Cia culture-intelligence-berrett-cultural topography


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Cia culture-intelligence-berrett-cultural topography

  1. 1. Improving AnalysisCultural Topography: A New Research Toolfor Intelligence AnalysisJeannie L. Johnson and Matthew T. Berrett In the third edition of his “History of the World,” J.M. Roberts “ notes that “Historical inertia is easily underrated…the historical forces molding the outlook of Americans, Russians, and Chinese for centuries before the words capitalism and communism were American invented are easy still to overlook.” 1 In this article, Jeannie Johnson decisionmakers have and I offer a variation on Roberts’s view: Cultural inertia is easilyshown a need for help in underrated, and American decisionmakers have shown a need for isolating and help in isolating and understanding the complexity, weight, and rel- understanding the evance of culture as they consider foreign policy initiatives.complexity, weight, and relevance of culture as The view I bring to this discussion is not one of an anthropologist but rather one of a former economic analyst in US intelligence who they consider foreign has been a senior manager of analysts in various disciplines for a policy initiatives. decade. My analytic and management positions have repeatedly brought me into indirect and sometimes direct interaction with top- ” level US decisionmakers including several US presidents. As I wit- nessed these decisionmakers in action and tried to help deliver insights they needed, I came to conclude that the "inertia of culture" was often underrated in their assessments of opportunities and obstacles, in part because few if any of their information sources offered a systematic and persuasive methodology for addressing this inertia and its implications for their policy options. I also came to conclude from direct observation and some readings out of the aca- demic field of strategic culture that Americas cultural view fea- tures the notion that Americans can achieve anything anywhere including going to the moon—if they just invest enough resources. This notion is understandable but perhaps hazardous. America’s remarkable history of achievement includes being the first nation actually to go to the moon, but the we-can-do-anything part of Amer- ican self-identity also leads some to argue still that US failures in The endnotes and an appendix are available in the digital version of the article in All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US govern- ment endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 1
  2. 2. Mapping CultureVietnam were not the consequence of a poorly managed investment; they were the consequences of invest-ing too little. 2 How many resources and over what period would have been sufficient to strike “suc-cess”—particularly if success would have required changes in Vietnam at the cultural level? I have rarelyseen American policymakers ask “Will our desired foreign policy outcome require change over there at thecultural level? Over what period and with what resources is such cultural change achievable?” The more I observed the policy-intelligence dynamic, the more I perceived a need for an analytic con-struct designed exclusively to illustrate clearly and persuasively the inertia of culture. Cultural influ-ences are typically touched on within US Intelligence Community (IC) analyses as peripheral factors,described with passing references, and often in general and superficial terms. Although the IC is full ofworld-class expertise on foreign peoples, places, and organizations, this industry rarely isolates and illus-trates culture as a factor deserving its own sophisticated and thorough treatment. To remedy this perceived deficiency, I teamed with Jeannie Johnson—formerly an intelligence analystat CIA and now with Utah State University—who had brought her academic training in strategic cul-ture to a pursuit similar to mine. For some time she had been amassing training ideas in the area of cul-tural analysis for IC experts, and our combined efforts, along with significant input from other membersof my former office, 3 trial runs of intelligence products, research, and continued refinements over the pastfour years have resulted in a process we call “Cultural Mapping.” This process, or methodology, isdesigned to isolate and assess cultural factors at play on issues of intelligence interest and to distin-guish the degree to which those factors influence decisionmaking and outcomes. Mapping exercises doneacross time, spanning multiple issues, and on diverse groups within a society may aid in understandingthat society’s “Cultural Topography.” We describe the process below.-mtbTarget Audience: norms onto others.” Intuition, a requires a significant number ofIntelligence Analysts compass regularly employed by years viewing the world career analysts, is culturally through the lens of one specific Understanding this methodol- encoded and, by nature, ethno- domain. This concentrationogy and its specific structure centric. Johnston warns of its gives the expert the power torequires a grasp of the users for use as a barometer for analyz- recognize patterns, performwhom it was designed: intelli- ing or predicting the behavior of tasks, and solve problems, butgence analysts. Anthropologist foreign agents. 5 According to it also focuses the expert’sRob Johnston was hired in the Edward Stewart and Milton attention on one domain to thewake of 9/11 to complete an eth- Bennett, American cultural ten- exclusion of others.” 7nographic analysis of the IC’s dencies are particularly unhelp-analytic cadre and to offer sug- Johnston’s cautionary counsel ful in this regard. Despite vastgestions for improving its per- regarding the habits of experts information resources and expo-formance. He observed biases echoes that penned by Rich- sure to exotic cultures, Ameri-produced by both ethnocen- ards Heuer two decades earlier: cans continue to overemphasizetrism and expertise, which similarity and assume thatresulted in rather serious cogni- Once people have started other social groups have valuestive gaps, and he noted a lack of thinking about a problem and aspirations in line withsystematic tools for going after one way, the same mental their own. 6cultural data. 4 circuits or pathways get It may seem counterintuitive activated and strength- Johnston defines ethnocen- ened each time they think to see expertise as a source oftrism as the tendency to proj- about it. This facilitates bias but Johnston points outect “one’s own cognition and the retrieval of informa- that “becoming an expert2 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
  3. 3. Mapping Culture Despite vast information resources and exposure to exotic cul- tures, Americans continue to overemphasize similarity and as- tion. These same sume that other social groups have values and aspirations in pathways, however, also become the mental ruts line with their own. that make it difficult to reorganize the informa- leaders and the elite cadres Specific cultural knowl- tion mentally so as to see that surround them. We have, edge is a skill and the it from a different institutionally, very few tools foundation for forecast- perspective. 8 aimed at understanding ing the behavior and national populations or specific decisionmaking of foreign A third form of observed bias subcultures, a point General actors. Acquiring culturalamong analysts, which might Michael Flynn made in his pub- knowledge should bebe added to Johnston’s list, has lic rebuke of intelligence prac- taken as seriously asroots in academic training and tices in Afghanistan in January learning any other facet ofis an institutional legacy that 2010. 9 The emphasis on elites one’s analytic capabili-tends to leave culture out in the has produced cognitive gaps in ties. Moreover, it is“all-source” approach to analy- our analysis—perhaps illus- incumbent on analysts tosis. The academic backgrounds trated anew by the surprise educate their own leader-of most intelligence analysts over the political tumult that ship and policymakersstem from disciplines that erupted across North Africa about the value and util-emphasize power and wealth as and the Middle East in early ity of cultural knowledgethe primary human motiva- 2011. Johnston observes: for intelligence analysis. 11tors, leaving underexploredother motivators such as iden- [An] analyst, while Johnston’s advice may soundtity, preservation of social insti- accounting successfully rather obvious, but given thetutions, alternative value for an adversary’s capa- scope and complexity of thestructures, powerful narra- bility, may misjudge that phenomenon we call “culture,”tives, or perceptions of the secu- adversary’s intention, not attempting its research andrity environment distinctive to because of what is cogni- determining—with no priora person’s or group’s region and tively available, but training in this field—whichhistory. Due to institutional because of what is cogni- aspects have policy relevancehabits, the educational para- tively absent. The failure can be an intimidating taskdigms of many of our experts, to determine an adver- even for the most talented polit-and the reticence of members of sary’s intention may ical, economic, or military ana-the anthropological community simply be the result of lyst. Interviews with analyststo accept positions within US missing information or, have often revealed a sense ofsecurity institutions, culture just as likely, it may be being overwhelmed by the scopehas received limited attention the result of missing of cultural data that are rele-as a variable. Most analysts hypotheses or mental vant to their accounts—and ofhave simply not been intro- models about an adver- dismay at the length and depthduced to the training or the sary’s potential behavior. 10 of the historical knowledge nec-research tools for going after essary to capture a grand stra-cultural data effectively. Noting that the lack of cul- tegic profile of any region or tural data in mental models is a group. One reaction is to sub- This bias also affects intelli- problem not only for analysts consciously search for reasonsgence collection, which aims but also for the policymakers why cultural data are not nec-disproportionately at foreign they support, Johnston exhorts: essary—a position that ana-Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 3
  4. 4. Mapping CultureInterviews with analysts have often revealed a sense of beingoverwhelmed by the scope of cultural data that are relevant totheir accounts, and of dismay at the length and depth of the his- amorphous and often inter- nally contradictory substancetorical knowledge necessary to capture a grand strategic pro- we call “national culture” oftenfile of any region or group. suffer follies of overgeneraliza- tion and static analysis, andlysts schooled in the research and analysis forward they reach, as a consequence,international relations para- within the community. Our questionable conclusions aboutdigms of realism and neoreal- research tool is designed to the sources of security policy. 12ism are already trained to take. broaden the IC’s grasp of the Patrick Porter heaps heavy crit- factors that drive outcomes, spe- icism on many of the West’s Analysts also face institu- cifically cultural factors, and to nascent efforts at cultural anal-tional obstacles to in-depth cul- help IC analysts be creative in ysis for making this mistake.tural study. The organizations their collection of cultural data. He accuses military and intelli-they work for are required to We make no attempt to deliver gence analysts of drawing staticproduce large volumes of often the end point or last word in cul- portraits of Eastern culturestactical pieces on a daily basis. tural research. What we offer is rather than recognizing themFor some analytic assignments, an accessible research tool that as moving, flexing, human cre-this pace can be relentless. IC can produce systematic, sophis- ations—and, in so doing, intro-institutions simply do not have ticated surveys of cultural vari- ducing dangerous sources ofthe manpower to pursue the ables, a grasp of which can error. a 13type of cultural research greatly help US policymakersemployed by professional achieve desired outcomes and To reference “culture” in theanthropologists: living in the avoid surprises. singular for any particular pol-region for extended periods in ity is typically an error; there isorder to conduct ethnography rarely just one internal variety.(participant observation) and to Research Philosophy Walter Russell Mead identifiesrefine fluency in the local lan- Our experience in marrying four distinct narratives withinguage. Many analysts move cultural data and analysis to US strategic culture and positsfrom one account to another the daily demands of defense that our various foreign poli-during their careers and must and intelligence analysis has cies are formed from the “colli-conduct cultural research via led to a few conclusions about sions and debates” thoseshort-term stays in theater, best practice. The most overrid- narratives inspire. 14 The idea ofbrief stints of language train- ing of these is that sweeping composite cultures is noting, and information that can cultural profiles of a region or a restricted to analysis of the US,be accessed from their desk or national group are of limited of course. Authors writing onin library holdings. value in the intelligence indus- Germany, China, India, and try for a number of reasons. As Iran, to name a few, all note the Given this particular organiza- internal conflict of competing has been effectively argued bytional backdrop, our aims have cultural narratives about Christopher Twomey, securitybeen modest but effective, we national security within these studies that attempt to drawhope, in moving cultural countries. 15 The existence of predictive power from thea Porter’s warnings are valid but may be a bit overstated. Today’s Department of Defense is not entirely uninitiated in doctrines of cul-tural change. Leading-edge training methods emphasize “practice theory”—an approach to culture which treats the change dynamic ascentral. Practice theory explains culture as a product of interaction between agent and structure and trains analysts to expect changerather than stasis.4 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
  5. 5. Mapping Culture Most academic work examining the impact of culture on securi- ty policy mirrors the biases of the IC by privileging elite-levelmultiple cultures is present notonly at the national level; it is culture (usually at the organizational level) over other types.true right down to the ordinaryindividual. As Kevin Avruch institutional and academic according to logical,quips, “for any individual, cul- work already done on their understandable princi-ture always comes in the topic and assess afresh which ples that every personplural.” 16 The cultural influ- actors and cultural influences living in the culture mustences at play on a single actor are most relevant for the policy understand, at least intui-could derive from a background issue they are researching. In tively, in order to getthat features Northern Euro- some cases this may be a vastly along with each other.pean, Catholic, engineering understudied section of the pop- With some basic study,school, and family-specific ulation, one which has received [others] can also recog-influences. little attention within official nize and understand these channels, and one whose principles and apply that Most academic work examin- research will require unortho- understanding to theiring the impact of culture on dox (for the institution) survey operations. 18security policy mirrors the and collection methods.biases of the IC by privileging It is with our specific audi-elite-level culture (usually at Culture at any level—organi- ence and these basic assump-the organizational level) over zational, tribal, ethnic, tions about culture in mind thatother types. The typical justifi- regional, or national—is a we constructed the Culturalcation of this approach is that dynamic human creation and Mapping method. It is pre-while public opinion may play a subject to change, but this sented here in the step-by-stepperipheral role, “it is arguably should not discourage analysts process we have providedthe elite—owing to its role as from its study. Any tool devised recently to groups of analysts.gatekeeper, its expert knowl- to track cultural influencesedge and its privileged access to must employ questions thatmeans of communication—that challenge previous assump- Cultural Mapping Exerciseultimately decides which way tions, unearth fresh data, and Step 1: Identify an Issue ofsecurity policy goes.” 17 But this highlight possible areas of Intelligence Interestlogic breaks down when one is change, but as Barak A. Sal- The first injunction to ana-assessing the impact of culture moni and Paula Holmes-Eber lysts is to narrow the scope ofwithin the context of counterin- remind Marines who may be cultural inquiry by isolating asurgency and stability opera- intimidated by the complexity particular policy question oftions, for instance. Given the and movement of the cultures interest. The narrower thepivotal role of local popular they are studying: issue, the more targeted theopinion in this type of military Although people are, by cultural research, and the moreengagement, understanding nature, variable and likely it will yield actionablepublic culture, the cultures of unpredictable, they still data. The issue selected maysignificant substate groups, and need to work with others reflect a frequently asked ques-how these affect security policy in social and cultural tion that needs examining frombecomes paramount. groups. These groups a new angle, or a question that The research method pre- —and their associated policymakers are not ask-sented here asks analysts to beliefs and struc- ing—perhaps due to ethnocen-step outside the biases of the tures—are organized tric blinders, habit, or limitedStudies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 5
  6. 6. Mapping Cultureknowledge of the region—but group properties. Analysts are the world works; and foreignshould be. invited to loop back to this youth who work part time at stage after an initial round of America’s franchises may beStep 2: Select an Actor research in order to disaggre- internalizing a strong dose of Analysts are urged in the this gate, refine, or switch actor sets capitalist work ethic. Westep to isolate a particular pop- in a way most profitable for encourage analysts to considerulation for study. All “players” intelligence analysis. all plausible influences ini-within this issue arena are tially, pursuing this as anidentified for consideration, Continued refinement occurs exploratory stage. Decisionsstretching to include some not to the central policy question as about which influences aretypically examined. A sampling well. Analysts may find that most relevant will come later.of possible actors might include they were as captive to ethno-prosperous urban elites, an eth- centric blinders as the clients Step 4: Explore the Culturalnic subgroup, a particular gov- they serve when crafting the Data from Four Perspectivesernment institution, a dissident initial intelligence question. In order to supply structure togroup, a village council, house- Looped-back refinements on the cultural exploration encour-wives across a region, a youth this front are to be expected. aged in Step 3, we suggest thebulge, or the cadre around a following four categories forleadership figure. From among Step 3: Amass a Range of assessing cultural data: Iden-these subgroups, or actors, one Cultural Influences tity, Norms, Values, and Percep-is selected for focused study. Assuming Avruch’s logic that tual Lens. This is not anThis actor may be the one all individuals and groups pos- exhaustive list of important cul-expected to play the most piv- sess culture in the plural, ana- tural factors but is a usefulotal role in a particular out- lysts are asked to map out the starting point in examining cul-come on the issue selected or various cultural influences ture from four policy relevantone that is dangerously under- which may guide the behavior perspectives. The categories arestudied and may present a wild of members of this distinctive enough from onecard for the future. group—again, within the con- another to inspire different sets text of the issue they are assess- of questions and elastic enough The actor in question need not ing. These influences range to capture a wide range of data:have a discernible “group cul- from the local, such as clan,ture.” The important question tribal, or organizational cul- Identity: The character traitshere is not “what is this actor’s tures, to wider cultural influ- the group assigns to itself, theculture?” but rather “what cul- ences, such as regional, ethnic, reputation it pursues, and indi-tural influences will weigh in religious, national, gendered, vidual roles and statuses it des-on decisionmaking on this issue socioeconomic, or generational. ignates to members.for members of this group?” Analysts need not confine themselves to fleshing out “typ- Norms: Accepted and The mapping exercise is ical” cultural influence sets but expected modes of behavior.designed as a looping process. rather think expansively andThe actor who seems most rele- creatively about the specific Values: Material or ide-vant initially may fade into the group they are studying. ational goods that are honoredbackground as research pro- or that confer increased statusgresses and the salience of New forms of social media to members.other actors becomes apparent. have norms embedded andConversely, the initial actor learned by new users; a leader- Perceptual Lens: The filtermay remain of interest but ship cadre hailing from a simi- through which this group deter-emerge as a far more complex lar educational institution may mines “facts” about others.entity once research magnifies espouse a common view of how6 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
  7. 7. Mapping Culture Unearthing and isolating factors that might be captured as identity, norms, values, and perceptual lens is a messy busi- Analysts receive an in-depth ness.list of questions for each cate-gory. a The magnitude of cul-tural data unearthed in • Would our proposed changes answers are readily apparentanswering the questions in in this policy area offer group and attainable. The reality isthese four categories may be members a way out of increas- that unearthing and isolatingmanaged by keeping a litmus ingly unpopular normative factors that might be capturedtest for policy relevance in practices? Which members? as identity, norms, values, andmind. An initial short list of perceptual lens is a messy busi-questions might examine the Values. ness. It involves doing heavyissue selected in Step 1 in the amounts of open-source read-ways below. • What is considered “honor- ing, using the research skills able” behavior in this issue honed in graduate school Identity. area? (rather than the typical day-to- • Which local values may be in day practices of the intelli-• Which factors surrounding gence business), and wading this issue would cause this conflict with our approach to this issue? through a lot of data of ques- actor’s identity to be threat- tionable relevance. ened? Alternatively, which might provide the US com- • Which values might be co- opted in moving US interests Most analysts need to take mon ground for co-option? themselves off-line for a period forward? in order to accomplish this task• Is group cohesion strong along with any effectiveness. This identity lines in response to • Where might value differ- ences between target groups sort of research does not mix this issue? What would cause well with the often frenetic pace the group to fracture or to present an opportunity to exploit cleavages? of producing current intelli- unite behind a common front? gence. Some offices have been• What individual roles and sta- Perceptual Lens: particularly proactive in this tuses might group members regard and have offered their • What are the preconceived analysts short sabbaticals in seek to protect? notions of this group concern- order to get them away from Norms. ing the behavior and charac- their desks. These intelligence ter of the United States? officers remove themselves to a• Does this issue place social separate location—in most institutions or common prac- • What are group’s beliefs about instances to an institution with tices under threat? the future? significant holdings on their • What hurdles must we over- area of interest—to conduct• Which practices are deeply research. Other offices have internalized and likely to come in messaging to this group on this issue? assigned analysts into research inspire resistance? or methodology teams where This tidy and rather simple they can focus on a long-term• Which practices are compati- research endeavor with the nec- ble with US interests on this list of questions may provide the false impression that the essary consistency. issue?a The questions are contained in an appendix available in digital versions of this article.Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 7
  8. 8. Mapping CultureMost analysts need to take themselves off-line for a period inorder to accomplish this task with any effectiveness. tory but of a glorious defeat in 1389 at the hands of the Otto- After immersing themselves One way to gauge those aspects man Turks. Serbs celebrate thein what cultural data is avail- of history relevant to the issue valor of the war’s hero, Princeable through official channels, being tracked is to pay atten- Lazar, who received a heavenlyopen-source searches, and (ide- tion to historic references made visitation on the eve of battleally) visits to the region, ana- when the policy issue is and was told that unless he sur-lysts begin to identify cognitive addressed, whether in political rendered he faced certaingaps in previous modes of anal- rhetoric, private conversation, defeat the next day. Given theysis. In addition to benefitting lessons in school, or expres- choice, Lazar declared that itfrom new data accumulated on sions from the artistic commu- was better to die in battle thantheir account, they become far nity. Which narratives do to live in shame. 21 He did pre-more attuned to what they politicians draw on to legiti- cisely that—and becamedon’t know—what information mize their behavior on this cemented in Serbian legend.the institution is not collecting. issue and to pacify the public?Identifying key knowledge gaps Which narratives work? Which This tale permeates Serbianmeans coming up with creative do not? society. It is taught to young-solutions for going after the tar- sters in school and is repre-get data. Time constraints limit Physical manifestations such sented in homes and offices inthe ability of intelligence ana- as architecture, street names, the renowned painting “Kosovolysts to employ extended eth- statues, and memorials demon- Girl.” Most analysts workingnography as a tool, and strate which aspects of a this issue were familiar withinstitutional restraints can nation’s history it chooses to these aspects of Serbian cul-limit the ability to employ preserve and celebrate. Find- ture but lacked a method formethods pursued by academic ing and understanding the tracking and weighing themor other institutions. The fol- selection of heroes, for exam- systematically and thus acquir-lowing is a collection of cul- ple, lends itself to understand- ing the footing necessary totural research strategies ing national values. 19 Of articulate persuasively to poli-proffered by a variety of ana- particular interest are those cymakers the potential impactlysts representing the full symbols that people volun- on Serbian behavior: that is,range of experience, with some tarily display in their homes. 20 that Serbia would find victoryresiding in academic venues by standing up to an overpow-and others in policymaking Understanding historic narra- ering military force when theforums. tives can be critical to making world expected it to fold. sense of the strategic choices ofHistorical Narratives foreign populations. The 1999 Understanding the weight of Nearly all analysts begin with bombing campaign against Ser- this narrative for Serbs inthe assumption that one must bia supplies an example. US defining honorable conduct dur-conduct a thorough back- analysts vastly underestimated ing war would probably haveground investigation to become the duration and expense of the disabused planners of the ideafamiliar with a regime’s his- 1999 engagement, in part that the bombing campaigntory, geography, internal social because they undervalued the would be over quickly. Insteadcodes, and general interactions role of historic narratives of vic- of projecting a three-day cam-with other states. If not con- tory and defeat. Serbia’s paign, we might have helpedducted with strategic efficiency, national holiday is not a cele- policymakers plan for a cam-this task can be overwhelming. bration of a past battlefield vic-8 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
  9. 9. Mapping Culture Useful interaction with the population under survey can range from rudimentary (daily records of anecdotal interaction) topaign closer to the almost 80 highly institutionalized methods (sophisticated polling conduct-days it eventually took. 22 ed nationwide).Tapping into the Population Useful interaction with the language modes, and percep- story.” 30 The patterns andpopulation under survey can tual lens of the local themes developed across con-range from rudimentary (daily community. 27 A key keeper may versations helped uncover gen-records of anecdotal interac- be institutional. In determin- erally accepted notions abouttion) to highly institutionalized ing core values within Israeli self and others. Additionalmethods (sophisticated polling society, Greg Giles looked first probing may reveal notions ofconducted nationwide). 23 One to shared, institutionalized identity—what is taken forpopular method for both insti- socialization processes. He pin- granted as a natural role fortutions and individual pointed the Israeli Defense the nation, what is expected,researchers is targeted focus Force (IDF) since universal con- and what is controversial. 31groups. Much has been written scription requires that allon this particular survey tech- Israeli citizens experience One inventive young scholarnique, but the advice of ana- socialization and training from Monterey’s Naval Post-lysts in the field is that through this institution. Giles graduate School proposed aneffective focus groups must be points out that it is not just alternative to official poll-preceded by an in-depth study contact with the institution ing—the systematic study ofof the issue at hand so that the that matters, but institutional “RUMINT” (rumorinterviewer can select a sam- legitimacy. The IDF meets intelligence). 32 She surveyedpling of relevant focus group these criteria based on the high and prioritized the issues onparticipants and frame ques- number of young people polled the minds of Iraqis by trackingtions appropriately. 24 who said they would be willing the frequency of rumors that to serve in the IDF even if it appeared in local print. One of One selection device employed were an all-volunteer force. 28 her findings, a surprise for USby ethnographers is to narrow forces at the time, was that ainterviews to “key informants” An important window into large swath of Iraqis believedof local culture. 25 Key infor- norms and the color of a group’s the United States was behindmants can range from subject perceptive lens is the “conven- the insurgency. Their beliefmatter experts to those who are tional wisdom”—the things stemmed not so much from ancynical about their own culture “everybody knows.” 29 Compil- assumption that the Unitedand are therefore observant, ing and analyzing oral tradi- States was malicious but fromreflective, and articulate. a 26 tions may take a number of the perception that it was different forms. The author of a impossible that a superpower A variation on key infor- recent popular survey of Iran with the might of Americamants is “key keepers” of cul- attempted to do this by engag- could not stop the insurgency ifture. These people are defined ing in dialogue with persons it wanted to. Therefore, theby frequent contact and from a sampling of all of the United States must be behindextended conversation with society’s castes and factions and it. Her work produced a num-other members of the commu- starting each conversation with ber of timely insights for USnity. As a result, the key keep- the same request: “Tell me yourers tend to harbor the notions,a Bernard claims that cynical informants have consistently been his best sources over the years.Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 9
  10. 10. Mapping CultureThose not in-theater could use alternative approaches to track-ing gossip networks. vice, and health conditions) in contrast to state claims aboutofficials concerning Iraqi atti- est living abroad are often its situation. 38tudes and priorities. better at identifying beliefs and norms in their home lands than Content Analysis of Texts Those not in-theater could use fellow citizens left behind When evaluating national-alternative approaches to track- because the students have level cultural threads, textsing gossip networks. Dr. Debo- experienced the contrast taught in school deserve spe-rah Wheeler, a specialist in between their national beliefs cial attention. Classroom text-Middle East studies, has and those of people in their host books explain perceptions of afocused her research on online countries. 35 nation’s own history, its view ofdiscussions across her region others, acceptable methods of—particularly among women Secondhand inter- warfare, and common justifica-who otherwise do not speak out. views—interviewing those who tions for past behavior (norms).Chat rooms and editorials frequently interact with mem- Societal values are taught toposted in pseudonymous blogs bers of the culture—are also children explicitly, particularlymay be one way to evaluate the very useful, especially in cases in the early stages of educa-thinking of otherwise reticent where the populace does not tion. Their texts may includepopulations. 33 Christine Fair, feel comfortable speaking hero legends, songs, rhymes,an analyst writing on Iran, sug- openly about its thoughts and fables and oversimplified anec-gests another alternative to opinions. 36 In some cases it is dotes from the nation’sfirsthand interviews with citi- politically incorrect to speak of history. 39 Valuable cultural orzens of a repressive regime: one’s historic culture, espe- political insights can be drawn cially where security policy is from noting which figures are Utiliz[e] consulates of concerned, so there is an celebrated, which are despised, countries where Iranians absence of civil or political rhet- and why. 40 Education and other seek US visas (India and oric on the topic. Rodney Jones socialization processes also Turkey) to collect and notes the case of Japan, where result in a body of shared liter- develop information dur- Jesuit priests who lived there ature considered “classic.” What ing the visa interview for extended periods were more are the messages in this body of process. Defense attachés likely than Japanese states- work? How widely are the clas- may also engage their in- men to speak freely of Japan’s sics read? How often are they country counterparts in history and predilections. 37 referenced? 41 countries where military cooperation with Iran are Joe Bermudez, a longtime Military texts are essential ongoing to gain insights Korea analyst, notes that when sources of information on the into Iran. 34 information is hard to come by, values, identity, and acceptable as it is with North Korea, even methods of achieving security Expatriates are a self-selected interviews with travelers and a within a regime. Twomey rec-group, often coming from within careful look at their photo- ommends a deep survey of alla limited segment of society not graphs can prove beneficial. In sorts of doctrinal texts—tele-representative of the broader North Korea’s case, it helps grams, military orders, descrip-base. Despite this sampling unveil the genuine state of tions of training regimens,drawback, interviews with this affairs for the state’s popula- diaries, memoirs, and communi-group offer some value. Stu- tion (regarding, for example, cations between militarydents from the region of inter- roads, electricity, phone ser- leaders. 42 This study would10 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
  11. 11. Mapping Culture Military texts are essential sources of information on the val- ues, identity, and acceptable methods of achieving securityreveal national aspirations over within a regime.time (identity), accepted normsfor achieving them, and per-haps more particular values tity front, Glenn Chafetz, Hillel and entertainments originat-such as views on the use of Abramson, and Suzette Grillot ing elsewhere. 49manpower and loss of life. 43 employ content analysis of lead- ers’ speeches in order to explain In order to understand iden-Tracking Political Rhetoric the weapons acquisitions pat- tity distinctions within large The key to analyzing political terns of diverse states. Their regions, one might systemati-rhetoric effectively is under- research presents a strong cor- cally observe social ceremoniesstanding, in local context, the relation between four identity and rituals. What is the pur-role it plays in communicating typologies and a “marked ten- pose of the ceremony? Whowith the population of interest. dency toward nuclear attends? 50 Which norms viola-Russia analyst Fritz Ermarth acquisition.” 47 The method tions are publicly punished?notes that a first step in weigh- Chafetz et al. suggest for cod- Which achievements publiclying the value of political rheto- ing role conception can easily be celebrated? One daily ritualric within a nation is to track duplicated for other issues. that often sheds light on iden-its correlation with actual tity and value structure is thebehavior in the past. Tracking Extended Observation of protocol of salutations, espe-over time and across politi- Public Behavior cially in conversations betweencians may yield useful general- Public reactions to the moves members of the populationizations about government made by state leadership may meeting for the first time. Howspeeches as indicators of sin- highlight areas of congruence or does one introduce oneself? Is itcere goals and security cleavage between the under- by way of profession, clan ties,objectives. 44 On China, Twomey standing of values and norms or religious affiliation? 51 Whichpoints out that the culture fostered by the populace and aspects of personal identity aretends to weigh private com- the behavior of state officers. most valued?ments more heavily than pub- Disaffection may come in thelic statements and that form of protest, local grum- Humor can serve as a usefulinflammatory public state- bling, or biting humor pointed test for one’s grasp of the cul-ments need to be qualified at political officials, while con- ture under study. What doesaccordingly. 45 gruence might manifest itself this group find funny? Why? through strong turnout for Which alternative group is con- Once understood, public rhet- state events and parades, vol- sistently used as the object oforic may represent a rich data untary displays of state insig- ridicule? Which of the alterna-field for assessing norm nia, or healthy membership in tive group’s characteristics arestrength or identity trends. The state-related organizations. 48 subjected to mockery? How doeswork of Andrew Cortell and Congruence or cleavage this illuminate the values of theJames Davis, as well as that of between separate identity group being tracked? What doesPaul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, groups may be manifest in part it say about their perception ofsuggests measuring a norm’s by the degree to which the tar- others?strength by the frequency with get group is willing to accumu-which it is referenced by states- Language is an indispensable late and incorporate traditionsmen proposing a course of source of cultural information. of food, dress, verbal expres-action or legitimizing one Not every analyst is going to sion, names given to children,already taken. 46 On the iden- have the opportunity to becomeStudies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 11
  12. 12. Mapping CultureEntertainment media provides valuable insights for those seek-ing to understand the current state of a particular set of norms nizations, media outlets mustwithin a society. present a worldview comfort- able to their audience. Thefluent in the local tongue but In a free society, the bounds worldview captured in news-will find that pursuing even and content of political debates casts validating (especially con-novice-level language compe- channeled through the press troversial) state actions maytence may yield cultural can identify not only cleavages illuminate popular perspec-insights. Concepts that a popu- in the strategic and political tives and narratives that morelation values are often assigned culture but also points of popu- formal instruments for measur-more words than those that are lar congruence. 54 Sometimes ing opinion would miss. 56not. Recent research suggests what is not addressed is asthat language has a profound interesting as what is. Christo- Entertainment media pro-impact on our perceptual lens. pher Meyer and Adrian Zdrada vides valuable insights forIt registers the content of our isolated a pronounced identity those seeking to understand thememories—the aspects of real- aspect to Poland’s willingness current state of a particular setity that we record, and how we to ally with the United States of norms within a society. Therecord them. 52 in our runup to the invasion of fabric of television sitcoms is Iraq in 2003 through content the exaggerated presentation ofEvaluating the Output of the analysis of press debates on the social faux pas and situationalMedia and the Artistic issue. Their research revealed conundrums. 57 Sitcoms are alsoCommunity an absence of serious security a helpful reference for illustrat- Depending on the level of discussions relating to Iraq and ing a culture’s typical problem-independence enjoyed by news, strong emphasis on establish- solving devices and for illumi-entertainment, and artistic ing Polish identity as a reliable nating changes underway inproducers within a popula- US partner. The identity basis society by poking fun at normstion, these may yield signifi- of Poland’s participation helps that are in flux. TV dramascant insight into a group’s explain why the failure to serve a different purpose—theyidentity and its core norms unearth weapons of mass most often focus on norms vio-and values. Twomey notes the destruction in the Iraqi theater lations that are serious enoughonerous level of work involved did not diminish the enthusi- to be considered tragedy andin a comprehensive review of asm for the US alliance in represent a shared core of val-these sources and commends Poland as it did in Great ues across the society.two authors who have tackled Britain. 55it: Peter Hays Gries on China, Free media may also serve as Step 5: Assemble Criticaland Ted Hopf, on Russia. 53Even completely controlled a reliable watchdog for norms Cultural Factorsmedia may still offer material violations within the state. For After analysts have worked tofor cultural analysis. State example, the flurry of reporting fill cognitive gaps and amassedpropaganda illuminates the in the United States on a sizeable accumulation of cul-identity, norms, and values excesses in Guantanamo and at tural data, they are then pre-that the state hopes to Abu Ghraib manifest norms sented with the painful task ofachieve, as well as the narra- violations that are considered setting much of it aside—hon-tive it hopes will dominate serious and newsworthy in the ing their data down to thosepopular perception. United States but may not have cultural factors that are likely been treated that way in other to play a role in the decision- countries. As commercial orga- making of this group on this12 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
  13. 13. Mapping Culture The cultural factors that emerge from this rigorous culling pro- cess are the Critical Cultural Factors (CCFs).issue. The analyst’s instruc-tions are to evaluate each cul-tural factor according to: cymakers? To what degree are play on this issue (i.e., tribal, we confident that behavior will sectarian, professional/organi-• Relevance for the issue reflect this cultural influence? zational), or are cultural influ- selected. How many types of research ences widely dispersed and sources or methods validate unlikely to provide anything• Robustness of the factor. a 58 this finding? close to a clear script for action? •How well established is it? Step 6: Mapping Step 7: Writing the Paper •How widely shared is it among members of this After an analyst has isolated Based on the outcome of the group? the relevant set of CCFs, she is mapping exercise, a finished asked to map the primary Cultural Topography paper will •To what extent is opinion or source of each from among the define for the reader first, behavior that is inconsis- various cultural influences which aspects of identity, tent with this aspect of iden- identified in Step 3 (national, norms, values and perceptual tity, norms, values, or ethnic, tribal, professional, lens are most important to perceptual lens rewarded or etc.). Are the identity compo- understand when the United punished internally by other nents on the CCFs list confined States engages this actor on members of this group? primarily to one domain (i.e., this issue, and second, the prob- tribal), or shared across other able influence boundaries of the• Likelihood of this cultural fac- sources of cultural influence CCFs identified. These CCFs tor to provoke a Response (i.e., ethnic and religious)? provide the primary focus of the (cooperative or conflictual) What about critical norms and paper. The paper answers, in when external actors engage values? What about critical specific terms, the following this group on this issue. aspects of the group’s percep- questions: tual lens? The cultural factors that • Which CCFs represent pointsemerge from this rigorous cull- The purpose of this portion of of possible leverage and coop-ing process are the Critical Cul- the mapping exercise is to eration?tural Factors (CCFs) for this define—for the analyst as wellgroup on this issue and will be as the eventual audience of her • Which CCF red lines arethe concepts that are addressed intelligence product—the influ- likely to spark resistance orin the finished intelligence ence boundaries of the CCFs. even armed conflict betweenproduct. In intelligence terms, Are they spread across the cul- foreign elites and theireach factor must be solidly con- tural landscape or confined to broader populations ornected to a “so-what.” What one or two key cultural influ- between foreign populationsimpact is it likely to have on ences? Is there a clear, some- and US actors?outcomes of interest to US poli- what bounded, cultural force ata The work of Jeffrey Legro may serve as a useful reference point for this task. He has written extensively on measurement of normstrength and his work on norms probably has some transferability to identity, values and perceptual lens. He proposes that a norm beevaluated according to three criteria: how clearly it is recorded in the rules of society (specificity), how long it has existed within this soci-ety and its strength in standing up to normative competitors (durability), and how widely it is accepted and referenced in discourse (con-cordance).Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 13
  14. 14. Mapping CultureA handful of papers based on the Cultural Topography method-ology have been produced, but they have prompted reaction to one of only two items—from asuggest the method offers a way to add analytic value. large pile of intelligence mate- rials—he wanted sent back to• Do most of the CCFs stem Initial Impact of Cultural his office for further study. Sev- from one cultural tradition or Topography eral senior commanders also source of influence (i.e., eth- expressed significant interest nic, religious, tribal)? If so, Only a handful of papers based in this paper. what else do we need to know on the Cultural Topography about this cultural domain in methodology have been pro- Additional reactions have been order to acquire adequate con- duced, but they have prompted consistent with those noted text for understanding the sufficient reaction to indicate above, but only the continued CCFs in question? that the insights they offer get application and refinement of beyond the general body of infor- this tool will fully display• Are the members of the group mation already grasped by most whether its potential is great or under study drawing from analysts and policymakers, and limited. The methodology is multiple cultural tradi- early reactions to such insights being taught in at least one IC tions/influences when they suggest that the methodology institution, and several new Cul- respond to this issue? Will it offers a way to add analytic tural Topography papers are in cause them to fracture when value: motion now. The main challenge pressure is exerted on the to pursuing and exploiting this myriad aspects of this issue? • In a meeting that was part of a approach within the IC is the US policy review on a specific pressure of daily production• To what extent do adversarial country, an attendee not famil- driven mostly by conventional groups in the region share the iar with this methodology collection and analysis. Cultural same cultural mapping on reported that several analysts, Topography holds no promise of this issue as the group under authors of a Cultural Topogra- advancing the understanding of study, reflecting common phy paper on this country, cultural influences on foreign sources of cultural influence? “quickly proved themselves to perceptions and actions unless Where is this not the case? be as smart or smarter on researchers are given the time to How does that inform fore- [country of focus] than anyone find additional, often novel data casting on future cooperation else in the room…on history, and then to incorporate them or divergence between these ethnic topography.” It is worth into the tool. groups? adding that the room was filled with experts who had spent (The appendix and endnotes.• Within which tradition will significantly more years on the are available in the digital ver- our messages to this group on subject than had these ana- sion of this article.) this issue be most persuasive? lysts. ❖ ❖ ❖• How likely are other groups • While traveling abroad, a spe- across the region to respond cial envoy with significant in similar fashion when pre- expertise selected one of the sented with this issue? Cultural Topography papers as14 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
  15. 15. Mapping Culture Appendix A Cultural Analysis Concepts and Questions Identity •Is individual identity seen as comprising one’s distinct, unique self, or is it bound up in a larger group (family, clan, tribe)? 59 •Does this group see itself as responsible for and capable of solving social problems? Are prob- lems responded to with energy or left to fate? •Which myths and national narratives compose the stories everyone knows? How do these speak about group identity? •What is this group’s origin story? Does it inform group members of their destiny? •What would this group list as defining traits of its national, tribal, ethnic character? •Is one aspect of identity being overplayed, not because it is foundational for most decisions but because it is being threatened or diminished? Values •For the linguist, which concepts/things are described in nuanced ways (meaning that many words have been assigned to them)? Which concepts are missing from the language? (For example, the concept of “fair play” is hard to find outside of English.) •What generates hope in this population? •Which is viewed more highly as a communicative tool—emotion or logic? Are conversational styles which emphasize logic viewed as trustworthy? •Is conspicuous consumption valued as a status marker? If not, what incentives exist to work hard? •To what extent do security concerns trump liberty concerns in this society? Which parts of liberty are deemed attractive? •Is social mobility considered a good thing, or is it deemed disruptive to a highly organized sys- tem? Would this group fight to keep a hierarchical arrangement even if offered opportunities for egalitarianism? •To what extent does loyalty trump economic advantage? •Which is more value-laden for this group—“progress” or “tradition”? •Is optimism rewarded as a character trait or is it considered naive, juvenile, and possibly danger- ous? •Which character qualities are consistently praised? •What composes the “good life”? •What sorts of myths, hero figures, segments of history, or identity markers does the material cul- ture celebrate? What is revealed by the decorations in homes, modes of dress, food eaten (or not eaten), monuments respected (as opposed to those covered with graffiti), gifts given, etc.?Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 15
  16. 16. Mapping Culture •In describing a proposed project, what will “impress” this audience? The project’s size? Its histori- cal relevance? The technology used to produce it? How might new projects best be framed in order to win popular support? NORMS Political •What is considered a legitimate pathway to power? How do “heroes” in film and other popular media obtain their power? Do they act as isolated individualists or in concert with others? •“What gives a public the comfortable feeling that the way that decisions are reached and leaders are chosen is ‘right’?” 60 •How does the group view compromise? •Where does “genuine” law come from? (Nature? God? A constitution? Current political institu- tions? Imagined, future institutions? Moral conscience? A personality from the past?) •Is adherence to state-manufactured law admired or disdained? To what extent is state law equated with “right” and “wrong”? Social •Is social status in this society primarily ascribed (i.e., one is born into it) or achieved? If achieved, how so? 61 •What are the primary markers of a person of high rank in this society? How would you recognize him/her? Does political power or intellectual prestige rank higher than economic surplus? •What is the process for establishing trust? How does one know when it has been achieved? •Do people perceive their own place and the dominant hierarchy as natural? •To what extent are subordinates responsible for their own actions? 62 •What do proverbs say about social expectations and the perceived pathway to success? Economic •What are the group’s views on work? Which types are admired? Which are disdained? What are the economic implications? •Which economic activities are considered immoral? •Is it considered appropriate to “master” the natural environment and bend it to one’s will? •To what extent is the economy intertwined with kin obligations? •What are obstacles to private property ownership? •How does this culture group stack up when evaluated against the traits some claim are necessary for successful market economies? 63 These can include: •Is there trust in the individual? •Are wealth and resources perceived as finite or infinite? Is the focus on “what exists” or “what does not yet exist”? •Is competition seen as healthy or unacceptably aggressive? •Is this society comfortable with a questioning mind? •Does the education system encourage investigative learning?16 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
  17. 17. Mapping Culture •Are the “lesser virtues”—punctuality, job performance, tidiness, courtesy, efficiency – admired? •Which are emphasized—small achievements accomplished by the end of the day (prefera- ble for market economies) or grandiose projects (the unfinished megaworks of progress- resistant economies)? •What is the “radius of trust” in this community? Is trust extended to family only? How far does it extend to strangers? 64 •What are prestige commodities within this community? Why? Might these serve as stronger incen- tives for cooperation than direct funding? •Is risk taking admired or negatively sanctioned? How widely spread is the “harm” of individual fail- ure (damages family honor, potentially ignites retribution cycle, etc.)? Security •What defines “victory” for this group in a kinetic conflict? •What types of battlefield behavior would result in shame? •What level of internal destruction is acceptable? •How do accepted myths describe this group’s military history? What is its projected destiny? •Are allies viewed as reliable, or historically treacherous? What is the resultant ethic regarding alli- ance loyalties? Time/Change Orientation •Does this group behave according to linear time? Is there a marked contrast between rural and urban regions? Do deadlines matter? 65 •What is the future orientation of this group? Does it see itself as capable of changing the near future? Is it deemed appropriate or laudable to make aggressive efforts to do so? •Which time frames are referenced with strong positive emotion—past or future scenarios? •Is there a significant gap between socioeconomic expectations and reality? (This often is a precur- sor of social shifts.) 66 Problem-Solving Devices •What is the order of activities for solving a social problem (often called an action chain)? Does face-to-face confrontation happen first or last? Is violence used as a signal or is it an endgame? 67 •How do those outside of official channels of activity (i.e. women in seclusion, youth in elder-ori- ented cultures) play a part in problem-solving processes? •Which is preferred—action or deep deliberation? Is this group comfortable with trial and error as a discovery method? •Are individuals comfortable with making a wide range of personal choices? Are individual choice and accountability practiced social norms? Would the choices present in democratic and market systems be overwhelming? •To what extent must community consensus be reached in order for a decision to go forward? PERCEPTIVE LENS Cognitive processes •What sources of information yield ‘truth’? Scientific/factual processes? Dreams? 68 Inspired author- ity figures?Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 17
  18. 18. Mapping Culture •Are most situations set into dichotomous frames? Are they made to be black and white? How com- fortable are group members with situational complexity? How patient are they in working to understand it? Of Self •What are the basic expectations about the future? (“Poverty becomes a greater problem the moment wealth is perceived as a definite possibility.”) 69 How might typical aspirations within this society be charted? •How does this group characterize/perceive its own history? Which events are highlighted? Which are omitted? •What does this group’s history tell it about “dangerous” behaviors/circumstances for a society? (For example, Chinese—chaos, Americans—tyranny). Of Others Generally •How do members of this group assign intentions? What motives make the most sense to them? (If the best US intentions do not “make sense” to the host population, they will assign intentions that do. It is to our advantage to understand and then emphasize areas of cognitive congruence when embarking on joint ventures.) 70 •What is this group’s view on human nature? Are people generally trustworthy? Are they prone to excess and beset by vices, or are they able to regulate themselves? How are these views used for legitimating less or more government? •How does this group obtain its information about the outside world? Which sources are consid- ered most reliable? How are those sources biased or deficient? •Are outsiders perceived as fundamentally different or fairly similar to group members? Of the US Specifically •What are regarded by this group as US vulnerabilities? •What does this group believe drives Americans? 71 What do they value? •Does this group see common ground with its American counterparts? In which areas? •To what extent does this group believe American rhetoric matches intentions? Cosmology (The way the world works...origin and structure of the universe) •When explanations for events are not easily accessible, how does this group fill in the blanks? ❖ ❖ ❖18 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
  19. 19. Mapping Culture Endnotes 1. J.M. Roberts, The Penguin History of the World (London: Penguin Books, 1995), xi–xii. 2. See reviews in this issue of three works on Vietnam, two of which suggest this approach. 3. Special thanks go to David Newcomb. 4. Rob Johnston, Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Eth- nographic Study, (Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005). 5. Ibid., 75–76. 6. Edward Stewart and Milton Bennett, American Cultural Patterns: A Cross- Cultural Perspective (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1991), 11. 7. Johnston, Analytic Culture, 66. 8. Richards Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington DC: Cen- ter for the Study of Intelligence, 1999), 21. 9. MG Michael T. Flynn (USA) et al., Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant to Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010) 10. Johnston, Analytic Culture, 8. 11. Ibid., 84. 12. Christopher Twomey, “Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International Security,” Contemporary Security Policy 29 no. 2 (August 2008): 338–57. 13. Patrick Porter, Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes, (London: Hurst & Co, 2009) 14. Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001), xvii. 15. Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 3 (September 2005): 339–59; Huiyun Feng, “A Dragon on Defense: Explaining China’s Strategic Culture,” in Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking, eds. J. L. Johnson, K. M. Kartchner, and J. A. Larsen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 171–88; Rodney Jones, “India’s Strategic Culture and the Origins of Omniscient Paternalism,” ibid., 117–36; Afshin Molavi, The Soul of Iran: A Nation’s Journey to Freedom, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2002). 16. Kevin Avruch, Culture and Conflict Resolution, (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 15. 17. Dalgaard-Nielsen, “The Test of Strategic Culture,” 342. 18. Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber, Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Applications, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Univer- sity Press, 2008), 13. 19. J. Avalos, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 20. C. Boyd, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 19
  20. 20. Mapping Culture Endnotes (cont.) 21. Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 39–47. 22. Author Jeannie Johnson was part of the team conducting intelligence analysis of Serbia and surrounding countries. 23. K. Moss, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 24. W. Stanley, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 25. H. Russell Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press, 2002), 188–93. 26. Ibid., 190. 27. S. Kjar, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 28. Gregory Giles, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. See Gregory Giles, “Continuity and Change in Israel’s Strategic Culture,” in Johnson et al., Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 97–116. 29. W. Stanley, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 30. Molavi, The Soul of Iran. 31. C. Boyd, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 32. Stephanie Kelley, “Rumors in Iraq: A Guide to Winning Hearts and Minds,” Strategic Insights, 4 (2005). This journal, published by the Naval Post- graduate School’s Center on Contemporary Conflict, is available on that orga- nization’s website nal/2005/Feb/kelleyfeb05.html 33. Deborah Wheeler, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 34. Christine Fair, “Iran: What Future for the Islamic state?,” in Angel M. Rabasa et al., The Muslim World After 9 / 11 (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2004), 244. 35. V. Daniels, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 36. W. Stanley, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 37. Rodney Jones, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 38. Joe Bermudez, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 39. J. Moyes, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 40. S. Taylor, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 41. W. Stanley, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 42. Christopher Twomey, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 43. A. Haycock, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 44. Fritz Ermarth, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 45. Christopher Twomey, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 46. Andrew Cortell and James Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda,” International Studies Review 2, no. 1 (2000), 65–87; Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity, and their20 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011)
  21. 21. Mapping Culture Endnotes (cont.) Limits: A Theoretical Reprise”, in The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 451–97. 47. Glenn Chafetz, Hillel Abramson, and Suzette Grillot, “Culture and National Role Conceptions: Belarussian and Ukrainian Compliance with the Nuclear Proliferation Regime,” in Culture and Foreign Policy, ed. Valerie Hud- son (London: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 175. The authors also offer a list of seven typologies unlikely to engage in illegal proliferation. The National Role typolo- gies are slightly modified versions of those proposed by Kal Holsti. See Kal Holsti, “National Role Conception in the Study of Foreign Policy,” Interna- tional Studies Quarterly 14 (1970): 233–309. 48. G. Lawrence, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 49. D. Anderson, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 50. L. Wilde, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 51. A. Richey, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 52. Lera Boroditsky, “Lost in Translation,” Wall Street Journal, 24 July 2010. 53. Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplo- macy, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005); Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002). 54. G. Giles, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 55. Christopher Meyer and Adrian Zdrada, “Unpacking the ‘Coalition of the Willing’: A Comparative Analysis of Norms in British and Polish Press Debates on the Iraq Invasion,” European Security 15 (2006): 23–45 56. D. Anderson, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 57. C. Curtis, discussion with author Jeannie Johnson, 2006. 58. Jeffrey W. Legro, Cooperation Under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1995); Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” International Organiza- tion 51 (1997): 31–63. Kowert and Legro, “Norms, Identity, and their Limits,” 451–97. 59. Thomas Hylland Ericksen, Small Places, Large Issues: An Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology, 2nd ed. (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2001), 54–55; Stewart and Bennett, American Cultural Patterns, 129–38. 60. Glen Fisher, Mindset: The Role of Culture and Perception in International Relations, 2nd ed. (Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1997), 95. 61. For examples, see ibid., 52, 64. 62. For discussion, see Ericksen, Small Places, Large Issues, 155. 63. Mariano Grondona, “A Cultural Typology of Economic Development” in Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, eds. Lawrence E. Harri- son and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 64. The basic theory: the wider the radius of trust, the easier to engage in economies of scale market economics. See Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital” in Culture Matters.Studies in Intelligence Vol. 55, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2011) 21