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  • 1. VOLUME 12, ISSUE 4 SUMMER 2003 NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW ASIA IN THE SHADOW OF A RISING POWERTHE US—PRC—TAIWAN TRIANGLE A PACKAGE DEAL: CONTENDING WITH CHINA’S RE-INTEGRATION John Allen Williams INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY David WelkerCHINA AND THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH KOREA: WHAT ARE THEKOREAN PENINSULA ISSUES AND US OPTIONS? Bradley O. BabsonBOOK REVIEW: 20:21 Vision STRATEGY WATCH by Bill EmmottRESEARCH REPORTS: The Transformation of National Security ~ International Law and thePreemptive Use of Force ~ Geriatric Teenagers ~ Post-Saddam Iraq: The Shiite Factor ~ TheUS and Israel: The Road Ahead ~ Why the Security Council FailedRECENT SPEAKERS: Ambassador Richard Williamson ~ Ambassador Thomas Pickering
  • 2. The National Strategy Forum Review is a quarterly publication ofNATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM Richard E. Friedman Chair/President Board of Directors Lester Crown The National Strategy Forum is a not-for-profit, non- Richard A. Behrenhausen partisan organization committed to the following principles: James R. Donnelley • The goal of United States national strategy is a genuine and just peace, sought in common cause with the community of free and Michael P. Galvin independent nations. • The advancement and preservation of democracy is essential to James N. Pritzker promote human rights, inspire principled cultural achievement, and maximize economic development. William Wolf • Informed public opinion and an enduring non-partisan consen- sus are fundamental parts of national security in a democratic Morris I. Leibman society. (1911–1992) • • • Founding Chair The National Strategy Forum has no membership fee, but it de- pends upon the support of its members. The Forum is a publicly supported charitable institution under section 501(c)(3) of the Inter- nal Revenue Code. As a non-profit organization, the Forum is funded solely by contributions from individuals, foundations, andNational Strategy Forum Review corporations. All contributions to the Forum are tax deductible. • • • Publisher The opinions expressed in the National Strategy Forum Review do Richard E. Friedman not necessarily reflect those of the National Strategy Forum or its members. Editor • • • Lauren Bean © 2003 National Strategy Forum, Inc. Editorial Board National Strategy Forum Marilyn Diamond 53 W. Jackson, Suite 516, Chicago, IL 60604 Rachel E. Golden John Allen Williams Endy Zemenides 2
  • 3. NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEWVolume 12, Issue 4 Summer 2003 TABLE OF CONTENTSLetter from the Publisher 4The US—PRC—Taiwan Triangle 5John Allen WilliamsChina and the Future of the Korean Peninsula 9Bradley O. BabsonA Package Deal: Contending with China’s Re-integration into 14the Global EconomyDavid WelkerNorth Korea: What are the Issues and US Options? 19Book Review: 20:21 Vision by Bill Emmott 25Reviewed by Lauren BeanRecent Speakers 27Strategy Watch 30Research Reports 36 NATIONAL STRATEGY FORUM REVIEW 3
  • 4. LETTER FROM THE PUBLISHER he theme of this issue of the National • The Korean Peninsula: North Korea’s nu- Strategy Forum Review is “Asia in the clear weapons development program threat- Shadow of a Rising Power.” The focus is ens stability in the region. How will the USon East Asia. However, we expanded the strate- react to North Korea, and will there be agic geographic boundaries of Asia to include: on multilateral coalition formed to deal withthe west, Iran; on the east, Japan; on the north, North Korea? Could the Korean problemthe Arctic Ocean; and on the south, the Indian strengthen the US-China relationship?Ocean. About one-half of the world population • The PRC-Taiwan-US triangle: Can a PRC-lives in Asia. Iran and India loom large in future Taiwan conflict be avoided? Is there a roleUS strategic calculations. for the US? Does continuing tension be- Iran, a hybrid Islamic theocracy/democracy, tween China and Taiwan threaten the evolv-is identified by the United States as having a nu- ing China-US relationship?clear weapons development program and provid-ing a safe harbor for international terrorism. It Another article looks behind the scenes at thealso has a young generation with western aspira- formulation of US foreign policy and how totions who chafe at restrictions imposed by con- identify subjective judgments that frequentlyservative religious leaders. The issue is whether guide and justify strategic decisions. The testthis pivotal state can contribute to world stability case is North Korea. We have adapted an ingen-and how can this be achieved. ious software program developed by scholars at India is well positioned to become a major the University of Chicago Graduate School ofAsian regional power and may become a world Business to identify a wide range of issues af-power, as well. It may now have more people fecting the Korean Peninsula to see how disci-than China. It is the world’s most populous de- plined probability equations may apply to thesemocracy and has the world’s second largest Is- issues.lamic population. A strong India-US relationship A critical strategic decision for the US isis developing. whether it will seek to become part of a condo- minium of Asian states, including the PRC, Ja-Three articles in this issue focus on major prob- pan, and India. China’s strategic objectives arelems affecting Asia: unknown: Will it seek hegemony or shared• Economic development: What does increas- power in the region? The reciprocal considera- ing integration of world trade and financial tion is whether the US strategic objective is markets mean for Asia? What are the effects dominance or shared power in the region. An- of the PRC as an economic magnet in the swers to these questions will define future US- region? Is globalization a positive or nega- China relations and future stability for Asia. tive factor for Asia?SUMMER 2003 4 NSF REVIEW
  • 5. THE US–PRC–TAIWAN TRIANGLE John Allen Williams he Chinese pictogram for "crisis" is a would become important if that happened. Fi- combination of "challenge" and nally, everyone needs to consider the effect of "opportunity." That is certainly true of public health issues in the region on the rest ofthe crisis-laden relationships among the United the world.States, the Peoples Republic of China, and the The underlying political problem is the unre-Republic of China on Taiwan. This brief essay solved status of Taiwan. It is an almost intracta-can only touch upon the complex interactions ble issue, with the PRC regarding Taiwan as aamong these international actors, but it hopes to renegade province, Taiwan enjoying its de factooutline some of their more important aspects. (but not de jure) independence but uncertain as To begin with the conclusions, the trilateral to its best political future, and the United Statesrelationship between the US, the PRC, and Tai- hoping to keep the issue dormant to preservewan need not degenerate into armed conflict, stability in the region.although the possibility of this happening is thegreatest conventional military threat faced by the The United States’ PerspectiveUS. The US needs to consider carefully the re-spective places of the PRC and Taiwan in its The main concern of the United States is re-long term economic and security interests. gional stability. With the significant exceptionBased on this assessment, the US needs to con- of recent North Korean actions, the US is gener-sider in advance what it would do to support Tai- ally happy with the status quo in the Far East: awan if the PRC decided to use force to resolve prosperous and increasingly democratic Taiwan,the issue of Taiwanese independence once and a China that is engaged with the world politicallyfor all. Similarly, the possibility of catastrophic and economically, and a US viewed by most inpolitical or economic collapse of the PRC, while the region as a benign and even welcome he-remote, is not outside the realm of possibility. It gemon. Certainly there are storm clouds on theis important to think now about the issues that horizon, in particular the looming confrontationDr. John Allen Williams is a Professor of Political Science at Loyola University Chicago and chairs theAcademic Advisory Committee of the National Strategy Forum. A frequent media commentator, he is aretired Captain in the U.S. Naval Reserve with extensive experience in the Pentagon as a strategic plan-ner. He is Executive Director and President Elect of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces andSociety.NSF REVIEW 5 SUMMER 2003
  • 6. THE US–PRC–TAIWAN TRIANGLEwith North Korea on the issue of their nuclear including missile tests near Taiwan intended toprogram and technology exports. Overall, how- influence the Taiwanese presidential electionever, the US can be pleased with the direction (which it did, but in the opposite direction fromthe region has taken. that intended by the PRC), amphibious landing The US has long viewed itself as a protector exercises, and a significant deployment of sur-of China, and many felt betrayed by the success- face to surface missiles across the strait fromful Communist revolution there and – worse still Taiwan. US Congressional support for Taiwan– Chinese involvement the following year in the has led some in Taiwan to believe (falsely) thatwar in Korea. Much of that paternal interest was US assistance can be assumed, even in the facetransferred to the Kuomintang regime of Chiang of a Taiwanese declaration of independenceKai-shek when his nationalist government fled to from China. The position of the US executiveTaiwan in 1949. Despite the rapprochement branch is one of studied ambiguity, but the cur-with China since President Nixon’s 1972 visit, rent administration has been more supportive ofthere remains considerable public and govern- Taiwan than others in recent memory.mental support for Taiwan. This is particularly The US has not sold the Taiwanese all thetrue of the US Congress, which has passed a sophisticated armaments they want, but bases itsnumber of resolutions of support for Taiwan in sales on the threat from across the strait. Theits resistance to forcible integration with China. PRC regards all such sales as illegitimate inter- The official US position is that it does not ference in the internal affairs of China. PRCcare about the eventual resolution of the Taiwan cross straits military pressure is the rationale forissue, so long as it is accomplished peacefully the US sale of weapons to Taiwan.and with the consent of the Taiwanese people.This is somewhat disingenuous, since the US The Mainland Chinese Perspectivewould clearly not like to see an early integrationof the Taiwanese economy with a China still After the fiasco getting the US Navy EP-3 , elec-under the authoritarian control of the Communist tronic surveillance airplane back from China (inParty and seeking to increase its strategic power. pieces) in 2001, US observers may view the Chi-Still, the US would have no choice but to accept nese perspective as arrogant and perhaps reck-a peaceful integration, and this is the best long lessly overconfident. In fact, actions that mayterm (perhaps very long term) outcome. appear as arrogant and reckless to an outside Of greater concern is what the US should do observer are often grounded on a combination ofin the event of increasing pressure by the PRC to deep-seated and persistent PRC insecurities andget the Taiwanese to agree to accelerate the pace genuine national security considerations. Ameri-of integration on PRC terms. Many forms of cans tend to forget the years of Western domina-PRC military pressure have already been seen, tion of China in the 1800s, with spheres of influ-SUMMER 2003 6 NSF REVIEW
  • 7. THE US–PRC–TAIWAN TRIANGLEence, preferential trading relationships, and even government.) One suggestion, made by NSFextraterritoriality in large parts of coastal China. President Richard Friedman and the author in theThe Chinese have not forgotten, and for them Washington Times, was for a loosely definednational sovereignty is paramount. They do not confederation that delayed the difficult decisionswish to be subservient to another power, and are and permitted at least the appearance of a politi-hypersensitive to any slight, real or imagined. cal movement. This proposal is not on the table Taiwan is a central concern to the leaders of at this time. Any action that forces this issue pre-the PRC, and they are capable of viewing the maturely, such as PRC provocations or a unilat-most remote events as somehow related to the eral declaration of independence by Taiwan, is apossible independence of Taiwan. Central to grave threat to regional stability that could wellthis is the desire to limit the international influ- involve the United States.ence of the Taiwanese government as much as In the long run, the PRC wishes to becomepossible. In particular, Taiwan must be excluded the hegemon of the region, and may have ambi-from membership in any international organiza- tions beyond that. This means that the influencetion that assumes government to government of the US, Japan, and perhaps South Korea mustrelations. This applies also to the Taiwanese bid be counterbalanced by an increase in Chinesefor observer status in the World Health Organi- economic and military power. Whatever thezation. The current SARS crisis in Taiwan may international developments may be, one may behave been exacerbated by the lack of official certain that the elites governing mainland Chinaconnection with the WHO, and the PRC’s reluc- will attempt to preserve their status at all costs.tance and delay in permitting official WHO visi-tors to Taiwan. Given the origins of SARS in a The Taiwanese Perspectiveremote Chinese province and the Chinese cover-up of the existence and extent of the disease in The Taiwanese are in no hurry to move closer toits early stages, this was particularly galling to the mainland politically, and would like to pre-the Taiwanese. serve the status quo as long as possible – at least Now that the status of Hong Kong and Ma- until the PRC evolves politically and economi-cao is settled, the PRC wants to move ahead as cally. There are differences among Taiwanesequickly as possible toward the eventual reunifi- leaders on the desirability of closer economiccation of Taiwan with the mainland. The “one ties, however. From a recent visit to Taiwan, itChina” policy is sufficiently vague to permit appears that leaders of the Kuomintang Partyvarious interpretations, but the devil is in the (KMT) are more supportive of close economicdetails. (Recall that Chiang Kai-shek and Mao ties than are the leaders of the currently rulingZedong each had a “one China” policy, with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), whosedifference being who represented its legitimate charter explicitly calls for an independent Tai-NSF REVIEW 7 SUMMER 2003
  • 8. THE US–PRC–TAIWAN TRIANGLEwan. One problem presented by closer ties is possibilities that would greatly alter the terms ofthat Taiwanese business elites tied to cross-strait the triangular relationship were they to occur:economic arrangements become a pressure • PRC impatience with the pace of change,group for friendlier relations with the mainland leading to military provocation.than may be desired by political elites. Despite • Taiwanese misunderstanding of the limits ofthe misgivings of some, economic relations are US support, leading to a unilateral declara-growing and the amount of Taiwanese invest- tion of Taiwanese sovereignty.ment in China is a significant part of the Chinese • Some action on the part of Japan, such as theeconomy, particularly in the high technology development of Japanese nuclear weapons insector. response to the challenge from North Korea. The Taiwanese are generally circumspect in • Expansion of the SARS epidemic or sometheir dealings with the PRC and in other dealings other pandemic.that relate to the PRC-Taiwanese relationship.Most leaders, even in the ruling DPP, understand Economic and/or political collapse of thethat US and international support cannot be PRC, perhaps in response to the significant cen-guaranteed if they provoke the PRC unnecessar- trifugal forces already existing in the society andily. In that connection it is interesting to note the additional stresses of a health crisis. Ironi-current calls by the Taiwanese government for cally enough, westernized Taiwanese politicalinternational condemnation of the PRC for cov- elites would be ideal candidates to strengthen aering up the SARS epidemic and demanding a unified Chinese government, something currentPRC apology for this. It seems a safe enough leaders on the mainland may realize all too well.issue to make the point that the PRC was negli- Whatever the future may hold for the rela-gent in its international obligations, and it puts tionship between the United States, the PRC, andthe PRC’s subsequent reluctance to let official Taiwan, it would behoove US strategists to con-WHO representatives visit Taiwan in a particu- sider the range of possibilities so they are notlarly bad light. Health issues transcend national caught unawares by developments.boundaries, and their resolution was clearly im-peded by PRC policies with respect to Taiwan.Problems and ComplicationsPredictions about the future tend to be linear ex-trapolations of current trends. One cannot antici-pate radical discontinuities and so they often donot figure into planning. But there are severalSUMMER 2003 8 NSF REVIEW
  • 9. CHINA AND THE FUTURE OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA Bradley O. Babson he critical role that China played in end of the Korean war. The sequence of events bringing the U.S. and the Democratic Peo- leading up to this shift is important: ples Republic of Korea (DPRK) togetherfor initial talks in Beijing in April 2003 is a har- • September 1990 -- the Soviet Union and thebinger of the future. This revealed the reality Republic of Korea (ROK) established diplo- matic relations.that China must play a proactive and not acqui-escent role in creating an environment of coop- • September 1991 -- DPRK became a membereration towards finding solutions to the complex of the United Nations in its own right, repre- senting a de facto recognition by the interna-set of issues involved. China cannot avoid this tional community of the two separate Ko-role, and the U.S. cannot avoid adopting a strate- rean states.gic partnership with China in managing the • December 1991 -- The Agreement on Rec-global and regional dimensions of change on the onciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges andKorean peninsula. This article will examine Cooperation (Basic Agreement) was signed by the two Koreas.China’s relations with the two Koreas, explorethe underlying forces driving China and the U.S • February 1992 -- The Joint Declaration oftowards this strategic partnership, and assess De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was signed by the two Koreas.implications for future U.S. policy in NortheastAsia. • August 1992 -- China and ROK normalized relations.China and the Two Koreas • December 1992 – The Soviet Union disinte- grated.Chinese policy towards the two Koreas under-went a fundamental change in the early 1990’s, The formal recognition of ROK, coupled with areflecting a shift in the underlying structure of period of warming relations between the tworelationships that had remained stable since the Koreas and UN acceptance of the two stateBradley O. Babson is a consultant on Asian affairs with a specialization on economic engagement withDPRK and Northeast Asia economic cooperation, as well as Southeast Asia. He worked for the WorldBank for 26 years before retiring in 2000, serving as a Senior Loan Officer on Indonesia from 1983-87,Division Chief for Education and Health for eight Asian countries from 1997-92, and the first ResidentRepresentative to Hanoi, Vietnam from 1994-97. From 1997-2000 he served as Senior Advisor in theoffice of the Regional Vice President for East Asia.NSF REVIEW 9 SUMMER 2003
  • 10. CHINA AND THE FUTURE OF THE KOREAN PENINSULAframework, anchored China’s shift to active rela- China’s accession to the World Trade Organiza-tions with both Koreas. The collapse of the So- tion (WTO). Beijing has also worked closelyviet Union created major complications for this with ROK both openly and quietly to managenew set of relations, as DPRK lost both political expanding bilateral relations and sensitive as-and economic support from the Soviet Union pects of relations with DPRK, including the on-and was forced to rely increasingly on China as going need for food aid and increasing flow ofits benefactor, just when China was pulling back refugees.from its traditional role through warming ties The expansion of Chinese-ROK ties alsowith ROK and hardening of terms of economic are having an affect on public opinion in ROK,assistance to DPRK. The nuclear and food cri- with attitudes towards China becoming increas-ses that followed in the mid-1990’s tested ingly favorable at the same time that attitudesChina’s new policy of even handedness. The towards the U.S. are becoming more negative.U.S. took center stage through the negotiations There are many factors affecting shifts in publicthat led to the Agreed Framework, and inter- perceptions, but among them is the realizationKorean reconciliation was put on the back- that ROK has a growing stake in its future rela-burner. This led to a situation where China’s tions with China and that it is in the Korean in-role came to be dominated by efforts to maintain terest to balance this perception with future rela-stability through expanded economic support to tions with the U.S.the failing DPRK system and encouragement of Chinese relations with DPRK have beenROK to continue to pursue a policy of engage- strained in recent years, but have retained thement with DPRK. Relations with the U.S. on essential characteristics of DPRK dependence onDPRK remained awkward for both countries, but Chinese political and economic aid to maintainbound by a shared desire to seek a peaceful out- the viability of the DPRK regime, which hascome that was reflected in cooperation for the been faced with great external and internal pres-Four Party peace talks that took place in a fitful sures for change. DPRK’s decision to establishway in the late 1990’s. an industrial enterprise zone in Shiniju in 2002 In recent years China’s relations with ROK and appoint a Chinese businessman with ques-have deepened considerably. China is now tionable credentials as the administrator, and theROK’s largest trading partner and the trend is for Chinese response of placing him under houseaccelerating trade and investment ties following arrest for tax evasion, illustrates the lack of closeSUMMER 2003 10 NSF REVIEW
  • 11. CHINA AND THE FUTURE OF THE KOREAN PENINSULAcoordination of DPRK and Chinese policy. Driving Forces Towards a Strategic Part- China’s active courting of ROK and contin- nership with the U.S. on Korean Issuesued willingness to buttress the DPRK regime,despite embarrassing North Korean behaviors, The nuclear crisis that was triggered by DPRK’sare consistent with its larger national security admission of a clandestine uranium enrichmentobjectives. In order to counter post Cold War program in October 2002 spelled the effectivedominance by the U.S., China adopted in the late end to the Agreed Framework, which had ex-1990s a “new concept of security” in which it cluded China as a partner in containing DPRK’sembraced regional security dialogue and coop- nuclear program. U.S. recognition that a multi-eration. It has pursued this policy actively with lateral rather than bilateral dialogue processthe Asia Regional Forum sponsored by ASEAN, would be needed to forge a viable replacementand the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for the Agreed Framework, was a tacit accep-which it helped create with Central Asian coun- tance that China’s influence on the Korean pen-tries. In Northeast Asia, this tactic has been re- insula should be harnessed to achieve sharedflected in the pursuit of the two Korea policy. goals through active collaboration on the secu- Looking ahead, China can be expected to rity agenda. This new working relationship hasretain an honest broker relationship with the two fundamentally altered the dynamics for manag-Koreas, respecting the legitimate interests of ing the crisis and can be expected to be a majoreach and seeking peaceful means to advance in- factor in future handling of Korean issues.ter-Korean reconciliation, regional stability and The need to contain the nuclear crisis is theincreased economic ties. The recent change in primary reason that China has taken a more pro-Chinese leadership is also likely to lead to a active role in international efforts to resolve Ko-hardening of Chinese intolerance for DPRK mis- rean issues. China’s interests are both short-termbehaviors, even if there is no shift from the fun- and long-term and its behavior is guided by both.damental policy of not permitting the regime to In the short-term, China wants to maintain stabil-collapse. The fact that China recently felt com- ity and avoid military confrontation over the nu-pelled to cut off temporarily oil pipeline flow to clear issue while aiming for a negotiated solu-DPRK to constrain potential actions that would tion. It also wants to minimize overflow prob-escalate tensions with the U.S. in the wake of the lems of the breakdown in DPRK and create anIraq war, can be interpreted as a recognition and environment supportive of a managed changesignal that the new leadership is prepared to act process. Longer term, China would like to see ato reinforce its views on DPRK behavior.NSF REVIEW 11 SUMMER 2003
  • 12. CHINA AND THE FUTURE OF THE KOREAN PENINSULAnuclear free Korean peninsula, a reduced mili- sion of U.S. hegemony and methods that are in-tary presence by the U.S., maintenance of a two compatible with China’s own interests. In deal-state framework of peaceful coexistence between ing with DPRK, this requires that China activelythe two Koreas with a gradual process of re- collaborate with the U.S.integration, and a reform process for DPRK that Longer term forces are active as well. Areduces direct dependence on China while transformation process for DPRK aimed to inte-DPRK becomes increasingly integrated in re- grate DPRK into the international communitygional economic and security relationships that will require that new forms of regional securityare consistent with maintaining stability and ex- and regional economic cooperation be devised topanded cooperation among the countries of the reinforce the dynamics of managed change onregion. the Korean peninsula. The architecture of con- The U.S. has accepted global responsibility ventional security structures based on Cold Warfor leadership in combating terrorism and prolif- alliance frameworks will need to give way to aeration of weapons of mass destruction. The new order in Northeast Asia. This will have tosuccess of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have be buttressed by improved institutional mecha-convinced the world that the U.S. will not shirk nisms for regional economic cooperation. An-these responsibilities, and the main question for choring the solution to the DPRK issues in thesethe future is how this leadership will be exer- new regional cooperation mechanisms wouldcised. These developments have not fundamen- both be consistent with China’s “new concept oftally altered the equation of interests and objec- security” and with the U.S. view that a multilat-tives of containing DPRK’s nuclear program, but eral framework will be needed to ensure thatthey have altered perceptions of U.S. priorities DPRK does not shirk its transformation processand methods of achieving these objectives. This and revert to old ways. The new administrationhas consequences for the way the U.S. manages of President Roh in ROK has already embracedits relations with both Koreas and creates a new the idea of regionalism as the future path for Ko-rationale for a continuing active policy towards rean security and prosperity. If this vision is tothe two Koreas that supercedes the old and now become reality, Chinese willingness to providedefunct Cold War rationale. For its part, China more proactive regional leadership will be essen-recognizes that it must accept U.S. leadership on tial. Support and encouragement from the U.S.the post Cold War global agenda, while at the will also be required, both in aligning futuresame time it seeks to constrain potential expan- Asian security policy and deployment of theSUMMER 2003 12 NSF REVIEW
  • 13. CHINA AND THE FUTURE OF THE KOREAN PENINSULAU.S. military in Northeast Asia with these new parties.frameworks, and in active participation in the Another issue is the future of the Korea Pen-economic agenda. insula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Neither China nor Russia are membersImplications for Future U.S. Policy in of KEDO. If KEDO will be given any new roleAsia in the future as a result of a negotiated solution to the DPRK nuclear crisis, it would be desirableOne implication for the U.S. of expanding coop- to include both countries in a multilateral efforteration with China on Korean issues is that the to deal with DPRK’s energy needs, using thisinformal alliance structure with ROK and Japan mechanism to forge a link to regional economicwill need to be realigned to embrace this reality. cooperation in energy.The Trilateral Coordination Group (TCOG) that More broadly, U.S. policy towards Northeastwas established during the Clinton Administra- Asia in the future should be guided by a desire totion to coordinate policy towards DPRK between promote long term stability in the region, basedthe U.S., has been an important mechanism to on increased transparency and expanded interde-smooth differences in perception and approach pendence in security and economic engagement with DPRK, even though the American economic interests should be pursueddriving interests of the three countries do not with an eye to expanded trade and investmentcompletely coincide. Finding a way to broaden opportunities driven by regional and not justthe consultation framework to include China, globalization dynamics. Building an environ-rather than relying solely on bilateral meetings ment in which China’s rise to power and exer-with China by the three alliance countries would cise of leadership can be congruent with U.S.seem to be a desirable direction for the future. security and economic interests is the major pol- If a nuclear agreement can be successfully icy challenge facing the U.S. in Asia. Putting anegotiated with DPRK, then verification of com- process of transformative change on the Koreanpliance will be an important and long term re- peninsula into this framework would anchor U.S.quirement. Chinese participation in a future Korea policy in the larger agenda to promoteverification arrangement would be one way to peace and prosperity in this critically importanthelp ensure DPTK compliance and reduce the region.risk of nuclear materials being shipped over theDPRK-Chinese border for potential sale to otherNSF REVIEW 13 SUMMER 2003
  • 14. A PACKAGE DEAL: CONTENDING WITH CHINA’S RE-INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY David Welker hina’s domestic situation has histori- on the international scene, there are more limita- cally been the only limiting factor as to tions on how China may act, as there are more how much influence China could exert channels for smaller Asian nations to counterin its neighborhood. When the internal forces China’s actions either multilaterally or throughcontributed to civil war and disarray in China, international law. After emerging from its post-the people at China’s periphery were left alone revolution self-isolation of the Mao years, evento practice some form of ‘self-government’ with- China’s autocratic but “pragmatic” leadershipout paying homage to the distant Chinese capital. recognized that there were rules to the game andWhen China’s imperial rulers maintained solid have to one degree or another curbed the age-oldcentral control, the neighboring peoples could impulse to dictate to its neighbors. The develop-expect emissaries, raiding parties and expecta- ment of the rule of international law in the sec-tions of some form of subservience to the Chi- ond half of the 20th century placed the large andnese Son of Heaven. The post-colonial inde- powerful nations under some restraints.pendent states in Asia are only facing the most David Zwieg, in his bookrecent instance of China’s latest ‘emergence’ “Internationalizing China: Domestic Interestsfrom itself. How to contend with China’s inte- and Global Linkages”, defines the re-integrationgration to the regional and global economy is a or ‘internationalization’ of China in the last 25question that China’s neighbors have had to ask years in his recent book in this way: “the ex-themselves for centuries. They’ve been here panded flows of goods, services and peoplebefore. across state boundaries, thereby increasing the The difference is that now the inter-relations share of transnational exchanges relative to do-between nation-states are at least nominally the mestic ones, along with a decline in the level ofrealm of international law, governing regulation regulation affecting those flows many sections ofof maritime navigation, international commerce, China’s society and economy have become in-exchange of alleged criminals or even in the con- creasingly more internationalized.”duct of warfare. Marking China’s ‘emergence’ Other Asian leaders (there are exceptions,David Welker is Special Projects Director at the Food & Allied Service Trades Department of the AFL-CIO. He previously was an Economic Policy Analyst at the Congressional U.S.-China Security ReviewCommission.SUMMER 2003 14 NSF REVIEW
  • 15. CONTENDING WITH CHINA’S RE-INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMYsuch as the Burmese junta or North Korea under By the mid-1990s, some observers of theboth Kims) accepted the need to hitch their for- regional economy felt China lagged behind itstunes to the global institutions and practices that neighbors due to its ‘half-hearted’ embrace offed internationalization. And the Asian leaders, globalization: China still maintained a hugeto one degree or another, implemented domestic state-owned industrial sector and banking sys-policies that accommodated the flows in goods, tem, it controlled its foreign exchange flows andservices, capital and people. Japan and the four flows of ‘hot capital’ into its nascent, flawedAsian Tigers – the Republic of China on Taiwan, equity markets, and it refused to let its currencySouth Korea, Singapore and the British colony be traded on the open market. Ethnic ChineseHong Kong – rode this wave to rapid industriali- from Hong Kong, Taiwan and elsewhere in Asiazation and development. China was very late to were the early adopters of China as the preferredthis internationalization trend, making its tenta- investment destination, but overall the invest-tive steps to reopen to the world only in 1979. ment flows into Asia were balanced until theChina was always going to be bigger than its mid-1990s. Then the Asian contagion of 1997-neighbors, but it was starting from a very low 1998 hit, where a series of competitive devalua-level of integration that would attract the global tions, a sudden evaporation of hot capital invest-players in the 1980s. ment into Asian markets, a rolling wave of bank Following the negative international reaction failures, an overall interruption in trade and capi-to the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, the other tal flows, and the implosion of budgets in capitalAsian nations were able to make gains in the after capital shocked the entire market for trade and capital at the Oddly, China was not infected – at least thatexpense of the politically out of favor Chinese. was the analysis at the time. Now there are con-Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines siderable academic disputes ongoing as toand, to a lesser degree, India saw investment whether China’s actually achieved its officiallylevels rise, trade flows increase, economic announced growth rates for the years 1998 togrowth quicken and living standards rise steadily 2000 – and mostly because of what previouslyduring the period of ‘globalization’ of the late were policies criticized by the investing commu-1980s to mid 1990s. China’s massive market nity. Its policies in implementing incrementalalways loomed large in the international players’ reforms now were seen as the factors of China’sminds, but the infrastructure – the ‘hardware’ of ‘stability’ in the days following the Asian crisis.airports, highways, seaports, electricity grids and The economic crisis created widespread politicalwaterways – and the economic regime – the change in Indonesia and the Philippines or‘software’ of macro-economic policies, reliable caused reforms of otherwise sclerotic economiccontract regulation and an investor-friendly bu- policies in Thailand and South Korea. Yet thesereaucracy – often lagged in China. countries fell out of favor due to the ensuingNSF REVIEW 15 SUMMER 2003
  • 16. CONTENDING WITH CHINA’S RE-INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY‘instability’ after the crisis. The one-party sys- Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) and thetem in China provided ‘stability’ and the concept Asian Corporate Governance Associationof the Chinese process of economic reforms as a (ACGA) released a report on 380 publicly traded‘model’ emerged. companies, which gave an average score of 62 The overall improved attitude towards out of 100 using such benchmarks as discipline,China’s model in the investing community oc- transparency, independence and accountability.curred at a time when the improvements in The governments and corporations in Asia couldChina’s infrastructure reached a ‘critical mass’ use the poor level of governance in China todayto facilitate large investments in the export- as a measuring standard to raise their own prac-processing sector in China. As many large mul- tices. Having made limited progress so far, theytinational companies invested in ever-larger pro- still must improve their supervisory bodies tojects in China (following scores of smaller convince investors that there have been realmanufacturers from Hong Kong, Taiwan, South changes to set them apart from their ChineseKorea and Singapore, who moved production to competition.China over the decade to take advantage of Another possible way for Asian countries tolower wages), the other Asian nations contem- improve their investment climates for interna-plated how to adjust their practices to compete tional investors is to lower the bureaucratic hur-against the Chinese model. dles for foreign companies. In comparing their One would have assumed that the questions regulatory regimes to those of China, some na-of poor corporate governance and government tions have determined that they can lessen de-oversight that were at least in part fingered for mands in such areas as environmental controls orthe Asian crisis would have resulted in one pos- trade union rules to bring them closer to China’ssible means for Asian countries to differentiate standards.themselves from China. But in the last few The Indian government began a policy inyears, the government’s policies and individual 2000 to establish special economic zones, meantfirms’ practices have been two steps forward and to copy China’s success in attracting foreign in-one step back. In South Korea, for example, the vestment in export processing sectors; the plangovernment has tolerated the purchase of control attempts to create “areas with new infrastructurein banks or large industrial conglomerates by and relaxed labor, customs and tax regulations.”foreign interests. It’s also pushed insolvent com- But the democratically elected government inpanies into bankruptcy to advance settlements to India must be more considerate of larger politi-foreign creditors, while at the same time tolerat- cal questions. As the Wall St. Journal notes, “theing the creditors of Hynix Semiconductor to government is treading carefully on how to relaxkeep that company on life-support. Similarly, labor laws within the zones” and leaving manySUMMER 2003 16 NSF REVIEW
  • 17. CONTENDING WITH CHINA’S RE-INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMYof the decisions to the states to tackle the harder duction of certain segments of the global supplyquestions. Maharashatra state “is set to enact chain from these nations to China is a harbingerlegislation that will exempt the zones from of longer-term trade relations. If China emergesregulations that help govern the formation of as a steady market in its own right, not simplyunions and the right to lay off workers.” as a transfer point for goods that are eventually Indonesia and Singapore are seeking to cre- headed to the U.S. or other developed markets,ate similar zones, where regulations governing then Asian nations would also be pulled alongtrade between the U.S. and companies on two by a steadily growing Chinese customer base.islands are exempted in a bilateral trade agree- Export figures from many Asian countries toment. Sandra Polaski, formerly of the State China were up over the last few years, while theDepartment and now with the Carnegie Endow- larger developed markets were experiencingment for International Peace, notes the agree- slow growth (or in Japan, no growth). The al-ment (which passed Congress in May 2003) ways astute CLSA puts it this way in a January“allows products produced in the Indonesian 2002 report: “China may have an absolute ad-islands of Bintan and Batam to be treated as if vantage in producing toys, shoes, semiconduc-they were of Singaporean for benefits under the tors, and everything else, but it would make noagreement. However, neither Indonesia nor sense for China to produce all of these goodsSingapore would be required to assume any of exclusively. The reason is that it will have athe obligations of the agreement…Adherence to comparative advantage in some goods whilelabor laws, environmental protections, and other other countries (producers) will have a com-provisions of the trade agreement would not parative advantage in others….China will notapply in the Indonesian territory.” Polaski displace the rest of the world’s production butwarns, “A U.S. congressional mandate that all rather it will add impetus to the forces of spe-U.S. trade agreements include such protections cialization that are the root of endogenouswould be flouted and a dangerous precedent growth.”will be set.” The governments in Asia again CLSA makes its comments on China’s com-seem to be missing an opportunity to rise above parative advantage in the context of China’sChina’s poor standard by providing more pro- entry into the WTO. They conclude that discus-tective and socially responsible regulatory re- sion by saying, “China’s entry to WTO is goodgimes. for everyone.” The Asian leaders have learned Many Asian nations are experiencing a de- some lessons better than others, but their com-gree of export growth that is tied to producing mitments to international rules and norms per-goods destined for China. The question remains versely still seem to put them at a as to whether the shift of assembly or pro- In that context, the conclusion that China’s en-NSF REVIEW 17 SUMMER 2003
  • 18. CONTENDING WITH CHINA’S RE-INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMYtry in WTO is good for everyone seems blithe. China is not yet known. Neither is the scientificChina signed the most complex accession docu- evidence yet gathered that would provide a con-ment in the WTO’s brief history. The deal con- clusive decision on its origins. China scholarsstituted a series of future dates and commit- must investigate the reaction of the Chinese gov-ments; China’s economy at the date of the sign- ernment to the disease in its earliest days of ap-ing was certainly not compliant with the spirit pearance. SARS has the potential to threaten the(and in places, even the law) of the WTO. Most 25 years of methodical economic reform, whileobservers give even odds that China will meet its at the same time it also has the potential tocommitments or will fail to meet its commit- stimulate long overdue political reforms. Somements. are calling the SARS outbreak China’s Cherno- So the other Asian nations are held to a dif- byl. It remains to be seen what will be the out-ferent standard than their big neighbor China come.when it comes to the WTO. (Not to mention the The snapshot of the disease and its impact atobvious double standard toward a country like this point is provided by a Wall St. Journal pieceRussia, which is expecting similar ‘deals’ for from May 2, 2003. The article notes that Warren‘future commitments’ in exchange for admission Buffett’s holding company Berkshire Hathawaytoday into the WTO.) But beyond the general has quietly built up a 13% stake in state-run oilrespect for the rule of law, there are specific eco- behemoth PetroChina. The author portrays thisnomic questions of fairness. China still main- as a reflection of Buffett’s belief in the economictains a soft peg of its currency to the American potential in China. But the author also states,dollar; so as the greenback goes through its pre- “As Berkshire was buying, China’s cover up andsent softness (read: revaluation), the Chinese bungling of the outbreak of SARS was in fullcurrency gains in competitive pricing against the swing. To some investors, the way China re-currencies of other Asian nations. In this regard, acted to SARS demonstrated the danger of in-the go-for-slow policies in China could be seen vesting in Chinese companies.” Just as a savvyto be poised to undermine the market mecha- investor like Buffett must consider the risks andnisms and norms of other international actors. rewards of China’s full return to the world com- Any article on China’s ‘re-emergence’ on the munity, so do China’s neighbors and the rest ofinternational scene at the opening of the 21st us.Century must address, even incompletely, thecurrent epidemic of severe acute respiratory syn-drome (SARS) now afflicting Asia. At the timeof this writing, the full extent of the illness inSUMMER 2003 18 NSF REVIEW
  • 19. NORTH KOREA: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES AND US OPTIONS?The decision-making process leading to the formulation of US foreign policy remains something of amystery. We know that foreign policy decision makers base their decisions on some combination of sub-jective judgments and objective data, but it is possible that the latter may become blurred.Is there a way for the National Strategy Forum members who are keen observers of US national securityand national strategy to exercise disciplined judgment to guide their opinions? Can this technique workfor foreign policy decision makers?We explored this issue with Professor Willard Zangwill of the University Of Chicago Graduate SchoolOf Business and his colleagues to determine whether his unique forecasting array could be applied toforeign policy issues. The result is heartening.We chose the contemporary, vexing problem of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program as a test caseto analyze the decision-making process. The following section describes the methodology used. Thenext section is a matrix that applies the methodology to possible options and outcomes available to theUS.PART ONE: SOFTWARE FOR STRATEGY DECISIONS by Keith Blume, Srikumar Chakravarty, and Willard Zangwill hen evaluating a complex problem, another and the process is repeated. we tend to overemphasize information For example, a case officer from a US intel- that supports our preferred hypothesis ligence agency presents information he or sheor solution and minimize evidence that suggests obtained from a high ranking contact of an infil-something different. The decision making proc- trated terrorist organization to an analyst. Theess involves an enormous quantity of interacting analyst filters the case officer’s personal biases,factors and issues, so many that no human mind and processes information from multiplecan possibly grasp and understand them. The sources, including HUMINT, satellite recon-information glut problem is real. naissance, and electronic surveillance. The ana- Human intelligence (HUMINT) is not im- lyst encounters several challenges, from han-peccable. It is susceptible to personal bias─ if dling information volume, to sorting throughthe evidence supports the hypothesis, the indi- conflicting information, to timely reporting.vidual stops the analysis because the hypothesis When bombarded with data from variousis “correct.” If the evidence does not support sources, an analyst may miss the most crucialthe initial hypothesis, the individual formulates facts.NSF REVIEW 19 SUMMER 2003
  • 20. NORTH KOREA: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES AND US OPTIONS? Professor Willard Zangwill of the University evidence that is an influence on the results andof Chicago Graduate School of Business and his providing a blindside factor, the software directsteam of graduate students (Jonathan Wilkenfeld, the analysis. By focusing research efforts on aAmit Israni, and Swapan Jha) have developed few key points, one can better quantify and qual-IdealDecisions, a statistical software package ify the possible outcomes, and therefore reducethat helps address this flaw in strategy analysis. the blindside factor and improve one’s confi-The software analyzes what events may happen dence in the the future, gives their probability of occur- The human mind is one of the most impres-rence, and provides the chance you will be sur- sive tools of all time, but it can be fooled and hasprised or blindsided by an unforeseen event. Al- limitations. With the imminent challenges ourthough it cannot specify what the surprise will nation faces in the war on terrorism, the Middlebe, using advanced statistics it estimates the East and North Korea, the ramifications of ourchance such a blindsiding event will occur. decisions become increasingly risky. The soft- The software tool is most useful when inputs ware helps overcome problems with conflictingare incorporated from several people, ideally information, personal bias, and groupthink.with different backgrounds and/or perspectives. These features combine to create a more preciseHowever, this can introduce the issue of and comprehensive analysis than could be“Groupthink.” Keith Blume, a student of Profes- achieved otherwise.sor Zangwill, developed a methodology to mini-mize this concern. PART TWO: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES The approach is easy. As a group, partici-pants develop a set of hypotheses pertaining to a AND US OPTIONS?specific question. Individually, participants by Richard Friedman and Lauren Beanevaluate each item of information to determinewhat hypotheses it supports or contradicts. This The strategy options available to the US forallows each participant the opportunity to evalu- resolving the North Korea crisis are multifac-ate the hypotheses and information devoid of eted. We have examined the issue from the per-outside influences. The software calculates prob- spective of the major players: the US, China,abilities based on their beliefs forcing the partici- Japan, South Korea, and Russia. For the pur-pants to confront their biases and assumptions. poses of this exercise, the variables are catego-Quantification exposes biases and enables a rized: fundamental interests, levers of power,greater understanding of why we believe what and US strategy options. This exercise is de-we believe. signed to provide a structure that will enable Na- It is imperative to increase the accuracy and tional Strategy Forum members to consider theconfidence of one’s analysis and decision mak- variables and questions leading to options for theing ability. The software provides a logical US.framework for resolving issues. By identifyingSUMMER 2003 20 NSF REVIEW
  • 21. NORTH KOREA: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES AND US OPTIONS? FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS The fundamental interests are divided into four subsets: security, economic, regional, and humanitarian. SECURITY ECONOMIC REGIONAL HUMANITARIANUS • International • Domestic prosperity • World stability • Assist the North Korean terrorism base for world leader- • Political stability in the people without military in- • Reduction of nuclear ship US tervention weapons • Ability to fund US • Retain prominent posi- military forces tion in Asia • Counterbalance China’s ascension to regional hegemonyCHINA • Protect its northern • Protect its economic • Maintain its diplomatic • Protect population from a border from a military viability charm offensive in an- potential war on the Korean invasion by North Ko- ticipation of the 2008 peninsula rea Olympics • Eliminate a nuclear • Enhance its role as a weapon capability regional and interna- from the Korean Pen- tional power insula and the region • Prevent a flood of North Korean refugeesJAPAN • Protection against a • Protect its economic • Retain its position as a • Protect population from a North Korean missile viability regional power in Asia potential war on the Korean attack • Avoid becoming a nu- peninsula clear power, or signifi- cantly increasing its military forceSOUTH • Protection against an • Safeguard economic • Phased reunification • Prevent population casual-KOREA invasion by North Ko- stability with North Korea, pro- ties in the event of an attack rean military forces vided that South Korea by North Korea • Protection against a remains the dominant North Korean nuclear, partner artillery, or missile attackRUSSIA • Prevent a downslide to • Safeguard bilateral • Involvement in the for- diminished world im- trade with North Ko- eign policy of North portance rea and the region Korea NSF REVIEW 21 SUMMER 2003
  • 22. NORTH KOREA: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES AND US OPTIONS? LEVERS OF POWER The US, China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia have levers of power that may be used to induce North Korea to disarm. LEVERS OF POWERUS • Form and lead a multilateral coalition • Political Capital • Military strength and dominance: • Precision targeted bombs capable of hitting nuclear facilities (unknown capability to hit under- ground facilities) • Anti-missile defense system (Patriot System) that can be used by South Korea and Japan. • US military force of 37,000 troops in South Korea is a trip wire (troops may be vulnerable in the early phase of the North Korean attack and may be repositioned) • Nuclear theater tactical weapons to stop a North Korean military offensive before reaching Seoul. • Use of MOAB (Missile Optimized Anti-Ballistic) system against North Korean troop move- ment • Economic aidCHINA • North Korea depends on China’s electric power grid (several years ago China cut off North Korea’s electric power for three days) • China maintains a large military force that can repel a North Korean ground invasion and can seal off its border to prevent a flood of North Korean refugees • China can threaten to use military force against North Korea. This could restrain North Korea from in- vading South Korea • Cooperate with US on international terrorism intelligence gathering • Use of naval forces to interdict North Korean shipments of nuclear weapons and technology to other statesJAPAN • Threaten and/or create nuclear weapons capability and increase its military force • International terrorism intelligence gathering • Use of naval forces can interdict North Korean shipment of nuclear weapons to other statesSOUTH • Offer incentives such as supplies of energy in return for disarmamentKOREA • Economic aidRUSSIA • International intelligence gathering • Use of naval forces to interdict North Korean shipment of nuclear weapons to other states SUMMER 2003 22 NSF REVIEW
  • 23. NORTH KOREA: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES AND US OPTIONS? US STRATEGY OPTIONS The following matrix provides seven strategy options for the US: economic incentives, burden shifting, regime change, defend South Korea, defend Japan, and interdiction of North Korea’s nuclear weapons shipments and technology. US STRATEGY OPTIONS OBJECTIVESEconomic Incentives • Provide economic and humanitarian aid mixed with Induce North Korea to disarm contributions from other states conditioned on disar- mament and verification. • Organize an international economic blockadeBurden Shift • Seek to have China, Japan, and South Korea play an Eliminate North Korea’s nuclear important role in a coalition weapons and nuclear capability by • Negotiate a non-aggression treaty with North Korea using the political and economic in return for total disarmament coupled with a verifi- leverage of other states able inspection regimeRegime Change • Military intervention similar to the Persian Gulf War Destabilize the Kim regime and the most recent Iraq military campaign • Organize an international economic blockadeDefend South Korea • Provide military assistance to South Korea (Patriot Limit the adverse consequences anti-missile defense system and technical aid). of a North Korean military or • Re-deploy 37,000 troops in South Korea for force missile attack; prevent population protection purposes. and economic loss • Introduce 250,000-500,000 US troops in the event of a North Korean attack • Induce South Korea to spend more on defense by reducing or repositioning 37,000 US troops.Defend Japan • Provide Patriot anti-missile defense system to Defend Japan against a missile at- Japan tack by North Korea; protect Japan in the event the US launches a re- taliatory attack against North KoreaDiplomatic Initiative • Recognize the potential for US decreased influ- Maintain US leadership position ence and China’s increased influence in the re- in the region gion.Interdiction of North • Seek international law change to allow interdiction Prevent North Korea’s nuclearKorea’s nuclear weapons of North Korean shipments of nuclear weapons and weapons and technology exports technologyand technology • Gain commitments from the China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia to interdict the shipment of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and technology, and pro- vide intelligence aimed at preventing future exports NSF REVIEW 23 SUMMER 2003
  • 24. NORTH KOREA: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES AND US OPTIONS?NORTH KOREA-US RELATIONSHIPNorth Korea and the US do not trust each other. North Korea reneged on the 1994 Agreed Frameworkunder which North Korea agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its nuclear program, which wouldbe verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, North Korea believes that theUS reneged on its promise to provide economic aid. North Korea’s negotiating posture may be to useextreme bluster. North Korea’s primary negotiating asset is its nuclear weapons capability. Given theseconditions, the traditional negotiating strategies may not be useful.QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSEDBearing in mind the three matrices (fundamental interests, levers of power, and US strategy options),consider the following questions to determine the best US policy for resolving the conflict with NorthKorea:• Does North Korea have nuclear weapons?• Can the presence or absence of North Korea’s nuclear weapons be determined with certainty?• Will North Korea agree to a robust inspection and verification regime?• Will economic sweeteners persuade North Korea to disarm?• If North Korea has nuclear weapons, will it seek to make additional nuclear weapons?• If North Korea continues production of nuclear weapons, will this change the underlying military and political equation?• Is it likely that the US will initiate military action with North Korea?• If the US does initiate military action, what is the likelihood that North Korea would invade South Korea?• If the US interdicts the export of North Korea’s WMD technology, what is the likelihood that Kim will retaliate and launch a missile attack on South Korea or Japan?• What are the options available to the US other than military action for resolving the conflict with North Korea?BLINDSIDE FACTORS• Kim Jung Il is unpredictable ─ rational analysis of his behavior and policy may be inapplicable. Economic incentives and disincentives may have a low probability of affecting a desired result.• Whether China will increase pressure of North Korea to disarm, and whether it will cooperate with the US.SUMMER 2003 24 NSF REVIEW
  • 25. BOOK REVIEW 20:21 Vision: Twentieth-Century Lessons for the Twenty-first Century by Bill Emmott Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003, $25.00, 373 pp.Reviewed by Lauren Bean about the America–China conflict over Taiwan. “If there is ever a fight between the United ill Emmott believes that the two most States and China, it is likely to arise from what important questions for the twenty-first would be the greatest and most fateful miscalcu- century are: Will American leadership lation in the history of mankind.”endure, or will it “go the way of Britain in the Adding to tensions in East Asia is what Em-twentieth century and decline?” And will capital- mott terms “Japanese Vulnerability.” Since Ja-ism survive in the twenty-first century with all of pan’s stock and property markets crashed inits strengths and weaknesses, or will it be chal- 1990, the country has endured recurring bouts oflenged? frustration and a continuing economic slump. Emmott, Editor-in-Chief of the Economist, Emmott states that “a more national government,believes that one of the most notable events of a more powerful navy and air force, a more visi-the twentieth century was the US “taking over ble military presence in the region, even, in thefrom Britain” as the policeman for world order. end, a publicly acknowledged program of nu-Emmott argues that American power is benign ─ clear research and development: all these mustit is not a “true hegemon.” America seeks to op- be considered likelihoods for Japan during theerate alongside multilateral institutions such as first few decades of the twenty-first century.”the UN and its allies. For the twenty-first cen- Emmott is confident that the European Uniontury, Emmott envisages the persistence of strong will not challenge America’s global dominance.American leadership ─ but not without friction. He does not deny the success of the EU. How- The greatest challenge to American power ever, the EU is “far from united.” It is the ac-will be China. However, Emmott writes that commodation of each country’s concerns that“China is several decades away from overtaking will prevent it from playing a dominant role inAmerica in terms of any important measure.” the international community. “In the end,” Em-China is in the process of reconstructing the mott writes, “they are happy that the real adults,economy; this process is nascent if one considers the Americans, are there to sort things out, tothat China began adopting capitalism only provide a secure home, and to pay the bills.”twenty years ago. Thus, China should not be Emmott believes that international terrorismfeared simply on the grounds of a burgeoning will be the chief threat in the twenty-first centuryeconomy. Yet Emmott is properly concerned given the proliferation of weapons of mass de-NSF REVIEW 25 SUMMER 2003
  • 26. BOOK REVIEW: 20:21 VISIONstruction (WMD). However, Emmott states that growth. Given the growth of world trade, invest-“terrorism can be contained, even if not entirely ment flows, and technological advancements,quelled.” American leadership, coupled with the Emmott states the promise of economic and so-collective action of the international community, cial development in the twenty-first century forshould be effective in both combating terrorism the world’s poor “is real.”and containing the desire for and use of WMD. Emmott notes that globalization and the re- As for capitalism, Emmott is cautiously opti- sulting inequality could threaten capitalism. Yetmistic that it will survive the twenty-first cen- Emmott argues that globalization has made thetury. Emmott defends capitalism against the ob- world open. “Liberalization and integration withjections that it is unpopular, unstable, unequal, the world economy has recently spread to manyand unclean (the chapter headings). Capitalism is poor and former communist countries.” Still,unpopular because it is “ruthless.” However, “globalization entails change, and change is de-Emmott argues that better government regula- stabilizing.”tions will make capitalism “behave properly” by As for the environment, Emmott argues thatcorrecting its dysfunctions ─ capitalism will the world’s environmental problems are not thecontinue to produce good and bad times. fault of capitalism but of government. Emmott Emmott argues that the instability of capital- acknowledges the importance of the environ-ism during the 1930’s can be avoided given the ment and its problems, yet he argues that dra-lessons of the Great Depression. He notes that matic forecasts of many environmentalists “areevidence of capitalism’s continuing instability, unlikely ever to become true in any meaningfulsuch as the East Asian financial crisis of 1997- fashion.” Emmott agrees with Bjorn Lomborg,98, is apparent in any decade. Yet capitalism is author of The Skeptical Environmentalist, whoflexible, and can adapt quickly once problems or claims that the world is getting better rather thanopportunities emerge. worse, and that the green movement is manipu- On inequality, Emmott notes that the gaps lating the truth to support its case.have widened between rich countries and poor In the epilogue, titled “Paranoid Optimism,”countries; he argues that the gaps have narrowed Emmott concludes that no one knows what willwithin countries. According to him, the solution happen in the twenty-first century; however, itto the first problem lies in “improvements in should to be possible to make calculated predic-public education” and efforts to ensure that eco- tions based on the trends of the twentieth cen-nomic growth is beneficial to both rich and poor. tury: America’s political and economic ascent;The solution to inequality within countries can the growth of global trade and investment flows;be seen in poor countries that have advanced the rise of social mobility, the fall of aristocracy;economically. A government that encourages developments in technology, communication, and transportation, etc. It is a matter of maintain-economic freedom, “an open, competitive econ- ing “positive expectations and a keen awarenessomy, a stable macroeconomic framework…and of risk.”peace and consent,” is likely to enjoy economicSUMMER 2003 26 NSF REVIEW
  • 27. RECENT SPEAKERSOn April 1, 2003, Ambassador Richard Wil- 10,000 nerve gas warheads, 1,500 chemicalliamson, US Representative for Special Political weapons, 412 tons of chemical agents, 25 long-Affairs for the US Mission to the United Nations, range missiles, and biological agents. The UNaddressed the National Strategy Forum on the discovered ten times the declared number ofmilitary conflict in Iraq and the future of the chemical weapons in Iraq.United Nations Security Council. Following is asummary of his remarks. All fifteen members of UN Security Council knew Iraq had WMD, they knew Iraq was inAmbassador Williamson states that problems material breach, and they understood clearly thatwith the UN’s procedures, performance, and Resolution 1441 authorized use of force. Thestructure were exposed as a result of the conflict Security Council failed to Iraq. Williamson believes the UN has a role. Adding to these tensions, the UN has funda-However, he questions whether that role encom- mental structural problems. For example, thepasses legitimizing the use of force. smallest country that has a vote equal to the US Williamson believes that the Bush admini- has a total geographic area of 1.7 kilometers.stration was correct to bring the Iraq issue to the Williamson believes that the UN SecurityUN, and to challenge a “brutal tyrant”. He noted Council could be useful in resolving regionalevidence that confirms Saddam Hussein’s cru- conflicts in Sierra Leone and the Congo, butelty. For example, Iraq has more unresolved dis- questions whether the Security Council can actappearances than any other UN member state ─ on larger issues and whether it should be the soleover 16,000 people. In 2000, Iraqi authorities venue for legitimizing the use of force. He con-introduced tongue amputations as punishment cludes that the process of reconstruction will befor criticizing Hussein. The regime has tortured long, but there is a role for the UN.and executed children, and taped the druggingand rapes of female relatives of government offi- Questions and Answerscials as a method of coercion. Hussein haslaunched a number of brutal attacks on his own Williamson states that the UN “does not have thepeople, the Kurds, and his neighbors. Also, there moral legitimacy” to deal with Israel and theis evidence that Iraq has a nuclear weapons pro- reformation of the Palestinian authority. Accord-gram. In the early 1990’s, Iraq declared it had ing to Williamson, some of the five permanentNSF REVIEW 27 SUMMER 2003
  • 28. RECENT SPEAKERSmembers of UN Security Council (P5) have di- Ambassador Thomas Pickering states thatminished influence, and use their position for Russia and China will play an increasing role inpolitical leverage. Israel has been the whipping world affairs in the next two decades. However,boy of the UN for forty years. In the sixties and this process will not occur without obstacles andseventies, the UN relied on the Arab states to tension.attack apartheid in Africa. The quid pro quo is After September 11th Russia and China werethat the UN helped the Arab states isolate Israel. supportive of the US and the war on terrorism. Williamson believes that the US-European For Russia, September 11th offered Russiandivide is based on power and influence. During President Vladimir Putin a chance for reorienta-the Gulf War, European allies realized that they tion and integration into the international com-were far behind the US militarily. Since the munity. He made a strategic change to align1990’s, European defense spending has de- Russia with the US and perhaps, Westerncreased. These countries rely on the US. The Europe. For China, September 11th provided anproblem is that these countries want the US to opportunity for cooperation with the US. Evenhelp them but fail to understand that less power though China had misgivings about the US at-means less influence. tack on Iraq, it did not take the lead in the Secu- Williamson forecasts that post-conflict Iraq rity Council to thwart US efforts. China contin-reconstruction will take many years. At present ues to help the US in post-conflict Afghanistan, ethnic groups have representa- For Russia, its weak economy hinders itstion in the government. Williamson believes that ability to expand its relations with the interna-the same potential exists for ethnic groups in tional community. Economic reform is a criticalIraq. objective of President Putin’s agenda; he wants _____________________________ to attract greater foreign investment. Pickering suggests that Russia should focus on the exportOn April 28, 2003, Ambassador Thomas of agriculture by removing the old, continuingPickering, former Ambassador and Representa- state farm system, and replacing it with a newtive to the United Nations, addressed the Na- agricultural system. Also, improvements in do-tional Strategy Forum on the relationship of the mestic law could result in a decline in corruptionUS, Russia, and China. Professor Charles and attract more foreign investment. PickeringLipson of the University of Chicago facilitated suggests that the US work with Russia on issuesthe question and answer portion of the event. regarding trade and security, support Russia’sFollowing is a summary of their remarks. entry into WTO, and work with the EU on better relations between Europe and Russia.SUMMER 2003 28 NSF REVIEW
  • 29. RECENT SPEAKERS China’s economic performance, unlike Rus- their relationships. Together, these three coun-sia’s, is significant and positive. Last year, China tries will begin to share the responsibility ofsaw 7%-8% growth. It is pursuing an active world leadership.campaign to attract investment from the US andelsewhere. Questions and Answer Politically, Russian democracy must be fos-tered. Russia needs to be pushed to make an ef- Professor Charles Lipson believes that the Euro-fort to stop crime and corruption. It is a perma- pean Union (EU) and Russia will develop anent member of the UN Security Council, and closer relationship. Yet there is a continuing de-the US must work with Russia on the interna- bate over the enlargement of the EU. At a mini-tional scene, global missile defense, and outer mum, it is a free trade organization. The problemspace. Also, the US must support changes in is that some states want it to be an organizationRussian policies regarding non-proliferation of that formulates foreign policy. However, a lar-WMD. It is important that Russia’s oil and gas ger organization will make it more difficult forreserves be developed to bolster the Russian the member states to agree. Thus, the EU needs aeconomy and provide the world with an alternate central authority and a constitution.resource to Middle Eastern oil reserves. In addressing democracy in Russia, Lipson For the US and China, the most critical area states that there are no stable Russian institu-of tension and potential future conflict is Taiwan tions. But given the efforts of the Putin admini-and the Taiwan Straits. Pickering believes that stration, it is likely that Russia will democratize.both sides of the Strait have made efforts to re- Lipson states that China is a long way fromduce the possibility of conflict and are looking to becoming a peer competitor. It is showing eco-the future. The US and China have a common nomic growth, but needs to develop full-rangeinterest in the Korean Peninsula. Both oppose components of a modern economy. The emerg-nuclear weapons on the peninsula. However, ing infrastructure needs to decentralize its eco-China does not want to pressure North Korea nomic power to adapt to its growth.with sanctions and believes that the US should Lipson states that the prospects for move-negotiate directly with North Korea. China ment on the Palestinian and Israeli front are bet-played a major role in organizing and hosting ter than in 1994. The US has a larger footprinttalks in Beijing between North Korea and the in the Arab-Muslim world. And, the threat of theUS. militant Islamic world pre-commits the US to According to Pickering, the US, China, and deal with failed states, rogue states, and terror-Russia understand the strategic importance of ism.NSF REVIEW 29 SUMMER 2003
  • 30. STRATEGY WATCHAsia China participated in the talks. In Bangladesh, two ferries sink in storms, killing 134 people.In early March, Brigadier-General Boer Buis is The trial of Abu Bakar Basyir, an Islamic clericsentenced to five years in jail by an Indonesian accused of plotting to overthrow the governmentcourt for failing to prevent massacres of civilians in order to establish a Muslim state, begins inin East Timor in 1999. Zhu Rongji resigns as Indonesia. The US states that it is considering aprime minister of China and is succeeded by his conditional offer by North Korea to disband itsdeputy Wen Jiabao. In Hong Kong, scientists nuclear weapons program but that it will not beidentify the virus responsible for a fatal form of rewarded.pneumonia called Severe Acute RespiratorySyndrome (SARS). Beijing reports over 1,440 Middle Eastconfirmed cases and 75 deaths. At least 10,000people are quarantined. More than 372 people Mahmoud Abbas is appointed to the new post ofhave died of the disease worldwide. North Ko- prime minister of the Palestinian authority. Tay-rea withdraws from regular talks with US offi- yip Erdogan, leader of the governing Justice andcers at Panmunjom, on the border of South Ko- Development party, becomes Prime Minister ofrea. Both India and Pakistan test-fire surface- Turkey. In mid-March, the US-led war againstto-surface missiles capable of delivering nuclear Iraq begins with missile attacks on the Iraqi lead-weapons. In mid-March the guerrillas of the ership in Baghdad. The UN withdraws its weap-Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philip- ons inspectors from Iraq. Three of Britain’spines attack a village killing five people. Weeks prime ministers resign in protest of Tony Blair’slater, bombers kill 16 people in the city of Da- decision to go to war without the backing of thevao. Malaysia bans tourists from mainland UN. In Afghanistan, American and Italian basesChina in an effort to stop the spread of SARS. are attacked by rocket and machine gun fire fromThe US says it plans to move its garrison in cen- suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. Intral Seoul to a less conspicuous site outside the northern Iraq, Kurdish peshmerga fighters,capital. In late March, North Korea abandons supported by American Special Forces, captureits demands that any talks on its nuclear program the stronghold of an extremist Islamist groupshould be solely with the United States. Japan which the US has accused of having links withfaces possible power cuts this summer as many terrorism and al-Qaeda. Indian troops kill theof the country’s nuclear reactors are shut down deputy leader of Kashmir’s main militant group,for safety checks. James Kelly, an American of- Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. In April, American forcesficial, holds talks in Beijing with North Korean topple the regime of Saddam Hussein with large-negotiator Li Gun in a move to try to persuade scale assaults. Iraqis celebrate the fall of the Sad-the North to end its nuclear weapons program. dam’s regime with widespread looting. LootersSUMMER 2003 30 NSF REVIEW
  • 31. THE NSF REVIEW STRATEGY WATCH March 15, 2003—June 3, 2003 31In the Moroccan capital of In Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, nine suicide President Bush meets with South Ko- Both India and Pakistan test-fireCasablanca, simultaneous sui- bombers ram their vehicles packed rean President Roh Moo-hyun to dis- surface-to-surface missiles capablecide bombings kill 42 people, with explosives into three compounds cuss the North Korea crisis. of delivering nuclear weapons.wound over 100. housing expatriates, killing at least 34 people, eight of them American.
  • 32. STRATEGY WATCHransack government buildings, shops, hospitals, explosives into three compounds housing expa-banks, and museums. Jay Garner, the retired triates, killing at least 34 people, eight of themAmerican general appointed by the Bush admini- American. Remains of up to 3,000 people arestration to be the American civil administrator in found at a mass grave south of Baghdad. It isIraq, arrives in Baghdad. Mid-May, Jay Garner estimated that there could be as many as 11,000is replaced by Paul Bremer, a former head of people buried at the site presumably killed by thecounter-terrorism at the State Department. Brit- Saddam Hussein regime. In late May, simultane-ish forces kill “Chemical Ali” Hassan al-Majid, ous suicide bombings kill 42 people, wound overa senior member of the regime responsible for 100, in the Moroccan business capital of Casa-the defense of southern Iraq. Eleven Afghan ci- blanca.vilians are killed when an American bomb goesastray and lands on a house in the outskirts of AfricaShkin, in eastern Afghanistan. American-sponsored talks on the creation of a post-war In March, Cote d’Ivoire swears in a new primeadministration begin in Nasiriya, south of Bagh- minister, Seydou Diarra, as rebel groups anddad. Representatives of Sunni, Shia, Kurdish, leading political parties prepare to form a coali-and other factions begin the task of brokering a tion government as part of a peace deal aimed atdeal between Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups. ending nearly six months of civil war. Uganda’sAmerica accuses Syria of helping the Iraqi re- government announces a ceasefire with the rebelgime during the war, offering refuge to fugitive group, the Lord’s Resistance Army. The UN andIraqis and developing chemical weapons. Syria the Cambodian government agree on arrange-denies the charges. In Baghdad, American ments for Khmer Rouge leaders to be tried forforces capture Abu Abbas, the leader of the Pal- crimes committed during their rule (1975-1979).estinian group that seized an Italian cruise ship In the Central African Republic, a coup over-in 1985, killing an American tourist in a wheel- throws president Félix Patassé, who has survivedchair. In May, the “road map”, an international seven previous attempts. Weeks later, Francoisblueprint for ending the conflict between the Is- Bozize, the coup leader and self-proclaimedraelis and Palestinians by 2005, is submitted to president, appoints a prime minister. Tony Yen-both governments after a new Palestinian cabinet geni, a former chief assistant for South Africa’sis sworn in. American troops open fire on pro- ruling party, the African National Congress, istesters in Falouja, a town near Baghdad, killing sentenced to four years in jail for fraud. Over 6013 people. The US states that it will pull all people are arrested in Zimbabwe after a generaltroops out of Saudi Arabia. Pakistan arrests strike protesting Robert Mugabe’s assumption ofsix members of a group linked to al-Qaeda. One the presidency. In Nigeria, seven people die in aof the six is said to have been involved in an at- clash of ethnic militiamen near the oil town oftack on an American warship, the USS Cole, in Warri. Congo’s government, rebel groups, and2000. In Riyadh, Saudi Arabias capital, nine opposition factions sign a pact aimed at endingsuicide bombers ram their vehicles packed with the country’s civil war, adopting a new constitu-SUMMER 2003 32 NSF REVIEW
  • 33. STRATEGY WATCHtion, and paving the way for elections. The presi- majority of the seats in a general election. Indent of Malawi, Bakili Muluzi, who had been late March, Finland’s politicians agree on a newseeking to change the constitution to allow him a coalition government to be headed by Annelithird term in office, relents and names a succes- Jaatteenmaki, Finland’s first woman prime min-sor. In April, Congo adopts a new constitution ister and leader of the conservative Centre Party.after peace talks in South Africa. Sierra Leone, In France, the biggest corruption trial in Frenchwhich has set up its own Truth and Reconcilia- history begins with 37 defendants accused oftion Commission, holds its first hearings. The milking Elf Aquitaine, a former state-owned oilcommission will take testimony from some 700 company, of more than $200 million dollars dur-survivors of the country’s decade-long civil war ing the 1980’s and 1990’s. Belgium suggests thewhich ended in 2001. Olusegun Obasanjo is re- creation of a new coalition distinct from NATOelected as president of Nigeria. Winnie composed of itself, France, and Germany. InMadikezela-Mandela, the ex-wife of Nelson Chechnya, nearly 90% of voters turn out for aMandela, is convicted of theft and fraud in a referendum on a new constitution; over 95% ofSouth African court. Protesters in Zimbabwe these back the new constitution. In Makhach-strike to oppose a 210% hike in the price of pet- kala, the capital of the southern Russian republicrol and the general misrule of President Robert of Dagestan, 28 children die in a school fire. InMugabe. A senior judge is shot dead in Phnom April, France, Germany, and Russia meet inPenh, Cambodia. In May, Malaysia, Indonesia, St. Petersburg to reiterate their call for theand dozens of other countries are hit by debris United Nations to oversee the administration offrom an Italian satellite falling to Earth after Iraq. The EU’s fifteen member countries and theseven years in space. In Nigeria, 100 expatriate ten newcomers due to join next year plan to meetoil-workers are held hostage by their local col- in Athens to sign a treaty of accession. Malta’sleagues on oil rigs off the coast of Nigeria. Bu- voters re-elected the Nationalist Party. Valéryrundi swears in a new president, Domitien Giscard d`Estaing, president of the EuropeanNdayizeye, a Hutu. Somalias transitional gov- Union’s constitutional convention, produced hisernment is shut out of its parliament building for proposal for an enlarged EU including a Euro-non-payment of rent. pean commission cut to 15 full members and a new European congress. The Turkish-CypriotEurope and Greek-Cypriot authorities temporarily open crossing-points between the communities’ twoIn March, Russia agrees to shut down its last zones. Sergei Yushenkov, the leader of a smallthree plutonium-producing reactors. Serbia’s Russian party, Liberal Russia, is shot dead out-Prime Minister, Zoran Djindic, is assassinated side of his home in Moscow. He is the tenthoutside the parliament in Belgrade. Weeks later, member of the Duma to be murdered in tenSerb police arrest the deputy commander of a years. At a summit, France, Germany, Bel-special police unit, Zvezdan Jovanovic, and gium, and Luxembourg agree on the outlines ofcharge him with murdering Djindic. Finland’s a scheme for a multinational headquarters forCentre party, led by Aneli Jaateenmaki, wins the non-NATO European defense operations. InNSF REVIEW 33 SUMMER 2003
  • 34. STRATEGY WATCHMay, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder Commission approves a resolution to send anthreatens to resign if his Social Democrats do not outside investigator to look at human rights inback his plans to reform unemployment rules Cuba. In May, two Peronists face a run-off elec-and other aspects of his country’s generous wel- tion on May 18th for Argentina’s presidency.fare state. In Italy, Cesare Previti, the former The Colorado party, which has governed Para-defense minister and close friend of Silvio Ber- guay for 56 years, will continue to govern forlusconi, is sentenced to 11 years in prison for five more years. Nicanor Duarte Frutos, a for-bribing judges. Suicide attackers drive a truck mer education minister, won the presidentialladen with explosives into a complex of govern- election with 38% of the vote. Luiz Inácio Lulament offices in Znamenskoye, in northern de Silva, the president of Brazil, presents draftChechnya, killing at least 54 people bills to reform pensions and the tax system to Congress.South America North AmericaIn March, a plane carrying three Americanscrashes in a jungle in Colombia. Some 80 dissi- In Quebec, liberals win a provincial election,dents are arrested in Cuba for allegedly conspir- ending nine years of rule by separatist Partiing with the top American official on the island. Québécois. Officials in Toronto react to a travelIn Brazil, Congress votes for a constitutional warning issued by the WTO for Canada’s largestamendment paving the way for central bank in- city, where SARS has killed 16. Two Sikh na-dependence. In April, the president of the cen- tionalists are put on trial in Vancouver; they aretral bank in Chile resigns after his secretary was accused of involvement in the 1985 bombing offound to have passed information to a corrupt an Air India flight which killed 329 firm. A mudslide in Bolivia kills 17 President Bush meets with South Korean Presi-people and leaves 200 missing. In Cuba, a man dent Roh Moo-hyun to discuss the North Koreacarrying hand grenades hijacks a plane on a do- crisis. Both leaders reaffirm their goal to elimi-mestic flight and forces the pilot to fly to Flor- nate North Korea’s nuclear threat. Nineteen ille-ida. The following day, armed Cubans seize a gal immigrants die after riding in an airtight,Havana ferryboat with more than 50 passengers sweltering trailer along the main highway fromand sail it towards the US. In Honduras, 69 peo- the Mexican border to Houston. Eight people areple are killed in a riot at a prison farm. An Amer- accused of conspiracy and transporting aliens.ica pilot dies when his plane crashes in Colom-bia while spraying drug crops with weed killer.In Cuba, summary courts sentence 70 dissidentsto 28 years in prison or more. The Venezuelangovernment and the opposition groups reach a“pre-agreement” to hold a referendum on HugoChavez’s presidency. The UN Human RightsSUMMER 2003 34 NSF REVIEW
  • 35. RESEARCH REPORTS Summaries of recent articles presenting new ideas on international affairsGeriatric Teenagers with trade with the New World and the attack on by Victor Davis Hanson the Ottoman Empire) that shifted power from the The National Review Online, Mediterranean to the new Europe of England, May 2, 2003 northern France, and Holland. Hanson also cites what he terms fits of “continental craziness”“The Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis needs some such as Napoleon’s willingness to risk millionstough love.” of lives for the “pan-European dream”; and the rise of German Nazism, Italian fascism, and con-Dr. Victor Davis Hanson is a fellow at the Clare- tinental Marxism.mont Institute in California and a visiting profes- Hanson proposes that the appropriate answersor at the US Naval Academy. Hanson offers to the disharmony is radical reforms aimed atlittle sympathy to those states that have proven eradicating shared institutions. First, Hansonto be fair weather allies of the US. Hanson envi- writes, the US must differentiate its allies fromsions a major reorganization within the interna- the opposition (French, Belgians, and Germans).tional community and a reassessment of interna- Eastern Europe does not share the same distrusttional institutions. of America, and Italy and Spain do not share the Hanson writes that European elites are analo- attitude of the naysayers. Next, the US shouldgous to “spoiled teenagers” who “snap at and form a stronger coalition with the willing. Heridicule their patient and paying parents, even as asserts that the US can begin this transformationthey call on them in extremis for help whenever by pulling all US troops out of Germany.the car stalls and the rent is short.” Hanson As for NATO, Hanson writes that given thewrites that this attitude may be the result of jeal- antics of the Belgians, it is inappropriate toousy of American power, different constitutions, house NATO in Brussels. Furthermore, Franceor the American experience ─ “vast frontiers, should decide where it stands within the interna-immigration, assimilation, and the lack of na- tional community. In the meantime, the UStional creed or race.” Hanson speculates that the should establish relationships with “those whocurrent friction between the US and Paris-Berlin- know something of the history of the 20th cen-Moscow will worsen as more evidence is uncov- tury.”ered revealing the true nature of Iraq’s relation- Hanson argues that the UN should “be theship with Germany, France, and Russia. centerpiece of [US] policy”. Among his many According to Hanson, drastic shifts in Europe suggestions, Hanson names India, Brazil, andare nothing new. He refers to the Protestant Ref- Japan as good candidates for the Security Coun-ormation of the 15th and 16th centuries (coupled cil. Also, the “united tyrannies” of Libya, Syria,NSF REVIEW 35 SUMMER 2003
  • 36. RESEARCH REPORTSNorth Korea, and Cuba should form their own able not only to criticism, but also to danger.institution and leave the General Assembly to Consequently, the Bush administration devel-the democratic governments. oped a vision for US national security designed Moreover, the US ambassadorships must be to reach beyond partisan politics and appeal toreassessed to ensure that the men and women both conservatives and liberals. This vision isserving in those positions are forcefully repre- composed of five significant redefinitions: thesenting the US interests rather than apologizing geography of national security, the nexus be-for the US. tween principles and power, the structure of in- __________________________ ternational security, multilateralism, and nationalThe Transformation of National Security: security as a function of time.Five Redefinitions Zelikow writes that “in the past, the geogra- by Philip Zelikow phy of national security was defined by foreign The National Interest, Spring 2003, frontiers.” Today, the threats against national pp. 17-28 security are not as clearly defined and they exist on a much larger scale. These threats arePhilip Zelikow is the White Burkett Miller Pro- “defined more by the fault-lines within societiesfessor of History and Director of the Miller Cen- than by the territorial borders between them”; inter of Public Affairs at the University of Vir- other words “the clashes in this phase of historyginia. In an examination of the Bush administra- are not clashes between civilizations but insidetion’s US National Security Strategy of the them.” As a result, the executive branch of theUnited States, Zelikow identifies “five essential US government, the archetype of the US nationalredefinitions” of what national security means security system, is undergoing the largest reor-for the United States in the 21st century. ganization in the last fifty years with the creation Zelikow refutes the criticism that the United of the Department of Homeland Security. USStates is an empire. He writes that “real imperial foreign policy must address individual societies,power is sovereign power…Sovereignty means a factions, and problems specific to those monopoly control over the organization According to Zelikow, US foreign policy mustand use of armed might…and over the admini- “transcend physical and material dimensions” tostration of justice” without limits of the ruler. He include “fundamental principles.”argues that the United States does not boast im- Zelikow defines what he terms “The Newperial power, nor does it seek imperial rule. Centrality of Moral Principles” as a move awayHowever, it is unrealistic to deny the central role from realism vs. idealism, or power vs. concernof the United States in the international commu- for human rights, towards the union of authoritynity. The present focus must be on how the US and principle. He believes that the Bush admini-exercises its role. stration’s concept of “balance of power that fa- America’s position as “the greatest power in vors freedom” supports relations among statesthis pluralistic world” has made the US vulner- and within states with a greater emphasis onSUMMER 2003 36 NSF REVIEW
  • 37. RESEARCH REPORTS“human dignity.” tional sources of political authority that are Zelikow writes “that for centuries, the struc- essentially national in character.ture of world politics has been defined by the ▪ Functional institutions (NATO) that producerivalry of great powers.” The Bush administra- concrete results instead of symbolic meas-tion is moving towards an integrated structure ures that might rally more support for anbased upon active cooperation among all major ideal, but at the cost of not doing much toglobal powers. The current position of the US further its attainment.presents an opportunity to challenge present andfuture partners, build and renew alliances, and Threats to national security can emergepartition the responsibilities of leadership. quickly and anonymously. Thus, it is hard to Zelikow writes that “everything that America quarrel with the essential premise of the Bushdoes in the world is done multilaterally.” For administration’s open willingness to considerexample, a network of governments is waging pre-emption.” Zelikow rejects the criticism thatthe war on terrorism. And, the operations in Af- the US should wait until the threat is so acuteghanistan involve several countries. Zelikow that a consensus can be reached on military ac-argues that the argument is not about tion. He writes that today “there is a kind of in-“unilateralism vs. multilateralism” but “five con- verse continuum of threat and vulnerability.”trasting ways of conceiving and operationalizing WMD capabilities minimize the threat of mili-multilateral action.” tary action. Therefore, the Bush administration has adapted the US national security strategy toThe Bush administration strategy is based on: the “new conditions of international life.” The strategy is “provocative”, and it will condition▪ An inductive method that draws ideas from the international community to think about new many sources and adapts them to specific threats and act cooperatively. conditions. _____________________________▪ International institutions that judge perform- International Law and the Preemptive Use of ance and stress accountability rather than Military Force those (United Nations) that maintain de- by Anthony Clark Arend tached neutrality in order to preserve a The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2003 friendly consensus. pp. 89-103▪ Multilateral strategies that rely on the sover- eign accountability of states instead of Anthony Clark Arend is a professor in the De- strategies that limit sovereignty in order to partment of Government and the School of For- link states in a common enterprise. eign Service at Georgetown University. Arend▪ A view of international law that emphasizes examines the lawfulness of the Bush administra- democratic accountability, linking the au- tion’s doctrine of preemption. He bases the ex- thority of international officials to constitu- amination on the United Nations Charter of 1945NSF REVIEW 37 SUMMER 2003
  • 38. RESEARCH REPORTSand provides options for US policymakers in drafted in 1945 addressed “conventional threatslight of international law. posed by states.” The threats posed by WMD Arend writes that prior to the UN Charter, and terrorism were not anticipated by interna-preemptive force was accepted by the interna- tional law.tional community if it was in self-defense. In US policymakers could resolve this conflict1945, the 51 delegates of the UN gathered to by accepting the traditional criterion for pre-draft normative order that would save emption as defined by the UN Charter, claiming“succeeding generations from the scourge of that the law should be reinterpreted in light ofwar” by restricting the option of force. There the proliferation of WMD and terrorism, or byare two exceptions: force authorized by the Se- declaring the UN Charter framework “dead.”curity Council and force mounted in self- Arend suggests that the US should accept thedefense. Article 51 offers two different interpre- criterion of the charter. Moreover, the UStations of the permissibility of preemptive force: should acknowledge that the existing legalone, “that the intent of Article 51 was to limit structure is problematic and obsolete. The USthe use of force in self-defense to those circum- should “take the lead” in identifying deficien-stances in which an armed attack has occurred”; cies and formulating solutions.two, “that the framers of the charter intended _________________________for a continuation of the broad pre-UN Charter Post-Saddam Iraq: The Shiite Factorright of anticipatory self-defense.” by Amatzia Baram Given the ambiguity of the Charter, Arend Iraq Memo # 15, April 30, 2003notes that it is reasonable to examine the prac- The Brookings Institutiontices of states post-UN Charter. There werethree cases in which the Security Council de- Amatzia Baram is a visiting fellow at the Sabanbated the efficacy of preemption: the 1962 Cu- Center for Middle East Policy. Baram exam-ban Missile Crisis, the 1967 Six-Day War, and ines the Shiite response to the US presence inthe 1981 Israeli attack on the Osirak reactor in Iraq, Iran’s interests in Iraq, and Shiite Islam.Iraq. In all three cases, there was no clear con- He provides recommendations as to how to neu-sensus of opposition to the doctrine of preemp- tralize the radical Shiite influence on the post-tion; there was conflict as to what justifies pre- conflict Iraq political orientation.emptive force under international law. Baram states that soon after the fall of Bagh- Arend states that the Bush administration dad, Shiite clergy exploited the absence of gov-“seeks to relax the traditional requirements of ernment in Iraq to stage a campaign for an Is-necessity.” The language of the 2002 National lamic Republic. Baram notes that while the im-Security Strategy implies that the old require- mediacy of the mobilization, the massive num-ments are no longer applicable because the ber of demonstrators, and the intensity of thethreats to international security are greater. Ar- demonstrations were surprising, the demonstra-end defends this notion because the UN Charter tors actually represent a minority. However, heSUMMER 2003 38 NSF REVIEW
  • 39. RESEARCH REPORTSsays if the radicals in the Shiite community are The US must provide better services to thenot neutralized, the result could be dangerous to Iraqis than the Shiite clergy. Baram explainsthe US and the entire international community. that Shiite clergy derive their following and in- The Shiite mullahs ruling Tehran oppose fluence from their ability to provide adequatedemocracy in Iraq, especially US-sponsored social services, including humanitarian anddemocracy. They fear it will set an example for technical support. “All services and economicthe younger generation in Iran and motivate aid must come from a central authority in Bagh-them to rebel against the mullahs; it could dad, and must be understood by all as comingeclipse the seminary at Qom. If a free, religious from there.”seminary were developed in the holy city of The US must gain support for democracyNajaf in Iraq, it could undermine the Iranian within the three major communities: Kurds,political system. Sunni Arabs, and Shiite Arabs. These communi- The young Iraqi Shiite clergy share similar ties will be represented in the government.interests with the Iranians. They see the current The US must empower the minorities. Iraqipredicament as an opportunity to reclaim “the women should be encouraged to establish insti-centrality of religion in their community’s life, tutions and practices for socialization and pro-and their own centrality within the community.” gression. Although the Kurds and Sunnis areThey want to dominate the Shiite community minorities, together, they form a majority. Theyand Iraq. However, Baram notes, they know must be encouraged to participate in the newthey cannot repair the damage to Iraq’s econ- state to counter Shiite dominance.omy and infrastructure. Moreover, the Iraqi Shi- Through the media, the Iraqi people shouldite clergy do not want to see Iraq’s demise nor be exposed to the discontent of the Iranian peo-encourage Iranian occupation. ple, in particular the younger generation, and Baram states that the US must take steps to the tyrannical behavior of the Iranian mullahs“neutralize the radical Shiite influence.” First, should be denounced.the US must declare that violence will be met For the first time in decades, the Iraqi peoplewith violence. Those who attack Coalition have an opportunity to assert their identities.forces will be punished. Second, the US must The Shiite Arabs are a majority and they wantensure that the occupation is temporary. It must to secure their position within Iraq. Despite thedefine its goal – to assist Iraq in becoming self- massive demonstrations, few Iraqi leaders wantsufficient. Third, a “greater international pres- to repeat the past.ence” would provide assurance to the Iraqi peo- _________________________ple that the US does not intend to “colonize the The US and Israel: The Road Aheadcountry.” Moreover, the US and the interna- by Abraham D. Sofaertional community should maintain some lever- Commentary Onlineage over Iraq’s political development even after May 2, 2003the US occupation ends.NSF REVIEW 39 SUMMER 2003
  • 40. RESEARCH REPORTSAbraham Sofaer is a Senior Fellow at the Hoo- cially terrorism against Israel.” For example, thever Institution , Stanford University. Sofaer iden- UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) subsi-tifies the gaps in the Israel-Palestinian “road dizes refugee camps that breed terrorism. Mil-map” prepared by the US, the EU, the UN, and lions of people, many of whom are not refugees,Russia, and provides policies and practices to the subsist in horrendous conditions without anyUS that will result in a more effective diplomatic structure. Sofaer suggests a new program thatinitiative. would include plans for building homes for refu- The “road map” proposes a two-state solution gees and to encourage refugees to relocate. Heto the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The plan is di- also calls for a reassessment of the Palestinianvided into three phases to be completed by 2005. education system. This system, partially fundedDuring phase one, both Israel and Palestine are by the UN, cultivates vitriolic attitudes towardsto declare an end to violence and terrorism. Pal- the state of Israel in addition to “intolerance, fa-estine is to consolidate all security forces, and naticism, and martyrdom.”Israel is to cooperate in rebuilding a viable Pal- The US must recognize the seriousness ofestinian security force. Phase two calls for the Palestinian violence. The Palestinian Authoritycreation of the Palestinian state, and phase three (PA) and other terrorist groups receive massiveis to result in a final agreement to settle any fur- funding from “private companies, humanitarianther issues. fronts, and wealthy individuals, some of them Sofaer notes that the key problem with this with American addresses.” Sofaer states that theroad map is that there are expectations that this US has been aware of the terrorist activities ofplan “will bring an end to Palestinian violence organizations such as Hamas, which operate inagainst Israel without addressing the reasons Israel, yet continues to criticize Israel for captur-why Palestinians have deliberately and repeat- ing or killing the leaders of these organizations;edly chosen that path.” Sofaer explains that the “Such conduct,” he says, “is part of every state’sPalestinian violence is the product of an environ- legitimate self-defense.”ment that “fosters, shelters, encourages, and re-wards acts aimed at nullifying Israel’s very exis- EDITOR’S NOTE: As we go to press, a summit has taken place intence.” It is the attitudes and actions of not only Aqaba, Jordan involving Jordanian King Abdul-the Palestinians and the Arab world that enable lah II, Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoudthe continuance of this conflict, but also those of Abbas, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, andthe US and the international community. President Bush. Prime Minister Abbas affirma- tively addressed the issue as defined by Sofaer: Sofaer offers policies and practices to be ap- “there can be no peace until the Arabs of theplied to three issues: terrorism, Palestinian vio- region openly accept the existence of Israel as alence, and the acceptance of Israeli statehood. permanent, sovereign state.” There may be cause for cautious optimism.“Some longstanding American policies,” Sofaerwrites, “have contributed to terrorism, and espe-SUMMER 2003 40 NSF REVIEW
  • 41. RESEARCH REPORTSWhy the Security Council Failed eignty…Security Council decisions limiting the by Michael J. Glennon use of force are but one example.” The US, how- Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003 ever, would not permit an international regime to pp. 16-35 determine its policies. Americans prefer correc- tive laws that leave the field open to competi-Michael Glennon is Professor of International tion, and Europeans prefer preventive laws thatLaw at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplo- avert crises.macy at Tufts University. Glennon examines “More than anything else, however, it hasthree forces that discredited the United Nations been still another underlying difference in atti-Security Council: power, culture, and interna- tude -- over the need to comply with the UNstional law, and why these forces destabilized this rules on the use of force -- that has proved mostinstitution. disabling to the UN system.” In framing the According to Glennon, it was not the military charter, the international community failed toconflict in Iraq that sealed the fate of the Secu- anticipate when force would be deemed unac-rity Council but the rise of American unilateral- ceptable. Glennon states that “the default posi-ism. “Since the end of the cold war,” Glennon tion” of international law has been, “if no restric-states, “the French, the Chinese, and the Rus- tion has been authoritatively established, a coun-sians have sought to return the world to a more try is considered free to act.” The lesson ─ thebalanced system.” The circumstances surround- use of force cannot be subject to archaic interna-ing the conflict in Iraq were the culmination of tional law. This does not imply that the rules ofdecades of tension. France, China, and Russia the UN are dead and that international rule ofseized the opportunity to use their position as law is ineffective. However, it does imply thatmembers of the Security Council to thwart US the rules must be devised.efforts and prevent US advancement. According to Glennon, one guiding principle Another “fault line” that exists between the underlies the destabilization of the UN SecurityUS and other UN states is cultural. It divides the Council: “states pursue security by pursuingNorth and South from the East and West espe- power.” Nations will continue to pursue powercially on the issue of the use of force and hu- and self-interests. They will continue to disagreemanitarian intervention. A further divide exists over the use of force. Therefore, new institu-between the US and the rest of the West, in par- tional laws should be devised based upon theticular, the US and Europe, over the role of inter- reality of how nations behave. Glennon suggestsnational law ─ who should make the rules: the considering the following questions: What arestates or supranational institutions? When should our objectives? What means have we chosen tothe rules be made? Because supranational insti- meet those objectives? Are those means work-tutions such as the European Union make deci- ing? If not, why not? Are better alternativessions on behalf of Europeans, they are available? What are they?“comfortable with impingements on their sover-NSF REVIEW 41 SUMMER 2003
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