Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #7
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Political Science 7 – International Relations - Spring 2013 - Power Point Presentation #7 - © 2013 Tabakian, Inc.

Political Science 7 – International Relations - Spring 2013 - Power Point Presentation #7 - © 2013 Tabakian, Inc.

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Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #7 Presentation Transcript

  • 1. Dr. Tabakian’s Political Science 7 Modern World Governments – Spring 2013 Supplemental Power Point Material #7
  • 2. LECTURE HIGHLIGHTS (1)• Conflict, Violence & War - Causes Of War: 1. Nationalism 2. Ethnicity 3. Religion 4. Culture 5. Natural Resources• “Kin-Country” Syndrome• Redefining Civilization Identity• West Versus The Rest• American Military Power• Unconventional Military Options: – American Biological Weapons Program
  • 3. LECTURE HIGHLIGHTS (2)• Making Foreign Policy• Models Of Decision Making• Decision Making As Steering• Individual Decision Makers• Group Psychology• Crisis Management• Domestic Politics• Bureaucracies• Interest Groups• Military Industrial Complex• Public Opinion• Legislatures
  • 4. CONFLICT, VIOLENCE & WAR (1) Cultural Conflict – The New Cold War?Tensions between civilizations are supplanting the politicaland ideological rivalries persistent during the Cold War. "Asthe ideological division of Europe has disappeared, thecultural division of Europe between Western Christianity, onthe one hand and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on theother, has reemerged. Samuel Huntington concludes afterreviewing 100 comparative studies of values in differentsocieties to conclude "the values that are most important inthe West are least important worldwide." World politics will bedirected in the future by conflicts that according to KishoreMahbubani will be between "the West and the Rest". SamuelP. Huntington adds "...and the responses of non-Westerncivilizations to Western power and values.”
  • 5. CONFLICT, VIOLENCE & WAR (2) Cultural Conflict – The New Cold War?These responses take on or a combination of threeforms:1. Non-Western civilizations isolate themselves from the Western-dominated global community.2. "Band-Wagoning" can lead non-Western countries to join with the West and accept its values and institutions.3. Non-Western countries can attempt to "balance" the West by developing an alternative economic and military power and ally with one another to effective counter Western dominance.
  • 6. CAUSES OF WAR (1)1.Nationalism2.Ethnicity3.Religion4.Culture5.Natural Resources
  • 7. CAUSES OF WAR (2)Defensive realists claim that war is today seen by thegreat powers as rarely profitable. War is brought forthfrom militarism, hypernationalism, or other domesticfactors that over exaggerate potential threats orexaggerates their military capacity. Offensive realistsbelieve that great powers are forced into competitiveactions for anarchy remains as long as there is nooverruling bodies that function over the state. This is whyoffensive realists believe that the US serves as anoverruling body through NATO and that if she were toleave that security competition would soon return toEurope.
  • 8. NATIONALISM MAY BE GOODThe existence of modern democracies over the last 200 yearsdemonstrates the success of democratic peace theory. Realistshave either countered these assertions through claims that liberaldemocracies were not next to one another or shared a mutualthreat that encouraged them to look past differences. Anotherreason provided is that external forces may force a state tobecome democratic if it wished to get along with otherdemocracies. This suggests that power relations have alwaysremained a viable factor for non-democratic states may desiregood relations with strong democracies like the United States.Nationalist struggles are welcomed as precursors to thesolidification process of tolerant and democratic societies.Nationalisms serve to establish unique identities in a world of everincreasing democratic homogenization. It is a process that theUnited States has been a party as were emerging democracies inWestern Europe in the nineteenth century.
  • 9. PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT “I HATE WAR”On October 6, 1937 in Chicago, President FranklinDelano Roosevelt warns of a steadily-increasingdanger of armed conflict menacing the UnitedStates. Without naming any nation as responsible,the Chief Executive finds a threat in present attacksfrom the air on civilians, and ships attacked and sunkby submarines in time of peace and without cause ornotice. Gravely, the President asserts that if suchthings can happen in other parts of the world,America cannot feel secure for long. UniversalNewsreel presents the Presidents speech as ahistoric document, and gives with it a dramatic viewof incidents of aggression which called forth Mr.Roosevelts impassioned warning." scenes of paradeoutdoors, sound of FDR speaking outdoors undertent, silent scenes of war inserted into FDRsspeech, FDR says, “I Hate War”.
  • 10. CAUSES OF WAR – RELIGIONRUSSIAN EXAMPLEReligion stimulates ethnic identifications. It also arouses Russianfears over the security of its southern borders. Archie Rooseveltdetails this concern: "Much of Russian history concerns the strugglebetween the Slavs and the Turkic peoples on their borders, whichdates back to the foundation of the Russian state more than athousand years ago. In the Slavs millennium-long confrontation withtheir eastern neighbors lies the key to an understanding not only ofRussian history, but Russian character. To understand Russianrealities today one has to have a concept of the great Turkic ethnicgroup that has preoccupied Russians through the centuries.” KennethWaltz insists that sovereign states with fixed borders are the best wayto maintain the peace domestically. When a state is no longercompetent it may fall into a state of disrepair with separate territoriesbreaking apart becoming autonomous, but unable to correlate totransnational developments.
  • 11. CAUSES OF WAR – CHECHNYAThe principle of national self-determinationholds that populations have the right todetermine their own futures and establishgovernments of their own making. The rightwas articulated after World War I, but itsimplementation has been uneven, and manypeoples who desire national self-determination have yet to receive it. InChechnya, ethnic Chechens declared theirindependence from the Russian Federationafter the collapse of communism. Russianintervention, designed to stave offindependence, has led to a long-standingwar between the Russian military andChechen separatists, with neither side ableto claim total victory.
  • 12. CAUSES OF WAR – IRAN?Recent developments with respect toIran’s nuclear program illustrate thistension. Iran maintains that it has theright to develop nuclear power forcivilian use without outsideinterference. The United States,however, contends that Iran’s nuclearprogram is developing nuclearweapons in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, creating asecurity dilemma for countriesneighboring Iran and—pendingsuccessful development of missiletechnology—around the world.
  • 13. “KIN-COUNTRY” SYNDROMEStates try to rally support from other states belonging to the sameculture when they are involved in a war with people from anothercivilization. This is the "kin-country" syndrome. This terminologyreplaces political ideology and traditional balance of power as theprincipal basis for cooperation and coalitions. Post-Cold War conflictslike those in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia involvedelements of civilization rallying. First, the 1991 Persian Gulf Warbegun as a result of one Arab state invading a neighbor Arab state.Second, Armenian military successes in 1992 and 1993 swayedTurkey to increase its support of Azerbaijan. The Soviet Unionoriginally supported Azerbaijan as the republic was dominated withcommunist leaders. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a reversalof Russian policy as it shifted support to Armenia due to a change ofconcern from political considerations to religious ones. Third,Western public may have shown sympathy for the Bosnian Muslimsover their suffering from Serbs, but little concern was given toCroatian attacks on Muslims.
  • 14. REDEFINING CIVILIZATION IDENTITYSamuel P. Huntington lists three requirements atorn country must meet before it can redefine itscivilization identity:1. The countrys economic and political elites have to enthusiastically endorse the transition.2. Second, its public has to endorse whatever new definition is adopted.3. Third, dominant groups in the recipient civilization have to embrace the convert.
  • 15. CAUSES OF WAR – CULTURECulturalist approaches are likely to accept the arguments of rationalchoice or structural analysis as both are seen as helping to constructsocietal norms. Culturalism begins with the premise that culturematters in any explanation. It is important to not make grandassumptions when using culture as a variable. For example,statements like “Muslim countries are resistant to democracy,” or“Confucianism helps explain capitalist development in East Asia” arenot appropriate. The problem with these claims is that it represents adecontextualized generalization that portrays culture as clear-cut,uniform, and basically static. Most Culturalists would argue today thatculture is multi-vocal and multidimensional. Comparativists dependon cultural analysis. It helps them to understand those particularidentities that someone identifies with, as it discerns the politicalbehavior that they are likely to pursue. Understanding societal normsfor instance would assist in almost any case study, as culturalvariables may be identified as having a primary effect on a particulardependent variable.
  • 16. CULTURE / CIVILIZATIONSamuel P. Huntington defines a civilization according to itscultural entity "villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities,religious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels ofcultural heterogeneity...A civilization is thus the highest culturalgrouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identitypeople have short of that which distinguishes humans fromother species. It is defined both by common objectiveelements, such as language, history, religion, customs,institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people."Huntington argues that people can refine their identities,resulting in their identification being redefined and thecomposition and boundaries of civilization. Civilizations canblend or even overlap. The can also encompass include sub-civilizations.
  • 17. CULTURAL COMMONALITIES (1)Cultural commonalities are becoming stronger following theend of the Cold War. Murray Weidenbaum gives an example ofthis effect on the East Asian economic bloc. "Despite thecurrent Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-basedeconomy of Asia is rapidly emerging as a new epicenter forindustry, commerce and finance. This strategic area containssubstantial amounts of technology and manufacturingcapability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial, marketing andservice acumen (Hong Kong), a fine communications network(Singapore), a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three)and very large endowments of land, resources, and labor(mainland China)...From Guangzhou to Singapore, from KualaLumpur to Manila, this influential network - often based onextensions of the traditional clans - has been described as thebackbone of the East Asian economy.
  • 18. CULTURAL COMMONALITIES (2)The European Community continues to resist including non-Arab-Muslim countries into its fold, thus encouraging them tocreate the Economic Cooperation Organization. There are tencountries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, andAfghanistan. Samuel P. Huntington argues that the clash ofcivilizations occurs at two levels: at the micro-level and themacro-level. At the micro-level, adjacent groups residing alongthe fault lines between civilizations battle one another over thecontrol of territory as well as each other. At the macro-level,states possessing different civilizations compete for militaryand economic superiority as well as fight over control ofinternational institutions and third parties, all while promotingtheir respective political and religious values.
  • 19. CULTURAL COMMONALITIES (3)Realists view the world as being wrought with anarchy. Thereis no legitimate authority above the nation-state. One mayargue from a realist perspective that even American allies areprone to act according to their own interests, even if it goesagainst Washington’s. Israel, a nation that has maintained apolicy of not openly declaring itself a nuclear power, has begunto openly defy US national security by selling the People’sRepublic Of China military hardware and technology, as well asa United States Patriot Missile. As the United States focuses itsattention on the prevention of rogue states developingweapons of mass destruction, US allies are willingly sellingdeadly military hardware and technology. Israel has longcooperated with China, accepting funding for the co-development and production of various strategic weapons.
  • 20. CULTURAL COMMONALITIES (4)Students may be interested in reading the1999 Cox Report that details espionagepractices of the Peoples Republic Of China(PRC) against the United States of America.PRC modernization strategies are discussedthroughout the report. Two versions wereproduced by the select committee with the firstciting classified information. A secondunclassified report was released that only citesinformation one can locate in the publicdomain. The second report was procured fromthe House Of Representatives database andrecompiled by your instructor. Students maydownload the report from our supplementalcourse site: www.tabakian.com.
  • 21. WEST VERSUS THE REST (1)Samuel P. Huntington stresses that civilization-consciousness is increasing and that global politics willbe focused on "the West and the Rest". This applies toconflicts between the Western powers, especially theUnited States, against "others". However, Huntingtonstresses that the first conflict(s) will be between the Westand several Islamic-Confucian states. He further arguesthat the West should strive towards greater cooperationamong its members while promoting further incorporatinginto the West those societies in Eastern Europe and LatinAmerica whose cultures are more adaptable.
  • 22. WEST VERSUS THE REST (2)The West should also coordinate its relations with Russia and Japan;prevent minor conflicts from developing into major inter-civilizationwars; limit the military capacity of Confucian and Islamic states; resistdrastic reductions in Western military capabilities and maintainmilitary superiority in the East and Southwest Asia; exploit differencesand conflicts that exist between Confucian and Islamic states;support those civilizations and their respective groups that admireWestern values and interests; bolster those international institutionsthat reflect and legitimize Western interests and values andencourage non-Western states to participate in these institutions.Many non-Western states have pursued a goal of modernizationwithout becoming Western. Japan is the only country that hassucceeded. Samuel P. Huntington infers that the West has tomaintain its economic and military strength to protect its interestsagainst any possible threats from alien civilizations. The fact is thatthe world will consist of various civilizations and each has to findsome way to coexist with one another.
  • 23. AMERICAN MILITARY POWER (1)In 1991, for the United States to overcome Iraqiforces in order to liberate Kuwait with minimumcasualties, they in effect spent nearly 7 timesthe amount that Iraq had spent preparing for theinvasion of Kuwait. United States estimateswere $6 billion for airlift and sealift; $30 billionfor global command control, communications,computers, and intelligence; and nearly $20billion each for the portion of the expeditionaryforces of the three military departments requiredto proceed with the war.. For the Iraqi estimates,assuming 100 percent of Iraq’s annual defenseexpenditures leading up to the invasion ofKuwait, Saddam Hussein’s total investmentwould be some $13 billion per year, concludingthe United States spent nearly seven times theamount of the Iraqi regime.
  • 24. AMERICAN MILITARY POWER (2)The main reasons for the US to maintain such ahigh military expenditure are:1. US commitments on a global basis. US military forces must be able to project power to regions located thousands of miles away.2. US forces require high technology in order to defeat its enemies with limited casualties.3. US maintains a much more expensive all- volunteer force.
  • 25. AMERICAN MILITARY POWER (3)In order for the United States to defeat the People’sRepublic of China in a conventional invasion, the annualUS military budget must be at least 7 times that of thePRC, between $2.65 and $5.30 trillion. Given that thePRC military budget is currently utilized to upgrade adepressingly archaic military, the current United Statesmilitary budget is acceptable. However, when the PLAhas achieved a level that either matches or surpassesthat of the United States, then the only possible optionavailable for a future US President would be a nuclearfirst strike. It is this reason that the People’s LiberationArmy has concentrated nearly 50% of their annualbudget on their Strategic Rocket Force division.
  • 26. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – ETHICS (1) Human beings are the ultimate weapon. Biological weapon development is presented in this PBS Special “The Living Weapon. All slides from this point incorporate information from the PBS website dedicated to “The Living Weapon”: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/weapon/index.html. Chapter 1: (2:37) "Teaser" introduction for The Living Weapon on American Experience. Chapter 2: (3:15) In December 1942, the U.S. government holds a secret meeting at the National Academy of Sciences to discuss a biological warfare program.
  • 27. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – ETHICS (2) Chapter 3: (4:16) During the summer of 1942, the British conduct secret anthrax tests on the Scottish island of Gruinard. Chapter 4: (5:11) American scientists begin secret biological warfare research at Camp Detrick in Maryland. Chapter 5: (4:00) New weapons of mass destruction are deployed during World War II. Chapter 6: (10:32) Surprising news of German and Japanese biowarfare research emerge at the end of World War II.
  • 28. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – ETHICS (3) Chapter 7: (5:59) The U.S. biological weapons program escalates during the Cold War. Chapter 8: (10:05) In 1954, American scientists begin testing biological agents on human subjects. Chapter 9: (5:13) The U.S. biological weapons program comes under public scrutiny. Chapter 10: (1:38) The United States ratifies international agreements leading to the end of the U.S. biological weapons program.
  • 29. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS – ETHICS (4) Title Unknown (Botulism) (9:43) This experiment was conducted to determine whether primates would make suitable research subjects in a study of botulism. Researchers inject a monkey with botulisum toxin to determine if he will exhibit the same effects as human victims. Operation Cover Up (9:04) This film questions how long military personnel would be able to remain in protective suits and gas masks in the event of an operation within a biological or chemical weapons area. Incapacitation by Enterotoxin (5:40) The film shows the effect of enterotoxin, a form of food poisoning, when delivered as an aerosol spray to monkeys.
  • 30. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (5) SECRET TESTING IN THE UNITED STATES The start of the Cold War brought new foes and new fears for the officials running Americas biological weapons program. Determined to anticipate possible Soviet attacks, the U.S. staged more than 200 domestic tests aimed at assessing national vulnerabilities to biological warfare. Ira Baldwin, Camp Detricks scientific director during World War II, left his position after the Allied victory in 1945 and returned to teaching at the University of Wisconsin. He continued to advise the government on issues concerning biological weapons, however, particularly the threat that might be posed by enemy spies releasing biological agents in American cities.
  • 31. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (6) In an October 1948 report, Ira Baldwin posited that the U.S. was "particularly vulnerable to this type of attack." But in order to determine the precise nature of these vulnerabilities, secret field tests would have to be done to ascertain the vulnerability of targets of potential interest to the enemy. The Armys Chemical Corps, which ran Camp Detrick, agreed with Baldwins assessment and set up a Special Operations Division at Camp Detrick to carry out the tests. Its first target was to be the Pentagon. In August 1949, the Special Operations Division operatives infiltrated the worlds largest office building and sprayed bacteria into the Pentagons air handling system, which then spread them throughout the structure.
  • 32. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (7) The operatives moved to larger scale testing, releasing clouds containing supposedly harmless bacteria from Navy ships off Norfolk, Virginia, in April 1950, and the San Francisco coast in September 1950. The San Francisco experiments showed exposure among almost all of the citys 800,000 residents. Had the bacteria released been anthrax bacteria or some other virulent pathogen, the number of casualties would have been immense.
  • 33. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (8) The St Jo Program and Large Area Concept The success of the first field tests only increased demand for more experiments. In response to an Air Force request, in 1953 the Chemical Corps created the St Jo Program and operatives staged mock anthrax attacks on St. Louis, Minneapolis, and Winnipeg. The bacteria were released from generators placed on top of cars, and local governments were told that "invisible smokescreen[s]" were being deployed to mask the city on enemy radar. The next stage was to increase dispersal patterns, dispensing particles from airplanes to find out how wide of an area they would affect. The first Large Area Concept experiment, in 1957, involved dispersing microorganisms over a swath from South Dakota to Minnesota; monitoring revealed that some of the particles eventually traveled some 1200 miles away. Further tests covered areas from Ohio to Texas and Michigan to Kansas. In the Armys words, these experiments "proved the feasibility of covering large areas of the country with [biological weapons] agents.”
  • 34. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (9) Airports and Subways Open-air testing continued through the 1960s, with the Special Operations Division operatives simulating even more audacious assaults. In 1965 they spread bacteria throughout Washingtons National Airport; a year later, agents dropped light bulbs filled with organisms onto the tracks in New Yorks subway system. "I think it spread pretty good," participant Wally Pannier later said, "because you had a natural aerosol developed every few minutes from every train that went past.”
  • 35. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (10) President Nixons 1969 termination of the United States offensive biological weapons program brought an end to the open-air testing, but the American public did not learn of this testing until 1977. Relatives of one elderly man Edward Nevin who had died of a nosocomial infection six months after the San Francisco tests sued the government in 1981, arguing that the supposedly harmless Serratia marcescens bacteria used in that test had in fact caused his death. In the event, the courts ruled against them, the main reason being that the plaintiffs could not prove that the bacteria used in the test were the same as those that killed Mr. Nevin.
  • 36. MAKING FOREIGN POLICY (1)• Foreign policies are the strategies governments use to guide their actions in the international arena. – Spell out the objectives state leaders have decided to pursue in a given relationship or situation. – Foreign policy process: How policies are arrived at and implemented.
  • 37. MAKING FOREIGN POLICY (2)• Comparative foreign policy. – Study of foreign policy in various states in order to discover whether similar types of societies or governments consistently have similar types of foreign policies.• Foreign policy outcomes result from multiple forces at various levels of analysis.
  • 38. MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (1)• Rational model: – Decision makers set goals, evaluate their relative importance, calculate the costs and benefits of each possible course of action, and then choose the one with the highest benefits and lowest costs. – Role of uncertainty. – Accepting of risk versus averse to risk.
  • 39. MODELS OF DECISION MAKING (2)• Organizational process model: – Foreign policy makers generally skip the labor- intensive process of identifying goals and alternative actions, relying instead for most decisions on standardized responses or standard operating procedures (sop).• Government bargaining (bureaucratic) model: – Foreign policy decisions result from the bargaining process among various government agencies with somewhat divergent interests in the outcome.
  • 40. DECISION MAKING AS STEERING
  • 41. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (1)• Study of individual decision making revolves around the question of rationality. – To what extent are national leaders (or citizens) able to make rational decisions in the national interest and thus conform to the realist view of IR?• Difficulties of oversimplification – Individual decision makers have differing values and beliefs and have unique personalities. – Idiosyncrasies.
  • 42. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (2)• Beyond individual idiosyncrasies, individual decision making diverges from the rational model in at least three systematic ways: • Decision makers suffer from misperceptions and selective perceptions when they compile information on the likely consequences of their choices. • The rationality of individual cost-benefit calculations is undermined by emotions that decision makers feel while thinking about the consequences of their actions (affective bias).
  • 43. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (3) • Cognitive biases are systematic distortions of rational calculations based not on emotional feelings but simply on the limitations of the human brain in making choices. • Cognitive dissonance • Justification of effort • Wishful thinking • Mirror image • Projection • Historical analogies
  • 44. INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKERS (4)• Two specific modifications of the rational model of decision making have been proposed to accommodate psychological realities. – Bounded rationality: • Takes into account the costs of seeking and processing information. – Optimizing. – Satisfying. – Prospect theory: • Decision makes go through two phases: editing phase and the evaluation phase. • Holds that evaluations take place by comparison with a reference point, which is often the status quo but might be some past or expected situation.
  • 45. GROUP PSYCHOLOGY• Group dynamics can be a promoter of state interests but they can also introduce new sources of irrationality into the decision-making process.• Groupthink – Refers to the tendency for groups to reach decisions without accurately assessing their consequences, because individual members tend to go along with ideas they think the others support – Groups tend to be overly optimistic about the chances of success and are thus more willing to take risks. • Iran-Contra scandal
  • 46. CRISIS MANAGEMENT• Crises are foreign policy situations in which outcomes are very important and time frames are compressed. –Time constraints –Groupthink –Psychological stress
  • 47. DOMESTIC POLITICS• Foreign policy is shaped not only by the internal dynamics of individual and group decision making but also by the states and societies within which decision makers operate.
  • 48. BUREAUCRACIES• Diplomats: – Virtually all states maintain a diplomatic corps, or foreign service, of diplomats in embassies in foreign capitals. – Political appointees. – Career diplomats. – Tension common between state leaders and foreign policy bureaucrats.• Interagency tensions: – Bureaucratic rivalry as an influence on foreign policy challenges the notion of states as unitary actors in the international system.
  • 49. INTEREST GROUPS• Coalitions of people who share a common interest in the outcome of some political issue and who organize themselves to try to influence the outcome.• Lobbying: – The process of talking with legislators or officials to influence their decisions on some set of issues. – Three important elements: • Ability to gain a hearing with busy officials. • Ability to present cogent arguments for one’s case. • Ability to trade favors in return for positive action on an issue.
  • 50. MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1)• Huge interlocking network of governmental agencies, industrial corporations, and research institutes, working together to supply a nation’s military forces.• Response to the growing importance of technology• Encompasses a variety of constituencies, each of which has an interest in military spending. – Corporations, military officers, universities, and scientific institutes that receive military research contracts. – Revolving door. – PACS from the military industry.
  • 51. MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (2)The phrase, “Military Industrial Complex” wasfirst used by President Dwight D. Eisenhowerduring his farewell address to the nation onJanuary 17, 1961. He warns against theincreasing influence of corporate influence inall areas of government. More significant isthe fact that before the presidency, DwightEisenhower’s was a five-star general in theUnited States Army. During the Second WorldWar, he served as Supreme Commander ofthe Allied forces in Europe, with responsibilityfor planning and supervising the successfulinvasion of France and Germany in 1944–45.In 1951, he became the first supremecommander of NATO.
  • 52. PUBLIC OPINION (1)• Range of views on foreign policy issues held by the citizens of a state.• Has a greater influence on foreign policy in democracies than in authoritarian governments. – Legitimacy – Propaganda – Journalists as gatekeepers
  • 53. PUBLIC OPINION (2)• In democracies, public opinion generally has less effect on foreign policy than on domestic policy. – Attentive public – Foreign policy elite – Rally ’round the flag syndrome – Diversionary foreign policy
  • 54. LEGISLATURES (1)• Conduit through which interest groups and public opinion can wield influence. – Presidential systems; separate elections. • Legislatures play a direct role in making foreign policy. • Different rules apply, however, to the use of military force. – Rally ’round the flag. – May challenge the president if they have power of the “purse”.
  • 55. LEGISLATURES (2)– Parliamentary systems; political parties are dominant • Often parliamentary executives do not need to submit treaties or policies for formal approval by the legislature. • Call elections; new executive • Legislatures play a key role in designing and implementing foreign policy.