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Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All

Sustainability and Equity: A Better Future for All
UNDP

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  • Human DevelopmentReport 2011Sustainability and Equity:A Better Future for All
  • GREATEST S U U S ST Human capabilities A Y II N IT supported equitably A A U B Q and sustainably IL E IT T Y Sustainable Equitable Equitable, LEAST but not equitable but not sustainable LEAST Unsustainable and inequitableThis Report explores the integral links between environmental sustainability and equity and shows that theseare critical to expanding human freedoms for people today and in generations to come. The point of departureis that the remarkable progress in human development over recent decades that the Human DevelopmentReport has documented cannot continue without bold global steps to reduce environmental risks andinequality. We identify pathways for people, communities, countries and the international community topromote environmental sustainability and equity in mutually reinforcing ways.The cover diagram symbolizes how different policies can have different implications for sustainability andequity. Whenever available, we should prefer solutions that are good for the environment while also promot-ing equity and human development. Pursuing sustainability and equity jointly does not require that they bemutually reinforcing. In many instances they will not be. Sometimes the most feasible alternative involvestrade-offs between sustainability and equity and requires explicit and careful consideration. No trade-off isisolated from a society’s structural and institutional conditions, and so we must address the underlyingconstraints and identify positive synergies between sustainability and equity. This Report is aimed not only atfinding positive synergies but also at identifying ways to build them.
  • Human Development Report 2011Sustainability and Equity:A Better Future for All Published for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
  • Copyright © 2011by the United Nations Development Programme1 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USAAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in anyform or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without prior permission.ISBN: 9780230363311Palgrave MacmillanHoundmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010Companies and representatives throughout the worldPalgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited,registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke,Hampshire RG21 6XS.Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC,175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companiesand has companies and representatives throughout the world.Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States,the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library and the Library of Congress.Printed in the United States by Consolidated Graphics. Cover is printed on Tembec’s 12 pt Kallima coated‑one‑sidepaper. Text pages are printed on Cascades Mills’ 60# Rolland Opaque Smooth text that is 50% de‑inked post‑consumer recycled fibre. Both sheets are Forest Stewardship Council Certified, elemental chlorine‑free papers andprinted with vegetable‑based inks and produced by means of environmentally compatible technology.Editing and production: Communications Development Incorporated, Washington DCDesign: Gerry QuinnFor a list of any errors or omissions found subsequent to printing please visit ourwebsite at http://hdr.undp.org
  • Human Development Report 2011 teamThe UNDP Human Development Report OfficeThe Human Development Report is the product of a collective effort under the guidance of theDirector, with research, statistics, communications and publishing staff, and a team supporting NationalHuman Development Reports. Operations and administration colleagues facilitate the work of the office.Director and lead authorJeni KlugmanResearchFrancisco Rodríguez (Head), Shital Beejadhur, Subhra Bhattacharjee, Monalisa Chatterjee, Hyung-Jin Choi,Alan Fuchs, Mamaye Gebretsadik, Zachary Gidwitz, Martin Philipp Heger, Vera Kehayova, José Pineda,Emma Samman and Sarah TwiggStatisticsMilorad Kovacevic (Head), Astra Bonini, Amie Gaye, Clara Garcia Aguña and Shreyasi JhaCommunications and publishingWilliam Orme (Head), Botagoz Abdreyeva, Carlotta Aiello, Wynne Boelt and Jean-Yves HamelNational Human Development ReportsEva Jespersen (Deputy Director), Mary Ann Mwangi, Paola Pagliani and Tim ScottOperations and administrationSarantuya Mend (Operations Manager), Diane Bouopda and Fe Juarez-Shanahan
  • Foreword In June 2012 world leaders will gather in Rio de Janeiro to seek a new consensus on global actions to safeguard the future of the planet and the right of future generations everywhere to live healthy and fulfilling lives. This is the great development challenge of the 21st century. The 2011 Human Development Report offers important new contributions to the global dia- logue on this challenge, showing how sustainability is inextricably linked to basic questions of equity—that is, of fairness and social justice and of greater access to a better quality of life. Sus- tainability is not exclusively or even primarily an environmental issue, as this Report so persua- sively argues. It is fundamentally about how we choose to live our lives, with an awareness that everything we do has consequences for the 7 billion of us here today, as well as for the billions more who will follow, for centuries to come. Understanding the links between environmental sustainability and equity is critical if we are to expand human freedoms for current and future generations. The remarkable progress in human development over recent decades, which the global Human Development Reports have documented, cannot continue without bold global steps to reduce both environmental risks and inequality. This Report identifies pathways for people, local communities, countries and the international community to promote environmental sustainability and equity in mutually reinforcing ways. In the 176 countries and territories where the United Nations Development Programme is working every day, many disadvantaged people carry a double burden of deprivation. They are more vulnerable to the wider effects of environmental degradation, because of more severe stresses and fewer coping tools. They must also deal with threats to their immediate environ- ment from indoor air pollution, dirty water and unimproved sanitation. Forecasts suggest that continuing failure to reduce the grave environmental risks and deepening social inequalities threatens to slow decades of sustained progress by the world’s poor majority—and even to reverse the global convergence in human development. Major disparities in power shape these patterns. New analysis shows how power imbal- ances and gender inequalities at the national level are linked to reduced access to clean water and improved sanitation, land degradation and deaths due to indoor and outdoor air pollution, amplifying the effects associated with income disparities. Gender inequalities also interact with environmental outcomes and make them worse. At the global level governance arrangements often weaken the voices of developing countries and exclude marginalized groups. Yet there are alternatives to inequality and unsustainability. Growth driven by fossil fuel con- sumption is not a prerequisite for a better life in broader human development terms. Investments that improve equity—in access, for example, to renewable energy, water and sanitation, and reproductive healthcare—could advance both sustainability and human development. Stronger accountability and democratic processes, in part through support for an active civil society and media, can also improve outcomes. Successful approaches rely on community management, inclusive institutions that pay particular attention to disadvantaged groups, and cross-cutting approaches that coordinate budgets and mechanisms across government agencies and develop- ment partners. Beyond the Millennium Development Goals, the world needs a post-2015 development framework that reflects equity and sustainability; Rio+20 stands out as a key opportunity toiv Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • reach a shared understanding of how to move forward. This Report shows that approaches thatintegrate equity into policies and programmes and that empower people to bring about changein the legal and political arenas hold enormous promise. Growing country experiences aroundthe world have demonstrated the potential of these approaches to generate and capture positivesynergies. The financing needed for development—including for environmental and social protection—will have to be many times greater than current official development assistance. Today’s spend-ing on low-carbon energy sources, for example, is only 1.6 percent of even the lowest estimate ofneed, while spending on climate change adaptation and mitigation is around 11 percent of esti-mated need. Hope rests on new climate finance. While market mechanisms and private fundingwill be vital, they must be supported and leveraged by proactive public investment. Closing thefinancing gap requires innovative thinking, which this Report provides. Beyond raising new sources of funds to address pressing environmental threats equitably, theReport advocates reforms that promote equity and voice. Financing flows need to be channelledtowards the critical challenges of unsustainability and inequity—and not exacerbate existingdisparities. Providing opportunities and choices for all is the central goal of human development. Wehave a collective responsibility towards the least privileged among us today and in the futurearound the world—and a moral imperative to ensure that the present is not the enemy of thefuture. This Report can help us see the way forward. Helen Clark Administrator United Nations Development ProgrammeThe analysis and policy recommendations of this Report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme or its Executive Board. The Report is an independent publication commissioned by UNDP. The research and writingof the Report was a collaborative effort by the Human Development Report team and a group of eminent advisors led byJeni Klugman, Director of the Human Development Report Office. Human Development RepoRt 2011 v
  • Acknowledgements This is my third and final year of directing the global Human Development Report, which, as ever, has been an enormous collaborative effort. The hard work and dedication of the Human Devel- opment Report Office team anchor the work, supported by a much broader family of researchers, advocates and officials whose commitment and vision are equally critical to our success. An academic advisory panel provided valuable guidance, for which we thank Bina Agarwal, Sabina Alkire, Anthony Atkinson, Tariq Banuri, François Bourguignon, William Easterly, Daniel Esty, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Enrico Giovannini, Stephany Griffith-Jones, Brian Hammond, Geoffrey Heal, Cesar Hidalgo, Richard Jolly, Gareth Jones, Martin Khor, Mwangi S. Kimenyi, Adil Najam, Eric Neumayer, Michael Noble, José Antonio Ocampo, Marcio Pochmann, Henry Richardson, Ingrid Robeyns, José Salazar-Xirinachs, Frances Stewart, Pavan Sukhdev, Miguel Székely, Dennis Trewin, Leonardo Villar and Tarik Yousef. A reconstituted statistical advisory panel, comprising official statisticians and academic experts, provided excellent advice on the methodology and data sources related to the fam- ily of human development indices: Anthony Atkinson, Grace Bediako, Haishan Fu, Enrico Giovannini, Peter Harper, Gareth Jones, Irena Krizman, Charles Leyeka Lufumpa, Michael Noble, Eduardo Nunes, Marcio Pochmann, Eric Swanson, Miguel Székely and Dato’ Hajan Wan Ramlah Wan Abd. Raof. More generally, the United Nations Statistical Commission provided useful feedback from member states. An extensive series of consultations involved some 500 researchers, civil society advocates, development practitioners and policy-makers from around the globe. Twenty-six events were held between February 2010 and September 2011—in Amman, Bamako, Bangkok, Beijing, Berke- ley, Bonn, Copenhagen, Dubai, Geneva, Kigali, Ljubljana, London, Nairobi, New Delhi, New York, Paris, Quito, San José—with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) country and regional offices. Support from partnering institutions, listed at http://hdr. undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2011/consultations, is also gratefully acknowledged. Background research, commissioned on a range of thematic issues, is available online in our Human Development Research Papers series and listed in References. Special thanks to Sabina Alkire and the Oxford Human Development and Poverty Initiative for their continued collabo- ration and efforts to improve our measure of multidimensional poverty. The statistics used in this Report rely on various databases. We are particularly grateful to the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center of the US Department of Energy, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee, Food and Agricultural Organ- ization, Gallup World Poll, Global Footprint Network, ICF Macro, International Monetary Fund, International Energy Agency, International Labour Organization, International Union for Conservation of Nature, Inter-Parliamentary Union, Luxembourg Income Study, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Institute for Statistics, United Nations Children’s Fund, World Bank and World Health Organization. Claudio Montenegro conducted the analysis on the World Bank’s International Income Distribution Database, Suman Seth on the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions and Kenneth Harttgen on the ICF Macro Demographic and Health Surveys.vi Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • A UNDP Readers Group, representing all the regional and policy bureaus, and other col-leagues, too numerous to list, provided valuable advice throughout the preparation of the Report.Particular thanks are due to Jennifer Laughlin, Charles MacPherson and colleagues at theBureau of Development Policy. The HD Network, which comprises some 1,500 UNDP staff,academics and nongovernmental organizations, generated a range of useful ideas and feedbackthrough online discussions. Martha Mai of the UN Office for Project Services provided admin-istrative support. Several hard working interns made important contributions over the course of the year:Raphaelle Aubert, Uttara Balakrishnan, Luis Fernando Cervantes, Nicole Glanemann, FaithKim, Meng Lu, Francesca Rappocciolo, Andrés Méndez Ruiz, Fredrik M. Sjoberg and Seol Yoo. A team at Communications Development Incorporated, led by Bruce Ross-Larson, withMeta de Coquereaumont, Rob Elson, Jack Harlow, Christopher Trott and Elaine Wilson, edited,proofread and laid out the Report. Gerry Quinn designed the Report and created the figures. We thank all of those involved directly or indirectly in contributing to our efforts, whileacknowledging sole responsibility for errors of commission and omission. Directing the global Human Development Report has been a great experience for me, bothpersonally and professionally over the past three years. The human development approach con-tinues to demonstrate its value as a lens for critical and constructive thinking about some of themost fundamental challenges facing us today, and I am confident that the independent globalreports, commissioned by UNDP, will remain as central as ever in key global debates. I wish mysuccessor, Khalid Malik, the best of luck in taking this endeavour forward into the next decade. Jeni Klugman Director and lead author Human Development Report 2011 Human Development RepoRt 2011 vii
  • ContentsForeword iv Other adverse repercussions 57Acknowledgements vi Disequalizing effects of extreme events 59 Disempowerment and environmental degradation 61Overview 1 Gender equality 61 Power inequalities 64ChApter 1 ChApter 4Why sustainability and equity? 13 Positive synergies—winning strategies for the Are there limits to human development? 14 environment, equity and human development 67 Competing paradigms 15 Scaling up to address environmental deprivations and The critical role of uncertainty 16 build resilience 67 Sustainability, equity and human development 17 Energy 67 What we mean by sustainability 17 Water access, water security and sanitation 71 What we mean by equity 18 Averting degradation 73 Why centre on equitable sustainability? 19 Expanding reproductive choice 73 Our focus of inquiry 20 Supporting community management of natural resources 75 Conserving biodiversity while promoting equity 76ChApter 2 Addressing climate change—risks and realities 77Patterns and trends in human development, Equitable and adaptive disaster responses 77equity and environmental indicators 23 Innovative social protection 78 Progress and prospects 23 Progress in human development 23 ChApter 5 Equity trends 28 Rising to the policy challenges 81 Prospects—and environmental threats 30 Business-as-usual is neither equitable nor sustainable 81 Threats to sustaining progress 31 Rethinking our development model—levers for change 83 Climate change 32 Integrating equity concerns into green economy policies 83 Chronic environmental threats 37 Empowering people to bring Success in promoting sustainable and equitable human about change 86 development 41 Financing investment and the reform agenda 90 Where does the world stand? 90ChApter 3 What development assistance can do 90Tracing the effects—understanding the relations 45 Innovations at the global level 94 A poverty lens 45 Innovative new sources to meet the financing gap 94 Deprivations facing the poor 46 Ensuring equity and voice in governing and in access to finance 96 Understanding the relations 47 Enabling universal access to energy 98 Environmental threats to people’s well-being 50 Harming health 51 Notes 99 Impeding education 54 References 105 Endangering livelihoods 54 Human Development RepoRt 2011 ix
  • StAtiStiCAl Annex 3.3 Indigenous peoples, land rights and livelihoods 55 Readers guide 123 3.4 Women’s participation in community forest management 65 4.1 From subsidy to self‑respect—the revolution of Community‑led Key to HDI countries and ranks, 2011 126 Total Sanitation 73 4.2 Culture, norms and environmental protection 76 Statistical tables 5.1 Distributional impacts of policies to cut pollution 84 1 Human Development Index and its components 127 5.2 Innovative financing schemes for water and sanitation 93 2 Human Development Index trends, 1980–2011 131 5.3 The currency transaction tax: newfound feasibility 95 3 Inequality‑adjusted Human Development Index 135 4 Gender Inequality Index and related indicators 139 FigureS 5 Multidimensional Poverty Index 143 1.1 An illustration of policy synergies and trade‑offs between equity 6 Environmental sustainability 146 and sustainability 20 7 Human development effects of environmental threats 150 2.1 The association with carbon dioxide emissions per capita is 8 Perceptions about well‑being and the environment 154 positive and strong for income, positive for the HDI and 9 Education and health 158 nonexistent for health and education 26 10 Population and economy 162 2.2 Countries with higher growth also experience faster increase in carbon dioxide emissions per capita 26 Technical notes 167 2.3 Patterns of risk change: environmental transitions and human Regions 174 development 27 2.4 High HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in Southern Africa stall Statistical references 175 improvements in health inequality 29 2.5 Scenarios projecting impacts of environmental risks on human BOxeS development through 2050 31 1.1 Environmental risk management—gambling with the planet 16 2.6 Scenarios projecting slowdown and reversals of convergence 1.2 Measures of sustainability—a conceptual overview 18 in human development due to environmental risks 2.1 Overcoming the democratic deficit—empowerment and the through 2050 31 Arab Spring 24 2.7 Average world temperatures have risen since 1900 32 2.2 What can we learn from trends in aggregate measures of 2.8 Sources of greenhouse gas growth 34 sustainability? 25 2.9 Rising temperatures and reduced rainfall 35 2.3 Consumption and human development 27 2.10 Some regions deforest, others reforest and afforest 38 2.4 Sustainability, crises and inequality 30 3.1 Multidimensional Poverty Index—a focus on the most deprived 46 2.5 Are people aware of climate change and its causes? 33 3.2 Environmental deprivations in the MPI 46 2.6 Impacts of climate change on small island developing states 36 3.3 Environmental deprivations are greatest for access to modern 2.7 Biodiversity—the accelerating loss of our ecosystems 38 cooking fuel 47 2.8 Land grabbing—a growing phenomenon? 39 3.4 The share of the population with environmental deprivations 2.9 Hazardous waste and the Basel Convention 41 rises with the MPI but with much variation around the trend 48 2.10 Positive synergies in Sweden and Costa Rica 42 3.5 Deaths attributable to environmental risks are associated with 3.1 Trends in multidimensional poverty 50 high MPI levels 51 3.2 Air pollution and its health consequences in China 52 3.6 Gender equality and contraceptive prevalence are closely linked 62x Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • 3.7 Unmet contraceptive need is higher among the 2.3 Disaster‑related casualties and costs, median annual values by multidimensionally poor 63 HDI group, 1971–1990 and 1991–2010 374.1 Large regional differences in the share of multidimensionally 2.4 Good performers on the environment, equity and human poor people lacking electricity 68 development, most recent year available 425.1 Integrating equity into policy design 84 3.1 Ten countries with the lowest share of environmental5.2 Official development assistance falls far short of needs 91 deprivations among the multidimensionally poor, most5.3 Key elements in transforming climate financing efforts 97 recent year available for 2000–2010 48 3.2 Average time per week spent fetching wood and water, rural areas of selected Sub‑Saharan African countries 58MAp 3.3 Attitudes towards the environment, by gender, low and very2.1 Temperature changes are greatest in polar regions and higher high HDI countries, 2010 64 latitudes 34 4.1 Key equity aspects of a menu of instruments to reduce carbon dioxide emissions 70tABleS 4.2 Social protection for adaptation and disaster risk reduction: benefits and challenges 782.1 Growth in carbon dioxide emissions and its drivers, 1970–2007 322.2 Projected impacts of a half‑metre rise in sea level by 2050 36 Human Development RepoRt 2011 xi
  • OverviewThis year’s Report focuses on the challenge concern for distributive justice. We value sus-of sustainable and equitable progress. A joint tainability because future generations shouldlens shows how environmental degradation have at least the same possibilities as peopleintensifies inequality through adverse impacts today. Similarly, all inequitable processes areon already disadvantaged people and how ine- unjust: people’s chances at better lives shouldqualities in human development amplify envi- not be constrained by factors outside theirronmental degradation. control. Inequalities are especially unjust Human development, which is about when particular groups, whether because ofexpanding people’s choices, builds on shared gender, race or birthplace, are systematicallynatural resources. Promoting human devel- disadvantaged.opment requires addressing sustainability— More than a decade ago Sudhir Anand andlocally, nationally and globally—and this can Amartya Sen made the case for jointly consid-and should be done in ways that are equitable ering sustainability and equity. “It would be aand empowering. gross violation of the universalist principle,” We seek to ensure that poor people’s aspi- they argued, “if we were to be obsessed aboutrations for better lives are fully taken into intergenerational equity without at the sameaccount in moving towards greater environ- time seizing the problem of intragenerationalmental sustainability. And we point to path- equity” (emphasis in original). Similar themesways that enable people, communities, coun- emerged from the Brundtland Commission’stries and the international community to 1987 report and a series of international dec-promote sustainability and equity so that they larations from Stockholm in 1972 throughare mutually reinforcing. Johannesburg in 2002. Yet today many debates about sustainability neglect equality, treatingwhy sustainability and equity? it as a separate and unrelated concern. This per- spective is incomplete and counterproductive.The human development approach has endur-ing relevance in making sense of our world and Some key definitionsaddressing challenges now and in the future. Human development is the expansion of peo-Last year’s 20th anniversary Human Develop- ple’s freedoms and capabilities to lead lives thatment Report (HDR) celebrated the concept of they value and have reason to value. It is abouthuman development, emphasizing how equity, expanding choices. Freedoms and capabilitiesempowerment and sustainability expand peo- are a more expansive notion than basic needs.ple’s choices. At the same time it highlighted Many ends are necessary for a “good life,” endsinherent challenges, showing that these key that can be intrinsically as well as instrumen-aspects of human development do not always tally valuable—we may value biodiversity, forcome together. example, or natural beauty, independently of its contribution to our living standards.The case for considering Disadvantaged people are a central focus ofsustainability and equity together human development. This includes people inThis year we explore the intersections between the future who will suffer the most severe con-environmental sustainability and equity, sequences of the risks arising from our activi-which are fundamentally similar in their ties today. We are concerned not only with Overview 1
  • what happens on average or in the most prob- Our starting point, and a key theme of able scenario but also with what happens in the the 2010 HDR, is the enormous progress in less likely but still possible scenarios, particu- human development over the past several larly when the events are catastrophic for poor decades—with three caveats: and vulnerable people. • Income growth has been associated with Debates over what environmental sus- deterioration in such key environmental tainability means often focus on whether indicators as carbon dioxide emissions, soil human-made capital can substitute for natu- and water quality and forest cover. ral resources—whether human ingenuity • The distribution of income has worsened Sustainable human will relax natural resource constraints, as in at the country level in much of the world, development is the the past. Whether this will be possible in the even with the narrowing of gaps in health expansion of the future is unknown and, coupled with the risk and education achievement. substantive freedoms of catastrophe, favours the position of preserv- • While empowerment on average tends to of people today ing basic natural assets and the associated flow accompany a rising Human Development while making reasonable of ecological services. This perspective also Index (HDI), there is considerable varia- efforts to avoid seriously aligns with human rights–based approaches to tion around the relationship. compromising those of development. Sustainable human development Simulations for this Report suggest that by is the expansion of the substantive freedoms of 2050 the global HDI would be 8 percent lower future generations people today while making reasonable efforts to than in the baseline in an “environmental chal- avoid seriously compromising those of future gen- lenge” scenario that captures the adverse effects erations. Reasoned public deliberation, vital to of global warming on agricultural production, defining the risks a society is willing to accept, on access to clean water and improved sanita- is crucial to this idea. tion and on pollution (and 12 percent lower The joint pursuit of environmental sus- in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa). Under tainability and equity does not require that an even more adverse “environmental disaster” the two always be mutually reinforcing. In scenario, which envisions vast deforestation many instances there will be trade-offs. Meas- and land degradation, dramatic declines in ures to improve the environment can have biodiversity and accelerated extreme weather adverse effects on equity—for example, if they events, the global HDI would be some 15 per- constrain economic growth in developing cent below the projected baseline. countries. This Report illustrates the types of If we do nothing to halt or reverse cur- joint impacts that policies could have, while rent trends, the environmental disaster sce- acknowledging that they do not hold univer- nario leads to a turning point before 2050 in sally and underlining that context is critical. developing countries—their convergence with The framework encourages special atten- rich countries in HDI achievements begins to tion to identifying positive synergies and to reverse. considering trade-offs. We investigate how These projections suggest that in many societies can implement win-win-win solu- cases the most disadvantaged people bear tions that favour sustainability, equity and and will continue to bear the repercussions human development. of environmental deterioration, even if they contribute little to the problem. For example, patterns and trends, low HDI countries have contributed the least progress and prospects to global climate change, but they have experi- enced the greatest loss in rainfall and the great- Increasing evidence points to widespread est increase in its variability, with implications environmental degradation around the world for agricultural production and livelihoods. and potential future deterioration. Because Emissions per capita are much greater in the extent of future changes is uncertain, we very high HDI countries than in low, medium explore a range of predictions and consider the and high HDI countries combined because of insights for human development. more energy-intensive activities—driving cars,2 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • cooling and heating homes and businesses, tomorrow as a result of development today.consuming processed and packaged food. The Again, income changes drive the trend.average person in a very high HDI country But these relationships do not hold for allaccounts for more than four times the carbon environmental indicators. Our analysis findsdioxide emissions and about twice the meth- only a weak positive correlation between theane and nitrous oxide emissions of a person HDI and deforestation, for example. Why doin a low, medium or high HDI country—and carbon dioxide emissions differ from otherabout 30 times the carbon dioxide emissions environmental threats? We suggest that whereof a person in a low HDI country. The average the link between the environment and quality where the link betweenUK citizen accounts for as much greenhouse of life is direct, as with pollution, environmen-gas emissions in two months as a person in a tal achievements are often greater in developed the environment andlow HDI country generates in a year. And the countries; where the links are more diffuse, quality of life is direct,average Qatari—living in the country with the performance is much weaker. Looking at the as with pollution,highest per capita emissions—does so in only relationship between environmental risks and environmental10 days, although that value reflects consump- the HDI, we observe three general findings: achievements are oftention as well as production that is consumed • Household environmental deprivations— greater in developedelsewhere. indoor air pollution, inadequate access to countries; where While three-quarters of the growth clean water and improved sanitation—are the links are morein emissions since 1970 comes from low, more severe at low HDI levels and decline diffuse, performancemedium and high HDI countries, overall lev- as the HDI rises.els of greenhouse gases remain much greater • Environmental risks with community is much weakerin very high HDI countries. And this stands effects—such as urban air pollution—without accounting for the relocation of seem to rise and then fall with devel-carbon-intensive production to poorer coun- opment; some suggest that an invertedtries, whose output is largely exported to rich U-shaped curve describes the relationship.countries. • Environmental risks with global effects Around the world rising HDI has been —namely greenhouse gas emissions—associated with environmental degradation typically rise with the HDI.—though the damage can be traced largely The HDI itself is not the true driver ofto economic growth. Countries with higher these transitions. Incomes and economicincomes generally have higher carbon dioxide growth have an important explanatory role foremissions per capita. But our analysis finds no emissions—but the relationship is not deter-association between emissions and the health ministic either. And complex interactions ofand education components of the HDI. This broader forces change the risk patterns. Forresult is intuitive: activities that emit carbon example, international trade allows countriesdioxide into the atmosphere are those linked to outsource the production of goods thatto the production of goods, not to the provi- degrade the environment; large-scale com-sion of health and education. These results also mercial use of natural resources has differentshow the nonlinear nature of the relationship impacts than subsistence exploitation; andbetween carbon dioxide emissions per capita urban and rural environmental profiles differ.and HDI components: little or no relation- And as we will see, policies and the politicalship at low HDI, but as the HDI rises a “tip- context matter greatly.ping point” is reached, beyond which appears It follows that the patterns are not inevi-a strong positive correlation between carbon table. Several countries have achieved signifi-dioxide emissions and income. cant progress both in the HDI and in equity Countries with faster improvements in the and environmental sustainability. In lineHDI have also experienced faster increases in with our focus on positive synergies, we pro-carbon dioxide emissions per capita. These pose a multidimensional strategy to identifychanges over time—rather than the snap- countries that have done better than regionalshot relationship—highlight what to expect peers in promoting equity, raising the HDI, Overview 3
  • reducing household indoor air pollution and where the drylands are highly sensitive and increasing access to clean water and that are adaptive capacity is low. top regional and global performers in envi- Adverse environmental factors are ronmental sustainability. Environmental sus- expected to boost world food prices 30–50 per- tainability is judged on greenhouse gas emis- cent in real terms in the coming decades and to sions, water use and deforestation. The results increase price volatility, with harsh repercus- are illustrative rather than indicative because sions for poor households. The largest risks are of patchy data and other comparability issues. faced by the 1.3 billion people involved in agri- Just one country, Costa Rica, outperforms its culture, fishing, forestry, hunting and gather- Environmental trends regional median on all the criteria, while the ing. The burden of environmental degradation over recent decades three other top performers display unevenness and climate change is likely to be disequalizing show deterioration on across dimensions. Sweden is notable for its across groups—for several reasons: several fronts, with high reforestation rate compared with regional • Many rural poor people depend over- adverse repercussions and global averages. whelmingly on natural resources for their for human development, Our list shows that across regions, devel- income. Even people who do not normally especially for the opment stages and structural characteristics engage in such activities may do so as a cop- millions of people who countries can enact policies conducive to envi- ing strategy during hardship. ronmental sustainability, equity and the key • How environmental degradation will depend directly on facets of human development captured in the affect people depends on whether they are natural resources for HDI. We review the types of policies and pro- net producers or net consumers of natural their livelihoods grammes associated with success while under- resources, whether they produce for sub- lining the importance of local conditions and sistence or for the market and how read- context. ily they can shift between these activities More generally, however, environmental and diversify their livelihoods with other trends over recent decades show deterioration occupations. on several fronts, with adverse repercussions • Today, around 350 million people, many of for human development, especially for the mil- them poor, live in or near forests on which lions of people who depend directly on natural they rely for subsistence and incomes. Both resources for their livelihoods. deforestation and restrictions on access to • Globally, nearly 40 percent of land is natural resources can hurt the poor. Evi- degraded due to soil erosion, reduced fer- dence from a range of countries suggests tility and overgrazing. Land productiv- that women typically rely on forests more ity is declining, with estimated yield loss than men do because women tend to have as high as 50 percent in the most adverse fewer occupational options, be less mobile scenarios. and bear most of the responsibility for col- • Agriculture accounts for 70–85 percent of lecting fuelwood. water use, and an estimated 20 percent of • Around 45 million people—at least 6 mil- global grain production uses water unsus- lion of them women—fish for a living and tainably, imperilling future agricultural are threatened by overfishing and climate growth. change. The vulnerability is twofold: the • Deforestation is a major challenge. Between countries most at risk also rely the most 1990 and 2010 Latin America and the on fish for dietary protein, livelihoods Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa expe- and exports. Climate change is expected rienced the greatest forest losses, followed to lead to major declines in fish stocks in by the Arab States. The other regions have the Pacific Islands, while benefits are pre- seen minor gains in forest cover. dicted at some northern latitudes, includ- • Desertification threatens the drylands ing around Alaska, Greenland, Norway that are home to about a third of the and the Russian Federation. world’s people. Some areas are particularly To the extent that women in poor coun- vulnerable—notably Sub-Saharan Africa, tries are disproportionately involved in4 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • subsistence farming and water collection, The poverty-focused lens allows us tothey face greater adverse consequences of examine environmental deprivations in accessenvironmental degradation. Many indig- to modern cooking fuel, clean water and basicenous peoples also rely heavily on natural sanitation. These absolute deprivations, impor-resources and live in ecosystems especially tant in themselves, are major violations ofvulnerable to the effects of climate change, human rights. Ending these deprivations couldsuch as small island developing states, arctic increase higher order capabilities, expand-regions and high altitudes. Evidence suggests ing people’s choices and advancing humanthat traditional practices can protect natural development. the most disadvantagedresources, yet such knowledge is often over- In developing countries at least 6 peoplelooked or downplayed. in 10 experience one of these environmental people carry a double The effects of climate change on farmers’ deprivations, and 4 in 10 experience two or burden of deprivation:livelihoods depend on the crop, region and sea- more. These deprivations are especially acute more vulnerable toson, underlining the importance of in-depth, among multidimensionally poor people, more the wider effectslocal analysis. Impacts will also differ depend- than 9 in 10 of whom experience at least of environmentaling on household production and consumption one. Most suffer overlapping deprivations: 8 degradation, they mustpatterns, access to resources, poverty levels and in 10 multidimensionally poor people have also cope with threatsability to cope. Taken together, however, the two or more, and nearly 1 in 3 (29 percent) to their immediatenet biophysical impacts of climate change on is deprived in all three. These environmental environment posed byirrigated and rainfed crops by 2050 will likely deprivations disproportionately contribute tobe negative—and worst in low HDI countries. multidimensional poverty, accounting for 20 indoor air pollution, percent of the MPI—above their 17 percent dirty water andunderstanding the links weight in the index. Across most developing unimproved sanitation countries deprivations are highest in accessDrawing on the important intersections to cooking fuel, though lack of water is para-between the environment and equity at the mount in several Arab States.global level, we explore the links at the com- To better understand environmental dep-munity and household levels. We also high- rivations, we analysed the patterns for givenlight countries and groups that have broken poverty levels. Countries were ordered by thethe pattern, emphasizing transformations in share of multidimensionally poor people fac-gender roles and in empowerment. ing one environmental deprivation and the A key theme: the most disadvantaged peo- share facing all three. The analysis shows thatple carry a double burden of deprivation. More the shares of the population with environmen-vulnerable to the wider effects of environmen- tal deprivations rise with the MPI, but withtal degradation, they must also cope with much variation around the trend. Countriesthreats to their immediate environment posed with the lowest share of poor people facing atby indoor air pollution, dirty water and unim- least one deprivation are mainly in the Arabproved sanitation. Our Multidimensional States and Latin American and the CaribbeanPoverty Index (MPI), introduced in the 2010 (7 of the top 10).HDR and estimated this year for 109 coun- Of the countries with the fewest multidi-tries, provides a closer look at these depriva- mensionally poor people with all three envi-tions to see where they are most acute. ronmental deprivations, better performers are The MPI measures serious deficits in concentrated in South Asia—5 of the top 10.health, education and living standards, look- Several South Asian countries have reduceding at both the number of deprived people and some environmental deprivations, notablythe intensity of their deprivations. This year access to potable water, even as other depriva-we explore the pervasiveness of environmental tions have remained severe. And five countriesdeprivations among the multidimensionally are in both top 10 lists—not only is their envi-poor and their overlaps at the household level, ronmental poverty relatively low, it is also lessan innovation in the MPI. intense. Overview 5
  • Performance on these indicators does not environmental factors, including that unclean necessarily identify environmental risks and water and inadequate sanitation and hygiene degradation more broadly, for example, in are among the 10 leading causes of disease terms of exposure to floods. At the same time worldwide. Each year environment-related the poor, more subject to direct environmental diseases, including acute respiratory infections threats, are also more exposed to environmen- and diarrhoea, kill at least 3 million children tal degradation writ large. under age 5—more than the entire under-five We investigate this pattern further by populations of Austria, Belgium, the Nether- looking at the relationship between the MPI lands, Portugal and Switzerland combined. Environmental and stresses posed by climate change. For 130 Environmental degradation and climate degradation stunts nationally defined administrative regions in change affect physical and social environ- people’s capabilities 15 countries, we compare area-specific MPIs ments, knowledge, assets and behaviours. in many ways, going with changes in precipitation and tempera- Dimensions of disadvantage can interact, com- beyond incomes and ture. Overall, the poorest regions and locales pounding adverse impacts—for example, the livelihoods to include in these countries seem to have gotten hotter intensity of health risks is highest where water impacts on health, but not much wetter or drier—change that is and sanitation are inadequate, deprivations education and other consistent with evidence exploring the effects that often coincide. Of the 10 countries with of climate change on income poverty. the highest rates of death from environmental dimensions of well-being disasters, 6 are also in the top 10 in the MPI, Environmental threats to selected including Niger, Mali and Angola. aspects of human development Environmental degradation stunts people’s Impeding education advances for capabilities in many ways, going beyond disadvantaged children, especially girls incomes and livelihoods to include impacts Despite near universal primary school enrol- on health, education and other dimensions of ment in many parts of the world, gaps remain. well-being. Nearly 3 in 10 children of primary school age in low HDI countries are not even enrolled in Bad environments and health— primary school, and multiple constraints, some overlapping deprivations environmental, persist even for enrolled chil- The disease burden arising from indoor and dren. Lack of electricity, for example, has both outdoor air pollution, dirty water and unim- direct and indirect effects. Electricity access proved sanitation is greatest for people in can enable better lighting, allowing increased poor countries, especially for deprived groups. study time, as well as the use of modern stoves, Indoor air pollution kills 11 times more people reducing time spent collecting fuelwood and living in low HDI countries than people else- water, activities shown to slow education pro- where. Disadvantaged groups in low, medium gress and lower school enrolment. Girls are and high HDI countries face greater risk from more often adversely affected because they are outdoor air pollution because of both higher more likely to combine resource collection and exposure and greater vulnerability. In low schooling. Access to clean water and improved HDI countries more than 6 people in 10 lack sanitation is also especially important for girls’ ready access to improved water, while nearly 4 education, affording them health gains, time in 10 lack sanitary toilets, contributing to both savings and privacy. disease and malnourishment. Climate change threatens to worsen these disparities through Other repercussions the spread of tropical diseases such as malaria Household environmental deprivations can and dengue fever and through declining crop coincide with wider environmental stresses, yields. constricting people’s choices in a wide range The World Health Organization’s Global of contexts and making it harder to earn a Burden of Disease database provides some living from natural resources: people have to striking findings on the repercussions of work more to achieve the same returns or may6 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • even have to migrate to escape environmental Children disproportionately suffer fromdegradation. weather shocks because the lasting effects of Resource-dependent livelihoods are time malnourishment and missing school limitconsuming, especially where households face their prospects. Evidence from many devel-a lack of modern cooking fuel and clean water. oping countries shows how transitory incomeAnd time-use surveys offer a window into the shocks can cause households to pull childrenassociated gender-based inequalities. Women out of school. More generally, several factorstypically spend many more hours than men condition households’ exposure to adversedo fetching wood and water, and girls often shocks and their capacity to cope, including a 10 percent increase inspend more time than boys do. Women’s the type of shock, socioeconomic status, socialheavy involvement in these activities has also capital and informal support, and the equity the number of peoplebeen shown to prevent them from engaging in and effectiveness of relief and reconstruction affected by an extremehigher return activities. efforts. weather event reduces As argued in the 2009 HDR, mobility— a country’s HDI almostallowing people to choose where they live—is Empowerment—reproductive 2 percent, with largerimportant for expanding people’s freedoms choice and political imbalances effects on incomes andand achieving better outcomes. But legal con- Transformations in gender roles and empower- in medium HDI countriesstraints make migration risky. Estimating how ment have enabled some countries and groupsmany people move to escape environmental to improve environmental sustainability andstresses is difficult because other factors are in equity, advancing human development.play, notably poverty. Nevertheless, some esti-mates are very high. Gender inequality Environmental stress has also been linked Our Gender Inequality Index (GII), updatedto an increased likelihood of conflict. The link this year for 145 countries, shows how repro-is not direct, however, and is influenced by the ductive health constraints contribute to genderbroader political economy and contextual fac- inequality. This is important because in coun-tors that make individuals, communities and tries where effective control of reproductionsociety vulnerable to the effects of environ- is universal, women have fewer children, withmental degradation. attendant gains for maternal and child health and reduced greenhouse gas emissions. ForDisequalizing effects of extreme instance, in Cuba, Mauritius, Thailand andweather events Tunisia, where reproductive healthcare andAlongside pernicious chronic threats, environ- contraceptives are readily available, fertilitymental degradation can amplify the likelihood rates are below two births per woman. But sub-of acute threats, with disequalizing impacts. stantial unmet need persists worldwide, andOur analysis suggests that a 10 percent increase evidence suggests that if all women could exer-in the number of people affected by an extreme cise reproductive choice, population growthweather event reduces a country’s HDI almost would slow enough to bring greenhouse gas2 percent, with larger effects on incomes and in emissions below current levels. Meeting unmetmedium HDI countries. need for family planning by 2050 would lower And the burden is not borne equally: the the world’s carbon emissions an estimatedrisk of injury and death from floods, high 17 percent below what they are today.winds and landslides is higher among chil- The GII also focuses on women’s partici-dren, women and the elderly, especially for the pation in political decision-making, high-poor. The striking gender inequality of natural lighting that women lag behind men acrossdisasters suggests that inequalities in exposure the world, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa,—as well as in access to resources, capabili- South Asia and the Arab States. This hasties and opportunities—systematically disad- important implications for sustainability andvantage some women by making them more equity. Because women often shoulder thevulnerable. heaviest burden of resource collection and are Overview 7
  • the most exposed to indoor air pollution, they air pollution and dirty water—suggesting an are often more affected than men by decisions important scope for positive synergies. related to natural resources. Recent studies reveal that not only is women’s participation positive synergies—winning important but also how they participate—and strategies for the environment, how much. And because women often show equity and human development more concern for the environment, support proenvironmental policies and vote for pro- In facing the challenges elaborated here, a environmental leaders, their greater involve- range of governments, civil society, private sec- Meeting unmet need ment in politics and in nongovernmental tor actors and development partners have cre- for family planning organizations could result in environmental ated approaches that integrate environmental by 2050 would lower gains, with multiplier effects across all the Mil- sustainability and equity and promote human the world’s carbon lennium Development Goals. development—win-win-win strategies. Effec- emissions an estimated These arguments are not new, but they tive solutions must be context-specific. But it 17 percent below reaffirm the value of expanding women’s effec- is important, nonetheless, to consider local what they are today tive freedoms. Thus, women’s participation in and national experiences that show potential decision-making has both intrinsic value and and to recognize principles that apply across instrumental importance in addressing equity contexts. At the local level we stress the need and environmental degradation. for inclusive institutions; and at the national level, the scope for the scaling up of successful Power disparities innovations and policy reform. As argued in the 2010 HDR, empowerment The policy agenda is vast. This Report can- has many aspects, including formal, proce- not do it full justice—but the value added is in dural democracy at the national level and par- identifying win-win-win strategies that dem- ticipatory processes at the local level. Political onstrate success in addressing our social, eco- empowerment at the national and subnational nomic and environmental challenges by man- levels has been shown to improve environ- aging, or even bypassing, trade-offs through mental sustainability. And while context is approaches that are good not only for the important, studies show that democracies environment but also for equity and human are typically more accountable to voters and development more broadly. To inspire debate more likely to support civil liberties. A key and action, we offer concrete examples show- challenge everywhere, however, is that even in ing how the strategy of overcoming potential democratic systems, the people most adversely trade-offs and identifying positive synergies affected by environmental degradation are has worked in practice. Here, we present the often the worst off and least empowered, so example of modern energy. policy priorities do not reflect their interests and needs. Access to modern energy Evidence is accumulating that power Energy is central to human development, yet inequalities, mediated through political insti- some 1.5 billion people worldwide—more tutions, affect environmental outcomes in a than one in five—lack electricity. Among the range of countries and contexts. This means multidimensionally poor the deprivations are that poor people and other disadvantaged much greater—one in three lacks access. groups disproportionately suffer the effects Is there a trade-off between expanding of environmental degradation. New analysis energy provision and carbon emissions? Not for this Report covering some 100 countries necessarily. We argue that this relationship is confirms that greater equity in power distri- wrongly characterized. There are many prom- bution, broadly defined, is positively associated ising prospects for expanding access without a with better environmental outcomes, includ- heavy environmental toll: ing better access to water, less land degradation • Off-grid decentralized options are techni- and fewer deaths due to indoor and outdoor cally feasible for delivering energy services8 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • to poor households and can be financed Promising avenues are also emerging to and delivered with minimal impact on the reduce the adverse impacts of disasters through climate. equitable and adaptive disaster responses and• Providing basic modern energy services for innovative social protection schemes. Disas- all would increase carbon dioxide emis- ter responses include community-based risk- sions by only an estimated 0.8 percent— mapping and more progressive distribution of taking into account broad policy commit- reconstructed assets. Experience has spurred a ments already announced. shift to decentralized models of risk reduction. Global energy supply reached a tipping Such efforts can empower local communities, there are manypoint in 2010, with renewables accounting for particularly women, by emphasizing participa-25 percent of global power capacity and deliv- tion in design and decision-making. Commu- promising prospectsering more than 18 percent of global electric- nities can rebuild in ways that redress existing for expandingity. The challenge is to expand access at a scale inequalities. energy provisionand speed that will improve the lives of poor without a heavywomen and men now and in the future. rethinking our development environmental toll model—levers for changeAverting environmental degradationA broader menu of measures to avert environ- The large disparities across people, groups andmental degradation ranges from expanding countries that add to the large and growingreproductive choice to promoting commu- environmental threats pose massive policynity forest management and adaptive disaster challenges. But there is cause for optimism.responses. In many respects the conditions today are Reproductive rights, including access to more conducive to progress than ever—givenreproductive health services, are a precondi- innovative policies and initiatives in sometion for women’s empowerment and could parts of the world. Taking the debate furtheravert environmental degradation. Major entails bold thinking, especially on the eve ofimprovements are feasible. Many examples the UN Conference on Sustainable Devel-attest to the opportunities for using the exist- opment (Rio+20) and the dawn of the post-ing health infrastructure to deliver reproduc- 2015 era. This Report advances a new visiontive health services at little additional cost and for promoting human development throughto the importance of community involvement. the joint lens of sustainability and equity. AtConsider Bangladesh, where the fertility rate the local and national levels we stress the needplunged from 6.6 births per woman in 1975 to bring equity to the forefront of policy andto 2.4 in 2009. The government used outreach programme design and to exploit the poten-and subsidies to make contraceptives more tial multiplier effects of greater empowermenteasily available and influenced social norms in legal and political arenas. At the globalthrough discussions with opinion leaders of level we highlight the need to devote moreboth sexes, including religious leaders, teach- resources to pressing environmental threatsers and nongovernmental organizations. and to boost the equity and representation of Community forest management could disadvantaged countries and groups in access-redress local environmental degradation and ing finance.mitigate carbon emissions, but experienceshows that it also risks excluding and disad- Integrating equity concerns into greenvantaging already marginalized groups. To economy policiesavoid these risks, we underline the importance A key theme of this Report is the need to fullyof broad participation in designing and imple- integrate equity concerns into policies thatmenting forest management, especially for affect the environment. Traditional methodswomen, and of ensuring that poor groups and of assessing environmental policies fall short.those who rely on forest resources are not made They might expose the impacts on the pathworse-off. of future emissions, for example, but they are Overview 9
  • often silent on distributive issues. Even when have both intrinsic and instrumental value. the effects on different groups are considered, Major disparities in power translate into large attention is typically restricted to people’s disparities in environmental outcomes. But incomes. The importance of equity and inclu- the converse is that greater empowerment sion is already explicit in the objectives of can bring about positive environmental out- green economy policies. We propose taking comes equitably. Democracy is important, but the agenda further. beyond that, national institutions need to be Several key principles could bring broader accountable and inclusive—especially with equity concerns into policy-making through respect to affected groups, including women traditional methods of stakeholder involvement in analysis that —to enable civil society and foster popular assessing environmental considers: access to information. policies are often silent • Nonincome dimensions of well-being, A prerequisite for participation is open, on distribution issues. through such tools as the MPI. transparent and inclusive deliberative processes while the importance • Indirect and direct effects of policy. —but in practice, barriers to effective partici- of equity and inclusion • Compensation mechanisms for adversely pation persist. Despite positive change, further is already explicit in affected people. efforts are needed to strengthen the possibili- the objectives of green • Risk of extreme weather events that, how- ties for some traditionally excluded groups, ever unlikely, could prove catastrophic. such as indigenous peoples, to play a more economy policies, we Early analysis of the distributional and envi- active role. And increasing evidence points to propose taking the ronmental consequences of policies is critical. the importance of enabling women’s involve- agenda further ment, both in itself and because it has been A clean and safe environment— linked to more sustainable outcomes. a right, not a privilege Where governments are responsive to pop- Embedding environmental rights in national ular concerns, change is more likely. An envi- constitutions and legislation can be effective, ronment in which civil society thrives also not least by empowering citizens to protect engenders accountability at the local, national such rights. At least 120 countries have con- and global levels, while freedom of press is vital stitutions that address environmental norms. in raising awareness and facilitating public And many countries without explicit environ- participation. mental rights interpret general constitutional provisions for individual rights to include a Financing investments: where do fundamental right to a healthy environment. we stand? Constitutionally recognizing equal rights Sustainability debates raise major questions to a healthy environment promotes equity by of costs and financing, including who should no longer limiting access to those who can finance what—and how. Equity principles afford it. And embodying this right in the argue for large transfers of resources to poor legal framework can affect government priori- countries, both to achieve more equitable ties and resource allocations. access to water and energy and to pay for adapt- Alongside legal recognition of equal rights ing to climate change and mitigating its effects. to a healthy, well functioning environment is Four important messages emerge from our the need for enabling institutions, including a financing analysis: fair and independent judiciary, and the right • Investment needs are large, but they do not to information from governments and corpo- exceed current spending on other sectors rations. The international community, too, such as the military. The estimated annual increasingly recognizes a right to environmen- investment to achieve universal access to tal information. modern sources of energy is less than an eighth of annual subsidies for fossils fuels. Participation and accountability • Public sector commitments are important Process freedoms are central to human devel- (the generosity of some donors stands out), opment and, as discussed in last year’s HDR, and the private sector is a major—and10 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • critical—source of finance. Public efforts implementing the tax is something new to can catalyse private investment, emphasiz- highlight. It has high-level endorsement, ing the importance of increasing public including from the Leading Group on Innova- funds and supporting a positive invest- tive Financing, with some 63 countries, among ment climate and local capacity. them China, France, Germany, Japan and the• Data constraints make it hard to monitor United Kingdom. And the UN High-Level private and domestic public sector spend- Advisory Group on Climate Change Financ- ing on environmental sustainability. Avail- ing recently proposed that 25–50 percent of able information allows only official devel- the proceeds from such a tax be directed to at a minimal rate and opment assistance flows to be examined. climate change adaptation and mitigation in• Funding architecture is complex and frag- developing countries. without additional mented, reducing its effectiveness and Our updated analysis shows that at a very administrative costs, making spending hard to monitor. There minimal rate (0.005 percent) and without any a currency transaction is much to learn from earlier commit- additional administrative costs, the currency tax could yield annual ments to aid effectiveness made in Paris transaction tax could yield additional annual revenues of $40 billion. and Accra. revenues of about $40 billion. Not many other Not many other options Although the evidence on needs, com- options at the required scale could satisfy the could satisfy the newmitments and disbursements is patchy and new and additional funding needs that have and additional fundingthe magnitudes uncertain, the picture is clear. been stressed in international debates. needs stressed inThe gaps between official development assis- A broader financial transaction tax alsotance spending and the investments needed promises large revenue potential. Most G-20 international debatesto address climate change, low-carbon energy, countries have already implemented a financialand water and sanitation are huge— even transaction tax, and the International Mone-larger than the gap between commitments tary Fund (IMF) has confirmed the adminis-and investment needs. Spending on low-car- trative feasibility of a broader tax. One versionbon energy sources is only 1.6 percent of the of the tax, a levy of 0.05 percent on domesticlower bound estimate of needs, while spend- and international financial transactions, coulding on climate change adaptation and mitiga- raise an estimated $600–$700 billion.tion is around 11 percent of the lower bound Monetizing part of the IMF’s surplus Spe-of estimated need. For water and sanitation the cial Drawing Rights has also attracted inter-amounts are much smaller, and official devel- est. This could raise up to $75 billion at littleopment assistance commitments are closer to or no budgetary cost to contributing govern-the estimated costs. ments. The SDRs have the added appeal of acting as a monetary rebalancing instrument;Closing the funding gap: currency demand is expected to come from emergingtransaction tax—from great idea to market economies looking to diversify theirpractical policy reserves.The funding gap in resources available toaddress the deprivations and challenges docu- Reforms for greater equity and voicemented in this Report could be substantially Bridging the gap that separates policy-makers,narrowed by taking advantage of new opportu- negotiators and decision-makers from the citi-nities. The prime candidate is a currency trans- zens most vulnerable to environmental degra-action tax. Argued for by the 1994 HDR, the dation requires closing the accountability gapidea is increasingly being accepted as a practi- in global environmental governance. Account-cal policy option. The recent financial crisis has ability alone cannot meet the challenge, butrevived interest in the proposal, underscoring it is fundamental for building a socially andits relevance and timeliness. environmentally effective global governance Today’s foreign exchange settlement system that delivers for people.infrastructure is more organized, central- We call for measures to improve equityized and standardized, so the feasibility of and voice in access to financial flows directed Overview 11
  • at supporting efforts to combat environmental The Report proposes an emphasis on four degradation. country-level sets of tools to take this agenda Private resources are critical, but because forward: most of the financial flows into the energy • Low-emission, climate-resilient strategies sector, for example, come from private hands, —to align human development, equity the greater risks and lower returns of some and climate change goals. regions in the eyes of private investors affect • Public-private partnerships—to catalyse the patterns of flows. Without reform, access capital from businesses and households. to financing will remain unevenly distributed • Climate deal-flow facilities—to bring about any truly across countries and, indeed, exacerbate exist- equitable access to international public transformational effort ing inequalities. This underlines the impor- finance. to scale up efforts to tance of ensuring that flows of public invest- • Coordinated implementation and monitor- slow or halt climate ments are equitable and help create conditions ing, reporting and verification systems—to change will require to attract future private flows. bring about long-term, efficient results and blending domestic and The implications are clear—principles accountability to local populations as well international, private of equity are needed to guide and encour- as partners. and public, and grant age international financial flows. Support for Finally, we call for a high-profile, global institution building is needed so that devel- Universal Energy Access Initiative with advo- and loan resources oping countries can establish appropriate cacy and awareness and dedicated support to policies and incentives. The associated gov- developing clean energy at the country level. ernance mechanisms for international pub- Such an initiative could kickstart efforts to shift lic financing must allow for voice and social from incremental to transformative change. accountability. Any truly transformational effort to scale * * * up efforts to slow or halt climate change This Report casts light on the links between sus- will require blending domestic and inter- tainability and equity and shows how human national, private and public, and grant and development can become more sustainable and loan resources. To facilitate both equitable more equitable. It reveals how environmental access and efficient use of international finan- degradation hurts poor and vulnerable groups cial flows, this Report advocates empowering more than others. We propose a policy agenda national stakeholders to blend climate finance that will redress these imbalances, framing a at the country level. National climate funds strategy for tackling current environmental can facilitate the operational blending and problems in a way that promotes equity and monitoring of domestic and international, pri- human development. And we show practical vate and public, and grant and loan resources. ways to promote jointly these complementary This is essential to ensure domestic account- goals, expanding people’s choices while pro- ability and positive distributional effects. tecting our environment.12 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • chap ter 1 why sustainability and equity?The human development approach has endur- degradation, which causes disproportionateing relevance for making sense of our world. harm to poor and disadvantaged people, andLast year’s Human Development Report the need to make greater equity part of the(HDR) reaffirmed the concept of human solution. Exploring patterns and implications,development— emphasizing empowerment, the Report sounds a bold call to action. In soequity and sustainability in expanding people’s doing, it identifies ways to break the perniciouschoices. It showed that these key aspects do not link between environmental degradation andalways coincide and highlighted challenges in economic growth that has tainted much ofaddressing them. And it raised the need to pro- the development experience of at least the pastmote empowerment, equity and sustainability half-century and threatens future progress.so that they are mutually reinforcing. This vision aligns with that of interna- That report also documented substan- tional declarations on sustainable developmenttial progress over the past four decades. The —including those in Stockholm (1972), RioHuman Development Index (HDI) has risen de Janeiro (1992) and Johannesburg (2002)—dramatically since 1970 — 41 percent over- which advanced the notion of three pillars ofall and 61 percent in low HDI countries— sustainable development: environmental, eco-reflecting strong advances in health, educa- nomic and social.1 Intragenerational equity istion and incomes. Significant gains have been part of the social pillar. Our call for prudencemade in girls’ primary and secondary educa- in managing the environment and basic nat-tion, for example. If these rates of progress are ural resources springs from an emphasis onsustained, by 2050 more than three-quarters expanding opportunities for the most disad-of the world’s people will live in countries with vantaged and from the need to consider thean HDI similar to that of very high HDI coun- risks of catastrophic events.tries today. There has also been progress in We do not deal at length with broaderother dimensions: the share of countries that issues of economic, financial and political sus-are democracies has risen from less than a third tainability, though we draw on some impor-to three-fifths. The 2011 Arab Spring marked tant lessons from those spheres. We can addanother leap forward, appearing to end dec- more value by concentrating on a well definedades of autocratic rule for some 100 million set of issues, rather than attempting to coverpeople. related fields. The choice of scope is also driven But we cannot assume that average past by the urgency of addressing today’s grave envi-rates of progress will continue: progress has ronmental threats.been far from uniform across countries and In sum, this Report highlights the linksover time. And in two key dimensions of between two closely related challenges to showhuman development, conditions have dete- how human development can become bothriorated. For environmental sustainability, more environmentally sustainable and moreevidence of devastating current and future equitable.impacts is mounting. And income inequalityhas worsened, while disparities in health and * * *education remain significant. This chapter sets the stage by reviewing the These are the themes of this Report: the notion of limits to human development andadverse human repercussions of environmental two alternate paradigms of sustainability that CHapteR 1 why SuStAinABility And equity? 13
  • fundamentally affect how we assess some of The 1994 HDR asserted “there is no tension humanity’s most pressing choices. We take a between human development and sustainable conservative stance because we cannot be cer- development. Both are based in the universal- tain of always finding technological fixes to the ism of life claims.”6 problems we create. Central to this approach The 2010 HDR went further, empha- is recognizing the inherent uncertainty associ- sizing sustainability in reaffirming human ated with the future and the need to deal with development:7 risks responsibly to meet our obligations to current and future generations. Human development is the expansion of we care about people’s freedoms to live long, healthy and environmental Are there limits to creative lives; to advance other goals they sustainability because human development? have reason to value; and to engage actively of the fundamental in shaping development equitably and sus- injustice of one Most people around the world have seen major tainably on a shared planet. People are both generation living at improvements in their lives over the last 40 the beneficiaries and the drivers of human the expense of others. years. But there are major constraints in our development, as individuals and in groups. Poeple born today should capacity to sustain these trends. If we deal deci- sively with these challenges, we could be on Sustainable development gained promi- not have a greater claim the cusp of an era of historic opportunities for nence with the 1987 publication of Our Com- on Earth’s resources expanded choices and freedoms. But if we fail to mon Future, the report of the UN World than those born a act, future generations may remember the early Commission on Environment and Develop- hundred or a thousand 21st century as the time when the doors to a bet- ment, headed by former Norwegian Prime years from now ter future closed for most of the world’s people. Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. The report We care about environmental sustain- produced what became the standard definition ability because of the fundamental injustice of sustainable development: “development of one generation living at the expense of that meets the needs of the present without others. Poeple born today should not have a compromising the ability of future generations greater claim on Earth’s resources than those to meet their own needs.”8 But the commis- born a hundred or a thousand years from now. sion’s work is relevant for much more. It dif- We can do much to ensure that our use of fered from much subsequent work on sustain- the world’s resources does not damage future ability in its emphasis on equity: opportunities—and we should. Amartya Sen notes that “a fouled environ- Many problems of resource depletion and ment in which future generations are denied environmental stress arise from dispari- the presence of fresh air … will remain foul ties in economic and political power. An even if future generations are so very rich.” 2 industry may get away with unacceptable The fundamental uncertainty about what levels of water pollution because the people people will value in the future means that we who bear the brunt of it are poor and una- need to ensure equal freedom of choice, the ble to complain effectively. A forest may be lynchpin of the capability approach, in part destroyed by excessive felling because the by protecting the availability and diversity of people living there have no alternatives or natural resources.3 Such resources are critical because timber contractors generally have in allowing us to lead lives that we value and more influence than forest dwellers. Glob- have reason to value.4 ally, wealthier nations are better placed The early HDRs recognized the centrality financially and technologically to cope of the environment. The first report warned with the effects of climatic change. Hence, of the continuing increase in environmental our inability to promote the common interest hazards, including health risks, from Earth’s in sustainable development is often a prod- warming, damage to the ozone layer, indus- uct of the relative neglect of economic and trial pollution and environmental disasters.5 social justice within and amongst nations.14 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • The commission also voiced concerns inflation-adjusted price of food is much lowerthat the world was reaching its natural lim- today than it was 200 —or even 50 —yearsits to growth in economic activity. In 1972 a ago, and known reserves of many minerals aregroup of scientists commissioned by the Club now substantially higher than in 1950.12 Withof Rome published The Limits to Growth, pre- improved farming techniques, world food pro-dicting that at current rates of consumption duction has outstripped population growth.growth, many natural resources would run The Green Revolution doubled rice and wheatout in the next century. Economists criticized yields in Asia between the 1960s and 1990sthis thesis for its disregard of price adjustments through the introduction of high-yield plant the thesis of weakand technological change that would moder- varieties, better irrigation and the use of ferti-ate rising demand for resources.9 But the facts lizers and pesticides.13 These increased yields sustainability focuses onseemed to bear out some of their predictions were achieved, however, through means that total capital stock rather—adjusted for inflation, oil prices rose fivefold were not always sustainable. Our concerns than on natural resourcebetween 1970 and 1985.10 for more sustainable agricultural practices depletion; that of strong Over the next two decades the perception go hand in hand with our awareness of the sustainability focusesof scarcity changed. Most commodity prices roughly 1 billion people who are undernour- on the belief that somepeaked in the mid-1980s, and by 1990 prices ished and face serious food insecurity.14 basic natural assets havehad fallen from their 1980s highs—57  per- These observations have led some to posit no real substitutes andcent for petroleum, 45 percent for coal and that as the stock of nonrenewable resources is thus must be preserved19 percent for copper. Against this backdrop consumed, technological innovation and pricethe belief that we were approaching a global signals will avert shortages that limit futureresource constraint became less plausible—if development. As a resource becomes scarcer,resources were becoming scarce, prices should rising relative prices mean higher potentialbe rising not falling. By 1997 even the United profits for innovators and for the owners ofNations Economic and Social Council was assets that can be substituted for the dimin-referring to the Club of Rome report’s predic- ished scarce resource. These forces can cuttions as “dogmatic,” “unreliable” and “politi- resource use substantially even as consumptioncally counterproductive.”11 grows. The Worldwatch Institute estimates Now, the pendulum has swung back again. that the production of one unit of output inConcerns differ in some respects from those the United States in 2000 required less thanfour decades ago. Today, the problems are a fifth as much energy as it did in 1800.15 Thismore evident in the preservation of renewable leads to a thesis known as weak sustainabil-natural resources, ranging from forests and ity, which focuses on total capital stock ratherfisheries to the air we breathe. But the message than on natural resource depletion.is clear: our development model is bumping up Disputing this view, advocates of the strongagainst concrete limits. sustainability thesis believe that some basic natural assets have no real substitutes andCompeting paradigms thus must be preserved.16 These assets are fun-The idea that resource scarcity limits the damental not only to our capacity to produceworld’s development potential has a long his- goods and services but also to human life. Soci-tory. In the late 18th century Malthus believed eties should strive to sustain the flow of ser-that limited land was an absolute constraint on vices from natural capital over time becausefood consumption and therefore on the popu- the accumulation of physical or other kinds oflation that could inhabit the Earth. Yet 200 capital cannot compensate for Earth’s warm-years later, the world is home to seven times ing, ozone layer depletion and major biodiver-more people than when Malthus wrote. sity losses. In practice, technological improvements While advocates of strong sustainability doand substitution of abundant for scarce not disregard the growing efficiency of resourceresources have allowed living standards to con- use, they argue that history is not necessarilytinue to rise over the past two centuries. The a good guide to the future. In the past some CHapteR 1 why SuStAinABility And equity? 15
  • constraints on natural capital may not have can engender sustainable production and con- been binding, but today some types of natu- sumption patterns with inclusive, pro-poor ral capital are irreplaceable. No example illus- solutions that integrate environmental con- trates this better than Earth’s warming. There siderations into everyday economic decisions.19 is overwhelming evidence that we are reaching Our approach complements and enriches the an upper limit to our capacity to emit green- green economy discourse, emphasizing peo- house gases without dire consequences. As one ple, the multiple dimensions of well-being and advocate of strong sustainability argues, we equity. Our concerns include—but go beyond are moving from an “empty world” economy, —growth alone. where human-made capital was limiting and natural capital superabundant, to a “full world” The critical role of uncertainty economy, where the opposite is true.17 Differences between strong and weak sustain- Beyond these debates, more recent think- ability approaches go beyond whether finan- ing has emphasized the potential congruence cial savings can substitute for natural resource of growth and environmental sustainabil- depletion. A key difference lies in the role of ity within the broader paradigm of a green uncertainty. economy.18 This thinking diverges from the How can we be sure of finding ways to off- traditional discourse on sustainability by set the damage caused by current and future focusing on ways in which economic policies production and consumption? The answer is BOX 1.1 that we cannot be certain. Acknowledging this Environmental risk management—gambling with the planet inherent uncertainty supports the strong sus- We are gambling with our planet through “games” in which private individuals reap the benefits tainability thesis. while society bears the costs. A system that allows such outcomes is doomed to mismanage Consider biodiversity. Its instrumental risk. As Nobel Prize–winning economist Joseph Stiglitz recently noted, “the bankers that put benefits for people are well known: greater our economy at risk and the owners of energy companies that put our planet at risk may walk biodiversity increases the chances of finding off with a mint. But on average and almost certainly, we as a society, like gamblers, will lose.” cures for illnesses, developing high-yield crops Perverse incentives provide investment banks and energy companies with hidden sub- and maintaining ecosystem goods and services sidies, like low liability caps, the prospect of bailouts, and the knowledge that taxpayers will such as water quality. We know that ecosys- shoulder the costs. Because these companies do not have to bear the full cost of any resulting tems are resilient—up to a point. Yet defining crises, they may take excessive risks. Consider the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the United States, for example, where the costs well exceeded the $75 million liability limit. the threshold at which ecosystems break down And even where liability is limitless, loopholes exist. In Japan, for instance, the Nuclear Com- is hard. An ecosystem might sustain piecemeal pensation Act excludes cases in which “the damage is caused by a grave natural disaster of destruction for some time until an unknown exceptional character.” threshold is breached such that it unravels. 20 Rare events with huge consequences are of course difficult to predict. But we can no These risks and unknown thresholds have longer afford to turn a blind eye, notwithstanding uncertainties. These events are occurring led to real concerns about gambling with the more frequently. And because most greenhouse gases will remain in the atmosphere for cen- planet (box 1.1). turies, we cannot wait until all uncertainties are resolved. The sooner we act, the better. Technological change is uncertain. Pro- What level of risk will persuade people of the need to change their behaviour? Research in behavioural psychology and experimental economics yields sobering insights. In simulation ductivity growth accelerated after the Second exercises showing how groups of participants respond when asked to invest collectively in World War, for example, then slowed between preventing climate change, too many players were free riding, that is, counting on the altru- the 1970s and 1990s.21 We can understand ret- ism of others. In scenarios where the probability of disastrous climate change was very low, roactively what drove accelerations and slow- almost no funds were pledged. But even when the probability was 90 percent, only about half downs, but it is very difficult to predict the of 30 study groups pledged sufficient funds. future. Even more uncertainty surrounds the The projected costs of averting climate change pale beside those of allowing change to types of innovations that will emerge. History continue unbridled. But precisely because cooperation is not guaranteed, even under high- is replete with unfulfilled predictions of spe- probability scenarios, strong political and advocacy efforts are needed to elicit commitments. As Joseph Stiglitz warns, the risks of inaction are too high: “If there were other planets cific innovations—from all-purpose personal to which we could move at low cost in the event of the almost certain outcome predicted by robots to mass-market space travel—and with scientists, one could argue that this risk is worth taking. But there aren’t, so it isn’t.” the failure to anticipate other innovations, Source: Stiglitz 2011; Milinksi and others 2008; Speth 2008. such as personal computers, the Internet and mobile communications.2216 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • Climate change debates have brought into not any particular thing but rather to endowsharp relief the relevance of uncertainty and them with whatever it takes to achieve a stand-risk for understanding the future.23 Scientists ard of living at least as good as our own andhave concluded that the probability of a dis- to look after their next generation similarly.”astrous systemwide collapse is not negligible. Solow added, “We are not to consume human-And since we cannot place a meaningful upper ity’s capital, in the broadest sense,” which is abound on the catastrophic losses from large succinct statement of the case for weak sustain-temperature changes, we need to cut green- ability. Of course, just what “standard of liv-house gas emissions not only to mitigate the ing” refers to is an open question, 26 while what Since we cannotconsequences known to result from their accu- is “good” is also value dependent.mulation but also to protect ourselves against place a meaningfuluncertain worst-case scenarios.24 What we mean by sustainability upper bound on the It follows that weak and strong sustain- Most definitions of sustainable development catastrophic lossesability differ, more than anything, in their capture the precept that the possibilities open from large temperatureattitude towards risk. The question is not to people tomorrow should not differ from changes, we needwhether different types of natural and other those open today, but generally do not ade- to cut greenhouseforms of capital were substitutes in the past, quately capture sustainable human develop- gas emissions notbut whether technological and institutional ment. They do not refer to the expansion of only to mitigate thechange will proceed at a pace and direction choice, freedoms and capabilities intrinsic to known consequencesthat ensure continuing improvements in human development. They do not recognizehuman development. that some dimensions of well-being are incom- but also to protect The position we take depends also on the mensurable. And they do not consider risk. against uncertainvalue we put on the well-being of future gen- Human development is the expansion of worst-case scenarioserations relative to that of current generations the freedoms and capabilities people have to—in other words, on how we discount the lead lives they value and have reason to value.future. From the perspective of capabilities, Freedoms and capabilities that enable us tothere is no justification to assume that the lead meaningful lives go beyond satisfactionfuture will provide greater opportunities of essential needs. In recognizing that manythan the present or to place a lower value on ends are necessary for a good life and that thesethe well-being of the present generation over ends can be intrinsically valuable, freedoms andfuture ones.25 capabilities are also very different from living Given the principles underlying the standards and consumption.27 We can respecthuman development approach, the inclina- other species, independent of their contribu-tion to give equal weight to the well-being of tion to our living standards, just as we can valueall generations and the centrality of risk and natural beauty, regardless of its direct contribu-uncertainty, our position leans towards that of tion to our material standard of living.strong sustainability. The human development approach rec- ognizes that people have rights that are notSustainability, equity and affected by the arbitrariness of when they werehuman development born. Further, the rights in question refer not only to the capacity to sustain the same livingSince the Brundtland Report, scholars have standards but also to access the same oppor-offered further definitions of sustainable tunities. This limits the substitution that candevelopment. One point of contention was the occur across dimensions of well-being. Today’scommission’s reference to “needs,” often inter- generation cannot ask future generations topreted to mean basic needs, which some believe breathe polluted air in exchange for a greateris too narrow. capacity to produce goods and services. That Economist Robert Solow offered an alter- would restrict the freedom of future genera-native definition in 1993, arguing that the duty tions to choose clean air over more goods andof sustainability was “to bequeath to posterity services. CHapteR 1 why SuStAinABility And equity? 17
  • A central concern of the human develop- Therefore, inequitable development can never ment approach is protecting the most disad- be sustainable human development. vantaged groups. The most disadvantaged are This Report does not propose a unique not just the generations that are worse off on measure of sustainable human development. average. They are also those who would suffer Despite recent advances, measuring sustain- most from the realizations of the adverse risks ability remains plagued by major data limita- they face as a result of our activity. Thus, we tions (box 1.2). A perennial challenge is the are concerned not only with what happens on disconnect among local, national and global average or in the most likely scenario but also measures—such as the distinction between with what happens in less likely but still pos- whether a national economy is sustainable and sible scenarios, particularly those that entail its contribution to global sustainability. For catastrophic risks. example, attributing the damage from carbon Building on the work of Anand and Sen, 28 dioxide to the economy that produces goods we define “sustainable human development” that have been exported for consumption as “the expansion of the substantive freedoms ignores both who benefited from consuming of people today while making reasonable the goods and services and the global nature efforts to avoid seriously compromising those of the damage. of future generations.” Like the 1994 HDR, Focusing too much on measurement can this definition emphasizes that the objective obscure some key but unquantifiable issues. of development is to sustain the freedoms and These include the risks faced by different peo- capabilities that allow people to lead meaning- ple and groups and the role of public delibera- ful lives. Our definition of sustainable human tion in making policy choices and enabling a development is normative: we seek the sus- society to decide how to avoid seriously com- tainability not just of any state of events but promising future well-being. of those that expand substantive freedoms. BOX 1.2 What we mean by equity Measures of sustainability—a conceptual overview Early ideas of equity postulated that individu- The conceptual paradigm — weak sustainability or strong — has implications for how we als should be rewarded according to their con- measure and assess trends. Given the range of opinions on how to define sustainability, it tribution to society. 29 Used interchangeably is not surprising that a broadly acceptable quantitative measure is hard to pin down. Many with fairness, equity has come to refer primar- measures have emerged in the literature. One recent study identified 37— some better known ily to distributive justice—that is, unjust ine- than others. Here we review those that are most in use. qualities between people. Green national accounting adjusts such measures as gross domestic product or savings Contemporary thinking on equity owes for environmental quality and resource depletion. Adjusted net savings, a measure of weak much to the work of US philosopher John sustainability, adds education spending and subtracts for the depletion of energy, minerals Rawls, who argued that just outcomes are those and forests and for damage from carbon dioxide emissions and pollution. It is an aggregate measure of all capital in an economy — financial, physical, human and environmental. It implies that people would agree to under a “veil of that the different kinds of capital are perfect substitutes, so that financial savings can replace ignorance”—that is, if they did not know what a loss of natural resources, for example. status they would occupy in society.30 Rawls’s Composite indices aggregate social, economic and environmental indicators into a single idea of justice espoused basic liberties and pro- index. A great deal of innovative work has pursued this approach. Two examples capturing cedural fairness and permitted inequalities strong sustainability are the ecological footprint— a measure of the annual stress people put only if they could reasonably be expected to be on the biosphere — and the environmental performance index. to everyone’s advantage (and if reducing them None of the aggregate measures is perfect. For instance, some scholars take issue with would make everyone worse off). adjusted net savings’ valuing such nonmarket components as the damage from carbon dioxide emissions, while the ecological footprint has been criticized for neglecting biodiversity. The capability approach emerged from Informed by ongoing debates about measurement, we refer to the main composite meas- thinking about which inequalities are just or ures alongside a dashboard that presents specific indicators to capture different aspects of unjust. In a set of landmark lectures in 1979, sustainability (see statistical tables 6 and 7). The single indicators underline the importance of Amartya Sen proposed that we think about strong sustainability by exposing poor performance and deterioration on any front. equality in terms of capabilities. Equality is nei- Source: Jha and Pereira 2011; Dasgupta 2007; Neumayer 2010a, 2010b. ther necessary nor sufficient for equity. Differ- ent individual abilities and preferences lead to18 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • different outcomes, even with identical oppor- opportunities and choices is a major imperativetunities and access to resources. Absolute levels of the human development approach. Thereof capabilities matter: inequality between mil- may be trade-offs and difficult choices. But aslionaires and billionaires is less the focus than we discuss below, the existence of these choicesinequalities between the poor and the wealthy. also implies a higher order moral imperative toAnd personal characteristics are also impor- consider how to build positive synergies thattant: poor and disadvantaged groups, includ- keep the present from being at odds with theing people with mental or physical disabilities, future.need greater access to public goods and services Concerns with sustainability and equity Promoting humanto achieve equality of capabilities. are similar in one fundamental sense: both Despite conceptual differences, inequity are about distributive justice. Inequitable pro- development entailsand inequality in outcomes are closely linked in cesses are unjust, whether across groups or addressing local,practice—because inequalities in outcomes are generations. Inequalities are especially unjust national and globallargely the product of unequal access to capa- when they systematically disadvantage specific sustainability; thisbilities. A Malian can expect to live 32 fewer groups of people, whether because of gender, can—and shouldyears on average than a Norwegian because the race or birthplace, or when the gap is so great —be equitable andpossibilities for people in Mali are far narrower that acute poverty is high. The current genera- empoweringon average than those for people in Norway. In tion’s destroying the environment for futurethis case, clearly the inequalities between Mali generations is no different from a present-dayand Norway are also inequitable. Moreover, group’s suppressing the aspirations of otherwe can measure inequality in key outcomes, groups for equal opportunities to jobs, healthwhereas we cannot readily observe the distri- or education.bution of capabilities. So, in this Report we Anand and Sen made the case for jointlyuse inequality as a proxy for inequity, point- considering sustainability and equity moreing out the exceptions where the relationship than a decade ago: “It would be a gross viola-is not straightforward. We also consider ine- tion of the universalist principle,” they argued,quality in human development—extending “if we were to be obsessed about intergenera-beyond income inequality to inequalities in tional equity without at the same seizing theaccess to health, education and broader politi- problem of intragenerational equity.”32 Yetcal freedoms. many theories on sustainability view equity and the plight of the poor as separate andWhy centre on equitable unrelated. Such thinking is incomplete andsustainability? counterproductive. Thinking about policiesThis Report concentrates on the links between to restore sustainability independent of poli-sustainability and equity. The main issues are cies to address inequalities between and withinthe adverse repercussions for human develop- countries is equivalent to framing policies toment of the lack of environmental sustainabil- address inequalities between groups (suchity, especially for those currently disadvan- as rural and urban) while disregarding thetaged, and more positively, the intersections interrelationships with equity between otherbetween greater sustainability and equity, as groups (such as poor and rich).well as the potential for progressive reforms While we argue strongly for the need tothat promote both goals. We will argue consider sustainability and equity jointly,that promoting human development entails we do not claim that the two are the same.addressing local, national and global sustain- Sustainability is concerned with one type ofability and that this can—and should—be equity—across people born in different timesequitable and empowering. —as distinct from the distribution of out- We ensure that the aspirations of the comes, opportunities or capabilities today.world’s poor for better lives are fully taken If this were not the case, it would be mean-into account in moving towards greater envi- ingless to speak about the effect of equity onronmental sustainability.31 Expanding people’s sustainability. CHapteR 1 why SuStAinABility And equity? 19
  • The reasons to focus on the links between Figure 1.1 illustrates this logic with exam- sustainability and equity are normative but ples of specific policies that typically improve also empirical. The empirics help us under- or worsen sustainability and equity.33 While stand their links—how they reinforce each we have sought to highlight likely outcomes, other in some cases—and the trade-offs that the implications are often context-specific, so can arise, as we investigate in chapters 2 the figure is not intended to be deterministic. and 3. Some examples: • Expanded access to renewable energy and a Our focus of inquiry global currency transaction tax to finance climate change mitigation and adaptation This Report identifies ways to jointly advance can advance both sustainability and equity sustainability and equity. Our line of inquiry (quadrant 1), as we will explore in chapters supports the broader human development 4 and 5. agenda, which seeks to understand the actions • Subsidies on gasoline consumption, still and strategies people can use to expand their common in many countries, may set us freedoms and capabilities. While we recognize back in both dimensions (quadrant  3) that many factors could impede or enhance the by favouring those who can afford a car sustainability of human development, we limit while generating an incentive for exces- our focus to environmental sustainability. We sive resource depletion. Countless cases of discuss what people, communities, societies regressive, inequitable subsidies in agricul- and the world can do to ensure that processes ture, energy and water are also often associ- respect distributive justice between and across ated with environmental damage.34 generations while expanding capabilities wher- • Some policies may advance one objective ever possible. but set back the other. Subsidizing coal in Pursuing sustainability and equity jointly developing countries may promote growth does not require that they be mutually rein- but also contribute to higher greenhouse forcing. In many instances they will not be. gas emissions. Such a policy could have But it compels us to identify positive synergies positive effects on global equity but nega- between the two and to give special considera- tive effects on sustainability (quadrant 4). tion to the trade-offs. • The converse can also occur: policies can improve sustainability while worsening FIGURE 1.1 inequity (quadrant 2). For example, poli- An illustration of policy synergies and trade-offs between equity and sustainability cies that limit access to common prop- erty resources such as forests may enhance This framework encourages special attention to identifying positive synergies between the two sustainability by preserving the natural goals and to considering trade-offs. resource but can deprive poor groups of their primary source of livelihoods, though Expand access to this is certainly not always the case. renewable energy We do not assume a positive empiri- cal association between sustainability and ST TE 1 equity. This association may well exist, and EA Subsidize coal Restrict access GR GR in developing 4 2 EA to public it requires investigation. Schematically, it TE countries 3 forests ST can arise whenever most of the feasible alter- TY Subsidize natives fall in either quadrant 1 or 3 of fig- LI gasoline EQ BI consumption ure 1.1. But it is also possible that most feasi- A U IN IT ble alternatives fall in quadrant 2 or 4, which A Y ST present trade-offs between sustainability and SU equity. And the pathways may be nonlinear. Such possibilities require explicit and careful LEAST consideration.20 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • But we can go further. A trade-off development). We should prefer approachesbetween sustainability and equity is like a in quadrant 1, whenever available, to thosetrade-off in the well-being of two disadvan- that fall in quadrant  2 or 3 but recognizetaged groups. Because no trade-off is iso- that options in quadrant  1 may not alwayslated from a society’s structural and institu- be available.35tional conditions, as in the case of trade-offsbetween the claims of different groups, we * * *must address the underlying constraints. So, The next chapter reviews how resource con-our policy focus is aimed not only at finding straints and environmental thresholds impedepositive synergies but also at identifying ways human development and equity. We reviewto build synergies. Our objective is to find the cross-national evidence of links amongsolutions that fall in quadrant 1—solutions sustainability, equity and human developmentthat are win-win-win (good for the environ- —and identify the challenges to meeting thesement while promoting equity and human goals successfully. CHapteR 1 why SuStAinABility And equity? 21
  • patterns and trends in chap ter 2 human development, equity and environmental indicatorsThis chapter reviews patterns and trends countries on the HDI, convergence that paintsin human development, inequality and key a far more optimistic picture than do trends inenvironmental indicators. We present new income, where divergence continues.evidence of the threats to progress posed by But not all countries have seen rapid pro-environmental degradation and inequalities gress, and the variations are striking. People inwithin and across countries. The most disad- Southern Africa and the former Soviet Unionvantaged bear and will continue to bear the have endured times of regress, especially inconsequences of environmental degradation, health. And countries starting from the sameeven if many contribute little to the under- position had markedly different experiences.lying causes. China’s per capita income grew an astounding 1,200 percent over the 40 years, but the Demo-progress and prospects cratic Republic of the Congo’s fell 80 percent. Advances in technical knowledge and globali-Progress in many aspects of human develop- zation made progress more feasible for coun-ment has been substantial over the past 40 tries at all levels of development, but countriesyears, as the 2010 Human Development Report took advantage of the opportunities in differ-(HDR) showed. But income distribution has ent ways.worsened, and environmental degradation The 2010 HDR reviewed trends inthreatens future prospects. empowerment—people’s ability to exercise choices and to participate in, shape and ben-Progress in human development efit from household, community and nationalMost people today live longer, are more edu- processes. For the Arab States the situationcated and have more access to goods and ser- described last year—of few signs of in-depthvices than ever before. Even in economically democratization—has changed profoundlydistressed countries, people’s health and educa- since late 2010 (box 2.1).tion have improved greatly. And progress hasextended to expansions in people’s power to Has progress come at the cost ofselect leaders, influence public decisions and environmental degradation?share knowledge. Not all sides of the story are positive. Income Witness the gains in our summary meas- inequality has worsened, and production andure of development, the Human Development consumption patterns, especially in rich coun-Index (HDI), a simple composite measure tries, seem to be unsustainable.that includes health, schooling and income. To explore environmental trends, weThe world’s average HDI increased 18 per- need to decide which measure of environ-cent between 1990 and 2010 (41 percent since mental degradation to use. The concep-1970), reflecting large improvements in life tual challenges were considered in chapterexpectancy, school enrolment, literacy and 1. There are also data challenges, and someincome.1 Almost all countries benefited. Of measures are available only for recent years.the 135 countries in our sample for 1970– Box 2.2 discusses the important insights2010 (with 92 percent of the world’s people), offered by leading aggregate sustainabilityonly three had a lower HDI in 2010 than in measures. But to understand patterns and1970. Poor countries are catching up with rich trends, we prefer to use specific indicators. 2 CHapteR 2 pAtternS And trendS in huMAn develOpMent, equity And envirOnMentAl indiCAtOrS 23
  • BOX 2.1 Overcoming the democratic deficit—empowerment and the Arab Spring Last year’s Human Development Report (HDR) looked at the “democratic demand for democracy and human rights is an integral part of broader mod- deficit” in the Arab States, seeking to understand why the region had dem- ernization and development. As the first Arab Human Development Report onstrated few signs of significant democratization. affirmed in 2002 (p. 18): “Human development, by enhancing human capa- Drawing on the Arab Human Development Reports since 2002, the bilities, creates the ability to exercise freedom, and human rights, by provid- 2010 global HDR pointed to the stark contrasts between actual practice ing the necessary framework, create the opportunity to exercise it. Freedom and formal adherence to democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It is both the guarantor and the goal of both human development and human emphasized that many democratic reforms in the region had been offset by rights.” countermeasures limiting citizen rights in other respects — including nearly In the long run people who have attained higher levels of education and unchecked concentration of power in the executive branch. Civil society, in who have experienced rising living standards are unwilling to tolerate con- turn, was weak: “Popular demand for democratic transformation and citi- tinued autocratic rule. For example, health and education are often neces- zens’ participation is a nascent and fragile development in the Arab coun- sary for meaningful participation in public life. Progress in these areas often tries,” noted the 2009 Arab Human Development Report (p. 73). occurs through their extension to the disadvantaged and disenfranchised, Even so, in most of the Arab States long-term trends showed major and once extended, it is very hard for elites to exclude the broader popula- progress in income, health and education, the Human Development Index tion from civic and political rights. The transition in the former Soviet Union (HDI) dimensions, since 1970. Five Arab States emerged among the top 10 is an earlier example of this pattern. performers — Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco — while But this progress must be placed within a broader context. Develop- Libya was among the top 10 countries in nonincome HDI achievement. ment has led to other contradictions, with rising but unfulfilled expectations All these countries advanced due mainly to improvements in health and often generating deep social frustrations. Inequality has increased while education. cellphones and Twitter™ have permitted more rapid transmission of ideas. Particularly striking were the changes in these countries relative to Many analysts have pointed to high unemployment and underemployment others at a similar HDI 40 years earlier. For instance, in 1970 Tunisia had a among educated youth as a key factor driving political dissent in the region. lower life expectancy than the Democratic Republic of the Congo and fewer Half the population in the Arab States is under 25, and youth unemployment children in school than Malawi. Yet by 2010 Tunisia was in the high HDI rates are nearly double the global average. In Egypt an estimated 25 percent category, with an average life expectancy of 74 years and most children of college graduates cannot find full-time professional work—in Tunisia that enrolled through secondary school. figure rises to 30 percent. The recent pro-democracy protests across the Arab States began in Although the outcome of this year’s political upheavals will not be clear Tunisia and Egypt, driven in both cases by educated urban youth. Multiple for some time, the region has already profoundly changed. What was strik- and complex causes underlie any social phenomena, but the democratization ing until recently was the juxtaposition of authoritarian rule and rising de- movement can be considered a direct consequence of human development velopment achievement. In 2011 this “Arab democracy paradox” seemed to progress. Indeed, many analysts over the years — sociologists, political sci- be coming to a sudden end, opening the door to a much fuller realization of entists and others both in and outside the region — have argued that popular people’s freedoms and capabilities throughout the region. Source: 2010 HDR (UNDP–HDRO 2010; see inside back cover for a list of HDRs); UNDP 2002, 2009; Kimenyi 2011. We have drawn on a wealth of research and medium or high HDI country.4 Compared analysis to determine which indicators pro- with an average person living in a low HDI vide the best insights. country, a person in a very high HDI country We start by looking at patterns of carbon accounts for about 30 times the carbon dioxide dioxide emissions over time, a good if imper- emissions. For example, the average UK citizen fect proxy for the environmental impacts of a accounts for as much greenhouse gas emissions country’s economic activity on climate. Emis- in two months as a person in a low HDI coun- sions per capita are much greater in very high try generates in a year. And the average Qatari HDI countries than in low, medium and high —living in the country with the highest per HDI countries combined, because of many capita greenhouse gas emissions—does so in more energy-intensive activities, such as driv- only 10 days, although this figure reflects both ing cars, using air conditioning and relying consumption within the country and produc- on fossil fuel–based electricity.3 Today, the tion that is consumed elsewhere, an issue we average person in a very high HDI country revisit below. accounts for more than four times the carbon Of course, development has many dimen- dioxide emissions and about twice the emis- sions. The HDI recognizes this by aggre- sions of the other important greenhouse gases gating measures of three key dimensions— (methane, nitrous oxide) as a person in a low, income, health and education. How do these24 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • BOX 2.2What can we learn from trends in aggregate measures of sustainability? Of the aggregate measures of sustainability surveyed in box 1.2 in chapter 1, Adjusted net savings The big message from the ecologi- only two are available for a large number of countries over a reasonably and ecological footprint show different results for cal footprint is that patterns of long period: the World Bank’s adjusted net savings and the Global Footprint sustainability trends over time consumption and production are Network’s ecological footprint. What do these measures tell us? unsustainable at the global level Adjusted net savings (percent of GNI) Adjusted net savings is positive for all Human Development Index (HDI) and imbalanced regionally. And Low, groups, meaning that the world is (weakly) sustainable (see figure). The posi- 20 medium the situation is worsening, espe- and high tive trend for low, medium and high HDI countries suggests that their sus- HDI cially in very high HDI countries. 10 tainability has improved over time, while that of the very high HDI countries The ecological footprint es- Very high is declining over time. 0 HDI timates the amount of forest that However, as reviewed in chapter 1, the concept of weak sustainability 1980 1990 2005 would be required to absorb carbon underlying adjusted net savings has been criticized for not acknowledging dioxide emissions —though this is Ecological footprint (hectares per capita) that sustainability requires maintaining some natural capital. Adjusted net not the only method for sequester- Very high savings also involves some other controversial methodological choices. For 6 HDI ing emissions. It neglects other key example, valuing natural resources at market prices can overestimate the 4 aspects of the environment, includ- Low, sustainability of an economy that produces them as the resources become medium ing biodiversity, and such amenities 2 and high scarcer and thus more expensive. HDI as water quality. And it focuses on 0 Further analysis — taking into account the uncertainty embodied in 1980 1990 2005 consumption, so that the consumer greenhouse gas emissions and their monetary valuation — shows that the Source: HDRO calculations based on data from country rather than the producer number of countries considered unsustainable in 2005 would rise about World Bank (2011b) and www.footprintnetwork.org. country is responsible for the im- two-thirds —from 15 to 25— if adjusted net savings used a more compre- pact of imported natural resources. hensive measure of emissions that includes methane and nitrous oxide as One further issue is that most changes over time (both global and national) are well as carbon dioxide and acknowledged valuation uncertainties. In other driven by carbon dioxide emissions, and there is a strong correlation between words, adjusted net savings may be overestimated. the volume of carbon emissions and the value of the ecological footprint. The ecological footprint, by contrast, shows that the world is increas- Another more recent measure is the environmental performance index, ingly exceeding its global capacity to provide resources and absorb wastes. developed at Yale and Columbia Universities. This composite index uses 25 If everyone in the world had the same consumption as people in very high indicators to establish how close countries are to established environmental HDI countries and with current technologies, we would need more than policy goals — a useful policy tool, built from a rich set of indicators and pro- three Earths to withstand the pressure on the environment. viding a broad definition of sustainability. But the measure’s data intensity (requiring 25 indicators for more than 160 countries) inhibits construction of a time series for the analysis of trends in this Report. Source: Garcia and Pineda 2011; Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 2009.dimensions interact with measures of environ- The correlation between some key meas-mental degradation? ures of sustainability and national levels The dimensions interact very differently of development are well known. Less wellwith carbon dioxide emissions per capita: the known, and emerging from our analysis, isassociation is positive and strong for income, that growth in carbon dioxide emissions perstill positive but weaker for the HDI and non- capita is related to the speed of development.existent for health and education (figure 2.1). Countries with faster HDI improvementsThis result is of course intuitive: activities that also experience a faster increase in carbonemit carbon dioxide into the atmosphere are dioxide emissions per capita (figure 2.2).5those linked to the production and distribu- Changes over time—not the snapshot rela-tion of goods. Carbon dioxide is emitted by tionship, which reflects cumulative effects—factories and trucks, not by learning and vac- are the best guide to what to expect as a resultcinations. These results also show the nonlin- of development today.ear relationship between carbon dioxide emis- The bottom line: recent progress in thesions per capita and HDI components: there is HDI has come at the cost of global warming.practically no relation at low levels of human In countries advancing fastest in the HDI,development, but a “tipping point” appears to carbon dioxide emissions per capita also grewbe reached beyond which a strong positive cor- faster. But these environmental costs comerelation between carbon dioxide emissions per from economic growth, not broader gains incapita and income is observed. HDI, and the relationship is not fixed. Some CHapteR 2 pAtternS And trendS in huMAn develOpMent, equity And envirOnMentAl indiCAtOrS 25
  • FIGURE 2.1 the association with carbon dioxide emissions per capita is positive and strong for income, positive for the hdi and nonexistent for health and education Carbon dioxide emissions per capita (tonnes) 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 –0.3 –0.2 –0.1 0 0.1 0.2 Income component of the HDI HDI Health and education (nonincome) components of the HDI Note: Data are for 2007. Source: HDRO calculations, based on data from the HDRO database. countries have advanced in both the HDI Research shows that some environmen- and environmental sustainability (those in tal threats have increased with development the lower right quadrants of figure 2.2)—an and others have not. A seminal study points important point investigated below. to an inverted-U relationship for air and water This relationship does not hold for all envi- pollution, showing that environmental deg- ronmental indicators. Our analysis finds only a radation worsens then improves as the level weak positive correlation between levels of the of development rises (a pattern known as the HDI and deforestation, for example. Why do environmental Kuznets curve). 6 This can be carbon dioxide emissions per capita differ from explained in terms of the increasing respon- other environmental threats? siveness of governments to people’s desire for FIGURE 2.2 Countries with higher growth also experience faster increase in carbon dioxide emissions per capita Change in carbon dioxide emissions per capita (tonnes) 0.06 0.04 0.02 0 –0.02 –0.04 –0.06 –0.08 –0.01 0 0.01 –0.01 0 0.01 –0.01 0 0.01 Change in the income Change in the HDI Change in the health and education component of the HDI (nonincome) components of the HDI Note: Data are for 2007. Source: HDRO calculations, based on data from the HDRO database.26 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • FIGURE 2.3clean and healthy environments as countries patterns of risk change: environmental transitions and humanbecome richer. But with carbon dioxide emis- developmentsions, the damage is global and harms mostlyfuture generations, so even very rich countries Household Indoor air pollution Globalhave little to gain from reining in greenhouse Poor water and Community Greenhouse Urban air pollution gas emissionsgas emissions unless others act too. sanitation These global patterns can be seen as a seriesof environmental transitions and related risksfor people, set against overall HDI trends. In Severity ofa twist on the traditional Kuznets story, the environmental impactglobal evidence suggests that countries addressdirect household deprivations first (such asaccess to water and energy), then communitydeprivations (notably pollution) and finallydeprivations with global effects and exter-nalities (namely climate change).7 Where the HDIlink between the environment and quality of Source: Based on Hughes, Kuhn and others (2011).life is direct, as with pollution, environmen-tal achievements are often greater in devel- BOX 2.3oped countries; where the links are more dif- Consumption and human developmentfuse, performance is much weaker. Figure 2.3 Runaway growth in consumption among the best-off people in the world is putting unprec-depicts three generalized findings: edented pressure on the environment. The inequalities remain stark. Today, there are more• Environmental risk factors with an than 900 cars per 1,000 people of driving age in the United States and more than 600 in West- immediate impact on households—such ern Europe, but fewer than 10 in India. US households average more than two television sets, as indoor air pollution, poor water and whereas in Liberia and Uganda fewer than 1 household in 10 has a television set. Domestic sanitation—are more severe at lower HDI per capita water consumption in the very high Human Development Index (HDI) countries, at levels and decline as the HDI rises. As we 425 litres a day, is more than six times that in the low HDI countries, where it averages 67 litres a day. show in chapter 3, within countries these Consumption patterns are converging in some respects as people in many developing threats also tend to be concentrated among countries are consuming more luxury goods: China is poised to overtake the United States the multidimensionally poor. as the world’s largest luxury consumer market. But even among very high HDI countries, con-• Environmental risks with community sumption patterns vary. Consumption accounts for 79 percent of GDP in the United Kingdom effects—such as urban air pollution— and 34 percent in Singapore despite the countries’ having nearly the same HDI. Among the seem to worsen as the HDI rises from low explanations for these differences are demographic patterns and social and cultural norms, levels and then begin to improve beyond a which affect savings practices, for example. certain point.8 This is the Kuznets part of At the same time, the links with human development are often broken, as explored in the 1998 Human Development Report: new products often target richer consumers, discounting the story. the needs of the poor in developing countries.• Environmental risk factors with global Education can be fundamentally important in tempering excessive consumption. Such ef- effects—such as greenhouse gas emissions forts have been promoted by the UN General Assembly’s declaration of the UN Decade of Edu- —tend to increase with the HDI, as shown cation for Sustainable Development (2005–2014) and United Nations Educational, Scientific empirically in figure 2.2. and Cultural Organization activities geared at encouraging sustainable consumption. Of course, the HDI itself is not the true Source: Data from Morgan Stanley, as cited in The Economist 2008a; data from Bain and Company 2011, as cited in Reutersdriver of these transitions. Public policies 2011; Heston, Summers and Aten 2009 (Penn World Table 6.3).are important too. Incomes and economicgrowth have an important explanatory rolefor emissions—but the relationship is not vary: Indonesia deforested nearly 20 percentdeterministic. For example, Norway’s per a year between 1990 and 2008; the Philip-capita carbon dioxide emissions (11  tonnes) pines, with similar per capita income, refor-are less than a third those of the United Arab ested 15 percent over the same period.10 AndEmirates (35 tonnes), although both have high consumption patterns are also important (boxincomes.9 Patterns of natural resource use also 2.3). At the international level broader forces CHapteR 2 pAtternS And trendS in huMAn develOpMent, equity And envirOnMentAl indiCAtOrS 27
  • interact in a complex manner, changing pat- • Higher levels of gender inequality (as meas- terns of risk—trade often allows countries ured by the Gender Inequality Index) led to outsource the production of goods that to lower levels of sustainability—a theme degrade the environment, as we discuss below explored in chapter 3.13 for deforestation. There are also outlier coun- These findings lend empirical weight to tries that have performed relatively well, as we our argument that inequality is bad not just show later using a broader framework of envi- intrinsically but also for the environment. And ronmental risk. weak environmental performance can worsen disparities in the HDI. We now examine these the findings of the Are there causal relations at play? disparities in more detail. quasi-experimental Did changes in sustainability come before or analysis lend empirical after changes in human development? Is there Equity trends weight to our argument a causal relation? Are increasing inequality To explore what has happened to equity over that inequality is bad and environmental unsustainability causally time we use a multidimensional approach that not just intrinsically related? For example, if wealthier groups and goes beyond incomes. This analysis builds but also for the corporations have disproportionate political on the innovation in the 2010 HDR, the environment and that and economic power and benefit from activi- Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI), which dis- ties that degrade the environment, they may counts human development achievements by weak environmental obstruct measures that protect the environ- the inequality in each dimension, and so the performance can worsen ment. A counter-example is how the empower- IHDI falls farther below the HDI as inequal- disparities in the HDI ment of women often goes hand in hand with ity rises.14 The basic idea is intuitive. School- greater protection of the environment. ing and longevity (like income) are necessary Our analysis of sequencing finds that in to lead fulfilling lives; therefore, we care about the short run the effects go in both directions how they are distributed between those with for the HDI, greenhouse gas emissions and more and those with less. Although incom- pollution. In the long run, however, a rising plete, especially in the neglect of empower- HDI precedes a rise in greenhouse gas emis- ment, the approach provides a fuller picture sions, so while not conclusive, the evidence is than a focus on income inequality alone. consistent with a causal relationship where ris- This Report takes an important step for- ing HDI—or at least the income component ward by presenting trends in the IHDI since —implies higher greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 for 66 countries (see statistical table 3 for the future. the 2011 values; Technical note 2 explains the What about inequality? Using quasi- methodology).15 experimental methods, we explored the causal • Worsening income inequality has offset relationship between inequality (measured in large improvements in health and educa- terms of HDI and gender disparities) and sus- tion inequality, such that the aggregate loss tainability. Although country differences in in human development due to inequality environmental performance are driven by mul- sums to 24 percent.16 tiple contextual and other factors, it is possible • The global trends conceal widening educa- to establish causality where sources of what tional inequality in South Asia and deep economists call “exogenous variation” can be health inequality in Africa. identified.11 We used climate-related shocks • Latin America remains the most unequal and changes in institutional arrangements, region in income, but not in health and such as the year women received full electoral education. rights, as sources of exogenous variation. The • Sub-Saharan Africa has the greatest ine- results are striking. quality in the HDI. • Poor sustainability performance — as measured by net forest depletion and espe- Narrowing health inequalities cially air pollution—raised inequality in Health affects people’s capability to function the HDI.12 and flourish. The evidence shows a positive28 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • FIGURE 2.4correlation between health and socioeconomic high hiv/AidS prevalence rates in Southern Africa stallstatus. This has led researchers to focus on improvements in health inequalityincome and social inequalities as determinants Loss in the health component of the HDI due to inequality, 1970–2010of health, with recent investigations using new Atkinson inequality indexhousehold data to examine trends.17 0.5 Botswana Our analysis suggests that the rising lon- Lesothogevity around the world—investigated in the South Africa2010 HDR—has been associated with greater 0.4 Zimbabweequity: health inequality, measured by lifeexpectancy, declined across the board.18 Very 0.3high HDI countries led the way, closely fol-lowed by improvements in East Asia and thePacific and Latin America and the Caribbean, 0.2with the Arab States not far behind. Gainswere most modest in Sub-Saharan Africa, 0.1from the lowest starting levels, due mainly to 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010the HIV/AIDS pandemic, especially in South- Note: See Technical note 2 for definition of the Atkinson inequality index. Each observation represents a five-year average.ern Africa, where adult HIV/AIDS prevalence Source: HDRO calculations based on life expectancy data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,rates still exceed 15 percent (figure 2.4).19 Population Division, Population Estimates and Projections Section, and Fuchs and Jayadev (2011).Improving equity in education and at different speeds.22 Education inequalityProgress in expanding education opportunities worsened about 8 percent in South Asia, forhas been substantial and widespread, reflecting instance, despite a massive average increase inimprovements in the quantity of schooling and education attainment of 180 percent.greater gender equity and access. Not only aremore children going to school, more finish.20 Widening income disparities As with health, trends in the distribution Income inequality has deteriorated in mostof education opportunities show narrowing countries and regions—with some notableinequalities around the world as overall enrol- exceptions in Latin America and Sub-Saharanments and attainment rise. For example, a Africa. Some highlights:study of 29 developing countries and 13 devel- • Detailed studies show a striking increase inoped countries found that the power of par- the income share of the wealthiest groupsents’ education as a predictor of their children’s in much of Europe, North America, Aus-schooling fell substantially in most countries tralia and New Zealand. 23 From 1990 toover the last 50 years, indicating reduced inter- 2005 within-country income inequal-generational inequality in education.21 ity, measured by the Atkinson inequality Our analysis of national trends in educa- index, increased 23.3 percent in very hightion inequality (measured by average years of HDI countries.24 The gap between the richschooling) since 1970 shows improvements and the poor widened over the last twoin most countries. In contrast with trends decades in more than three-quarters ofin income inequality, education inequality Organisation for Economic Co-operationdeclined most in Europe and Central Asia and Development countries and in many(almost 76 percent), followed by East Asia and emerging market economies.25the Pacific (52 percent) and Latin America and • Income has also become more concen-the Caribbean (48 percent). trated among top earners in China, India Though rising average levels of education and South Africa. 26 In China, for exam-and health attainments have generally been ple, the top quintile of income earners hadaccompanied by narrowing inequality, the 41  percent of total income in 2008, andeffect is not automatic. Average attainments the Gini coefficient for income inequalityand inequality can move in different directions rose from 0.31 in 1981 to 0.42 in 2005. CHapteR 2 pAtternS And trendS in huMAn develOpMent, equity And envirOnMentAl indiCAtOrS 29
  • Using the same Atkinson inequality index education because of the low quality of their applied to health and education and the over- primary and secondary schooling. all IHDI, our own analysis confirms this Why has declining inequality in health and picture and finds that average country-level education not been accompanied by improved income inequality increased around 20 per- income distribution? Increased access to edu- cent over 1990–2005. The worst deterioration cation may be part of the story. The returns to was in Europe and Central Asia (more than basic education fall as more people gain access. 100 percent). Completion of primary school brought smaller Over the last decade or so, much of Latin income gains than before, while the relative America and the Caribbean has bucked this value of education to those at the top of the trend: within-country inequality has been distribution increased. This increase in the falling, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Hon- “skill premium” resulted from a combination duras, Mexico and Peru, with some exceptions, of skill-biased technical change and changes in including Jamaica.27 Some trace Latin Amer- policy—though country institutions and poli- ica’s performance to the shrinking earnings cies strongly influenced country-level effects. 29 gap between high- and low-skilled workers We might also expect financial crises to and to the increase in targeted social transfer affect trends in inequality. To what extent do payments. 28 The shrinking earnings gap fol- crises increase income inequality? Does income lows expanding coverage in basic education in inequality make crises more likely? Can gov- recent decades, but it may run into headwinds ernment policy make a difference? This Report when the poor are turned away from university focuses on the effects of environmental shocks, but recent research on the causes and effects of BOX 2.4 financial crises offers some parallels (box 2.4). Sustainability, crises and inequality Prospects—and environmental Background research commissioned for this Report considered income inequality and two types of economic crisis — banking crises and collapses in consumption or gross domestic threats product— over the century to 2010. The analysis focused on 25 countries — some experiencing The global HDI has risen strongly in recent the crisis, others not—14 in North America and Europe and 11 elsewhere. decades, but what does the future hold? How Does inequality make crises more likely? There is some support for the hypothesis that might HDI values change for developed and a rise in inequality is associated with subsequent crises, but high inequality is not always developing countries through 2050? And how linked to crisis. Rising inequality preceded crises in Sweden in 1991 and in Indonesia in 1997 severely might environmental and inequality but not in India in 1993. Where rising inequality did precede a crisis, it could be attributed to constraints affect that advance? Given inher- overconsumption among some groups or underconsumption among others and to the effects of such patterns on the broader economy. ent uncertainties, we compare three scenarios Who bears the brunt of a crisis? For 31 banking crises for which inequality data are avail- through 2050, produced by the University of able, there are a few cases of rising overall inequality followed by crises and then a fall in Denver’s Frederick S. Pardee Center for Inter- inequality, notably the 2007 Icelandic crisis — but such cases do not predominate. Inequality national Futures (figure 2.5).30 rose in about 40 percent of the cases, fell in just over a quarter and showed no change in the • A base case scenario, which assumes lim- remainder. ited changes in inequality, environmental Overall, the analysis suggests no systematic relationship between crises and income in- threats and risks, anticipates for 2050 a equality, even for countries simultaneously experiencing banking crisis and economic collapse. global HDI that is 19 percent higher than Inequality rose in the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Singapore as a result of the 1997 Asian financial crises but remained steady in Indonesia. While data are not yet available to allow today’s (44 percent higher for Sub-Saharan rigorous analysis of the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, some evidence affirms the lack of a Africa). The increase is less than a simple clear pattern across countries — with inequality rising in some countries and falling in others. extrapolation of past trends would yield The effects of inequality and of crisis also reflect policy responses. For example, following because progress in the HDI tends to slow crises, compensatory transfers or progressive taxation can mitigate inequality, while cutting at very high levels.31 transfers to reduce budget deficits can do the opposite. Crises have often prompted institu- • The environmental challenge scenario envi- tional change, for instance the introduction of social security in the United States in the 1930s. sions intensified environmental risks at Following the Nordic crises of the 1990s, the welfare state and fiscal provisions seem to have the household (indoor solid fuel use), local been a powerful moderating force on any increase in inequality. (water and sanitation), urban and regional Source: Atkinson and Morelli 2011. (outdoor air pollution) and global levels30 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • FIGURE 2.5 (especially increasing impacts of climate Scenarios projecting impacts of environmental risks on human change on agricultural production) and development through 2050 inequality and insecurity.32 The global HDI HDI in 2050 is 8 percent lower than in the 1.0 Base case base case and 12 percent lower for South Very high HDI Environmental challenge Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. countries Environmental disaster• Under an environmental disaster scenario 0.9 most early 21st century gains have eroded by 2050 as biophysical and human sys- tems are stressed by overuse of fossil fuels 0.8 and falling water tables, glacial melting, progressive deforestation and land deg- Low, medium Base case radation, dramatic declines in biodiver- 0.7 and high HDI countries sity, greater frequency of extreme weather Environmental challenge events, peaking production of oil and gas, increased civil conflict and other disrup- 0.6 Environmental disaster tions. The model does not exhaustively consider the potential for associated vicious feedback loops, which would exac- 0.5 erbate these trends. Under this scenario the global HDI in 2050 would be some 0.4 15 percent below the baseline scenario. Both the environmental challenge andenvironmental disaster scenarios would lead to 0.3breaks in the pattern of convergence in human 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050development across countries observed over Note: See text for explanation of scenarios. Source: HDRO calculations based on data from the HDRO database and Hughes, Irfan and others (2011), who draw on forecasts fromthe past 40 years. And longer term projections International Futures, Version 6.42.suggest that divergence would widen further FIGURE 2.6after 2050. Scenarios projecting slowdown and reversals of convergence in This is illustrated by projections of cross- human development due to environmental risks through 2050country inequality in the HDI, using the Atkinson inequality indexAtkinson inequality index, which has fallen (loss in the HDI due to inequality) .07more than two-thirds over the past 40 years,reflecting the convergence trends. Under the .06base case, inequality among countries is pro-jected to continue to fall over the next 40 years.But under the disaster scenario, future conver- .05gence, as measured by changes in the Atkinsoninequality index, would be on the order of only .04 World24 percent by 2050, compared with 57 percent medianunder the baseline (figure 2.6). .03 Environmental disasterthreats to sustaining progress .02 Environmental challenge Base casePast patterns suggest that, in the absence of .01reform, the links between economic growthand rising greenhouse gas emissions could 0jeopardize the extraordinary progress in the 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Note: See text for explanation of scenarios.HDI in recent decades. But climate change Source: HDRO calculations based on data from the HDRO database and Hughes, Irfan and others (2011), who draw on forecasts from—with effects on temperatures, precipitation, International Futures, Version 6.42. CHapteR 2 pAtternS And trendS in huMAn develOpMent, equity And envirOnMentAl indiCAtOrS 31
  • sea levels and natural disasters—is not the only and manufacturing cement, which increase environmental problem. carbon dioxide emissions. Other greenhouse Degraded land, forests and marine ecosys- gases, such as those regulated by the Mon- tems pose chronic threats to well-being, while treal Protocol, also pose serious threats. The pollution has substantial costs that appear to 100-year global warming potential of nitrous rise and then fall with development levels. We oxide is nearly 300 times that of carbon diox- discuss these threats in turn, then consider ide and 25 times that of methane.33 That cli- which countries have performed better than mate change is caused by human activities is their regions and the world. scientifically accepted,34 though public aware- ness still lags, with less than two-thirds of the Climate change population worldwide aware of climate change Global temperatures now average 0.75°C and its causes (box 2.5). higher than at the beginning of the 20th cen- tury, and the rate of change has accelerated Key drivers (figure 2.7). The main cause is human activity, Global carbon dioxide emissions have increased particularly burning fossil fuels, cutting forests since 1970—248 percent in low, medium and high HDI countries and 42 percent in very FIGURE 2.7 Average world temperatures have risen since 1900 high HDI countries. The global growth of 112 percent can be broken down into three drivers: Variation from 1951–1980 mean (degrees Celsius) population growth, rising consumption and 1.0 carbon-intensive production.35 Rising con- Annual mean sumption (as reflected by GDP growth) has 0.8 Five-year mean been the main driver, accounting for 91 per- 0.6 cent of the change in emissions, while popula- tion growth contributed 79 percent. The con- 0.4 tribution of carbon intensity, in contrast, was –70 percent, reflecting technological advances 0.2 (table 2.1). In other words, the principal driver 0 of increases in emissions is that more people are consuming more goods—even if production –0.2 itself has become more efficient, on average. Although the carbon efficiency of pro- –0.4 duction (units of carbon to produce a unit 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2008 of GDP) has improved 40 percent, total car- Note: Calculated using average temperatures in 173 countries, weighted by average population in 1950–2008. bon dioxide emissions continue to rise. Aver- Source: HDRO calculations based on data from the University of Delaware. age carbon dioxide emissions per capita have grown 17 percent over 1970–2007. TABlE 2.1 growth in carbon dioxide emissions and its drivers, 1970–2007 Patterns of carbon dioxide emissions vary (percent) widely across regions and stages of develop- Growth Percentage share of total growtha ment. Some highlights: Per capita Total Population GDP per capita Carbon intensity • In very high HDI countries the carbon HDI group intensity of production has fallen 52 per- Very high 7 42 81 233 –213 cent, but total emissions and emissions High 3 73 94 116 –111 per capita have more than doubled and are Medium 276 609 32 82 –15 112 percent higher now than 40 years ago. Low 49 304 72 21 7 Improvements in carbon efficiency have World 17 112 79 91 –70 not kept up with economic growth. a. Based on an accounting decomposition of the effects on carbon growth that simplifies the Kaya identity presented in Raupach • Emissions are more than 10 times higher and others (2007) from four drivers to three. Values may not sum to 100 percent because of rounding. in East Asia and the Pacific than in Sub- Source: HDRO calculations based on data from World Bank (2011b). Saharan Africa.32 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • BOX 2.5• Emissions per capita vary from a low of Are people aware of climate change and its causes? 0.04 tonnes in Burundi to a high of 53 Despite overwhelming scientific evidence of the seriousness of the climate change threat and tonnes in Qatar. growing evidence around the world that we are already experiencing many of the effects, Trade enables countries to shift the carbon public awareness remains limited. The Gallup World Poll, a representative survey carried outcontent of the goods they consume to the trad- regularly in nearly 150 countries since 2007, reveals some major gaps in public knowledge ofing partners that produce them. The carbon the seriousness of the problem, its causes and even its existence (see table).dioxide emitted in the production of goods Less than two-thirds of people in the world have heard of climate change. Awareness istraded internationally increased by half from associated with level of development. Some 92 percent of respondents in very high Human1995 to 2005.36 Several countries that have Development Index (HDI) countries reported at least some knowledge of climate change, com-committed to cutting their own emissions are pared with 52 percent in medium HDI countries and 40 percent in low HDI countries. Perceptions of other environmental issues also differ. Overall, 69 percent of people arenet carbon importers, including Germany and satisfied with water quality while 29 percent are not, and 76 percent of people are satisfiedJapan, as are countries that have not signed or with air quality while 22 percent are not. Not surprising, there is wide disparity across coun-ratified global treaties, such as the United States. tries. For example, only 2.5 percent of people are dissatisfied with water quality in Denmark, While very high HDI countries account compared with 78 percent in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.for the largest share of world carbon dioxide Public opinions on climate change (percent agreeing)emissions, low, medium and high HDI coun- Aware of Climate change is a Human activity causestries account for more than three-fourths of the climate change serious threat climate changegrowth in carbon dioxide emissions since 1970. Country group (n = 147) (n = 135) (n = 145)East Asia and the Pacific is the largest contrib- Regionsutor by far to the increase in these emissions Arab States 42.1 28.7 30.3(45  percent), while Sub-Saharan Africa con- East Asia and the Pacific 62.6 27.7 48.3tributed only 3 percent, and Europe and Cen- Europe and Central Asia 77.7 48.2 55.0tral Asia, 2 percent (figure 2.8). For methane Latin America and the Caribbean 76.5 72.7 64.8and nitrous oxide, we have data for a shorter South Asia 38.0 31.3 26.9period, but here too, the contribution of the Sub-Saharan Africa 43.4 35.5 30.6East Asia and the Pacific region is pronounced. HDI groups The stock of carbon dioxide trapped in the Very high 91.7 60.2 65.3atmosphere is a product of historical emissions— High 76.1 61.2 60.7“carbon is forever.”37 Today’s concentrations are Medium 51.6 29.3 38.8largely the accumulation of developed countries’ Low 40.2 32.8 26.7past emissions. With about a sixth of the world’s World 60.0 39.7 44.5population, very high HDI countries emitted Note: n refers to the number of countries surveyed. Data are population-weighted averages andalmost two-thirds (64 percent) of carbon diox- refer to the most recent year available since 2007. For details on the Gallup sample and method, see https://worldview.gallup.com/content/methodology.aspx.ide emissions between 1850 and 2005.38 Since1850 about 30 percent of total accumulated Source: HDRO calculations based on Gallup World Poll data (www.gallup.com/se/126848/worldview.aspx).emissions have come from the United States.The next highest emitters are China (9  per- Temperature and precipitationcent), the Russian Federation (8 percent) and The past half century’s most dramatic changesGermany (7 percent). Very high HDI countries in temperature have been in the polar regionshave generated cumulatively more than nine and at higher latitudes (map 2.1).39 Does thistimes more carbon dioxide per capita than low, mean that climate change harms high HDImedium and high HDI countries combined countries more? Not necessarily. Countries—hence the Kyoto Protocol’s “common but with lower initial temperatures can betterdifferentiated responsibilities” for address- withstand temperature rises—whereas ining climate change, explored in detail below. climate-sensitive tropical areas a small rise in temperature can severely disrupt natural con-Repercussions for temperature, rainfall, ditions, with adverse repercussions for watersea level and disaster risk availability and crop productivity.40Climate change affects not only temperature In recent decades precipitation has fallenbut also rainfall, sea level and natural disasters. more than 2  millimetres (almost 3 percent) CHapteR 2 pAtternS And trendS in huMAn develOpMent, equity And envirOnMentAl indiCAtOrS 33
  • FIGURE 2.8 Sources of greenhouse gas growth 175 Share of the increase in total emissions (percent) 120 Carbon dioxide (1970–2007) Methane (1990–2005) 100 Nitrous oxide (1990–2005) 80 60 China and India 40 China 20 India Europe and Sub-Saharan Very high Central Asia Africa HDI 0 Arab States East Asia and Latin America South Asia High Medium Low the Pacific and the HDI HDI HDI Caribbean –20 –40 –60 –80 Source: HDRO calculations based on data from World Bank (2011b). MAP 2.1 temperature changes are greatest in polar regions and higher latitudes Change from 1951–1980 average to 2000–2008 average More than –1°C –1°C to 0°C 0°C to 1°C 1°C to 2°C More than 2°C Source: HDRO calculations based on data from the University of Delaware.34 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • FIGURE 2.9from a 1951–1980 baseline. The largest decline rising temperatures and reduced rainfallhas been in Sub-Saharan Africa (7  milli- Levels and changes in climate variability by HDI groupmetres, or more than 7 percent) and in low TemperatureHDI countries (4 millimetres, or more than Levels (degrees Celsius)4  percent), followed by medium HDI coun- 0.84tries (figure 2.9). 41 Low HDI countries have Average 0.74 value, 0.66 0.64also experienced the sharpest increases in rain- 2000sfall variability. What to expect going forward? There is Precipitationno scientific consensus on the net effects of (millimetres per month)climate change on precipitation, given dif-ferent patterns around the world. 42 How- Very high High Medium Low HDI HDI HDI HDIever, some broad regional trends emerge from Average value, Very high High Medium Lowthe climate models. Africa is expected to see –0.07 1951–1980 HDI HDI HDI HDIhigher than average warming—with less rainin North Africa and the southern and western –1.49parts of the continent but more rain in EastAfrica. Western Europe is expected to become –2.89warmer and wetter, while the Mediterraneanwill experience less rainfall. In Asia the num- –4.16ber of hot days will increase, and the number ofcold days will decrease. In Latin America and Change in variability (percentage points) 1.38the Caribbean temperatures are likely to risewhile precipitation falls. Small island develop-ing states are expected to have lower than aver- Temperature Precipitation (degrees Celsius) (millimetres per month)age temperature increases, but they will likelybe hard hit by changes in the sea level, as we see Very high High Medium Low Very high High Mediumfurther below.43 HDI HDI HDI HDI HDI HDI HDI Average value, Low 1951–1980 –0.08 –0.15 –0.17 HDISea level riseSince 1870 the average sea level has risen 20 –0.65centimetres, and the rate of change has accel- Averageerated. If this accelerated rate holds, the sea value, –0.98 2000slevel will be 31 centimetres higher in 2100 –1.35 –1.38than in 1990, 44 with devastating impacts, Note: Change in variability is the difference in the coefficients of variation between 1951–1980 and the 2000s, weighted by averageespecially for small island developing states, population for 1950–2008.which are particularly exposed (box 2.6, table Source: HDRO calculations based on data from the University of Delaware.2.2). Many face high mitigation costs rela-tive to income, and their vulnerability risks countries have the resources and technologydiscouraging private investors, affecting their to reduce the risk of losses. The Netherlands,ability to adapt. 45 with large, densely populated areas of low- These sea-related increases will affect all lying land, has abated the risk of flooding andcoastal regions. A half-metre sea level rise by reclaimed inundated land with innovative2050 would flood almost a million square technology and infrastructure investments. 47kilometres—an area the size of France and Among regions, the impact will be larg-Italy combined—and affect some 170 million est in East Asia and the Pacific, where morepeople.46 than 63 million people are likely to be affected The share of people likely to be affected is (see table 2.2). The greatest economic impactslargest in very high HDI countries and small will be felt in East Asia and the Pacific andisland developing states, but very high HDI in medium HDI countries (both around CHapteR 2 pAtternS And trendS in huMAn develOpMent, equity And envirOnMentAl indiCAtOrS 35
  • BOX 2.6 Impacts of climate change on small island developing states Small island and low-lying coastal countries share similar challenges, includ- cryptosporidium, a diarrhoea-causing parasite. Similarly, dengue fever has a ing small populations, lack of resources, remoteness, susceptibility to natu- clear association with rainfall and temperature in the Caribbean. ral disasters, dependence on international trade and vulnerability to global Small island developing states are vulnerable not only to climate change developments. Their temperatures are predicted to increase 1˚–4˚C by 2100 but also to natural disasters, including storm surges, floods, droughts, tsu- (relative to 1960–1990), with adverse effects on people, including displace- namis and cyclones. Natural disasters are particularly frequent on small is- ment and poorer health. lands. Of the 10 countries suffering the greatest number of natural disasters Rising sea levels will displace people and inundate cultivable low-lying per capita from 1970 to 2010, 6 were small island developing states. And a lands. Island countries with a low mean elevation — such as Tuvalu (1.83 single disaster can cause huge economic losses. Hurricane Gilbert in 1988 metres), Kiribati (2.0 metres) and the Marshall Islands (2.13 metres) — are cost Saint Lucia almost four times its GDP, while Hurricane Ivan in 2004 seriously threatened by the possibility of a 0.18–0.59 metre sea level rise by was responsible for losses in Grenada that were twice its GDP. The 2004 the end of 21st century. In low-elevation coastal zones the entire population Indian Ocean tsunami that hit the Maldives killed more than 100 people and of the Maldives and 85 percent of the population of the Bahamas are at risk. affected more than 27,000. By 2100, 90 percent of coral reefs that protect Health effects may be severe as well. Kiribati can expect a 10 percent islands from ocean waves and storms could disappear, making natural dis- drop in rainfall by 2050 — reducing fresh water 20 percent. Moreover, salt asters more likely still. water intrusions are increasing due to sea level rise and frequent coastal Constraints extend to data and statistics. We have improved coverage flooding, further contaminating ground water wells, the primary fresh wa- of the HDI in these states, from 23 last year to 32 out of 49 this year. These ter source for its rapidly growing population. About 19 percent of potable states have an average HDI of 0.617, compared with the global average of water in Trinidad and Tobago following heavy rainfall tested positive for 0.649. Source: www.sidsnet.org/2.html; Elisara 2008; UNDESA 2010a; Kelman and West 2009; Mimura and others 2007; Elbi and others 2006; Amarakoon and others 2008; Noy 2009; Heger, Julca and Paddison 2009; www.climate.gov.ki/Climate_change_effects_in_Kiribati.html; www.emdat.be/result-country-profile; http://pdf.wri.org/reefs_at_risk_revisited.pdf. TABlE 2.2 natural disasters more than doubled from 132 projected impacts of a half-metre rise in sea level by 2050 a year over 1980–1985 to 357 over 2005– Population likely Share of total 2009.49 Although it is hard to link any single to be affected by population likely disaster directly to climate change—given the Number of sea level rise to be affected Country group countries (millions) (percent) inherent randomness in what generates these Regions events—science links global warming to their Arab States 20 8.9 2.6 increased incidence.50 The frequency of high East Asia and the Pacific 22 63.1 3.3 intensity tropical cyclones and associated pre- Europe and Central Asia 17 4.4 1.2 cipitation is predicted to rise 20 percent by Latin America and the Caribbean 31 7.0 1.3 2100.51 South Asia 6 38.9 2.4 The growing incidence of reported natural Sub-Saharan Africa 30 10.2 1.9 disasters does not affect everyone equally— Small island developing states 35 1.7 3.4 not only because the damage wrought by the HDI groups average natural disaster may change but also Very high 41 41.0 16.0 because the capacity of societies to respond and High 42 15.0 4.5 protect themselves also varies.52 Medium 38 84.6 0.4 Most countries do not experience natu- Low 32 30.8 9.4 ral disasters, so patterns differ markedly by World 153 171.4 2.7 country and region. In recent years South Source: HDRO calculations based on data from Wheeler 2011. Asia experienced the largest number, an aver- age of almost six a year per country. Low HDI 2 percent of GDP). Low HDI countries, many countries, while often vulnerable to drought, landlocked, will lose proportionately less tend to have fewer disasters than medium (0.5 percent).48 HDI countries, partly because many are land- locked. Small island developing states are Natural disasters also highly exposed to natural disasters (see Climate change is increasing the likelihood box 2.6). of extreme weather events, such as droughts, These numbers, which are affected storms and floods. The average number of such by extreme cases and may differ from the36 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • average, can reveal how societies are marked opportunities and power, as chapter 3 shows,by most natural disasters and demonstrate and carry further implications such as loss oftheir resilience. The good news is that the biodiversity (box 2.7).median costs of these events (whether num-ber of deaths, people affected or economic Soil erosion, desertification and waterlosses) have fallen over the past four decades scarcityglobally and for all HDI groups (table 2.3). Agricultural output has doubled over the pastHighlights include the significant drop in 50 years, with only a 10 percent increase in cul-the median number of deaths due to natural tivated land. But degradation of soil and water Low HDI countriesdisasters, with the steepest declines in low resources is increasing: soil erosion, reducedHDI countries (down almost 72 percent). fertility and overgrazing are affecting as much are experiencing theNatural disasters afflict many more people as 40 percent of croplands.53 steepest declines inand are much more costly in low and medium At the extreme, overexploitation can turn precipitation and theHDI countries than in high and very high arable land into desert—though the overall sharpest increasesHDI countries. Medium HDI countries extent of degradation is hard to quantify.54 It in its variabilityare particularly affected: the typical natural affects an estimated 31 percent of total landdisaster in a medium HDI country takes 11 area in low, medium and high HDI countriespercent more lives and affects nearly twice and about 51 percent in very high HDI coun-as many people as a typical natural disaster tries. The lowest shares of severely and veryin a low HDI country. Economic losses have severely degraded land in developing regionsalso declined over time as a share of income, are in Latin America and the Caribbean andthough the estimates depend on underlying Europe and Central Asia, and the highest areassumptions. in South Asia. Nonetheless the highest shares of people living on degraded land are in the * * * Arab States (25 percent of the population) andIn sum, the poorest countries bear many of Sub-Saharan Africa (22 percent) (see statisticalthe costs of climate change, and the pros- table 7).pect of worsening global inequality is very Water is vital for natural systems andreal. Low HDI countries are experiencing human development. Irrigated lands producethe steepest declines in precipitation and two to three times as much as rainfed agricul-the sharpest increases in its variability. Some ture. Agriculture accounts for 70–85 percentof the largest temperature increases are in of water use—and an estimated 20 percent ofalready-hot parts of developing countries. global grain production uses water unsustain-The frequency of natural disasters is highest ably. And demand for water for food produc-in low and medium HDI countries, though tion is projected to double by 2050.55the good news is that the human develop-ment cost of the typical natural disaster has TABlE 2.3declined. Sea level rise has the largest direct disaster-related casualties and costs, median annual values byeffects on coastal developed countries, which hdi group, 1971–1990 and 1991–2010are often better prepared to deal with them, Deaths Affected population Cost (per million people) (per million people) (percent of GNI)and on small island developing states, which Country group 1971–1990 1991–2010 1971–1990 1991–2010 1971–1990 1991–2010are far more vulnerable. HDI group Very high 0.9 0.5 196 145 1.0 0.7Chronic environmental threats High 2.1 1.1 1,437 1,157 1.3 0.7Climate change is not the only environmental Medium 2.7 2.1 11,700 7,813 3.3 2.1threat. Deforestation and overexploitation of Low 6.9 1.9 12,385 4,102 7.6 2.8soil and waterways can threaten long-term live- World 2.1 1.3 3,232 1,822 1.7 1.0lihoods, fresh water availability and essential Note: Values are for median impacts of climatological, hydrological and meteorological natural disasters.renewable resources, such as fisheries. These Source: HDRO calculations based on Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters Emergency Events Database:problems sometimes reflect imbalances in International Disaster Database. CHapteR 2 pAtternS And trendS in huMAn develOpMent, equity And envirOnMentAl indiCAtOrS 37
  • BOX 2.7 Water withdrawals have tripled over the Biodiversity—the accelerating loss of our ecosystems last 50 years.56 Pumping from aquifers exceeds Healthy and resilient ecosystems — and the life-supporting services that they provide — natural replenishment, so water tables are fall- depend on the biodiversity they contain. But rapid loss of biodiversity is accelerating globally, ing. The main causes: destruction of wetlands, with serious declines experienced in the last decade in fresh water wetlands, sea ice habitats, salt marshes and coral reefs. The Convention on Biological Diversity’s Global Biodiversity Out- watersheds and natural water towers to make look 3 points to “multiple indications of continuing decline in biodiversity in all three of its main way for industrial and agricultural use. The components — genes, species and ecosystems.” According to the report, natural habitats in 2006 HDR documented how power, poverty most parts of the world are shrinking, and nearly a quarter of plant species are estimated to and inequality contribute to water scarcity. be threatened with extinction. Environmental scientists believe that we are witnessing what may be the fastest mass Deforestation extinction of species, with about half the Earth’s estimated 10 million species expected to One way the demands of development appear disappear this century. The biggest cause of this loss is the conversion of natural areas to at odds with environmental sustainability is in agriculture and urban development; other causes include the introduction of invasive alien species; overexploitation of natural resources; pollution; and, increasingly, the effects of cli- the loss of forest cover. This has been occur- mate change. ring for a long time: Earth’s forest cover today Some 10–30 percent of mammal, bird and amphibian species are threatened by extinc- is only three-fifths of what it was in prehistoric tion, with more in poorer countries. This partly reflects the location of “biodiversity hotspots” times.57 While deforestation has often been (areas with the richest and most threatened resources of animal and plant life) in tropical linked to development, trends today are asso- areas. ciated more with underdevelopment. The impact of biodiversity loss on human development is severe in tropical developing The average forest share is similar in very countries, where poor communities rely heavily on natural resources. For example, wild foods high and low HDI countries (28–29 percent), are an important source of vitamins and minerals in the diets of many African communities. Use of wild foods can also reduce disease transmission in complex tropical ecosystems. and around 23 percent in medium HDI coun- tries.58 And while very high HDI countries Source: Klein and others 2009; Myers and Knoll 2001; Rockström and others 2009; Roscher and others 2007; Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 2010. have increased total forest cover about 1 per- cent since 1990, low HDI countries have aver- aged 11 percent loss and high HDI countries FIGURE 2.10 4 percent loss, while medium HDI countries Some regions deforest, others reforest and afforest have had almost no change. Latin America Forest cover shares and rates of change by region, 1990–2010 (millions of square kilometres) and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa Forest area, 2010 Change in forest area, 1990–2010 had the greatest loss, followed by the Arab States; the other regions have seen minor gains Arab States 0.88 –0.07 (figure 2.10).59 East Asia and Seven developing countries (Bhutan, 4.70 0.10 the Pacific China, Costa Rica, Chile, El Salvador, India, Europe and 9.00 0.06 and Viet  Nam) have recently transitioned Central Asia from deforesting to reforesting with sup- Latin America and the 9.47 –0.93 port from domestic and international pro- Caribbean grammes. However, there are indications that South Asia 0.93 0.02 some of these countries have, in effect, shifted Sub-Saharan deforestation to other developing countries, 5.85 –0.70 Africa so that for every 100 hectares of reforestation they import the equivalent of 74 hectares in Very high HDI 10.10 0.11 wood products. 60 Simulations suggest that the European Union transfers 75 of every High HDI 16.80 –0.71 100 cubic metres of reduced timber harvest to Medium HDI 6.72 0.03 developing countries, mainly to the tropics; Australia and New Zealand, 70 cubic metres; Low HDI 6.58 –0.81 and the United States, 46 cubic metres. 61 Understanding trends in global forestation thus requires examining consumption and Source: HDRO calculations based on data from World Bank (2011b). trade as well as production. 62 Switzerland,38 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • BOX 2.8for example, consumes agricultural products land grabbing—a growing phenomenon?equivalent to more than 150 percent of its cul- Private, government and public-private joint ventures, usually from capital-rich countries,tivated land. 63 are acquiring long-term leases or ownership rights to large portions of land (often more than A related concern is the rise of interna- 1,000 hectares) in developing countries. Economically powerful developing countries, such astional “land grabs,” as governments and corpo- China, India and Saudi Arabia, as well as developed countries, are joining the land grab. Whilerations acquire large tracts in land-abundant sources differ, all suggest a recent acceleration, with estimates of more than 20–30 millionand poorer countries (box 2.8). hectares transacted between 2005 and mid-2009 and about 45 million hectares between 2008 and 2010. The rise in commodity prices appears to be motivating both government and privateDegradation of marine ecosystems purchases.Fish are an important source of protein for Some see this phenomenon as an opportunity for long-awaited investments in agricul- tural modernization that will provide access to better technology, create more jobs for farm-hundreds of millions of people: on aver- ers and reduce poverty in rural areas. But others consider it a threat to local populations. Aage, people eat 24 kilograms of fish a year in recent World Bank study supports the latter view, finding that expected benefits were notNorth America, 18.5 in Asia and 9.2 in Latin achieved. Several studies have reported human rights violations, with local populations forci-America and the Caribbean. 64 But fishing bly displaced and access to local natural resources restricted. Hurt most were smallholders,that exceeds the natural rate of regeneration, indigenous people and women, who often lack formal title to the lands on which they live andcoupled with dredging, dumping, discharge of farm. Environmental organizations have criticized negative impacts, including deforestation,pollutants, coastal infrastructure and coastal loss of biodiversity and threats to wildlife.tourism undermines the conditions required Recent international initiatives seek to provide a regulatory framework to spread out the benefits and balance opportunities with risks. The challenge is to implement multilevel insti-for healthy marine ecosystems, thereby threat- tutional arrangements, including effective local participation, to promote sustainability andening their sustainability. equity in this major change in land use. The current annual fish catch of 145 mil- Source: Borras and Franco 2010; Deiniger and others 2011; IFAD 2011; Da Vià 2011.lion tonnes far exceeds the maximum annualsustainable yield of 80–100 million tonnes.65In 2008 the Food and Agriculture Organiza- Catch rates are still rising, most rapidly intion estimated that 53 percent of known fish some developing regions, despite governmentstocks were fully exploited, 28 percent were initiatives to reduce overfishing. 68 Rates moreoverexploited, 3 percent were depleted and than quadrupled in East Asia and the Pacific,only 15 percent were moderately exploited.66 for example, between 1980 and 2005. OnceAlthough total output has not yet fallen, yields again, this increase partly reflects high produc-for some species, especially larger fish, have tion for export to developed countries, wheredeclined considerably since the 1980s.  consumption per capita is greater. Here again we see considerable disparity.Some 10 percent of fishing activities account Pollutionfor an estimated 90 percent of the total catch Recent studies suggest that pollution tran-—mostly developed country fishers using sitions may be more complex than thosecapital-intensive methods such as technologi- described by the environmental Kuznetscally advanced fishing vessels with long-term curve, which asserts that pollution first risesstorage facilities and mechanized trawls suit- and then falls with economic development.69able for fishing in deep waters. Average annual For example, low-income cities have local,production by fish farmers is 172 tonnes in immediate and poverty-related environmentalNorway, 72 in Chile, 6 in China and 2 in problems; middle-income cities have citywideIndia. Although 85 percent of people in the problems related to rapid growth; and high-fish industry work in Asia, annual production income cities experience the consequences ofin the region is 2.4 tonnes per ocean fisher, wealthy lifestyles.70 So, while affluence reducescompared with amounts as high as 23.9 tonnes the “brown” pollution problems of low-incomein developed regions such as Europe.67 Large cities, such as poor water supply, sanitation andcommercial fishing companies not only catch solid waste management, it replaces them withmore fish but also engage in damaging prac- “green” ecological issues such as waste reduc-tices, using high bycatch methods and bottom tion, high emissions and inefficient transporttrawling. systems. CHapteR 2 pAtternS And trendS in huMAn develOpMent, equity And envirOnMentAl indiCAtOrS 39
  • Cities are at once sources of major pollu- these potential improvements present an enor- tion and opportunities for fostering sustain- mous opportunity. The relationship between ability. People in cities consume 60–80 per- equity and the density of cities is complex. But cent of energy produced worldwide and more compact neighbourhoods and afford- account for roughly similar proportions of able transport systems can enhance equity by carbon emissions.71 Cities can foster sustain- increasing accessibility, and some evidence ability, especially when urban planning inte- suggests that higher density is correlated with grates environmental considerations. High less social segregation. population density fosters economies of scale Natural disasters affecting cities can be Cities can foster and skill and enterprise specialization. These especially devastating, as with Hurricane Kat- sustainability, features make most infrastructure and public rina in New Orleans in the United States. especially when urban goods, such as water, sanitation and drainage, Cities need investments in infrastructure and planning integrates and public transportation systems, more cost systems to manage these vulnerabilities. Rio environmental efficient and provide more options for mate- de Janeiro uses sophisticated modelling tech- considerations. High rial reuse and recycling. It has been estimated niques to predict natural disasters and take population density that when a city doubles in population, the pre-emptive measures. fosters economies associated increase in infrastructure require- Global trends tell a more optimistic story. ments is only 85 percent.72 Per capita emis- Pollution measurement has been a subject of of scale and skill sions in New York City are only 30 percent vigorous debate, but outdoor concentrations and enterprise of the US average; the same holds for Rio de of particulate matter suggest declines around specialization, but the Janeiro and Brazil.73 The average Manhattan the world over the past two decades.77 Sub- downside from waste resident accounts for 14,127 fewer pounds Saharan Africa has seen more rapid decline, generation and outdoor of carbon emissions annually than a subur- though from a higher level. In very high HDI air pollution can be huge ban New Yorker, in part due to lower vehicle countries pollution has fallen almost one- use.74 The pattern appears in all US metro- third. Even so, average concentrations of par- politan areas. ticulate matter in urban areas are 2.3 times But the downside of cities from waste gen- higher in low, medium and high HDI coun- eration and outdoor air pollution can be huge. tries than in very high HDI countries.78 Richer Air pollution, which tends to be worse in countries have tougher air quality regulations urban areas, is a major cause of respiratory and and measures targeting air pollution, such as cardiovascular diseases globally, while limited control systems on power plants and industrial access to safe drinking water and proper sani- facilities, catalytic converters on vehicles and tation accounts for 1.6 million deaths a year.75 cleaner fuels.79 Urbanites also produce enormous quantities of waste, too often poorly managed. Areas near * * * New Delhi and Kathmandu, for example, suf- This section on trends in key environmental fer from severe river pollution.76 Some richer indicators and their threats to human devel- countries are exporting their waste to poorer opment has shown deterioration on several countries, with harmful effects, despite the fronts, but not on all. Remarkable progress 1992 Basel Convention restricting such trade in curbing air pollution, for example, sug- (box 2.9). Outdoor air pollution is generally gests that some dimensions of the environ- worse in cities, as are related health effects ment can improve with development. Of (chapter 3). The high density of pollutants greatest concern is that the poorest countries also increases cloud concentration, affecting experience the most serious consequences of precipitation. environmental degradation. The next chapter High population density means that even confirms that this pattern also holds within small declines in per capita pollution emis- countries. We now explore how countries sions, water use or energy use can bring major have broken these patterns to achieve sus- absolute improvements. With around half tainable and equitable progress in human the world’s population living in urban areas, development.40 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • BOX 2.9Hazardous waste and the Basel Convention As public concern about hazardous waste mounted in developed countries in least 10 people; and affecting more than 100,000 people. Such cases reflect the 1970s and 1980s, many governments passed restrictive legislation. An not only weaknesses in the Basel Convention but also the economic real- unexpected result was a massive increase in exports of hazardous waste — ity in many developing countries. The convention assumes that developing including asbestos, mercury, ash, heavy metals, clinical waste and pesticides countries have the technical and administrative capacity to assess the risk — to developing countries. Economic inequalities made the prospect of of accepting waste shipments and the good governance necessary to resist accepting hazardous waste attractive to some countries. In the 1980s a monetary inducements, not always the case. coalition of European and US companies offered Guinea-Bissau $600 million Electronic waste (e-waste), the fastest growing sector of global waste, — about five times its gross national product—to accept shipments of toxic is hazardous to human health and the environment. E-waste from China, In- waste, an offer it ultimately refused because of international pressure. dia, Thailand, the United States and the European Union over 2004–2008 to- The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements talled 17 million tonnes a year; the United Nations Environment Programme of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal regulates such exports, requiring estimates global e-waste at 20–50 million tonnes a year. Only a small share informed consent about the nature of the waste. Today, 175 countries are of e-waste is recycled. For example, in 2007 the United States recycled parties to the Basel Convention; the United States is among those that are less than 20 percent of e-waste from obsolete televisions, cell phones and not. A 1995 amendment prohibits all exports of hazardous waste, but it has computer products. The rest was disposed in landfills, mostly in developing not yet been ratified by the necessary three-quarters of participants. The countries such as China, India and Nigeria. Nevertheless, e-waste recycling convention recognizes the urgency of the problem, but an adequate interna- has become a dynamic economic sector, particularly in China and India, tional regulatory framework has not yet been established. where recovering, repairing, and trading materials from discarded electronic Exposure to hazardous waste in developing countries remains serious. devices provide an important livelihood for poor people. But the lead, mer- In 2006 a Dutch company dumped 500 tonnes of toxic waste in 16 sites in cury and cadmium in these products are highly toxic. While precautions can Abidjan, contaminating the city’s drinking water, soil and fisheries; killing at be taken, many people are unaware of the risks. Source: Andrews 2009; Sonak, Sonak, and Giriyan 2008; Widmer and others 2005; Robinson 2009; UNEP/GRID-Europe 2005; GreenPeace 2009; UNEP and UNU 2009; www.epa.gov/international/toxics/ ewaste.html; http://toxipedia.org/display/toxipedia/Electronic+Waste+%28E-Waste%29.Success in promoting next chapter, relate to the immediate humansustainable and equitable impacts of household-level deprivation inhuman development terms of access to water and indoor air pol- lution. These variables are gauged relative toHow can we best interpret these contrasting regional medians of achievement. We need topatterns? Can we identify the better perform- account for regional differences—otherwiseing countries in human development, sustain- only very high HDI countries would beability and equity? The task is difficult, not deemed successful, which would shed littleleast because no single indicator captures sus- light on the range of circumstances facing peo-tainability well. But we illustrate a potentially ple around the world.useful approach to assessing joint progress The global environmental aspects oftowards these objectives and review a range sustainability—those that pose wide-rang-of indicators that provide interesting insights ing threats—are measured by greenhouse gasinto promising policy approaches. The find- emissions, deforestation and water use, inings synthesize much of the evidence we have a normative manner, each relative to globalaccumulated so far and provide a bridge to the norms reflecting good practice. Following thecommunity and household analysis in the next same logic, we identify countries with a bet-chapter. We propose a method, identify some ter record on the HDI and inequality than theinstances of positive synergies, where countries median of their region. Applying this multi-have promoted sustainable human develop- dimensional filter enables us to identify ament with equity, and discuss the main policy shortlist of countries with relatively better per-implications. formance in responding to both localized and How can we identify positive syner- global environmental threats, as well as withgies? Our framework reflects both local and respect to the HDI and equity. The results areglobal dimensions of sustainability that we illustrative, owing to patchy data and otherhighlighted in figure 2.3. The local aspects, issues relating to comparability. Nonetheless,which we will explore in greater depth in the for the indicators that we are able to assemble, CHapteR 2 pAtternS And trendS in huMAn develOpMent, equity And envirOnMentAl indiCAtOrS 41
  • they suggest some promising approaches that threshold (for global threats) and better than have the potential to promote relatively equi- the regional median (for local impacts, HDI table and environmentally sustainable policy and HDI losses due to inequality). 80 A few as well as human development more broadly. countries perform well on at least four of the Table 2.4 illustrates the application of the five environmental fronts considered. Costa joint lens described above to identify countries Rica stands out for good performance on all that have performed better than the global five criteria. Germany and Sweden, two very BOX 2.10 high HDI countries, perform well in defor- Positive synergies in Sweden and Costa Rica estation, water use, water access and indoor The performance of countries identified as doing well on environmental, human development air pollution but less well in greenhouse gas and equity fronts can offer insights and development lessons. Here we focus on environmental emissions. The Philippines is an interesting performance in Sweden and Costa Rica. case particularly with respect to afforestation, Sweden is currently seventh in the Human Development Index (HDI), sixth best in human because the increase in forest area has been development loss due to inequality and first in the Gender Inequality Index. Its per capita emis- supported by community-based social forestry sions were the sixth lowest for very high HDI countries, and air pollution rates were the lowest programs. Also, indoor air pollution in the for very high HDI countries and the fourth lowest globally. Sweden’s performance appears to Philippines is only 48 percent of the regional be rooted in its strong environmental awareness and a tradition of egalitarian and democratic median, and broad access to schooling and policy. For example, the Committee for Research into the Preservation and Utilization of Natu- ral Resources, established in 1957, worked to raise public awareness of environmental issues healthcare offsets traditionally high income and served as a powerful pressure group. Other early clues include a 1969 survey indicating inequality. Box 2.10 highlights the experiences majority support for both slower economic growth to prevent environmental deterioration and of Costa Rica and Sweden. for higher local taxes to fight water pollution, reflecting a willingness to pay for better environ- Of course, this picture is incomplete. Data ment quality. The right to common access is rooted deeply in the Swedish social psyche and limitations have already been hinted at. And, in centuries-old customs. Contemporary awareness is reflected in Gallup Poll results showing an obvious shortcoming, it does not include that 96 percent of Swedes are aware of climate change and almost half regard it as a serious any indicators of political freedom and empow- threat. Sweden’s achievements in equity and education might translate into stronger political erment or performance on gender equality voice, partly explaining why popular environmental awareness and sensitivity are reflected in environmentally friendly policies. and women’s empowerment (as captured by Successive governments in Costa Rica have implemented policies and built institutions the GII, for example, which is explored in the with environmental objectives in mind. In 1955 Costa Rica established the Institute for Tourism next chapter). All four countries are democra- to protect the country’s natural resources. But it was the forestry legislation of the late 1980s cies and do well relative to their HDI group in that really launched its environmental policy. The law defines the environmental services of terms of gender equality. forests as carbon sequestration, biodiversity protection, water flow regulation and scenery. Exploring trends over time also gives a It was also the foundation for introducing payments for environmental services as a financial more mixed picture. Of the four countries mechanism to protect forests. By the mid-1990s environmental rights were enshrined in the we identify here as relatively strong perform- Constitution, and Costa Rica had become a pioneer in selling carbon reduction credits (to Nor- way). Active participation by civil society, the population’s pride in the country’s beauty, biodi- ers, only Germany and Sweden improved versity and natural resources, and investment opportunities related to sustainable practices in on all dimensions. Since the 1990s all coun- sectors such as tourism have also contributed. tries on the list have reduced air pollution Source: UNDP Costa Rica Country Office, Observatorio del Desarrollo and Universidad de Costa Rica 2011; Kristrom and Wibe and maintained or improved the share of the 1997; Lundqvist 1972. population with access to water, and all but TABlE 2.4 good performers on the environment, equity and human development, most recent year available Global threats Local impacts Equity and human development HDI Overall loss Greenhouse gas (percent of regional (percent of regional Country emissions Deforestation Water use Water access Air pollution median) median) Costa Rica ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 104 77 Germany ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 103 91 Philippines ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 103 89 Sweden ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 102 70 Note: These countries all pass the criteria of absolute thresholds for global threats as defined in note 80, perform better than the median of their respective regional peers both in the human development and inequality dimensions and perform better than the regional median for local impacts.42 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • the Philippines have reduced greenhouse gas sustainability and local threats. While dataemissions.81 Multidimensional inequality also constraints preclude presenting a completefell in these top countries except in Costa Rica, ranking of countries, we offer some illus-which nevertheless still has lower inequality trative results and suggest that the methodthan its regional median.82 offers a valuable means of demonstrating that Many developing countries also demon- countries in different regions, with very dif-strate successful, scalable, sectoral models for ferent structural characteristics and levels oftransition to a green economy. Some examples:83 development, can adopt policies consistent• The city of Curitiba in Brazil has success- with more sustainable and equitable human fully implemented innovative approaches development. to urban planning, city management and transport to address the challenge of rapid * * * population growth. The city now has the This chapter has considered key patterns and highest rate of public transport use in Bra- trends in human development and the envi- zil (45 percent of all journeys) and one of ronment and provided evidence of major the country’s lowest rates of air pollution. cross-country disparities as well as new find-• Kenya’s Ministry of Energy adopted a ings about positive synergies. In many cases feed-in tariff in 2008 to supply and diver- the poorest countries bear the brunt of envi- sify electricity generation sources, gener- ronmental deterioration, even though they ate income and employment and reduce contribute only a small share to the problem. greenhouse gas emissions. The tariff covers But greater equality—both across and within biomass, geothermal, small hydroelectric, countries—is consistent with better environ- solar and wind power. mental performance. In sum, it is possible to identify countries The analysis underlines the potentialthat have promoted sustainable and equitable pay-offs from development models that bothhuman development through a higher HDI, promote equity and less lopsidedly favourlower inequality and performance on a set of economic growth, themes that we explore inenvironmental indicators that reflect global subsequent chapters. CHapteR 2 pAtternS And trendS in huMAn develOpMent, equity And envirOnMentAl indiCAtOrS 43
  • chap ter 3 tracing the effects— understanding the relationsWe have seen major intersections between links—educated girls have lower fertility rates,equity and the environment. In this chapter and more empowered communities suffer lesswe focus on how environmental unsustaina- pollution.bility affects people and how inequality medi- Through the lens of multidimensional pov-ates this relationship. We also draw attention erty, this chapter first documents deprivationsto countries and groups that have broken the in the immediate environments of the poorpattern, emphasizing transformations in gen- and how such deprivations can intersect withder roles and empowerment. adverse repercussions of climate change. Next Poor and disadvantaged people suffer the related environmental threats to people’smost from environmental degradation. That health, education and livelihoods are explored,fact surprises no one. Almost every week the followed by how chronic disadvantage inter-media report catastrophes that shatter lives in acts with acute risks to make extreme eventsthe poorest parts of the world—lives of people more disequalizing. The chapter closes withwho already face major disadvantages. a focus on gender and power inequalities and While extreme events are disequalizing, so on how greater equality in these areas can havetoo are activities that harm the environment. positive effects on the environment, laying theStudies for the United States, for example, ground for the investigation of policy optionsshow that toxic waste facilities are located dis- in the chapters that follow.proportionately in working class and minorityneighbourhoods, harming health and educa- A poverty lenstion as well as property values.1 Whether theseoutcomes arose because land and housing in A key theme of this Report is that the world’sthose areas lost value after the facilities were most disadvantaged people carry a “doublebuilt or because residents were less able to resist burden.” More vulnerable to environmentallocation decisions, it is clear that environmen- degradation, they must also cope with imme-tally harmful practices accentuate racial and diate environmental threats from indoor airsocial inequalities. These location decisions do pollution, dirty water and unimproved sani-not happen only in market economies: in the tation.3 Our Multidimensional Poverty Indexformer Soviet Union the Mayak nuclear facil- (MPI), introduced in the 2010 Human Devel-ity was built in a region settled mostly by Mus- opment Report (HDR), gives us a closer look atlim Tatar and Bashkir people and descendants these household-level deprivations (figure 3.1).of people repressed and exiled under Stalin. 2 The MPI measures deficits in health, educa-This chapter aims to understand why and how tion and living standards, combining both thethese patterns come about today. number of deprived people and the intensity of Which factors condition the relation- their deprivations. This year we explore the per-ship between environmental degradation and vasiveness of environmental deprivations amonghuman development? Both the absolute level the multidimensionally poor—focusing on theand the distribution of individual, household lack of improved cooking fuel, drinking waterand community capabilities matter. Absolute and sanitation—and the extent of their overlapdeprivations can hurt the environment, and at the household level, an innovation of the MPI.bad environmental conditions erode people’s These are absolute deprivations that bothcapabilities. Many examples illustrate these matter in themselves and are violations of basic CHapteR 3 trACing the eFFeCtS—underStAnding the relAtiOnS 45
  • FIGURE 3.1 human rights. Ensuring access—including to Multidimensional poverty index— a focus on the most deprived modern cooking fuel, safe water and basic sanitation—also creates the potential to Living expand higher order capabilities, thereby Multidimensional enlarging people’s choices and furthering standard poverty MPI human development. The lens of the MPI highlights joint deprivations in access. Education Health Deprivations facing the poor Multidimensional poverty is estimated for FIGURE 3.2 109 countries (see statistical table 5),4 and the environmental deprivations in the Mpi results are striking. MPI • Globally, at least 6 in 10 people experience 0.7 • Arab States one environmental deprivation, and 4 in East Asia and the Pacific 10 experience two or more.5 These depri- 0.6 ✖ Europe and Central Asia vations are more acute among the multi- Latin America and the Caribbean dimensionally poor. More than 9 in 10 face 0.5 • South Asia at least one deprivation: nearly 90 percent 17 ✖ Sub-Saharan Africa do not use modern cooking fuels, 80 per- 0.4 cent lack adequate sanitation and 35 per- 0.3 cent lack clean water. • Most suffer overlapping deprivations: 8 0.2 in 10 poor people experience two or more environmental deficits, and 29 percent face 0.1 all three. • The rural poor are more afflicted. A strik- 0 ing 97 percent face at least one environ- 0 10 20 30 40 mental deprivation, and about a third suf- Environmental deprivation contribution to the MPI (percent) fer all three. Comparable data for urban areas are 75 percent and 13 percent. MPI • State- and provincial-level MPIs show 0.7 wide disparities in environmental depri- vations. Within Haiti the proportion of 0.6 people who are both multidimensionally 0.5 poor and deprived of clean water in Aire Métropolitaine/Ouest is 19 percent, while 0.4 in the Centre it is 70 percent. Similarly, in Senegal the proportion of people who 0.3 are both multidimensionally poor and deprived in cooking fuel is about 4 percent 0.2 in Dakar and about 88 percent in Kolda. And in India deprivations in sanitation 0.1 among multidimensionally poor people range from 3.5 percent in Kerala to more 0 60 than 70 percent in Bihar. 0 10 20 30 40 50 70 80 Environmental deprivations typically rise Share of multidimensionally poor with three environmental deprivations (percent) with the MPI, but the composition of multi- Note: The dashed line in the top panel denotes what the average contribution of environmental deprivations would be if their dimensional poverty varies, even for countries contribution to total poverty were equal to their weight in the MPI. Countries to the right have disproportionate environmental poverty, and countries to the left, less than expected. Survey years vary by country; see statistical table 5 for details. with similar poverty levels. Overall, envi- Source: HDRO staff estimates based on data in statistical table 5. ronmental deprivations disproportionately46 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • FIGURE 3.3contribute to multidimensional poverty, HDI countries face all three environmental environmental deprivationsaccounting for 20 percent of the MPI—above deprivations. And these countries typically are greatest for access totheir 17 percent weight in the index (figure have above average environmental poverty— modern cooking fuel3.2, top panel).6 In rural areas the average is about 6 percentage points higher than if the Share of multidimensionally poor22 percent of poverty, compared with 13 per- environmental deprivations they face equalled with environmental deprivations, by region (percent)cent in urban areas. In Mongolia, Peru, Swa- their weight in the MPI. For example, 65 per- 22.6 Waterziland and Uganda such deprivations account cent of the population in Madagascar lack 19.5 Sanitationfor more than 30 percent of multidimensional access to clean water. The repercussions are 26.8 Cooking fuelpoverty. extensive. Most schools in Madagascar have Europe and Central Asia But there are some good performers as no running water for adequate hygiene and 24.1well, with lower shares of environmental sanitation, so pupils fall sick regularly, miss- 41.5 54.3deprivation.7 In several Arab States (Jordan, ing classes and underperforming. Diarrhoea Latin America and the CaribbeanOccupied Palestinian Territory, the Syrian causes an estimated annual loss of 3.5 millionArab Republic and the United Arab Emir- school days in Madagascar.8 30.5 62.6ates) and European and Central Asian coun- There is also good news, sometimes reflect- 75.1tries (Croatia, Estonia, Russian Federation and ing successful outreach by governments and East Asia and the PacificUkraine) such deprivations are less than half nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). For 19.4their weight in the index. Brazil has also per- example, South Asia stands out for having a 86.4formed well. relatively low share of its population (less than 94.1 South Asia Regional patterns show that environmen- 15 percent) deprived in access to water.tal deprivations are most acute in Sub-Saharan 65.2Africa: 99 percent of the multidimensionally Understanding the relations 86.7 98.3poor face at least one environmental depriva- To better understand environmental depriva- Sub-Saharan Africation, and nearly 60 percent face all three (figure tions, we analysed the data holding poverty Note: Survey years vary by country; see statistical3.2, bottom panel). Environmental depriva- levels constant.9 Countries were ordered by table 5 for details. Data are not shown for thetions are also severe, if less pervasive, in South their share of multidimensionally poor people Arab States because low poverty levels render the results potentially unreliable.Asia: 97 percent of the poor suffer at least one facing one or more environmental deprivations Source: Calculated based on data in statisticaldeficit, and 18 percent face all three. By con- and the share facing all three. In both cases the table 5.trast, in Europe and Central Asia 39 percent share of the population with environmentalof the poor have one or more environmental deprivations rises with the MPI but with muchdeprivations (excluding Tajikistan, where the variation around the trend (figure 3.4).poor population is large and the share with one Countries above the trend line have higherdeprivation or more is an unusually high 82 than average environmental poverty, and thosepercent). Few have all three—just over 1 per- below perform better. The countries with thecent, excluding Tajikistan. lowest shares of their population facing at least Deprivations are most widespread for one deprivation are concentrated in the Arabaccess to cooking fuel (figure 3.3). In South States and Latin America and the CaribbeanAsia and Sub-Saharan Africa, the two poor- (7 of the top 10), while those with the lowestest regions, more than 90 percent of the share of the population with all three are con-multidimensionally poor lack access to centrated in South Asia (5 of the leading 10;modern cooking fuel. More than 85 per- table 3.1).cent of poor people in both regions lack Brazil, Djibouti, Guyana, Morocco andaccess to improved sanitation. In several Pakistan are in both top 10 lists. They performArab States water problems are paramount, well in having a low share of the populationaffecting more than 60 percent of the multi- with at least one environmental deprivationdimensionally poor. and with all three. The extent of environmental deprivation Some examples:is also associated with the country’s Human • The Brazilian government has beenDevelopment Index (HDI) value. More than expanding access to water and sanitation4 in 10 multidimensionally poor people in low for several decades, investing in water CHapteR 3 trACing the eFFeCtS—underStAnding the relAtiOnS 47
  • FIGURE 3.4 the share of the population with environmental deprivations rises with the Mpi but with much variation around the trend Share of multidimensionally poor with at least one deprivation (percent) Share of multidimensionally poor with three deprivations (percent) 100 • • • •• ••• •• •• • • •••• • •••• • ••• • • • •• •• •• • • • • • • • •• • • • 100 •• • • • • • • PAKISTAN •SENEGAL • • • 80 • MOROCCO • YEMEN 80 • • • •• • •• • • DJIBOUTI • • • IRAQ • • • •• • • • 60 • 60 • ••• • • • • • • • •• • • • • • • GUYANA • • • • • • • • •• 40 • BRAZIL 40 •• • •• • • • • • • • INDIA • 20 20 ••• • NEPAL • MOROCCO • GAMBIA • DJIBOUTI • • • PAKISTAN • • TAJIKISTAN • • BHUTAN • BANGLADESH 0 BRAZIL 0 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 MPI MPI Note: Survey years vary by country; see statistical table 5 for details. The figures depict deviations from the trend for the regression exercises described in the text. Source: HDRO calculations based on data in statistical table 5. TABlE 3.1 ten countries with the lowest share of environmental deprivations a national LPG delivery system and cross- among the multidimensionally poor, most recent year available for subsidies for LPG through taxes on other 2000–2010 fuels.12 Lowest share of multidimensionally Lowest share of multidimensionally • In Bangladesh only 4 percent of the multi- poor with at least one deprivation poor with all three deprivations dimensionally poor lack access to clean Brazil Bangladesh water, thanks to the country’s thousands of Guyana Pakistan hand tubewells. But there are caveats. Cov- Djibouti Gambia erage rates include access to a public stand- Yemen Nepal pipe, and wait times can be long. Dhaka Iraq India has only one public tap for every 500 slum Morocco Bhutan dwellers.13 Moreover, arsenic levels exceed Pakistan Djibouti World Health Organization (WHO) rec- Senegal Brazil ommendations in about a third of hand Colombia Morocco tubewells, jeopardizing the health of tens Angola Guyana of millions of Bangladeshis.14 Note: Countries in bold are on both lists. • The Djibouti government made water and Source: HDRO calculations based on data in statistical table 5. sanitation a priority in the mid-1990s.15 Reforms included priority funding and supply and using cross-subsidies to ben- new construction.16 More than 8 in 10 efit low-income households.10 Innova- Djibouti households use modern sources tion has also been important. Brasilia has of cooking fuel, though use of wood and developed condominial sewerage systems charcoal is now reportedly rising because that use narrow pipes installed at shal- of higher kerosene costs.17 low depths instead of more expensive • In Nepal water access is also fairly high conventional construction.11 Almost all among the multidimensionally poor Brazilian households (98 percent) use liq- (around 78 percent). This has been attrib- uefied petroleum gas (LPG) fuel, thanks uted to the lead role local communities and to policies beginning in the late 1960s for women, empowered through NGOs, have48 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • played in planning, designing and imple- three environmental deprivations were selected menting small subprojects for water sup- as the best comparable measures across coun- ply, sanitation, health and hygiene.18 tries, but other environmental threats may be The worst performers by share of the multi- equally or more acute at the local or nationaldimensionally poor with environmental dep- level. Flooding may be a more pressing concernrivations are located across several regions, for poor households in Bangladesh, for exam-with Sub-Saharan African countries featuring ple, than access to water.prominently. Among the countries perform- And it is important to underline that gooding relatively poorly in this respect, weak insti- performance (or bad) with respect to these the MPI sheds lighttutional capacity emerges as one explanation. specific indicators is not necessarily indicativeSome examples: of environmental degradation more broadly. on the patterns• The share of Peru’s population with access Some countries, such as Syria, have a very low of environmental to water and sanitation is among the lowest MPI (and low contribution of environmental deprivations facing in Latin America.19 Institutional capacity, deprivation) but still face pressing environ- households, showing planning and quality control have impeded mental stresses relating to water availability, the prevalence progress.20 Low rural electrification rates land deterioration and agricultural productiv- of overlapping mean that more than 80 percent of rural ity. And, as we explore in chapter 4, addressing deprivations but also, households rely on fuelwood for cooking. household-level deprivations needs to be done more optimistically, The availability of modern fuel is limited in in a way that minimizes environmental degra- highlighting countries many rural areas because of poor transpor- dation more broadly. tation networks and high upfront costs.21 Chapter 2 argues that as countries develop, that have done• In Mongolia large rural–urban disparities the nature and severity of their environmental relatively well in access to clean water and sanitation are problems tend to evolve. The types of direct exacerbated by weak institutional capacity environmental threats experienced at the indi- and lack of investment. In theory the gov- vidual and household levels—those we explore ernment gives priority to the water needs here—tend to be more severe and widespread of the poor, but in practice lack of regula- in countries at low HDI levels, and they are tions has resulted in price structures that experienced even more acutely by the poor. provide water at low cost to business and We have also highlighted a double burden of industry while disregarding the poor. Per the multidimensionally poor: that they may litre, rural consumers and small businesses be more exposed not only to these localized, pay 84 times more for clean water than do household-level threats but also to environ- industrial and mining companies.22 mental degradation writ large. The MPI sheds light on the patterns of We investigate this pattern further byenvironmental deprivations facing households looking at the relationship between the MPI(box 3.1). It shows the prevalence of overlap- and changes in climate. For 130 nationallyping deprivations but also, more optimisti- defined administrative regions in 15 coun-cally, highlights countries that have done rela- tries, we are able to compare area-specific MPIstively well, including through programmes we with changes in temperature and precipitationexplore in the next chapter. In addition to how —the “anomalies” discussed in chapter 2 (seecountries perform relative to each other, this map 2.1). The results are thought provoking.year we also explore how some have fared over • In our sample, on average, temperature wastime. 0.5°C higher in 2000–2008 than in 1951– These findings should be interpreted with 1980, while rainfall increased nearly 9care, however. Last year’s HDR recognized sev- millimetres (4.6 millimetres, if we excludeeral limitations of the MPI as a measurement some extreme changes in Indonesia). Thetool. The datasets cover different years, limit- temperature rose in 106 of 110 cases, anding comparability. In some cases the surveys rainfall rose in nearly 85 cases (80 percent).may not reflect recent improvements. Addi- • Overall, a strong positive associationtional caveats apply to the analysis here. The emerges between MPI levels and warming, CHapteR 3 trACing the eFFeCtS—underStAnding the relAtiOnS 49
  • BOX 3.1 Trends in multidimensional poverty Our concern with equity leads us to focus on the most disadvantaged. This year we use the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) to reveal trends in the mul- tiple deprivations that batter poor people at the same time for seven countries — Bolivia, Colombia, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar and Nigeria — and find that poverty declined in all of them (see figure). The decline was fastest in absolute terms in Bolivia, Nigeria and Lesotho, while annualized percentage reductions were greater in Bolivia, Colombia and Jordan, where low poverty means that small reductions translate into large relative declines. Capturing reductions in both the incidence and intensity of poverty is one of the MPI’s key strengths, creating useful incentives to reduce both the num- ber of people in poverty and the number of deprivations that they jointly face. The index thus overcomes a well known problem associated with traditional (“headcount only”) poverty measures, which can lead to a focus on moving people from just below to just above the poverty line. In our seven countries poverty has fallen by reducing both the number of multidimensionally poor people and the intensity of their poverty. Madagas- car’s improvement, for example, was driven mainly by reducing poverty intensity, while in the other countries the biggest change was in the number of poor people. Reduction in the MPI and in the multidimensional poverty headcount and intensity in seven countries, various years (average annual percent change) MPI Headcount Intensity 0.008 0.022 0.089 0.156 0.229 0.310 0.357 –0.5 –0.2 –0.7 –0.7 –1.1 –1.6 –1.9 –2.2 –1.6 –3.1 –3.0 –3.8 –3.4 –5.5 –5.0 –5.4 –6.9 –9.1 –8.4 –8.7 –9.8 Jordan Colombia Bolivia Lesotho Kenya Nigeria Madagascar 2007–2009 2005–2010 2003–2008 2004–2009 2003–2009 2003–2008 2004–2009 Note: Values in bold are MPI levels for the most recent year available. Headcount refers to the percentage of the population that is multidimensionally poor; intensity refers to the average percentage of deprivations experienced by people in multidimensional poverty. Source: Alkire and others forthcoming. Underlying the overall drops in poverty, different patterns emerge. For example, multidimensional poverty fell at a similar rate in Kenya and Nigeria, but Kenya’s progress was driven by improvements across all standard of living indicators, whereas Nigeria progressed most in water, sanitation and child mortality. Poverty reduction was widely distributed across Kenya. In Nigeria, by contrast, poverty worsened in the northeast, the poorest region, while the south saw the most substantial reduction. Source: Alkire, Roche and Santos forthcoming; Demographic and Health Surveys (www.measuredhs.com). suggesting that localities that have had the particular threats from environmental degra- largest increases in temperature tend to be dation because their coping options are more poorer than those that have had smaller limited. We go on to examine particular ways changes.23 in which environmental degradation threat- But for rainfall there is no strong pattern,24 ens human development and how it may harm and within countries, overall tendencies mask already deprived groups the most. considerable variation. Nonetheless, the rela- tionship is consistent with research exploring environmental threats the effects of climate change on income pov- to people’s well-being erty.25 Further study is needed to extend this work to a multidimensional setting. To better understand the channels through Where poverty and the effects of climate which environmental degradation impedes and change intersect to constrain possibilities, the damages capabilities, especially those of poor poor are especially vulnerable. But more gen- and disadvantaged groups, we look at adverse erally, disadvantaged people and groups face effects on health, education, livelihoods and50 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • FIGURE 3.5other aspects of well-being, including choices deaths attributable to environmental risks are associated withon how to spend time, where to live and free- high Mpi levelsdom from conflict. MPI 0.7Harming health • NIGERThis section reviews the adverse health impacts 0.6 ETHIOPIAof indoor and outdoor air pollution, dirty • • MALI MOZAMBIQUE • • • SOMALIA 0.5 • • •water and unimproved sanitation, and climate LIBERIA• ANGOLA • •SIERRA LEONEchange. Environmental degradation affects COMOROS • • • RWANDA 0.4 •people’s health through impacts on physical • •• •• •• • • CHAD ••and social environments as well as through the 0.3 • • • •• • •knowledge, assets and behaviours of individuals • • • CAMEROON • •and households. Interactions between dimen- 0.2 • • • • ••sions of disadvantage also affect health—for • •• • •• GHANA•• 0.1 •instance, health risks are greatest where water • • •• • TAJIKISTAN • •• CHINA •• •and sanitation are inadequate. Our analysis of 0 •••••• •• • • •••• • • •multidimensional poverty suggests that such 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000deprivations often coincide with deaths due Deaths due to environmental causes (per million people)to environmental causes: 6 of the 10 countries Note: Excludes very high HDI countries. Survey years vary by country; see statistical table 5 for details.with the highest rates of death attributable to Source: Calculations based on data from statistical table 5 and Prüss-Üstün and others 2008.environmental causes are among the 10 coun-tries with the highest MPI (figure 3.5).26 The associated with acute respiratory infections,economic costs of the health impacts of envi- lung cancer, reduced lung function, carbonronmental factors, including malnutrition, are monoxide poisoning and immune systemalso large. The World Bank recently estimated impairment. Indoor smoke from solid fuel isthem at close to 6 percent of GDP in Ghana linked to some 2 million deaths a year. Aboutand more than 4 percent in Pakistan. Add- 36 percent of these deaths are in low HDIing the longer term effects on education and countries, with a further 28 percent in Chinaincome boosts the annual cost for each coun- and 25 percent in India. 29 Deaths related totry to as much as 9 percent of GDP.27 indoor air pollution are concentrated among The WHO’s study of the global burden the rural poor, who rely on coal for cookingof disease underlines the importance of envi- and heating. The uptake of modern cookingronmental factors. Unsafe water, inadequate fuel has been faster in urban areas—in China,sanitation and insufficient hygiene are among for instance, 82 percent of urban householdsthe top 10 leading causes of disease worldwide. use gas.30Each year at least 3 million children under Indoor pollution kills 11 times more peopleage 5 die from environment-related diseases, in low HDI countries than in other countriesincluding acute respiratory infection and and 20 times more people than in very highdiarrhoea—more than the entire under-five HDI countries. It accounts for 5.4 percent ofpopulation of Austria, Belgium, the Nether- the disease burden in low HDI countries—aslands, Portugal and Switzerland combined.28 much as 10 percent in Afghanistan, the coun-And in low HDI countries about 14 percent of try most afflicted in absolute terms.31the disease burden has environmental causes, Women and children in rural areas, whonotably indoor air pollution. spend more time in houses that use fuelwood, suffer most.32 Burning wood contributes toIndoor air pollution deforestation, which in turn forces householdsHalf the people in the world still use traditional to burn dung and crop residues instead, inten-biomass for heating and cooking. In low HDI sifying the exposure to indoor air pollutioncountries 94 percent of the multidimension- because these fires require constant tendingally poor rely on such fuels, producing smoke and their smoke is more toxic.33 CHapteR 3 trACing the eFFeCtS—underStAnding the relAtiOnS 51
  • Background research shows that deaths pollution and mitigate health risks, alongside related to indoor air pollution are strongly efforts to expand access to modern energy related to the national MPI,34 showing how sources, as we explore in the next chapter. deprivations in cooking fuel contribute to multidimensional poverty and to the ill health Outdoor air pollution of the poor. Poor households know that burn- Long-term exposure to outdoor air pollution ing wood irritates the eyes and damages the causes respiratory disorders, immune system respiratory system. An older Bhutanese woman damage and carbon monoxide poisoning, observed that burning wood caused eye prob- among other deleterious effects.37 In Mexico lems and coughs for many elderly women in City studies have found a significant impact her village.35 In India Rabiya Khatun of Bihar from outdoor pollution on the mortality of the commented: “We have always used twigs and high-risk population,38 and in Linfen, China, branches from nearby trees as cooking fuel. and Norilsk, Russian Federation, industries Everyone here does that. It burns our eyes, but produce levels of air pollution that seriously it has to be done”; in West Bengal Faizul Haque threaten the health of their populations.39 Dis- observed that his wife, who is not yet 30, has advantaged groups are both more exposed and been “sick for the last few years . . . she is hardly more vulnerable to the effects: in Hong Kong able to breathe, because of all the fumes.”36 Special Administrative Region of China and Improved stoves, better ventilation and Shanghai mortality due to outdoor air pollu- clean fuel are expected to reduce indoor tion is higher among the economically disad- vantaged and the least educated.40 BOX 3.2 The pattern holds across the globe. In Air pollution and its health consequences in China England half of municipal incinerators are Outdoor air pollution is high in China, especially in urban areas and the north. A recent of- in the most deprived tenth of municipali- ficial environmental assessment finds that almost one city in five does not meet government ties.41 People in the poorest households and standards; far more would likely fail to reach World Health Organization (WHO) air quality standards. Outdoor air pollution is associated with some 300,000 deaths and 20 million cases ethnic minorities are most likely to breathe of respiratory illness in China each year, with estimated health costs of about 3 percent of polluted air, while areas with the highest rate GDP annually. of car ownership enjoy the cleanest air.42 In Among the many sources of outdoor air pollution in China are residential and industrial Rijnmond, Netherlands, poorer and minor- coal combustion and motor vehicle exhaust. About 70 percent of the country’s electricity is ity households endure more air pollution and generated from coal, most of it high in sulphur. High sulphur dioxide emissions contribute to live closer to waste disposal sites.43 In Kassel, smog and acid rain, which affect more than half of China’s cities. Germany, the air is more polluted in neigh- Outdoor air pollution patterns suggest major challenges, particularly in cities. Vehicle bourhoods where the foreign-born population emissions may be the fastest growing source of urban air pollution, with China’s Environmen- tal Protection Agency estimating that vehicles account for 70 percent of sulphur in the air. lives.44 And French communities with higher With rising incomes and better roads, the country has seen its vehicular fleet jump 20 percent proportions of immigrants host more indus- a year since 1990. And since in 2009 only 3 percent of people in China owned a car, the trend is trial and nuclear waste sites, incinerators and likely to continue. In Beijing more than 1,000 new cars are added to the total each day. waste management facilities.45 Air pollution in China has caused a dramatic rise in asthma. From 1990 to 2000 its preva- The good news, as reviewed in chapter 2, is lence among urban children rose 64 percent, affecting almost 2 percent of children. In Chong- that air pollution is declining, though on aver- qing, one of the country’s fastest growing cities, nearly 5 percent of children under age 14 age it remains much higher in cities in poorer suffered from asthma in 2000. countries. China again emerges as an important China’s efforts to reduce outdoor air pollution are closely integrated with its policies aimed at climate change, energy efficiency and renewable energy use. In 2000 the govern- case: rising energy consumption, based largely ment began requiring lead-free petrol, which reduced the lead content of urban air, and has on coal and other solid fuels, and vehicle pollu- made developing new clean energy vehicles the priority of the country’s auto industry for the tion have taken a toll on air quality (box 3.2). next five years. The country has pledged to reduce energy consumption and carbon emissions 18 percent per unit of industrial value added by 2015 and to increase consumption of non–fos- Dirty water and unimproved sanitation sil fuel energy to 15 percent by 2020, up from the current 8 percent, which should also reduce Lack of adequate sanitation and clean water outdoor air pollution. compromises the life chances of many peo- Source: China National People’s Congress 2011; Fang and Chan 2008; Liu and Raven 2010: 8329; Millman, Tang and Perera ple, mainly in poorer countries. In medium 2008; Watts 2006, 2011; Zhan and others 2010. HDI countries half the people lack access to52 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • improved sanitation, and one in eight lacks sanitation services is especially important foraccess to improved water. In low HDI coun- women, not only for the health gains52 but alsotries the figures are 65 percent for sanitation for privacy, time savings and reduced risk ofand 38 percent for water. Nearly 4 in 10 people sexual violence.53worldwide lack sanitary toilets, but as many as8 in 10 of the multidimensionally poor do. Climate changeUrban and rural disparities are large: less than The health risks posed by climate change arehalf the rural population had improved sanita- immense and diverse—from increased riskstion facilities in 2008, compared with almost of extreme weather events to salinization of Indigenous peoples maythree-quarters of the urban population.46 land and fresh water from rising sea levels and These deprivations exact a high toll on the changing dynamics of infectious disease be especially susceptiblehealth. For children under age 5 environmen- caused by higher temperatures. Higher tem- to the adverse healthtal factors account for more than a third of peratures will broaden the spread and increase effects of environmentalthe global disease burden.47 Diarrhoeal dis- the transmission rates of vector- and rodent- degradationeases account for some 2 million deaths of borne diseases, expanding endemic areas forchildren under age 5 each year, and the most malaria, tick-borne encephalitis and denguerecent estimates indicate that improved sanita- fever.54 Estimates suggest that 260–320 mil-tion and drinking water could save 2.2 million lion more people will be affected by malariachildren a year, or some 5,500 a day.48 Half of by 2080.55 And many more will be at risk ofall malnutrition is attributable to environmen- contracting dengue fever.56 A recent study oftal factors, particularly poor water, sanitation 19 African countries found that weather vari-and hygiene.49 Malnutrition from these causes ations increased the prevalence of diarrhoea,is responsible for some 70,000 child deaths a acute respiratory infections and undernutri-year, while underweight children are more vul- tion in children under age 5.nerable to infectious disease and less likely to Heat stress will rise with temperatures,recover fully when they do fall sick.50 Child- and more people will die from heatstroke—hood malnourishment also impairs cognitive particularly urban residents and people withdevelopment and education performance, respiratory conditions. The incidence of diar-reducing opportunities over a lifetime. rhoea will also rise with temperatures.57 By Inadequate water and sanitation are linked 2050 sea level rise, droughts, heat waves, floodsto an even broader array of health problems, and rainfall variation could increase the num-as the 2006 HDR exposed. Today, billions of ber of malnourished children by 25 million.people are affected by parasitic diseases: 1.5 Land and ecosystem degradation will alsobillion with ascaris, 740 million with hook- add to malnutrition.58 These projections areworm, 200 million with schistosomiasis and based on a business-as-usual scenario. More40–70 million with liverfluke. Many millions sustainable behaviours and practices, outlinedare likely affected by tropical enteropathy, an in chapter 4, could deflect these trajectories inintestinal disease caused by faecal bacteria positive ways.that reduces nutrient absorption. These infec- Indigenous peoples may be especially sus-tions as well as hepatitis, typhoid and polio ceptible to the adverse health effects of envi-can be avoided through safe excreta disposal ronmental degradation. In northern Australia,and other hygienic behaviours, as we discuss in for example, higher temperatures and morechapter 4. Beyond the human costs, the finan- frequent heat waves will assail indigenous peo-cial repercussions are large. For instance, the ples in remote areas, where cardiovascular andeconomic costs of poor sanitation and hygiene respiratory disease rates are already high. Thein Cambodia (7.2 percent of GDP), Indonesia health effects may be especially severe where(2.3 percent), the Philippines (1.5 percent) and indigenous peoples’ connection to ecosystemsViet Nam (1.3 percent) in 2007 amounted to —as a place of ancestry, identity, language,around $9 billion (in 2005 prices) or 2 percent livelihood and community—is a key determi-of their combined GDP.51 And access to basic nant of health.59 CHapteR 3 trACing the eFFeCtS—underStAnding the relAtiOnS 53
  • Impeding education to promote education for girls. In the words As highlighted in the 2010 HDR, the expan- of 13-year-old Manasha, “When there is no sion of primary education is one of the great light, we go to bed very early after dinner and successes of the past 40 years. The share of chil- get up early. Now at night I can study.”69 Inter- dren attending school rose from 57 percent ventions to improve access to electricity are to 85 percent, with near universal enrolment explored in chapter 4. in many parts of the world. Yet gaps remain. Nearly 3 in 10 children of primary school Endangering livelihoods age in low HDI countries are not enrolled in Environmental degradation can endanger the Environmental school.60 And a range of other constraints, livelihoods of the millions of people around degradation can some related to environmental factors, persist. the world who depend directly on environ- endanger the livelihoods Electricity access can improve schooling. mental resources for work. About 1.3 billion of the millions of people Better lighting allows for more study time, people, or 40 percent of the economically around the world and electricity at home and school increases active people worldwide, work in agriculture, who depend directly the time children and adults spend read- fishing, forestry, and hunting or gathering. on environmental ing and keeps children in school longer. 61 In Almost 6 in 10 of the economically active resources for work northwestern Madagascar electricity made it people engaged in these activities live in low easier for girls to do their homework and for HDI countries, while just 3 percent live in very their mothers to help them in the evening high HDI countries. In Bhutan, Burkina Faso after household tasks were done.62 In Bang- and Nepal, 92 percent of economically active ladesh the time children spent in school was people depend directly on natural resources correlated with access to electricity, even after for their livelihoods; less than 1 percent do in controlling for family wealth (landholdings).63 Bahrain, Qatar, Singapore and Slovenia.70 And in Viet Nam communes connected to The rural poor depend overwhelmingly the electric grid between 2002 and 2005 saw on natural resources for their income.71 Even school enrolment increase 17 percent for boys those who do not normally engage in natural and 15 percent for girls.64 resource–related activity may do so during Having access to electricity and other times of hardship.72 The effects of environ- modern fuels can reduce the time spent col- mental degradation on crop production, fish lecting biomass fuel. 65 In Malawi children supply, extraction of forest goods, and hunting often collect fuelwood and other resources, and gathering vary, hurting some groups more and their likelihood of attending school falls than others. How it affects people depends on as time allocated to this work rises.66 In rural whether they are net producers or consumers Ethiopia the probability of schooling as the of natural resources and whether they produce main activity, especially for boys, falls as the for subsistence or the market (and how read- time to reach a water source rises.67 ily they can shift between the two). Women A negative relationship was found between in poor countries engage disproportionately children’s resource collection and their likeli- in subsistence farming and water collection, hood of attending school, though not the per- exposing them more to adverse repercussions.73 formance of those attending school. In Kenya’s Indigenous peoples deserve special men- Central Province district of Kiambu, fuel- tion (box 3.3). While they make up about 5 wood collection averages more than 4 hours a percent of the world’s people,74 they own, day, ranging from half an hour to 10 hours.68 occupy or use (generally by customary rights) Girls were more likely to combine resource col- up to 22 percent of the world’s land, which lection and schooling. holds 80 percent of the planet’s biodiversity.75 In the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh, Indigenous peoples and communities legally Gujarat, Rajasthan and Maharashtra, for own around 11 percent of global forests,76 and example, the United Nations Children’s an estimated 60 million of them depend totally Fund and others are providing solar-powered on forest resources for their livelihoods.77 They lamps to schools and women’s literacy groups often live in ecosystems particularly vulnerable54 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • BOX 3.3to the effects of climate change, such as small Indigenous peoples, land rights and livelihoodsisland developing states, arctic regions, on the Unusual weather patterns and storms hurt indigenous communities that rely on natural resourc-coast or at high altitude, and depend on fish- es for their livelihoods. In northern Canada global warming has shortened the period when sea-ing, hunting and farming to survive.78 ice access routes to hunting areas are open, reducing food security and safety among the Inuit We turn now to the differentiated impacts in Nunavik, Quebec, and in Nunatsiavut, Labrador. In Peru freak cold spells have increased, withof environmental trends on people engaged in temperatures falling to an unprecedented –35°C in the high Andes. In 2004, 50 children and upagriculture, forestry and fishing. to 70 percent of livestock died, and as many as 13,000 people became severely ill. Indigenous peoples’ relationship with their lands often has cultural and spiritual dimensions,Threatening agriculture which land management practices can disrupt. As outsiders increasingly seek indigenous peo-Agriculture is the main source of livelihood for ples’ lands for conservation and resource extraction, decisions are being made about the use of these lands without meaningful participation by the affected peoples. Indigenous communitiesmost of the world’s poor.79 The natural envi- may want to keep their environment and resources intact, leading to tension and conflict.ronment delivers support functions to agri- As chapter 4 shows, governments are increasingly recognizing the special nature of indig-cultural production, such as regulating the enous peoples’ relationships with their land and environment. In 2004 the Canadian Supremenutrient and water cycles. And as agriculture Court recognized the government’s obligation to honour the environment-related rights of twointensifies to meet the food needs of growing native tribes in British Columbia. Most Latin American constitutions include a provision gov-populations, healthy ecosystems remain an erning indigenous peoples’ lands, territories and natural resources. The 2009 Bolivian consti-important foundation. Environmental deg- tution recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to their original communal lands, guarantee-radation thus threatens livelihoods and food ing the use and improvement of sustainable natural resources — in line with an alternative vision of development (vivir bien) that seeks the spiritual and collective well-being of people assecurity. Among the many complex interac- well as greater harmony with nature.tions, the focus here is on the effects of landdegradation, water stress and climate change. Source: Furgal and Seguin 2006; Simms, Maldonado and Reid 2006; World Bank 2008c; Colchester 2010; Green, King and Morrison 2009; Manus 2006; Aguilar and others 2010. Land degradation reduces arable land andcrop yields and increases the frequency offlooding. Specifically: financing programmes do not help the poor• Loss of fertile topsoil is reducing land when the technical requirements and match- productivity, with estimated yield losses ing contributions are too onerous.85 as high as 50 percent in the most adverse The effects of climate change on farmer scenarios.80 Sub-Saharan Africa (especially livelihoods vary with the crop, region and Angola, Gabon and Swaziland) and East season. Researchers have studied the relation Asia and the Pacific (especially China, between climate change and crop and pas- Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar) are hit ture yields using simulation models, statistical hardest. studies and hedonic approaches. Some results• Drylands, home to about a third of the suggest that moderate temperature increases world’s population, are threatened by (no more than 2°C) might benefit yields in the desertification.81 Some areas are especially short run in temperate regions but will have vulnerable, such as Sub-Saharan Africa’s adverse effects in tropical and semiarid regions. drylands, where adaptive capacity is low.82 Globally, maize production has decreased 3.8 Other parts of the world have also been percent and wheat production 5.1 percent affected. Land degradation in northern since 1980 due to climate change, with consid- China’s Minqin County led to the aban- erable regional variation (and some countries donment of more than 80 percent of its even benefitting from a changing climate). For farmland.83 rice and soy, countries benefitting and losing By 2025 water scarcity is expected to affect largely balanced out. 86 Projections throughmore than 1.8 billion people.84 Field research 2030 suggest that maize and wheat produc-suggests that the direct impacts of water deple- tion in Southern Africa will fall sharply, whiletion on crop cultivation can be worse for poor rice yields are expected to be positively affectedfarmers. For example, in rural Mexico poor by climate change.87 Rainfed maize yields arefarmers without the capital to adapt to fall- predicted to increase in China’s northeast buting water tables cannot buy more drought- to fall in its southern regions. Across the worldresistant seeds or piped water. And government the biophysical impacts of climate change on CHapteR 3 trACing the eFFeCtS—underStAnding the relAtiOnS 55
  • both irrigated and rainfed crops are likely to increased income poverty overall, even if be negative by 2050.88 rural food producers did better.95 Simi- The variability of effects underlines the larly, food price hikes increased the inci- need for detailed, local analysis. So does the dence and intensity of poverty in Indone- variability in household production and con- sia, the Philippines and Thailand.96 sumption patterns, access to resources, poverty Because different types of environmental levels and ability to cope.89 For instance, agri- change have different effects on land, labour culture is the most common source of work for and food production, it is important to exam- rural women in most developing regions, yet ine the joint effects. In India climate change Because different types they have less access than men to assets, inputs could lead to a sharp drop in land productiv- of environmental change and complementary services. Disparities in ity for some 17 percent of farmers, through the have different effects landholdings are particularly acute—just 20 effect on cereal prices, but effects on consump- on land, labour and percent of landholders in developing countries tion would be muted, as most rural households food production, it is are women, and their landholdings are smaller derive their income largely from wage employ- important to examine than those of men.90 ment. Costs would fall disproportionally on the joint effects, through Food production must rise to meet the the poor in urban areas, who would pay more detailed, local analysis demands of growing populations, but the com- for food, and on wage earners and net consum- bined environmental effects of land degrada- ers of food in rural areas.97 tion, water scarcity and climate change will restrict supply. Adverse environmental factors Pressuring forests are expected to drive up world food prices in Around 350 million people living in or near real terms 30–50 percent in the coming dec- forests depend on forest wood and nonwood ades and increase price volatility.91 Income resources for subsistence and income.98 Many poverty and malnutrition could worsen if people in developing countries rely on forests the prices of key staples rise—as vividly dem- for fuelwood: in Asia and the Pacific more onstrated during the 2007–2008 food price than 70 percent of wood removed from forests spike.92 The poor spend a large share of their is for fuel; in Africa the share may be as high income on staple foods, and to survive, they as 90 percent.99 sacrifice nutrition and eat less.93 Women are responsible for most fuel- The effects of food price hikes depend on wood collection in many parts of the world. household consumption and production. Peo- Though global data are lacking on the number ple in urban areas and nonfarm rural house- of women working in forestry, evidence sug- holds, who are net food consumers, tend to be gests that women, with fewer occupational relatively worse off. But the research results are options and less mobility, rely on forests more mixed: than men do.100 • One modelling exercise covering 15 coun- Forest resources also generate income, tries found that the effects on income pov- through employment and the sale of goods erty depend on a household’s location and and services. Nonwood forest products—such whether it engages in agriculture.94 Price as food, fuel for cooking and heating, animal hikes were predicted to hurt nonagricul- fodder, wild game, medicinal herbs and shelter tural households most, with 20–50 per- —provide local communities with subsistence cent falling into poverty in parts of Africa and marketable goods. They also provide cash and Asia. But households specializing in to pay for school, medicine, equipment, sup- agriculture benefit, and many in Latin plies and food. America and the Caribbean and elsewhere Poor people typically depend more on for- in Asia are lifted from poverty. ests for cash and noncash incomes—and as • Another recent study of nine countries safety nets.101 A review of case studies of rural (Bolivia, Cambodia, Madagascar, Malawi, communities living in or on the fringes of trop- Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Viet Nam and ical forests found that poor households derived Zambia) found that rising food prices more than a fourth of their incomes from56 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • forest resources, compared with 17 percent for more men, who typically engage in deep-oceannonpoor households.102 Some examples: fisheries and commercial fishing, while coastal• In Arunachal Pradesh, India, poor house- erosion will hurt more women, who typically holds depended on community forests for gather invertebrates closer to the shore. basic survival, and households that had less How people respond to the impacts of cli- land and less education and that were far- mate change on fisheries is likely to vary. In ther from markets depended more on for- Kenya, for example, even with catch declines est products.103 of up to 50 percent, subsistence fishers from• In southern Ethiopia forest income kept a poor households and with less diverse income Countries most at fifth of the population above the poverty sources were more likely to continue fishing line, reducing income inequality some 15 than were fishers from households with more risk from overfishing percent.104 assets and diversified livelihoods.113 and climate change• In Viet Nam forest products provided rural But not all the expected effects are nega- are also among those households with a safety net when other tive. For countries near the Equator fresh water relying most on fish sources of income failed. People stricken by aquaculture of fish such as tilapia may benefit for dietary protein, illness and health shocks were more likely from greater fresh water availability and higher livelihoods and exports than others to extract forest products.105 temperatures.114 And ocean warming and the It follows that poor people are more vul- retreat of sea ice at high latitudes are predictednerable to forest degradation and exclusion.106 to increase the potential catch in the long termIn South Asia households relying on fuel col- —with the greatest benefits likely to accrue inlection responded to reduced access by increas- Alaska, Greenland, Norway and the Russianing collection time, purchasing fuelwood and Federation.115cooking less often. Wealthier households, bycontrast, shifted to alternative fuels.107 * * * People can adjust their production andDamaging fisheries consumption strategies to environmentalAn estimated 45 million people directly conditions—for instance, they may grow cropsengage in capture fisheries or aquaculture, at more suited to poorer soils or warmer tempera-least 6 million of them women.108 More than tures or eat food that requires less cooking and95 percent of small-scale fishers and post- thus uses less fuelwood. People often react toharvest workers live in developing countries environmental degradation by pursuing alter-and face precarious living and working condi- native livelihood strategies in the same area ortions. Countries most at risk from overfishing by moving.116 We now consider other adverseand climate change are also among those rely- repercussions on well-being.ing most on fish for dietary protein, liveli-hoods and exports.109 Other adverse repercussions More than 80 percent of the world’s poor Environmental degradation has additional,fishers are in South and Southeast Asia. But interacting repercussions on disadvantagedtwo-thirds of the countries whose capture fish- groups. Here, we explore the links with timeeries are most vulnerable to climate change are use, migration and conflict. Environmentalin tropical Africa.110 stress can increase the difficulties in making a Climate change is predicted to reduce living from natural resources—forcing peoplefishery resources in the Pacific Islands by as to go farther to collect them, to work more tomuch as half by 2100 and to drastically reduce obtain a similar livelihood or even to migrate.mangrove forests and coral reefs.111 Research In some cases environmental stresses have beencommissioned by the United Nations Devel- linked with greater likelihood of conflict.117opment Programme Pacific Centre emphasizesthe centrality of fishing to livelihoods in the Time usePacific region for both subsistence and cash.112 For people who lack access to modern fuels andRising sea temperatures will adversely affect safe water, collecting fuelwood and water takes CHapteR 3 trACing the eFFeCtS—underStAnding the relAtiOnS 57
  • considerable time. Nearly half the households total work burden and reduces the time they in low HDI countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan devote to market-oriented activities.123 Africa, spend more than 30 minutes a day col- Thus, the gains from secure and sustain- lecting water. The burden is especially high in able access to these resources and more mod- rural areas. Trips average 82 minutes in Soma- ern alternatives could be large. In Sierra Leone lia, 71 minutes in Mauritania and 65 minutes improved access to water and electricity in Yemen.118 reduced domestic work time about 10 hours Widespread environmental stress increases a week.124 A study in the 1990s found that if time burdens for households, with adverse all households in the Mbale district of East- widespread implications for their well-being. Time-use ern Uganda had secure access to water and environmental stress surveys illuminate this burden, showing how fuel—living 400 metres or less from potable increases time burdens tasks are allocated within households and how water and no more than 30 minutes from a for households, with they can be affected by environmental degrada- fuelwood source—they would gain more than adverse implications tion.119 Studies in India have found that fuel- 900 hours a year.125 And a recent study esti- for their well-being wood collection time has increased markedly mated that 63 percent of the economic ben- in recent decades: in Kumaon, Uttar Pradesh, efits from reaching the Millennium Develop- women and children travelled on average 1.6 ment Goal target for water supply would come hours and 1.6 kilometres to collect wood in the from time savings.126 early 1970s and 3–4 hours and 4.5 kilometres in the 1990s.120 Migration Women and children have primary respon- Environmental stress can also drive people to sibility for fetching wood and water. A recent relocate, especially where families and commu- study of seven low HDI countries found that nities are deprived in multiple dimensions and 56–86 percent of rural women fetched water, see better opportunities elsewhere. It is diffi- compared with 8–40 percent of rural men.121 cult to quantify how many people move due to In rural Malawi, for instance, women spend environmental stresses, because other factors more than eight times what men do fetching also constrain people’s freedoms. wood and water, and girls spend about three Some prominent estimates have been very times what boys do on these chores (table 3.2). high—the 1994 Almeria Statement observed Collecting fuelwood and water has been that 135 million people might be at risk of dis- linked in women to spinal damage, compli- placement due to desertification.127 And the cations during pregnancy and maternal mor- Stern Review suggested that 200 million peo- tality.122 The demands on time can also have ple might be displaced by 2050.128 But other a high opportunity cost in forgone schooling estimates are far lower. The UN High Com- or leisure time for children and labour market missioner for Refugees found that 24 million activity for adults. In rural Pakistan, for exam- people had been displaced by floods, famine ple, difficult access to water increases women’s and other environmental factors.129 A recent detailed estimate suggests that temperature TABlE 3.2 and rainfall variation drove some 2.35 mil- Average time per week spent fetching wood and water, rural areas of selected Sub-Saharan African countries (hours) lion people in Sub-Saharan Africa to move Gender Guinea Madagascar Malawi Sierra Leone between 1960 and 2000.130 and ratio (2002–03) (2001) (2004) (2003–04) As argued in the 2009 HDR, expand- Women 5.7 4.7 9.1 7.3 ing people’s opportunities to choose where Men 2.3 4.1 1.1 4.5 they live is an important way to expand their Girls 4.1 5.1 4.3 7.7 freedoms. Mobility can be associated with Boys 4.0 4.7 1.4 7.1 improved income-earning opportunities and Women/men 2.5 1.1 8.3 1.6 better opportunities for children. The prob- Girls/boys 1.0 1.1 3.1 1.1 lems, of course, are that a degraded envi- Source: HDRO calculations based on data from Bardasi and Wodon (2009) (Guinea); Blackden and Wodon (2006) (Madagascar); ronment constrains choices—especially for Beegle and Wodon (2006) (Malawi); and Wodon and Ying (2010) (Sierra Leone). those whose livelihoods depend on a healthy58 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • environment—and that legal constraints on environmental scarcity and conflict but thatmovement make migration riskier.131 resource scarcity has to be embedded in the context of the broader political economy: sep-Conflict arating the processes and elements associatedFinally, climate change and limited natural with environmental conflict from the struc-resources have been linked to an increased tures within which they are embedded is “bothlikelihood of conflict, one of the most perni- difficult and a distortion of reality.”138cious threats to human development. Theymay also undermine the prospects for peace. disequalizing effects People living in urbanMost resource-related conflicts are domes- of extreme eventstic, but increasing scarcity of land, water slums in low and mediumand energy could spark international strife. People living in urban slums in low and HDI countries faceAn estimated 40  percent of civil wars over medium HDI countries face the greatest risk the greatest risk fromthe past 60 years are associated with natural from extreme weather events and rising sea extreme weather eventsresources, and since 1990 at least 18  violent levels, caused by a combination of high expo- and rising sea levels,conflicts have been fuelled by the exploitation sure and inadequate protective infrastructure caused by a combinationof natural resources and other environmen- and services.139 By 2050, with a projected 0.5 of high exposure andtal factors.132 Some cross-country evidence is metre rise in sea level, Bangladesh is likely to inadequate protectiveillustrative. For example, greater variability in lose about 11 percent of its land, affecting an infrastructurerainfall increases the risk of civil conflict, par- estimated 15 million people.140 Over the sameticularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, where a 1°C period rising sea levels could displace more and servicesrise in temperature is associated with a greater than 14 million Egyptians as increased sali-than 10 percent increase in the likelihood of nization of the Nile reduces the irrigated landcivil war the same year.133 available for agriculture.141 Recent episodes support the link. Com- The United Nations estimates that 29 per-petition over land contributed to postelection cent of the world’s slum dwellers live in lowviolence in Kenya in 2008 and to tensions lead- HDI countries—with an additional 24 per-ing to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Water, cent in China and 15 percent in India (bothland and desertification are major factors in the medium HDI countries).142 Vulnerable groupswar in Darfur, Sudan. In Afghanistan conflict in megacities are particularly exposed to natu-and the environment are caught up in a vicious ral disasters, because of both their precariouscycle—environmental degradation fuels con- living conditions and the absence of public ser-flict, and conflict degrades the environment.134 vices and formal social security systems. But,Policy responses, when they are badly designed as shown below, some substitution with socialor fail to consider all parties’ interests, can also capital, which builds resilience, can reduceexacerbate the risk of conflict. risk. Global and local resource scarcity may be Our own analysis suggests that a 10 per-key causes of conflict—a well known early cent increase in the number of people affectedstudy highlights the interplay between envi- by an extreme weather event typically reducesronmental degradation, population growth a country’s HDI by almost 2 percent, with par-and unequal resource distributions in stirring ticularly strong effects on the income compo-up strife.135 And countries with high depend- nent of HDI and in medium HDI countries.ence on primary commodity exports may be at In some countries poorer regions suffer most.increased risk—an abundance of resources is a In Ha Giang Province, Viet Nam, one of thepowerful incentive for conflict.136 country’s poorest regions and home to 22 But natural resources are rarely, if ever, ethnic minorities, irregular rainfall, massivethe sole driver of violent conflict. They are flooding and unpredictable storms have sub-threat multipliers that interact with other merged land and crops, drowned livestock andrisks and vulnerabilities.137 The evidence does destroyed infrastructure.143 In Mexico naturalnot suggest that there are direct links between disasters, particularly droughts and floods, set CHapteR 3 trACing the eFFeCtS—underStAnding the relAtiOnS 59
  • the HDI back in affected municipalities by The risks and impacts are largest overall about two years and increased extreme poverty in developing countries—but the patterns almost 4 percentage points.144 of structural disadvantage are not confined The risk of injury and death from floods, to them. Witness Hurricane Katrina in the high winds and landslides has been system- United States. New Orleans’s poorest dis- atically higher among children, women and tricts, composed mainly of black communities, the elderly, especially the poor. In Bangladesh bore the brunt of the 2005 hurricane—three- poorer groups tend to live closer to rivers and quarters of people in flooded neighbourhoods thus face a greater risk of flooding.145 Local case were black.151 In the 2003 European heat the strikingly unequal studies of a 1991 Bangladeshi cyclone, the 2003 wave, more women than men died, as did more gender effects of natural European heat wave and the 2004 Asian tsu- elderly people than young people. disasters suggest that nami affirm the greater vulnerability of women Shocks can have longer term adverse effects inequality in exposure and children, as does broader cross-country evi- that extend beyond the destruction of life and and sensitivity to risk dence. Sri Lanka’s tsunami killed nearly 1 in 5 immediate damage to health and livelihoods. —as well as disparities displaced women and almost 1 in 3 displaced Children may suffer disproportionately from in access to resources, children under age 5—more than two times weather shocks through the lasting effects of capabilities and and four times the mortality of displaced men reduced schooling and malnourishment. In (about 1 in 12), respectively.146 And in rural response to transitory income shocks, families opportunities—overlap India the mortality differential between girls without assets or other income opportunities, and systematically and boys increases during droughts.147 such as wage labour, may pull children out of disadvantage The strikingly unequal gender effects of school. The perceived risk of income loss con- some groups natural disasters suggest that inequality in tributes in its own right. Further, schooling exposure and sensitivity to risk—as well as dis- infrastructure may be affected, and teachers parities in access to resources, capabilities and may be injured or killed.152 The relationship opportunities—overlap and systematically dis- is not always straightforward, however. In advantage some groups. In 141 countries over Mexico, high-impact disasters were linked to 22 years, higher female mortality from natu- increased school attendance and reduced drop- ral disasters and their aftermaths cannot be out rates for primary school, and in Mozam- explained by biology and physiology.148 And bique, to better school performance,153 possibly major catastrophes, as approximated by the because the opportunity cost of sending chil- number of people killed relative to population dren to school fell along with market wages. size, have more severe impacts than smaller Weather shocks can also affect child health, disasters on women’s life expectancy relative notably through increases in malnutrition. to that of men. One study in Zimbabwe found that children The explanations lie in social norms and who were exposed to shocks (civil war and the roles and, more generally, in the socioeconomic 1982–1984 drought) at ages 12–24 months status of women in the specific context. The completed 0.85 grade of schooling less and higher women’s socioeconomic status (meas- were on average 3.4 centimetres shorter than ured by such factors as freedom of choice of those who were not. This stunting was shown employment, nondiscrimination at work and to reduce lifetime earnings by 14 percent.154 In equal rights to marriage and education), the Nicaragua infant malnutrition more than tri- smaller the gender-differentiated impacts on pled among households most exposed to rain- life expectancy. In other words, it is the socially fall during Hurricane Mitch.155 And Bangla- constructed vulnerability of women that leads desh experienced a resurgence of child poverty to the higher mortality rates due to natural after 2000 in the low-lying coastal regions of disasters.149 Along similar lines, countries that the country most vulnerable to flooding.156 focused on female education suffered far fewer In Viet Nam evidence suggests that losses from extreme weather events than less household responses vary by type of shock. progressive countries with equivalent income Households exposed frequently to shocks and weather conditions.150 such as drought or moderate flooding learn to60 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • adapt.157 But survey analysis suggests no adap- country and one high HDI country includedtation to less frequent storms and hurricanes in the GII perform as badly.—hurricanes can halve consumption in house- We focus on two intersections betweenholds near large cities, especially since disaster gender equity and environmental sustainabil-relief largely neglects those areas. ity: reproductive choice and participation in decision-making. Contraceptive prevalencedisempowerment and and the ability to make reproductive choicesenvironmental degradation carry ramifications for the environment and for women’s empowerment. And, as we show, women’s ability to makeInequality, as manifested in unequal access women’s political empowerment is not onlyto resources and decision-making, can harm intrinsically important, but it also has con- reproductive choiceshuman development and the environment. sequences for proenvironment policy and carries ramifications forWe assess the implications of gender dispari- practice. the environment and forties, focusing on reproductive health and par- women’s empowerment,ticipation in decision-making. We then focus Reproductive choice and women’s politicalon empowerment as a driver of environmental Poor reproductive health is a major contribu- empowerment haschallenges to inform the policy discussions in tor to gender inequality around the world. consequences forchapters 4 and 5. Lack of access to reproductive health services proenvironment results in debilitating outcomes for women policy and practiceGender equality and children—and to fatalities in excess ofWomen’s economic opportunities and empow- those caused by the most devastating naturalerment remain severely constrained. Access to disasters. An estimated 48 million women givereproductive healthcare has been improving in birth without skilled assistance, and 2 millionmost regions, but not fast enough to achieve give birth alone. An estimated 150,000 womenMillennium Development Goal 5 (to improve and 1.6 million children die each year betweenmaternal health).158 Indicators under the tar- the onset of labour and 48 hours after birth.159get of universal access to reproductive health- For the bottom 20 countries in the GII thecare include the adolescent birth rate, antena- population-weighted maternal mortality ratiotal care and unmet need for family planning. averages about 327 deaths per 100,000 live Last year’s HDR introduced the Gender births, and the adolescent fertility rate aver-Inequality Index (GII) for 138 countries. This ages 95 births per 1,000 women ages 15–19,year it covers 145 countries, and our updated both roughly double the global averages of 157estimates confirm that the largest losses due to deaths and 49 births. In these countries con-gender inequality are in Sub-Saharan Africa, traceptive use is low, averaging only 46.4 per-followed by South Asia and the Arab States. cent. More broadly, an estimated 215 millionIn Sub-Saharan Africa the biggest losses arise women in developing countries have unmetfrom gender disparities in education and from need for family planning.160high maternal mortality and adolescent fertil- Every country, developed or developing,ity rates. In South Asia women lag behind men that offers women a full range of reproductivein each dimension of the GII, most notably in health options has fertility rates at or beloweducation, national parliamentary representa- replacement.161 Cuba, Iran, Mauritius, Thai-tion and labour force participation. Women land and Tunisia have fertility rates of less thanin Arab States are affected by unequal labour two births per woman.162 And Addis Ababa’sforce participation (around half the global is also less than two births per woman, whileaverage) and low educational attainment. All Ethiopia’s rural fertility rate remains above six.the low HDI countries have high gender ine- In much of rural Bangladesh, despite wide-quality across multiple dimensions. Of the 34 spread poverty, fertility is now at the replace-low HDI countries included in the 2011 GII, ment rate.163 And family sizes have fallen asall but four also have a GII score in the worst rapidly in Iran as they have in China, but with-quartile. By contrast, only one very high HDI out government limits on family size.164 CHapteR 3 trACing the eFFeCtS—underStAnding the relAtiOnS 61
  • As table 2.1 in chapter 2 illustrates, popula- inequality is high, as in Mali, Mauritania and tion growth seriously strains the limits of world Sierra Leone, contraceptive prevalence is below resources. A range of studies suggest that lower 10 percent. Data collected between 2000 and population growth could offset at least some of 2009 show that fewer than 3 in 10 women of the higher greenhouse gas emissions associated reproductive age in low HDI countries use with rising incomes. One early estimate was modern contraception, compared with 88 per- that by 2020 carbon dioxide emissions would cent in Norway and 84 percent in the United be about 15 percent lower than they would be Kingdom. without family planning.165 A more recent Further analysis highlights the impor- study of 34 developed and developing coun- tance of national HDI levels, especially edu- tries with 61 percent of the world’s population cation and health achievements, in explaining finds that halving 2010’s population growth the relationship between gender inequality could provide 16–29 percent of the carbon and contraceptive prevalence. However, the dioxide emissions reductions needed by 2050 same does not apply for income—if we control and 37–41 percent needed by the end of the for income alone, gender inequality and con- century to avoid dangerous climate change.166 traceptive prevalence continue to be strongly Another study estimated that meeting unmet linked. This underlines the importance of need for family planning would avert 53 mil- investments in health and education in fur- lion unintended pregnancies a year and cut thering reproductive health choices. carbon emissions by 34 gigatonnes, or about The reported unmet demand for family 17 percent of the world’s current yearly total, planning is very low in Chad, the Democratic as of 2050.167 The environmental pay-offs are Republic of the Congo and Niger (below 5 per- thus clearly enormous, over and above the ben- cent), alongside very high average fertility.168 efits to women’s empowerment. This can happen because of cultural or reli- Gender inequality and contraceptive prev- gious objections by women, their husbands alence are closely linked (figure 3.6). Where or other family members; a lack of knowledge women have greater standing, as in Japan, the of contraceptive methods or fear of their side Netherlands and Norway, most couples use effects; or preference for larger families.169 Low some form of contraception. But where gender unmet need can be associated with low contra- ceptive prevalence at low levels of development FIGURE 3.6 gender equality and contraceptive prevalence are closely linked (where fertility preferences are high) and with high contraceptive prevalence at high levels of Contraceptive prevalence rate (percent) 100 development (where fertility preferences are NORWAY IRELAND low). This means that family planning pro- • • •• CHINA • BRAZIL grammes must go beyond supplying contracep- 80 • • • • •• •• • • •• • • • • • • • • • • tion at affordable prices to raising awareness ••• • • •• •• • NICARAGUA • • • • • • •• • • of its use and health effects and addressing the NETHERLANDS • • • • • • • • • • •• • structural constraints facing poor women (see 60 • • • • JAPAN • • •• • • • •• • INDIA chapter 4). Some studies link fertility decisions • • •• • •• • • • • • • • • IRAQ• KENYA TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO • •• •• •• to deforestation and difficult access to water, 40 • • ••• • •• PAPUA NEW GUINEA which require women and children to spend • • •• • • • • YEMEN more time collecting fuelwood and water.170 ••• • 20 • • Unmet need is often high—more than 30 MAURITANIA • ••• • THE FORMER YUGOSLAV • •• REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA • • • NIGER • •• MALI percent of people in some countries, including BURUNDI SUDAN • 0 SIERRA LEONE • CHAD Haiti, Liberia, Mali and Uganda, would like 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0 to use family planning but do not.171 Multi- Gender Inequality Index dimensional poverty is correlated with unmet need for contraception. The incidence of peo- Note: Contraceptive prevalence rates are for the most recent year available from the World Health Organization for each country during 2000–2008; see statistical table 4 for details. The Gender Inequality Index is for 2011. ple living in households with unmet fam- Source: HDRO calculations based on data from the World Health Organization. ily planning needs is always higher among62 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • FIGURE 3.7the multidimensionally poor (figure 3.7). In unmet contraceptive need is higher among the multidimensionally poorBolivia 27 percent of the multidimensionally Population with unmet contraceptive need (percent)poor have unmet need for family planning,more than twice the share among the nonpoor 0 10 20 30 40 50(12 percent), and in Ethiopia unmet need MALDIVES ◆ —among the multidimensionally poor (29 per- LIBERIA ◆ —cent) is almost three times the share among MALI ◆ — — — —the nonpoor (11 percent). UGANDA ◆ GABON ◆ ◆ Fertility is also affected by women’s edu- HAITI Among thecation. A recent study covering more than PAKISTAN nonpoor ◆ —90 percent of the world’s people found that BENIN ◆ —women who have never gone to school average ETHIOPIA Among ◆ — — — — — GUINEA the poor4.5 children, those with even a few years of pri- ◆ SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE ◆mary school average just 3, and those with one TIMOR-LESTE ◆ ◆or two years of secondary school average 1.9. NEPALAnd when women enter the workforce, start PHILIPPINES ◆ — —businesses or inherit assets, their desire for a AZERBAIJAN ◆ RWANDA ◆ — — —large family also tends to diminish.172 BOLIVIA ◆ The principles and routes—removing bar- KENYA ◆ ◆riers to the use of family planning and rights- CAMBODIA — — — —based population policies—are not new. They CAMEROON ◆ NIGERIA ◆were directly envisioned by conferees in Cairo CONGO, DEM. REP. OF THE ◆in 1994 and committed to by nearly all gov- ZAMBIA ◆ —ernments. Chapter 4 argues that progress has MALAWI ◆ — —been too slow and highlights some promising SWAZILAND LESOTHO ◆avenues to consider. ◆ — NIGER ◆ CONGO — — — — — ◆Women’s participation in decision-making GHANA ◆Gender inequalities are also reflected in MADAGASCAR ◆women’s low participation in national and EGYPT ◆ MOZAMBIQUE ◆ — — —local political fora. This has ramifications for NAMIBIA ◆ ◆sustainability if, as some research suggests, NICARAGUAwomen express more concern for the environ- ARMENIA ◆ — —ment, support more proenvironmental policy INDIA ◆ TURKEYand vote for proenvironmental leaders. ◆ — — — JORDAN ◆• Countries with higher female parliamen- UKRAINE ◆ tary representation are more likely to set COLOMBIA ◆ — aside protected land areas, as a study of ZIMBABWE ◆ — — — 25 developed and 65 developing countries INDONESIA ◆ ◆ MOROCCO reveals.173 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ◆ — —• Countries with higher female parliamen- PERU ◆ tary representation are more likely to rat- VIET NAM ◆ — — ify international environmental treaties, BANGLADESH ◆ MOLDOVA ◆ — according to a study of 130 countries with about 92 percent of the world’s people.174 Note: Data are for most recent year available during 2000–2010 and are based on the Demographic and Health Survey second definition of unmet need (DHS 2008).• Of the 49 countries that reduced carbon Source: Calculated based on data on MPI from statistical table 5 and from Demographic and Health Surveys. dioxide emissions between 1990 and 2007, 14 were very high HDI countries, 10 of But women continue to be underrepre- which had higher than average female par- sented in national parliaments, on average occu- liamentary representation. pying only 19 percent of seats and accounting CHapteR 3 trACing the eFFeCtS—underStAnding the relAtiOnS 63
  • for just 18 percent of ministers.175 Higher posi- While overall levels of education influence tions are even more elusive: only 7 of 150 elected attitudes, the ratio of the share of women to heads of state and only 11 of 192 heads of gov- men in secondary and tertiary education does ernment are women. The situation is similar in not. The implication: women’s greater concern local government.176 for the environment in rich countries is not a Other evidence suggests that gender function of their having more education, nor is empowerment and environmental awareness the converse true in very poor countries. may be related. The number of women’s and Some evidence suggests that women’s environmental NGOs per capita was nega- involvement is associated with better local Disempowerment and tively correlated with deforestation in a study environmental management. Yet women’s power imbalances of 61 countries between 1990 and 2005. That mere presence in institutions is not enough to add to environmental may be partly because of women’s incentives overcome entrenched disparities—additional challenges to avert the negative effects of deforestation changes and flexibility in institutional forms on their workload, income and health.177 In are needed to ensure that women can partici- developed countries survey data show that pate effectively in decision-making. In some women are more likely than men to engage in cases including women and other marginal environmentally sensitive behaviours, such as groups is perceived as a way of maintaining the recycling, conserving water and avoiding envi- status quo rather than achieving any specific ronmentally harmful products.178 outcomes or questioning inequalities.180 But the relationship, far from straightfor- What matters, then, is not simply women’s ward, varies with development. As we saw in presence but the nature of their participation. box 2.5 in chapter 2, analysis of Gallup World Consider forestry management (box 3.4). A Poll data on environmental attitudes suggests recently published study of community for- that concerns about environmental problems estry institutions in India and Nepal found are not very high. On average, the attitudes of that women’s proportional strength in forest men and women differ little,179 but some vari- management committees affects the effec- ation appears across HDI groups (table 3.3). tiveness of their participation.181 The more In very high HDI countries women express women on the management committee, the more concern for environmental issues (cli- greater is the likelihood that they will attend mate change, water and air quality) than do committee meetings, speak up and become men, while men express more concern in low office holders. HDI countries. The medium and high HDI The arguments here are not new. But they countries (and most developing regions) fall in point to an important part of a reform pack- between. age to address inequality and environmental degradation—with major expansions of wom- TABlE 3.3 en’s freedoms. Attitudes towards the environment, by gender, low and very high hdi countries, 2010 (percent, unless otherwise noted) Power inequalities Low HDI countries Very high HDI countries As a critical dimension of people’s freedoms, Difference Difference empowerment is an important end in itself. (percentage (percentage Attitude Male Female points) Male Female points) But disempowerment and power imbalances Climate change is add to environmental challenges. We build a serious threat 47.76 46.05 1.71 27.18 31.46 4.29 on the 2010 HDR, where we addressed several Dissatisfied with: components of empowerment: agency, politi- Air quality 22.81 21.27 1.55 17.95 21.36 3.41 cal freedoms, civil liberties and accountabil- Water quality 50.48 47.32 3.16 13.56 16.28 2.72 ity. Box 2.1 in chapter 2 already highlighted Government environmental policy 54.82 52.12 2.70 46.36 48.38 2.02 some recent changes. Here we focus on the Government political arena—on national and local govern- emissions policy 61.46 49.16 12.30 53.13 60.83 7.70 ments, accountability and democracy, and civil Source: HDRO calculations based on data from Gallup World Poll (http://worldview.gallup.com). society.64 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • BOX 3.4 History, power relations and context all Women’s participation in community forest managementaffect the links between democracy and envi- Participation of women in community decision-making is important for resource conservationronmental public goods. State activity can and regeneration, particularly for community forest management. However, preexisting andusefully be seen as a continuum from “oli- structural gender inequalities (in income, assets and political endowments) often weakengarchic, extractive, exploitive and divisive” to women’s ability to participate. Even in communities where women are not formally excluded“inclusive, innovative, accountable, responsive from decision-making bodies, their ability to participate in policy-making may be limited by so-and effective at mediating distributional con- cial inequalities. Requiring female representation on committees and ensuring that women areflict.”182 Where state activity falls along the consulted are necessary but insufficient conditions — ultimately the issue is one of challengingcontinuum is determined by the underlying and changing power relations.social contract—historically shaped interac- In villages where women are not actively involved in decision-making, they are more ad- versely affected by forest management decisions such as forest closures than in communitiestions between political and economic elites where they are more involved.and other social groups—as manifest in for- Prior equality is not necessary for women to assert themselves in committee meetings.mal and informal institutions. As economic In fact, women from disadvantaged households are more outspoken in public forums thanprocesses, both state action and capitalism women from better-off households, a finding attributable to their opportunity to gain more ifare often weak in sustaining the environment decisions go in their favour. This outcome was found to be more likely where a large number of—capitalism, intrinsically so, given the short women were present or where women had already been exposed to women’s empowermenttime horizon of most firms and the impor- programmes. Other studies affirm that allowing women to participate, even in a limited role,tance of externalities. The state, despite its role changes cultural perceptions as to women’s capacity to make decisions, in turn prompting the formation of other initiatives and cooperatives for women, allowing them to become morein providing public goods and managing exter- active outside the home.nalities, can often be limited by short political Source: Agarwal 2001, 2009; see also Tole (2010), Gupte (2004) and Timsina (2003).and electoral time horizons. These factors caninteract with political and social structures tohave harmful effects on the environment, espe- countries185 and positively influence cleancially where the adverse impacts affect mainly water and improved sanitation.186disempowered groups. New cross-national analyses of more than Studies have shown that democracies are 100 countries commissioned for this Reporttypically more accountable to voters and more confirmed the strong correlation betweenlikely to allow civil liberties, enabling peo- proxies for the distribution of power and envi-ple to be more informed on environmental ronmental quality.187 Empowerment is linkedproblems (thanks to a free press), to organ- with access to improved water, less land deg-ize and to express concerns. At the national radation and fewer deaths due to indoor andlevel the extent of democracy has been associ- outdoor air pollution and dirty water. Andated with environmental quality.183 But even empowerment variables are even more impor-in democratic systems, the people and groups tant than income in explaining many keymost adversely affected are those who are less dimensions of environmental quality, includ-well-off and less empowered. Policy priorities ing access to improved water, deaths due tomay not reflect their interests and needs. In pollution and mortality in children undermany countries and contexts power inequali- age 5. The implication is that while powerfulties affect environmental outcomes, mediated economic interests can distort policies, socie-through political and social institutions. ties can do much to limit that power. State-level evidence across the United Investigations of environmental data overStates suggests that greater inequality in time for a large number of countries havepower (measured by lower voter participation found this relation to hold. Most studiesand educational attainment and weaker fiscal focus on pollution, a public bad from whichpolicies) leads to weaker environmental poli- the state is expected to protect its popula-cies and more environmental degradation.184 tion.188 The general finding is that literacy andCross-country evidence supports this view. In political rights are associated with less air and180 countries variables such as literacy, politi- water pollution. A recent contribution high-cal rights and civil liberties improve envi- lights the importance of long-term democ-ronmental quality in high- and low-income racy in lowering sulphur and carbon dioxide CHapteR 3 trACing the eFFeCtS—underStAnding the relAtiOnS 65
  • emissions.189 This makes sense: it takes time industry.194 Where civil society is active, it has for democracy to yield tangible instrumental been shown to bring about significant change: gains. Other work in more than 100 countries • A recent study modelling environmental links a higher level of democracy to less defor- NGO impact in a framework of interest estation, less land degradation and less air and group participation and influence in 104 water pollution.190 countries found that the number of envi- Various studies suggest that democracy ronmental advocacy groups in a country increases the likelihood of state commit- had a statistically significant negative rela- ment to goals to address climate change, tion with the lead content in gasoline.195 greater equality transboundary air pollution and river man- • A study using cross-country panel data for between men and agement, if not policy implementation. But 1977–1988 found a statistically signifi- women and within while democracies tend to be more commit- cant negative relation between the num- populations may ted to positive outcomes for climate change, ber of environmental NGOs and air pol- have transformative the relationship is not very strong—given that lution levels and weaker relations between potential in advancing the benefits are perceived to be external and democracy and pollution and between lit- environmental beyond the time horizon of current voters (and eracy rates and pollution.196 sustainability politicians).191 This widens the gaps between Civil society, in turn, can thrive only with words and deeds. popular support. Where civil society groups Even within democracies, political institu- are active, power imbalances can be overcome. tions vary widely. Some are centralized, and In the 1990s activists in poor, racial minority others decentralized. Likewise, political rep- neighbourhoods in Chicago, United States, resentation is affected by the role of political succeeded in getting the national Environ- parties, the existence of quotas for particular mental Protection Agency to act against illegal groups, the duration of electoral cycles and waste dumping in their communities. Com- other factors. Some countries have a strong munity policing programmes were established, independent agency charged with protecting and city regulations and enforcement of ille- the environment; others may have only a weak gal dumping were also strengthened, includ- line ministry. The strength of labour unions ing new harsher penalties.197 Civil society contributes to lower environmental air qual- groups in a range of contexts have successfully ity; the strength of green parties has the oppo- opposed activities likely to be a detriment to site effect.192 the environment and the livelihoods of people Civil society groups can organize and exert who directly rely on it. real impact on the decisions of policy-makers, offsetting the often disproportionate influence * * * of powerful economic interests and lobbies. We have outlined the ways environmental The possibility of developing this “countervail- deprivations and environmental degradation ing power”193 depends on whether institutions can constrain choices—showing how they seri- in a society allow for open and free participa- ously jeopardize health, education, livelihoods tion. As Sweden’s environmental policies show, and other aspects of well-being and at times strong democratic participation can translate worsen prevailing inequalities. We have also into policies that reflect popular concern. But suggested that greater equality between men such concerns may be countervailed by other and women and within populations may have vested interests—as reported for the Russian transformative potential in advancing sustain- Federation in the problems civil society faces ability. We go on to explore this possibility and in mobilizing public support around greening promising approaches and policies.66 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • positive synergies—winning chap ter 4 strategies for the environment, equity and human developmentIn facing the challenges laid out in chapters integrating environmental concerns into the2 and 3, a host of governments, civil society, country’s Economic Development and Pov-private sector and development actors have erty Strategy. And crucial at the local level aresought to integrate environmental and equity strong institutions, particularly those that payconcerns and promote human development attention to disadvantaged groups and pro-—win-win-win strategies. An example at mote community management.the global level is the 1987 Montreal Proto- The policy agenda is vast. This Report can-col, which bans ozone-depleting chemicals, not do it full justice or cover all the challengesthereby benefiting sustainability (through raised in the preceding chapters. Several recentprotection of the ozone layer), equity (through global reports provide important details.3 Thetechnology transfer to developing countries) value added here is in identifying win-win-and human development (through positive win strategies that successfully address theimpacts on health).1 world’s social, economic and environmental This chapter showcases local and national challenges by managing, or even bypassing,strategies to address environmental depriva- trade-offs so that the approaches are good nottions and build resilience, thereby demonstrat- only for the environment but also for equitying positive synergies. An important backdrop and human development more broadly. Thisto this discussion is the need for healthy eco- effort provides concrete experience and impor-systems and the services they provide, espe- tant motivation for the forward-looking finalcially for the poor. Ecosystems build the foun- chapter.dation for water quality, food security, floodprotection and natural climate regulation.2 Scaling up to address Scaling up successful community and local environmental deprivationsinitiatives is a prime focus. Key elements at the and build resiliencenational level are policies that bring togethersocial, economic and environmental con- We begin by highlighting promising win-cerns; coordination mechanisms aligned with win-win routes in energy and in water andbudget frameworks; a culture of innovation; sanitation.and strong institutions, alongside mechanismsthat ensure accountability. Some countries Energyhave overcome siloed arrangements through Energy is central to a range of services support-medium-term plans that allow cross-secto- ing human development, from modern medi-ral coordination across government agencies cal care, transportation, information and com-and with development partners. Senior core munications to lighting, heating, cooking andministries—such as finance and planning— mechanical power for agriculture. Equitableare often critical, as are line agencies, especially and sustainable development requires makingworking with other ministries. In Malawi the energy available for all, controlling emissionsMinistry of Agriculture helped create demand and shifting to new and cleaner energy sources.for measures to reduce poverty and protectthe environment, and in Rwanda the Min- Addressing energy deprivationsistry of State, Lands and the Environment Some 1.5 billion people, more than one in five,garnered presidential and cabinet support for lack access to electricity, and 2.6 billion cook CHapteR 4 pOSitive SynergieS—winning StrAtegieS FOr the envirOnMent, equity And huMAn develOpMent 67
  • FIGURE 4.1 with wood, straw, charcoal or dung.4 Major services would increase carbon dioxide emis- large regional differences in the share energy inequalities persist across regions, sions only 0.8 percent by 2030.12 Off-grid and of multidimensionally poor countries, gender and classes. Acknowledging decentralized options are important and tech- people lacking electricity that energy distribution cannot be considered nically feasible. While difficult to quantify, Percent apart from political and social exclusion,5 the the number of rural households already served 65th United Nations General Assembly pro- by renewable energy is estimated in the tens 0.4 claimed 2012 as the International Year of Sus- of millions, through such schemes as micro- Europe and Central Asia tainable Energy for All.6 hydropower in villages and county-scale mini- One multidimensionally poor person in grids, an important source of energy in Brazil, 3.3 three (32 percent) lacks electricity, and there China and India.13 East Asia and the Pacific is a strong regional pattern to this deprivation There have been some successes in extend- (figure 4.1). More than 60 percent of the multi- ing energy access to the poor, including 11.1 dimensionally poor in Sub-Saharan Africa through decentralized energy systems. The Latin America and the Caribbean lack electricity, compared with less than 1 per- challenge is to make such innovations hap- cent in Europe and Central Asia. Progress in pen at a scale and speed that will improve the 27.7 electrification has been slow in Africa. Elec- lives of poor women and men now and in the South Asia tricity generation capacity per person in Sub- future.14 Governments can do more to sup- Saharan Africa today is similar to levels in the port entrepreneurship and capital acquisition 62.3 1980s but just a tenth that in South and East for alternative energy startups.15 As Latvia and Sub-Saharan Africa Asia. And rural electrification has stagnated at other countries have shown, the right legal below 10 percent—while growing to 50 per- framework can boost growth in the nonrenew- Note: Excludes very high HDI countries. Source: HDRO staff calculations based on data cent for developing countries as a whole.7 able energy sector and limit emissions from from the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Electrification can reduce poverty by traditional energy sources. Initiative. increasing productivity, employment and time Increasing efficiency is important too. And spent in school and reducing environmen- innovations are proceeding, from improved tal pressures. For instance, in South Africa stoves—which have reduced fuelwood require- electrification is associated with a 13 percent ments some 40 percent in parts of Kenya and greater likelihood of women participating dramatically cut pollution levels and improved in the labour market,8 while in Viet Nam it child health in Guatemala16 —to more energy- increased income, consumption and schooling efficient buildings—which can reduce heating outcomes.9 Bhutanese villagers attest enthusi- and cooling loads.17 astically to the difference electricity makes in their lives, citing the ability to work in the eve- Making energy cleaner nings and cook without wood, which reduced Any long-run strategy for broadening energy respiratory problems and time spent fetching access must include actions to promote cleaner fuel.10 energy.18 There are encouraging signs. By 2010 Expanding energy access and mitigating more than 100 countries—up from 55 in 2005 climate change can be presented as trade-offs. —had enacted some policy target or promo- For instance, the World Bank’s recent $3.75 tion policy for renewable energy, including billion loan to South Africa to build one of all 27 EU members. Many countries specify the world’s largest coal-fired plants will expand a target share of renewables in electricity pro- access, but the project raised concerns about duction, typically 5–30 percent, but within a greenhouse gas emissions and environmental range of 2 percent to 90 percent. degradation as well as carbon lock-in when the In several countries renewables constitute longevity of infrastructure prolongs the use of a rapidly growing share of total energy supply. obsolete technologies.11 The share is 44 percent of energy in Sweden, But the prospect of win-win-win options one of the better performers identified in chap- enables us to go beyond trade-offs. Recent ter 2. As of 2008 Brazil produced almost 85 World Energy Outlook estimates indicate that percent of its electricity from renewables, and providing everyone with basic modern energy Austria 62 percent. And hydropower accounts68 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • for close to 70 percent of electricity gener- Transparency International study, for exam-ated in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South ple, reported that almost 70 percent of poten-Africa).19 tial energy investors in North Africa consider According to the Renewable Energy Policy regulatory risk, including corruption, a seriousNetwork for the 21st Century, global energy impediment to investment.22 Technical limi-supply reached a tipping point in 2010, as tations must also be overcome. For example,renewables accounted for a quarter of global intermittency raises capital costs for wind andpower capacity and delivered almost a fifth solar power and requires supplementation byof electricity supply20 (see statistical table 6). other sources. Improved storage technologies Developing countriesVirtually every renewable technology has seen are also needed.consistently strong growth. Some highlights: Currently, more than 90 percent of clean are adopting renewable• Wind. Despite the 2008 global economic energy investments are in the G-20 coun- energy and now have crisis, new wind power installations tries. 23 To expand equity and sustainability more than half of reached a record 38 gigawatts in 2009, a in clean energy globally, concerted efforts are global renewable 41 percent increase over 2008 and equiv- needed to improve conditions in other coun- power capacity alent to nearly a quarter of total global tries that would enable future investments. 24 installations. In the next chapter we call for addressing per-• Solar. Grid-connected solar photovoltaic verse incentives and market distortions, reduc- systems have grown at an annual average of ing risks and increasing rewards, and increas- 60 percent over the past decade, increasing ing accountability in global environmental 100-fold since 2000, with major expan- governance. Beyond facilitating greater access sions in the Czech Republic, Germany and and lowering emissions, clean energy can create Spain. Unit prices have declined sharply— new industries and jobs. Installing 1 megawatt some dropping 50–60 percent, to less than of wind turbine capacity creates an estimated $2 a watt. Generous feed-in tariffs are one 0.7–2.8 times the permanent employment of a reason. An estimated 3 million households comparable natural gas combined-cycle power in rural areas get power from small solar plant; installing 1 megawatt of solar capacity photovoltaic systems, and an estimated 70 creates up to 11 times more. 25 An estimated million households worldwide have solar 3 million people worldwide already work in hot water heating. renewable energy industries, about half of Since 2004 global renewable energy capac- them in biofuels.26ity for many technologies has grown 4–60 per-cent a year, spurred by new technology, high Reining in global emissionsand volatile oil prices, climate change con- Policies to cut emissions nationally entailcerns, and local, national and global policy both potential advantages and concerns aboutdevelopments.21 equity and capacity. Developing countries are adopting renew- Table 4.1 lists illustrative policy instru-able energy and now have more than half of ments to cut carbon dioxide emissions andglobal renewable power capacity. China leads their key equity effects. Typically, instrumentsthe world in several indicators of market must be combined to deal with the broad rangegrowth, including wind power capacity and of market failures.biomass power, while India stands fifth in Pricing can powerfully affect behaviour.wind and is fast expanding such rural renewa- An obvious candidate is the reduction of fossilbles as biogas and solar. Brazil produces much fuel subsidies, which are expensive (amountingof the world’s sugar-derived ethanol and is add- to about $312 billion in 2009 in 37 developinging new biomass and wind power plants. countries)27 and encourage consumption. The The continuing roll-out of renewable Organisation for Economic Co-operation andenergy sources will require large private Development estimates that phasing out theinvestments, but corruption and lack of reg- subsidies could free fiscal resources and reduceulation can slow the momentum. A recent global greenhouse gas emissions 10 percent by CHapteR 4 pOSitive SynergieS—winning StrAtegieS FOr the envirOnMent, equity And huMAn develOpMent 69
  • 2050 —more than 20 percent in oil-exporting But the optimal policy here, as elsewhere, countries. 28 Similarly, subsidized electric- depends on context. Careful investigation and ity prices for agriculture often encourage targeted compensation are needed where the greater groundwater extraction, risking over- affected goods and services account for a large exploitation. 29 These types of perverse subsi- share of family spending. Redistribution can dies favour medium and large producers over be implemented through social transfers or, smaller farmers because smaller farmers rarely if the tax base is broad enough, through tax pump water and instead use wheels, surface cuts for the poor. To compensate for lower water or rainfall.30 oil subsidies, Indonesia implemented a cash transfer scheme in late 2005 targeting 15.5 TABlE 4.1 million poor and near-poor households (some Key equity aspects of a menu of instruments to reduce carbon 28 percent of the population). To offset higher dioxide emissions energy prices, Mexico supplemented its con- Policy instrument Examples Key equity aspects Other considerations ditional cash transfer programme in 2007. Cap-and-trade permits • EU trading scheme • If permits are given • Potentially high And Iran replaced oil-based subsidies on fuel, away, this favours monitoring and incumbent firms enforcement costs food and other essentials with a transitional and does not raise • Carbon permit prices revenue can be volatile. monthly $40 cash grant to 90 percent of the Emissions targets • Voluntary targets • Depends on pattern • If electricity is population in 2010, leading to a drop of 4.5 of European Union, of consumption and generated with fossil percent in gas consumption and 28 percent in Indonesia and the production fuels, targets will Russian Federation to cause prices to rise diesel consumption.31 reduce emissions • Poor people spend a larger proportion Several large developing countries have of their income on committed to deep carbon cuts. For example, energy Taxes or charges • Fuel and coal taxes • Depends on pattern • Fiscal revenue in 2009 China set a goal of lowering carbon • Motor vehicle taxes of consumption and potentially as high intensity 40–45 percent from 2005 levels over production as 1–3 percent of GDP in Organisation the next decade, later announced further short- for Economic term targets and is supporting renewable energy Co-operation and Development through subsidies, targets and tax incentives.32 countries by 2020a In 2010 India announced voluntary targeted Subsidies for renewables • Hybrid cars • Depends on purchase • Potentially expensive; • Subsidies for electric patterns, but unlikely more than $7,000 per reductions of 20–25 percent in carbon intensity. vehicles to be progressive; vehicle in Belgium, These new commitments are important could be targeted Canada, China, the (means tested) Netherlands, the steps in the transition to a lower carbon econ- United Kingdom and the United States omy. As we saw in table 2.1 in chapter 2, falling Subsidy cuts • Fossil fuels • Eliminating subsidies • Fossil fuel subsidies carbon intensity of production globally lowered • Electricity for would create cost around $558 irrigation substantial fiscal billion in 2008 and total emissions growth between 1970 and 2007 and environmental $312 billion in 2009 well below what it would have been otherwise. benefits • Complete phase-out by 2020 could reduce But the announcements must be put in emissions 20 percent in non-European perspective. Reduced carbon intensity can countries, the Russian run alongside rising greenhouse gas emissions Federation and the Arab States if economic growth continues apace. Despite Performance standards • Limits on car • May raise costs and • Does not allow firms increased energy efficiency, US emissions emissions limit access of the to reduce emissions • Energy efficiency poor at the lowest possible have continued to grow—more than 7 per- standards cost cent from 1990 to 2009.33 China was already Technology standards • Building and zoning • Care needed to avoid • Importance of reducing carbon intensity at 1.4 percent a year codes cost increases that appropriate are prohibitive for technology over 1970–2007, but rapid economic growth the poor meant that total emissions still grew 5.9 per- Better information • Public awareness • Ensure outreach • Group identity of campaign and accessibility to users matters cent a year. The new target would more than • Emission and energy disadvantaged groups double the rate of carbon intensity reduction use disclosure requirements to 3.8 percent a year, but again that does not a. At $50 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent greenhouse gas emissions. mean that China’s total emissions will decline. Source: Based on OECD (2010c). In fact, if China’s economic growth through70 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • 2020 exceeds 3.9 percent (as predicted), its Asia and the Pacific and 2 in the Arab States.37total emissions would continue to rise; if the In July 2010 the UN General Assembly rec-economy continues to grow at the 9.2 percent ognized the right to water and sanitation andannual rate of the past decade, total emissions acknowledged that clean drinking water andwould increase 2.8 percent a year. improved sanitation are integral to the reali- Other countries have committed to zation of all human rights. In all countries,reducing absolute emissions. Indonesia has improving access to these facilities can be a keyannounced a target of reducing carbon diox- driver in poverty reduction.ide emissions 26 percent.34 Similarly, the Euro- And there is cause for optimism. Innova- Expanding access topean Union, as part of its 20/20/20 plan to be tive approaches are under way in many coun-met by 2020, committed to cutting green- tries.38 Some highlights: modern energy forhouse gas emissions 20 percent from 1990 lev- • Providing affordable access. Small-scale, all and developingels, increasing renewable energy use 20 percent needs-driven technologies can provide renewable energyand reducing energy consumption 20 percent households with low-cost potable water. sources are gainingthrough improved energy efficiency.35 In Cameroon cheap biosand filters, devel- traction, but involving oped in South Africa, are used to make the state, donors * * * water safe to drink.39 In India the inter- and internationalIn sum, expanding access to modern energy for national nongovernmental organization organizations is criticalall and developing renewable energy sources (NGO) Water for People partnered with for reducing disparitiesare gaining traction, but involving the state, a local university to develop simple, locallydonors and international organizations is criti- manufactured filters that remove arse-cal for investing in research and development nic from the water at public wellheadsand reducing disparities within and across in West Bengal.40 Governments have thecountries. Moreover, strong efforts are needed obligation to connect their populations toto include the poor: if current trends continue, modern waterworks through public, pri-more people will lack access to modern energy vate or civil society service provision, butin 2030 than today.36 encouraging these types of local innova- tions can relieve water deprivation evenWater access, water security and before larger water infrastructure projectssanitation can be implemented.Chapter 3 told of the devastating impacts of • Supporting local communities. Small grantslack of access to potable water. Addressing this can support local community effortsinequity calls for managing water resources to manage water resources. The Uniteddifferently to serve a growing world popula- Nations Development Programme’s Com-tion. Water security, defined as a country’s munity Water Initiative and other smallability to secure enough clean water to meet grant programmes have worked with gov-needs for household uses, irrigation, hydro- ernments in Guatemala, Kenya, Maurita-power and other ends, has win-win-win possi- nia and Tanzania to support communitybilities. In poorer countries the greatest needs water projects.41are for household and agricultural uses. Whilethe two uses are closely linked, particularly for Agricultural waterrural communities, the policy implications Agricultural water problems range from lackdiffer. of access to overexploitation. But again there is cause for optimism—in efficiency gains andHousehold water real-cost pricing that moves away from oftenA first step in increasing access to potable water regressive subsidies. Even in a water-abundantis recognizing equal rights to water, regardless country such as the United States farmers useof ability to pay. Right-to-water legislation 15 percent less water now than 30 years ago toexists in 15 countries in Latin America, 13 in grow 70 percent more food; the country hasSub-Saharan Africa, 4 in South Asia, 2 in East doubled its water productivity since 1980.42 CHapteR 4 pOSitive SynergieS—winning StrAtegieS FOr the envirOnMent, equity And huMAn develOpMent 71
  • Recognizing the problems of overexploita- from access to safe water and sanitation, all tion of water and the need to ensure equita- else equal. ble access has led to promising new schemes. Several innovative approaches have pro- Several countries in the Arab States have vided small-scale access to sanitation: water user associations that now operate and • Manaus, Brazil, recently used a $5  mil- manage irrigation systems, establishing ser- lion grant to connect 15,000 mainly poor vice levels and charges. In Yemen water-sav- households to a modern sewage system, ing technologies and regulatory systems are by subsidizing services to poor house- designed in consultation with users to ensure holds that otherwise could not afford the Better access to safe that the technologies meet farmers’ needs and service. To encourage take-up, the project water and sanitation that regulatory systems are equitable. And in worked to raise awareness of the benefits, can improve health Egypt pilot programmes have reduced pub- since the failure of even a small number of directly and productivity lic subsidies; increased the efficiency of water households to adopt modern sewage sys- indirectly and use, operations and maintenance; and reduced tems can result in contamination of water contributes to human pollution.43 sources.48 dignity, self-respect Analysis of the distributional impacts of • SaniMarts (Sanitation Markets) in east- and physical safety, water investments is important. For exam- ern Nepal help households buy materials ple, irrigation investments can buffer weather to construct or upgrade latrines. Piloted in particularly for women shocks to smooth consumption over time, but Southern India, SaniMarts are local shops the effects can be uneven. Recent analysis of staffed by trained sanitation promoters large irrigation dams in India found that peo- who sell latrine construction materials at ple living downstream were likely to benefit, affordable prices.49 while those living upstream were likely to • The Sanitation Marketing Pilot Project in lose.44 Cambodia sought to enhance the adoption Healthy, intact ecosystems, such as for- of latrines in the provinces of Kandal and est headwaters, are vital for sustaining the Svay Rieng by demonstrating that selling flow and quality of water for human use. An them could be a profitable business enter- estimated one-third of the world’s largest cit- prise. The “easy latrine” was sold as a com- ies depend on intact protected forest areas for plete package that households could easily their water supply.45 In Venezuela water from install themselves. The commercial viabil- 18 national parks meets the fresh water needs ity of the product led private businesses of 19 million people, or 83 percent of the urban to invest their own resources to address population, and about 20 percent of irrigated demand.50 lands depend on protected areas for water.46 Despite some regional successes, most such This is also critical for rural areas. Indonesia’s programmes have not been scaled up, largely Lore Lindu National Park provides water for because they lack strong local leadership or irrigation and fish to support rural livelihoods. interest, because skills are weak and because monitoring and evaluation are insufficient.51 Sanitation One exception is an initiative known as the Almost half the people in developing coun- Global Scaling up Rural Sanitation Project, tries lack access to basic sanitation services.47 supported by the World Bank in rural India, Expanding access can improve health directly Indonesia and Tanzania, which has reached an and productivity indirectly and, as discussed estimated 8.2 million people over four years. in chapter 3, contributes to human dignity, Its success is traceable, at least in part, to bet- self-respect and physical safety, particularly ter performance monitoring, which shifts the for women. Our own analysis confirms that focus to outcomes.52 better access to safe water and sanitation While most approaches focus on sup- are also positively associated with women’s ply, Community-led Total Sanitation targets health outcomes relative to men—in other demand (box 4.1). Along with increasing the words, women benefit disproportionately use of toilets, other behavioural interventions,72 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • BOX 4.1such as promoting hand washing,53 are reduc- From subsidy to self-respect—the revolution of Community-leding faecal bacterial contamination in Africa Total Sanitationand Asia. Chapter 3 reviewed how faecal-related infections, now rare in richer countries, are stubbornly endemic in others. Some 2.6 billion people lack sanitary toilets, and 1.1 billion people defecate * * * in the open.In sum, greater public policy efforts are needed That the Millennium Development Goal for sanitation is the farthest off track resultsto increase investments in water and sanitation partly from a failed reliance on hardware subsidies. The top-down approach, with subsidizedto improve access. Current patterns of natural standard designs and materials, has provided inadequate toilets that cost too much, deliveredresource exploitation are creating huge envi- them to people who are not the most poor, achieved only partial coverage and use, and engen- dered dependence.ronmental hardships for the poor, who are Community-led Total Sanitation (CLTS) turns all this on its head. There is no hardwareoften excluded from even minimal levels of subsidy, no standard design, no targeting the poor from outside. Collective action is key. Pio-service. Access can be increased by building on neered by Kamal Kar and the Village Education Resource Centre in partnership with WaterAidthe successes of a range of countries, many at in Bangladesh in 2000, CLTS teaches communities to map and inspect their defecation areas,the local and community levels, and by involv- calculate how much they deposit and identify pathways between excreta and mouth. It helpsing national governments and development communities “face the shit” (the crude local word is always used). Disgust, dignity and self-partners. respect trigger self-help through digging pits and adopting hygienic behaviours. With follow- up encouragement, community members also address equity. Children and schools are often involved.Averting degradation Sustainability is enhanced by social pressures to end open defecation. There are chal- lenges, and few communities have done away with it completely. Sandy pit walls can collapseWe turn now to three keys to reducing deg- — and floods devastate — but households and communities have bounced back and movedradation pressures: expanding reproductive themselves up the sanitation ladder, installing better, more durable toilets.choice, supporting community management Where governments and communities have endorsed CLTS and enabled quality trainingof natural resources and conserving biodiver- and well led campaigns, outcomes have been remarkable. In Himachal Pradesh, India, the num-sity while promoting equity. ber of people in rural areas who had toilets rose from 2.4 million in 2006 to 5.6 million in 2010 out of a total population of 6 million. CLTS has spread to more than 40 countries: more than 10 million people in Africa and Asia already live in open defecation–free communities, and manyExpanding reproductive choice more have benefited from toilets. In some countries CLTS is making the sanitation MillenniumReproductive rights, including access to repro- Development Goal look not just achievable but surpassable.ductive health services, are a precondition for In a 2007 British Medical Journal poll sanitation was voted the most important medicalwomen’s health and empowerment and essen- advance of the past 150 years. And CLTS won the journal’s competition in 2011 for the ideatial to the enjoyment of other fundamental most likely to have the greatest impact on healthcare by 2020. The quality of training, facili-rights. They form a foundation for satisfy- tation and follow-up are all critical as CLTS is scaled up. CLTS expansion could reduce theing relationships, harmonious family life and suffering and enhance the health, dignity and well-being of hundreds of millions of deprivedopportunities for a better future. Moreover, people.they are important for achieving international Source: Chambers 2009; Mehta and Movik 2011.development goals, including the MillenniumDevelopment Goals. Important in themselves, that empower women and increase their accessfully realized reproductive rights can also have to contraceptives and other reproductivepositive spillover effects on the environment if health services.they slow population growth and reduce envi- It follows that greater worldwide availabil-ronmental pressures. ity and adoption of reproductive health and Recent projections put the world’s popula- family planning services raise the prospect oftion at 9.3 billion by 2050 and 10 billion by a win-win-win for sustainability, equity and2100, assuming that fertility in all countries human development. Of course the environ-converges to replacement levels.54 However, mental gains depend on carbon footprintscalculations also suggest that simply address- at the individual level. For instance, an aver-ing unmet family planning need in 100 coun- age citizen in Australia or the United Statestries could shift global fertility below replace- accounts for as much carbon dioxide emissionsment levels, putting the world on a path to an in two days as an average citizen of Malawi orearlier peak in population and then a gradual Rwanda in a year. Reproductive health anddecline.55 This can be done through initiatives family planning are critical in Malawi and CHapteR 4 pOSitive SynergieS—winning StrAtegieS FOr the envirOnMent, equity And huMAn develOpMent 73
  • Rwanda—where women still have an average workers, with large benefits in reduced mater- of five children—but will not significantly nal mortality.61 reduce carbon dioxide emissions. By contrast, A number of governments have reformed innovative programmes such as Family PACT policy frameworks and programmes to in California, which reimburses physicians improve reproductive health. In Bangladesh for providing reproductive healthcare to low- the fertility rate fell from 6.6 births per woman income women and prevents almost 100,000 in 1975 to 2.4 in 2009, a huge drop attributed unintended births each year, not only improve to the introduction of a major policy initia- the lives and health of women and their fami- tive in 1976 that emphasized population and greater worldwide lies but also reduce the future carbon footprint family planning as integral to national devel- availability and adoption by some 156 million tonnes a year.56 opment. Measures included community out- of reproductive health Reproductive rights include choosing the reach and subsidies to make contraceptives and family planning number, timing and spacing of one’s children more easily available, efforts to influence social services raise the and having the information and means to do norms through discussions with the commu- prospect of a win-win- so. A rights-based approach means address- nity (religious leaders, teachers, NGOs), educa- win for sustainability, ing demand—by informing, educating and tion of both men and women and development equity and human empowering—and ensuring access to the of reproductive health research and training supply of reproductive health services. Many activities.62 development reproductive choice initiatives are under way In many cases partnerships across differ- worldwide—though most focus more on the ent groups and with a range of service pro- supply side.57 viders have brought gains. In three rural dis- The incremental infrastructure require- tricts and two urban slums in Kenya, poor ments of reproductive services are typically families were given vouchers to pay for repro- modest because service delivery can often pig- ductive health and gender-based violence gyback on other health programmes. Several recovery services. 63 In Viet Nam a long-term initiatives exploit synergies among popula- collaboration of the government, provincial tion, health and environment programmes at health institutions and several NGOs has the community level. These include a United led to dramatic improvements in the quality States Agency for International Development of reproductive health services, provision of pilot programme in Nepal covering some new services and establishment of a sustain- 14,000 community forest user groups58 and able clinical training network in reproductive the PATH Foundation’s Integrated Popula- health.64 tion and Coastal Resource Management Ini- Similarly, in Iran efforts to introduce tiative in the Philippines, which show how to reproductive health services began in the late bring reproductive health services into existing 1980s, when rapid population growth was community-run programmes. Cambodia and recognized as an obstacle to development. Uganda have similar initiatives.59 ProPeten, an Today, nearly 80 percent of married women organization devoted to preventing deforesta- use contraception65 —the country also has tion in Guatemala, augmented its deforesta- a maternal mortality ratio that is less than tion prevention initiatives with an integrated 8 percent of that in South Africa, which has approach to population, health and environ- a similar per capita income. In 2009 Mongo- ment that was associated with a decline in aver- lia endorsed a national strategy for reproduc- age fertility in the region from 6.8 births per tive health, included the services in the mid- woman to 4.3 over a decade.60 term budget framework and committed to Better management and more effective fully funding contraceptive supply by 2015. targeting of resources often bring large gains, Lao PDR’s Ministry of Health implemented a even in resource-poor areas. A local sustained community-based distribution model for pro- leadership development programme for health viding family planning services in three poor workers in Aswan, Egypt, led to more fre- southern provinces. The programme sharply quent prenatal and childcare visits by health increased contraceptive prevalence, in some74 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • regions from less than 1 percent in 2006 to affect who benefits from community manage-over 60 percent in 2009.66 ment. The distribution of wealth (including Several initiatives show encouraging evi- land tenure rights) and knowledge and par-dence of the effect of raising awareness of ticipation in decision-making are especiallyreproductive healthcare. ProPeten sponsored important. For example, when influentiala radio soap opera to disseminate informa- stakeholders benefit from a common resource,tion on the environment, gender issues and they might invest heavily in restricting access,reproductive health. 67 Using the extensive thus enhancing sustainability but at a cost tomobile phone networks now common in equity. As we discuss below, evidence suggests as an alternative todeveloping countries—more than 76 percent that more equal and socially cohesive commu-of the world’s population68 and more than nities are more likely to organize and agree on centralized control,1 billion women in low- and middle-income how to deal with collective action problems.73 community-conservedcountries currently have access 69—multiple A major threat to equity is women’s exclu- areas help ensureinitiatives, including the Mobile Alliance for sion from decision-making. With no commu- equitable access toMaternal Action, provide customized health nity voice, women are often excluded from the resources, sustain humaninformation to expectant and new mothers in benefits of common resources while bearing a development throughBangladesh, India and South Africa.70 These disproportionate share of the costs, as in some essential ecosystemapproaches have enormous potential, though parts of India.74 For example, deciding to close services and maintaintheir widespread effectiveness has yet to be forests without considering women’s needs ecosystem integritydemonstrated. can deprive women of fuelwood, increase the Concerted government efforts are needed time they spend finding alternative sources ofto achieve universal access to reproductive fuelwood and fodder and reduce their incomehealthcare, which yields rich dividends in from livestock products. More generally, ourlower fertility rates and better health and edu- analysis suggests a causal link between ourcation outcomes. Bangladesh’s success sug- Gender Inequality Index and deforestation ingests that the bottleneck is not resources but more than 100 countries between 1990 andpriorities and political will. The incremental 2010. And as chapter 3 notes, empirical evi-infrastructure requirements are low, but just dence stresses the importance of the natureincreasing provision is not enough. Informa- and extent of women’s participation in man-tion and training are needed to boost uptake of agement decisions.75these programmes in ways that respect tradi- One of the most successful and equitabletion and social mores. Community-based pro- models of community management of naturalgrammes have great potential, as do new forms resources is the community-conserved areaof communications and connectivity. —land or water protected by legal or other means and owned and managed by a commu-Supporting community nity. Around 11 percent of the world’s forestsmanagement of natural resources are known to be under community ownershipSupport is growing for community manage- or administration,76 but this is likely a severement of natural resources as an alternative to underestimate.77 Community-conserved areascentralized control, especially where commu- help ensure equitable access to resources, sus-nities depend on local natural resources and tain human development through essentialecosystems for their livelihoods. Increasing ecosystem services and maintain ecosysteminterest in reforestation in countries as diverse integrity.as Costa Rica, Estonia and India reflects the Locally managed marine areas—areas ofpotential for success.71 near-shore waters and their associated coastal While participatory management of com- and marine resources—also provide win-win-mon resources has been widely embraced as a win solutions. Pacific Island communities,promising concept, a detailed review commis- such as Fiji, have dozens of such areas wheresioned for this Report shows that the reality island communities have long practiced tra-is more nuanced.72 Local structural factors ditional management systems that include CHapteR 4 pOSitive SynergieS—winning StrAtegieS FOr the envirOnMent, equity And huMAn develOpMent 75
  • BOX 4.2 ecosystems. In some cases—including Costa Culture, norms and environmental protection Rica and the Philippines—greater decentrali- The values and beliefs that shape people’s relationships with their natural environment are zation and comanagement of natural resources central to environmental sustainability, as are accumulated traditional knowledge and commu- have helped alleviate tensions. nity practices of environmental management. The environmental management skills of local people may include multiuse strategies of appropriation, small-scale production with little sur- plus and low energy use, and a variety of custodial approaches to land and natural resources Conserving biodiversity while that avoid waste and resource depletion. promoting equity Case studies suggest that traditional values can protect natural resources. Over three In recent years perceived trade-offs between decades in the Zambezi Valley of Zimbabwe, for instance, forests considered sacred lost less preserving livelihoods and maintaining bio- than half the cover of those that were not. In Ghana conservative traditions and practices diversity have been replaced by a clearer led to the designation of sacred areas and to periodic restrictions on farming, harvesting and understanding of the potential synergies. For fishing. Local knowledge also informs natural disaster responses. Chile reported only 8 fisher instance, preserving natural ecosystems and victims out of an estimated population of about 80,000 following the February 2010 tsunami, thanks mostly to lessons from previous tsunamis passed down through elders’ stories and biodiversity can help secure livelihoods, food, neighbours’ evacuation alerts. water and health. Many countries (including Though such knowledge is often downplayed and overlooked, traditional values have Botswana, Brazil and Namibia) and interna- also informed policy. In Andavadoaka, a small fishing village in Madagascar, the community tional organizations (including the United initiated a sustainable octopus fishing initiative that inspired other villages and became the Nations Development Programme) are call- country’s first locally managed marine area, involving 24 villages. And in Afghanistan the gov- ing for investments to preserve biodiversity ernment is drawing on elements of long-standing mirab systems — in which locally elected for its potential development benefits. One leaders manage water rights — in creating water use associations. instrument is to assign and enforce protected Source: Byers and others 2001; Marín and others 2010; Thomas and Ahmad 2009; Sarfo-Mensah and Oduro 2007; UN 2008. area status to ecosystems, putting in place measures to avert or reverse land degradation seasonal fishing bans and temporary no-take and ecotourism. Ecotourism in particular is areas. Community-conserved marine areas a promising route to protecting biodiversity provide enormous value to local communities while enhancing livelihood opportunities for in the forms of fish protein and sustainable the local community. The primary challenge livelihoods.78 is to ensure equitable participation, including Communities can manage natural by women.80 resources using a variety of mechanisms, A recent survey found that nature-based including payments for ecosystem services and tourism is one of several conservation mecha- community-conserved areas. Cultural or tra- nisms that can reduce poverty.81 In Namibia, ditional norms emerge as important (box 4.2). for example, an ecotourism programme has Success requires broad stakeholder inclusion in protected nearly 3 million hectares of land and returns—from the resources themselves as well marine areas housing great biodiversity. Espe- as from their management. Local processes cially important for equity, the programme and national commitment are also important. has improved livelihoods immensely. And Sweden’s experience in the 1960s, reviewed with roughly 29 percent of the wealth gener- in box 2.10 in chapter 2, shows that national ated by these protected areas going to labour environmental protection mandates can sup- and another 5 percent to traditional agricul- port community management. ture, the programme shows the potential of Where the livelihoods of multiple stake- protected areas to reduce poverty as well. 82 holders are closely tied to natural resources, Similarly, an initiative to conserve biodiver- community-based management is susceptible sity at the level of landholders in the island to conflict. As discussed in chapter 3, scarcity state of Vanuatu led to the establishment of of natural resources and environmental stresses 20 conservation sites, which reduced poach- can contribute to the eruption and escalation ing and enhanced fishstocks and incomes for of conflict. In some cases public policies exac- local communities. And in Ecuador the gov- erbate the sources of conflict, especially when ernment entered into an agreement with the policies worsen horizontal inequality79 or neg- United Nations Development Programme in atively affect people living within particular 2010 to establish an international trust fund to76 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • protect Yasuní National Park, an area rich in and progressive distribution of reconstructedbiodiversity and home to the indigenous Taga- public assets.eri and Taromenane people, from oil drilling. Experience has led to a shift from top-downThough too early to assess the results, the ini- models of disaster recovery to decentralizedtiative offers a model for preserving such eco- approaches. Community-based disaster risksystems through developed country compensa- programmes are generally better than central-tion of poorer countries.83 ized programmes at tapping local knowledge of Another example of promoting liveli- capacities and constraints for emergency reliefhoods while maintaining biodiversity is agro- and longer term recovery and reconstruction. Poor rural communitiesforestry, which entails an integrated approach Local organizations are also often better ableof combining trees, shrubs and plants with to reach remote and restricted areas—as dem- are disproportionatelycrops and livestock to create more diverse, onstrated in Aceh, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka, affected by ecosystemproductive, profitable, healthy and sustain- where periods of armed conflict made it diffi- degradation andable land-use systems. Agro-forestry produc- cult for international aid workers to operate.86 disproportionatelytion can be seen in the Yungas region on the Some attention is needed to avoid depending benefit from theireastern slope of Peru’s Central Andes, among exclusively on local organizations, which could protection andan indigenous community of around 32,000 intensify disparities and exclusion. restorationinhabitants. This enables the community to Community-led vulnerability and resourceconserve genetically important species while mapping has demonstrated effectiveness:87providing for a range of nutritional, medicinal • In Mount Vernon, one of the poorest com-and commercial purposes.84 munities in Jamaica, community-led dis- Integrated conservation and development aster mapping highlighted flooding prob-projects aim to conserve biodiversity while lems and led to agreement on the need forpromoting rural development. For example, footbridges.in Nepal’s western Terai Complex commu- • A community-led mapping of women’snities reduce pressures on natural forests by access to resources and services in Jinja,focusing on biodiversity-friendly and sustain- Uganda, identified corrupt land distribu-able land and resource use practices. Such pro- tion and denial of women’s rights to landjects ensure that communities, particularly as impediments to women’s access. Grass-women and the poor, have viable alternatives roots leaders responded by setting up sav-for income, while reducing pressures on natu- ings clubs and rotating loan schemes, whichral ecosystems.85 improved women’s access to land titles and helped them develop their property.Addressing climate change— Community involvement can be enor-risks and realities mously empowering for poorer communities, as shown by disaster training programmesFinally in this review of promising approaches, in 176 districts in the 17 most hazard-pronewe consider two key policy directions to off- Indian states. Female master trainers reachedset the impacts of climate change on people: out to women in their communities and servedequitable and adaptive disaster responses and as role models. Engaging women in commu-innovative social protection. nity risk-mapping involved them in decision- making, giving them greater voice and con-Equitable and adaptive disaster trol over their lives. In the words of Mitaliresponses Goswami of Ngoan District in Assam, “WeAs chapters 2 and 3 show, natural disasters are feel very useful and are filled with pride whendisequalizing, reflecting economic and power we see ourselves fulfilling our responsibilitiesrelations at the local, national and global lev- towards the family and community.”88els. But planning and targeted responses can Poor rural communities are dispropor-reduce the disparities. Two promising avenues tionately affected by ecosystem degradationare community-based disaster risk mapping and disproportionately benefit from their CHapteR 4 pOSitive SynergieS—winning StrAtegieS FOr the envirOnMent, equity And huMAn develOpMent 77
  • protection and restoration. Sometimes the agreements were reached to promote local hir- most efficient and equitable ways to avoid and ing and contracting on reconstruction.90 mitigate disasters are to manage, restore and protect the ecosystems that buffer the com- Innovative social protection munity. For example, villages with healthy Growing evidence shows that social protec- mangroves, coral reefs and lowland forests tion programmes—assistance and transfers to were better protected from the 2004 tsunami enhance the capacity of poor and vulnerable in India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka.89 people to escape poverty and manage risks Structural inequalities are often embedded and shocks—can help families maintain stable in patterns of infrastructure and social invest- consumption and meet broader distributive ments and reflected in the outcomes. Rebuild- goals.91 As many as 1 billion people in devel- ing after environmental disasters can address oping countries live in households that receive past biases and other factors that perpetuate some form of social transfer.92 poverty and inequality. When Northern Cali- Table 4.2 shows four types of social protec- fornia was recovering from the 1989 Loma tion measures that, appropriately combined, Pietra earthquake, the community opposed can promote both equity and environmental rebuilding the freeway along the original route, objectives. We highlight both the potential which divided neighbourhoods and exposed benefits and the challenges of targeted cash them to vehicular pollution. The freeway was transfers, employment schemes, weather-based rerouted through nearby industrial land, and crop insurance and asset transfers. Social protection programmes can help TABlE 4.2 people access modern energy sources, clean Social protection for adaptation and disaster risk reduction: water and adequate sanitation. A recent study benefits and challenges illuminates the impacts of cash transfers to Programme and example Benefits Challenges poor households under Mexico’s Oportuni- Targeted cash transfers • Targets the most vulnerable • Ensuring adequate size and Ethiopia: Productive Safety Net • Stabilizes consumption predictability of transfers dades programme that go beyond the well Programme • Allows adaptive risk-taking • Reducing risk through studied effects on health and education. The and investment long-term focus • Enhances flexibility to cope • Demonstrating the economic transfers have affected both short-run spend- with climate shocks case for cash transfers associated with climate shocks ing on energy services and long-run spending • Using socioeconomic on new appliances (refrigerators, gas stoves). vulnerability indices for targeting They have enabled families to switch from Employment schemes • Provides 100 days of • Ensuring adequate benefits wood or charcoal to the cleaner, more expen- India: Mahatma Gandhi National employment on demand in • Accountability and Rural Employment Guarantee Act rural areas transparency sive electricity and liquefied petroleum gas.93 • Constructs infrastructure, • Increasing awareness to Countries should consider more inte- including projects that enhance ensure high participation community resilience against • Controlling costs and avoiding grated approaches to social protection— climate change impacts the risk of exclusion • Provides a guaranteed income approaches that address environmental sus- to combat seasonal variations in income tainability, equity and human development. Weather-based crop insurance • Guards against risk-taking • Targeting marginal farmers A recent survey of social protection, disaster Government of Malawi and associated with insurance • Tackling differentiated gender risk reduction and climate change adapta- partners: weather-indexed • Frees up assets for investment impacts crop insurance for groundnut in adaptive capacity • Keeping premiums affordable tion schemes in South Asia revealed that few production • Can be linked to trends and for the poor projections for climate change • Subsidizing capital costs countries integrate such programmes. Of the • Supports adaptive flexibility • Integrating climate projections 124 programmes surveyed, just 16 percent into financial risk assessment • Establishing guarantee combined all three elements.94 One exam- mechanisms for reinsurance ple is South Africa’s Working for Water, part Asset transfers • Targets the most vulnerable • Ensuring provision Bangladesh: Reducing • Can be integrated into commensurate with the threats of an Expanded Public Works Programme Vulnerability to Climate Change livelihood programmes faced launched in 2004. The project, the first of its project • Ensuring local appropriateness of assets kind to include an environmental component, • Integrating changing natural environmental stresses in increased stream flows and water availability, asset selection improved land productivity and biodiversity in Source: Adapted from Davies and others in OECD (2009). some ecologically sensitive areas and inspired78 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • similar initiatives for wetlands, coastal areas Ultimately, how adaptive social protec-and waste management.95 When reviews of tion is implemented turns largely on politicalthe first phase (2004–2009) found that public preferences for equity and the environmentworks programmes were too short and wages and on how well society is mobilized behindtoo low to substantially reduce poverty, the programmes for building long-term resil-government set a new minimum wage for the ience as part of social protection and povertynext phase of the programme. reduction. Public works programmes need to provideoptions for women and for people unable to * * * we have seen successeswork. South Africa’s Working for Water has This review of promising approaches providesquotas for women (60 percent) and for people strong grounds for optimism. It is possible to around the world withwith disabilities (2 percent).96 In India women identify and implement strategies that improve strategies that improveand members of scheduled castes and sched- both sustainability and equity—strategies that both sustainabilityuled tribes account for (an overlapping) 50 fall in quadrant 1 of figure 1.1 in chapter 1—to and equitypercent of participants in the National Rural address many of the challenges outlined inEmployment Guarantee Act. chapters 2 and 3. And we have seen successes in Involving the community in designing such approaches around the world, with tan-and managing adaptive social protection pro- gible benefits for poor and disadvantaged peo-grammes is important. A review of the India ple and the environment. But such outcomesNational Rural Employment Guarantee Act are not automatic. More concerted efforts areillustrates how villagers have been empowered needed to integrate equity into policy and pro-to identify projects and negotiate with local gramme design and engage people in discus-authorities.97 How widespread participation sions and decisions that affect their lives. Suchin governance and decision-making contrib- approaches must be resourced appropriately, inutes to strong and accountable institutions and ways that ensure a progressive distribution ofequitable outcomes is discussed further in the responsibilities. It is to these challenges that wefollowing chapter. turn in chapter 5. CHapteR 4 pOSitive SynergieS—winning StrAtegieS FOr the envirOnMent, equity And huMAn develOpMent 79
  • chap ter 5 rising to the policy challengesThis Report has focused on the large dispari- multiplier effects of greater empowermentties across people, groups and countries— in the legal and political arenas.disparities that coexist with and worsen envi- • At the global level it calls for greaterronmental degradation and loss of ecosystem resources to be devoted to pressing envi-services that the world’s poor depend on. ronmental threats and for more equitableYes, the challenges are massive. But in several representation of disadvantaged countriesrespects conditions today are more conducive and groups in accessing finance.to progress than ever. Global public aware- Concerted actions can bring equity andness is higher, and the new calls for democracy sustainability closer to the centre of humansweeping parts of the world augur well for development. Too often development plansreform. invoke unnecessary trade-offs—sacrificing a Taking the debate further entails bold healthy environment or equitable distributionthinking, especially on the eve of the 2012 of wealth for the sake of economic growth.UN Conference on Sustainable Development Implicit is the notion that one aim is a luxury,(Rio+20). This Report advances a new vision less important than the other. Power imbal-for promoting human development through ances and political constraints loom large.the joint lens of sustainability and equity. For And too often the plans are incomplete, notthat vision to become a reality, institutions designed to promote equity. But policies canmust be strengthened, capacities enhanced, maximize the synergies among healthy com-policies reformed and democratic governance munities, healthy economies and a healthyfortified. environment. The vision calls for an expansive rethink- The chapter reinforces the central con-ing of the role of the state and communities tention of this Report: that integrating the—and their capacity to identify and exploit approaches to sustainability and equity canemerging opportunities. Building on the produce innovative solutions and concreteinsights of Amartya Sen and the key princi- guidelines to promote human development.ples of the human development approach, thisvision stresses an approach to sustainability Business-as-usual is neitherand equity rooted in inclusion, participation equitable nor sustainableand reasoned public debate, while recognizingdiverse values, conditions and objectives. The conventional focus on maximizing growth Beyond the Millennium Development has been associated with a model that ignoresGoals the world needs a post-2015 develop- the environmental impacts and externalities ofment framework that reflects equity and economic activity. This is true in a commandsustainability: Rio+20 stands out as a great and control system (the former Soviet Union),opportunity to reach a shared understanding in a liberalizing socialist economy (China inabout how to move forward. the 1990s) and in fairly free market economies This chapter proposes key reforms at the (Australia and the United States over much ofnational and global levels: the 20th century). Especially since the Second• At the national level it stresses the need World War, accelerations in economic growth to bring equity to the forefront of policy have been carbon-intensive, and economic and programme design, and the potential regulation has been scaled back. As chapter 2 CHapteR 5 riSing tO the pOliCy ChAllengeS 81
  • shows, untrammelled growth without regard degradation. As chapter 1 argues, lessons from for the environment has brought the world to the recent financial crisis can be applied to the the point where the concentration of carbon potential effects of climate change (see box dioxide in the atmosphere already exceeds 350 1.1). More active public policy is critical, not parts per million and is heading to levels that least because development must be decoupled risk multiple catastrophes. from carbon emissions and the true value of In the face of daunting environmental ecosystem services should be incorporated into challenges that endanger prospects for con- national development plans. The good news is tinuing progress in human development, con- that there is growing recognition, or rediscov- worsening certed global action too often falls far short of ery, of industrial policy—of proactive policies environmental what is needed. This chapter reviews the scale and interventions to restructure an economy degradation could of the challenges and points to a fundamental towards more dynamic activities— even at soon break the 40-year contradiction: business-as-usual is neither sus- such institutions as the World Bank, long a pattern of convergence tainable nor equitable, but attempts to move proponent of free market approaches.4 in human development forward are beset by political economy con- Overcoming pervasive market imperfec- across countries straints. It proposes key principles for coun- tions requires, among other things, internaliz- tries to promote change and then addresses ing the externalities in decision-making and in key elements at the global level. some cases creating markets where none exist Worsening environmental degradation —as for some ecosystem services. Because of could soon break the 40-year pattern of conver- the costs and risks created by greenhouse gas gence in human development across countries. emissions, the loss of ecosystem services due to Consider the potential trade-offs between eco- environmental degradation and underinvest- nomic costs and environmental damage given ment in innovations, more support should go to today’s technology and carbon intensity of promoting innovative renewable energy tech- production. Simulations for this report sug- nologies. If firms underestimate the long-term gest that if no country or region is prepared benefits of investing in new technologies or if to bear a loss of more than 1 percent in total they cannot appropriate the benefits, they will future income, or more than 5 percent of its invest less than is optimal socially and globally. income in any five-year period, carbon dioxide As chapter 4 shows, well designed, well levels will trigger a temperature increase of 3°C implemented incentives can elicit change. For above preindustrial levels by 2100.1 But a tem- example, Japan’s 2009 buy-back system for resi- perature rise above the 2°C threshold would be dential rooftop photovoltaics promoted invest- catastrophic for many developing countries, 2 ment and provided incentives for customers to as chapter 2 describes. So, we highlight the reduce electricity use. Similarly, tax incentives potential outcomes of alternative paths and a have encouraged renewable energy investments framework to induce global cooperation. Sys- in Canada, Denmark, India, Sweden and the tematic thinking about how to share the costs United States.5 But price-based incentives, of adjustment and promote greener growth especially for scarce resources, need careful cal- is critical, alongside concerted public action ibration to avoid impoverishing or excluding to support innovations in technology and already disadvantaged groups. enhance voice and accountability. A key constraint to public action on envi- A fundamental rethinking of the con- ronmental problems is lack of awareness. About ventional growth model is well under way. a third of the world’s people seem unaware of The 2008 global financial crisis and its after- climate change, and only about half consider it math reinforced the growing consensus that a serious threat or know that it is caused at least deregulation went too far and that the pendu- partly by human activity (see box 2.5 in chap- lum should swing back.3 Indeed, compound- ter 2). But even with raised awareness, serious ing the economic failures of conventional political constraints would remain—in other policies are the other costs they can introduce words, our collective failure to act also reflects —such as greater inequality and environmental the complexity of the politics and the power82 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • of groups opposing change. Chapters 2 and 3 assessments are often silent on the winnersshow how many countries and communities and losers of a policy or programme. 8 Butmost affected by climate change lack power distributional aspects require explicit consid-and influence. So understanding these con- eration because effects on the poor or the richstraints is a vital first step in framing strategies might differ from average effects—and some-with a real chance of meaningful change. times from intended outcomes. It is important As chapter 4 discusses, national planning to consider differences between the rich andprocesses are critical, but capacity constraints the poor, between men and women, amongand siloed approaches can limit effectiveness. indigenous peoples and across regions. Such Equity issues go wellIn the western Balkan countries, for example, considerations are consistent with the stateda major barrier impeding implementation of objectives of green economy policies, but they beyond developed versusclimate change mitigation policies is the lack warrant a sharper focus in practice. developing countries—of national coordination mechanisms. 6 Integrating distributional aspects into and beyond mitigation It is clear that equity issues go well beyond cost–benefit analysis has long been recognized costs alone—to thedeveloped versus developing countries—and as important9 but has rarely been practiced, burden of adjustmentbeyond mitigation costs alone—to the burden resulting in neglect of equity in project andof adjustment. Procedural justice requires that policy analysis. In the absence of transfers,all parties be able to participate effectively7 policies and projects that pass cost–benefit—some of the groups that lobby nationally, tests might not make everyone better off—including those pushing for more equitable and might even reduce the welfare of somepolicies for women and indigenous peoples, groups (box 5.1). But appropriately valuingalso merit a voice on the global stage. Similarly, environmental and resilience-promoting ben-global environmental finance and governance efits is difficult. This is true especially of themechanisms must be informed by principles of ecosystems for which the value of services isequity and fair representation that go beyond not fully known.country governments. The distributional analysis of economic policy reforms has advanced in the past decaderethinking our development —examining effects on the well-being of dif-model—levers for change ferent groups, especially the poor and vulner- able. The World Bank has supported manyThe required transformations involve a pro- such analyses, though sometimes the tim-gressive approach that integrates the pillars of ing is too late to inform decision-making orsustainable human development. Due consid- policy-makers fail to adequately incorporateeration must be given to differences in coun- the results of such assessments.10 And distri-try contexts: one-size-fits-all thinking is rarely butional analyses still tend to be restricted toeffective when formulating policy or imple- income, using conventional economic toolsmenting programmes. Proposed here are two and focusing on such transmission mecha-major avenues to guide such efforts—one is the nisms as prices and employment. Becauseintegration of equity concerns into policy and such analyses can miss important parts ofprogramme design and evaluation, the other is the picture, we propose that the approach beempowerment in the legal and political arenas. expanded and deepened.For each avenue the chapter sets forth basicprinciples and highlights the experiences of Key principlesselected countries. Environmental regulations and subsidies can affect people’s capabilities as individuals,Integrating equity concerns into family members, workers, entrepreneurs andgreen economy policies farmers (figure 5.1). Policy can affect people’sThe need to integrate equity concerns endowments, opportunities and agency—andmore fully into environmental policy is a through them the distribution of a range ofmajor theme of this Report. Conventional assets. CHapteR 5 riSing tO the pOliCy ChAllengeS 83
  • FIGURE 5.1 integrating equity into policy design Endowments KEY DISTRIBUTIONAL PEOPLE’S ASPECTS CAPABILITIES Opportunities Sources of livelihoods, assets, land, skills, social capital, Agency opportunities Farms Firms Communities Monitoring outcomes Institutional and distributional framework impacts Environmental DESIGN policy instruments ASPECTS Coverage, costs, source of financing, benefits, incidence, compensation Both vertical and horizontal equity are Key priorities for integrating equity into important. Vertical equity looks at the treat- green economy policy design include: ment of individuals across the distribution— • Mainstreaming the nonincome dimen- for example, how a tax on gasoline would affect sions of well-being. Building on the Multi- people at the bottom of the distribution differ- dimensional Poverty Index could broaden ently from those at the top. Horizontal equity understanding of disadvantage and relates to differences across groups or areas. highlight the impacts of policy changes across all dimensions of deprivation. For BOX 5.1 instance, higher charges for water could Distributional impacts of policies to cut pollution reduce access, harming health, while more Current discussions often raise concerns that policies to reduce pollution can be regressive, expensive kerosene could push households but rarely is systematic impact analysis brought to bear. The type of analysis needed can back to using biomass for cooking, bad for be illustrated for a carbon permit system such as cap-and-trade — which raises the price of health and the environment. products that use fossil fuels intensively, such as electricity. It draws attention to first- and • Understanding direct and indirect effects. second-round effects: Direct effects can be followed by a second 1. Everyone faces real income losses, but the effect is regressive if low-income households round of indirect changes (see box 5.1). spend a higher fraction of their income on these goods. 2. If technologies are capital-intensive, a mandate to abate pollution can induce firms to • Considering compensation mechanisms. substitute capital for polluting inputs, depressing demand for labour and relative wages. Countries with well developed tax-and- Low-income households receive a larger share of their income from wages, so they may transfer systems can use income tax sched- again be more affected. ules or social benefits to offset negative 3. Unemployment may be concentrated among certain regions, industries and groups, such effects. For example, South Africa provides as coal miners. When the industry shrinks, workers with industry-specific human capi- an income tax deduction for communal tal lose that investment, while premiums go to skilled workers in renewables and other and private landowners who set aside land energy-efficient technologies. with high biodiversity value and manage it These effects raise important empirical questions to be investigated case by case. Re- search in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries points as a protected area.11 But where such sys- to few truly “green” skills and suggests that most green jobs resemble familiar occupations. tems are less feasible, alternative compen- This is good news for displaced workers in developed countries, but it warrants investigation sation or exemptions are needed. elsewhere. • Understanding the risk of extreme events. Low-skilled workers are more likely to be displaced by carbon taxes. In OECD countries However small the probability, it is essen- these workers stay unemployed for longer after job losses than do higher skilled workers and tial to consider the huge adverse conse- are less likely to find employment that pays as well. So, governments need to watch out for quences of extreme weather events, espe- adversely affected groups when implementing environmental regulations, particularly when cially for the most vulnerable—and to regulations will affect already disadvantaged groups. Policies must include redistributive and backstop mechanisms to avoid these problems. reduce the risks.12 Such analysis may reveal that investing in land use planning and Source: Fullerton 2011. ecosystems can be a cost-effective buffer for84 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • vulnerable groups against climate risks, as Policies to drive structural change, such as demonstrated by mangrove restoration in pollution pricing, will inevitably have winners Viet Nam.13 and losers. Some companies will claim unfair So, rather than accept or reject an individ- adverse impacts. Policy measures to respondual policy, it is important to consider a range of to such concerns, such as exemptions anddesigns and to determine which can improve compensation, can be costly, and the distribu-outcomes for equity. There are always con- tional impacts need to be understood. Alter-straints in data, analysis, capacity and time, so natives, such as more effective consultationsflexibility is needed in meeting the main goals. and public communications, should also be Countries need Stakeholder analysis is critical. Political contemplated.20economy factors and the influence of various Consumption and production profiles can industrial policiesactors can affect both design and implemen- shape distributional effects. Two examples that support inclusivetation of policy. For instance, the oil industry from the energy sector: green growth whilein the United States spent almost $1.5 billion • Ghana’s electricity sector was draining the being mindful of theon federal lobbying in 2010.14 And in Tanza- government budget. In 2002 public utility pitfalls and challengesnia the proposed reform of charcoal produc- company deficits approached 11 percent of state promotiontion, trade and use highlights the needs and of government spending, or 4 percent of of selected types ofinfluence of dealer-transporter-wholesaler GDP. Distributional analysis found that economic activitynetworks.15 Policy design and implementation subsidies benefited mainly middle-classmust address such influences and their likely urban customers: only 7 percent of theimpacts. rural poor used electric light. The lack of Institutional arrangements must guard rural electrification in the poorest north-against rent-seeking and official corruption— ern regions warranted reducing subsidies,and more than this, against distortions of sci- raising public awareness of energy effi-entific facts, breaches of principles of fair rep- ciency and increasing efforts to improveresentation and false claims about the green market efficiency.21credentials of consumer products.16 Countries • In Lao PDR, which experienced rapidneed industrial policies that support inclu- expansion of access to modern energysive green growth while being mindful of the services after the late 1980s, key equitypitfalls and challenges of state promotion of aspects were incorporated in programmeselected types of economic activity. The fea- design. A “power to the poor” componenttures of a new industrial policy are relevant provides interest-free credits to connectfor policies to reduce the carbon intensity of poor households to the grid, benefitingdevelopment—limited incentives to new activ- female-headed households in particular.ities, automatic sunset provisions (so that the Local communities and rural householdssubsidies are temporary) and clear benchmarks also receive support for electricity use forfor success. This requires the right institutions, income-generating activities.22a political champion and systematic delibera- While some insights can be drawn from suchtions that engage the private sector.17 interventions, the effects are always context- specific and require local analysis.Country experience Data constraints can limit understand-More countries are using distributional anal- ing. The joint analysis of human developmentysis to inform environmental policy design. and equity impacts requires individual andSouth Africa’s plans to introduce environ- household information, as well as qualitativemental taxes as part of its fiscal reforms were data, to build statistical capacity. This under-informed by stakeholder analyses of likely lines the importance of continuing to improvequantitative and qualitative effects.18 Viet disaggregated data, especially in developingNam announced new taxes following impact countries.assessments simulating price and sectoral Ex ante assessments need to be followed byeffects.19 results monitoring. In rural Bangladesh home CHapteR 5 riSing tO the pOliCy ChAllengeS 85
  • solar power systems were estimated to displace are not equivalent to legal rights, although kerosene use equivalent to 4 percent of total they can motivate legislation and thus pro- annual carbon emissions. 23 Surveys showed vide the basis for legal action. Some rights are that solar subsidies—amounting to almost procedural—as with the right to information $400 million and allocated through a private discussed below—and must encompass both microcredit agency—were progressive when opportunity and process aspects.27 accurately targeted, because the bottom two Constitutionally recognizing equal rights income groups spent about three times more to a healthy environment promotes equity on kerosene than the top two. Benefits also because such access is no longer limited to Constitutionally included better lighting, good for children’s those who can afford it. 28 And embodying recognizing equal education, and reduced indoor air pollution, such rights in the legal framework can influ- rights to a healthy with benefits for health. ence government priorities and resource environment promotes allocations. equity because such Empowering people to bring access is no longer about change Growing country experience limited to those This Report argues for empowerment to Many EU countries recognize fundamen- who can afford it bring about greater equity and environmen- tal environmental rights as a matter of natu- tal benefits—and as an important outcome ral law—as inherent universal rights. In the in itself. What does this mean in practice? United Kingdom the Human Rights Act Consider two spheres where enhancing voice includes the right to a healthy environment. 29 and representation has important links to And although the European Convention on sustainability—the legal, with enabling insti- Human Rights does not mention environmen- tutions and rights to a clean and safe environ- tal rights, it establishes that serious environ- ment, and the political, with more participa- mental damage may violate the right to respect tion and accountability. for private life and family life.30 Sweden rec- ognizes the right of public access through its A clean and safe environment— constitutional “Don’t disturb; don’t destroy” a right, not a privilege policy: people have the right to roam freely in That all people, born and yet to be born, have the countryside as long as they do not incon- the right to a clean and safe environment is a venience others.31 powerful idea, grounded in the framework in Kenya’s 2010 Constitution grants the right chapter 1. Despite the slow progress in securing to a clean environment and requires the gov- such rights globally, 24 constitutions in at least ernment to maintain its natural resources.32 At 120 countries address environmental norms least 31 other African countries express envi- or the state’s obligation to prevent environ- ronmental rights in their constitutions, and mental harm.25 And many countries without some—such as Ethiopia and Namibia—also explicit environmental rights interpret general stress that economic development should not constitutional provisions for personal rights as harm the environment.33 including a fundamental right to a clean, safe The enforceability of environmental rights and healthy environment. That right derives in Africa is largely untested, however, except from people’s rights to bodily health and integ- in South Africa. Some countries have struc- rity and to enjoyment of the natural world. tural impediments. In Cameroon citizens do Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum and oth- not have the right to appeal to the country’s ers have noted a close relationship between constitutional council, which limits enforce- the capabilities approach and rights-based ability.34 And in Namibia environmental approaches to human development. 26 But rights can be enforced only by someone with unlike the idea of freedom or capability in a private interest, barring claims in the public itself, an acknowledged human right also interest.35 incorporates corresponding obligations. Not- Several Latin American countries, includ- withstanding such obligations, human rights ing Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Peru, have86 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • enforceable environmental rights. The Chilean depending on coercive legislation.”44 Indeed,Supreme Court voided a government-issued procedural human rights linked to environ-timber licence because it had been approved mental protection often receive more attentionwithout sufficient evidence of environmen- than substantive environmental rights.45tal viability, thus violating the right of allChileans—not just those directly affected—to Enabling institutionslive free of environmental contamination.36 Alongside legal recognition of equal rights to Many Latin American constitutions rec- a healthy, well functioning environment, ena-ognize environmental rights for indigenous bling institutions are needed, including a fair alongside legalpeoples.37 Paraguay guarantees that the state and independent judiciary and the right towill defend them against habitat degradation information from governments. For example: recognition of equaland environmental contamination.38 In Guy- • In the United States conservation groups rights to a healthy,ana environmental rights exist alongside rec- have used information on emissions levels well functioningognition of the rights of indigenous peoples.39 to bring public nuisance actions against environment, enablingBolivia’s proposed Law of Mother Nature private companies.46 institutions aretakes this recognition a step further, giving • One Million Acts of Green, launched by needed, including athe natural world equal rights with people. The Cisco in partnership with the Canadian fair and independentproposal is heavily influenced by a resurgent Broadcasting Corporation and Green- judiciary and theindigenous Andean spiritual world view that Nexxus in Canada in 2008, uses television, right to informationplaces the environment and the earth deity Facebook®, Twitter™ and other InternetPachamama at the centre of life.40 resources to engage Canadians in conversa- from governments Among Asian countries India is notable tions on environmental issues and encour-for allowing aggrieved individuals to challenge age “green acts.” The initiative elicitedstate action or inaction related to the environ- nearly 2 million green acts within a year.47ment.41 The Indian judiciary has broadly inter- An institutional context conducive to civilpreted environmental rights in the constitution liberties is a necessary backdrop. But recentto protect public health as well. For example, Gallup data suggest that a majority of the peo-environmental advocates successfully argued ple in close to half of nearly 140 countries sur-that environmental laws obliged the govern- veyed lack confidence in their judicial systemment to reduce air pollution in New Delhi in and courts.48 This underlines the importancethe interests of public health, resulting in an of implementing broader reforms and improv-order mandating conversion of city buses from ing the context for enforcing rights.diesel to compressed natural gas. 42 Rights to government information are Bhutan has pioneered placing environ- spreading. At least 49 national constitutionsmental conservation at the centre of its devel- recognize them, and at least 80 legislaturesopment strategy, reflecting traditional norms have enacted right-to-information laws. Southand culture. 43 Article 5 of the 2008 Constitu- Africa’s 1996 Constitution guarantees all “thetion emphasizes the responsibility of all Bhu- right of access to any information held bytanese to protect the environment, conserve the state and held by another person that isits biodiversity and prevent ecological degra- required for the exercise or protection of anydation. It also stipulates that at least 60 percent rights.” In Argentina, Canada, France, India,of the country remain forested in perpetuity. Israel and the Republic of Korea higher courts Even if rights provide only what Immanuel have held that constitutional guarantees ofKant called imperfect obligations, they can free expression implicitly recognize a constitu-still empower groups and individuals to take tional right of access to information.49public action to protect their environment. As But legislation is just a first step. Imple-Amartya Sen wrote, “because of the impor- mentation and enforcement are equally criti-tance of communication, advocacy, expo- cal. Civil society organizations are impor-sure and informed public discussion, human tant for implementation by helping citizensrights can have influence without necessarily understand and use legal rights of access to CHapteR 5 riSing tO the pOliCy ChAllengeS 87
  • information, by training public officials in productive environment by requiring that all information disclosure and by monitoring sectors of society manage the environment effi- implementation. In Bulgaria a nongovern- ciently and use natural resources rationally.56 mental organization, the Access to Informa- tion Programme, provided legal assistance and Participation and accountability disseminated information to the wider public Process freedoms, which enable people to about the right-to-information law and the advance goals that matter to them, are cen- scope of citizens’ rights.50 tral to human development and—as discussed Information disclosure is very impor- in last year’s HDR—have both intrinsic and Democracy is important, tant to environmental protection and citizen instrumental value. Major disparities in power but to enable civil society empowerment. Ensuring that polluters disclose are reflected in unsustainable outcomes, but and foster popular information on emissions and discharges can the converse is that greater empowerment can access to information, reduce violations and complement regulation. bring about positive environmental change national institutions British Columbia’s public disclosure strategy equitably, as chapter 3 argues. Democracy is need to be accountable had a larger impact on emissions and compli- important, but to enable civil society and foster and inclusive— ance than the sanctions traditionally imposed popular access to information, national insti- especially with respect by Canada’s Ministry of the Environment. tutions need to be accountable and inclusive— Stricter standards and larger penalties were also especially with respect to women and other to women and other influential—suggesting that both information affected groups. affected groups and regulation can reduce emissions.51 And in China programmes to rate and publicly dis- Forums to facilitate participation close companies’ environmental performance A prerequisite for participation is open, trans- have prompted facilities to reduce air and water parent and inclusive deliberative processes. pollution, improving firms’ market competi- Consider energy. As work commissioned for tiveness and relationships with communities this Report demonstrates, most energy deci- and other stakeholders.52 The Czech Republic, sions are made behind closed doors and rarely Egypt, Indonesia and Mexico recorded simi- in democratic fora.57 Because of concerns for lar results with the new mandated Pollutant commercial confidentiality or geostrategic sen- Release and Transfer Registers.53 sitivities about energy supplies, the public has The international community is increas- participated little in negotiating energy policy ingly recognizing a right of access to environ- decisions. “Consultations” can provide limited mental information.54 This in turn supports a or incomplete information, neglect equity and broad interpretation of national constitutional impact assessments, and fail to report results rights to information. effectively. Even where public participation or The complex cross-sectoral challenges of comment is formally invited, its role is often to sustainable human development have a long legitimize prior policy choices and decisions, time horizon and require long-term com- not to shape them.58 In Australia, for exam- mitments.55 Changing decisions, mobilizing ple, cases have demonstrated a lack of open investment and developing new strategic plans exchanges among local government, polluting can take years if not decades. This may involve industries and local communities and a failure major institutional reforms to mainstream to inform citizens of the risks of living and environmental considerations in government working near toxic sites.59 planning. The government of Rwanda recog- Where governments are responsive to nized the need to integrate environmental and popular concerns, change is more likely. In natural resource management plans into the the United States, for example, 23 states allow country’s development strategy. Its Environ- citizens to petition for a direct vote on a pol- mental Management Authority works closely icy initiative, a mechanism that some states with the national and local governments as well have used to adopt environmental and energy as civil society to promote sustainable devel- policies (such as Washington in 2006). 60 opment and the right to live in a clean and Some groups have pursued accountability of88 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • private corporations in emissions and climate The United Nations Collaborative Programmechange. 61 But such concerns may be offset by on Reducing Emissions from Deforestationother vested interests—as reported for the and Forest Degradation in Developing Coun-Russian Federation in the problems civil soci- tries goes even farther, since its board, whichety faced in mobilizing public support around decides on strategic directions and budget allo-greening industry. 62 And where civil society is cations, includes representatives of indigenousactive, as chapter 3 shows, it can bring about peoples and civil society as full members, notpositive outcomes. just as observers.66 An active press raises awareness and facili- Still, barriers to effective participation per- For climate changetates public participation. In Rwanda the gov- sist in many national and local contexts. Someernment launched radio and television pro- groups, such as women, have traditionally and other globalmotions highlighting national environmental been excluded from governance institutions. environmentalissues and targeting all levels of society. Media But here again, there have been changes, with problems, proceduralcoverage increased support from the Environ- documented results not only on equity but justice implies anmental Management Agency and other gov- on sustainable management of environmen- equal opportunityernment ministries to jointly explore ways to tal resources. 67 For example, in Europe local for all countries tointegrate environmental concerns into plan- authorities in jurisdictions with the highest affect internationalning and to enhance cooperation for environ- recycling rates had a higher than average per- negotiations, but weakmental protection. 63 centage of female managers. 68 And extensive capacity often means For climate change and other global envi- fieldwork in India has documented that activeronmental problems, procedural justice implies participation by women in community for- that few developingan equal opportunity for all countries to affect est management significantly improved forest country governmentsthe direction and content of international protection. 69 are representednegotiations. But weak capacity often meansthat few developing country governments are Community managementrepresented, let alone able to represent their Chapter 4 illustrates the growing recogni-citizens’ interests adequately in arenas with tion of the benefits of community manage-high demands for legal and scientific exper- ment of natural resources. To ensure thattise. Although 194 countries attended the UN such approaches do not exclude poor people,Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen women, the elderly and other marginalizedin 2010, only a powerful handful negotiated groups, governments and other organizationsthe terms of the Copenhagen Accord. In inter- that sponsor community-based projects neednational summits the top five polluting coun- to involve all groups in decision-making andtries usually field more than three times the implementation. For example, initiatives todelegates of the five countries most affected by mentor community forest groups in Nepalclimate change.64 sensitized them to issues of equity and partici- The news is not all bad, however. Gov- pation, ultimately increasing the participationernance of the Climate Investment Funds is and influence of women and the poor.70already moving towards more equitable voice Where women and other marginalizedand participation—with an equal number of groups are included in community decision-representatives from donor and developing making, the benefits can be substantial. Forcountry governments on the governing com- example, Bhutanese community forests havemittees for each of the trust funds and with the dual purpose of engaging locals in man-decisions made by consensus. The Climate aging forests and regulating access to forestInvestment Funds have also institutional- resources for sustainable livelihood activities.ized formal observer roles for civil society, the Enabling access to fuelwood, which benefitsprivate sector and in some cases indigenous women more than men, is one benefit of thispeoples, while making the role of observers approach. Household surveys of Bhutanesemore meaningful by enabling them to suggest communities have found that poorer house-agenda items and contribute to discussions.65 holds and female-headed households were CHapteR 5 riSing tO the pOliCy ChAllengeS 89
  • usually assigned a larger share of trees than climate-resilient society.75 Medium-term plans, richer households, and women were able to col- budgets and investments can be a foundation lect more fuelwood from community forests.71 for consolidating good intentions and providing cross-sectoral mechanisms for effective coordi- * * * nation across donors and government agencies. In sum, implementing a joint equity–sustain- Lively debates about the future of official ability approach at the national level involves development assistance continue. While recog- integrating equity into policy and programme nizing the growing importance of private flows design and evaluation, bolstering empower- and the likelihood that aid will shrink as a share Development assistance ment through legal rights and corresponding of development finance for most countries, rich reaches only 1.6 percent institutions, and promoting greater participa- countries must not shirk their responsibilities. of even the lower bound tion and accountability. Strong equity arguments warrant substantial estimate of needs for transfers of resources from rich countries to low-carbon energy Financing investment and poor to meet equity goals and guarantee equal and around 11 percent the reform agenda access to financing. And strong economic argu- for climate change ments support measures to solve global collec- Policy debates about sustainability raise major tive action problems, such as climate change. questions about investment and financing, particularly on how much is needed, who Where does the world stand? should have access and who should be respon- Although evidence on global needs 76 and sible for financing what. official aid commitments and disbursements Development finance constrains the equi- is patchy and magnitudes are uncertain, the table transition to a global green economy overall picture is clear. Development assistance in two ways. First, it falls far short of global reaches only 1.6 percent of even the lower requirements. Second, countries and sectors bound estimate of needs for low-carbon energy have unequal access, so they do not always and around 11 percent for climate change (fig- receive the financing they need to address envi- ure 5.2). These numbers are slightly better for ronmental deprivations; the poorest countries water and sanitation, where aid commitments often miss out. are more than twice the lower estimate of needs Global capital markets, with some and close to 20 percent of the upper estimate. $178 trillion in financial assets, have the size Access to financing is uneven and generally and depth to step up to the challenge.72 Over correlated with a country’s level of develop- the medium to long term, and with sufficient ment. Many resources go to the countries devel- public sector support, the United Nations oping fastest. Low-income countries account Environment Programme estimates that pri- for a third of the 161 countries receiving Global vate investment in clean energy technolo- Environment Facility allocations, but they gies could reach $450  billion by 2012 and receive only 25 percent of the funding (and $600 billion by 2020.73 The Global Environ- least developed countries, only 9 percent).77 In ment Facility’s experience suggests that private 2010, under the Climate Investment Funds, investment can be substantial: public funding Mexico and Turkey accounted for about half for climate mitigation has leveraged private the approved project funding in clean technol- investment by 7 to 1 or more.74 This leveraging ogy.78 Evidence also suggests that the resources requires public efforts to catalyse investment have been allocated less equally over time.79 flows, by developing an appropriate investment environment and building local capacity. What development assistance can do These issues are covered in depth in a recent Official development assistance is a vital source of UNDP report that highlights policies for build- external finance for many developing countries. ing developing country capacity to mobilize the Recent years have seen much progress in increas- public and private investment flows needed to ing the quality and quantity of official aid, which finance the transition towards a low-emission, rose some 23 percent from 2005 to 2009.90 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • But the contributions still do not meet the countries. It is unclear, however, whether theworld’s development challenges. The $129 bil- funding would really be additional—one con-lion committed in 2010 was 76 percent of the cern is that current aid will simply be divertedestimated cost of achieving the Millennium to meet the new targets. 81Development Goals—and not all aid goes toachieving the goals.80 Rich countries have con- Access to energy and climate changesistently failed to meet their stated pledges, investmentsincluding that of the G-8 at Gleneagles in 2005 As this Report has already noted, providing(to increase aid by $50 billion a year by 2010), clean energy to the 1.5 billion people who lackthe European Union (to increase aid from 0.43 electricity and the 2.6 billion who rely on tra-percent of gross national income to 0.56 percent) ditional biomass for cooking is a major win-and the United Nations (the long-standing tar- win-win. Clean energy offers the potential toget of 0.7 percent of gross national income). alleviate poverty, reduce health impacts from Developed countries have pledged $100 indoor air pollution and drive social and eco-billion a year by 2020 to finance climate change nomic development, while mitigating energy’smitigation and adaptation in developing impact on the climate.FIGURE 5.2Official development assistance falls far short of needsEstimated future needs and existingofficial development assistance (ODA)Annual expenditures ($ billions) 1,500Highestimateof need 1,000 ODA commitments and disbursements, 2010 ($ billions) 50 500 40Low 30estimateof need 20 ODA commitments 10 ODA 50 disbursementsODA 0 0 Climate Low-carbon Water and Climate Low-carbon Water and change energy sanitation change energy sanitation 2010–2030 2010–2035 by 2015Source: Based on data from IEA (2010), UN Water (2010a), UNDESA (2010a) and OECD Development Database on Aid Activities: CRS online. CHapteR 5 riSing tO the pOliCy ChAllengeS 91
  • International financial institutions have the impact of climate change on ecosystems, overseen sweeping reforms of the energy sec- are two to three times higher.86 tor in many parts of the world, with a view to • Estimates of total annual mitigation and opening markets and guaranteeing equitable adaptation costs to address climate change access to funds. And countries have positioned by 2030 range from $249 billion to $1,371 themselves to mobilize and attract private billion. Why the large difference? Because investments to the energy sector. But policy- the costs of integrating renewable energies makers have yet to steer energy finance towards are context- and site-specific and thus dif- tackling energy poverty82 or climate change on ficult to estimate globally. though large, the a larger scale, especially in places less attractive The amounts needed are clearly large, if amounts needed to to the private sector. uncertain. But they are below current spend- address climate change Redirecting energy finance will require ing on defence, on recent financial sector bail- are below current greater political will and exceptional leader- outs and on perverse subsidies, indicating the spending on defence, ship. Moreover, addressing energy poverty scope for reassessing priorities. In 2009 global on recent financial needs to stay at the head of the agenda because military expenditure neared 3 percent of world sector bailouts and on doing so is central to maintaining public sup- GDP, while some countries spent much more, perverse subsidies, port and development assistance for achiev- including the United States (4.7 percent of ing the Millennium Development Goals and GDP) and the Russian Federation (4.3 per- indicating the scope for beyond. cent of GDP).87 The bailouts in the wake of the reassessing priorities A key dimension of climate policy discus- recent financial crisis were close to $700 bil- sions relates to the size, direction and source of lion in the United States under the Troubled financing. The World Bank recently outlined Asset Relief Program, while EU commitments the difficulties in tracking such investments, were close to $1 trillion (about 6  percent of including limited and inconsistent informa- annual GDP in both cases). tion in reporting systems, the ambiguous pur- As the previous chapter shows, there is pose of some flows, the confidential nature enormous scope for reducing environmentally of some transactions and double counting. 83 harmful subsidies. Uzbekistan, for example, Costing is difficult, in both theory and prac- spends over 10 times more on fossil fuel con- tice, and the scope of the estimates differs sumption subsidies than on health (32 percent along with the methods. Underlying assump- of GDP, compared with 2.5  percent), while tions matter—especially those regarding the Iran spends 20 percent of GDP on fossil fuel discount rate. So do assumed consumption consumption subsidies, compared with less and production elasticities to changing prices. than 5 percent on education. 88 With these caveats in mind, we review the Are developed countries meeting the financ- available evidence and find: ing commitment implied by their “common • Recent estimates of the investments needed but differentiated responsibilities” under the to reduce the concentration of greenhouse Framework Convention on Climate Change? gases (mitigation costs) range widely, from No. Almost $32 billion has been pledged for 0.2 percent of annual global GDP to 1.2 climate change actions (about 19 percent of percent by 2030.84 total official development assistance).89 But the • Estimating adaptation costs is even harder, pledges fall well short of estimated needs, and and it is difficult to distinguish them disbursements fall well short of pledges: most from related development investments. of the “new and additional” funds pledged at This Report’s updated estimates of annual the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in investment requirements for adaptation are Copenhagen have not been delivered, and less of the order of $105 billion,85 within the than 8 percent of pledges for climate change $49–$171 billion range proposed by the were disbursed in 2010. Governments have yet United Nations Framework Convention on to agree how to track spending or determine Climate Change by 2030. Other estimates, whether funding is truly additional—accurate which account for the costs of adaptating to monitoring requires an aid baseline.92 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • Some 24 special climate change funds For 20 developing countries reporting drink-already exist, ranging from international ing water and sanitation expenditures, GLAASsources of funding such as the Hatoyama Ini- 2010 estimates median government domestictiative (which has received 48 percent of total spending at $65 million in 2008 (0.48 percentpledges to date—35 percent from public sources of GDP). For 2009, the most recent year withand 13 percent from private sources) to national data, aid commitments totalled $14.3 billiontrust funds that can receive donor funds, such and disbursements $7.8 billion.as the Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund Investor belief that the water and sanita-(0.06 percent of pledges). The funds differ in tion sector in developing countries is a high-structure and include both bilateral and multi- risk, low-return investment makes market-lateral arrangements, making reliable monitor- based financing difficult to mobilize. Anding of spending very difficult. while reforms in governance, institutions and Given this fragmentation, climate finance tariffs are critical to the sector’s financial sus-must incorporate the lessons of aid delivery tainability, innovative schemes are bridgingto improve how assistance is organized and the financing gaps in the interim (box 5.2).91delivered. The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Again, greater efforts are needed. Gov-Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for ernment clearly is important, but reliance onAction agreed on principles to promote coun- financial aid is high, covering much nationaltry ownership, aid alignment and harmoniza- spending on sanitation and drinking-watertion, results, and mutual accountability. The —in some countries, near 90 percent. And2007 Bali Action Plan shows how these prin- even with cost-effective innovative approaches,ciples can be incorporated into climate change as in community sanitation, public commit-finance. This state of affairs does not imply that ment is too low. Refocusing assistance is calledthere should be one global superfund, which is for, alongside mobilizing more domestic andneither feasible nor desirable, but it did show private resources for scaling up investments.the scope for reducing complexity and enhanc- Although the gap in aid allocations betweening access and transparency. Equally impor- high HDI and low HDI countries is smallertant is avoiding parallelism in funding, as far as for water and sanitation than for low-carbonpossible, instead integrating provisions for cli- energy, the disparities are still large. Part ofmate change in national planning and budgets. the constraint relates to capacity, though more predictable donor funding would help.92Water supply and sanitationHow much will it cost to meet the Millennium BOX 5.2Development Goal targets for safe drinking Innovative financing schemes for water and sanitationwater and basic sanitation? Assessments depend A review of financing schemes to promote investment in water and sanitation reveals someon baseline and demographic assumptions and promising new avenues. Some schemes supported by donors encourage private investment.on whether they include maintenance costs and Indonesia’s Master Meter Scheme uses microcredit to connect the urban poor to water, anduse low-technology options. Moreover, defini- the Coca-Cola Company and the United States Agency for International Development spon-tions of “water supply” and “basic sanitation” sored the installation of locally made rope pumps in Zinder, Niger. In Kenya an innovative combination of commercial finance (through a microcredit institution) and a subsidy that tiesdiffer, and consistent data are often lacking. public funding to achieving specified goals has improved water supply and connected poor The 2010 Global Annual Assessment of households to piped water.Sanitation and Drinking Water (GLAAS) esti- Other financing schemes include blended grants and repayable financing (as funded by themates for achieving the Millennium Develop- World Bank in Senegal and the European Investment Bank in Mozambique), revolving funds forment Goal water and sanitation targets, which water and sanitation (as funded by the World Bank, Denmark and Finland in Viet Nam and bytake several earlier cost estimates into account, UFUNDIKO, a small nongovernmental organization, in Tanzania) and pooled funds (as in Tamilrange from $6.7 billion to $75 billion a year.90 Nadu, India), which disbursed bond-issue funds to municipalities as subloans. Market-basedMuch more would be needed to achieve uni- finance is also becoming more common. For instance, several US cities and Johannesburg, South Africa, have used municipal bonds to fund water infrastructure.versal access. The amounts now being spent from domes- Source: Nelson 2011; Coca-Cola Company 2010; World Bank 2010a; International Water and Sanitation Centre and Netherlands Water Partnership (2009); OECD 2010c.tic and international sources are much lower. CHapteR 5 riSing tO the pOliCy ChAllengeS 93
  • Social protection scaling up private investments, especially Estimates put global allocations to social pro- in poorer countries, which have largely tection at a sizeable 17 percent of GDP.93 But missed out on private finance. much of this spending bypasses the most dis- • Have all governments re-examine their advantaged groups. High-income countries spending priorities so that sustainability spend on average nearly 20 percent of GDP, and equity objectives are well reflected in while low-income countries spend around 4 budget allocations. percent.94 Clearly, there is enormous scope • Mobilize additional resources to narrow for increasing the coverage of social protec- the large gaps in addressing the environ- the prime candidate tion schemes in the poorest countries, as part mental deprivations facing billions of poor to close the financing of national and global efforts. It makes sense, people around the world and to solve the gap is a currency then, to take these needs into account in dis- major global collective action problem pre- transaction tax cussions on financing the sustainability and sented by climate change. equity agenda. • Ensure that national and community part- Setting a social protection floor—a set of ners have the capability to define policies essential social transfers, in cash and in kind, and budgets and implement programmes to provide a minimum income and secure that promote and support sustainability, livelihood—is promising. Such programmes equity and inclusiveness. need not be expensive. Brazil’s Bolsa Familia and Mexico’s Oportunidades cost their gov- innovations at the global level ernments about 0.4 percent of GDP and cover about a fifth of their populations. India’s Environmental sustainability and equity chal- Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employ- lenges have major implications at the global ment Guarantee Act cost about 0.5 percent of level, including for financing and governance, GDP in 2009 and benefited 45 million house- the two key areas addressed here. holds, about a tenth of the labour force.95 For several African and Asian countries the Inter- Innovative new sources to meet the national Labour Organization (ILO) esti- financing gap mated in 2008 that a scheme guaranteeing As outlined above, massive new investments workers 100 days of employment a year could are needed to avoid business-as-usual trajecto- cost less than 1 percent of GDP on average.96 ries, but sufficient funding has not been forth- The ILO estimates that less than 2 percent coming, especially for poor countries. And of global GDP would provide all the world’s the fiscal outlook is difficult. Many govern- poor with a minimum package of social ben- ment budgets are under pressure in the wake efits and services—defined as access to basic of the 2008 global financial crisis and given healthcare, basic education and basic income longer term structural problems, while cli- transfers in case of need.97 Broadening the mate change is intensifying the development scope to include adaptation to climate change challenges facing poor countries. Domestic by bolstering local resilience and supporting commitments are important, though the scale livelihood diversification strategies would cost of the investments needed suggests that more more.98 Based on admittedly heroic assump- international public funds will be required to tions, this could increase the cost to a still attract large additional private funds. It fol- manageable 2.5 percent of global GDP.99 lows that innovative sources of financing are vital, alongside stronger commitments and * * * concrete actions from developed countries. In sum, the financing challenges loom large, The prime candidate to close the financ- but there is cause for optimism. The priorities ing gap is a currency transaction tax. Origi- for governments around the world are clear: nally proposed and promoted in the 1994 • Ensure that appropriate institutional and Human Development Report (HDR), the idea regulatory features are in place to enable is increasingly being accepted as a practical94 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • policy option. What is new today is its greater Appropriately designed and monitored, thefeasibility. The infrastructure for global real- tax would allow those who benefit most fromtime settlements, introduced after the most globalization to help those who benefit least—recent global financial crisis, makes it straight- and help finance the global public goods thatforward to implement. The foreign exchange can sustain globalization.settlement infrastructure is now more organ- The tax rate should not impose too heavyized, centralized and standardized (box 5.3). a burden but should reduce speculative flows.Recent innovations—notably real-time gross Estimates of revenue generation dependsettlement and measures to reduce settlement on, among other things, assumptions aboutrisk—mean that existing systems now capture the effect of the tax on trading volumes. Inindividual transactions. updated analysis prepared for this Report, the The tax can be a simple proportional levy North–South Institute estimates that a tax ofon individual foreign exchange transactions 0.005 percent would yield around $40 billionassessed on foreign exchange dealers and col- a year.102 The revenue potential is thus huge.lected through existing financial clearing or The Center for Global Development esti-settlement systems. Because the financial infra- mates donor spending on global public goodsstructure is now in place, a currency transac- at around $11.7 billion in 2009. The bulk oftion tax can be implemented relatively quickly the spending is on UN peacekeeping; exclud-and easily. The tax has high-level endorse- ing this important function lowers global pub-ment from the Leading Group on Innovative lic good expenditure to about $2.7 billion.103Financing for Development.100 Belgium and The currency transaction tax would mobilizeFrance already have legislative frameworks in nearly 15 times as much each year. Even a uni-place for instituting a currency transaction tax. lateral currency transaction tax (limited toAnd Brazil, Chile, Japan, Norway and Spain the Euro) could mobilize $4.2–$9.3 billionhave started to move in that direction. The in additional financing. Clearly, then, a cur-tax also enjoys broader support from nongov- rency transaction tax could, even under veryernmental stakeholders, such as the Bill andMelinda Gates Foundation and the Citizen’s BOX 5.3Coalition for Economic Justice. The currency transaction tax: newfound feasibility Such a tax could address a major anomaly Today, there are many ways to trade foreign currency in the wholesale market: on an ex-in the financial sector: many of its transactions change, online, through a human or electronic broker or by phone or fax. But there are just twoare not taxed.101 That, along with the large scale ways to make the payments to settle a deal. One is by sending both payments to a continu-of financial activity, makes a strong case for a ous linked settlement bank, which matches and exchanges them simultaneously. The other issmall levy on foreign exchange transactions to by sending them to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Communication (SWIFT),fund global public goods, such as mitigating where they are matched and then forwarded to the correspondent banks in the two currency-and adapting to climate change in poor coun- issuing countries. These two highly organized clearing and settlement systems are the coretries. The incidence of the tax would be pro- infrastructure of today’s foreign exchange industry. They keep detailed records of nearly everygressive, as the countries with larger currency foreign exchange transaction around the world. How would a tax work? SWIFT keeps itemized records of the details of global foreigntransactions tend to be more developed. The exchange trading activity in the world’s frequently traded currencies as it clears or settlesallocation of revenues should also be progres- foreign exchange transactions. A copy of the transaction details would be sent to the usualsive, as discussed below. Distributional issues, tax authority or its agent. The authority would calculate the tax due from each trader and addsuch as a potential minimum tax threshold, it to a running tally. Traders would pay their currency transaction tax obligations to the taxneed to be considered, so as not to unduly authority periodically.burden individual remittance transfers. Such Incentive and compliance issues are surmountable. It is unlikely that trading banks woulddetails need to be examined during design and opt out of SWIFT’s communications platform to avoid paying the tax. Doing so would costmonitoring. more than the tax. Further, there are only a few large traders in the wholesale market for foreign exchange, so they could easily be audited for tax purposes. There would be no intru- The tax could also substantially reduce sion on individual privacy, because the currency tax would be assessed on the large banks,the macroeconomic volatility caused by the investment funds and corporations participating in the wholesale foreign exchange market.high volume of short-term speculative funds Source: Schmidt and Bhushan 2011.flowing through world financial markets. CHapteR 5 riSing tO the pOliCy ChAllengeS 95
  • conservative assumptions, dramatically scale private sector. They have raised an additional up global public good expenditure. $3.7 billion for development and can leverage This is also an occasion to reconsider a substantial additional funds.109 Considerable broader financial transaction tax. The Interna- private funding has also been leveraged. tional Monetary Fund (IMF) recently pointed out that many G-20 countries have already Ensuring equity and voice in implemented some form of financial trans- governing and in access to finance action tax.104 While the revenue potential Bridging the gap separating policy-makers, depends on the tax’s design and the response of negotiators and decision-makers from the peo- any truly traders, a broad-based, low-rate financial trans- ple most vulnerable to environmental degra- transformational effort actions tax of 0.01–0.05 percent could generate dation requires closing the accountability gap to scale up climate nearly €200 billion a year at the European level in global environmental governance. Account- change mitigation and $650 billion at the global level.105 Other ability alone cannot meet the challenge, but and adaptation will estimates suggest that in the United States alone it is fundamental for building a socially and require blending the tax could raise more than 1 percent of GDP environmentally effective global governance resources—domestic (about $150 billion in 2011), even with very sub- system that delivers for people. and international, stantial reductions in trading volume.106 Private resources are critical, but because Taxes on currency and financial transactions most financial flows into the energy sector, private and public, would not have prevented the recent financial for example, are private, the greater risks and and grant and loan crisis, which originated in the United States and lower returns of some regions of the world spread to the rest of the world. But in addition affect the patterns of flows. In the absence of to the revenue potential, such taxes are tools for reform, access to financing across countries discouraging the short-term reckless behaviour will remain unevenly distributed, and indeed that drove the global economy into crisis. add to existing inequalities.110 This underlines Transaction taxes need not be the only the importance of ensuring that flows of pub- instrument to close the financing gap. Using the lic investments are equitable and create condi- IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) for inno- tions to attract future private flows. vative financing and climate change adaptation Failing to ensure equitable access to cli- is another avenue worth exploring.107 Monetiz- mate finance would also constrain the capac- ing part of the IMF’s surplus could raise up to ity of industries to capitalize on low-cost $75 billion at little or no budgetary cost for opportunities to improve efficiency and reduce contributing governments.108 IMF analysis of greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively. The the possible role of SDRs as seed finance for building sector, for example, could not take a new global green fund suggests that issuing advantage of cost-effective energy efficiency additional SDRs and other reserve assets could improvements. This is particularly important mobilize $100 billion a year by 2020. The SDRs over the next 5–10 years as low-income coun- have the added appeal of acting as a monetary tries invest in long-lived power generation and rebalancing instrument; demand is expected to urban infrastructure. Limited access to cli- come from emerging market economies looking mate financing would lock these countries into to diversify their reserve holdings. Because the high-emission development paths, constrain- SDR is not a sovereign currency, it would not ing the world’s capacity to limit increases in be subject to the currency transaction tax, thus global temperature. avoiding double taxation. The implications are clear. Principles of Several public and private sources could equity should guide and encourage interna- also be tapped to close the financing gap. tional financial flows. Support for institution Already, innovative financing instruments— building should help developing countries such as the Clean Technology Fund and the establish appropriate policies and incentives. Strategic Climate Fund—are blending fund- And the associated governance mechanisms ing from multilateral development banks, gov- for international public financing must allow ernments, climate finance instruments and the for voice and social accountability.96 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • FIGURE 5.3 Any truly transformational effort to scale up planning and robust collaboration with a vari- Key elements inclimate change mitigation and adaptation will ety of traditional and new development actors, transforming climaterequire blending resources—domestic and inter- including national and regional technical cen- financing effortsnational, private and public, and grant and loan. tres of expertise, the private sector, communi- Low-emission,To facilitate both equitable access and efficient ties and civil society organizations. climate-resilientuse of international financial flows, this Report A second key institutional innovation development strategiesadvocates empowering national stakeholders to could be market-making public-private part-blend climate finance at the country level. nerships. These partnerships aim at market Bringing about long-term, efficient results transformation and apply to both climateand accountability to local populations change mitigation (renewable energy tech-and partners will require four sets of tools nologies, energy efficiency appliances and the Market-making(figure 5.3): like) and adaptation (weather indices, climate- public-private partnerships• Low-emission, climate-resilient strategies resilient agricultural commodities, climate- —to align human development, equity resilient buildings and the like). They would and climate change goals. build on recent experience but go beyond tra-• Public-private partnerships—to catalyse ditional service delivery and infrastructure to capital from businesses and households. bring together the potentially diverging inter- Climate deal-flow• Climate deal-flow facilities—for equitable ests of a wide range of stakeholders and blend facility access to international public finance. various sources of finance. The public policies• Coordinated implementation and moni- and measures underlying such partnerships toring, reporting and verification systems. will need to provide incentives and support to Most climate control activities today are improve the risk and reward profile of climatediscrete and incremental mitigation or adapta- investments, consistent with national develop- Implementationtion projects. But broader strategic approaches ment goals. and reportingare also needed. Low-emission, climate- The third set of tools involves establish- instrumentsresilient development strategies could prove a ing climate deal-flow facilities to help national Source: Adapted from Glemarec and others 2010.critical institutional innovation for incorpo- and subnational project proponents assemblerating equity and climate change into devel- bankable projects and tap international pub-opment planning. Involving all stakeholders, lic climate finance. Carbon finance, as in thesuch strategies can help manage uncertainty by Clean Development Mechanism, has shownidentifying development trajectories resilient that limited capacity to prepare bankable pro-to a range of climate outcomes. These strategies jects can be a major barrier to catalysing privatecan incorporate priorities for win-win mitiga- climate finance in many locations. Similarly,tion and adaptation initiatives. And they can the complexity of application and reportingassess the policy changes and capacity develop- requirements for international public fundsment required to implement them.111 A com- makes it difficult to determine eligibility andprehensive strategy to attract investments in appropriateness, posing obstacles to use, moni-green and equitable development must come toring and evaluation. So, the climate deal-flowto grips with the large distortions in energy facilities should enhance the capacity of coun-markets—in favourable tax treatment, regu- tries to gain access to international sources oflatory privileges and legacy monopolies. The both private and public finance.investment climate can be improved by reduc- The fourth set of tools in the proposeding risks (say, through greater policy predict- framework for equitable and efficient cli-ability or guarantee instruments) and increas- mate finance addresses the need for coordi-ing rewards (say, through tax credits).112 nated implementation and reporting. Climate Strategies need to involve municipalities: finance on a scale sufficient to rein in tempera-since cities account for the majority of green- ture changes to 2°C demands unprecedentedhouse gas emissions, actions by subnational efforts to implement, monitor, verify andgovernments will be key to reining in tem- report—over several decades, with multipleperature change. This calls for coordinated actors, diverse sets of actions and a variety of CHapteR 5 riSing tO the pOliCy ChAllengeS 97
  • financing sources. National climate funds can The time is right for such a campaign. The UN facilitate the operational blending and moni- General Assembly has designated 2012 as the toring of domestic and international, private International Year of Sustainable Energy For and public, and grant and loan resources— All while the Rio+20 conference will pro- essential to ensuring domestic accountability vide a unique opportunity to define a global and positive distributional effects. approach for universal access to energy, bring- ing together the energy, green economy and Enabling universal access to energy climate agendas. This global approach can then Central to moving to universal access in energy be developed through regional and national It is time to launch a is addressing the barriers to investing in clean energy dialogues. high-profile global energy. While potentially earning an attrac- Complementing the campaign, support initiative for universal tive return, most technologies for renewable to developing countries for climate-resilient access to energy in energy and energy efficiency require substan- development strategies could identify barri- developing countries tial upfront investment. Even if offset by lower ers, benefits and impacts for disadvantaged operational costs, these upfront capital costs groups—and create favourable investment can be prohibitive. The financial constraints conditions. Major market failures heighten that businesses and consumers face are often the importance of public policies to attract more severe than those implied by national private finance. Such policies can improve discount rates or long-term interest rates. And clean energy investment risk-reward profiles by they are usually compounded by behavioural, reducing risks (stable regulatory context, local technical, regulatory or administrative barri- supply of expertise, streamlined administra- ers. Take wind power: no country will attract tive arrangements, guarantee instruments and private investment if independent power pro- the like) and by increasing rewards (premium ducers face barriers in access to grids, uncer- prices, tax credits and the like). For example, tain licensing processes, limited local expertise a commercially unattractive renewable energy or lack of long-term price guarantees. investment could become profitable by guaran- Achieving universal energy access requires teeing independent power producers access to a response strategy on multiple levels from the grid and a price premium. various partners—here again, there is no one- Support from the Universal Energy Access size-fits-all solution. National and local gov- Initiative could include assistance for deter- ernments must set the stage for other players mining priority energy access technologies, ranging from civil society and the private sec- ideally in the context of formulating a low- tor at the national and subnational levels to emission, climate-resilient strategy; identify- global finance and energy companies. ing key barriers to technology diffusion; select- It is time to launch a high-profile global ing an appropriate mix of policy instruments initiative for universal access to energy in to remove barriers; and accessing funding developing countries. It could have two parts: options to deploy the selected mix of policies. first, a global advocacy and awareness-rais- ing campaign; second, investments on the * * * ground through dedicated support to sectoral This Report calls for a new vision that jointly approaches in clean energy. Together, they can considers equity and environmental sustain- kick-start a shift from incremental to trans- ability. It elaborates ways to attain synergies formative change. between the two objectives that are crucial for A global campaign to promote a participa- shaping our understanding of how to move tory and informed initiative, key in both donor forward and guide policy. Taking up this and developing countries, can harness existing challenge will expand choices for people today capacities for advocacy, analysis, planning, and in the future—the hallmark of human knowledge management and communications. development.98 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • notesChapter 1 Implementation of Agenda 21 (UN 1997) and the 2002 is determined by factors outside the causal system Johannesburg Declaration (UN 2002). examined (Wooldridge 2003).1 UN 2002, 2010. 32 Anand and Sen (2000: 2,038), emphasis in original. 12 Doubling net forest depletion as a percentage of2 Sen 2003: 330. 33 Of course, some policies can be neutral in impacts, GNI increases overall inequality 2 percent (or 0.423 Weikard (1999) as cited in Scholtes (2011). but these are omitted for simplicity. percentage point), while doubling particulate emission4 Scholtes 2011. 34 See Brown (2003). damage as a percentage of GNI increases overall5 1990 HDR: 38 (UNDP–HDRO 1990; see inside back 35 A caveat arises for solutions not in quadrant 1 inequality by a massive 26 percent (or 5.6 percent- cover for a list of HDRs). because major improvements in one dimension age points).6 1994 HDR: 19 (UNDP–HDRO 1994; see inside back cause small deteriorations in the other. Would any 13 The number of years since women received the for- cover for a list of HDRs). solution that improves both dimensions slightly mal right to vote and the contraceptive prevalence7 2010 HDR: 2; emphasis added (UNDP–HDRO 2010; be preferred? It can be argued that a policy that rate are instruments for the Gender Inequality Index see inside back cover for a list of HDRs). improves both dimensions should be preferred only (GII). In particular, a 10 percent increase in gender8 WCED 1987: 57–59; emphasis added. if it benefits groups that are objectively worse off. In inequality (measured by the GII) leads to a 1.13 point9 Solow 1973. other words, a policy that enhances sustainability (or 150 percent) increase in net forest depletion as10 USEIA 2008. but worsens equity should be preferred only if the a percentage of GNI. For details on the method and11 Commission on Sustainable Development 1997, most disadvantaged future generations that will results, see Fuchs and Kehayova (2011). paragraph 12. benefit from the change would have been worse 14 The IHDI is a measure of the average level of human12 Baumol, Litan and Schramm 2007. off than the poorest today. development in a society once inequality is taken into13 FAO 1996. account. It captures the HDI of the average person in14 UNDESA 2011a. society, which is less than the aggregate HDI when15 Brown and others 2001. Chapter 2 there is inequality in the distribution of health, educa-16 On strong sustainability, see Barbier, Markandya and tion and income. Under perfect equality, the HDI and Pearce (1990) and Ross (2009). 1 2010 HDR: chapter 2 (UNDP–HDRO 2010; see inside IHDI are equal; the greater the difference between17 Daly 2005. back cover for a list of HDRs). the two, the greater the inequality. See Alkire and18 UNEP 2011; OECD 2010a. 2 On this issue, see UNECE (2011) for a recent review. Foster (2010).19 UNDESA 2011a. 3 The ratio of per capita greenhouse gas emissions 15 As we reviewed in last year’s report, global inequal-20 Perrings and Pearce 1994; Barbier, Burgess and in very high to those in low, medium and high HDI ity across people is an important measure, but most Folke 1994. countries was 3.7 in 1990 and 3.3 in 2005. Underlying studies are limited to income. Almost all agree that21 See Nordhaus (2004), who estimates a slowdown the small drop in the ratio, total greenhouse gas inequality is high, though there is no consensus on of 0.86 percent a year. emissions have grown much faster in developing recent trends (Anand and Segal 2008). Sala-i-Martin22 Babbage 2010. countries, partly because of their faster population (2006), providing estimates for 1970–2000 by inte-23 See Weitzman (2009a), Stern and Taylor (2007), IPCC growth. grating the income distributions of 138 countries, (1997), and Dietz and Neumayer (2007). 4 The differences are 4.4 times for carbon dioxide found that mean per capita incomes had risen, but24 Weitzman 2009b. emissions, 1.3 times for methane and 2.1 times for inequality had not. Other studies—such as Milanovic25 This stands in contrast to the Stern Review’s proposal nitrous oxide. (2009)—concluded the opposite. Still others—such as of a long-term discount rate of 1–2 percent (Stern 5 The strong correlations between both the levels Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002)—found no change. 2007), itself much lower than commonly used rates and changes in environmental impacts and the 16 Pradhan, Sahn and Younger 2003. of 4–5 percent. HDI also suggest that the link between these two 17 O’Donnell and others 2008.26 Solow 1993: 168. phenomena has not changed much over time. This 18 This is consistent with earlier studies (for example,27 Economists have defined sustainability in terms of contrasts, for example, with life expectancy and Neumayer 2003 and Becker, Philipson and Soares living standards, consumption or utility. Consumption- income, where levels but not changes are cor- 2003). Becker, Philipson and Soares monetize life based definitions are favoured by advocates of weak related, indicating changes over time in the under- expectancy and create a measure of “full” income— sustainability, such as Dasgupta and Heal (1974), lying processes. See 2010 HDR (UNDP–HDRO which rose 140 percent in developed countries from Hartwick (1977) and Solow (1974). Utility-based 2010; see inside back cover for a list of HDRs) 1965 to 1995 and 192 percent in developing countries. definitions, such as that offered by Neumayer and Georgiadis, Pineda and Rodríguez (2010). 19 2010 HDR: 32 (UNDP–HDRO 2010; see inside (2010a), consider a path to be sustainable if people 6 Grossman and Krueger 1995. back cover for a list of HDRs). Other studies become progressively more efficient at attaining 7 Hughes, Kuhn and others 2011. have highlighted similar points; see, for example, greater utility. 8 Grossman and Kruger (1995) suggested a peak, in McGillivray (2011).28 Anand and Sen 1994, 2000; Sen 2010. most cases, before a country reached a per capita 20 According to the 2010 HDR (UNDP–HDRO 2010;29 The concept originated in the work of Adams (1965), income of $8,000 (in 1985 dollars). Other studies see inside back cover for a list of HDRs), primary Homans (1961) and Blau (1964). have identified different thresholds. completion rates have risen from 84 percent30 Rawls 1971. 9 See statistical table 6. Gross national income (GNI) in 1991 to 94 percent today. Expected years of31 The priority of poverty eradication in the search per capita data are from the World Bank (http:// schooling have also risen —from 9 years in 1980 for sustainable development has been reaffirmed data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD). to 11 years today. in several UN declarations, including the 1992 Rio 10 See statistical table 6. 21 Hertz and others 2007. Declaration on Environment and Development (UN 11 An exogenous variable is independent of the state of 22 For example, in a study over 1960–1995, Checchi 1992), the resolution on the Programme for the Further other variables in a causal model—that is, its value (2001) found that inequality in years of schooling nOteS 99
  • remained almost constant at low levels in Organisa- 44 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 65 Data on current catch are from FAO Fisheries and tion for Economic Co-operation and Development 2007) projects increases of 0.18–0.59 metre under Aquaculture Information and Statistics Service 2009; countries, despite increases in average education six scenarios, while other studies suggest that the sustainable yield is from FAO (2005). attainment. increase could be as much as 2 metres. Ice thin- 66 FAO 2010a. 23 Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 2011. ning is expected to ultimately break up ice shelves, 67 FAO 2010a. 24 HDRO calculations based on data from Milanovic which is likely to accelerate sea level rise (Gregory 68 For instance, Peru’s introduction of individual fishing (2011). We include a group of 29 developed countries and Huybrechts 2006; Jevrejeva and others 2006; rights over its anchovy fishery, the anchoveta, is cited for which we have income inequality observations Thomas and others 2004). as key to improving the sustainability of its fishing for 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. 45 Anthoff 2010. stock (Fréon and others 2008; Schreiber forthcoming). 25 OECD 2011a. 46 Wheeler 2011. 69 Grossman and Krueger 1995. 26 OECD 2010a. 47 Vankoningsveld and others 2008. 70 McGranahan and others 2001. 27 HDRO calculations based on data from Milanovic 48 Dasgupta and others 2009. 71 OECD 2010b. (2011) and Lopez-Calva and Lustig (2010: 10). 49 These figures refer to climatological, hydrological 72 Bettencourt and others 2007. 28 Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010. and meteorological natural disasters, as estimated 73 Dodman 2009. 29 OECD 2010a. from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology 74 Lehrer 2010. 30 Hughes, Irfan and others 2011. of Disasters Emergency Events Database: Interna- 75 See www.unesco.org/water/wwap/facts_figures/ 31 Not only does the logarithmic term on income con- tional Disaster Database. An event is classified as basic_needs.shtml. tribute mechanically to such slowing, so does the a disaster if it meets at least one of the following 76 Tachamo and others 2009; Pepper 2007. inevitable slowing of rising years of formal education, criteria: 10 or more people died, 100 or more people 77 Urban pollution is defined as suspended particulates of advances in life expectancy in better off countries, were affected, a state of emergency was declared or less than 10 microns in diameter (PM10), expressed and of convergence of low- and middle-income coun- international assistance was requested. But data may in micrograms per cubic metre (World Bank 2011a). tries as their health and education gaps with rich not be fully consistent across countries. Population 78 Calculations are based on urban population-weighted countries narrow. growth increases the number of people affected and averages. 32 Environmental risks are modeled with the Environ- thus the number of the events classified as disasters. 79 See UNDESA (2006). mental Risks Scenario, developed by Hughes, Irfan See also Neumayer and Barthel (2011) on the effects 80 The thresholds for greenhouse gases are total accu- and others (2011). Inequality and insecurity factors are of awareness and reporting bias. mulated emissions over the next 50 years likely to modeled with the Security First Scenario, developed 50 IPCC 2007. Changes in atmospheric moisture affect keep temperature change within 2°C (1,678 giga- by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP moisture absorption capacity, leading to a greater tonnes), no deforestation and global fresh water with- 2007). This involves socioeconomic and environmental probability of intense precipitation and associated drawals of 5,000 cubic kilometres a year, which we stresses, economic and personal insecurity, significant natural disasters. expressed in per capita terms for our analysis. There domestic and global inequality, high levels of protec- 51 Knutson and others 2010. is considerable uncertainty and estimated variance tionism, barriers to migration, and more militarism 52 The numbers could also reflect people’s greater around these thresholds in the scientific community. and conflict. exposure to natural hazards (for example, settle- For more information on global environmental thresh- 33 Global warming potential measures the relative ment in previously uninhabited areas) and increased olds, see, for example Rockström and others (2009) radioactive effect of a given substance. For the lat- vulnerability. and Meinshausen and others (2009). Greenhouse est estimates, see IPCC (2007: chapter 2). 53 Wood, Sebastian and Scherr 2000. gas emissions combine 2005–2007 averages for 34 Of the scientists publishing most actively in the field, 54 Two UN bodies—the Food and Agriculture Organi- carbon dioxide and 2005 data, the latest available, 98 percent support the idea that climate change is zation and the Secretariat of the United Nations for methane, nitrous oxide and other greenhouse caused by human activity (Anderegg and others 2010). Convention to Combat Desertification—produce gases. Forest data from 2000 and 2010 are used to While some studies have pointed to mistakes in the estimates, but their approach has been criticized in calculate deforestation. Total water withdrawals Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports academic circles; see Veron, Paruelo and Oesterheld are based on averages from the 2000s, and data (Khilyuk and Chilingar 2006; Church and others 2008), (2006). on improved water access are for 2008. Data on air none has seriously questioned its key conclusions. 55 Hanasaki and others (2008); UNEP (2009). pollution are averages over 2006–2008. Thresholds for 35 Raupach and others 2007. 56 World Water Assessment Programme 2009. the local impacts are regional medians. See statistical 36 Aichele and Felbermayr 2010; Grether and Mathys 57 Ball 2001. table 6 for data sources. 2009. 58 These shares are the total land area–weighted aver- 81 The earliest observation from the 1990s and latest 37 Carbon dioxide can remain in the atmosphere for age for each HDI group. from the 2000s were used to calculate changes thousands of years, unlike methane, which lasts 59 Estimates differ by method and data coverage: assess- over time. about 12 years, and nitrous oxide, which lasts ments based on satellite images in 2002 indicate 82 However, Costa Rica is among the few countries in about 114 years. See Archer and Broikin (2008) and 23 percent lower deforestation rates than those Latin America that has experienced an increase in IPCC (2007). reported in FAO (2001). Source data from official or income inequality during the last decade despite 38 See the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool of the World informal institutions are often inaccurate and incom- the growth boom that preceded the global economic Resources Institute (http://cait.wri.org). plete, and detailed information is lacking on forest crisis of 2008. Inequality in health and education fell 39 Areas above the 45th parallel north and below the composition, maturity, disturbance, canopy cover over the same period. 45th parallel south experienced a 2.66°C increase in and quality. See Grainger (2010). Some countries, 83 UNEP 2010. average temperature for November–April during the such as Brazil, have made major achievements in 2000s over that during 1951–1980; areas between reducing deforestation (www.undp.org/latinamerica/ the coordinates saw a 0.66°C increase. biodiversity-superpower/). Chapter 3 40 Cooper 2008. 60 See Meyfroidt, Rudel and Lambin (2010). Bhutan and 41 Very high HDI countries had a more than 2 percent El Salvador have reportedly used more land abroad 1 Ash and others 2010; Brulle and Pellow 2006; Pas- decline in precipitation. than they have reforested within their boundaries. tor 2007; Sze and London 2008; United Church of 42 For example, estimates show that rainfall is very likely 61 Gan and McCarl 2007. Christ 1987. (90 percent probability) to increase in high latitude 62 Mayer and others 2005, 2006. 2 When the plant exploded in 1957, nearby ethnic areas and likely (66 percent probability) to fall in most 63 Würtenberger, Koellner and Binder 2005. Russians were evacuated and resettled, but the subtropical regions and to increase in variability in 64 In 2007 annual average per capita consumption Tatar people were left to suffer the effects of con- equatorial areas (IPCC 2007; Dore 2005). was 28.7 kilograms in developed countries and 9.5 tamination (Agyeman, Ogneva-Himmelberger and 43 Christensen and others 2007. kilograms in least developed countries (FAO 2010a). Campbell 2009).100 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • 3 The shares of the population with access to an 21 Meier and others 2010. 58 Nelson and others 2009. improved water source and improved sanitation are 22 World Water Assessment Programme 2006. 59 Green, King and Morrison 2009; Galloway McLean 2010. Millennium Development Goal indicators relating to 23 The Spearman correlation is .6 for temperature King, Smith and Gracey (2009) review the literature. environmental sustainability (goal 7). A household anomalies (1951–1980, compared with 2000–2008). 60 2010 HDR: statistical table 13 (UNDP–HDRO 2010; is considered deprived if it relies on dung, wood or When we consider only those statistically significant see inside back cover for a list of HDRs). charcoal for cooking; if it lacks access to clean drinking changes, which could be interpreted as suggestive 61 Independent Evaluation Group 2008. water (or if the water is more than 30 minutes away); of climate change, the result is nearly unchanged. 62 Daka and Ballet 2011. and if it lacks improved sanitation (or shares it with 24 A weak negative correlation disappears altogether 63 Khandker and others 2009a. other households). See Alkire and Santos (2010). when we exclude Indonesia from the sample and 64 Khandker and others 2009b.4 Since last year’s HDR, these estimates were updated when we consider only statistically significant 65 Flora and Findis 2007. for 19 countries and presented for the first time for changes over time for the full sample. 66 Nankhuni and Findeis 2004. an additional 5. Countries with MPI data include 11 25 For a recent review, see Skoufias, Rabassa and 67 Senbet 2010. in the Arab States, 9 in East Asia and the Pacific, 23 Olivieri (2011). 68 Ndiritu and Nyangena 2010. in Europe and Central Asia, 18 in Latin America and 26 Environmental risk factors include indoor smoke from 69 Walker 2010. the Caribbean, 5 in South Asia and 37 in Sub-Saharan solid fuel use; outdoor air pollution; inadequate water, 70 FAO (2010b) data. “Economically active popula- Africa. There are 103 countries that have complete sanitation and hygiene; solar ultraviolet radiation; tion” refers to the number of people constituting data on environmental deprivations—the descriptive climate change; lead; mercury; occupational car- the labour supply and refers to all employed and analysis focuses on these countries. Data for the cinogens; occupational airborne particulates; and unemployed people (including those seeking work Arab States are not given because low poverty levels second-hand smoke (Prüss-Üstün and others 2008). for the first time). render the results potentially unreliable. 27 World Bank 2008a. 71 World Resources Institute 2005. Aside from small-5 These aggregates are for the 2000s; the survey dates 28 Prüss-Üstün and others 2008. scale agriculture, the collection of wild foods, span 2000–2010. Population data correspond to 29 Prüss-Üstün and others 2008. Estimates are based materials and medicines are the main sources of each country’s survey year here and in the follow- on 2004 WHO country health statistics. The use of environmental income. ing analysis. solid fuels is a reliable indicator of exposure to indoor 72 Pattanayak and Sills 2001.6 The MPI reflects deprivations across three dimen- air pollution, but over time, as improved stoves and 73 Vincent 2011; UNFPA 2009. sions, each weighted equally, and 10 indicators. For decent ventilation come into widespread use, the 74 IWGIA 2008. more details, see Technical note 4. two will not be as closely correlated. 75 Sobrevila 2008.7 However, low poverty may conceal poverty that exists 30 Between 1990 and 2005 the percentage of urban 76 Sobrevila 2008. subnationally. In Ghana, for instance, poverty is 10 households with access to gas increased from 19 77 World Bank 2008c. times higher in Greater Accra than in Northern Ghana, percent to 82 percent (Vennemo and others 2009). 78 Galloway McLean 2010. and other countries also exhibit sharp area-based 31 Data based on 2004 WHO burden of disease data. 79 Hertel and Rosch 2010. For a review, see Nellemann differences. And in Europe and Central Asia, groups 32 Smith, Mehta and Maeusezahl-Feuz 2004. and others (2009). such as Roma are likely to be much more deprived 33 Shandra, Shandra and London 2008. 80 Nellemann and others 2009. than national poverty measures would suggest. 34 Correlation = .82, p < .05. 81 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005.8 UNICEF Madagascar Water Sanitation and Hygiene 35 Fieldwork by the Oxford Poverty and Human 82 Fraser and others 2010. 2007. Development Initiative (www.ophi.org.uk/policy/ 83 Yonghuan and others 2007.9 The exercise was also carried out with controls for multidimensional-poverty-index/mpi-case-studies/). 84 2007/2008 HDR (UNDP–HDRO 2008; see inside HDI group and regional fixed effects, but they were 36 Fieldwork by Indrajit Roy (www.ophi.org.uk/policy/ back cover for a list of HDRs). not jointly significant and thus were dropped. The total multidimensional-poverty-index/mpi-case-studies/). 85 World Bank 2009. sample consisted of 73 country-year observations. 37 Kjellstrom and others 2006. 86 Lobell, Schlenker and Costa-Roberts 2011. Fifty-two country-year observations were not included 38 Riojas-Rodríguez and others 2006. 87 Lobell and others 2008. in the exercise: those whose poverty was based on 39 Blacksmith Institute 2007. 88 Nelson and others 2010. lower or upper bounds (see Alkire and Santos 2010), 40 On Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China, 89 Thornton and others 2009. those missing an environmental indicator and those see Wong and others (2008, 2010); on Shanghai, 90 The Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that whose MPI value was less than 0.032 because the see Kan and others (2008), as cited in HEI (2010). if gender access to productive resources were equal, small number of poor people in these countries (less 41 Friends of the Earth 2004. yields would increase 20–30 percent and agricultural than 8.5 percent) makes the results potentially unreli- 42 Mitchell and Dorling 2003; Brainard and others 2002. output would rise 2.5–4 percent on average (FAO able. The 30 countries missing nonenvironmental 43 Kruize and Bouwman 2004. 2010b: 5). indicators were retained, but the analysis controlled 44 Kockler 2005. 91 Nellemann and others 2009. for their absence. 45 Viel and others 2010; Laurian 2008. 92 FAO 2010b.10 De Oliveira 2008. 46 UN Water 2010a. Data are from Prüss-Üstün and 93 Ulimwengu and Ramadan 2009.11 Hall and Lobina 2008. others (2008). 94 Hertel, Burke and Lobell 2010.12 Da Costa, Cohen and Schaeffer 2007; De Oliveira 47 Prüss-Üstün and Corvalán 2006. 95 Ivanic and Martin 2008. and Laan 2010. 48 UN Water 2010a. Data are from Prüss-Üstün and 96 Cranfield, Preckel and Hertel 2007.13 UN Habitat 2003 others (2008). 97 Jacoby, Rabassa and Skoufias forthcoming.14 Milton and others 2010; UNICEF 2010; Argos and 49 Prüss-Üstün and Corvalán 2006. 98 See www.fao.org/forestry/28811/en/. others 2010. 50 Prüss-Üstün and others 2008. 99 FAO 2011.15 UNDP Water Governance Programme 2010. 51 World Bank 2008b. 100 Agarwal 2010b: 37; FAO 2010b: 16.16 UNDP Water Governance Programme 2010. 52 UN Water 2010a. 101 Mayers 2007.17 IMF 2004; statistical table 5; see also Djibouti on the 53 For example, sexual violence can result when women 102 Vedeld and others 2004: meta-study examining 54 Austro-Arab Chamber of Commerce’s Arab Countries have to relieve themselves in the open after nightfall case studies (33 in Africa). Profile (www.aacc.at). (UN Water 2006). 103 Mitra and Mishra 2011.18 See IDA at work: Nepal (http://go.worldbank.org/ 54 Costello and others 2009. 104 Yemiru and others 2010. TXVG8IJ8L0). 55 Lindsay and Martens 1998. 105 Based on surveys covering 2002–2008 (Volker and Wai-19 Peru Ministry of Housing, Construction and Santia- 56 Hales and others 2002. ble 2010). Similar findings are reached by Pattanayak tion 2006. 57 Checkley and others 2000, 2004; Speelmon and others and Sills (2001) for Brazil and McSweeney (2004) and20 IADB 2008. 2000; Lama and others 2004. Takasaki, Barham and Coomes (2004) for Honduras. nOteS 101
  • 106 Agarwal 2010b. 146 Nishikiori and others 2006. Oxfam International’s 180 Arora-Jonsson 2011. 107 Arnold, Kohlin and Persson 2006. 2005 report on the 2004 Asian tsunami’s impact on 181 Agarwal 2009. 108 FAO 2010a. women finds a similar pattern for floods. 182 Walton 2010: 36. 109 Allison and others 2009. 147 Rose 1999. 183 Gallagher and Thacker 2008; Bernauer and Koubi 2009. 110 Allison and others 2005. See also Allison and others 148 Neumayer and Plumper 2007. 184 Boyce and others 1999. (2009). 149 Neumayer and Plumper 2007. 185 Torras and Boyce 1998. 111 Secretariat of the Pacific Community 2011. 150 Blankespoor and others 2010. 186 Torras 2006. Power is assessed using the Gini index, 112 AUSAid and UNDP Pacific Centre 2008. 151 The probability of dying as a result of Hurricane political rights and civil liberties, literacy rate, higher 113 Cinner, Daw and McClanahan (2009), a small scale Katrina was higher for people who were black education, population density, Internet user density study of 434 households, from 9 coastal villages, and poor (Price 2008; 2007/2008 HDR: 81, box and female representation in government. from which there were 141 fishers. 2.3 [UNDP–HDRO 2008; see inside back cover 187 The principal components method was used to create 114 Secretariat of the Pacific Community 2011. for a list of HDRs]). an index of power equality using data on income 115 Cheung and others 2009. 152 Baez, de la Fuente and Santos 2010. inequality, adult literacy, Internet access, political 116 Iftikhar 2003. Afifi and Warner 2008; Boano, Zetter 153 Seballos and others 2011. rights and civil liberties, and political stability. The and Morris 2008. 154 Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2006). Jensen (2000) results are similar to those of Boyce and Torras (2002). 117 See, for instance, Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti found similar results in Côte d’Ivoire. 188 All these studies tend to test a variety of outcomes (2004), Hendrix and Glaser (2005), Boano, Zetter and 155 Baez and Santos (2007). and to use a variety of datasets and specifications. Morris (2008) and Burke and others (2010). 156 Alkire and Roche forthcoming. 189 Gallagher and Thacker 2008; see also Torras and 118 Calculated on the basis of Demographic and Health 157 Christiaensen, Do and Trung 2010. Boyce 1998. Survey and Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey data, 158 UN 2010. 190 Li and Reuveny 2006. most recent year available since 2000. 159 See the Mobile Alliance for Maternal Action (www. 191 Neumayer 2002. Battig and Bernauer (2009) found 119 These surveys are available for only a small number mobilemamaalliance.org/issue.html). similar results for 1990–2004 in 185 countries: democ- of countries because they are expensive and dif- 160 Engelman 2011. racy had a positive effect on political commitment ficult to conduct. The questionnaires differ, so the 161 Engelman 2009: 5. to climate change mitigation, but the effects on resulting data are illustrative rather than strictly 162 UNDESA 2011b. policy outcomes—emissions levels and trends— comparable. 163 We note, however, that even after the large decline were ambiguous. 120 Agarwal 2010b: 36, table 2.1. in fertility during the 1970s and 1980s, population- 192 Bernauer and Koubi 2009. 121 Koolwal and Van de Walle 2010. related problems in Bangladesh remain serious, and a 193 The term “countervailing power” was coined by 122 Kramarae and Spender 2000. sense of complacency has led to less rigorous policy Galbraith (1952). 123 Ilahi and Grimard 2000. implementation and programme performance in 194 Crotty and Rodgers forthcoming. 124 Wodon and Ying 2010. recent years (Khan and Khan 2010). 195 Fredrikkson and others 2005. 125 Blackden and Wodon 2006. 164 Potts and Marsh 2010: p. 5. 196 Specifically, the results suggest that a 10 percent 126 To estimate the economic benefits of improvements 165 United States National Academy of Sciences 1992: 26. increase in the strength of NGOs (measured by number in water supply, Hutton, Haller and Bartram (2006) 166 O’Neill and others 2010. of environmental NGOs per capita) lowers sulphur assume that expanding access to water supply would 167 Wire 2009. dioxide levels 5.1–9.3 percent, smoke 5.7 percent save 30 minutes for each household per day. 168 Of 6.2 births per woman for Chad, 4.4 for the and heavy particulates 0.8–1.5 percent. Additional 127 See www.sidym2006.com/eng/eng_doc_interes.asp. Democratic Republic of Congo and 7.1 for Niger; estimates suggest an even greater impact after con- 128 Boano and others 2008. see statistical table 4. trolling for potential endogeneity and measurement 129 UNHCR 2002: 12. 169 Mills, Bos and Suzuki 2010. error (Binder and Neumayer 2005). 130 Marchiori and others 2011. 170 Filmer and Pritchett (2002) find a partial correlation 197 Pellow 2004. 131 2009 HDR: chapter 4 (UNDP–HDRO 2009; see between indicators of fuelwood scarcity and fertility in inside back cover for a list of HDRs). Pakistan, and Biddlecom, Axinn and Barber (2005) link 132 UNEP 2009. poorer environmental quality and a greater reliance Chapter 4 133 Miguel and others 2004; Hendrix and Glaser 2005; on public natural resources with higher fertility in Raleigh and Urdal 2008; Fiola 2009; Burke and oth- Western Chitwan Valley, Nepal. National data for 1 Barrett 2009. ers 2010. Nepal, however, indicate that environmental scarcity 2 Ervin and others 2010. 134 Evans 2010. is associated with less demand for children (Loughran 3 UNDESA 2009; OECD 2010c; IEA 2010; UN Rio 135 Homer-Dixon 1994. and Pritchett 1997). Preparatory Committee Meeting 2011 publications 136 Collier 2006. 171 Based on the most recent Demographic and Health (www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/index.php?page=view 137 Evans 2008; Collier 2007. Survey data (www.measuredhs.com/accesssurveys/). &type=13&nr=28&menu=24). 138 Boano and others 2008: 22. 172 Engelman 2009. 4 REN21 2010: 47. 139 Bartlett 2008. 173 Nugent and Shandra 2009. However, why this result 5 Newell, Phillips and Mulvaney 2011. 140 Wheeler 2011 came about was not clear. 6 UN 2011. 141 Boano and others 2008. 174 Norgaard and York 2005. 7 Bernard 2010: 1–2. 142 UN HABITAT Global Urban Indicators database (www. 175 See www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm (accessed 8 Dinkelman 2008. unhabitat.org/stats/). Slum households are defined 14 July 2011). See statistical table 4 for country 9 Khandker and others 2009b. as lacking in any of the following elements: access and regional data. 10 www.ophi.org.uk/policy/multidimensional-poverty to improved water, access to improved sanitation, 176 UNDESA 2010b. -index/mpi-case-studies/. secure tenure, durable housing or sufficient living 177 Shandra, Shandra and London 2008. 11 Zacune 2011. area. 178 Gallup World Poll data (www.gallup.com/se/126848/ 12 This is compared with the New Policies Scenario, 143 Asia Summit on Climate Change and Indigenous worldview.aspx) for the most recent year available which takes into account countries’ broad policy Peoples 2009; see also the Asia Summit on Climate since 2007. commitments and plans, even where not yet imple- Change and Indigenous People (www.tebtebba.org/ 179 Differences between men and women are significant mented. Under this scenario, through 2035, carbon index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id= for perceived severity of climate change and govern- dioxide emissions rise over 21 percent relative to 47&Itemid=58). ment environmental efforts (at the 95 percent level) 2008. Fossil fuels—mainly coal and natural gas— 144 Rodriguez-Oreggia and others 2010. and for air quality and emissions policy (99 percent remain dominant in this scenario, but their share of 145 Brouwer, Akter and Brander 2007. level) but not for satisfaction with water quality. total generation drops from 68 percent to 55 percent,102 Human Development RepoRt 2011
  • as nuclear and renewable sources expand and the 51 Roseinweig 2008. 2 IPCC 2007. amount of carbon dioxide emitted per unit of electric- 52 World Bank 2011a. 3 Chang and Grabel 2004; Rodrik 2006. ity generated falls by a third (see IEA and others 2010). 53 See Perez and others (2011); www.stanford.edu/ 4 See Aghion (2009); Rodrik (2005); Lin 2010.13 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st group/jennadavis/index.html; Lwin Oo 2010; Wilkin- 5 IPCC 2011. Century 2011. son, Moilwa and Taylor 2004. 6 UNDP 2011a.14 Under the New Policies Scenario world primary energy 54 UNDESA 2010b. 7 Grasso 2004. demand increases some 36 percent between 2008 55 Engelman 2011. 8 Even if the importance of distributional aspects is and 2035, or 1.2 percent a year. More than 80 percent 56 Potts and Marsh 2010. increasingly recognized; see, for example, OECD of electricity demand is from non–Organisation for 57 www.unfpa.org/stronger_voices. (2010a). Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 58 www.ehproject.org/phe/adra-nepalfinal.html. 9 Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980. countries (IEA and others 2010: 4 and 8). 59 www.ehproject.org/phe/phe.html. 10 Oxfam International 2007.15 OECD 2010c. 60 Grandia 2005; Guatemala Instituto Nacional de 11 Cadman and others 2010.16 On Kenya, Okello (2005); on Guatemala, Bruce and Estadistica 1999, 2009. 12 Weitzman 2009a, 2009b; Torras 2011. others (2004). 61 Mansour, Mansour and Swesy 2010. 13 http://go.worldbank.org/5JP4U774N0.17 AGECC 2010. 62 Bangladesh Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 14 See www.opensecrets.org/influence/index.php.18 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st 2004; UNDESA 2009. 15 World Bank 2010c. Century 2010. 63 Kenya National Coordinating Agency for Population 16 Transparency International 2011.19 Eberhard and others 2008. and Development 2008. 17 Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004; Iyigun and20 Around 80 percent of renewable power generated in 64 www.pathfind.org/site/PageServer?pagename= Rodrik 2004. 2010 came from hydropower, which also accounted Programs_Vietnam_Projects_HIV_RH_Integration. 18 Speck 2010. for around a third of new renewable capacity added 65 Roudi 2009. 19 Willenbockel 2011. between 2010 and 2011. Renewable Energy Policy 66 UNFPA 2010. 20 OECD 2010c. Network for the 21st Century 2010. 67 Lopez Carr and Grandia 2011. 21 Ghana Ministry of Energy and World Bank 2004.21 Geothermal power grew at an annual rate of 4 per- 68 ITU 2011. 22 World Bank 2008b. cent, ethanol production 23 percent, wind power 69 The GSMA Development Fund, the Cherie Blaire Foun- 23 Wang and others 2011. 27 percent and solar photovoltaic 60 percent (Renew- dation for Women and Vital Wave Consulting 2010. 24 Gearty 2010. No such right has been recognized in able Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century 2011: 70 www.mobilemamaalliance.org/opportunity.html. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the figure 2). 71 For example, Costa Rica went from a deforestation International Covenant on Economic, Social and22 Transparency International 2011. rate of 0.8 percent a year between 1990 and 2000 to Cultural Rights.23 The Pew Charitable Trusts 2010. a reforestation rate of 0.9 percent in the subsequent 25 Earthjustice 2004, 2008. Debate over the recognition24 Glemarec 2011. decade, and India increased its reforestation rate from of environmental human rights is ongoing within25 Kammen, Kapadia and Fripp 2004. of 0.2 percent a year between 1990 and 2000 to 0.5 the human rights community. Some argue that rec-26 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st percent a year between 2000 and 2010 (FAO 2011). ognizing a third generation of rights (one in which Century 2010: 9. 72 Nagendra 2011. the protection of humans is not the central focus)27 IEA, UNDP and UNIDO 2010. 73 Ostrom 1992. would devalue the concept of human rights and divert28 Burniaux and Chateau 2011. 74 Agarwal 2001; Gupte 2004. attention from the need to implement existing civil,29 Badiani and Jessoe 2011. 75 Agarwal 2010a. political, economic and social rights fully. Others30 World Bank 2009. 76 Molnar and others 2004. assert the inherent value of recognizing a right to31 On Indonesia, Kojima and Bacon (2006); on Iran, 77 Corrigan and Granziera 2010. have the environment protected. See Boyle (2010). Global Subsidies Initiative (2011). 78 UNDP, UNEP, World Bank and WRI 2005. 26 Fukuda-Parr 2007; Nussbaum 1998, 2006; Sen 2009;32 Norton Rose Group 2011. 79 http://us.macmillan.com/horizontalinequalities Vizard, Fukuda-Parr and Elson 2011.33 United States Environmental Protection Agency 2011. andconflict. 27 Sen 2009 Emissions fell about 6 percent in 2008–2009, due 80 Leisher and others 2010. 28 Boyce 2011. mainly to the economic recession, which led to fuel 81 Leisher and others 2010. 29 However, the legislation preserves Parliament’s switching as the price of coal rose and the price of 82 UNDP and GEF 2010. discretion to authorize any interference with envi- natural gas fell. 83 Baud and others 2011; Martin 2011. ronmental rights: May (2006).34 India Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change 84 Ervin and others 2010. 30 See Pedersen (2008). 2008; Stern and Taylor 2010. 85 Ervin and others 2010. 31 See the Swedish Environment Protection Agency35 ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm. 86 Roper, Utz and Harvey 2006. (www.naturvardsverket.se/en/In-English/Start/36 IEA, UNDP and UNIDO 2010. 87 Gupta and Leung 2011. Enjoying-nature/The-right-of-public-access/).37 See www.righttowater.info/progress-so-far/. Such 88 Government of India and UNDP Disaster Risk Manage- 32 Every person has the right to a clean and healthy legislation exists also in Kazakhstan and in four ment Programme 2008. environment, which includes the right to have the Western European countries. 89 Chung and others 2002. environment protected for the benefit of present and38 Leonhardt 2011. 90 Duval-Diop and Rose 2008. future generations through legislative and other meas-39 Klopfenstein and others 2011. 91 See Grosh and others (2008) and Tucker (2010). ures (Constitution of Kenya 2010, Chapter 5, Part40 Sarkar and others 2010. 92 UKaid–DFID 2011. 2). Since 1972 more than half of UN member states41 See www.undp.org/water/community-water- 93 Fuchs 2011. have added constitutional guarantees concerning initiative.shtml. 94 See Arnall and others (2010). the environment (Earthjustice 2007).42 Fishman 2011. 95 Lieuw-Kie-Song 2009. 33 Article 44 of the 1994 Constitution of the Federal43 World Bank 2007. 96 South Africa Department of Environmental Affairs Democratic Republic of Ethiopia says that “govern-44 Duflo and Pande 2007. and UNEP 2011. ment shall endeavor to ensure that all Ethiopians live45 Dudley and Stolton 2003. 97 UNDP 2011c. in a clean and healthy environment” and Article 9246 Mulongoy and Gidda 2008. that “the design and implementation of programmes47 www.unicef.org/wash/. and of development shall not damage or destroy the48 Inter-American Development Bank 2010. Chapter 5 environment.”49 Nepal Water for Health 2004. 34 Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon 1996,50 Baker and others 2011. 1 Frankel and Bosetti 2011. Article 47(2). nOteS 103
  • 35 Constitution of the Republic of Namibia 1990, Article how climate change is damaging the forests where from $4.5 billion to $13 billion for water and from 25(2). they live, and the resulting documentary was used in $2.2 billion to $17 billion for sanitation (Fonesca 36 Bruch, Coker and VanArsdale 2007. advocacy work at the 2009 Global Indigenous Summit and Cardone 2005). 37 Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras do not recognize on Climate Change (UNDP 2010). 91 On innovative financing, see OECD (2010c). environmental rights for indigenous peoples, and the 68 Buckingham 2010. 92 See UN Water 2010a. constitutions of Guatemala, Panama, Paraguay and 69 Agarwal (2009, 2010b) found that the overall forest 93 ILO 2010. Peru refer to land but not natural resources (Aguilar condition was significantly higher where executive 94 Although worldwide nearly 40 percent of the working- and others 2010). committees had more than two women than where age population is legally covered by contributory 38 Political Constitution of 1992, Republic of Paraguay, they had two women or fewer and that the higher the old-age pension schemes, only 26 percent have Article 66. percentage of women on the executive committee, effective coverage. And while 75 percent of peo- 39 According to the Constitution of the Co-operative the lower the percentage of degraded forest area. ple over age 64 receive some kind of pension in Republic of Guyana Act 1980: “The state shall protect 70 Schreckenberg and Luttrell (2009). high-income countries, less than 20 percent do in the environment for the benefits of present and future 71 Buffum, Lawrence and Temphel 2010. low-income countries, with a median of just over generations” (Article 149J.2); “Everyone has a right 72 Glemarec 2011. 7 percent (see ILO 2010). to an environment that is not harmful to his or her 73 Bloomberg New Energy Finance and UNEP 2010. 95 OECD 2010b. health or well-being” (Aricle 149J.1); and “Indigenous 74 Kim and others 2009. 96 The ILO (2008) estimates the cost would not exceed Peoples shall have the right to the protection and 75 Glemarec 2011. 0.5 percent of GDP in Bangladesh, Cameroon, Guinea, promulgation of their languages, cultural heritage 76 The global estimated needs exclude payments for India, Pakistan, Senegal and Viet Nam, for example; and way of life” (Article 149G). ecosystem services. See Glemarec (2011). while for Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal and 40 Vidal 2011. 77 For the Global Environment Facility over 2007–2010 Tanzania the costs are 0.7–0.8 percent of GDP. 41 May 2006. Other countries whose national courts have China attracted 12 percent of funds approved, India 10 97 See Cichon and Hagemejer (2006). explicitly recognized the enforceability of such rights percent and the Russian Federation 6 percent. But China 98 “Adaptive social protection” is a term coined by include Argentina, Columbia, Costa Rica and Portugal. and India have a per capita allocation of only $0.10 and researchers at the Institute of Development Stud- 42 Jackson and Rosencranz 2003. $0.09, far below the median of $0.43, while the Russian ies, Sussex, to bring together thinking about social 43 UNDP Bhutan 2008. Federation receives $0.51. See www.gefonline.org. protection, disaster risk reduction and climate change 44 Sen 2006. 78 See CIF 2011. adaptation (Davies, Oswald and Mitchell 2009). 45 Shelton 2010. 79 GEF 2009. 99 Our calculations indicate that an additional 46 American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 10-174. 80 OECD 2011a; www.oecd.org/document/35/0, $15–$28 billion is needed to incorporate adaptation For discussion, see New York Times (2011). 3746,en_2649_34447_47515235_1_1_1_1,00.html. into the Millennium Development Goals. Calcula- 47 Biggar and Middleton 2010. Percentage calculated based on UN Millennium Pro- tions based on Frankhauser and Schmidt-Traub (2010) 48 Fifty percent or more of people in 61 of 137 countries ject (2005) table 7. and the UN Millennium Project: Estimated Costs of surveyed do not have confidence in the judicial system 81 There is not even a consensus on a working definition meeting the Millennium Development Goals in all and the courts (https://worldview.gallup.com). of new and additional finance. The European Com- countries (www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/ 49 See Constitutional Protections of the Right to Informa- mission has requested that all EU member states costs_benefits2.htm) (table 7). tion (http://right2info.org). declare their own working definitions, with the goal 100 Leading Group on Innovative Financing for Develop- 50 Puddephatt 2009. of having a common and unified definition by 2013. ment 2010. 51 Foulon, Lanoie and Laplante 2002. See Bird, Brown and Schalatek (2011). 101 Griffith-Jones, Ocampo and Stiglitz 2010. 52 Jin, Wang and Wheeler 2010. 82 Sanchez 2010. 102 This estimate is slightly higher than Schmidt’s (2008) 53 Wang and others 2002; Bennear and Olmstead 83 World Bank 2010b. estimate for a tax of 0.005 percent of $34 billion (2006) also confirmed this in the context of water 84 At the lower end is the United Nations Framework a year. utility suppliers in Massachusetts (United States) Convention on Climate Change estimate of about 103 Other areas included are the Extractive Industries over 1990–2003. $200 billion in additional financial flows by 2030. The Transparency Initiative, Consultative Group on Agri- 54 For example, the 1998 United Nations Economic Com- McKinsey & Company (2009) estimate of $800 billion culture, 3ie Evaluation Initiative, Global Environment mission for Europe Convention on Access to Informa- to stabilize carbon dioxide at 450 parts per million is Facility, UN Adaptation Fund, advanced market com- tion, Public Participation in Decision-Making and in the middle of the range. The numbers reported by mitments, Montreal Protocol, International Finance Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus the Stern Review ranged from $600 billion to $1,200 Facility for Immunisation, Climate Investment Funds Convention) and the Inter-American Strategy for the billion a year, depending on the emission targets and International Monetary Fund surveillance. See Promotion of Public Participation in Decision Making (see UNDESA 2009). A recent Intergovernmental Birdsall and Leo (2011). for Sustainable Development. Panel on Climate Change (2011) report estimated 104 IMF 2010. 55 UNEP 2007, chapter 8. the annual infrastructure and technology investment 105 European Parliament Committee on Economic and 56 See www.rema.gov.rw. costs of moving to a low greenhouse gas economy at Monetary Affairs 2011. 57 Newell and others 2011. $136–$510 billion a year for the next decade and at 106 Baker 2011. 58 Newell and others 2011. $149–$718 billion a year for 2021–2030. The higher 107 SDR surpluses occur when a country’s holdings exceed 59 Lloyd-Smith and Bell 2003. cost scenario would stabilize atmospheric carbon allocations. The largest SDR surplus countries include 60 Byrne and others 2007. dioxide concentration at 450 parts per million. the United States, China, Japan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, 61 Newell 2008. 85 This is an update of the $86 billion figure, equivalent to Kuwait and Botswana. 62 Crotty and Rodgers forthcoming. 0.2 percent of Organisation for Economic Co-operation 108 Birdsall and Leo (2011). Willing governments would 63 UNDP–UNEP Poverty-Environment Initiative 2008. and Development (OECD) GDP, in UNDP–HDRO use a small portion of their SDR allocation to capitalize 64 Transparency International calculations based on 2007/08, using the latest information available. a third-party financing entity that would offer bonds on the Conference of Parties documentation, pollution 86 Parry, Lowe and Hanson 2009. international capital markets backed by SDR reserves. data from 2006 (UN Stats Division 2010) and Climate 87 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2010. 109 Climate Funds Update 2011 (www.climatefundsupdate Risk Index 2010 by Germanwatch (Transparency 88 See IEA (2010); calculations based on UNESCO .org/graphs-statistics/pledged-deposited-disbursed). International 2011). Institute for Statistics (www.uis.unesco.org) and 110 Newell and others 2011. 65 Ballesteros and others 2009. World Bank 2011b. 111 UNDP, and others, have developed a series of meth- 66 www.un-redd.org/Home/tabid/565/Default.aspx. 89 Climate Funds Update 2011 (www.climatefundsupdate odologies to assist such efforts: see www.undp.org/ 67 In Eastern Cameroon, for example, a United Nations .org/graphs-statistics/pledged-deposited-disbursed). climatestrategies. Development Programme (UNDP) initiative gave the 90 Not all these estimates can be broken out separately 112 Glemarec 2011. Baka people access to video cameras to document into water and sanitation, but those that can range104 Human Development RepoRt 2011
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