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Owasp Top10 2010 rc1
Owasp Top10 2010 rc1
Owasp Top10 2010 rc1
Owasp Top10 2010 rc1
Owasp Top10 2010 rc1
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Owasp Top10 2010 rc1

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Within end of March, the OWASP foundation will release the 2010 version of its major documentation project, the "Top 10 security risks in web applications." …

Within end of March, the OWASP foundation will release the 2010 version of its major documentation project, the "Top 10 security risks in web applications."

Agenda:
- The 10 most common web application attacks
- Discovering the OWASP Top 10 document
- Integrating the Top 10 within an existing SDLC, as a software vendor, or a software buyer.

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  • 1. OWASP Top 10 - 2010 rc1The Top 10 Most Critical Web Application Security RisksAntonio FontesOWASP Geneva Chapter Leaderantonio.fontes@owasp.org<br />
  • 2. Agenda<br />10 ways to attack web applications<br />The OWASP Top 10 rc1 Project<br />Integrating the Top 10 in an existing SDLC/SALC<br />Q&amp;A<br />2<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 3. About the OWASP<br />Open Web Application Security Project<br />“Helping organizations secure their web applications.”<br />Documentation and tools projects<br />130 local chapters worldwide<br />http://www.owasp.org<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />3<br />
  • 4. About me…<br />Antonio Fontes, from Geneva (Switzerland)<br />&gt;1999: Web developer<br />&gt;2005: Ethical hacker / Security analyst<br />&gt;2008: Security &amp; Privacy manager (banking software ISV)<br />&gt;2008: OWASP Geneva Chapter Leader <br />&gt;2010: Information Security Consultant <br />SANS/CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors contributor<br />4<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 5. And about you?<br />Coders? <br />Testers?<br />Managers?<br />Hardcore OWASP Top 10 users?<br />5<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 6. Just taking the temperature…<br />6<br />© Randal Munroe (xkcd.com)<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 7. Part 1: <br />Top 10 major web application attack techniques<br />7<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 8. Attacking the infrastructure<br />Attacking the application<br />Attacking the users<br />Other attacks<br />8<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 9. Attacking the infrastructure<br />hitting the weakest layer<br />9<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 10. 10<br /> ; ) <br />Are all demo apps removed?<br />Is the web server up to date?<br />Is the admin area protected from external access?<br />Is directory indexing been disabled?<br />Were all default passwords changed?<br />Are all unnecessary scripts removed?<br />Are there any backup/test/unused resources?<br />Is the web server up to date?<br />Have all default passwords been changed?<br />Are all unnecessary services disabled?<br />Are all unnecessary accounts disabled?<br />Have all default passwords been changed?<br />Is the system up to date?<br />© Darwin Bell@flickr<br />Are all unnecessary paths closed?<br />Are all unnecessary ports closed?<br />Is the admin interface reachable from the web?<br />Can an administrative account be broken?<br />Is the device up to date?<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 11. Risk A6: <br />Security misconfiguration<br />11<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 12. What is the risk?<br />If there is a weaker link than the web application itself, the attacker will switch to the flawed layer. <br />What are the countermeasures?<br />Harden all layers<br />Reduce services and accounts to the minimum<br />No default passwords<br />Keep everything up to date<br />Apply security guidelines (OS security, Web server security, Application server security, etc.)<br />Keep default web application configuration safe<br />“Deploy securely on a secure architecture”<br />12<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 13. Attacking the infrastructure<br />Attacking the application<br />Attacking the users<br />Other attacks<br />13<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 14. Attacking the application<br />injecting hostile code…<br />14<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 15. what if?<br />15<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 16. 16<br />what if?<br />SELECT * FROM users usrWHERE usr.username = &apos;admin &apos;;--‘AND usr.password = ‘bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be’<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 17. 17<br />what if?<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 18. what if?<br />18<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 19. 19<br /> Any user input is a potential attack vector.<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 20. Risk A1: <br />Injections<br />20<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 21. RISK?<br />Any application entry point can be used as a vector to inject hostile content that will modify expected behaviors.<br />GOOD TO KNOW<br />All non-binding query languages are exposed! (LDAP and Xpath….)<br />21<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 22. COUNTERMEASURES?<br />All input can be modified client-side. Be sure to validate:<br />Querystring parameters<br />Form fields (hidden fields also count)<br />File submissions : if you’re expecting a picture, then make sure it is a picture!<br />Cookies<br />HTTP headers: all fields, including referrer are “user input”<br />22<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 23. COUNTERMEASURES? (cont’d)<br />Neverpaste user input into query commands (SQL, Xpath, LDAP, OS commands, etc.):<br />Use binding variables such as SQL parameters:<br />If no binding model, encode input before pasting:<br />Doubled quotes (‘’) for SQL server<br />Escaped quotes (’) for MySQL (PHP addslashes is helpful!)<br />Etc.<br />23<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 24. COUNTERMEASURES ?(cont’d)<br />Choose best validation strategy!<br />Best: Whitelist<br />When all possible values are known (enums, if/else if statements, regular expressions, …)<br />Graylist:<br />Enforce business rules:<br />Type: string, numeric, byte, …<br />Range: &gt;0, &lt;MaxInt, [a-z]{3,20}<br />Weakest: Blacklist<br />if(input.IndexOf(“&lt;script&gt;”)&gt;=0)<br />//reject<br />24<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 25. Attacking the application<br />playing with obvious identifiers…<br />25<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 26. what if?<br />26<br />99999999<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 27. what if?<br />27<br />1234567<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 28. Risk A4: <br />Insecure direct object references<br />28<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 29. What is the risk?<br />All references can modified client-side. An attacker might be able to access and/or modify confidential information.<br />What are the countermeasures?<br />Never send internal references to the browser:<br />Use temporary or random number mapping (#0, #1, #2, #3, etc.)<br />OR combine referenced access with access control:<br />SELECT * FROM item WHERE id = $id AND owner = $uID<br />UPDATE item … WHERE id = $id AND owner = $id<br />29<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 30. Attacking the application<br />breaking session and authentication mechanisms…<br />30<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 31. what if?<br />31<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 32. what if?<br />32<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 33. what if?<br />33<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 34. Risk A3: <br />Broken authentication or session management<br />34<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 35. What is the risk?<br />HTTP is a stateless protocol. Each request must transmit ‘session’ information over the network.<br />Authentication mechanisms are highly targeted by attackers , at all levels: forms, traffic, stored data.<br />What are the countermeasures?<br />Use simple, centralized and standardized session mechanism<br />Enable cookie security attributes (secure flag, httponly flag, encryption and integrity control)<br />Validate session identifiers <br />Is the sessionID coming from the right place?<br />35<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 36. countermeasures? (cont’d)<br />Make sure ‘logoff’ actually invalidates the session.<br />Prevent bruteforcing attacks, but also prevent denial of service on legitimate accounts<br />Enforce secure password recovery<br />Authenticate before resetting<br />Review, review, review authentication (and logoff) code manually!<br />36<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 37. Attacking the application<br />finding hidden “secret” URLs…<br />37<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 38. what if?<br />38<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 39. what if?<br />39<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 40. Risk A7: <br />Failure to restrict URL access<br />40<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 41. What is the risk?<br />URLs that lead to confidential resources can be easily sent, stored (bookmarks), monitored (proxies, security devices) and sometimes, guessed. <br />What are the countermeasures?<br />Completely disallow access to sensitive file types<br />Validate ALL incoming requests<br />Authorize explicitly (web.xml, ASP.Net page lifecycle, etc.)<br />Don’t expose physical documents with permanent or guessable URLs<br />41<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 42. Attacking the infrastructure<br />Attacking the application<br />Attacking the users<br />Other attacks<br />42<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 43. Attacking the users<br />redirecting users elsewhere…<br />43<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 44. what if?<br />44<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 45. Risk A8: <br />Non-validated redirects and forwards<br />45<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 46. What is the risk?<br />An attacker may use your website reputation as a vector to redirect victims to a hostile website.<br />What are the countermeasures?<br />Never allow absolute URL redirection.<br />If not possible: <br />Use a whitelist of valid hosts<br />Show a warning before redirecting the user<br />If using a “web portal”, make sure redirect pages do not include sensitive information in URLs (aka single-signon-on information)<br />46<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 47. Attacking the users<br />running client hostile code in the website…<br />47<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 48. what if?<br />48<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 49. what if?<br />49<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 50. Risk A2: <br />Cross-site scripting<br />50<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 51. What is the risk?<br />An attacker might inject client-side hostile code in the web application, which will be returned to a victim.<br />51<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 52. What are the countermeasures?<br />Sanitize output. Encode to destination format.<br />For HTML output, use HtmlEntities:<br />&lt;div id=“comment”&gt;Here is my &lt;script&gt;attack&lt;/script&gt;&lt;/div&gt; &lt;div id=“comment”&gt;Here is my &amp;lt;script&amp;gt;attack&amp;lt;/script&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;<br />52<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 53. What are the countermeasures?<br />Sanitize output, encode to destination format:<br />For XML output, use predefined entities:<br />&lt;says&gt;“here is my &lt;script&gt;”&lt;/says&gt;  &lt;says&gt;&lt;![CDATA[here is my &lt;script&gt;]]&gt;&lt;/says&gt;<br />&lt;says&gt;my input is &lt;script&gt;&lt;/says&gt; &lt;says&gt;my input is &amp;lt;script&amp;gt;&lt;/says&gt;<br />53<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 54. Attacking the users<br />replaying predictable requests…<br />54<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 55. what if?<br />55<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 56. what if?<br />56<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 57. Risk A5: <br />Cross-site Request Forgery<br />57<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 58. What is the risk?<br />An attacker might build her own website and trigger requests on the visitor’s browser. (yes, that’s exactly what it seems to be...)<br />58<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 59. What are the countermeasures?<br />Implement unpredictable requests for all sensitive actions<br />Use temporary random hidden control fields:<br />&lt;input type=hidden name=check value=ab23b4a/&gt;<br />Link forms to the user session:<br />if(!(Request.Form[“checker”]).Equals(SessionID)) // return error<br />Use CAPTCHA<br />Use out-of-band verification:<br />SMS / Voice call / Cryptographic tokens, etc.<br />59<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 60. Attacking the infrastructure<br />Attacking the application<br />Attacking the users<br />Other attacks<br />60<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 61. Other attacks<br />breaking weak cryptography…<br />61<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 62. what if?<br />Encrypting with Base64<br />$cookie = base64($sessionId);<br />62<br />It’s not encryption, it’s encoding!<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 63. what if?<br />Encrypting user passwords with AES256<br />$password = encrypt($get_[“password”],AES256,key);<br />63<br />reversible encryption!<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 64. what if?<br />Hashing user passwords with md5<br />$password = md5($get_[“password”]);<br />64<br />weak algorithm!<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 65. what if?<br />Hashing user passwords with SHA-256<br />$password = sha($get_[“password”]);<br />65<br />Missing seed!<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 66. what if?<br />Building keys with Math.Random<br />Byte[] key = Math.RandBytes(128);<br />66<br />Weak random number generator!<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 67. what if?<br />Deriving a key from human entered secret<br />$key = md5($GET_[“secret”]);<br />67<br />Weak key entropy!<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 68. what if?<br />Using ECB mode of operation<br />$bytes = encrypt($text, key);<br />// returns: {0xAF00CADACCE34A4D}<br />$bytes2 = encrypt($text, key);<br />// returns: {0xAF00CADACCE34A4D}<br />68<br />Weak mode of operation!<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 69. what if?<br />Using CBC mode of operation<br />$bytes = encrypt($text, key);<br />// returns: {0xAF00CADACCE34A4D}<br />$bytes2 = encrypt($text, key);<br />// returns: {0xAF00CADACCE34A4D}<br />69<br />Non-random initialization vectors!<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 70. what if?<br />Decrypting with internal secret<br />String clearText = CryptUtils.Decrypt($bytes, Parameters.SecretKey);<br />70<br />Hard-coded secret!<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 71. what if?<br />blablabla<br />71<br />Another problem.<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 72. Risk A9: <br />Insecure cryptographic storage<br />72<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 73. What is the risk?<br />An attacker might not need as much time as you expected to decrypt your data.<br />If one of these words sounds foggy to you, there is a risk:<br />Asymmetric/symmetric encryption, offline encryption, online encryption, CBC, key entropy, initialization vector, ECB, message authentication code, PBKDF2 (RFC2898), constant time operation, Rijndael, AES, 3DES, DSA, RSA, ECC, SHA, keyring, DPAPI, … <br />73<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 74. What are the countermeasures?<br />Don’t do cryptography by yourself<br />Use business level APIs:<br />Use open-source reference implementations (OpenSSL, Truecrypt, etc.)<br />Use expert-community-driven libraries (OWASP ESAPI, …)<br />Take classes…<br />74<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 75. Other attacks<br />observing the environment…<br />75<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 76. 76<br />?<br />© daquellamanera @flickr<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 77. Risk A10: <br />Insufficient transport layer protection<br />77<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 78. What is the risk?<br />Traffic eavesdropping, due to insufficient transport layer protection.<br />What are the countermeasures?<br />Require an SSL encrypted link.<br />Use appropriate certificates (signed and valid).<br />Prevent cookies from leaving the encrypted link (“secure” flag enabled).<br />78<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 79. 79<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />WHAT IS THE RISK LEVEL ?<br />LOW<br />HIGH<br />
  • 80. Part 2: <br />Assessing the risks induced by these 10 attacks<br />80<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 81. Hopefully, someone did it…<br />81<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 82. rating the risks<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />82<br />XSS (example)<br />= 2,6x?<br />
  • 83. 83<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />OWASP Top 10 – 2010 RC1The top ten web application security risks<br />
  • 84. 84<br />Risk Managers<br /><ul><li> exploitability
  • 85. prevalence
  • 86. detectability
  • 87. impact (CIA, AAA)</li></ul>Testers<br /><ul><li> search patterns
  • 88. typical cases
  • 89. myths</li></ul>Developers<br /><ul><li> mitigation steps (agnostic)
  • 90. best practices</li></ul>Advanced material<br /><ul><li> detailed attack scenarios
  • 91. mitigation techniques (per technology)
  • 92. further references</li></ul>Teachers / Students<br /><ul><li> example scenarios</li></ul>Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 93. 85<br />Migration info<br /><ul><li> removed entries
  • 94. new entries
  • 95. gap analysis</li></ul>Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 96. Part 3: <br />Integrating the Top 10 into an existing software development / acquisition lifecycle<br />86<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 97. Antonio Fontes / ConfooConference, Montreal / 2010<br />The Top 10 in your SDLC/SALC<br />87<br />Secure coding<br />Metrics analysis<br />Security testing<br />Secure design<br />Software vendor<br />PERSONEL TRAINING<br />QUALITY ASSURANCE<br />Software buyer<br />Penetration test<br />Design review reports<br />Security test results<br />Contract conditions<br />SLA support<br />
  • 98. Conclusion<br />Your web application will be hacked. ; )<br />88<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 99. Conclusion<br />But if you use the Top 10…<br />89<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 100. Conclusion<br />It won’t be the cheap way…<br />90<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 101. Conclusion<br />And it won’t be the embarrassing way…<br />91<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 102. Conclusion<br />You now know the 10 riskiest flaws in web applications.<br />92<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 103. Conclusion<br />But there’s still a lot to see…<br />93<br />CWE/SANS Top 25 Programming errors<br />WASC Threat Classification<br />Threat modeling<br />OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS)<br />Open Software Assurance Maturity Model<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 104. Conclusion<br />before becoming “secure”.<br />94<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 105. http://owasp.org/index.php/Top10<br />(final version: end of March 2010)<br />95<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />thank you :)<br />
  • 106. 96<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />
  • 107. Copyright<br />You are free:<br />To share (copy, distribute, transmit)<br /> To remix <br />But only if: <br />You attribute this work<br />You use it for non-commercial purposes<br />And you keep sharing your result the same way I did<br />97<br />Antonio Fontes / Confoo Conference, Montreal / 2010<br />

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