The New Horizon of Microfinance
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  • LIP presents:

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  • 1. The New Horizon of Microfinance 27 th , May 2009 Taejun Shin (Representative of LIP, NGO)
  • 2. - Established on Oct 28 th , 2007 - Named from Japanese Constitution - Mission is to alleviate poverty by utilizing knowledge and social networks of members - Web site : http://www.living-in-peace.org/ About Living in Peace
  • 3. - The first private microfinance fund in Japan’s investment history - First target country : Cambodia - Collaboration with Music Securities - Collaboration with a major MFI - To be launched in June LIP Microfinance Fund for MDGs ×
  • 4. Congratulations on this wonderful initiative! I will be very honored to add my support to the website. It is heartening and inspiring to hear of your leadership. With warmest regards, Jeff Sachs http://www.living-in-peace.org/supportmessage/ Message from Jeffrey Sachs
  • 5. Slide Agenda I. Microfinance as an Investment Opportunity     Microfinance has high return by itself and low correlation with other traditional investments. II. Recent Microfinance Data     While the market is expanding by 45% annually since 2001, we find little microfinance investment from Japan. III. Economic Theory of Microfinance     Group Lending can alleviate information asymmetry to promote social capital and enhance efficiency.
  • 6. I. Microfinance as an investment opportunity
  • 7. Slide Agenda I. Microfinance as an Investment Opportunity     Microfinance has high return by itself and low correlation with other traditional investments. II. Recent Microfinance Data     While the market is expanding by 45% annually since 2001, we find little microfinance investment from Japan. III. Economic Theory of Microfinance     Group Lending can alleviate information asymmetry to promote social capital and enhance efficiency.
  • 8. Slide Table of Contents
    • Summary
    • Comparison to common asset classes
    • Correlation of Microfinance with conventional assets
    • Correlation with economic indicators / indexes
    • Comparison of Portfolios 1
    • Comparison of Portfolios 2
    • Comparison of Portfolios 3
    • Influence of the Financial Crisis
    • Trend of Return on Microfinance Index
    • Appendix: A L ist of MIVs
  • 9. Slide
    • Why is microfinance an attractive investment?
    • Provides an average Sharpe Ratio more than 20 times that of foreign and domestic stocks and bonds.
    • Improves portfolio diversification due to weak correlation with other asset classes
    • Has continued providing consistent returns and risks after the Financial Crisis
    1. Summary
  • 10. - Microfinance presents a Sharpe Ratio more than 20 times that of foreign and domestic stocks and bonds Slide Source : Government Pension Investment Fund “Testing Basic Portfolio.” June 2008. ( Note: Calculation of SMX is based on the data of SMX USD - Symbiotics Microfinance Index - U.S. Dollars   2004.1~2008.10 ) Domestic Stocks : TOPIX ( including dividend ) annual return   (1973~2007) Foreign Stocks : Morgan Stanley Capital Index, KOKUSAI Index ( including dividend, based on JPY ) (1973~2007) Domestic Bonds : NOMURA-BPI Annual Return of Composite Index (1973~207) Foreign Bonds : Citygroup World ( except Japan ) National Bonds Index ( Based on JPY ) annual return Microfinacne(SMX)  : SMX USD - Symbiotics Microfinance Index - U.S. Dollars   (2004.1~2008.10) Suppose that the risk-free rate=0.45% , a 6-month short-term national bond ) 2. Comparison to common asset classes (% per annum ) Total Return Volatility Sharpe Ratio Domestic Stocks 5.30% 22.15% 0.22 Foreign Stocks 6.00% 19.59% 0.28 Domestic Bonds 2.80% 5.40% 0.44 Foreign Stocks 3.40% 13.25% 0.22 Microfinance (SMX) 4.49% 0.36% 11.22
  • 11. Slide Source : Computation is based on the data from 1973~2007,      Number of Samples : 420 monthly-based data for Domestic Bonds, Domestic Stocks, Foreign Bonds, Foreign Bonds, 51 monthly-based samples for SMS . Independent Administrative Agency for the Management of Pension Financial Reserve 「 Verification of Basic Portfolio 」 June, 2008   Note: Original Computation of Correlation Coefficient between Microfinance and Other Assets is based on SMX USD - Symbiotics Microfinance Index - U.S. Dollars, whose object is the data from 2004.3 to 2008.6.      *** :p<0.01 **:p<0.05 ( Null Hypothesis : Correlation=0 ) 3. Correlation of Microfinance with conventional assets - Correlation between Microfinance and conventional assets   Domestic Bonds Domestic Stocks Foreign Bonds Foreign Stocks Microfinance (SMX) Domestic Bonds 1 Domestic Stocks 0.16 *** (p=0.00) 1 Foreign Bonds -0.06 (p=0.22) -0.25 *** (p=0.00) 1 Foreign Stocks -0.05 (p=0.31) 0.27 *** (p=000) 0.56 *** (p=0.00) 1 Microfinance (SMX) 0.30 ** (p=0.03) -0.26 (p=0.07) -0.02 (p=0.89) -0.30 ** (p=0.03) 1
  • 12. - Weakly correlated to domestic/foreign capital markets and economic climates, as shown in empirical studies from 1998 to 2006 Slide Source : Nicolas Krauss, Ingo Walter “Can Microfinance Reduce Portfolio Volatility?” ,      Economic Development and Cultural Change , (forthcoming) Morgan Stanley “Flash Report”, August 2008 4. Correlation with economic indicators / indexes Correlation to GDP Growth Stock Market S&P500 MSCI Global Index MSCI Emerging Market Index MFI Operating Income 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.03 MFI Delinquency ( > 30days ) 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00
  • 13. - Increase of Investment Efficiency, indicated by shift to upper left region of Efficient Frontier Slide Foreign Bonds Domestic Bonds Foreign Stocks Microfinance 5. Comparison of Portfolios 1 Expected Rate of Return Risk ( Standard Deviation ) Portfolio of 4 assets Portfolio of 5 assets % Reference: Merton, R.C., 1972, “An Analytic Derivation of the Efficient Portfolio Frontier”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis Domestic Bonds
  • 14. Slide - Mitigation of Risks by Incorporating Microfinance (assuming no short-selling regulation) 6. Comparison of Portfolios 2 Performance of Portfolio Share of Each Asset in Portfolio Target Return=3.0% Volatility Domestic Bonds Domestic Stocks Foreign Bonds Foreign Stocks MF 4 assets 4.81% 78.35% 4.66% 17.70% -0.71% - 5 assets 4.19% 67.75% 0.86% 17.99% -10.33% 23.73% MF ratio ≦30% 4.19% 67.75% 0.86% 17.99% -10.33% 23.73% Target Return=5.0% Volatility Domestic Bonds Domestic Stocks Foreign Bonds Foreign Stocks MF 4 assets 12.40% 32.75% 20.16% -7.28% 54.37% - 5 assets 1.30% -22.95% 0.21% -5.75% 3.83% 124.66% MF ratio ≦30% 9.48% 19.35% 15.36% -6.91% 42.20% 30.00% Target Return=7.0% Volatility Domestic Bonds Domestic Stocks Foreign Bonds Foreign Stocks MF 4 assets 23.36% -12.84% 35.66% -32.25% 109.44% - 5 assets 6.72% -113.65% -0.45% -29.49% 17.99% 225.59% MF ratio ≦30% 20.53% -26.25% 30.86% -31.89% 97.28% 30.00%
  • 15. Slide - Increase of Return by incorporating Microfinance (assuming no short-selling regulation) 7. Comparison of Portfolios 3 Performance of Portfolio Share of Each Asset in Portfolio Target Risk=5.0% Volatility Domestic Bonds Domestic Stocks Foreign Bonds Foreign Stocks MF 4 assets 3.23% 73.11% 6.44% 14.83% 5.62% - 5 assets 6.37% -84.96% -0.24% -21.98% 13.51% 193.67% MF ratio ≦30% 3.93% 55.87% -5.72% -5.00% 24.85% 30.00% Target Risk=10.0% Volatility Domestic Bonds Domestic Stocks Foreign Bonds Foreign Stocks MF 4 assets 4.53% 43.55% 16.49% -1.36% 41.33% - 5 assets 8.21% -168.33% -0.84% -43.80% 26.52% 286.45% MF ratio ≦30% 5.10% 17.12% 16.15% -8.13% 44.85% 30.00% Target Risk=15.0% Volatility Domestic Bonds Domestic Stocks Foreign Bonds Foreign Stocks MF 4 assets 5.48% 21.78% 23.89% -13.29% 67.62% - 5 assets 10.04% -251.65% -1.44% 65.60% 39.53% 379.17% MF ratio ≦30% 6.01% -3.69% 23.19% -19.53% 70.04% 30.00%
  • 16. - Stable risks and returns on Microfinance, even after the Financial Crisis - SMX USD - Symbiotics Microfinance Index - U.S. Dollars   From 2004.2 - 2008.9 Slide Source : symbiotics http://www.symbiotics.ch/en/smx/smx_usd.asp 8. Influence of the Financial Crisis Year Yield Volatility 2008 5.04% 0.52% 2007 6.33% 0.44% 2006 5.09% 0.33% 2005 4.30% 0.31% 2004 2.61% 0.18% Average 4.49% 0.36%
  • 17. - Figure:   Trend of Return on Microfinance Index - SMX USD - Symbiotics Microfinance Index - U.S. Dollars   2004.2 - 2008.9 Slide Source : symbiotics http://www.symbiotics.ch/en/smx/smx_usd.asp 9. Trend of Return on Microfinance Index Monthly Performance Index Value
  • 18. - Still robust Slide Source : symbiotics http://www.symbiotics.ch/en/smx/smx_usd.asp 9. Trend of Return on Microfinance Index (Updated) Monthly Performance Index Value
  • 19. - MIV: Microfinance Investment Vehicle - SMX USD - Symbiotics Microfinance Index - U.S. Dollars Slide Source : symbiotics http://www.symbiotics.ch/en/smx/smx_usd.asp 10. Appendix: A List of MIVs MIV Redemption Main Investors Dual Return Fund Vision Microfinance USD Cap Possible Institutional and Private investors ResponsAbility Global Microfinance Fund B Cap Possible Private investors Dexia Micro-Credit Fd Sicav BlueOrchard Debt USD Cap Possible Private investors ResponsAbility Microfinance Leaders Fund Possible Institutional investors Finethic Microfinance SCA SICAR USD Possible Institutional investors
  • 20. II. Recent Microfinance Data
  • 21. Slide Agenda I. Microfinance as an Investment Opportunity     Microfinance has high return by itself and low correlation with other traditional investments. II. Recent Microfinance Data     While the market is expanding by 45% annually since 2001, we find little microfinance investment from Japan. III. Economic Theory of Microfinance     Group Lending can alleviate information asymmetry to promote social capital and enhance efficiency.
  • 22. Table of Contents
    • Summary
    • References
    • Trend of microfinance loan portfolio
    • Number of MFIs by region
    • Data on Top 50 MFIs “ Correlation between borrower and the average of personal loan size ”
    • Total amount of loans by region
    • Total number of borrowers by region
    • Average personal loan size by region
    • Top 5 MFIs + Representative MFIs by region (based on number of borrowers)
    • Top 20 countries (based on number of borrowers)
    • Actual condition of SRI market in Japan (1/2) ‏
    • Actual condition of SRI market in Japan (2/2) ‏
    • Country by country comparison of SRI market size ( in Feb 2005 )
    • Problems of SRI market in Japan
    Slide
  • 23.
    • Market size of Micro-Finance is expanding by an average of 45% per year since the beginning of 21st century.
    • MFI’s market share of South Asia, Africa and South America dominate two-thirds of the world.
    • The SRI market of Western is large. In contrast, that of Japan is smaller than 1 % of the western world.
    1 . Summery Slide
  • 24.
    • Microfinance Information Exchange (the MIX) ‏
    •   Which has m ore than 1,300 MFIs and 73.5 million Borrowers (in Oct 2008)
    • ※ MFIs : Micro Finance Institutions
    • ( which provide Micro-Finance services. Their legal style has variety from small nonprofit organizations to large commercial banks. )
    • ※ the other databases are:
    •   Micro Banking Bulletin, Microcredit Summit, and CGAP
    • Annual Report of SRI in Japan 2007
    • ※ SRI : Socially Responsible Investment
    2 . References - This section is prepared by references as follows. Slide
  • 25. Based on a sample of 1,333MFIs , 2008 Reference: B y 2006 , Deutsche Bank “Microfinance: An emerging investment opportunity” and at 2007 estimates by authors based on the MIX. Unit of credit : $1 billion 3. Trend of microfinance loan portfolio - Market size of Micro-Finance is expanding by an average of 45% per year since 2001. Slide
  • 26. Source : The MIX 2008 - The region with the most number of MFIs Latin America and The Caribbean, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. 4. Number of MFIs by region Based on a sample of 1,334MFI , 2008 Slide
  • 27. 5. Data on Top 50 MFIs “ Correlation between borrower and the average of personal loan size ” - Latin America’s MFI has a smaller number of borrowers, but loan sizes are larger. - South Asia’s MFI has a larger number of borrowers, but loan sizes are smaller. - MFIs are considered most correlated with geopolitics and per capita income. Slide Source : The MIX 2008 ※ Bubble size represents total loan amount. South Asia Latin America
  • 28. 6. Total amount of loans by region Source : The MIX 2008 - Total region with the most amount of loans are (arranged according size) Latin America and The Caribbean, followed by Eastern Europe and Central Asia and East Asia and the Pacific. Based on a sample of 1,333MFIs , 2008 Eastern Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Middle East and North Africa Africa East Asia and the Pacific South Asia Average ※ Except North America Slide
  • 29. 7. Total number of borrowers by region Source : The MIX 2008 - The region with the most number of borrowers is South Asia, followed by East Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and The Caribbean. Based on a sample of 1,333MFIs , 2008 Eastern Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Middle East and North Africa Africa East Asia and the Pacific South Asia Average ※ Except North America Slide
  • 30. Source : The MIX 2008 Eastern Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean Middle East and North Africa Africa East Asia and the Pacific South Asia Average Based on a sample of 1,333 MFIs , 2008 8. Average of personal loan size by region - MFI loan size varies by region, from USD 100 in South Asia to USD 3,300 in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. ※ Except North America Slide
  • 31. 9. Top 5 MFIs + Representative MFIs by region (based on the number of borrowers) Source : The MIX, “How Many MFIs Clients exists?” Note: other income includes other charges and fees - MFI’s Top 1 and 2 are Grameen Bank (Top 1), and BRAC(Top 2) of Bangladesh. Slide
  • 32. - The country with the most number of borrowers is Bangladesh, followed by India and Vietnam. ※ Penetration rate = number of the borrowers in the country / number of destitute people in the country 10. Top 20 countries (based on number of borrowers) Source: The Mix 2008 and &quot;How Many MFIs and Clients Exists?&quot; Slide
  • 33. Source : Annual report of SRI in Japan 2007 - MFI is being provided money by SRI, and the reality of SRI market in Japan is as indicated below. 11. Actual condition of SRI market in Japan (1/2) ‏ ‏
    • Japan's public offering of SRI mutual fund performance is generally above average.
    • SRI Fund in Japan began in Aug 1999.
    •    ※ Definition of SRI by Social Investment Forum-Japan
      • Investors’ will to SRI can be confirmed.
      • Considering more than one of the following themes: environment, sociality, and corporate governance in investing process.
    Slide
  • 34. Source: Annual report of SRI in Japan 2007 - Public offering of SRI mutual fund’s net asset balance and changes in the number of funds - Net asset balance is approximately 500 billion yen and the number of funds is 60. 12. Actual condition of SRI market in Japan (2/2) ‏ (number) (million yen) Slide
  • 35. - Market size of SRI in the U.S. is approximately 270 trillion yen and in Europe is about 150 trillion yen. - Market size of broad SRI in Japan is just 0.8 trillion yen. - SRI in Japan is 1% of U.S based on GDP Source: Annual report of SRI in Japan 2007 13. Country by country comparison of the market size of SRI ( in Feb 2005 ) Slide
  • 36.
    • In western countries universities, utility firm s, and labor unions are the core institutions of SRI; in Japan there is little interest in SRI.
    • Market size of SRI in Japan is expanding, but the size is still much smaller compared to western countries.
    • Micro-Finance is not well recognized as an investment choice in Japan.
    14. Problems of SRI market in Japan Slide
  • 37. Looking for a Japanese Microfinance Fund? Slide
  • 38. III. Economic Theory of Microfinance Slide
  • 39. Slide Agenda I. Microfinance as an Investment Opportunity     Microfinance has high return by itself and low correlation with other traditional investments. II. Recent Microfinance Data     While the market is expanding by 45% annually since 2001, we find little microfinance investment from Japan. III. Economic Theory of Microfinance     Group Lending can alleviate information asymmetry to promote social capital and enhance efficiency.
  • 40. Table of Contents
    • Summary
    • Asymmetric information and Solution
    • When does the Borrower “behave”?
    • Benefit of Group lending ① : Social capital
    • Benefit of Group lending ② : Monitoring
    • Conclusion
    •      Appendix
    Slide
  • 41. Slide 1. Summary
    • Social capital and Monitoring make
      • Borrowers can better “behave”
      • B orrowers can receive larger loans given smaller assets
    Slide
  • 42. R eference : Slide ※ Refer to the following for contract theory. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, “The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model” , Princeton University Press, 2002 Jean Tirole, “ The Theory of Corporate Finance”, Princeton University Press, 2005
  • 43. 2. Asymmetric information and Solution Slide
    • Difficulty in Disciplinary control & Monitoring ( Asymmetric information ) ⇒Solution : Strong Incentive to “behave”
    Strong Incentive to “behave” with profit ratio Feature of l ending in developing countries Profit of the project “ behave” “ misbehave” Small loan Large loan Borrower Lender 1: 2: “ behave” : exert effort, taking no private benefit “ misbehave” : shirk, taking a private benefit “ behave” Large loan Presence of Group lending Borrower Lender Lender Borrower Lender Borrower
  • 44. 3. When does the Borrower “behave”? Slide Income when behaving > Income when misbehaving ⇒ the borrower “behaves” R 600 R 400 B 200 “ behave” “ misbehave” R 750 R 500 B 200 600 600 750 700 Equilibrium state Incentive to “behave” R  : The borrower’s Profit from the project B  : The borrower’s private benefit “ R” gets bigger
  • 45. R 600 R 400 B 200 150 R 300 B 200 R 450 other borrower’s profit Absence of Social Capital 600 600
    • Social capital ・・・ relationship of trust, connections within social networks
    600 600 150 100 4. Benefit of Group lending ① : Social capital Slide Presence of Social Capital “ behave” “ misbehave” R  : The borrower’s profit from the project B  : The borrower’s private benefit Equilibrium state Equilibrium state With smaller profit (R)
  • 46. R 600 R 400 B 200 150 R 300 R 450 lower private benefit by monitoring 600 600  ① Before receiving loan, the borrowers chose members to “behave”  ② After receiving loan, the borrowers monitor respectively to restrain private benefit 450 450 B 150 5. Benefit of Group lending ② :Monitoring Slide Absence of Monitoring Presence of Monitoring “ behave” “ misbehave” R  : The borrower’s Profit from the project B  : The borrower’s private benefit Equilibrium state Equilibrium state With smaller profit (R)
  • 47. Simulation Result
    • Conclusion
    • By Group Lending ( Social capital effect and Monitoring effect ) ,
      • The borrowers can better “behave”
      • The borrowers can receive larger loans given smaller assets
    【 Assumption of Project 】  Investment : 1,000  ⇒  Profit of the project : 1,200 ( See Appendix ) 6. Conclusion Slide Absence of Group Lending Presence of Group Lending +Social capital +Monitoring Borrower’s Minimum Profit for “Behaving” 600 462 360 Borrower’s Minimum Asset needed for project 400 262 160 Rate of return 1.5 1.8 2.3
  • 48. < Appendix > Tirole, “The Theory of Corporate Finance” Chapter 3,4 Slide
  • 49. Assumptions Setup Notations 1.” behave” 2.” misbehave” Slide Fixed Investment The borrower’s Asset Probability of success with behaving Probability of success with misbehaving Profit of the project The borrower’s Profit of the project The lender’s Profit of the project The borrower’s private benefit Investment
    • The borrower starts the project with loan
    • The borrower’s Asset ( ), Fixed Investment( ),⇒ loan( )
    • Only if the project succeeds, the profit of the project ( ) is received ⇒Profits are distributed to the borrower( ) and the lender( )
    • The borrower “behaves” or “misbehaves” ⇒ Probability of success : ( “behave” ), (“misbehave” )
    • If the borrower “misbehaves”, the borrower gains private benefit from the loan
    * “behave” : exert effort, taking no private benefit , “misbehave”: shirk, taking a private benefit With Probability , is received With Probability , is received
  • 50. “ Behaving” constraint & Lender’s breakeven constraint (1) ・・・ Lender’s breakeven constraint Slide The borrower “behaves” if income when behaving exceeds income when misbehaving By the condition, the borrower’s minimum profit of the project for “behave” is Then, the lender’s profit of the project in the case of success is Then, the lender’s expected profit of the project is This lender’s expected profit must exceed his initial outlay for lending ・・・” Behaving” constraint
  • 51.
    • The borrower “behaves”
    • The lender reach es break e ven
    Slide If the lender demands no interest, Therefore, if the borrower’s profit of the project ( ) and Asset ( ) satisfy the following conditions, “ Behaving” constraint & Lender’s breakeven constraint (2)
  • 52. Group lending : Social capital effect (1) The other borrower’s probability of success Slide Social capital effect : A portion of other borrower’s profit is added to the borrower’s own profit. Assumption : - Group lending for two borrowers ・・・ Lender’s breakeven constraint ・・・” Behaving” constraint By this condition, the borrower’s minimum profit of the project for “Behaving” Then, the lender’s expected profit of the project is The lender’s expected profit must exceed his initial outlay for lending The condition that the borrower “behaves” is - The other borrower “behaves”
  • 53. Slide If the lender demands no interest, Therefore, If the borrower’s Profit of the project ( ) and Asset ( ) meet following conditions,
    • The borrower “behaves”
    • The lender reach es break e ven
    Group lending : Social capital effect (2)
  • 54. Group lending : Monitoring effect (1) Upper: Outcomes Lower: ( the borrower’s probability of success , the other borrower’s probability of success ) 1 2 3 2 “ Outcomes” & ” Probability of S uccess ” 1 > 3 2 or Slide Assumptions : - Group lending for two borrowers The borrower can make the other borrower “behave”( ) with monitoring cost ( ). If the borrower gains private benefit ( ) , Probability of success goes down( ). - The other borrower “misbehaves” Suppose that the monitoring cost is equivalent to private benefit: The borrower “behaves” if his profit meets Presence of Monitoring Absence Monitoring “ Behave” “ Misbehave”
  • 55. Group lending : Monitoring effect (2) 1 > 2 1 > 3 Slide The borrower’s profit : The borrower’s profit : ・・・” Behaving” constraint In the above, the second condition is hold since Then, the condition that the borrower “behaves” is The borrower’s minimum profit of the project for “Behaving”
  • 56. Group lending : Monitoring effect (3) Slide
    • The borrower “behave”
    • The lender reach es break e ven
    ・・・ Lender’s breakeven constraint This lender’s expected profit must exceed his initial outlay for lending If the lender demands no interest, Therefore, if the borrower’s profit of the project ( ) and Asset ( ) meet following conditions, Then, the lender’s expected profit of the project is
  • 57. Setting up the Parameters Parameters Slide Fixed Investment Social capital weight Profit of the project Monitoring cost The borrower’s private benefit Probability of success with “Behaving” Probability of success with “misbehaving”
    • The borrower “behave”
    • The lender reach es break e ven
    <Simulation> The borrower’s profit of the project ( ) and Asset ( ) which meet following conditions
  • 58. LiP Members
    • Yuma Kinoshita
    • Souichiro Kojiya
    • Takashi Sugawara
    • Akiko Sugiyama
    • K yongil C hu
    • Fumi Tsukamoto
    • Chinatsu Tobita
    • Ayako Hatano
    • Takayuki Fukuda
    • Koji Honda
    • Muneaki Iwadate
    • Kensuke Saneshima
    • Wataru Kamiya
    • Dean Kirkness
    • Samuel Levin
    • Tsubasa Umezaki
    • Financial Engineering Group, Inc.
    • Tokyo Financial Advisers
    • Financial Engineering Group, Inc.
    • Music Securities, Inc.
    • Seikei University Law School
    • PricewaterhouseCoopersHRS Co., Ltd.
    • Morgan Stanley Japan Holdings Co., Ltd.
    • Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
    • KPMG FAS
    • Mizuho Securities Co., Ltd.
    • Keio University
    • Keio University
    • PRAP Japan, Inc.
    • PRAP Japan, Inc.
    • Waseda University
    • Waseda University
    Slide Views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official views of their organizations.
  • 59. Wearing a Suit, Changing the World.    
  • 60.     A Suit?
  • 61. Contact: [email_address] [email_address]
  • 62. Fin