4. The German command decided to hold major
strategic operations in the Kursk salient in the
summer of 1943. It was planned to make converging
strokes from the areas of the city of Orel (from the
north) and Belgorod (from the south). Strike groups
were to unite in the Kursk area and surround the
troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the
Soviet Army. The operation was code-named
"Citadel".
For the operation, the Germans concentrated the
group consisting of up to 50 divisions (including 18
armored and motorized), two armored brigades,
three separate tank battalions and eight battalions
of assault weapons, numbering, according to Soviet
sources, about 900 thousand people.
5. The Soviet command decided to hold a defensive battle, to
wear down the enemy troops, defeat them and make the
counterattacks at the critical moment. In this end, the
defense was created. Totally, eight defensive positions were
established. The average density of mining in the direction
of the expected impact of the enemy was 1500 and 1700
anti-tank mines per kilometer.
Troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts
numbered:
more than 1 million 300 thousand people
20 thousand guns and mortars
3,600 tanks and self-propelled guns
about 2950 aircrafts.
6. Source Personnel (thousand)
Tanks and (sometimes)
ACS
Guns and (sometimes)
mortars
Aircrafts
USSR Germany USSR Germany USSR Germany USSR Germany
Ministry of
Defense of
Russia
1336 over 900 3444 2733 19100
about
10000
2172 or
2900
(including
U-2 and
long-range)
2050
Grigoriy
Krivosheev
(Russian
military
historian)
1272
David
Glantz and
Jonathan
House
(American
military
historians)
1910 780 5040
2696 or
2928
Mueller-
Gillebrand
(The
general of
Wermacht)
2540 or
2758
Nicholas
Zetterling
and Anders
Frankson
(British
historians)
1910 777
5128
+2688
totally,
more then
8000
2451 31415 7417 3549 1830
Estimates of the forces before the battle of Kursk in various sources
7. Since the beginning of 1943, operation “Citadel“ was increasingly mentioned in the
interception of secret messages of the High Command of Hitler's army and secret directives
of Hitler . According to the memoirs of A. Mikoyan, on March 27 he was informed by Joseph
Stalin about the German plans in the general details . On April 12, translated from German
the text of Directive № 6 "On the plan of operation "Citadel " of the German command went
to the table of Stalin, endorsed by all the services of the Wehrmacht, but not yet signed by
A. Hitler, who signed it only three days later . These data were obtained by the agent who
operated under the name of "Werther." The real name of the man is still unknown, but it is
assumed that he was a member of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, and the
information got to Moscow through the agent “Lucy”(R. Roessler), operating in the territory
of Switzerland. There is an alternative hypothesis that Werther is the personal photographer
of Hitler.
However, it should be noted that on April 8, Zhukov, basing on the data of intelligence
agencies of the Kursk’s direction, very accurately predicted the strength and direction of the
German attacks on the Kursk Bulge. Though, the exact text of the "Citadel" had been on the
table of Stalin three days before it was signed by A. Hitler, and four days before the German
plan was obvious to the top Soviet military leaders, and general details about the availability
of such plan had been known for at least twelve days before.
8. Before operation "Citadel". From right to
left: Mr. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943
Colonel-General Hermann Hoth and Field
Marshal Erich von Manstein, on discussion.
June 21, 1943
9. The German offensive began in the morning on July 5, 1943. As the Soviet command knew
exactly when the operation began - 3 am (the German army fought according the Berlin time
- in terms of the Moscow time - 5:00 am), at 10:30 pm and at 2:20 am according the Moscow
time, the forces of the two fronts carried the preliminary bombardment (0.25 of the
ammunition). The German report noted significant damage of the links and slight casualties.
An unsuccessful air raid was also made by the 2nd and the 17th Air Army (more than 400
attack aircraft and fighters) to the Kharkov and Belgorod TMA of the opponent.
Before the beginning of the ground operation, at 6 am, the Germans also attacked the Soviet
defensive lines with bombing and artillery strikes. On beginning of the offensive, the tanks
immediately encountered serious resistance. The main attack on the northern facet was
struck in the direction of Olkhovatka. Unable to reach success, the Germans moved the blow
in the direction of Ponyri, but they couldn’t break the Soviet defense. The Wehrmacht moved
only on 10-12 km, after loosing two-thirds of tanks since July 10, the 9th German Army
passed to the defense. In the southern facet main attacks of the Germans were sent to the
areas of Korochi and Obayan.
10. July 12, in the area of Prokhorovka the largest ever cross-tank battle took place.
According to the data from Soviet sources, on the German side about 700 tanks and assault
guns, according to Mr. Zamulina - 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which had 294 tanks (including 15 "Tigers") and
ACS were involved in the battle.
On the Soviet side the 5th Guard Tank Army of P. Rotmistrov, numbering about 850 tanks took part in
the battle. After massive air strikes from both sides, the battle turned into an active phase, and it lasted
until the end of the day.
During the fight a lot of commanders of tanks (platoon and company) dropped out of the battle. The
level of losses of commanders was high: 41 tank commanders (36% of total), the commanders of tank
platoons (61%), the commanders of tank companies (100%) and the commanders of tank battalions
(50%). By the end of July 12, the battle finished with unclear results, just to be resumed in the afternoon
on 13 and 14 July. After the battle, the German forces could not move into the fortifications despite the
fact that the loss of the Soviet tank armies were greater. After advancing at 35 miles for July 5-12 , the
troops of Manstein were forced to begin the withdrawing of the troops from the captured beachhead. It
has become the turning point in the battle. Having begun the advance on July 23, the Soviet army
pushed the German armies in the south of the Kursk salient to their positions.
11. The belfry in commerotion of those,
who died on Prokhorovka field
The cathedral in commemoration of
those, who fell on Prokhorovka field
12. July 12, the Western (commanded by Colonel General Vasily
Sokolovsky) and the Bryansk’s (commanded by Colonel Popov
Marcian) Fronts launched the offensive against the 2nd Armored and
9th Armies of the Germans in the city of Orel. By the end of the July
13, the Soviet troops broke through the enemy defenses. July
26, Germans left the Orel’s foothold and began to withdraw to the
defensive line "Hagen" (in the east of Bryansk). August 5, 05:45, the
Soviet troops liberated Orel . According to Soviet data, 90,000 Nazis
have been destroyed in Orel’s operation.
13. The counteroffensive of the Voronezh’s and Steppe Fronts on the
southern facet began on August 3. August 5, at about 6 pm Belgorod
was released, August 7, Bogodukhov was released. During the
offensive, the Soviet troops cut the railroad “Kharkov-Poltava” August
11 , August 23 they captured Kharkov. German counterattacks have
failed.
August 5, the first salute of the whole war was given in Moscow in
honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.
14. Victory at Kursk heralded the transition of a strategic initiative to the Red Army. By
the moment of the front stabilization, the Soviet troops reached the beginning
positions.
After the end of the battle of Kursk the German Command had lost an opportunity
to carry out strategic offensive operations. The local massive offensives, such as
"Watch on the Rhine" (1944), or the operation at Lake Balaton (1945), also were
failed. The losses in the battle of the parties are not clear. Thus, Soviet
historians, including the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, say that there are more
than 500 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, 1,500 tanks and 3,700 aircraft
had been destroyed.
