LEADERSHIP - Insurgency is not simply random political violence; it is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organized coherence. Leaders of the insurgency must make their cause known to the people and the government to establish their movement’s credibility. They must replace the government’s legitimacy with that of their own. IDEOLOGY - To win, the insurgency must have a program that explains society’s ills and justifies its insurgent actions. It must promise great improvements after overthrowing the government. The insurgency uses ideology to offer society a goal. The insurgents often express this goal in simple terms for ease of focus. OBJECTIVES - Effective analysis of an insurgency requires interpreting strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The strategic objective is the insurgent’s desired endstate; that is, how the insurgent will use the power once he has it. Replacing the government in power is only one step along this path; however, it will likely be the initial focus of efforts. Objectives can be either operational or tactical. Operational objectives are those that insurgents pursue as part of the overall process of destroying government legitimacy and progressively establishing their desired endstate. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts, such as disseminating PSYOP products or the attack and seizure of a key facility. ENVIRONMENT/GEOGRAPHY - Environment and geography, including cultural and demographic factors, affect all participants in a conflict. How insurgents and counterinsurgents adapt to these realities creates advantages and disadvantages for each. The effects of the environment and geography are most visible at the tactical level where the predominant influence on decisions regarding force structure, doctrine, and TTP may exist. CA forces have a regional focus, coupled with specific cultural awareness, which ensures relevant support to the commander. EXTERNAL SUPPORT - Historically, some insurgencies have done well without external support. However, recent examples, such as Vietnam and Nicaragua, show that external support can accelerate events and influence the outcome. External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or unavailable. Accepting external support can affect the legitimacy of both insurgents and counterinsurgents. It implies the inability to sustain oneself. In addition, the country or group providing support attaches its legitimacy along with the insurgent or the counterinsurgent group it supports. The consequences can affect programs in the supporting nation wholly unrelated to the insurgent situation. PHASING/TIMING - Successful insurgencies pass through common phases of development. Not all insurgencies experience every phase, and progression through all phases is certainly not a requirement for success. The same insurgent movement may be in another phase in other regions of a country. Successful insurgencies can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming development when favorable conditions return. Some insurgencies depend on proper timing for their success. Because of their limited support, their success depends on weakening the government’s legitimacy so that it becomes ineffective. Then, an opportunity to seize power exists. When these insurgencies move to seize power, they expose their organization and intentions. If they move too early or too late, the government may discover their organization and destroy it. ORGANIZATIONAL/OPERATIONAL PATTERNS - Insurgencies develop organizational and operational patterns from the interaction of many factors. As a result, each insurgency organization is unique. However, knowing the commonly accepted general patterns or strategies of insurgency helps in predicting the tactics and techniques that may be employed against the supported government.
Know Your Threat Leadership Ideology External Support Environment/ Geography Objectives Target Selection Organizational/ Operational Patterns Phasing/ Timing Attributes of The Threat
Enemy Analysis Capabilities Vulnerabilities Requirements Examples: Money Technical know-how Bomb making supplies Vehicles Compliant population Suicide bombers Examples: Key individuals Caches VBIED Factories Examples: Information dissemination VBIEDs External support Hide within population Where do we start? Step 3 - Evaluate the Threat (1-2) What must the enemy do/have to accomplish his objectives? What resources does the enemy have available? What shortfalls does the enemy have between capabilities and his requirements?
Enemy Analysis Examples: Emplacers Builders Financiers Triggermen Another method… Who Is attacking? Organizing? Directing? What Are their objectives? Methods? Techniques? When Do they emplace? Attack? Where Have they attacked? Will they attack in the Future? Do they store? Assemble? Get supplies? Why Do they Attack coalition? Locals? Examples: RCIED Complex Baited ambush Examples: Day Night Before/ after clearing Examples: Previous attacks Examples: Personal gain Money Power Revenge Step 3 - Evaluate the Threat (2-2)
Disposition Location Tactical deployment Where they are & What they are doing Includes:
Composition Who they are & What they have 24 134/10 1 2 2/28/134 Unit Identification Organization I X
Strength Includes: Personnel Equipment Weapon Systems
The Enemy – Big to Small 3 14 15 23 21 22 23 24 1 2 3 4 xx xx xx xx III III III III II II II II 10 T-80 29 BMP 10 T-80 29 BMP 10 T-80 29 BMP 10 T-80 29 BMP 5th OSC
The Enemy – Total Combat Power 40 x T80 116 x BMP2 12 x AT5 6 x AT5(D) 6 x 2A45M 100 Inf (Air Insert) 100 Inf (Truck) 100 Inf (FD) 6 x 2S6 3 x SA-18 4 x MSD FSD AT CO MOD 2/24 1/24 (+) 24 III 14 x T80 35 x BMP2 6 x AT5 3 x 2A45M 100 Inf (FD) 3 x 2S6 1 x MSD 10 x T80 29 x BMP2 3 x AT5 3 x 2A45M 1-2 x 2S6 1 x MSD 3 x T80 8 x BMP2 1 x AT5 3 x 2A45M 2 x AT5 1 x UMZ 1 x GMZ 9 x T80 27 x BMP2 1 x 2S6 1 x MSD 7 x T80 22 x BMP2 1 x 2S6 1 x MSD 3/24 I I (-) 4/24 I I (-)
Enemy Strengths/Weaknesses Heavily reliant upon ground based recon Effective ground based recon Intel Weakness Strength WFF Limited available artillery systems; targeting reliant upon HUMINT Counter-fire radar (45km range) Dedicated sensor-to-shooter link at MID 75% rounds fired RAP/ext FS Modern T-80 tanks (2500m MG, AT-8) equipped w/ thermal imaging BMP-2 - All are TIS equip & stab M2 Limited range of ADA systems; minimal threat to fixed-wing aircraft Dedicated engineer support at all levels; Significant mobile ADA either self-propelled or shoulder-fired; night capable ADA. Protection Heavily reliant upon retrans due to terrain FM Single Channel Encrypted C2 Critical shortage of POL; limited repair parts for tanks; limited ammunition for tanks and artillery Sustainment
From Order of Battle Data and Threat Model Threat Capabilities - what the threat can accomplish
Identify Threat Capabilities ( Can the enemy dance?)
Four tactical COAs open to military forces in conventional operations:
Conduct a retrograde
Broad COAs can be divided into a variety of more specific COAs.
Unconventional operations can also be depicted using a doctrinal template.
For example a drug trafficking ring that transports large amounts of drugs my use certain convoy procedures, such as the distance between vehicles, how many vehicles, where security forces are placed and how many are in the convoy, and how the security force will react to a police force
Step 4 - Determine Threat COAs Define the Battlefield Environment Describe the Battlefield's Effects Evaluate the Threat Determine Threat COAs
Identify Threat’s Likely Objectives and Endstate
Strategic: The level of war at which a nation, group of nations, or an international organization, determine security objectives and guidance.
Operational: The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned and executed (OSC and DTG).
Tactical: The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed (BTG and IMG). Activities at this level focus on the maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and the enemy.
Identify Threat’s Likely Objectives and End State
Threat COA Model – A model of one COA available to the threat. It consists of a graphic depiction ( situational template ); a description ( narrative or matrix ); and a listing of assets important to the success of the COA ( HVTs ). The degree of detail in the model depends on available time.
At a minimum, the COA models address the five standard elements of a COA:
ENEMY COURSE OF ACTION MISSION: INTENT: TASK ORG: TASK & PURPOSE: RECON: FS: C2: Decision to execute COA 2 based on read by DTG Recon of defensive prep on AA3B. Reconstitute assault force upon its destruction in battalion on Route White has not been defeated. The 202 BTG attacks to destroy friendly forces NLT XX2100JUN01 in order to fix enemy and prevent the BDE from counter-attacking the DTG exploitation force. Move rapidly through the AOR to gain contact with the enemy. Fix enemy forces in prepared defensive positions. Assault force defeats northern battalion in east while exploitation force destroys battalion in west IVO Kill Zone 2. I E I I 18 X 2S1 I I 18 X 2S3 X 202 22 I I I I DISRUPTION ZONE Recon Det: T: ID enemy defensive positions P: ID HPTs and determine best route for exploitation force. BATTLE ZONE Fixing Force: T: Destroy enemy forces on AA 3C & 4B. P: Prevent enemy forces from attacking BTG main effort the exploitation force. Assault Force T: Defeat enemy forces in east. P: Prevent action against the exploitation force and attrit enemy forces in the battle zone. Exploitation Force T: Destroy enemy battalion IVO Kill Zone 2. P: Fix enemy BCT and prevent attack on DTG exploitation force. Initially set to support Recon Fires. Facilitate movement of recon det. and destroy Q36 or Q37 Radar. O/O shift to destroy enemy in contact w/ assault force. O/O shift to destruction fires ISO exploitation force. Identify MDL to facilitate commitment of ME. Identify HPTs for destruction w/ reconnaissance fires. Identify reserve for disruption by fire support assets. X XXX XII X PL ZINC PL GOLD X Kill Zone 2 Kill Zone 1 I I (+) X PL SILVER I I (+) I I (-) KALMAL I I (+) I ASSAULT EXPLOITATION Kill Zone 3 BTG Attack Zone BTG Battle Zone
PL TIM 3 X 2 X 3 X PL DAVE (FEBA) PL LARRY PL ROGER (FLOT/IHOL) ECOA Sketch EXAMPLE 1-5 II 4-64 II II HVTs by Phase: Recon/INF Fight - AT5s, BMPs, BRDMs 2S5s, Inf LD - POP Fight - ENG assets, BMPs 2S19s, ARK 1, BM21s POP - ENG assets, BMPs, 2S1s, T80s MISSION Statement: who, what, when, where why. RECON T: ZONE RECON P: LOCATE BLUFOR CO PSNs/ HPTS INF T: SEIZE KEY TERRAIN ; DESTROY ENEMY COMPANY TEAM P: SUPPORT MAIN BODY AT THE POINT OF PENETRATION DISRUPT T: SEIZE KEY TERRAIN; FIX ENEMY FORCES P: PREVENT REPOSITIONING/MASSING FIXING T: DESTROY CO TEAMS/ FIX KEY FORCES P: PREVENT REPOSITIONING/MASSING/PROTECT FLANKS ASSAULT T: DESTROY CO TEAMS P: PROTECT FLANK OF EXPLOIT/ESTABLISH BREACH EXPLOIT T: PENETRATE ENEMY BPs, DESTROY KEY NODES/RESERVE P: FACILITATE DEEP PENETRATION / DENY CBT OPNS SPT IFC T: DESTROY MECH, ENG, & INF FORCES/SUPPRESS ARMOR P; DISRUPT DEFENSE T: CONDUCT COUNTERFIRE, DESTROY DEEP HPTS, FASCAM P: DESTROY FS, HPTS, AND DELAY COUNTERATTACK II II Destroyer AT-5 100 INF 3 ATs Angel AT-5 100 INF 3 ATs DISRUPT 4/12/3 ASSAULT 12/32/0 FIX 6/16/2 EXPLOIT 10/28/1 EXPLOIT 10/28 0715 MB. 210545 CRP’s 201900APR BDE RECON 191830APR DIV RECON 0600 FSE 0630 AGMB 2S1 BN ATTACK TIMELINE AT LD 0645 BRAG DAG Emplaced
PL TIM 3 X 2 X 3 X PL DAVE (FEBA) PL LARRY PL ROGER (FLOT/IHOL) ECOA Sketch EXAMPLE CONTINUED 1-5 II 4-64 II II IFC HVTs by Phase: Recon/INF Fight - AT5s, BMPs, BRDMs 2S5s, Inf LD - POP Fight - ENG assets, BMPs 2S19s, ARK 1, BM21s POP - ENG assets, BMPs, 2S1s, T80s MISSION Statement: who, what, when, where why. Total Number 18 2S1s 18 2S19s 18 2S5s 18 BM21s 6 Hinds Special Munitions 6 NP 1 PCHEM 2 FASCAM RECON T: ZONE RECON P: LOCATE BLUFOR CO PSNs/ HPTS INF T: SEIZE KEY TERRAIN ; DESTROY ENEMY COMPANY TEAM P: SUPPORT MAIN BODY AT THE POINT OF PENETRATION DISRUPT T: SEIZE KEY TERRAIN; FIX ENEMY FORCES P: PREVENT REPOSITIONING/MASSING FIXING T: DESTROY CO TEAMS/ FIX KEY FORCES P: PREVENT REPOSITIONING/MASSING/PROTECT FLANKS ASSAULT T: DESTROY CO TEAMS P: PROTECT FLANK OF EXPLOIT/ESTABLISH BREACH EXPLOIT T: PENETRATE ENEMY BPs, DESTROY KEY NODES/RESERVE P: FACILITATE DEEP PENETRATION / DENY CBT OPNS SPT IFC T: DESTROY MECH, ENG, & INF FORCES/SUPPRESS ARMOR P; DISRUPT DEFENSE T: CONDUCT COUNTERFIRE, DESTROY DEEP HPTS, FASCAM P: DESTROY FS, HPTS, AND DELAY COUNTERATTACK II II NP NP NP NP … … BAG 2S19 2S19 2S1 IFC DAG BM-21 2S5 JTOC TOC 0715 MB. 210545 CRP’s 201900APR BDE RECON 191830APR DIV RECON 0600 FSE 0630 AGMB 2S1 BN ATTACK TIMELINE AT LD 0645 BRAG DAG Emplaced
Collection requirements are difficult to focus until patterns develop
Most Probable Course of Action (MPCOA) - COA Sketch & Statement (Includes T, P, M, E, DP, CP) - SITEMP (brief T/P by subunit and/or BOS) - OBJ Blowup Sketch - High Value Targets (HVT) Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) - Same as for MPCOA - Explain differences between MDCOA, MPCOA, and additional ECOAs FINAL ASSESSMENTS - Enemy Strengths & How to Overcome - Enemy Weaknesses & How to Exploit - How Best to Assault the OBJ - Weaknesses of the Enemy at the OBJ - Best Use of Terrain to Assault the OBJ - Where should we attack/assault from, and why? Evaluate Threat COAs
Event-based vs. Maneuver-based COAs ISSUE - COAs may consist of linked singular events to reach a desired end-state vice conventional maneuver operations to destroy enemy forces and seize terrain. EVENTS INTENDED EFFECT DESIRED ENDSTATE Snipe Bombing Mortar Attack Observe Only Influence CF to withdraw and gain political control Loss of Public Support Lower Morale Operation too long Operation too costly
Products of IPB High Value Targets Define the Battlefield Environment Describe the Battlefield’s Effects Determine Threat Courses of Action Event Template Situation Template Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay Doctrinal Template Evaluate the Threat
Depicts where to collect the information that will indicate which COA the threat has adopted
Differences between the NAIs, indicators, and TPLs associated with each COA form the basis of the event template
Named area of interest (NAI) - the specific point, route, or area where key events are expected to occur; where information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected; usually selected to capture indications of threat COAs but also may be related to conditions of the battlefield
Indicator - positive or negative evidence of threat activity; activities which reveal the selected COA
The initial event template focuses on identifying which of the predicted COAs the threat has adopted
FM 34-130, 1994, p. 2-50, G-7 & G-8
Event Template 1 2 SITEMP 1 SITEMP 2 Consolidated SITEMP EVENT TEMPLATE 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 & 2 2 2 NAI 2 NAI 3 NAI 4 NAI 1
Example Event Temp H-Hr H-Hr H + 30 H + 60 H + 90 H +120 H +150 H + 30 H + 60 H + 90 H +120 H +150 NAI 8 NAI 6 NAI 2 NAI 4 NAI 1 NAI 3 NAI 7 Ea Smash NAI 9 NAI 5
NAI LOCATION EN COA INDICATOR NET/ NLT PRIORITY PRIMARY/ ALTERNATE CONFIRMATION REMARKS EVENT MATRIX (S2) ISR MATRIX (S3) 1. Start with Situation Template 2. Determine Time Phase Lines (TPLs) and Mobility Corridors 3. Determine where events will occur that differentiate between EN COAs (these become NAIs) 4. Determine what action confirms or denies a particular EN COA (Indicators) 5. Determine when events will occur (NET/NLT) EVENT TEMPLATE 1 FL 123456 1 Bridging Operations H+30 H+1.5 2 FL 123456 1 Armor Assets H+15 H+2 3 FL 123456 2 Bridging Operations H+45 H=1.5