Non Cooperative Games Nash 1950

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    Non Cooperative Games Nash 1950 - Presentation Transcript

    1. A DISa.m'ATION ?reaented to the Faculty of PrincetOll University 1n Cand1c1aoy tor tho Decree Phlloaollh7 of Doctor Clt tor ~Ade4 ~ 'by 1M ~ Qt!4M'a• •1!\\Qa
    2. oo~copt ~ of non-cooporat1.:vo Thi:s i'Apor mtroduco:; the And Do dovclopa m.cJthoda tor the matb.etatlcal analya1a of pmea. :he $Uch to,ies and r-y-ott runctlcma detlned tor t.'l.e oombinat1ona of ?ure atrato:;1ea. The dlat1ncr-viCX1 botnen ooo,orative and non-oooperat1ve SlUJGa 1s at pure unrolatod to tho atha:at1cal doacrit'tioll by atntO&1es ::JItUla funct10nn ot it deyer.da on t.'us ,oluJ1:;'U1tj ~e.:;-o.cr c~. ~ther. e.::d a1de-pr.~ta. or 1mpo&o1b1llty of cOGllt1cma. oor:m1n1catiou. alI1 at an Gqu1l.1brlut1 pomt. a aolut1oD. a IVon& ao1utioa., The concopta .~u\"tic&l. 1D:tro<1uced by matbaat1.cal d4rt1n1tiQla. a And valuoa aN or And in later aectlQtl8 the 1ntGrpretation thote ooncepta 1n non-cooper- cS1acuaa~. .t1'VQ 1. pmM .. , or at lean equ1l1brlua polat. Other· ruulta po- OODMnl tM pu ODe Mtr1ca1 atruofsure of the aet of equ111brlUll point. of ....... with • 10- 1 ' ~, ~ ~ lut1oA.t the ~ ~ aub-eolutd.oaa, ud the a1nenae of • •,..ta-lea1 - ~ . . p.. ~~ .. , equ111brla po!Jrb !D • J 11luaftt;1~ of 1;t. ,..ibU1Uea te appl1Gat;1c •• a.. . . .le U 1ot • .!apt. tbNe 'WI poIm' lI/Idel la 1Dclu4ed. J . o ~ I '- n , a..,
    3. Tabla of Contenu !:oct!on 1. Introduction... • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 1 z. Ponal ::e£!nit!QOB and ':erminoloG:/ • • • • • • • • •• 2 3. 5 •••••••••• 7 4. of Game_ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• Sj~tr1ea .. . .. . . . . . . . !::ol:.rtio~ ••••• 9 •••• ~ 6. Geametr10al of Solut1ona • • • • • • • • • • •• F~ 13 15 7. Dom1 na n 08 and Contradiction !!ethoda • • • • • • • •• o. 17 A Throe-Man !)o)cer Game • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • o. and IDterpretatlon • • • • • • • • • • •• 21 MDt1~t1on 10. Appl1oat1ona. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 25 B1bl1Qcra~....... 11. • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 27 12. ••••••••••••••••••• JL~l~~
    4. Introduction fruitful theory Von ~reumanu and !Jorgenstorn have developed a very or of two-,erson _era-sum games in their book Theor;r Games and Economio or a type 30r..o.v1cr.~,~l~ book also contains a tr.ecry of o-:'HJrson QUOOs wtich wo would call oco,?erativa. theo~J Thi3 is baaed on an analyai3 or the 1ntorrelatlonahinG of tho various coalitions which cnn be ro~d caco. by the pla!rers or trA Our thoory, in contradistinction. is based on the absor.oo of coo.l1- tiona 10 thnt it is a&&umed oach nartioipant aots ~;at indo~endeot1y. without collaboration or oommunioation with any or the othern. Tho notion of an equilibrium. !>Oint 1a the basio lncrediont in our This notion yiold4 a Z8%lOru1:ut1on or tho concO':lt of the solu- 'tl1.ecrJ. It turns out that the set ot equili- tion of a two-!)eraon sero-eu.m~. brium points or a tiro-person :ero-aum gaos is simply the set ai' all pair. \"r;ood strategies.- of oppoaing oqu1l1b~iWll In the 1:u:ledlately followinG aectioDB &ball d.fine 'We pointa and prow that t1nlte QOll-Cooperatlve game always has at least Do :re shall .lao 1ntroduoe the notiona of aolvabil1ty one equl111lrlw.:1 poUlt. and. UrOD; aolvabll1ty of DOD-Ooop8l'atlw g _ and prove a tbeor. 011 & the geaMtr1cal atruotura t4 the Nt of equ1l1brium pointe at • aol_ble ga.-. I.e an oxomplo at the application or our theo17 wo include a solution or ~. a simplified three penon poker or tho athematlcal The motivation and 1ntorpretntion em- COD08?U . ployed in the theor:! are roaer'n!d for d1ecusalon in a epeoial section at th18 paper.
    5. For.cal and ~erlnit1ons Te~nolobY In this section define the besic concept3 this and set ~~ o~ ~apcr U~ :.standard tor::li:!ology and notation. I:aports:lt dol' in! tiona will 00 i~clcati~g conce~t proceeded by cub-title tho defined. The non-coc?- Q ~111 erati-'.-e i::!ea be implicit, rathor than oxplicit, below. F1.o.ite Ge.ms , For us an n-nerson will be a set of n or ryos1tions, C~ ~laj~rs. strntogioa; and corros?or.dinC each with an associatoci finite sat ~~ . Pr ' or whioh =-PH tho set to each player, I • a no.y-off funotion, all n-tuplea of pure strategies into the real nu.:Dbers. Whan '?Ie uno tho term n-tuplo wo ahall always ocan a sot oJ: n 1tema. with oach item Q~300iAted a d1.frercnt !layer. with • A .mixed strategy or player 'will be a oollection of non-D.8:;at1ve numbera which have unit aum and are 1n one to one correspondenoe with hia pure strate,1ca. ~c. --, =~ C ic(. TT \\ L{. 101- Sa with wr1 t. ';I. 01. 0(. c(., atrawO. where the to repr...nt auob a mixed are tho pure . atrategl.. ot player • W. re;ard the I 1T ; ol ' S plG whose verticea are tr.o ThiB s1,mplex tllly be regarded • ot a. real veator apace. Giving as a convex subset natural proce•• of tl8 • 11.cear cotabinatlcn ter tho ::l1Xe4 atratet,;ie•• olJ~'~ i,j,J<.. w. shall use the .uriaea tor players and to $;, t: _ The G~la lnd1a.t. wr10ua pure strate,1\". o£ a pla)\"Jr. wHl 1::dl-
    6. -:5- oL th pure strategy. eta. ca.ote tllo \\ th player' a L n-11nonrJ. which 1& linear 1n the mi~ed stratsGY or each pla:,\"Or Pi • writinG p;(S.,S~,.-. Sn). This i:Xtons1on we shall alao donota by or ·\"e shill wr! 'to ~ or ;;t::: to denote ttn n-tu,?la :nixed :ztratacios p; (l.) (S, I Sn) A:= and if then .... 4 • w111 also ~e regarded ns a ,oint ~o a 'Voctor Such an n-tu.,le, 8':'1108, th~ mixed stratec:ies. For convenience we introduce the eubat1tutlon notation CS., St.., .... s: -'.\" t: ,5;+1) ••• $ ..) (A; t;) to stand for S't)) -J... -== where (S./5&/ .... • • The effect or suocessive subat1tu- /' ~; t: ; t\" j ;i-J) ) , Gtc. tiona ((A.;t;) we 1%Jdlcato by Equilibrium Po1at. (1) • --4.. that each ~layerl a Thua an oquilibrium point is n-tuple all KUoh mixed strater;y ma.x1.izd.zd his Pfll--aff if the stratecies ot the others are held fixed. Thua oaoh ,layer' 8 stratogy 1s optimal against tho.e of the We .hall ooo••1onally abbreviate equiliiJri\\.Ull point by Oq. pt. others.
    7. Si fie say ~h8t ~a r ure strato:y -rr;~ m..-:ed strateGY if Cl ~ C~ C ~~ ~= C$.~5t., - - · >0 · s \"') ?i:: • IT;oL and If S; thnt ~ uses Trio(. we alao end un 03 l'T;at • &8y S.~ r=; C • \". • 511) S; , :'rcm t!1e l!nee.rity of 1n :1'';~.s [P{-<t;,:)] =. VV:~LP;(4 ilT;<t)] (2) • R~f4..) -= P.. (A IT.ac.) • Thon we obtain ; .,4 the followinG triv!al noccsonr;,-' and auf.!'1cient cond1'tion for to be \\.. an ?Oint: equilib~~UQ P;~) (3) • ~:: (S,,, S\"\" ••• S,,) u and P;(4.);: ~(;ol. P,'al~) , oonaeGuentl~ for • IT.oI.. ..4... doe. not us. 1t iD an optical to ••y that WllOIi a which 18 i• pure strnteQ\" for pltt1'Jr SO we . .ite (4) if another neeeaaary and lutf1ciant oondition tor an equUlbn\\a point. all (\"'3) eq. pt. can b. Gpreaaed •• tho Sinoe a criterion tor &A A.. equating of two continuous tunct10na the apaco at n-tuplea the 011 ton a cloud aubaet Oq. pta. obv1oaaly of th!a apace. Actually. thi. v\\u-Mbs..,... or ~ subset 1s formed frcn a piecee o£ albegraic varietl... cut out by other a1cebraio vnr1etioa.
    8. ~'01.at8 ExiBtenco of Zqu11!briwm !!.!!. 36 I have previously publ18hGd£PrOC.:.l!.!. (1950) 48-49J a proof of \"t~c :-esult !;olC\";I based on l:aJ( utnr.i~ bcneralized fixed point theoreo. t\"l'he proof b i van here uses the Brouwer \"theore.:n. !hft ~hod la -to aet u!' Bequence of oontinUOl.lS mMpp lut;a, t\\ whoee !,Oi~t8 fued have an eq,ul1ibritua point 88 limit !,>oint. A limit cappinC dlscontil:uC\"~:l, au~r exists. but is (L.\"ld :lceO not have fixed points. l'lU:..'O. 1, Evor:r finite garno has an equ11ibriun ?oiJlt. Uainc our atGJldard notation. let -<l. Proof, be an ll-tuple of mixed tho pa,-.ott to i'lnyer atratoglea. and 11- he usee his ; Viot pure at.. t.gy and the others use thoir rcspect!n m1xed strate- ... l'~ar each 1ntet;Or A we -<i... dGi'1ne t.ha following continuous glee in ..4... , 1'unctl ana of P:cll4-) • ~~ q,.{4.) ¢i oJ..--J..J~ =: Po Y\"A. • + (4.) - '1 ;(-.tJ and 0( ¢itf-t),.) =- max (0) ¢jot (4~)..)J • =y)o. >0 ~ ¢~(A/.;)'-) mt-J(¢~~~~) > ot <6t (-<L/-J L ~;t(-4.7A) 1& cont1nuoua. (l bt.) ~) =: C< ,')..) ~ L 1T: 0( S;I' Define and (. _4.:'(.4.~ -,...) ::- (S.'7 $ ~7. S:') oc: • all the operat1oDII £ il:c G •• 18 con-
    9. or -<L • 15 • coll, thero auat tinuouaJ and sinoe the apaoe n-tuplea. A' • 4,.... , bo n fixed poiot for each lionce thero wUl bo a aubsoquence -<t.* , whGre cotmJrt:~ to 4~ in :JAi??~ .A.--tA'f.t.,/(~». ; !'i:ad under the nOll.upp_~e~ ~1t- wore not an equUibrium point. -:hen 1£ • P.=. (S,*, •• • s#) 5;* must be non- soma c<=pQnont $;* uaea ~0tXJ ~ atratoQ opt1al acainat tho others. which moana (if)) ,,~ . 4-J ~ that IT:ol' which 1:1 non-opt1tal. £aoo :-hiu P;ol~*) < C(;&-t*) which juatU\"!.oa P;~A*) - '1;(4*) ~ - E • I[hot f ~) <. %.. Cf: (..t.*J] <'74 a-l [11D({4Jf) - (-<l#-'-) - Cfj{:<lrtU - q,- &<ttJ.) + y}.(N <. 0 p; (4) - Addlnw whioh 1a 0( ¢;O{ (AI'\\-~ ft£I\"-l) < 0 J ..,,-~ ¢! (4,..).u.i}:ojlanoe Ci ~ (-'..,.., 7'{,...) ) == .0 · an equation we know that From this A,... .dJ1De 18 ACt WMtd 1A ;r;al A.f4 = ~ -mot Cj-:C (4.,...1 ~)) t 1Xed po.11'lt. • wh1ch contftd1n. our uaumptlon. -4..~ 18 1Ddeed an equilibrium. point. IIe.aoe
    10. auto;:r.vJZJ?hi!~ ~ An or 8it.??:8'hr;\" of a 'Will bo a portrutatlc.t: of condl'tionG. c1von 001011'. p~ oortai.~ lta atrate&108 which IAtiafiea atratocaa belont; to G~O pla~rcr ~'1fr; ~o into tlUst If two t-;IO (& ¢ GtnlteGi~ ~.~ to 1:1 tho ?or::zuta- A sin;;lo pla:1tJr. Thus!.r <f tion of t.'lo :m.\"\"\" atrnto::;!oa 1~ !nducoo a ~Ilt!on or the players. Each n-tuple at pure atratocioa 18 therotoro per::lUtod into another X the !.nducod ~or:::utat!on n-tuplo of pure stratobioa. 2.:/ call \".0 S or thea. n-tuplea. denote an A-tuple of pure atrategiea and Let P;~) ~r p~ S j wbaJl the n-tuplo to 18 __ the lie require that it ployea. J=.,'f • then l~rJ. which canplatea the de.f1n1tioll at a ¢ baa a Wl1que l1DMar exte1l81011 to the JId:XIId The penJLttat10n nrateb1es. It ~. . aD ¢ to tho :d..u4 atn.teC1U olear17 !'he ext.uIlcm ot X to the n-tuplM of a\\xaS a1ft~. ~ oxteMlon ot lYe ahall ~ tb1a by 7<- • VIe det1ne a .~1o Il-'Wple ~y ca- .4. at & ~\"= A X ~s to%' all A 'beinG a penattat10n deriTed trca a .,..try it Wlderatood that ID8a1W ¢.
    11. -8- ~ hu a ayoaotr10 equ!llbriun !)Oint. Any finite 'riEO. 4. Firat we not. that :.:lrool't =- ~-rrj\"\" ;>rope~y (S,o)¢~ 5;<> ';.;<> haG the 'IIhore r't Ao :: (~.o 5\"'0 ••• tf· J\" -- .·\"tro':that the o-tuple S'h).J , 14 j ~ ~ X a~':Xletrio f!;;od under an\";{ J henoe any GntlO ho.G At lOQst one :p tuple. It A~(S,~ .•• S,,) Sr-;:j is so c...une~ j:= i 'f ) hence too because = lS;):+ (t;)¢'\", lSI;t) ¢ ,hence ~t*\")X ~ AC!rs . 'l'hia allOW6 that tho Get at S\";:anetr1c n-tuplea 1& a convex aubaet of tho apace of n-tuplea a1t!ce it 18 obvioual:/ cloaed. -<t.--:,-J... /(-t. ~ A. ) A !Iow ob.\",\"\", that for uoh t;be _pp!.ng uaed 1.D the proot of exiatenoe tbecrea • • intrinsically defined. Therefore. f<.> .. ': -x.\" 1M '~ '~t~ ;\"'1 \"\",'\" .- -4.1.. ~ -<L / ( At. , \"}\\.) at the r ; - 1: and morphia = ,4/(4;X,'A) ~. A;J<. wewUlhaTo • 18.,... tt -4.;:<- = -4. / (-4.,}'A.) ...4.:x.:: = -d. t. -4, aDd tbaN.rcre tr1Q • coueqU8llt.l.7 this -pplDc apa tt» ad of n-tupl. 1.trto ita.It. .~c Since th1a aet 1a • cell there . .t be • •~tr1c t1xed point -J.~ • or .And. .. in the proot could obtain a l1nlt the aSatAnco thGo~ _ ~br10. A-k Wh1ch would to be po1n\\ bay.
    12. ~olutlona 1';a dof1:18 here solutions. stronG solutions, aM t;ub-solut1.ol'ls. A no~oopE}ra:tive alw~ rJUJIJ dooa not haw a :lol:. ;tion, but whon it does ~onc u~ci&l the aaolution l.:l unique. solutions aru noluticns with ~ S. wm denote a set of m1xad Gtrateciea of player j am! or a set n-tuploa of r.d..oo;cd atrnte;ietl. GolvahUit:r: ~ ~ • or 1a solvable if ita set. equillbr1ua pointe ••tis- A tielS the condlt1oD (1) Thia 18 _lled the _ b 1 1 1 t y condit1on. The aolutloa of • an.,£. or equilibrium point•• aol_ble guw 1a 1ta ~ sol_bUl\"~ ~ ,aolvable 11' 111 bu. • aa- aolutlou.'; • auall that 1a A s tor all ; s;
    13. -10- tr~t (~; S;) ;t- 16 an equi11briwa the n-tuple such for sane L o~ul11~!.um point.J i oomponent o.r SCi:lO th Si point. is the . S; 01~ !llayer •• the set at ocul1ibr1um. st:-nt&hies call 710 .i :r 1D a Gubaet of tho cot of equilibrium ,o1nta of a Game and Q1~mal ~'U4 d rolAt,170 to :sat1B:t1M condition (1); and if 1G ?rO- ~y t~..n ~ a Dul>Bolutlon. call 1I8 ~ S; • a.a we dot1.no the .. tJl factor se;t. For any atID-eolU\"\"tooion ~ coma'M ( :::t-; s:) tor 'tho :wt 0: all S : IS .UGh tt-At II . . . ;;t-. ~ue. a aul>-aolut1on. when a aolut1on, and ita tactor Nate that 14 are the Hta of 4Iqu1llbrium strateGi••• uta ~• 2J aub-aolutlon. 18 the set of all n-tuples A 1'RJJ). S. S;; (S •., S1..,. _. Sft) $i E 1a the mob 1aha'b each where J. ~ proGu~ ot ita o.c.tr1oally_ 18 the ; th taotor Nt ot factor ..te. • 57 det1n1t1on r ft-;- ; s,-) t:-eL · 3 ..;;C ~ ;;t;.., • • • .,;;ttl\\. ~ ftr _ch 8tIDb t1JI1rlg the oond1tlon (1) D-l t1mee ... obtaln auccoa.1....\",y (*.;S,;S1.;S~; .. -; S..) e-laDd the lan 18 0=ljSI;S1.)e-~, ••• ) .1Dp~ (SI/ S.., ••• S..) fj . wh1ah we neodec! 1:0 abcIIr. !llEO. ~ The.1'aotor aota S' ., S ~ or. aubwGolut10J1 1.\" • • • Y\\ .JaO\". or atratec' are olosed and oonvax as aubaeta the a1ZIId S·• Sf e S; aDd •
    14. -11- S'i Si* = (S: +')t)/2. S;# is ; (b) 1! € then S; Si Si\"1tf • limit point at • then €.£ . /t Let Then we have 'tj , (I), P9- 3 for an eq. for any by ueing the criterion of f:- (51.1 ••• S.,) in Adding these inequalitiea, using the linearity of pt. PJ (t-; $;1 ~ I) (A; \\; *;t,D Sj • and dividing by 2. bet 'IfO S; *:::: ($; +S; I ) /L . ::'rom t..'1is we know that :since pt. for any -*E~. Ii: the set of (?t; Si7E) is an eq. C?t; ~ C;:*) is added to all such eq. pta. the aU(;lD8nted set /) ana ainee ~ cloarly aatiai'iea couciitiOll (1). 'Was to be maximal it S; . S:* E- follows that ;::t-c~ s: *) (:t; To attack (b) note that the n-tupla , where f+; Si) Umit point ot the .at of n-tuplea will be the form. oi~ & ~ S; . sinoe Si . '5;\"* S; i s . limit point of where Eut thla aet 1a a eet ot eq. pta. and hence any point 1n ita closure 18 an p,. trJ. .inc. L\"ee eq. pt., the ••t of all eq. pta. 1. cloaed There- 0-; S; ~) S; <: ') ,=1* - tor. 18 an eq. pt. and M.I1Oe trOll! the . . . argument as tor • Values, ~ be the sat of equUibrium po1l:ta ot a ga:.e. Let ;fa define .:;:t[P:hii] :::'LLP:[4-J] , Vj+- Vi-=: • '\"\". - \"'.- ,~+ .- v, Vi-t 'W'l\" 1t we e 18 • i the upoer value to player of the game J
    15. -12- the value, 1.r 1t _iata. '\" ·ialu8a will obvioualy have to exist if thero 1$ but one QC1uilibriuu point. One can det1ne associated ;:or a sub-solution by reatr!ot1oc ·nU.U80 ~ ~ \":.. - pta. in tho aub-oolution IILd then ua1n.:; tho llama defl.niog to equat10rus as aboN. is. a \"uddla l'01nta 1n stron& t,Jolutio.~ GXiat thel~ aol'VabloJ only when
    16. Geamotrical Form at Solut!ona In tho two-peraon zero-sum cane 1t han boon shown thn t tho Nt of an:r solvable ~. equllibr..u= atratet;ica 1n if • lfh10b 18 ~1 t10n (S) on paGe An equivalent conait10n 1& for (2) 5j at equU1br1ura nnW- tom at tb4f.n ooca1der 1m Lft WI JlQW * ~1o., p~ j • SJ. ot bI aq equI 11brl\\a po1A1a,t.t.A Let oa1~ 1t s; Sj : • (;t ; Sj) E. w1ll be aD equW.brlua po1at 1t and (A-; S;) frca'rheo.:' We:lOW appl: ooad1t-1cma (2) to P: a ;C SlJJH il-11ne&r a.cd !a conatant theae ,are a set of linMr 11.,.. (5;) ~ a • 1neqtal1t1e. ot the tara Each such 1mqual1t)' SJ or tor tho.a lying ,ide 1\" either aatl.t1ed tor all and to one OIl or .aae h,-perpla.be pua!Jl£ 'I'beretore. the through the atftteg' , .bpla.
    17. -12a- Simple J;D.mplee the 10ft. ate. -3 5 Ex. 1 (to(.. ,,~ 4 -4 -S bat 5 ~ ~-4 b .J .., _.\\ 1 a..at 1 :olution: ..:..x. :~n~ I.. -10 (l. ~ 10 V. =. \\1\". -::. -I 10 b~-l0 -1 b~ -1 Unaolvahle J equUlbrlUl4 JKl~ ( a 101.) ) (3) ~ (k 14.C( Ex. 3 1 ('Vi...... bf ~ , .:;(/1. + (5/1.) .:ho at.~- ,,-10 -lO and CL teGioa in the last caB. have maxi-min and -10 b 0(. -10 1 b p> 1 ~!li-!:lSX pro~erties. or .'l11xed 1 a.. Co(.. 3tro~ Ex. 4 1 ':olutiona all:>airs strate- 0<1. ~ ~1es. ~ 1 v\"\\.- ::::. 0 =1 , \\I, += ,,~ a 1 \\0 0( '1,-:::. o\\:)~ 0 Ex. 5 let.. c( 2 -1 q ~ -4 -4 hot -1 2b~ 1 la..Q{ 1 ~.e .w1th O C1 r.> 0 Ob~ 0 an CU1p1e at !.:stability. o r.> b 0
    18. LWh!ch t1nitoJ 0: conditione r...ll all co:1ploto aet be satisi'1ed Ui . ~ a~~ polyhedra~ si::lultaoeoualy on convex eubset of pla;rer J S stra- taw· ciraplo....:. £Interaect1on of ilalf-6paoea.J Skis the couve.x cloeu.ro a oorollary we %!Jay concll..tde that Ali £'ve-r; ice aJ• ;;.t . ~ .mixed 01\" A i'inita strntocica
    19. Doo.1 nnnco a&d contrad1ct1on !rethodD tl-..e..t Gal~l ,;g X. . ror overy ~ ':his. ~~~ ~o G&:li.nG that I a hiJlcr ~.. Si t;iVtis paJCr or ott than ~:.oo titrtlt8~io:J r.atter lthat the the other plaj'Ors are. , To ae. whetb.or a atrateQ' S i it aufficea to conai- dominates ): d.r only pure atrate&ioa for tho other !,llcyera becauae of the n-11near- P: • it:! 01\" It iaobvioua £rom the definitions that .a2 esuilibr1um ZOilIt ~ involve .! dom.i..oated atratoQ ~i • than 1n P:::a c I 'S. • enoubh Zhon tor a amll -t/= ti + p(5(- Si) prove a t81l proport1ea of tho aet at Wldominated atnte&1ea. C.QO Call h1 tM \\m101l at acas ooUttC'Uon at .~ ~ &Ad 10 torMd It ia taoea ot the .~ a1mplex. tor ~ The intonation obta1McS by dlaoovor1rlg dom1nano. . one . , be ot relnano. to the othen. 1naofar ... tba el1m1natlon of olu... u ot Ja1xed ftrateG1e. .a poaalb1e OOJIPOIlenta ot an equU1brlla po!l* ;t 's are all ccmo..-d. For 1:he an all 1IboM 0CIIlp0DIDta undam.i.nated atratec1H or that need be COJl81dered and this elhdnat1I1G acme ot the olaaa at atratec1ee ~ one 1'la,.- .y taka posa1blo the ol1m1natlon a nGW tar another play.-.
    20. -18- .l41athcr :n--occdure which =-:t. bo uaod ill locatinG ~uil1briUL'1 ,ointo cl,)~..trurJlct!.cn-~e 01'.0 t:.s:tt.U:J::i t};at &.'1 OCiuilib~iUtl ar..alys!t;. Eare is tlw e~~ ro~!.ons ba\"linu caczponcnt at.,touioa l\"JicG ·.vithin certain ?Oint of :wt .!\"..l...-t1lCr coc.diJ,;:or..a s-;:-n\"t~; :;~coc ced\\.~cc ·Hh.icl~ -:h.o a.-:d :?rocccd%! to to 5a~~!'ed ~' ~?otllQC!.a. ~ .~.l.O. r:1~ ~~ ~. tho aart cf be to evo,nt'wllly obtain a oontrat.iict1on in- t..lu-out;h &Overal Can\" 10<1 GtD.t;OG ~t utiar~~ ~7C­ there iz no equil!.briu::1 point dicatint; t.ho initial thea1&.
    21. \" include tr..o si:npll!'iad. l'ok.er ~ ~1ven belaar. Tho rcali=t!.c \\1110 CQ.SO rules are aa :~11a~81 l2!! TI1 th 8q un11 :-- ::iSJ1~. ( 1; hiGh and cards. and ':'he dec 1: is l.ar :;'6, cons lata or one card. a ~d ~ (:;) The ,layora :,llay 1n rotation and tho enes a.fter all ha9JQ puaod or ai'-~er .J.t::.e ?~or llnfi opOl4eC ar.d .l;!:o ot!10ra ha-re had a cbulce to call. tho antGa are retrioved. (.;) If no o&le beta Othorwiae the pot ia <llviQed oClually amollb tha h~st l~ (5) whioh bA711 bot. como !:lOre ::atiai'o.ctar:; to treat the in torma at qtaDt1- ~'Jo .r1ltd i.$.; u. .. to:m ~ tt~ Gall \"bebn1or puw,roter.. tbau .1ll tba nonlDl oc:e. ~ and 1Jc0D0aio ~T1or.\" In tho noral i'om repreaeatat101.1 two atratec1u 'at a p~ ~ btt equivalent in the . . . . tbat -.oh Jrdxed akee the ind1vidual ohooae each a_1lable ooura8 01' .OUOD 1D each par- t1cular altuat10n nqw.rinG l\\Ct1cn OD hi. pertt-w1th the . . . tntquenoy. tM __ bebaY10r pattern em the pan at the 1D- ~ That 1a. thq dlv14ual. give the prcbabU1t1ea ot tald.nc .ach of the ~. Be1:aT1or ~1oua poaa1ble 81tuatiolll wh1ch vu-loua poaa1b18 acti0D8 1A each at the l\"hwa tbq deao.r1be bebarlar pattorna. Je1 arl.ae. pla~ In tanaa of behavior pa.nmatera the atrategt.. of the - : be ,lm,o, that a1noe ropruantod aa foll.owa, •• is co point 1n puainG ~here hiGl! card at one'. laat opportun1ty to bert that thia wUl not be with a
    22. ·. i 0(· open~-.!!!fA t ~ on ~ A on..2. Gall !I t :: Opon J on.!£!. ,.... call II and II:r f le.!! i !~! -zJ Call on low Call: on ~ ~ Ct.ll !II and :: on ~ !! Opon on high - E Cptln on law ~ Call :l on ~ ~ and ~ Opon on Ja! .... .,....,. e Call I - lew OIl - & Call I! on low w. leo_to all porus1blo equ1l1br1ucL po1nta b:: t1rat ah.owing b.'t moat at the creek ~er. mtLIl't maW:/, w1th a 11tt1. 1'IUlUh. By c;lom'na M • oontrad1ot1o~ ~1a ~,~, f.> 18 eli-Seated and wlth it 60 f'-, ~) ,~ A~ k t9 ., 'by 4ca' .. nee. Thea oonVadlc\\1ODa e1Sm1nete aDd a? YJ • orcter. 1ll that Thi. 1.ava ua 'With € aM aIlS V 0(, DOC. at Contr'ad1ct1011 a.nalya1a sm.. that the.. can be aero or one and tJwa we obtain a system of ail:w:taneoUG al.pbra1c equat1ona. ThIa equatiOJla happen to haw but one solution 'l:1th tho -var1ablea 111 tl:.a racp (0\" , ) • ~\\ s= J5ii ljOlt\\ ':7--~c( 11_ ,.J_ - J0 •I- 4- V\\- , ,:)+0( E :::. ~ o(-} These Ute Id ~O~\" '1==. G\"!>I; J 'b =.~\" • J ct-t t; 0(-= - 7 ..... -I
    23. .. , ~1nco equ111br1ua point the GU28 there is onl;l valuos J theae are OM 1'..48 - - Oq~ = 1- ~o( \" CJ.h\\da - ' r '\" 1--. \" • tioneG are zero. I ill Q.#\\d]I = ~/.\" , O~.,~ ~ V~ t -=- 0{ · 0 ~11..~~ y~ ~ III' : ~= €=J value to III. ][ ~ cI I 'fttnJU8 'h 0<-= I : -. J'G7 ea 'ftlue to =: - ' / nr I ~d h~h. louJ - - .. _.- ~ -= -X, ,€ == 3/1J bet pct.S\\ _ .. -_ .... pass ~SS If.: -.1 r~ G::: - ':.fiI. Y- valuo to p~d. a~n1ts.c.uxt. o~ plq be1'ore the pm 1. thia ad'ftntaGe 'becClt:lea I ill. ']I[ ot coalition in ti'A case whore ray open arter two pua•• I on both hl?ib and Je! but will not opea 11' h:1d planned to pua when
    24. ·.
    25. .. - Uotlvatlou Uld InterpretatIon or In th1a section .. shall tx-/ to oxplain the alcniflcance tho 1ntroduaed 1n th1a paper. shall try to ahow how That la, _ COIlCepta equilibrium polnta &.ad aolut1cma can be conneoted w1th obaervable .- - pMnomlaa. tor • tlOD-COOperatlve The b. . l0 requirements 1a that thare pM £ unl••• it haa Ihould be no pre-play o~lcatlon among the pla,.ra beering on the~. Thus. br 1mpUcatlO1l. there are no coallt1ona I¥) £\"par-ottJ and no ald..pa)'Mnta. Decaun there 1a no extra-game uti11tr ~ta tranater, the of d1ttereJl'U plaJera are .ttecti..,..l)' 1ncamparabl.J Pi ~ a ~ Pi + b: ~ • 11 we tncatona the tuDctloDa l1nearlfl Q;>o where equUlbrium po1%lta are preaenecl UDder ,UGh i:nDataa-.tiam. We ,hall now take up the - . . .-action- 1nterpretat1011 of equilibrIum 18 mm--1A17 to uslat that thG partloipanta hne .tul1 kI¥Ar1Mce at the tIuwch the .bU1~ an4 1nc11mtlOJl to CO total ItrucWre of the pa. OJ- 'aD7 oaapl_ retlaoDiDc proa..... !hR the partlo,\"peta U. IUPPO'\" to ac- tbe~.H1a~l,\" achaDtaca.ot the ftl'loua cumulate·..,1J1.oallntormaUOIl.OA ~ atntlllp. &11 1Ibe1zo 4!apoeal. puN 4eta1led. we ..... that tb8n 18 • population CIA To be IIOre 1;be the.... nat1aUoV ot Let of sar'lo1paDta tor ••• podt1oa of M ... alao . . . . . that the ·a~ p~ of the _ 1molwa particl- WI Ii na- tna tbe ~ put. ae1eoted at rud_ popa1aUou. aA4 that S. • A .....-ac. trequeaay with 1Ib1ah . . . PUN ..,J.o,. by the 'b~ ....- 0 1a •.-nne- ...,... ot the appropr1at. populatloa. in S1I1ce there 1a to be no oollaboratlOD be. . . . Wi v14ua1a p~
    26. -22- ca-. probability that a partioular n- ~ d.1Eterent posit1ons at the tuple of pure Gtntebloa will be caploycd in playinc or the GIlm8 It or should be the product at the probabUlt1_ 1ndloat1n& the obaooe at the Jl punt atratel.':iea to be emplcr.,91 1Jl a nmdom. p1ay1ng • _ch - ... _\".. \"\"_ ....-'\" - . . Let the probabU1ty that lTio( 11'111 be emplo;,ed 1A a nndara • and let S; -= L. C; c( IT; l( ot Ci ot the gam be play1n& • 0( ~(~.,S1., •• - ~ ..) Then the ex~ pay-01't to an 1nd1-v- • t th poalt1on at the game aD4 employ1Dc the pure 1dual play1Dc 1n the p; (4; Tr;o() = P:ol (~) • lr.o( atrategy 14 U. ooneid.. ~ what efteate the experlenoe the pari10ipanta let BQW 1'0 \"CUM. .. •• did. tha't they .oo~te4 ..,1r1oa1 will produce. evidence the pure etrate&iea at their d1apoeal 1. to uaw. 1Ulat 011 .• leuD the numb... thoae playlnc 1n pooitlon • the1 w1ll epl07 oal.1 optSal atntep.e•• But it they lmow thea. puN 'bIc'- ·1ricl auah tha1a 1.... 1sbo_ pun ..... • s: atta-.. poet- .~lJ .bIoI .xpre. . . their bebn!~ Si ~_lo~ ~ to o~ pun 11n~. ~,.... \"' '1..,. tor ~ to be ISIIJ17 • equUlbrl_ poln. Bu\" th1a 1& oOll41t1orl aD £ ... [II-},ri:9 T1wa the ..~1oaa we .... JA tlWa \" . . . . .OUOIl\" JAMrpret10A '0 lvatecU. re~-tiDC the a'V'8raP tM ooaolualO1l tbat 1Ibe a1xed lead bebaYio.- in _ob ot the populaUOIli tana ID equ1l1br1ua pl1lrt. tt the u8lJlllptlos. nW !:\"(t~b ! ~: !he popalaUoDII need D01J be lar£fJ -.
    27. -23- :_:'..1 hold. There an aituations in economic. or international politics in lrh1ch, effoctl..,l)'... &rOUp of interests are involved 10 non-cooperat1va £UIIIt without be1nc -.re or it, the l1~enea. 0. euq1l1br'1ua., a1nco tho inrOr.:a'tdOl1. ita ut1ll&at1on. aDd the atabUlty or a~bO trequenc1u wUl be 1=partaot. the w. sketch another lAterprotat1on. one in which aolutlona play 110W pla1ed but once • ~or ~ a role. and which 18 applicable to a . . p.roceed b1 1n\".nlga1W1& the qu..tiol1& ldlat would be • \"ratiOllal- p1\"ff41ot1on of the behavior to b. cpected ~ rat10nal plq1&lc tJ. pm8 1:1 By \\l.iD& the principles that • rational prediotion ehould be ClueatlO11' or UI11que. that the abould be able to deduce and aake u•• p~ lt, and or eaah ot What to expect pla~ ~ tha'b such knowledp on the pert; at oOllto:m1t1 with the ou~ otben 150 do .hould .not lead h1a to act pre- 1. leeS to the aoaoep1I of a aolut1aD 4etlMd d1otloa; ObI betON. S'JS~, ••• .... the . . . ot ~ nn.tec1a S\" U ~ a aolwble p~ aho'leS\", \"n.....-.p sa-. the -r&t1ocal\" i 1ICIU1d det~ • au.d beh&ftW Of ra1:1oml aID plq1Dc 1D. poelt1oa a~ ~ out.\" S; i t . experlmc1J were S; SA run ~ p~ 1A th1a 1nterprot&UOA ... J»04 to Ji:DoJr the the atn1c~ of tM CMO 111 order to be able to deduce tile p*lo14Ob tor atr~ thezuelvea. It 18 quite a ratloaal1at1a aDd w.11a1Dc inter- p....Uoa. ca- 1t aaa.t1aa happua that &ooci blur1aUo In an UDaolvabl. rel.acm a oan be tOWld tor Dal'row1ng dCWD the aet at equ1l1brium. painta to _, tho.. 111 a 81z1c1e lub-aolutloD, wh1ch theA plqll th. role ot • aolat1on. - /
    28. r ... ,. III CGnenl a aub-aolutlon 'SU:¥ be looked at ... a aet or IIltually • coherent whole. 'the sub- t~ oompatible equU1br1um poiJIta, ,i. -che aolutlone apptlal' to a natural 8ubdiv1aion ofj.eet at equilibrium ·'.oa--- . pointa ~
    29. -\" \" Applicat1oll8 ot fair ~10. The atudy of n-peraOll guea tor 'Whioh the aoooptod play imply non-oooperatl\" playing 18. of course, an obvioua d1reotlOD in which .-to apply -this t1uJo17'a .And poker 18 the moat obvioU8 target. -... . ~'''-~.~--.. .'- -'. anal~1a of • lION rea11stic poker game than our very a1mple model 'the Ihoul4 hi quite intereet1.ng affair. aD the oamplox1ty at tho mathGtatloal work needed tor a oaaplete 1D.- 'V'Mtl~t1on lncr...... rather rapidly. hawewr, with increaaiDt complex- 1'b7 at the OU-J ao that 1t . . . . that &Ilalya1a ~ a much more ooa- gatlO onl7 be pla than the exuplAt Clwn here waUd toaa1bl. ua1ng appraxi- .te oc.puta111oaa1 ..thode. A leu obY1oua ~~ appl1cat1oD 1& to the atuq of oooporat1w ca- we ..\". a altua'b1oa:r. ~ B1 •. ooopenl\"l.... lnvolv1nc a ••t pMa. ph,... pu.r. atntec1... and p~. . . uaual, but with i;h8 . .8UlDpt1on tha, the ph,... 08D aDd 1IU1 oollaboft_ .. 1ZQ do 111 tlw WA . . .,pn -ana the pta,... .., oanmioa1lll ..s tora a.rxi Jlarc8AlteJ'D tbe0J7. Tbi. u wU1 be elltoroed b7 an *'Pint. It 1a IUi17 wh1~ oa.11_1aa8 UDbIIO. . tl'aDltenbU;V. or ..,. 00IIpUIIb11- natrlotlw. baIrewr. to aD7 UIUDMt 1V ot·.1;he pq-ott. Lwhloh ahou14 be ill uf;W:'7 Wl11:V to .41tt..--t ~. AIt¥ 4.1N4 tnutenbWt7 au 1M C- lUalt 1D- be pW lDto eztn,..ca- oollaboftt1on. .'Mad ot ...ma1q 1t poa.1b1e 1n the _1,.. 84)'_a1oalw apprcuh to.the baa 4--lot*I ~ of !M 00- & os-raU- ..... baNd OM rec!uot1oa 1:0 Dat-aoopca1;1\". tar. PIG- upoA . . . 1»7 ~ • the \".. p'q ~1aUoA ao tbail tM .,g]. ot bJo\" .,... 111. larcc- J1CIIl-ooop....l . . . . . C1dWJb a1Jepe ~ D8got1a~lon 1Dt1D1~ at pure atn:blg1_J 4cJaar1b1Dc the total altsuation. wU1 ha.... Ul trea\"* 1A t . . . of tM 'heor7 ~ th1a ,.,.- Tlda lupr ,pM SA the
    30. £ extended to 1nt1n1t. ~ u.d are are teken it _luau obtained they or .. the 'ftluea the cooperatl'1e Thue tho probl_ anall=ing a gax:G. or cooperatlft ,ame beoome8 the ,robl_ obtaininr; a suitable. aJld con- -vr1no1ng. noa-oooperatlw model for the negotiation. The writer bu. by 8uch • treatment. ob1:a1ned values tor all finite two penon ooopC'Gt1w t;ame8, and so:ae speoial n-peraon game••
    31. '. \".. B1bllograpl:q von Neumann, llor&enatern, wTheor:r of Games and Economic Behavior\". (1) Pr1noeton Un1.venl\\7 PHa •• 1944. a...-. J. F. lZuh. Jr •• -BquUibrlua l'o1nta 1n N-Per8On ?roc. N. (2) A. s. (1950) 48-49. 3a jln. ~. G~ut1ona Gal•• awl AuhA &avo valuable cri1Uciaa a£¥l tor 1mprov1ng the expoelt1on at the material 1n th1a paper. DaYid Gale auggeated the tnwetlgatlon at .~1c pmea. The .olution of the Poker .,.1 . . a jolD projan s. ahapleJ uc1 tba ~ _~. 'b)' Llo)U PlDaU7_ the author\".. auria1Ded t1DaJ3a1allJ by the Ataaio IDerg COWJa- .1oA 1D the period 1949-60 cluriDg wb10h thia work.... doMe -- ~
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