Middle-East 168 210 255 293 326 353Africa 805 1 014 1 275 1 523 1 769 1 997Latin America 416 472 526 563 588 600 Brazil 174 196 209 217 220 219World 6 068 6 832 7 675 8 309 8 801 9 150EU27 481 501 507 507 503 496The macro-economic assumptions are taken from a range of assumptionsconsidered in previous forecasts, for scenarios that are close enough to those14 WEC scenarios ( 2008-2009) and scenarios developed for the EC in the ADAM project (2005-2009)in particular15 Enerfuture©PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 65
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"considered in this study (according to the storylines). For the EU-27, they are takenfrom VLEEM/TILT results. Figure 7-3: GDP assumptions, PACT scenarios Scenario 1 :SC Scenario 2 : SP Scenario 3 : HWThe assumptions on oil ultimate recoverable resources are taken from ASPO16,assuming possible increases in "Spacecraft" and to some extent in "Smartphone "(technological progress), but not in "Hard Way". Assumptions on maximumproduction of the "Gulf" countries considered a range between a maximum of 35millions barrels per day ("Spacecraft") and a minimum of 26 ("Hard Way", almost thelevel of today). Figure 7-4: assumptions on oil availability, PACT scenariosThe assumptions on biomass potentials are taken from the ADAM project, andsummarized in the figure below, for the World and for the EU.16 ASPO: Association for the Study of Peak Oil and gasPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 66
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Figure 7-5: Biomass potentials in PACT scenarios More GDP focussed S1 - SC 200 EJ/pa BAU (EU10 EJ/pa) More attention More attention to Wealth S2 - SP to Environment 100 EJ/pa (EU 5 EJ/pa) S3 - HW 300 EJ/pa (EU15 EJ/pa) « Post- Carbon » Less GDP focussedBelow are the assumptions about the actual use of the biomass potentials in theWorld according to scenarios, and about the imports from the EU. Imports areforbidden in "Smartphone " scenario, while authorized in the other two scenarios. Figure 7-6: Biomass use in PACT scenarios Bio-energy potentials & share of bio-energy used (dotted line), World Bio-energy imports in EU27The assumptions which drive renewable electricity, nuclear and CCS in the EU-27result from a mix of VLEEM/TILT results about zero and energy+ houses in the oneside (decentralized photovoltaïcs), and assumptions on discount rates, feed-in tariffsand investment costs in the other side.The assumptions on the discount rates used in the choice of power generationtechnologies are taken from the range of values considered in the previous WECstudy. Here are the assumptions taken in the 3 PACT scenarios, for centralized anddecentralized technologies, which drive in particular the renewables and nuclear: – 4% (centralized) to 6% (decentralized) in SpacecraftPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 67
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" – 6% (decentralized) to 8% (centralized) in Smartphone – 10% (decentralized) to 12% (centralized) in Hard WayAdditional assumptions on CCS are necessary; they are the same for the 3scenarios: – Anticipation by economic actors of the filling up of CO2 storage capacities – Actors may stop using CCS technologies, taking into account the life-time of existing CCS facilities and the remaining space for CO2 storage – Limited geological CO2 storage capacity in the EU27 (14.3 GtCO2 maximum)In Poles, the carbon constraint is summarized through an assumption on values ofthe ton of CO2, which reflect either a market price (in case of ETS for example), or ashadow price of the constraint (non ETS constraint for example). These values candiffer from country/region to country/region and across sectors. The nature of thecarbon constraint changes from one scenario to the other: imposed from "above" inSpacecraft, self-imposed in Smartphone , almost negligible in Hard Way. Altogether,it has been considered that the relative level of constraint across the scenarios was: Scenario 2 (SP) > Scenario 1(SC) > Scenario 3 (HW)In Spacecraft, the carbon constraint "from above" is expressed as binding targets oncarbon intensity of the GDP. The figure below show the differences betweenSpacecraft and Smartphone as regard the improvements in carbon intensities of theGDP across the world. Figure 7-7: Improvements in carbon intensities, PACT scenarios Scenario 1 : Spacecraft Scenario 2 : SmartphoneIn addition, the following assumptions were made: – Sector-based differentiation of the carbon value in S1 "Spacecraft" : ETS (1 global market) vs Non-ETS – Region-based differentiation of the carbon value in S2 "Smartphone ": Developed vs Emerging countriesPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 68
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" – No differentiation in S3 " Hard Way" : one single small tax (to exclude coal in final demand)The figure below displays the carbon values resulting from the constraints consideredin the 3 scenarios. Figure 7-8: Carbon values, PACT scenarios Spacecraft Smartphone Hard WayPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 69
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"7.2 Socio-economy, energy and CO2 projections in PACT transition scenariosThe detailed data tables are displayed in annex 4.7.2.1 Socio-economy, EU-27Here are the main projections calculated with the VLEEM/TILT model for the EU-27as a whole, as regard demography, macro-economy, urbanization, dwellings andmobility. DemographyThe expected population in 2050 is roughly in a range 500 - 600 millions inhabitantsin the EU-27, according to scenarios: almost 100 millions inhabitants more than in2000 in "Spacecraft" (the highest demography), almost the same population than in2000 in "Hard Way" (the lowest demography). These differences come from thedifferences in assumptions regarding birth rates and immigration.In all scenarios, the share of old, retired people is expected to increase a lot: a factortwo or more in 2025, two ("Spacecraft") to almost three in 2050 ("Hard Way"). Thehighest the total population in 2025 and 2050, the lowest the share of people above75 years old (6% in 2000, 13% to 16% in 2050)."Spacecraft" is the only scenario where the share of young people (<25 years old) isconstant over time. In the other two scenarios, it decreases. In "Smartphone "nevertheless, the decrease (down from 28% to 26% between 2000 and 2025) stopsaround 2025. In "Hard Way", it continues after 2025, down to 23%.As a consequence the share of the population between 25 and 75 years old, i.e. thebulk of the active population, decreases sharply between 2000 and 2025 (from 66%to 61%-62%), then more smoothly afterwards (down to 59%-61% in 2050).Because first the population aging, and second the so-called "decohabitation", thestructure of the households is expected to change a lot in all scenarios: the share ofhouseholds with one person explodes from 28% in 2000 to 45%-47% in 2050. Almostone household on two will be a "single". Reversely, the share of families with morethan two person is expected to decrease dramatically, from 40% (2000) down to 23%("Hard Way"), 24% ("Smartphone ") or 27% ("Spacecraft"). Consequently, thenumber of households, i.e. the number of homes, is expected to increase significantlyin all scenarios, much more than the population, while the average household sizewill continue to decrease: +85 millions (+45%) between 2000 and 2050 in"Spacecraft", +64 millions (+34%) in "Smartphone " and +50 millions (+27%) in "HardWay".PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 70
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Figure 7-9: EU-27 demography, PACT scenarios 700 300 Households (Millions) Population (Millions) 600 250 500 200 400 300 25-75 150 >2 pers 200 >75 100 2 pers <25 1 pers 100 50 0 0 SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW 2000 2025 2050 2000 2025 2050 UrbanizationIn "Spacecraft", the share of the population living in core cities and sparsesettlements will decrease very little, 1 point each, and the share of homes will remainalmost stable. But because the steady growth of the total population and number ofhomes, this will result in absolute increases of population and homes in these twoareas.The most striking urban evolution in this scenario is the shift of population from 1strings of core cities to small/medium cities, in particular those close to core cities: theshare of population living in first rings will loose 4 points between 2000 and 2050(from 24% to 20%), the absolute number of people living there remaining stablearound 120 millions. But because the evolution of the social structure of these livingareas, a much faster decrease of households size in 1st rings, we observe a reversephenomenum for households and homes: +2 points for the share of homes in 1strings (+25 millions homes), -1 point for small/medium cities (+20 millions homes).In "Smartphone ", the share of the population living in core cities and 1st rings willincrease steadily: from 16% to 19% between 2000 and 2050 in core cities (+ 25millions inhabitants), from 24% to 31% in 1st rings (+50 millions). In 2050, half thetotal population will live either in core cities or in the immediate suburbs; 75% of thetotal population increase between 2000 and 2050 will be hosted by these urbanareas. We will have a similar evolution for households and homes, although still morerapid in the 1st rings: +15 millions households in core cities between 2000 and 2050(45% increase), +44 millions households (x2) in 1st rings.The share of the population in small/medium cities will decrease very little (from 27%in 2000 to 25% in 2025 and 26% in 2050), while that of sparse settlements willdecrease sharply (from 33% to 24%), its total population loosing almost 30 millionspersons. Similarly, and more pronounced, the share of households will decreasesharply in both living areas, while the absolute number of homes will increase just alittle (+4 millions in small/medium cities, +2millions in sparse settlements between200 and 2050). Behind these global figures, one has to keep in mind very differentPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 71
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"situation between small/medium cities and sparse settlements rather close to corecities, for which population and households will continue to grow, and those far awayfrom the core cities that will experience a real decline (already observed in somecountries).In "Hard Way", the structural evolution of the population is much smoother than inthe two previous scenarios. The share of the population living in core cities and 1strings is expected to grow a little (+1point for core cities, +2points for 1st rings,between 2000 and 2050, as well as their respective populations (+4 millions and +7millions respectively). The situation is more contrasted for households in core cities,with much faster increases (+4points and +18 millions households), because of therapid decrease of average household size in this area.The shares of the population and households living in small/medium cities shrink inthis scenario between 2000 and 2050 (from 27% down to 23% and 19%respectively), as well as the total population and number of households (-23 millionspersons and -6 millions households). The share of the population living in sparseareas increase a little (+2points), as well as the total population (+5 millions). Samefor the households, with a more drastic increase in absolute values (+22 millionshomes). Figure 7-10: EU-27 urbanization, PACT scenarios 700 300 Population by zone of residence (Millions) Households by zone of residence (Millions) 600 250 500 200 400 sparse settlements 150 300 small/medium towns 100 200 1st ring suburbs Core cities 50 100 0 0 SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW 2000 2025 2050 2000 2025 2050 Macro-economy and welfareThe GDP growth is strongly contrasted across the scenarios, both in global termsand per capita. In "Spacecraft" the total GDP will increase by 70% between 2000 and2025, and be multiplied by 3.5 between 2000 and 250, while in "Smartphone ", theincrease will be limited to 33% up to 2025 and only 57% by 2050. The perspective iseven worth in "Hardway": +14% up to 2025 (= recession between 2010 and 2025),+26% by 2050. The contrasts are a bit less strong in GDP per capita, because of thedifferences in population, but nevertheless important.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 72
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"Conversely, the quality of life, as measured by the ratio time for self-accomplishmentversus time for paid work looks much better in "Smartphone " than in "Spacecraft":from 1.8 in 2000 to 2.4 in 2050 in "Smartphone ", 1.9 in "Spacecraft". Indeed, theratio is also going up in "HardWay", but more because lack of jobs than because ofsocial choices as in "Smartphone ".Two major reasons explain these differences in GDP: the volume of labour, muchhigher in "Spacecraft" because of the demography and work rules, and theproductivity, also higher in Spacecraft because of technology and a more rapidadaptation of workers skills. In "Hardway", a third reason plays a strong role, the highstructural unemployment ratio. Table 7-3: EU-27 economy and welfare, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HWGDP (index) 100 171 133 114 345 157 126%population at work 43% 39% 38% 35% 41% 34% 34%Volume of labor hours (index) 100 94 84 79 113 66 69Labor productivity 100 183 157 145 305 237 183GDP/capita index 100 157 125 111 290 144 129self-accomplishment / work ratio 1,8 2,0 2,1 2,1 1,9 2,4 2,1 DwellingsThe stock of homes built before 2000 will remain at a high and similar magnitude inall scenarios in 2050, between 150 millions ("Smartphone ") and 160 millions("Spacecraft"), i.e. around 60% of the total stock (65% in "Hard Way"). Twoconsequences are to be expected: the needs for thermal energy will remain highlydetermined by the performances of the stock built today; because of the averagedecrease of household size, the m² per person, and therefore the need forthermal/cooling energy per capita, will increase significantly.The share of the single family houses in the stock of homes will remain close to 50%in the two scenarios where the urban sprawl is assumed to continue ("Spacecraft"and "Hard Way"), while it will decrease to 38% in "Smartphone ", in which moreurban densification is assumed. This means that the average m² per capita (and therelated needs for thermal/cooling energy) will increase more slowly in the latterscenario. Figure 7-11 : EU-27 dwellings, PACT scenarios 300 300 Homes by year of construction (Millions) Homes by building types (Millions) 250 250 200 200 big buildings 150 2026-2050 150 small buildings (<5 100 2001-2025 100 stores) <=2000 50 50 single family houses 0 0 SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW 2000 2025 2050 2000 2025 2050PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 73
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" MobilityIn "Spacecraft", the combination of the urban development, high income and speediconisation result first in a continuous upward trend in car motorization: 1 car for 1.8persons in 2050 against 1 for 2.5 persons in 2000. As a consequence, the passengertraffic in cars will continue to increase for urban and regional trips, both in absoluteterms and in share in passenger traffics: +28% increase for urban passenger traffic incars, +9points in urban modal share (82% in 2050); +35% increase for regionalpassenger traffic in cars, +6 points in regional modal share (89% in 2050).Consequence of the urban development in this scenario, the average distancetravelled per year per inhabitant in urban areas will decrease a little (-8% between2000 and 2050) moderating the increase of the total urban passenger traffic to 15%,while that in regional trips will increase a little (+5%), the increase of the total regionalpassenger traffic growing by 25%.Public transport and slow modes will therefore decline a little, both in absolute termsand in modal share, in urban and regional traffics: -10% for the public transport ofpassengers in urban and regional areas, -5% for slow modes.The situation is reverse for long distance passenger traffics, which will be multipliedby four between 2000 and 2050. The quest for higher speeds will not favour carsanymore, but high speed trains and airplanes. The total long distance passengertraffic in cars is expected to remain mostly unchanged in volume for the nextdecades, around 1000 billions passengers-km per year, but its modal share willshrink from 75% in 2000 down to 19% in 2050. Annual long distance travelled inEurope per capita in high speed trains and airplanes in 2050 will be close to 7000kmin average, against roughly 300 km in 2000.Altogether, the annual mobility per capita is expected to increase from 11500 km peryear in 2000 to almost 18000 km in 2050, while the share of cars in this mobility willdecrease from 78% (2000) to 52% (2050).In "Smartphone ", the annual mobility per capita will increase much less, from 11500km per year in 2000 to roughly 12000 km in 2050, but the share of cars will alsodecrease less rapidly (63% in 2050). Three main reasons for this: less GDP, averagespeed control and less car attractivity (1 car for 2.2 persons in 2050).The average distance travelled per year per inhabitant in urban areas remain almoststable, which will result in a global 14% increase of the passenger traffic in urbanareas between 2000 and 2050, very close to the evolution in "Spacecraft" despitehuge differences in demography and urbanization. But the evolution of the modalsplit of this urban traffic will be very different: the share of traffic in cars will decreasefrom 73% down to 57%, while that of slow modes will increase from 6% to 8%. Inabsolute terms, the passengers traffic in cars will decrease a little (roughly 10%),PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 74
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"while that in public transport will increase by 83% and that in slow modes will roughlydouble.Consequence of the urban development in this scenario, the average distancetravelled per year per inhabitant in regional areas will decrease substantially (-34%between 2000 and 2050) bringing down the total regional passenger traffic (-27%).The share of cars in this traffic will also go down by almost 10 points, from 83% to74%.The long distance passengers traffic will double from 2000 to 2050, while the share ofcars will go down from 75% (2000) to 61% (2050). These evolutions are muchsmoother than in "Spacecraft": it is obviously the direct consequence of the combinedeffect of less income, higher transport costs, constraints on air transport, and changein people preferences as regard leisure. Nevertheless, air traffic within Europe isexpected to double, and the traffic in high speed trains will be 50% higher than thetotal rail traffic of 2000.Altogether the rail traffic in Europe will be multiplied by four between 2000 and 2050in this scenario.In "Hard Way", surprisingly, motorization rate will rise fast between 2000 and 2025,even faster than in "Spacecraft" (mostly because of the differences in thedemographic evolutions), and decline afterwards (mostly for economic reasons): in2050, there will be one car for 2 persons in average. Consequently, the share of carsin the urban and regional passenger traffics will remain fairly stable up to 2025 (73%and 82-83% respectively), and then decline steadily to 57% (urban) and 74%(regional) in 2050.The total urban and regional passenger traffics will grow a little up to 2025 and then,either decline (urban) or stabilize (regional): in 2050, the passenger traffic in urbanareas will be 3 % above that of 2000, while the regional passengers traffic will be 5%above 2000 level. Per capita, this means an increase in mobility from 3500 km/cap/year in urban areas in 2000 to 3700km/cap/year in 2050, from 5100 km/cap/yearfor regional trips in 2000 to 5400 km/cap/year in 2050. The contribution of Publictransport in urban areas will increase by 70% between 2000 and 2070, from 370billions pass-km to 620, while that of slow modes will increase by 50%, up to 140billions pass-km. For regional trips, the contribution of public transport will increaseby 60%, from 420 to 670 billions pass-km, between 2000 and 2050.The growth of the long distance traffic will be even more slower than in "Smartphone", mostly for economic reasons (low income and rather high transport costs). But thelong distance traffic will be more unequal than in the other scenario, with a high sharedue to high income people moving fast in airplanes and, mostly, high speed trains.Consequently, the share of cars in the long distance traffic will decline much fasterthan in "Smartphone ", down from 75% in 2000 to 31% in 2050. The air traffic will notgrow so fast (only 65% above 2000 level in 2050), while high speed rail will growalmost too times faster than in "Smartphone " (1050 billions pass-km in 2050).PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 75
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Figure 7-12: EU-27 mobility indicators, PACT scenarios 0,60 Motorization rate (pers / car) 0,55 0,50 SC 0,45 SP 0,40 HW 0,35 0,30 2000 2025 2050 Modal split passenger traffic (%) 2500 100% Urban passenger traffic (billions pass-km) 90% 2000 80% Slow modes 1500 70% 60% air (intra EU) 50% 1000 40% High speed rail 30% 500 normal rail 20% 10% public road 0 0% Cars SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW 2000 2025 2050 2000 2025 2050 Car Public Slow modes 3500 Regional passenger traffic (billions pass-km) 6000 Long distance passenger traffic (billions pass-km) 3000 5000 2500 4000 2000 3000 1500 2000 1000 500 1000 0 0 SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW 2000 2025 2050 2000 2025 20507.2.2 End-use technologies and energy needs, EU-27 TransportIn all scenarios, plug-in hybrids and electric cars are assumed to replace the existinginternal combustion engine (ICE) cars, more or less rapidly depending on theeconomic context, but certainly in a comprehensive way before 2050. The maindifference across scenarios is the electric autonomy of the plug-in hybrids, inparticular for daily urban and regional trip, and the structure of the km driven by cars(very low electric mode for long distance).In "Spacecraft", the more advanced batteries technology and the small share of longdistance trips in car-km result in a high share of electric km. This share is much morereduced in "Smartphone ", and further more in "Hard Way". Surprisingly, the car-kmPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 76
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"driven by hybrid vehicles in thermal mode is in the same range for the 3 scenarios(despite strong differences in total car traffic), "Hard Way" having the highest level in2050, followed by "Smartphone " and "Spacecraft".As a result, the consumption of oil based motor fuels for cars is also in the samerange for the 3 scenarios (around 38-46 Mtoe, 25% of 2000 level), with similar levelsof biofuels (21 to 25 Mtoe, 13-15% of the motor-fuel consumption of 2000). There aremuch sronger differences across scenarios as regard the electricity consumption ofcars, between 80 TWh ("Hard Way"), 130 TWh ("Smartphone ") and 310 TWh("Spacecraft"). In "Hard Way" and "Smartphone ", most of this electricity will begenerated with solar PV. Altogether, it is expected that in all scenarios, but fordifferent reasons, the total CO2 emissions of cars will be reduced more or less by afactor three to four between 2000 and 2050. Figure 7-13: EU-27 car use and technology, PACT scenarios car stock by technology (millions) 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 SC SP HW SC SP HW 2000 2025 2050 ICE Elec Hybrids plug-in Figure 7-14: EU-27 car energy consumption and CO2 emissions, PACT scenarios Car energy consumption (Mtoe) CO2 emissions of cars (gCO2/veh-km) 180 200 160 140 120 biofuels 150 100 80 elec SC 60 100 GPL+GNV SP 40 20 diesel 50 HW 0 gasoline SC SP HW SC SP HW 0 2000 2025 2050 2000 2025 2050 BuildingsThere is no major difference across scenarios as regard the structure of the newconstruction according to building concepts: due to the climatic geography of Europe,passive concepts (including zero energy and +energy concepts) will representaround 45% of the new construction and low energy/exergy standards the remaining55%. The penetration rate of these new concepts in the total stock, and thereforePACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 77
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"their contribution to "post-carbon", is highly dependent on the demographicassumptions of the scenarios: highest for "Spacecraft" and lowest for "Hard Way".Existing buildings are also subject to thermal retrofitting in the 3 scenarios, but atspeeds and effectiveness dependent on the scenarios.As a consequence, the level of the total useful energy for thermal needs of homes in2050 will be close (5% below) to the 2000 level in "Spacecraft", despite a 45%increase in the stock of homes (+85 millions homes). Taking into account theincrease in the performances of heating and cooling systems in the meantime, thismeans that the final energy consumption will be around 30% below 2000 level in2050.In "Smartphone " and "Hard Way", the 2050 level will be almost 20% below that of2000, and part of this useful energy (around 25%) will be supplied by home systemsof zero energy and + energy concepts. Taking into account the increase in theperformances of heating and cooling systems in the meantime, this means that thefinal energy consumption will be around 60% below 2000 level in 2050. Figure 7-15: EU-27 dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios Stock of homes by construction year and building concept (millions) 200 150 100 50 0 -50 SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW 2000 <2000 in 2025 <2000 in 2050 2001-2025 2026-2050 Passive Low energy Standard (=2000) Figure 7-16: EU-27 useful energy of buildings, PACT scenarios useful energy for thermal uses of homes by construction useful energy for thermal uses of homes by building 6,00 year (PJ) concept (PJ) 5,00 6,00 4,00 5,00 3,00 4,00 3,00 2,00 2,00 1,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW SC SP HW 2000 2025 2050 2000 2025 2050 <=2000 2001-2025 2026 - 2050 Passive Low energy Standard (=2000)PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 78
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"7.2.3 Global energy outlook Primary energy and World oil marketThe World primary energy consumption is expected to peak in all scenarios before2050. In "Spacecraft" it will peak around 2045 and then plateau more or lessafterwards; in 2050, the World energy consumption will be roughly 90% above 2000level. In "Smartphone ", the peak will occur sooner, 2040, and will be followed by adecline; in 2050, the World consumption will be a little more than 50% above 2000level. The peak will occur even sooner in "Hard Way", around 2035, at lower levelthan in the previous scenarios, with a very slow decline afterwards; in 2050, theWorld consumption level will be a little less than 50% above 2000 level.It will be roughly the same type of evolution, but more drastic, for fossil fuels. In allscenarios, the consumption of fossil fuels will peak up between 2025 ("Hard Way")and 2035 ("Smartphone "), and then decline rapidly. In 2050, the World consumptionof fossil fuels will be close to 2000 level in all scenarios, with nevertheless less oil,much more gas and a little more coal.Nuclear will develop in all scenarios, but at very different pace according toscenarios: rapidly in "Spacecraft" after 2015, very slowly in "Hard Way", in the middlein "Smartphone ". In 2050, nuclear will contribute to roughly 20% of the primaryenergy requirement in "Spacecraft" and less than 10% in "Hard Way".Renewables will experience the fatest development in all scenarios, and willcontribute to 25%-30% of the World primary energy consumption in 2050. Figure 7-17: World primary energy, PACT scenarios Scenario 1 : Spacecraft Scenario 2 : Smartphone Scenario 3 : Hard WayPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 79
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"World oil consumption will decline in all scenarios, immediately after 2010 in "HardWay", but only after 2025 in "Smartphone " and 2030 in "Spacecraft". Nevertheless,because of differences in depletion policies all over the world, the tensions on theWorld oil market will increase regularly in all scenarios up to 2030 (a little slower in"Spacecraft" despite a higher demand), bringing the long term price17 in a range 110-130 US$2005/bbl in 2030. Afterwards, these tensions will continue to increase at asimilar pace in "Spacecraft" (140 US$2005/bbl in 2050) , but they will explode in"Smartphone " and, moreover, in "Hard Way", bringing the long term oil price in arange 220-240 US$2005/bbl in 2050), with large fluctuations around this long termtrend. Figure 7-18: Oil prices on World markets, PACT scenariosIn the EU-27, the situation is much more contrasted across scenarios regarding theevolution of the primary energy consumption: the growth will resume after 2020 in"Spacecraft", to reach in 2050 a level 25% above that of 2000, while it will decreasesharply after 2010 in the other two scenarios; in 2050, the primary energyconsumption will be 30% lower than in 2000 in "Smartphone ", and 35% in "HardWay".In all scenarios, the EU consumption of fossil fuels will decrease sharply after 2010,with levels in 2050 ranging from 1/3 ("Smartphone " and "Hard Way") to 2/3("Spacecraft") of 2000 level. In any case, they will contribute to 50% or less to theprimary energy consumption in 2050.Nuclear energy will increase a lot after 2025 in "Spacecraft" (doubled in 2050 ascompared to 2000), but it will almost disappear in 2050 in "Hard Way" or come backto 2000 level after a decline between 2010 and 2030 in "Smartphone ".As for the world, renewables will experience the fatest development in all scenarios.They will contribute to 35%-45% of the EU primary energy consumption in 2050.17 The so-called long term price refer to the long term market equilibrium price (as driven by marketfundamentals). This price can be very different from spot prices which are influenced by short termfinancial speculation. Historically, spot prices have been recorded at maximum levels two times abovethe long term market equilibrium price.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 80
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Figure 7-19: EU primary energy, PACT scenarios Scenario 1 : Spacecraft Scenario 2 : Smartphone Scenario 3 : Hard Way Electricity mixThe World nuclear capacity will grow in all scenarios, but at different paces. In 2050,the World capacity will reach 1800 GW (400 GW in 2000) in "Spacecraft", 1200 GWin "Smartphone " and 800 GW in "Hard Way". In the EU, the situation is verydifferent. The total capacity will further decline until 2020 in all scenarios, but it will re-increase as soon as 2020 in "Spacecraft", to reach 330 GW in 2050 (145 GW in2000), and re-increase after 2035 (100 GW) in "Smartphone " to come back to the2000 level in 2050. In "Hard Way", the decline will continue all over the period, downto 50 GW.For renewable electricity (wind power, photovoltaic, CSP, biomass, etc...), theperspective is bright for all scenarios, in the World as in the EU-27. The Worldrenewable electricity capacity will be close to 11 000 GW in 2050 in "Spacecraft" and"Smartphone " (roughly 1000 GW in 2000), and 6000 GW in "Hard Way". In the EU,this generating capacity will be close to 1200 GW in 2050 in "Spacecraft" and"Smartphone " (180 GW in 2000), and close to 700 GW in "Hard Way".PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 81
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Figure 7-20: Nuclear and renewables, World and EU-27, PACT scenarios Nuclear capacity, World Nuclear capacity, EU27 Renewables capacity, World Renewables capacity, EU27World electricity needs will increase rapidly in all scenarios: from 15000 TWh in2000 to more than 60 000 TWh in 2050 in "Spacecraft", 53000TWh in "Smartphone ",and 40 000 TWh in "Hard Way". Renewables will contribute to roughly 50% to theelectricity generated in 2050 in all scenarios. The nuclear electricity will increase alsoin all scenarios in absolute terms, but at very different pace according to scenarios. In2050, its contribution will range from 20% ("Hard Way") to 25% ("Spacecraft") of theWorld electricity generated. Figure 7-21: Electricity generation mix, world, PACT scenarios Scenario 1 : Spacecraft Scenario 2 : Smartphone Scenario 3 : Hard WayIn the EU, electricity needs will be multiplied by almost 2.5 between 2000 and 2050 in"Spacecraft". Wind power, solar (mostly CSP), biomas and other centralizedrenewables will contribute to 40% to the electricity generated in the EU in 2050, andnuclear 35%. In "Smartphone ", the increase of electricity needs will be limited to50% during the same period; wind power, photovoltaïcs, limited CSP, biomas andother decentralized renewables will contribute to more than half the electricityPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 82
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"generated in the EU in 2050, and nuclear 25%. In "Hard Way", electricity needs willfluctuate around 2000 level up to 2050; wind power, photovoltaic, limited CSP,biomass and other decentralized renewables will contribute to more than half theelectricity generated in the EU in 2050, and nuclear 20%. Figure 7-22: Electricity generation mix, EU-27, PACT scenarios Scenario 1 : Spacecraft Scenario 2 : Smartphone Scenario 3 : Hard Way7.2.4 CO2 emissions outlook CCSAlthough basic assumptions on CCS are rather conservative in all scenarios, CCSdoes play nevertheless a role in CO2 mitigation, in particular in the EU. Two sectorsare mostly concerned: thermal electricity generation and steel. For EU electricitygeneration, CCS will develop immediately after 2010 in "Spacecraft", after 2015 in"Smartphone ", and only after 2030 in "Hard Way". Because the evolution of theelectricity generating mix, the EU thermal power capacity equipped with CCS willpeak around 60 GW in "Spacecraft" (peak in 2030) and in "Smartphone " (peak in2040), and then start decreasing. In "Hard Way", CCS equipped thermal electricitywill reach 35 GW in 2050, but will keep on increasing afterwards.Around 45% of the identified CO2 storage capacity of the EU will be filled up withcumulative CO2 stores in "Spacecraft" and in "Smartphone " in 2050, but only 10% in"Hard Way". Figure 7-23: CCS in the EU-27, PACT scenarios Cumulative CO2 stored CCS power capacity (EU27) over total storage capacity (EU27)PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 83
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" World CO2 outlookFor all scenarios, by construction, long-term concentrations are around 500 ppmv forCO2 and 650 ppmv eq for all green house gases.But, more surprisingly, emissions paths are also close across the scenarios, whichresults from contradictory effects of the economic growth in the one side, and climatepolicies in the other side.In "Spacecraft", the World CO2 emissions related to energy will peak up at 38Gtaround 2020 and then decrease steadily, with a 2050 level close to that of 2000. CO2concentration in the atmosphere will stabilize around 500 ppmv in 2035.Energy-CO2 emissions will peak up later (around 2030) and at a little lower level in"Smartphone " (37Gt), and then decrease steadily, with a 2050 level also close tothat of 2000. CO2 concentration in the atmosphere will also stabilize around 500ppmv after 2035.In "Hard Way", the energy-CO2 emissions will peak up earlier (around 2025), at aneven lower level than in "Smartphone " (35Gt); then they will decrease steadily, witha 2050 level also close to that of 2000. CO2 concentration in the atmosphere will alsostabilize around 500 ppmv after 2035. Figure 7-24: World CO2 emissions and concentration, PACT scenarios European outlookEmissions paths are more contrasted in Europe across scenarios, than at World levelIn the EU-27, the CO2 emissions related to energy will decrease by almost a factor 2from 2000 to 2050 in "Spacecraft", and by almost a factor 3 in "Smartphone " and in"Hard Way".In 2020, the reduction of CO2 emission will be in a range -21% to -33% according toscenarios. / 1990 levels Short-term (2020) Longer-term (2050) • S1 - Spacecraft -21% CO2 emissions close to F2 • S2 - Smartphone -33% CO2 emissions slightly over F3 • S3 - Hard Way -26% CO2 emissions F3PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 84
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Figure 7-25: Overall EU-27 CO2 emissions, PACT scenariosThe downwards trajectories of sectoral energy-CO2 emissions are very similar for"Smartphone " and "Hard Way", differences in GDP growth being compensated bydifferences in climate policies: they decrease by more than 70% in the buildingsector, 55% in the transport, 65% in industry and 70% in electricity generation. Themain differences with "Spacecraft" are in the buildings ("only" 35% reduction between2000 and 2050) and power generation ("only" 40% reduction between 2000 and2050). Trajectory is similar for transport, but quite different for industry (stability ofCO2 emissions between 2010 and 2030 in "Spacecraft"), although the emission levelof industry in 2050 is above, but not far, in "Spacecraft" as compared to the other twoscenarios. Figure 7-26: CO2 emissions by sector, EU-27, PACT scenarios Households Transport – Services – Agriculture Power Industry GenerationPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 85
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"8 ConclusionThe 3 scenarios describe very different pathways to post-carbon situations in Europe,resulting in very contrasted social, economic and technology panoramas in 2050.Demography, economic growth, World tensions on resources and climate, policies,behaviours and life styles, technologies, are the main discriminating factors amongscenarios.Nevertheless, these very different routes could lead to similar reduction in CO2emissions of the EU, and similar levels of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, by2050. But with very different prices for oil and gas, and very different values (i.e.constraint) for CO2:- "Hard Way" is the scenario in which the oil prices will reach the highest levels (closeto an average 250 US$2005/bbl in 2050, with the highest fluctuations), but the lowestcarbon value (lowest constraint, around 100 US$2005/t), and the lowest GDP/capita;- "Smartphone " is the scenario with the highest carbon value (constraint), around800 US$2005/t in 2050, with also high oil prices (around 200$2005/bbl in 2050) andhigher GDP/capita than in "Hard Way";- "Spacecraft" is the scenario in which the increase of oil prices is the slower (around140 US$2005/bbl in 2050), with a rather high carbon value (around 400 US$2005/bblin 2050) and a much higher GDP/capita as compared to the other two scenarios.It may be argued, of course, that the timing of the change in the scenarios could bedifferent as compared to those considered in this study, resulting in different profilesfor GHGs trajectories, and different levels of stabilization of CO2 equivalentconcentration: higher level of concentration - and higher increase in temperature atthe surface of Earth-if the transition is slower than that described in the scenarios,and the reverse if it is faster. This is mostly a matter of appreciation of the speed ofpolicy design and implementation, not a problem of internal consistency of thescenarios.These scenarios do not attempt to indicate to policy makers and stakeholders whatroute must be chosen, but to give them two clear messages:- The EU may reduce in any case by large amounts its consumption of fossils in thenext 40 years, and therefore reduce its CO2 emissions in the same proportion, butthe social, economic and policy costs would be very high if this transition is notproperly planned and implemented;- There not one single way for planning and implementing properly the transition.Indeed, social forces are currently pushing in two very different directions: some tendto reproduce the recipes that have cooked the economic growth of the OECDcountries during the last 50 years (even if this economic model seems a bit tiredthese days), while others consider this model obsolete and fight for inventing a new"beyond GDP" model. Depending on which social forces will become predominant,PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 86
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"who will take the lead and with which socio-economic objectives, the transitionpathways, even if duly planned and managed, will be very different.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 87
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"9 Annex 1: brief description of VLEEM/TILTVLEEM: Very Long term Energy Environment Model (VLEEM)VLEEM simulates the needs of energy services over the very long term, in relation tofundamental drivers linked to demography, life-styles and information embodied intechnologies, socio-economic organizations and skills. Figure 9-1: VLEEM overview Demography Education - information Activity Production, wealth Time - use Needs of energy services «Food-feeding» « Shelter » « Transport» « Self-accomplishment » « Other production»AccessibilityDeveloper(s): Bertrand Chateau (Enerdata), Hector Lopez (LET), Brieuc Bougnoux (Enerdata)Contact person(s): for questions regarding the model please contact Bertrand Chateau(bertrand.chateau@enerdata.net). For further information please see the model’s web site:www.VLEEM.org , which contains a rich description of the model.Status: Developments to include richer simulation of mobility and transport technologies.Planned development: urbanization and land use.Applications (past, current, planned): analysis of sustainable worldwide energy developmentover the 21th century in different energy paradigms (EU Research Programme, FP6).Assessment of sustainable mobility up to 2050 in France (PREDIT, on-going since 2004).Assessment of pathways for carbon transition (on-going PACT and PASHMINA researchprogramme, EU-FP7)PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 0
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"Linkages with other models: with POLES model in PACT research programme.FormulationModeled processes: combination of several sub-models:- demographic: population by age categories and households by size are driven by fertilityand mortality assumptions, and distributed among urban and rural areas taking into accountinternal and external migrations.- life-styles: life-styles are appraised within households cohorts characterized by age,education level and living area; life-styles are captured through daily time-budget allocatedto 5 main socio-cultural functions: food-feeding, shelter, mobility, self-accomplishment andworking-for-money, and through material preferences (car ownership for instance).- macro-economic : economic growth is driven by labor hours and productivity; labor hoursare driven by active population (age between end of education and retirement, activitylevels according to status within the household), time budget allocated to working-for-money and unemployment rate; productivity is driven by an information ratio calculatedfrom access rates to primary, secondary and tertiary education. Difference is made betweenproduction value and wealth, depending on the information ratio (reflecting differencesbetween exchange rates and purchasing power parities for GDP evaluation).- needs of energy services: for every socio-cultural function, needs of energy services arecalculated for each household cohort, depending on number of households / population,wealth / production value, time budget, equipment; needs of energy services are alsocalculated for material inputs for infrastructures and goods involved in the socio-culturalfunctions (buildings, transport infrastructures, food production,...). Needs of energy servicesare displayed in matrices with two dimensions:- exergy requirement- spatial / power densityTime horizon: 2100, 25 years steps.Spatial Resolution: 10 macro regionsScope: The model is structured so as to support back-casting analysis.Literature:PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 1
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" 1. Bertrand CHATEAU, Vincent BAGARD, Nathalie GLOT-SANCHEZ, Jaime PEREZ, Nathalie QUERCIA, www.VLEEM.org, VLEEM 1, " Modelling the dynamics of the needs of energy services in VLEEM. Final report -- August 2002 -- Annex 1"Inputs[name of variable in the model, type of variable, units, year or period, geographic referenceas applicable]  Initial energy demand data per end-use  Base year GDP at market exchange rates and ppp  Population by area and age class, base year  Households by area and size, base year  Fertility and mortality ratios, base year  Participation rates to education: primary, secondary, tertiary, per area  Time budget structure, base year  transport equipment ratios and modal average speeds and shares base year  Material inputs in infrastructures and equipment, and for food production  Parameters to calibrate needs of energy services  Parameters to calibrate information ratioOutputs[name of variable in the model, type of variable, units, year or period, geographic referenceas applicable]  population by age class and households by size categories, per area  Information ratio  economic production volume and wealth  travel speed for passengers and freight, according to areas  time-budgets per household cohort  material inputs for infrastructures and goods involved in socio-cultural functions  needs of energy services per socio-cultural function and type of servicesSoftware & HardwareModeling software: ExcelPolicy relevancePACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 2
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"Policy variables:Mainly used to assess conditions for sustainability in the long term.Geographical scale and time horizon:Any composition of the 10 macro-regions. Policy analysis is usually done using data until2100.Integration with policy-relevant evaluation /decision tools:Analysis of the role of demographic structures, education and life-styles on the needs forenergy services, a pre-requisite to assess energy demand on the very long termPerformanceStrengths: endogenous growth and knowledge accumulation, accounting for fundamentaldrivers of human behaviors.Weaknesses: lack of land use dynamics, poor macro-economics.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 3
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" 10 Annex 2: brief description of the POLES model POLES: Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems General information The POLES model is a World simulation model for the energy sector. It works in a year- by-year recursive simulation and partial equilibrium framework, with endogenous international energy prices and lagged adjustments of supply and demand by World region. Developed under research programmes of the European Commission, the model is fully operational since 1997 and enables to produce:- detailed long term (up to 2050) World energy outlooks with demand, supply and price projections by main region;- CO2 emission Marginal Abatement Cost curves by region, and emission trading systems analyses;- technology improvement scenarios  exogenous or with endogenous features  and analyses of the value of technological progress in the context of CO2 abatement policies. Issues addressed Long-term (2050) simulation of World energy scenarios / projections and international energy markets analysis. National / regional energy balances, integrating final energy demand, new and renewable energy technologies diffusion, electricity and the transformation system, fossil fuel supply. Impacts of energy prices and taxes policies. Energy RTD strategies. Greenhouse Gas emissions and abatement strategies. Costs of international GHG abatement scenarios with different targets, entitlements, flexibility systems and constraints. Developments in energy technology, with impacts of public and private investment in R&D and cumulative experience with “learning by doing”. Model characteristics PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 4
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"The POLES model is a global sectoral model of the World energy system. It has beendeveloped in the framework of a hierarchical structure of interconnected sub-models at theinternational, regional, national level. The dynamics of the model is based on a recursive(year by year) simulation process of energy demand and supply with lagged adjustments toprices and a feedback loop through international energy prices. Figure 10-1 : Overview of the POLES model Resources International Energy Markets Coal Oil Gas Prices (t+1) Imports / Technologies Technologies Technologies Exports (t) 46 Regions Emission Constraint Emissions Regional Energy Balances Cons, Prod POP GDPStructure of the modelIn the current geographic disaggregation of the model, the World is divided into 47countries or regions (table 1) Table 1 : Geographic disaggregation of POLES Region Sub-Region Countries North America Unites States, Canada Europe EU-15 > Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, EU-25 France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, EU-27 Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, Turkey > Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Baltic States Japan – South Pacific South Pacific Japan, Australia & New Zealand CIS Russia, Ukraine Latin America Central America Mexico South America Brazil Asia South Asia India South-East Asia China, South Korea Africa / Middle-East North Africa Egypt, Algeria-Lybia, Morroco-Tunisia Sub-saharan Africa Middle-East Gulf countriesPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 5
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"The largest countries are treated, as far as energy demand is concerned, by a detailedmodel. The other countries and other sub-regions are dealt with in more compact buthomogeneous models.For the purpose of the WEC scenario study, the results of the model are aggregated acrosscountries and sub-regions according to the precise definition of the WEC regions.For each region, the model articulates four main modules dealing with :- final energy demand by main sector- new and renewable energy technologies- the conventional energy and electricity transformation system- fossil fuel supplyWhile the simulation of the different energy balances allows for the calculation of importdemand / export capacities by region, the horizontal integration is ensured in the energymarkets module, the main inputs of which are import demand and export capacities of thedifferent regions. Only one World market is considered for the oil market (the "one greatpool" concept), while three regional markets (America, Europe, Asia) are identified forcoal, in order to take into account for different cost, market and technical structures.Natural gas production and trade flows are modelled on a bilateral trade basis, thusallowing for the identification of a large number of geographical specificities and thenature of different export routes.The comparison of import and export capacities and the changes in theReserves/Production ratio for each market determines of the variation of the prices for thesubsequent periods.Final Energy Demand moduleIn the detailed demand model for the main countries or regions, the consumption of energyis disaggregated into key homogeneous sub-sectors.In each sector energy consumption is calculated for substitutable fuels on one hand and forelectricity on the other, while taking into account specific energy consumption (electricityin electrical processes and coke for the other processes in steel-making, feedstock in thechemical sector, electricity for heat and for specific uses in the Residential and Tertiarysectors). Each demand equation combines a revenue or activity variable elasticity, priceelasticity, technological trends and, when appropriate, saturation effects. Particularattention has been paid to the treatment of price effects.Furthermore the model includes some detailed demand technologies for :PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 6
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"- road transport sector: 6 types of vehicles are simulated in the model (oil ICE, electrical,pluggable hybrids, hydrogen ICE, hydrogen fuel cell, gas fuel cell)- buildings: low and very low energy buildings are modelled in addition to standardbuildings.The penetration of these explicit technologies depends on the speed of the stock renewal(and renovation for buildings) and their relative competitiveness. Table 2 : Sectoral disaggregation of energy demand in POLES Substituable Transport Electricity Fuels Fuels Industry Steel industry X X Chemical industry X X Non Metallic Mineral X X Other industries X X Transport Road / passenger X Road / goods X Rail / passenger X Rail / goods X Air transport X Other X Tertiary X X Residential X X Agriculture X XNew and Renewable Energy technologies diffusion moduleMost studies on international energy perspectives either disregard new and renewableenergy technologies as offering insufficient economic potential for development in themedium term or, conversely, try to assess their potential in a purely technical approach inorder to show that their contribution to World energy supply can be important. Theapproach adopted in the New and Renewable Energy module of the POLES model tries tosupersede these limits while recognising the difference between technical and economicalpotentials as well as the time-constant which characterise the diffusion process. Elementssuch as learning-curves and "niche-markets" have been introduced, which allow a trulydynamic approach of the development and diffusion of these technologies.The module dedicated to the simulation of new and renewable technologies identifies tengeneric technologies which are representative of the solutions to be implemented indifferent types of countries and might have a non negligible quantitative contribution in thelong-term development of energy systems. The time horizon of the model (2050) in factallows to consider that, given the development time-constants, the technologies that mighthave a significant role to this horizon should today be at least identified and have passedthe first stages of development. Twelve technologies have been selected in the currentversion of the model :PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 7
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Table 3 : New and renewable technologies in POLES New and Renewable Technologies Combined Heat and Power (decentralized, competing with grid) Biomass Conventional thermal Biomass Gasif. with Gas Turbines Photovoltaic (windows) (decentralized, competing with grid) Rural Photovoltaic Solar Thermal Power plants Small Hydro Wind Turbines (on-shore & off-shore) Biofuels for transport Fuel Cell Vehicle (PEM) Stationary Fuel Cell (Gas and Hydrogen) (decentralized, competing with grid)Electricity and Transformation System moduleWhile the transformation system for conventional fossil fuels is treated in a relativelyaggregated way through the use of conversion, transport and distribution efficiency ratios,which is acceptable in a World model, the electricity system deserves a much moredetailed treatment. In fact the electricity system is in any country not only one of the mainenergy consuming sectors but also probably the major sector for inter-fuel substitution. Alast characteristic is that, because of the particularly long lifetime of equipment, this sectordisplays much higher price-elasticities in the long-term than in the short-term.In order to take into account the capacity constraints in the electricity production systemthe module simulates the evolution of existing capacities at each period as a function ofequipment development decisions taken in preceding periods and thus of the anticipateddemand and costs at the corresponding time. In the current version of the model, twelveelectricity generation technologies, conventional and new are identified: Table 4 : Electricity generation technologies in POLES Large Scale Power Generation Super Critical Pulverised Coal* Integrated Coal Gasif. Comb. Cycle* Coal Conventional Thermal Lignite Conventional Thermal Large Hydro Nuclear LWR New Nuclear Design Gas Conventional Thermal Gas Fired Gas Turbines Gas Turbines Combined Cycle* Oil Conventional Thermal Oil Fired Gas Turbines * : Coal and gas technologies considered with and without carbon capture and storagePACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 8
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"Oil and gas production moduleOil and gas production is simulated for each region using a full discovery-process modelfor the main producing countries and simplified relations for minor producing countries.For each main producing country the available data cover the estimate of UltimateRecoverable Resources for oil and for gas, the cumulative drilling and cumulativeproduction since the beginning of fields development and the evolution of reserves.Cumulative discoveries are then calculated as the sum of cumulative production andremaining reserves. For base producers, oil or gas production then depends on a depletionratio, applied to the remaining reserves (discoveries - cumulative production) in eachperiod. Gbl Oil in place Recoverable Resources Discoveries Reserves Cumulative Prod. Pproduction Cumul. Drilling Figure 10-2 : Oil and gas production moduleInternational Energy Prices moduleIn the current version of the model, the basis for international oil price modelling combinesa Target Capacity Utilisation Rate model for the Gulf countries and the global oil R/P ratioas a long-term explanatory variable. This reflects the fact that most applied analyses of theoil market points to the fact that, as experienced in the seventies and eighties, the shorterterm variations or shocks in the price of oil can be explained by the development of under-or over- capacity situations in the Gulf region.Coal and natural gas prices are computed for each one of the three main regional marketswith regional coal and gas trade matrixes and price variations linked respectively to coalproduction capacities and to the gas R/P ratio of the key residual producers for each region.PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 9
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"InputsHistorical dataThe energy balance data for the POLES model are extracted from the international energydatabase Enerdata, which also includes international macro-economic data concerningGDP, the structure of economic activity, deflators and exchange rates. Technico-economicdata (energy prices, equipment rates, costs of energy technologies ...) are gathered bothfrom international and national statistics.AssumptionsBasic assumptions on the drivers of energy demand concern: - GDP - Population - Technological trends per sector and sub-sector - Basic assumptions on the drivers of energy supply concern: - Ultimate recoverable resources for oil and gas - Trends in recovery rates for oil - Trends in investment costs and performances of individual technologies (electricity generation, renewables, coal production) - Potentials for renewables - Discount ratesOutputsThe main outputs of the model are: - Projections of energy flows for each country / region in a structure similar to that of a standard IEA-type energy balance - Detailed projections on energy consumption per sector and sub-sector, input/output of power plants, new energy technologies and electricity production capacities development - Oil, gas and coal prices on international markets, and detailed energy prices at the consumer level - Investment related to electricity generation and renewablesPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 10
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"11 Annex 3: linkage between scenario statements and models inputs VLEEM/TILT POLES1 International context1.1 Governance of global issues1.1.1 Climate change and GHG mitigation UN negociation bindings targets and carbon leakage CO2 max flexibility instruments GHG trading CO2 price who pays for what?1.1.2 Availability and Accessibility to oil and gas resources Ultimate ressouces oil & gas, Depletion policies: Gulf countries, Russia, ... Recovery rate of Ultimate oil resources, Production capacity Gulf trade mechanisms: long term contracts, gré-à-gré, markets,... IEA role and extension, other global governance of access to ressources1.1.3 World trade WCO and protectionism GDP growth per county/zone barriers to GHG imports social protection issues ppp1.1.4 World finance IMF financing investment in developping countries US debt1.2 Major world players policies and constraints1.2.1 US economic growth and content GDP growth + sectoral breakdown coping with climate change CO2 max, CO2 price Discount rates, public (supported) energy security investments, costs nuclear, coal international partnership1.2.2 China economic growth and content GDP growth + sectoral breakdown wages and internal demand ppp coping with climate change CO2 max, CO2 price Discount rates, public (supported) energy security investments, costs nuclear, coal international partnership1.2.3 other BRICs economic growth and content GDP growth + sectoral breakdown wages and internal demand ppp coping with climate change CO2 max, CO2 price Discount rates, public (supported) energy security investments, costs nuclear, coal international partnership1.2.4 EU economic growth and content see below 2.1.1, 2.1.2 GDP growth + sectoral breakdown East/West descrepancies GDP growth + sectoral breakdown coping with climate change CO2 max, CO2 price Policy objectives: % renewable, energy security efficiency gain, max gaz RussiaPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 11
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" VLEEM/TILT POLES 2 EU and member countries context 2.1 Economic model2.1.1 Human capital fertility, immigation fertility rates, immigration flows working time and retirement policies hours/year, retirement age womens activity support policies % active education, culture % tertiary education participation to collective goods, support to ederly2.1.2 Role and intervention of EU and member countries Governments de-regulation, re-regulation of energy related business, re-nationalisation Discount rates Discount rates, costs nuclear, CCS, non investment policy in strategic capital intensive technologies & infrastructures conventional gas taxation, subsidizing and pricing policy prices to final consumers Utilisation rate of production support to economic activity potential, Elasticity of labour productivity to information GDP growth + sectoral breakdown 2.1.3 Utility functions, consumption model, preferences, life styles,... car equipment saturation, elasticity inclusion of time and environment friendliness in utility functions speed/GDP, elasticities energy services to affluence budget coefficient elasticities useful energy to energy attitude towards wasting services leisure model % leisure time budget per activity hours/year, retirement age, % active marginal benefit of not working versus marginal earnings from work in second household adult 2.2 The social balance between environment and wealth2.2.1 Environment policies and instruments GHG quotas: scope and magnitude CO2 max ETS GHG trading system: scope and magnitude CO2 price ETS GHG taxation: modalities, magnitude, carbon leakage CO2 price non ETS % new efficient building per type in construction, energy efficiency gains regulations and norms on technologies, buildings, cars,... through retrofitting, CO2/km for new cars feed-in tarriffs, subsidies, tax credit,... tarriffs and costs green, white certificates others2.2.2 Equity, social exclusion, social protection, pensions households income/affluence structure poors lodging: where, what type of buildings social/health expenses coverage pensions mechanisms2.2.3 Education, values, icons, democraty environment and climate change in basic education car equipment saturation, elasticity spread of de-growth / sobriete values speed/GDP, elasticities energy services to affluence budget coefficient social icons how democraty works, from EU to local 2.3 Technology, energy efficiency and stake-holders strategies2.3.1 Transport infrastructures for long distance: motorways, fast trains (passengers, elasticities spedd / GDP forfreight), airports, waterways, ports passengers and freight % new technologies in car sales, car industry strategies: efficiency, electric propulsion,... efficiency gains % slow modes, % car in urban and public support to non road transport regional, km/car/year 2.3.2 Buildings % single family houses, % new structure of building concepts in construction efficient building per type in construction  insulation standards new buildings insulation standards  retrofitting mandatory targets targets 2.3.3 Materials  soft materials in construction (wood, straw,...)  material substitution: buildings, vehicles, packaging  recycling 2.3.4 Renewables  windpower targets  solar: CSP, PV, heat targets  biomass: direct use, biofuels, biogas,... targets  others targetsPACTNetwork energy systems (electricity, gas, heat/cool) 2.3.5 D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 12  smart grids, smart metering, local grids  gas deployment infra coef  district heat/cool deployment infra coef
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" VLEEM/TILT POLES3 Local transitions3.1 Local players policies and actions3.1.1 Municipalities and other local/regional authorities objectives/instruments local policies towards climate change CO2 max / city type % single family houses & % new objectives/instruments local policies towards building, construction efficient building per type inand retrofitting construction, % retrofitting % slow modes, % car in urban and objectives/instruments local policies towards transport regional, car speed urban objectives/instruments local policies towards energy solar PV targets/city type, district heat/biomas/city type, co-generation3.1.2 Utilities and services district heating services % dwellings connected local supply/demand electricity balance elasticity useful energy to energy integrated supply/efficiency services services3.1.3 NGOs and citizens associations % single family houses & % new local innovative experiences efficient building per type in construction, % retrofitting policy burden on local authorities monitoring, evaluation and follow-up elasticity energy service to affluence, education and public awareness elasticity useful energy to energy services3.2 changes in urban schemes3.2.1 transport and energy networks, and spatial distribution ofdwellings among the 4 quadrants % households per type, % slow requalification of public space and buildings in core cities, district modes, % car in urban and regional, % dwellings connected to districtheating networks, densification of residents TC and car speed heating % households per type, % dwelling densification of residents in 1st ring, mass transit system with core types in construction, % dwellingcities, district heating networks replacement, % slow modes, % car in % dwellings connected to district urban and regional , TC and car speed heating % households per type, % dwelling densification of residents in small/medium cities, mass transit system types in construction, % dwellingwith core cities nearby, gas network replacement, % slow modes, % car in urban and regional, TC and car speed % dwellings connected to gas % households per type, % dwelling population in sparse settlements, intermodal platforms with mass types in construction, % dwellingtransit systems replacement, % car in urban and regional, TC and car speed3.2.2 transport networks and spatial distribution of urbanfunctions among the 4 quadrants commerces education health services to the public (post, banks,...) services to business3.2.3 city networking networking among core cities % fast train, air networking between core cities and surrounding small/medium cities % car in regional, speed TC regional % normal trains, % car in regional, networking among small/medium cities speed TC regional3.2.4 land-use and cities energy supply balancing targets: solar PV district heat/ co- core cities: solar captation, geothermal (incl heat pumps), wastes generation/wastes, geothermal 1st rings: solar captation, geothermal (incl heat pumps), wastes, wind targets: solar PV district heat/ co- generation/wastes, geothermal, wind small/medium cities: solar captation, geothermal (incl heat pumps), targets: solar PV district heat/ co-wastes, wind generation/wastes, geothermal, wind sparse settlements: solar captation, geothermal (incl heat pumps), targets: solar PV , geothermal, wind,wastes, biomass, wind biomass3.3 daily life in post-carbon societies in the EU3.3.1 How people move time budget and utility time budget transport per quadrant average urban/regional speed per speed and accessibility quadrantPACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 & regional, per % car in urban 13 quality and image of transport modes quadrant3.3.2 Indoor comfort elasticities energy services to thermal comfort, winter and summer
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"12 Annex 4: scenario projections12.1 EU-27 as a whole12.1.1 Socio-economy Demography Table 12-1: EU-27 demography, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HWPopulation (millions) 482 531 517 502 584 535 476 % <25 28% 27% 26% 25% 28% 26% 23%% >75 6% 12% 13% 13% 13% 15% 16% % 25-75 66% 61% 61% 62% 59% 59% 61%Households (millions) 187 244 239 237 272 251 238 % 1 pers 28% 42% 42% 43% 46% 45% 47% % 2 pers 32% 28% 31% 30% 27% 31% 30% % >2 pers 40% 29% 27% 27% 27% 24% 23% Urbanization Table 12-2: EU-27 urbanization, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HWPopulation (millions) 482 531 517 502 584 535 476 % Core cities 16% 16% 18% 16% 15% 19% 17%% 1st ring suburbs 24% 22% 27% 26% 20% 31% 26% % small/medium towns 27% 29% 25% 24% 32% 26% 23%% sparse settlements 33% 33% 30% 34% 32% 24% 35%Households (millions) 187 244 239 237 272 251 238 % Core cities 18% 18% 18% 20% 18% 20% 22%% 1st ring suburbs 23% 25% 30% 26% 25% 35% 25% % small/medium towns 27% 25% 22% 21% 26% 21% 19%% sparse settlements 32% 32% 29% 33% 31% 25% 34% Macro-economy and welfare Table 12-3: EU-27 economy and welfare, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HWGDP (index) 100 171 133 114 345 157 126%population at work 43% 39% 38% 35% 41% 34% 34%Volume of labor hours (index) 100 94 84 79 113 66 69Labor productivity 100 183 157 145 305 237 183GDP/capita index 100 157 125 111 290 144 129self-accomplishment / work ratio 1,8 2,0 2,1 2,1 1,9 2,4 2,1PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 14
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Dwellings Table 12-4: EU-27 dwellings, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HWDwellings (millions) 185 242 237 235 270 250 237 <=2000 185 172 172 172 161 150 155 single family houses 92,7 85,9 85,8 85,9 79,2 70,2 76,7 small buildings (<5 stores) 61,3 57,7 57,2 57,7 54,4 53,4 50,7 big buildings 30,6 28,9 28,6 28,9 27,3 26,8 27,3 2001-2025 69,1 65,4 62,1 69,1 65,4 62,1 single family houses 33,5 18,2 27,5 33,5 18,2 27,5 small buildings (<5 stores) 20,7 13,4 13,1 20,7 13,4 13,1 big buildings 14,9 33,8 21,5 14,9 33,8 21,5 2026-2050 40,5 34,2 20,4 single family houses 19,3 6,2 9,1 small buildings (<5 stores) 12,4 7,9 3,9 big buildings 8,8 20,1 7,4 Mobility Table 12-5: EU-27 mobility indicators, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HWCar ownership (car/pers.) 0,41 0,50 0,46 0,53 0,56 0,46 0,50Passenger traffics (Gpkm) 5521 7358 6103 6517 10430 6531 6673 Urban (Gpkm) 1718 1847 1848 1825 1972 1950 1776 Car (%) 73% 80% 65% 73% 82% 57% 57% Public (%) 21% 15% 28% 22% 14% 35% 35% Regional (Gpkm) 2476 2774 2160 2534 3105 1817 2585 Car (%) 83% 85% 79% 82% 89% 74% 74% Public (%) 17% 15% 21% 18% 11% 26% 26% Long distance (Gpkm) 1328 2737 2095 2157 5353 2763 2313 Car (%) 75% 37% 68% 53% 19% 61% 31% Public (%) 25% 63% 32% 47% 81% 39% 69% Cars (%) 78% 66% 71% 70% 52% 63% 55% Public (%) 20% 33% 27% 29% 48% 34% 43% road 9% 6% 9% 7% 2% 4% 5% rail 8% 21% 14% 16% 36% 26% 35% High speed 0% 13% 4% 9% 30% 10% 16% air (intra EU) 3% 6% 4% 5% 10% 4% 3%PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 15
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"12.1.2 End-use technologies and energy needs Transport Table 12-6: EU-27 car use and technology, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Cars Car ownership (car/pers.) 0,41 0,50 0,46 0,53 0,56 0,46 0,50 Car stock (millions) 196 262 237 262 323 243 236 ICE 100% 57% 83% 83% 0% 1% 1% Elec 0% 7% 3% 3% 20% 19% 19% Hybrids plug-in 0% 36% 14% 15% 80% 80% 80% Km/year/car (000) 13,0 11,9 11,6 11,7 11,2 10,7 10,2 Traffic cars (Gveh-km) 2550 3110 2764 3069 3609 2595 2416 urban (%) 38% 39% 37% 38% 39% 36% 36% regional (%) 43% 43% 36% 41% 46% 30% 47% long distance (%) 19% 17% 28% 21% 16% 35% 16% ICE( %) 100% 48% 83% 82% 0% 0% 0% Elec (%) 0% 4% 1% 2% 8% 7% 7% Hybrids plug-in (%) 0% 48% 15% 17% 92% 93% 93% of which elec mode (%) 0% 25% 16% 10% 55% 31% 19% Table 12-7: EU-27 car energy consumption and CO2 emissions, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Energy cars (Mtoe) 164 122 125 140 86 76 78 dont gasoline 129 41 48 53 13 15 16 diesel 33 54 55 63 25 28 30 GPL+GNV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 elec 0 6 1 1 27 11 7 biofuels 3 21 21 23 21 23 25 gCO2/vkm car (direct) 181 78 95 95 29 45 53 l/100km ICE 7,9 5,9 5,8 5,8 5,7 5,7 5,7 gep/km ICE 64 49 49 49 26 27 27 Buildings Table 12-8: EU-27 dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Dwellings (millions) 185 242 237 235 270 250 237 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 0% 13% 12% 12% 18% 18% 15% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 0% 74% 74% 74% 82% 82% 85% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 13% 13% 14% 0% 0% 0% dont <=2000 185 172 172 172 161 150 155 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 0% 81% 82% 81% 100% 100% 100% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 100% 19% 18% 19% 0% 0% 0% 2001-2025 69 65 62 69 65 62 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 44% 45% 44% 44% 45% 44% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 56% 55% 56% 56% 55% 56% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2026 - 2050 41 34 20 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 43% 44% 43% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 57% 56% 57% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0%PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 16
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions" Table 12-9: EU-27 useful energy of buildings, PACT scenarios PJ 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Useful energy (PJ) 5,49 5,66 5,42 5,33 5,22 4,52 4,43 heating, air cond 4,29 4,23 4,10 4,10 3,87 3,44 3,45 hot water 1,19 1,42 1,32 1,23 1,35 1,08 0,97 dwellings <=2000 5,49 3,82 3,76 3,71 3,03 2,72 2,79 % Low Cons. 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% % Med. Cons. 0% 75% 76% 75% 100% 100% 100% % Stand. Cons. 0% 25% 24% 25% 0% 0% 0% 2001-2025 1,84 1,66 1,62 1,77 1,59 1,55 % Low Cons. 31% 31% 31% 31% 30% 30% % Med. Cons. 30% 37% 26% 69% 70% 70% % Stand. Cons. 39% 33% 43% 0% 0% 0% 2026 - 2050 0,41 0,21 0,09 % Low Cons. 35% 39% 43% % Med. Cons. 65% 61% 57% % Stand. Cons. 0% 0% 0%PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 17
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"12.2 Core cities Demography Table 12-10: Core cities demography, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Population (millions) 75 85 91 80 90 100 79 % <25 23% 20% 23% 14% 19% 23% 8% % >75 7% 18% 14% 22% 21% 16% 28% % 25-75 69% 62% 62% 64% 61% 61% 63% Households (millions) 34 44 44 46 50 49 52 % 1 pers 41% 52% 47% 56% 56% 49% 62% % 2 pers 29% 28% 29% 31% 28% 30% 32% % >2 pers 30% 20% 24% 13% 16% 21% 6% Mobility Table 12-11: Core cities mobility indicators, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Cars Car ownership (car/pers.) 0,33 0,35 0,32 0,40 0,37 0,31 0,38 Car stock (millions) 24 30 29 32 33 31 30 Km/year/car (000) 11,5 10,5 10,0 10,3 9,5 8,5 8,5 Passenger traffics (Gpkm) Urban (Gpkm) 361 411 416 392 439 435 390 Car (%) 58% 65% 50% 58% 70% 40% 40% Public (%) 36% 29% 42% 36% 25% 49% 51% Regional (Gpkm) 149 169 154 162 181 144 174 Car (%) 75% 80% 70% 75% 75% 60% 60% Public (%) 25% 20% 30% 25% 25% 40% 40% Buildings Table 12-12: Core cities dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Dwellings (millions) 33 44 43 46 49 49 51 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 11% 12% 13% 16% 17% 17% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 72% 73% 71% 84% 83% 83% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 17% 15% 16% 0% 0% 0% dont <=2000 33 33 32 33 32 30 32 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 0% 78% 80% 78% 100% 100% 100% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 100% 22% 20% 22% 0% 0% 0% 2001-2025 11 11 13 11 11 13 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 45% 46% 45% 45% 46% 45% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 55% 54% 55% 55% 54% 55% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2026 - 2050 7 7 6 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 44% 44% 44% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 56% 56% 56% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0%PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 18
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"12.3 1st rings Demography Table 12-13: 1st rings demography, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Population (millions) 118 117 142 132 118 167 125 % <25 28% 21% 21% 24% 18% 18% 22% % >75 5% 10% 11% 9% 11% 13% 11% % 25-75 68% 69% 68% 66% 71% 69% 67% Households (millions) 43 60 72 61 68 87 60 % 1 pers 25% 55% 51% 48% 62% 52% 48% % 2 pers 30% 23% 28% 23% 24% 30% 28% % >2 pers 45% 22% 21% 29% 15% 18% 24% Mobility Table 12-14: 1st rings mobility indicators, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Cars Car ownership (car/pers.) 0,36 0,44 0,41 0,43 0,50 0,43 0,41 Car stock (millions) 42 51 58 57 59 71 51 Km/year/car (000) 17,6 16,5 16,0 16,3 15,0 14,0 14,0 Passenger traffics (Gpkm) Urban (Gpkm) 817 824 950 923 836 1062 879 Car (%) 79% 85% 70% 78% 85% 60% 60% Public (%) 18% 12% 26% 20% 13% 35% 36% Regional (Gpkm) 298 300 310 337 305 310 346 Car (%) 84% 85% 80% 83% 90% 75% 75% Public (%) 16% 15% 20% 18% 10% 25% 25% Buildings Table 12-15: 1st rings dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Dwellings (millions) 42 59 71 60 67 86 60 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 15% 20% 16% 21% 26% 18% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 74% 70% 74% 79% 74% 82% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 11% 9% 11% 0% 0% 0% dont <=2000 42 39 39 39 36 36 36 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 0% 84% 84% 84% 100% 100% 100% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 100% 16% 16% 16% 0% 0% 0% 2001-2025 20 32 21 20 32 21 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 45% 46% 45% 45% 46% 45% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 55% 54% 55% 55% 54% 55% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2026 - 2050 11 18 3 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 44% 44% 44% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 56% 56% 56% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0%PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 19
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"12.4 Small/medium cities Demography Table 12-16: Other cities demography, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Population (millions) 131 157 131 121 187 138 108 % <25 26% 26% 24% 23% 29% 25% 25% % >75 5% 12% 13% 13% 12% 13% 13% % 25-75 69% 62% 63% 63% 59% 62% 62% Households (millions) 50 62 53 51 70 54 44 % 1 pers 25% 38% 39% 40% 38% 39% 43% % 2 pers 34% 27% 29% 29% 24% 30% 25% % >2 pers 41% 35% 32% 31% 38% 31% 33% Mobility Table 12-17: Other cities mobility indicators, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Cars Car ownership (car/pers.) 0,40 0,46 0,45 0,52 0,53 0,45 0,48 Car stock (millions) 53 73 59 63 99 63 51 Km/year/car (000) 13,0 12,0 11,5 11,8 11,0 10,0 10,0 Passenger traffics (Gpkm) Urban (Gpkm) 252 303 242 236 359 241 209 Car (%) 72% 80% 65% 73% 85% 60% 60% Public (%) 16% 9% 19% 15% 6% 19% 22% Regional (Gpkm) 935 1122 802 874 1331 715 837 Car (%) 83% 85% 80% 83% 90% 75% 75% Public (%) 17% 15% 20% 18% 10% 25% 25% Buildings Table 12-18: Other cities dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Dwellings (millions) 49 61 53 50 69 53 44 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 12% 6% 4% 17% 9% 8% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 75% 78% 80% 83% 91% 92% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 13% 16% 16% 0% 0% 0% dont <=2000 49 46 46 46 42 42 36 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 0% 82% 82% 82% 100% 100% 100% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 100% 18% 18% 18% 0% 0% 0% 2001-2025 16 7 5 16 7 5 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 45% 46% 45% 45% 46% 45% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 55% 54% 55% 55% 54% 55% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2026 - 2050 12 4 4 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 44% 44% 44% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 56% 56% 56% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0%PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 20
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"12.5 Sparse settlements Demography Table 12-19: EU-27 demography, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Population (millions) 159 173 153 169 189 131 164 % <25 27% 29% 27% 27% 31% 27% 24% % >75 7% 12% 14% 13% 15% 19% 17% % 25-75 66% 59% 59% 61% 54% 54% 59% Households (millions) 60 77 71 79 84 62 82 % 1 pers 25% 31% 32% 33% 34% 37% 39% % 2 pers 33% 33% 35% 34% 30% 34% 32% % >2 pers 42% 35% 32% 33% 35% 29% 29% Mobility Table 12-20: EU-27 mobility indicators, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Cars Car ownership (car/pers.) 0,48 0,63 0,60 0,66 0,70 0,60 0,63 Car stock (millions) 76 109 91 111 132 78 103 Km/year/car (000) 11,1 10,0 9,5 9,8 10,0 9,0 9,0 Passenger traffics (Gpkm) Urban (Gpkm) 287 310 240 274 338 212 298 Car (%) 77% 85% 73% 78% 85% 70% 70% Public (%) 17% 9% 18% 15% 10% 19% 20% Regional (Gpkm) 1093 1182 893 1162 1287 648 1227 Car (%) 83% 85% 80% 83% 90% 75% 75% Public (%) 17% 15% 20% 18% 10% 25% 25% Buildings Table 12-21: EU-27 dwelling stock by technology, PACT scenarios 2000 2025 2050 SC SP HW SC SP HW Dwellings (millions) 60 77 71 79 84 62 82 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 12% 9% 13% 17% 14% 16% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 74% 76% 74% 83% 86% 84% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 14% 15% 13% 0% 0% 0% dont <=2000 60 55 55 55 51 42 51 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 0% 81% 81% 81% 100% 100% 100% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 100% 19% 19% 19% 0% 0% 0% 2001-2025 22 15 23 22 15 23 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 43% 43% 43% 43% 43% 43% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 57% 57% 57% 57% 57% 57% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2026 - 2050 12 4 7 % Low Cons. (PH & ZEH & +EH) 43% 43% 43% % Med. Cons. (LEnH & LexH) 57% 57% 57% % Stand. Cons. (=2000) 0% 0% 0%PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 21
    • PACT D6: "3 scenarios to assess post-carbon transitions"PACT D6 vf Enerdata 23-09-2011 22