Nobuo tanaka keynote1


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  • Although the 2009-2010 economic crisis appears to be abating, the foundation of the recovery is still shaky, and expectations of lengthy austerity in some economies hint at a drawn-out recovery period for OECD demand. At the same time, oil demand and supply are proving to be increasingly inelastic, leading to increased uncertainty as to price formation. Technological advances have rendered a veritable revolution in gas production, upending many projections of past years and potentially heralding a golden age of gas – with implications for all gas substitutes in the energy mix, including oil. Climate change negotiations and subsidy reform discussions have yielded key agreements whose implications are reflected in one of our main WEO scenarios, but question marks remain over their implementation. With over 90% of oil demand growth expected to derive from non-OECD countries, policy directions in places like China and India will have major impacts on the market. And events in the Middle East and North Africa have not only led to actual supply disruptions in Libya, but have raised questions about the stability of larger producers. Last week’s OPEC meeting also points to deep fissures within the organization which do not bode well for flexible response from producers. However I would like to focus on a relatively recent uncertainty which has particular implications for the power market in coming years. Following the Fukushima nuclear incident after the tragic earthquake and tsunamis in Japan in March, altered nuclear policies in both OECD and non-OECD countries could impact new power generation capacity worldwide, but most immediately in Europe.
  • But first, some comments on the recent IEA stock release. We have acted in direct response to the disruption in Libya, but the significant delay is due to the postponed effects in the oil market as a result of seasonal tightening. Despite the Historically, price spikes and oil shocks regularly coincide with economic slow down. While other factors may be the primary drivers of a recession, as in 2008, high oil prices add to the drag on growth and often compound underlying causal factors. If current prices are sustained over the medium term, the oil burden could reach 5% levels over the year, similar to 2008. Such levels threaten economic recovery and are not in the interest of consumers nor producers. With supply reduced by the crisis in Libya, stock levels are down, and coupled with reduced OPEC spare production capacity, the situation starts to resemble the thin flexibility margin that underpinned price rises to 2008. This situation makes the economy more vulnerable to further supply shocks, at a time of significant political uncertainty in many producing countries. Sustained economic damage from high oil prices usually only occurs after a lag of 6-12 months. But our analysis indicates that prices are beginning to have an impact on demand growth in Asia and the US.
  • High oil prices are affecting the entire global economy, but pass through to headline inflation and impacts on GDP will be greater in those more energy intensive economies facing increasing levels of import dependence. Emerging economies are most at risk. High prices through 2011 would impact oil import bills, which in China would surpass those seen in 2008. The result is a significant worsening of the current account in consuming countries already facing a weak economic recovery. And those prices are likely to stay high, with seasonal demand increases tightening the market through the summer. Production must increase to meet that demand. Saudi Arabia is planning to provide such increased production, but until then the IEA has acted to release strategic oil stocks to bridge the gap until that production comes online.
  • For emergency management, changing global consumption patterns require global cooperation for emergency response. Here you can see how IEA stockholding requirements are expected to account for a diminishing share of global oil demand, as non-OECD countries account more and more of global consumption. This has the possibility to render our collective emergency response capabilities less effective, in the absence of global engagement. Thus the IEA is increasing its cooperation with emerging countries, and particularly those such as India, China, and other ASEAN countries which account for a quickly growing share of global oil demand. That increasing role also means that any efforts to bring forward the peak in global oil demand will similarly require close cooperation with them.
  • Premature to assess in detail the implications of the unfolding events in Japan on the evolution of the global energy mix, but recent projections for growth in nuclear capacity may now be viewed as optimistic Investment in nuclear capacity may be delayed or deferred at least in the short-term An increasing number of plants may be retired early due to the introduction of more stringent safety regulations Countries actively engaging in policy development or discussions to stimulate nuclear new build are likely to find this a difficult path to pursue—examples include UK, Australia, but also places like Thailand, Indonesia and possibly even some Middle East countries.
  • (A) Number of operational reactors (B) Installed capacity (GW) (C) Average fleet age (years) (D) Share of total generation* (%) (E) Number of reactors under construction (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) ====================================== OECD 343 326 27 25% 12 US 104 106 31 20% 1 France 58 66 25 76% 1 Japan 54 49 25 27% 2 Germany 17 21 28 23% 0 Korea 21 19 17 33% 5 Canada 18 13 26 15% 0 UK 19 11 29 19% 0 Other 52 40 28 24% 3 ====================================== Non-OECD 98 68 21 6% 55 Russia 32 24 28 17% 11 Ukraine 15 14 22 48% 2 China 13 11 8 2% 28 India 19 5 17 2% 6 Other 19 14 24 9% 8 ====================================== World 441 393 27 17% 67
  • Policy assumptions for the Lower-Nuclear Case Capacity additions are just half the level of the New Policies Scenario of WEO-2010 , reducing projected capacity in 2035 by 180 GW Policy drivers for the Lower-Nuclear Case Fewer life extensions for older nuclear power plants Projected capacity expansion slows, particularly in OECD All plants under construction go ahead In the Lower-Nuclear Case, capacity additions are just half the level of the New Policies Scenario of WEO-2010, reducing nuclear’s share of generation to 10% in 2035 from 14% today
  • Increase of electricity demand in 2035 for coal, gas and nuclear is 4.1%, 6.1% and 4.1% respectively Coal increase is about 130 Mtce, which is about equal to current Australian steam coal exports. Gas increase is about 80 bcm, which is roughly equivalent to the current gas production of Qatar The increase of renewables generation is equivalent to almost 5 times the current generation from renewables in Germany Higher demand will obviously also push up prices for fossil fuels and therefore end-user prices.
  • The growth in emissions from the power sector in 2008-2035 is almost 30% higher in the Lower-Nuclear Case than in the New Policies Scenario. Emissions increase in 2035 is 520 Mt greater than in the NPS of WEO-2010. Cumulative emissions over 2010-2035 is 5.4 Gt higher In a 'low nuclear scenario' energy-related CO2 emissions would rise in line with the increased use of fossil fuels in the medium term (which would have a lasting upwards effect on the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere) while in the longer term the trend would depend on policies that are put in place. A reduced role for nuclear power will increase the overall carbon intensity of the global energy mix which will make it harder and more expensive to combat climate change. To still achieve the 2°C goal, the development and deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) would need to be accelerated and applied to both coal and gas-fired power plants. To do this a series of separate technological and regulatory challenges would need to be overcome. More effort (and a higher level of investment) would also need to be put towards energy efficiency measures and renewables.
  • After investigating the global effects of less nuclear, some specific thoughts on the German nuclear moratorium … Germany is at the heart of the interconnected European electricity system. While market integration is welcome, this also means that a major change in the German system will affect the entire European power market, triggering changes in production, trade flows and CO2 emissions. Germany in 2010 had 140 twh nuclear energy production, and renewable energy in recent years has been growing consistently at a rate of 10-12 twh/year. Germany has been successful in mobilizing investments into renewable energy. However, even with the current investment effort it will take more than a decade to replace nuclear with renewables, and during that decade renewables do not contribute to decarbonisation - they replace nuclear. Germany will need to upgrade its transmission system to accommodate growing renewable energy production. In 2010 Germany had 16% renewables and 23% nuclear in its electricity mix. A decade later Germany will indeed have 35% renewables but no nuclear, the share of fossil fuels will have to increase. We fully agree with the German government that a serious effort on energy efficiency is essential to decarbonize the energy system. The 10 % reduction in consumption will require a consistent push to improve energy efficiency. Even with the 10 reduction, a changing mix of fossil generation, a coal to gas switch will be needed to reduce CO2 emissions to the level of the policy targets. The associated increase in gas consumption is around 16 bcm, well within the capability of the EU gas supply infrastructure.
  • 日本の電力及びガス市場が、地域間の連系が十分ではない。この図においては、とても大きな地域(大きな円)がとても小さな送電容量(細い線)で他の地域とつながっている。もし各地域の電源が一層共有されれば、供給安全保障及び経済効率性に利益をもたらすであろう。また、重要なことには、より良いルールや規制が既存資源の共有を促す。これは、財政支出を伴わずに新しいエネルギー資源を手に入れることに近い。 系統連係接続の強化は、風力や太陽光といったいわば安定的でない再生可能エネルギーの開発及び普及をも促す。
  • In the GAS Scenario, global primary energy demand is projected to rise by 37%, to 16 800 Mtoe in 2035. Global natural gas demand is now 3.3 tcm and projected to reach 5.1 tcm in 2035 - around 600 bcm higher than in the NPS, increasing by over 50% from today, or at nearly 2% per year. By 2035 gas accounts for 25% of the world’s fuel mix in 2035. The combined effect of a strong increase in gas demand, and a decline in coal demand from around 2020 onwards, results in global demand for natural gas overtaking coal before 2030 to become the second fuel in the mix after oil. The share of fossil fuels in the overall primary energy mix decreases from 81% in 2008 to just over 74% in 2035. Power generation remains the prime sector for gas demand, where the share of gas rises from 21% today to nearly a quarter of all fuel by 2035 mainly at the expense of coal which drops from 41% today to 31% in 2035. The main countries where coal share of electricity generation drops are China and the US.
  • Demand for gas rises in all regions, but China accounts for nearly 30% of the growth to 2035 rising from 110 bcm today (the same demand as of Germany) to 630 bcm in 2035 (the same as the complete European Union). Among developed economies the United States sees the largest change in demand (to 790 BCM), driven by the power generation and transport sectors. Middle East demand almost doubles to 2035 (to 630 BCM), as a result of rapid growth in electricity generation, and increased industrial use. India also experiences very strong growth in natural gas, but from a low base (quadrupling to 234 BCM), also driven by power generation and transport.
  • But thanks to the rise of unconventional gas, we do have the resources globally to meet that demand - recoverable resources have almost doubled as a result. There are now over 250 years of gas resources available globally, and each region has a supply of 75 years of current regional consumption. Such volumes and their geographical distribution are a significant factor for energy security – and herald nothing less than a redefinition of the geopolitics of gas. Conventional gas continues to make up most of global production through to 2035 and beyond, increasing from 2.8 tcm in 2008 to 3.9 tcm in 2035, but its share of the total declines. Unconventional gas supplies more than 40% of the increase in demand to 2035, when it is projected to reach 1.2 tcm. The share of unconventional gas in global production increases from 12% in 2008 to 24% in 2035. And while unconventional gas production is currently concentrated in the United States and Canada (forming something of a “gas island” thanks to limited export capability), by the end of the Outlook period, unconventional gas also reaches a significant scale in China, Russia, Australia, and India. Trade more than doubles, with n ew supplies & trade routes emerging. Russia & the Caspian export more, to both east & west; and LNG (particularly from Australia) increases flexibility of supply and enhances energy security.
  • The next crucial question is, how does such expansion of gas use affect climate change mitigation efforts? Let us be clear – gas does not by itself serve to achieve climate goals. This is no panacea. Energy-related CO 2 emissions in the GAS Scenario follow a path similar to that in the NPS, reaching 35.3 Gt in 2035 (just 160 Mt lower than NPS). Lower gas prices boost energy consumption and lead to the displacement of coal, but also of some low-carbon fuels, including nuclear and, to a lesser extent, renewables. This results in a set of competing interactions shown here. (CLICK) Considering each separately, the effect of increased energy demand relative to the NPS (as a result of cheaper gas and thus electricity) is a 260 Mt increase in CO2 emissions in 2035. (CLICK) Emissions are also increased by the reduction in nuclear and (CLICK) renewable energy, adding 220 Mt and 100 Mt respectively in 2035. (CLICK) But the substitution of gas for coal, and to a lesser degree oil, reduces CO 2 emissions by 740 Mt in 2035, more than compensating for the sum of the other effects. China alone accounts for 43% of this reduction as a result of implementing its policy decision in the 12th Five Year Plan to increase the share of its energy mix met by gas largely in place of coal.
  • While our low-nuclear and high-gas scenarios may show slightly different projections, Electricity from renewable energy sources is vital in all IEA scenarios : rising to 23% by 2035 in the Current Policies Scenario, 32% in the New Policies Scenario, and 45% in the 450 Scenario (from 19% in 2008). In the lower nuclear case, renewables do not increase significantly above the NPS – most of the shortfall will be made up by coal and gas. The 450 scenario, like the widespread adoption of renewables to replace lower nuclear, will require significant and timely technical and deployment investment.
  • Although coal remains a core component of the global energy mix in the New Policies Scenario, the use of modern renewable energy expands dramatically over the Outlook period – tripling from 843 Mtoe in 2008 to 1 376 Mtoe in 2020 to 2 409 Mtoe in 2035. Its share in total primary energy demand increases from 7% to 9% and then 13%. Demand for renewable energy increases substantially in all regions, with remarkable growth in some areas; for example, increasing six‑fold between 2008 and 2035 in China and four‑fold in India. Demand remains highest in the European Union, where the increase is driven by policies to raise the share of renewables to 20% in gross final consumption in 2020, related to the commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 20% relative to 1990. The United States and China follow closely, as a result of large increases in renewables-based electricity generation and in biofuels use (particularly in the US).
  • Fossil fuels Renewables Nuclear EU27 26% 10% 14% Korea 1% 2% 16% Luxembourg 0% 2% 0% Japan 1% 3% 15% Belgium 1% 4% 22% France 1% 8% 42% Ireland 9% 4% 0% Slovak Rep 6% 7% 22% Spain 3% 11% 13% Italy 7% 10% 0% Switzerland 0% 22% 27% Portugal 0% 25% 0% Hungary 19% 8% 16% Germany 17% 10% 11% Turkey 18% 11% 0% Finland 6% 26% 17% Austria 8% 26% 0% Greece 27% 7% 0% Sweden 1% 34% 30% IEA Europe 33% 11% 13% IEA nuclear 45% 7% 13% Czech Rep 50% 7% 17% IEA 51% 8% 11% United King 62% 3% 8% Poland 59% 7% 0% United States 62% 6% 10% Netherlands 78% 4% 1% New Zealand 52% 39% 0% Denmark 100% 17% 0% Canada 129% 17% 9% Australia 252% 5% 0% Norway 626% 37% 0%
  • Given that CO2 emissions in the low-nuclear scenario are only slightly higher than the NPS, and in the high-gas scenario are only slightly lower, the point is that neither case changes the need for massive investments in low-carbon fuels and especially efficiency measures to achieve the 450 scenario. End-use efficiency accounts for 50% of the 13.7 Gt abated in 2035, vis-à-vis the New Policies Scenario. This is achieved through greater efficiency in direct combustion of fossil fuels and abatement achieved as a result of lower electricity demand attributable to greater efficiency in end use.
  • As I just mentioned, there are 1.4 billion people around the world lacking access to electricity today, nearly 80% of them in rural areas. Without additional dedicated policies, by 2030 the number drops, but only to 1.2 billion. Some 15% of the world’s population still lack access, the majority of them living in Sub-Saharan Africa. Electricity consumption in Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa, is roughly equivalent to consumption in New York. In other words, the 20 million inhabitants of New York consume annually roughly the same quantity of electricity, 40 TWh, as about 800 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa. Meeting the more ambitious target of achieving universal access to modern energy services by 2030 will require additional investment of $756 billion, or $36 billion per year. While grid extension will be important in achieving universal access, decentralised options have an important role to play. Small, stand-alone renewable energy technologies – such as mini-hydro, wind, PV, geothermal and biomass- can often meet the electricity needs of rural communities more cheaply and much faster, often displacing costly diesel-based power generation. Moreover, governments are becoming aware of the limitations of policies to encourage switching to liquid cooking fuels and are putting in place strategies to increase the use of advanced biomass cookstoves and biogas systems. The annual investment required to achieve universal access to modern energy services by 2030, is equivalent to around 12% of the total fossil-fuel subsidies in 2009. It is also less than a third of the some $120 billion of Official Development Assistance in 2009. Looking at another comparison, in the 2008 edition of the World Energy Outlook we estimated that the cost of providing modern energy access to those households without access in the ten largest oil and gas-exporting countries in Sub-Saharan Africa would be roughly equivalent to only 0.4% of the governments’ cumulative take from hydrocarbon exports through to 2030. Finally, by increasing household electricity tariffs in OECD countries by just 0.3 cents per kWh would raise enough money to finance universal electricity access. Achieving universal access to modern energy services would have a modest impact on energy-related CO 2 emissions and oil demand. Compared with the New Policies Scenario, global energy-related CO 2 emissions in the Universal Modern Energy Access Case increase by just 0.8% by 2030, or around 2% of current OECD emissions. Expanding household access to modern fuels for cooking would increase global demand oil but only by a mere 0.9% in 2030.
  • Growing interdependence among producers and consumers means security & sustainability challenges are collective, & enhancing cooperation – including on emergency response - will be mutually beneficial
  • Nobuo tanaka keynote1

    1. 1. Secure and Sustainable Energy Future <ul><li>TBLI Conference </li></ul><ul><li>September 2011 </li></ul><ul><li>Nobuo TANAKA </li></ul>
    2. 2. The context: A time of unprecedented uncertainty… <ul><ul><li>The worst of the global economic crisis appears to be over – but is the recovery sustainable? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Oil demand & supply are becoming less sensitive to price – what does this mean for future price movements ? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Natural gas markets are in the midst of a revolution – will it herald a golden era for gas? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Copenhagen Accord & G-20 subsidy reforms are key advances – but do they go far enough & will they be fully implemented ? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Emerging economies will shape the global energy future – where will their policy decisions lead us ? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Tightening oil market plus political unrest in producing regions – how vulnerable is the market to even small disruptions? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>What is the energy landscape post Fukushima nuclear accident? </li></ul></ul>
    3. 3. Oil prices affect the global economy <ul><ul><li>Oil price spikes have preceded each global recession since the early 1970’s </li></ul></ul>
    4. 4. Annual expenditure on net imports of oil <ul><li>If oil prices average US$100 a barrel in 2011, spending on oil imports in many countries will reach or surpass the record levels of 2008 </li></ul><ul><li>* Projections made prior to events of 11 March </li></ul>
    5. 5. Need for cooperation during oil supply disruptions IEA stockholding cover of global oil demand Growing share of non-OECD oil demand results in declining global demand cover from IEA oil stocks
    6. 6. The Future of Nuclear Power after Fukushima <ul><ul><li>Recent projections for growth in nuclear capacity may now be viewed as optimistic </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>An increasing number of plants may be retired early due to more stringent safety regulations </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Life extensions for older plants may become less common </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Investment may be delayed or deferred </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Investment to replace the aging fleet in OECD </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Investment in emerging economies to meet rising base-load demand </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Costs of new nuclear plants may increase </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Countries pursuing new nuclear power programs may face difficulties </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Including Indonesia, Thailand & possibly some Middle East countries </li></ul></ul></ul>
    7. 7. Nuclear construction shifting to developing countries Nuclear reactor construction starts, 1954-2011 Today, 30 countries operate 441 nuclear reactors, 82% being in OECD countries. However, new construction is overwhelmingly in non-OECD countries, where 55 of the 67 new reactors were being built.
    8. 8. Lower-Nuclear Case: implications for electricity generation from nuclear <ul><li>Lower Nuclear case means 1) Higher Electricity Prices, 2) Less Security and 3) Less Sustainable. </li></ul>Post Fukushima: New Energy Security of the 21 C
    9. 9. Lower-Nuclear Case: implications for the fuel mix <ul><li>The Lower-Nuclear Case would push up demand for coal, natural gas & renewables, and have a corresponding knock-on effect on energy prices </li></ul>Increase of coal-, gas- and renewables-based electricity generation in 2035 compared with the New Policies Scenario Coal Gas Renewables 130 Mtce 80 bcm 460 TWh 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7%
    10. 10. Lower-Nuclear Case: implications for CO2 emissions <ul><li>The growth in emissions from the power sector in 2008-2035 is almost 30% higher in the Lower-Nuclear Case than in the New Policies Scenario </li></ul>Growth in CO 2 emissions from power generation compared to current levels 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 Gt New Policies Scenario Lower-Nuclear Case 0.5 Gt
    11. 11. Germany: Additional 16BCM of Natural Gas Import will be needed. It may Compromise European Energy Security and Susrtainability. German electricity mix with 10% demand reduction, no nuclear, 35% renewables and CO2 at the target level twh
    12. 12. Japan : Power Grid Market Reform is needed and interconnection to Korea and Russia Source:  資源エネルギー庁、電気事業連合会、電力系統利用協議会、 IEA算定 Tokyo Hokkaido Tohoku Hokuriku Kansai Chugoku Kyushu Shikoku Chubu Okinawa Hydro Oil Gas Nuclear Coal Other Power utility company Generating company In-house generation
    13. 13. “ Golden Age of Gas” Scenario <ul><li>World primary energy demand by fuel in the GAS Scenario </li></ul><ul><li>Gas overtakes coal before 2030 and meets one quarter of global energy demand by 2035 – demand grows by 2% annually, compared with just 1.2% for total energy </li></ul>Growing role of Gas in Energy Security Other renewables 0 1 000 2 000 3 000 4 000 5 000 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 Mtoe Oil Gas Coal Biomass Nuclear Hydro 2035
    14. 14. Consumption grows most in developing economies <ul><li>Increase in natural gas consumption in the GAS scenario, 2010-2035 </li></ul><ul><li>Non-OECD countries account for 80% of demand growth – China alone makes up nearly 30% of global growth & uses as much gas as the EU by 2035 </li></ul>0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Rest of the world Africa Russia Latin America India Middle East OECD total China bcm
    15. 15. Production of unconventional gas becomes widespread <ul><li>Largest gas producers in the GAS Scenario, 2035 </li></ul><ul><li>Unconventional gas supplies 40% of the 1.8 tcm increase in gas demand to 2035, making up nearly one quarter of total production </li></ul>0 200 400 600 800 1 000 Turkmenistan Saudi Arabia Australia Algeria Canada Qatar Iran China United States Russia Conventional Unconventional bcm
    16. 16. CO2 emissions drop, but only slightly <ul><li>CO 2 emissions in the GAS Scenario compared with the New Policies Scenario, 2035 </li></ul><ul><li>CO2 emissions are just 160 Mt lower than in the New Policies Scenario in 2035. Substitution of coal & oil by gas cuts emissions by 740 Mt, but this is largely offset by other effects </li></ul>34.0 34.5 35.0 35.5 36.0 36.5 New Policies Scenario GAS Scenario Gt Less nuclear Less renewables Higher energy demand Increase due to: Reduction due to: Substitution of coal & oil by gas
    17. 17. Renewable electricity is vital in all scenarios <ul><li>Global electricity from RE increases from 3 800 TWh (2008) </li></ul><ul><li>to 14 500 TWh (2035) in the 450 Scenario </li></ul>45% RE share 0 3 000 6 000 9 000 12 000 15 000 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 450 Scenario 23% RE share Current Policies Scenario 33% RE share Lower Nuclear Case New Policies Scenario 32% RE share
    18. 18. Renewables enter the mainstream…. <ul><li>The use of renewable energy triples between 2008 & 2035, driven by the power sector where their share in electricity supply rises from 19% in 2008 to 32% in 2035 </li></ul>Renewable primary energy demand in the New Policies Scenario 0 100 200 300 400 European Union United States China Brazil India Africa OECD Pacific Mtoe 2008 2035
    19. 19. Energy mix as Energy Security Mix <ul><ul><li>Nuclear is an important option for countries with limited indigenous energy resources (low energy sustainability). </li></ul></ul>Self sufficiency =inland production / tpes (2010 estimates) Energy Self-sufficiency rates of selected countries
    20. 20. The 450 Scenario: Abatement by technology <ul><ul><li>In moving from the New Policies Scenario to the 450 Scenario, more expensive abatement options such as CCS play a growing role </li></ul></ul>World energy-related CO2 emission savings by technology in the 450 Scenario relative to the New Policies Scenario 42.6 Gt 35.4 Gt 21.7 Gt Current Policies Scenario 450 Scenario New Policies Scenario 13.7 Gt 7.1 Gt Sustainability Constraint Low Nuclear : +0.5Gt High Gas : -0.2Gt 20 25 30 35 40 45 2008 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 Gt Efficiency 50% Renewables 18% Biofuels 4% Nuclear 9% CCS 20% Share of cumulative abatement between 2010-2035
    21. 21. Number of people without access to electricity (million) Today, there are 1.4 billion people lacking access to electricity. Based on current trends, 1.2 billion people – or 15% of the world’s population – will still lack access in 2030 Energy Poverty ; Another sustainability Problem
    22. 22. Implications for Japan and Emerging Economies <ul><ul><li>Japan </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Regional energy security framework is key for future competitiveness </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Further develop energy efficiency, renewables, grid interconnection, smart grid and electric vehicles. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Safe nuclear remains important option. Turn lessons in to global asset. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Emerging Economies like India </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Ensure energy security while addressing rapid growth and energy access issue. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Develop new energy policy model for emerging economies by promoting energy efficiency while avoiding heavy dependence on coal and phasing out fossil fuel subsidies. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Common challenge </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>New Comprehensive Energy Security Framework for the 21 st Century. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Work together towards low carbon future: Global Financial mechanisms, transparent energy market, and cutting edge technology on energy efficiency, nuclear, renewables, CCS and Advanced Vehicles. </li></ul></ul></ul>