Citizens’ trust in the police
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×
 

Citizens’ trust in the police

on

  • 71 views

Assessing the impact of procedural justice, the instrumental approach, and proximity policing in an

Assessing the impact of procedural justice, the instrumental approach, and proximity policing in an
international comparative perspective

Statistics

Views

Total Views
71
Views on SlideShare
71
Embed Views
0

Actions

Likes
0
Downloads
1
Comments
0

0 Embeds 0

No embeds

Accessibility

Categories

Upload Details

Uploaded via as Adobe PDF

Usage Rights

© All Rights Reserved

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Processing…
Post Comment
Edit your comment

Citizens’ trust in the police Citizens’ trust in the police Document Transcript

  • Citizens’ trust in the police Assessing the impact of procedural justice, the instrumental approach, and proximity policing in an international comparative perspective Master thesis of Dorian Schaap Research Master Social & Cultural Science Radboud University Nijmegen June 2012 Supervisor: Peer Scheepers Second reader: Jan Terpstra
  • 1 Contents List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . 2 List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . 2 List of Appendices . . . . . . . . . 2 Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . 4 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . 6 1.1 Trust and the police as representatives of the state . . . . 6 1.2 Trust and legitimacy . . . . . . . 6 1.3 The importance of trust and gaps in our knowledge . . . . 7 1.4 Research questions . . . . . . . 9 2 Theoretical framework and hypotheses . . . . . . 10 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . 10 2.2 The contextual research: macro-level approaches to institutional trust . . 12 2.3 Police science perspectives: three systematic approaches to police-public relationships 13 2.3.1 The procedural justice perspective . . . . . 14 2.3.2 The instrumental perspective . . . . . 16 2.3.3 The proximity policing perspective . . . . . 18 2.4 Control variables based on the demographic-attitudinal research branch . 21 2.5 Differential effects of macro-level determinants . . . . 24 2.6 Theoretical model of trust in the police . . . . . 25 2.7 Cross-country equivalence of trust in the police . . . . 26 3 Data and measurements . . . . . . . . 28 3.1 Main data source and dependent variable . . . . . 28 3.2 Contextual determinants and additional data sources. . . . 29 3.3 Micro-level determinants . . . . . . . 33 3.4 Control variables . . . . . . . . 35 4 The equivalence of trust in the police . . . . . . 38 4.1 Three forms of invariance . . . . . . . 38 4.2 Configural invariance . . . . . . . 41 4.3 Metric invariance. . . . . . . . 43 4.4 Scalar invariance . . . . . . . . 45 4.5 The equivalence of perceived procedural justice . . . . 47 4.6 Concluding remarks regarding measurement equivalence . . . 50 5 Analyses . . . . . . . . . 51 5.1 The presence of trust . . . . . . . 51 5.2 Determinants of trust in the police . . . . . . 52 5.2.1 Country-level determinants and trust . . . . 53 5.2.2 Constructing a full model of trust in the police . . . 54 5.2.3 Intermediary variables . . . . . . 59 5.2.4 Robustness checks . . . . . . 61 5.3 Summarizing the results . . . . . . . 62 6 Conclusions and discussion . . . . . . . 65 6.1 Three research questions . . . . . . . 65 6.2 Factors influencing trust . . . . . . . 66 6.2.1 Contextual research . . . . . . 66 6.2.2 The procedural justice perspective . . . . . 67 6.2.3 The instrumental perspective . . . . . 67 6.2.4 The proximity policing perspective . . . . . 69 6.2.5 Differential effects . . . . . . 70 6.2.6 Control variables . . . . . . . 70
  • 2 6.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . 71 6.4 Final notes . . . . . . . . 72 Literature . . . . . . . . . . 74 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . 81 List of tables Table 1 Index of proximity policing. . . . . . . . 33 Table 2 Descriptive table of all included variables . . . . . . 36 Table 3 Factor loadings of five items measuring institutional trust . . . . 44 Table 4 Results of scalar invariance tests for institutional trust. . . . . 46 Table 5 Results of scalar invariance tests for perceived procedural justice . . . 49 Table 6 Regression estimates of macro-level determinants on trust in the police . . 54 Table 7 Full multilevel regression model on trust in the police. . . . . 56 Table 8 Multilevel regression estimates of intermediary variables . . . . 59 Table 9 Overview of the hypotheses and their results . . . . . 63 List of figures Figure 1 Conceptual model of trust in the police . . . . . . 26 Figure 2 Theoretical factor structure of institutional trust . . . . . 38 Figure 3 Improved factor structure of institutional trust . . . . . 42 Figure 4 Mean levels of trust in the police in 20 countries . . . . . 52 List of appendices Appendix A Values of contextual variables for each country . . . . 81 Appendix B Developing indicators of proximity policing in Europe. . . . 82 i Introduction . . . . . . . 82 ii Methodology . . . . . . . 82 iii Remarks and problems . . . . . . 83 iv Unique countries . . . . . . . 84 Appendix C Macro determinants, Pearson correlations . . . . . 86 Appendix D Macro determinants on intermediary variables . . . . 87 Appendix E Robustness checks . . . . . . . 88
  • 3 Abstract Much research has been conducted on the subject of citizens’ attitudes towards the police. In present study, I aim to improve upon existing research in three ways: by discerning and incorporating three distinctly different theoretical perspectives on trust in the police, by including multiple European nations in a multilevel regression framework, and by testing for the measurement equivalence of citizens’ trust in the police. The three theoretical approaches I assess are the procedural justice perspective, emphasizing fair and respectful police treatment of citizens, the instrumental perspective, focusing on police effectiveness in both a narrow and broader sense, and the proximity policing perspective, concentrating on a broad range of neighbourhood issues, community involvement, and a preventive approach toward crime and disorder. I find that trust in the police is equivalently measured across European countries, but may not be comparable outside Europe. Furthermore, through analyses of both direct and indirect effects of country characteristics and individual determinants, I conclude that all three theoretical approaches have a role in determining trust in the police in Europe, but that support for the procedural justice perspective is most convincing. Country-level corruption and perceived procedural justice prove to be powerful determinants of trust. Shortcomings of the study are addressed, as well as some implications for researchers and policy makers.
  • 4 Acknowledgements Public attitudes towards the police have been the subject of many a study. Scholars from a broad range of disciplines have contributed to our understanding of citizens’ trust in the police: criminologists, sociologists, social psychologists, political scientists, philosophers, economists, many a former police officer or –manager, and more. Such a multidisciplinary field of study is bound to be interesting, but just as often confusing as well. Distilling a coherent theoretical and empirical framework out of so many different approaches towards roughly the same subject is no easy task. I am, therefore, very grateful that I did not have to do so alone. I am first of all indebted to my supervisors Peer Scheepers and Jan Terpstra. Peer Scheepers as my main supervisor made essential contributions in structuring my work, making it concise and keeping me on track whenever I started to digress in my writings. His methodological knowledge and advice proved to be of vital importance in the empirical parts of my thesis as well. Jan Terpstra was pivotal in shaping my interest in the subject of public-police relationships and helping me find my way in the enormous amount of literature and theoretical considerations involved in this study. Thanks to his support, a research paper written two years ago was able to grow into this thesis. I learnt much from my supervisors’ different perspectives, which often supplemented one another quite well. Many other people helped to shape this study in one way or another. I am grateful to my colleagues from the Criminological Institute who always made me feel at home: Caroline Liedenbaum, with whom I spent many a Wednesday discussing policing and the art of conducting research as well as our travels or the books we read; and Mirjam Krommendijk and Renze Salet, who were always interested in this thesis and were willing to listen as well as give sound advice. Much gratitude also goes to my classmates and friends of the research master Social & Cultural Science; in particular to Maarten, Mark, Anouk, Liedewij and Margriet, with whom I spent so much time last year that it is almost worrisome. They were always willing to listen, help, or share a beer or two. In the past four years, my student association AEGEE-Nijmegen had an important role in shaping my life as well as my interests. I am quite certain that the people I met at AEGEE and the places I travelled to were essential for my interest in Europe and cross-national comparisons, so cheers to all of them. I would also like to thank my parents Peter and Claire for their continuous support, and oma Lien for everything she gave me and all the time we shared. It saddens me that she will never get to read this. Finally, I wish to extend my thanks to Frédérique for her patience with me, her interest in my work, and her love.
  • 5 “A cooperative relationship between the police and the public is essential. Both citizens and police have responsibilities in this matter, but the police must take the initiative in building good public relations” (Gourley, 1954: 142) “There are many reasons not to trust the police. Indeed, withholding trust from police will often be perfectly sensible and rational” (Goldsmith, 2005: 450)
  • 6 1 Introduction 1.1 Trust and the police as representatives of the state In recent decades, democratic governments all over the Western world have been concerned about a loss of trust from the public and a decrease in perceived legitimacy. This seems to hold for parliament, government and other democratic institutions (Dalton, 2005; Newton & Norris, 1999; Chanley et al., 2000), the armed forces (Newton & Norris, 1999) and the police (Reiner, 2010; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Jackson et al., 2009; Myhill & Quinton, 2010). For some institutions, such as the judiciary, there is no clear evidence for a decrease in trust (Gibson, 2007), but the trend seems to be one of governmental institutions being trusted less and less. An exception is Eastern Europe, where trust has remained at a rather constant (low) level ever since the fall of communism (Mishler & Rose, 2001). This lack of confidence in governmental institutions is problematic, since democratic governments need to be trusted in order to function (Hetherington, 1998; O’Neill, 2002). The police are supposed to be among the primary victims of these falling trust rates. Terpstra and Van der Vijver (2006) state that the emergence of public safety as one of the pillars of societal debate during the early 1990’s caused citizens to nurse higher expectations of the police, but harbor less trust than before. In contemporary society, the police are expected to symbolize the difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’, giving the police an important symbolic power for many citizens. This is closely related to the increased needs of citizens for protection against risks, danger and insecurity (Loader & Mulcahy, 2003: 43-44). However, police officers on the beat notice that they command ever less respect, making their work that much more difficult (Terpstra & Trommel, 2009; Terpstra & Schaap, 2011). When studying the relationship between citizens and their government, the standing of the police amongst the public is one of the most central issues, because the police are the most visible representation of the authority of the state. This makes the public’s trust in the police an important indicator of the legitimacy of governmental institutions in general (Fleming & McLaughlin, 2010). Thus, information about trust in the police may also offer us insight into the relationship between citizens and the state. 1.2 Trust and legitimacy Concepts like citizens’ trust in the police are highly complex and contradictory, making them ‘wicked issues’ (Fleming & McLaughlin, 2010). This also applies to related concepts like legitimacy, citizens’
  • 7 judgments, satisfaction, and perception that are highly dependent upon specific interpretations. The differences and relations between these various phrases remain too implicit, since they are often confused and used without any clarification (Hawdon, 2008). The most vital concepts in this respect are legitimacy and trust. Generally, legitimacy can be considered primarily a concept at an institutional level (Suchman, 1995), while trust relates to the level of individual agency: “the role is legitimate, the individual is trusted” (Hawdon, 2008: 186). When dealing with legitimacy, it is important to make a distinction between normative and social legitimacy (Terpstra, 2011). Normative police legitimacy consists of the rationality of law and other formal principles. As it mostly concentrates on the correctness of police authority in the written rule of law, normative legitimacy is neither expected to be strongly related to trust nor to other attitudes of citizens towards the police. Social legitimacy, on the other hand, provides a moral framework that explains and justifies the police to citizens. When people understand the authority of the police and accept that the police have the power to determine their behavior, even against their will, the police possess social legitimacy (Tyler, 2004: 84). Social legitimacy thus provides the public a basis for trust in police motives and a belief in the capacity of the police as an institution to protect citizens (Tyler, 2004). Trust, the central concept of this study, can be defined as the expectation that another person will behave in a beneficial way to the individual concerned and does not have harmful intentions. Although there are various kinds of trust (Luhmann, 1988), I will focus on cognitive (or reflexive) trust in the police (Goldsmith, 2005). Since trust, contrary to social legitimacy, concentrates on the individual level, it is more dependent on specific contexts. Generally, we may assume that trust and social legitimacy go together (Hawdon, 2008: 196). However, even if the police as an institution possess a high level of social legitimacy, citizens still may not trust individual representatives of the police in specific circumstances, just as high levels of social trust in a society do not imply that all its citizens trust one another. On the other hand, citizens’ trust in individual representatives of a public institution may contribute to its authority and thus its legitimacy (Hetherington, 1998). 1.3 The importance of trust and gaps in our knowledge For the police, it is essential to be trusted by the public. Trust in the police increases citizens’ compliance with the rule of law, is related to the willingness to cooperate with the police and report crime, improves the readiness of citizens to intervene in cases of minor problems of social disorder in their neighbourhood, and is an important pre-condition for overall police effectiveness (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2004; Jackson & Bradford, 2010; Goudriaan, Wittebrood & Nieuwbeerta, 2006; FitzGerald,
  • 8 2010). Skogan (2009) states, additionally, that trust in the police increases feelings of security. This implies that high rates of trust in the police are beneficial for the public as well as the police. Knowledge about factors affecting public confidence in the police could have important policy implications: if we know what influences trust, it is possible to address these factors through policy measures and thus improve public confidence. Since the police encounter similar problems in the field of trust and perceived legitimacy in many different countries, such knowledge could prove to be of international benefit. Much has been written about police legitimacy and citizen’s trust in this institution, but most studies have a limited scope concerning the theoretical approach, included geographical range and the matter of whether we can compare trust in the police across countries. This study aims to improve upon previous literature on all these three elements. First of all, previous studies often concentrated on a single theoretical approach (Stack, Cao & Adamzyck, 2007; Goldstein, 1987; Jackson & Sunshine, 2007), failing to include multiple perspectives and thus refraining from formulating rival hypotheses or accounting for possible confounding factors on both the individual and national level. In present study, I aim to analyze three scientific police perspectives. Secondly, the majority of prior research focuses on one country, while the aim of this work is to include as many countries as possible. As was noticed before (Goldsmith, 2005; Hough et al., 2010; Jang, Joo & Zao, 2010; Kääriäinen, 2007; Lambert et al., 2010), there is a lack of theory-based research on citizen’s trust in the police in different nations, despite considerable differences in the level of trust between European countries (Kääriäinen, 2007). Furthermore, earlier studies seldom addressed the fundamental question whether trust in the police is perceived in an equivalent fashion across countries. Do people understand trust in the police similarly in different countries? With rare exceptions, this issue has hardly ever been accounted for (Wallace & Latcheva, 2006; Mishler & Rose, 1997), even though it is an important prerequisite if we aim to conduct a meaningful comparison of police trust across countries. Present study aims to fill these serious gaps in our knowledge by providing an extended theoretical framework, using an internationally comparative perspective and controlling for the robustness in comparability of police trust across countries. An international approach allows us to take into account factors that can influence trust in the police on the national (macro) as well as the individual (micro) level, while an extended theoretical framework is required to provide for a complete overview of these national and individual factors.
  • 9 1.4 Research questions There are several problems I aim to address in this study, so I formulate multiple research questions. It is first of all necessary to test the often too implicit assumptions that there are large differences between countries in the extent to which their police is trusted. Thus, my first research question is: what are the differences between European nations in police trust in 2010? However, in order to interpret these differences in a meaningful way, we need to address the often neglected empirical matter of whether it is justified to compare trust in the police from one country to another. To what extent is trust in the police equivalent across different countries? This leads to the second research question: to what extent is trust in the police empirically comparable across nations? The third and final research question, then, aims to explain public trust in the police: which factors on the national and on the individual level explain these differences in police trust? When these questions are answered, we have information on what trust in the police entails, why the police are trusted or distrusted, and how trust can be improved.
  • 10 2 Theoretical framework and expectations 2.1 Introduction In this section, I will provide an overview aiming to cover the relevant theories and past empirical research on the subject of public trust in the police and other institutions. On the basis of this theoretical framework, I derive hypotheses on under which circumstances trust is higher and under which it is lower, and which factors on the individual and national level affect trust. The first research question asks what differences between countries are. My proposition is that levels of trust in the police, and thus differences in police trust, can be explained by various measurable factors. This leads us to the third research question: what factors can explain these differences? In this section, I will address four types of determinants that can affect trust in the police and thus explain differences between countries. Existing studies on trust in the police can roughly be divided into four global, non-mutually exclusive, branches of research: I label these the demographic-attitudinal, interactional, contextual and systematic police science branches1 . Each of these categories emphasize a specific set of determinants of trust. Two of these research fields, the demographic-attitudinal and the contextual categories, may offer explanations for most types of institutional trust, but I expect the two others to be predominantly police-specific. Literature on traditional determinants of trust is discussed for each of these approaches, after which I deal with shortcomings of these studies. Finally, I will argue that in order to fully comprehend the mechanisms behind trust in the police, a combination of these four categories will have to be taken into account. These different approaches together can provide a set of hypotheses answering the research questions. Public attitudes towards the police and other governmental institutions have been the subject of research ever since the 1950’s. Most early studies, generally originating from the United States and in later years Great Britain, emphasized the effects of certain individual characteristics on these attitudes. I discern two types of micro-level research: demographic-attitudinal research and interactional research. The first type includes demographic characteristics like age, gender and ethnicity, and certain individual values or attitudes such as overall life satisfaction or political orientation that may relate to trust in the 1 Although one may argue that all four of these branches concern police science, the latter of the four is unique in that it takes a much more systematic, even paradigmatic approach in attitudes towards the police. This systematic aspect is what I wish to emphasize through this label.
  • 11 police – and often of other institutions as well. In this type of research, only individual citizens are the subject of study and police characteristics or behaviour are not taken into account. The second type of classical studies adds a new and quite essential element to the analysis of trust in the police: police behaviour. In an early study, Gourley (1954) already stressed that “the police themselves are the most important factor in determining public attitudes” (Gourley, 1954: 135). In the Western world, the police hold a unique position among public institutions. Not only are they the most visible representatives of the state (Fleming & McLaughlin, 2010) and do they have a monopoly on the use of force in domestic issues with the exception of the rare cases in which the military are involved (Elias, 1982; Waddington, 1999a; 2003; Loader & Walker, 2001), the police also interact with the public on a daily basis. Police officers have regular contact with citizens and relatively large autonomy to make choices based on unique situations (Wilson, 1968; Manning, 1977). In this respect, the position of the police among governmental institutions is shared only with the social services. A police officer on the beat is a “street-level bureaucrat” (Lipsky, 1980). We might even rather refer to police officers as “street-corner politicians” (Muir, 1977), a phrase that further emphasizes the policeman’s autonomy. In his verbal interaction with citizens, the policeman’s influence on the public should, like that of a politician, not be underestimated: “Eloquence enriches his repertoire of potential responses to violence and permits him to touch the citizenry’s souls – their hopes, their fears, their needs to be something worthwhile, their consciences.” (Muir, 1977: 4). In these elegant words, Muir (1977) implied that individual police officers are capable of altering the public perception in both a positive and negative fashion, an idea that is reinforced by quantitative empirical research (Scaglion & Condon, 1980) – even though the impact of negative encounters between police and citizens appears to be larger than that of positive ones (Jacob, 1971; Skogan, 2006a). In this interactional branch of research, both individual police officers and citizens are the most important actors in determining the extent to which the police are trusted. This is an essential step towards understanding differences between countries in terms of trust in the police. These two research branches are not the main focus of present study, but I will argue in section 2.4 that they are relevant for understanding differences of trust in the police between countries. Besides, the interactional branch of research provides the foundation for the more advanced systematic police science branch. Present study will concentrate predominantly on deducting hypotheses from the contextual and systematic police science research branches, two fields of study that operate on the macro level as well as the individual level. Because they can be applied to the level of nations, they offer the most suitable explanations for differences between countries.
  • 12 2.2 The contextual research: macro-level approaches to trust in the police Although initial research in the field of public attitudes towards the police mostly focused on individual factors affecting trust, researchers soon became aware that the social context of individuals could also determine the extent to which the police would be trusted. The relationship between ethnicity and trust, for example, was in recent decades proven to be not nearly as strong as it had seemed to be in early research such as undertaken by Bayley & Mendelsohn (1969), Jacob (1971), Smith & Hawkins (1973) and Skogan (1978). The powerful initial results were soon considered to be primarily an artefact caused by differences in neighbourhood socialization (Dunham & Alpert, 1988) or other neighbourhood factors (Cao, Frank & Cullen, 1996; Kusow, Wilson & Martin, 1997). Apparently, the social context can play an important role in explaining the extent to which the police are trusted. This finding lead to different types of analysis, and different types of determinants: those on the macro-level. The first of these studies concentrated on the influence of various neighbourhood characteristics on trust – particularly trust in the police and law-enforcement (Skogan, 1978). This research was conducted on the level of neighbourhoods. Neighbourhood disorder (Cao et al., 1996) and perceived insecurity and crime in the neighbourhood (Reisig & Parks, 2000) were found to be relevant determinants. Through media exposure and other modes of communication, moreover, crime-related events in neighbourhoods could be argued to affect people’s attitudes in the entire nation. The late 1990’s saw a major new development in contextual research: the emergence of cross- national studies on the subject of citizen perceptions of the police (Cao et al., 1998), the judiciary (Gibson, Caldeira & Beird, 1998) and public institutions in general (Newton & Norris, 2000). In these studies, the context is that of entire countries. Country characteristics are expected to affect the population’s trust in public institutions. One of these characteristics is income inequality. Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) found that more (income) equality in a country tends to increase generalized trust, which they attribute to increased solidarity and the feeling that common values are shared throughout society. In a country with equal opportunities for every citizen to attain wealth and prestige, people are more likely to feel that the government represents these common values. Since the police are the most visible representation of the government, Jang, Joo & Zhao (2010) expected an effect of income inequality on trust in the police.
  • 13 A similar reasoning holds for the level of democracy in a country: in cases where and when all citizens feel they have equal shares of influence on their government, they are more likely to trust their institutions as these institutions are thought to represent the public interest (Jang et al., 2010; Cao & Zhao, 2005). The past may be relevant in this respect: when a democracy is still young and memory of a former authoritarian, non-democratic regime is fresh in people’s minds, governmental institutions will be trusted less (Caparini & Marenin, 2005: 5). This could prove to be particularly important in Eastern European former communist nations, where the police, even more than other institutions, were considered a tool of the communist one-party system (Caparini & Marenin, 2005). In these countries, police reforms still encounter many difficulties, and the public is likely to be less trusting towards the police (Rose-Ackerman, 2001). This leads to the following expectations for present study: Hypothesis 1a: In countries with higher levels of income inequality, citizens have less trust in the police. Hypothesis 1b: The more recent a country has had a non-democratic regime, the lower citizens’ trust in the police is. 2.3 Police science perspectives: three systematic approaches to police-public relationships The central assumption of explaining trust in the police through the systematic police science branch is rooted in interactional research, which indicated that police behaviour has an influence on trust (Gourley, 1954; Scaglion & Condon, 1980). This interaction between the police and the public is not merely an individual matter, dependent on choices of isolated street-corner politicians on the basis of personal ethics or orders from superiors. It is also affected by broader mechanisms, both intentional and unintentional. First of all, specific elements of police culture may shape police attitudes towards citizens (Reiner, 2010; Muir, 1977). Despite the fact that police culture is not the same across countries or individuals (Terpstra & Schaap, 2011), may change over time (Foster, 2003), and that the difference between talk and action in police culture may generally not be appreciated sufficiently (Waddington, 1999b), there are some cultural characteristics that are present in most police forces (Reiner, 2010: 137- 138). Among other characteristics, police officers are thought to be cynical and distrusting towards the public, show strong internal solidarity and are susceptible to machismo and racism (Reiner, 2010). All of these elements, when displayed in contacts between police and public, may lead to public distrust in the police. However, there are also specific means for police officers and organizations to make the public view them in a more positive way. Since the very start of police-public relation studies,
  • 14 recommendations were made to change policies in certain (problematic) neighbourhoods, and to alter police priorities (Gourley, 1954; Biderman et al., 1967). This is important, because due to various causes, trust in the police and government declined all over Western Europe during the 1980’s (Reiner, 2010). Rising crime rates, various violent conflicts between protest- or minority groups and the police, and increasing egalitarianism in Western societies are thought to be causes of less trust in and respect for the police (Terpstra & Trommel, 2009; Reiner, 2010). Regaining the public’s trust became an important policy goal from the 1990’s onwards (Terpstra & Trommel, 2009). This makes systematic study of the relationship between the police and citizens highly essential. Three quite different scientific perspectives on policing that can be applied to the problem of trust in the police have been the subject of research in the past decades: the instrumental perspective, the proximity policing perspective and the procedural justice perspective. Each of these perspectives offers a different view on which factors affect citizens’ trust in the police, and although their implications sometimes overlap, they are quite distinct. 2.3.1 The procedural justice perspective The first perspective on public attitudes towards the police is the procedural justice approach. This perspective is historically mostly linked to police and court (social) legitimacy rather than trust. Tyler (2004) treats trust (or confidence) as one of three core sections that make up legitimacy, while Reisig, Bratton & Gertz (2007) consider trust to be the strongest element of legitimacy. Hence, it is likely that the procedural justice approach can be applied to trust as well as legitimacy. Procedural justice theory deals predominantly with the direct interaction between police officers and citizens. Tyler (1988; 1990) united the interactional research tradition on public trust in the police such as conducted by Gourley (1954) and Jacob (1971) with social-psychological studies of the legitimacy of law and courts (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Lind, 1982) in one theory of procedural justice for law enforcement. According to the procedural justice paradigm applied to the police, citizens judge the police predominantly by their fair and respectful treatment of citizens. A fair procedure in police-citizen contact entails, in the words of Tyler (1988), various elements: opportunity of representation for the citizen to make his case, and consistency, impartiality, quality of decision, correctability and ethicality on the side of the police officer. When the police show respect, let citizens explain their views on situations, and show their commitment to making informed decisions, citizens will comply more often (McCluskey, 2003: 91), will have more confidence in the police (Jackson & Sunshine, 2007), and will hold more favourable attitudes towards the police in general (Frank, Smith & Novak, 2005). Police violence, on the
  • 15 other hand, generally being rather the opposite of fair treatment, will have the exact reverse effect (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Sunshine and Tyler (2003) found that elements of perceived police procedural justice have a larger influence on public attitudes towards the police than concerns about crime rates. Naumann and Bennett (2000) argued – although not in a police context – that procedural justice has larger effects than merely between the authority and the direct subject of procedural justice: the application of procedural justice has the ability to spread across groups, creating a climate of procedural justice. Thus, we may expect that the behaviour of individual police officers has an indirect impact on both fellow police officers and other citizens than the ones they encounter. This need not necessarily be a positive effect: police officers use more force in disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Terrill & Reisig, 2003), possibly leading to a climate of legal cynicism among citizens of those neighbourhoods since they do not perceive the police to act according to the procedural justice principles (Sampson & Bartusch, 1998; Sharp & Atherton, 2007). Hence, while a climate of procedural justice appears to enhance police legitimacy and citizens’ trust in the police, the contrary holds as well: a climate of unfair treatment and the very absence of procedural justice could ensue if police officers or other civil servants are corrupt or violent. Corruption may be a vital aspect here. A corrupt police force is unable to treat its citizens fairly and equally (Tankebe, 2010; Tyler, 1990), while societal corruption in general implies poor overall institutional procedural justice (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003). Since police organizations all over the world are among the most vulnerable to pervasive forms of corruption of all public institutions, corruption in the police force and broader societal corruption are closely entwined (Punch, 2000; 2009). Societal corruption is thus not only widely considered to be morally wrong, but is also extremely harmful to the legitimacy of a nation’s government (Wolters & De Graaf, 2005: 216). Social legitimacy and trust are such closely related concepts that it comes as no surprise that Anderson and Tverdova (2003) found corruption on a national level to decrease trust in civil servants generally. Jang, Joo & Zhao (2010) and Kääriäinen (2007) more specifically expected a relationship between corruption on the (societal) macro-level and trust in the police. Tankebe (2010), in the specific context of Ghana, as well as Weitzer and Tuch (2005) in the USA, also found an effect of perceived police corruption on trust in the police. Summarizing, there are plenty of reasons to expect a negative effect of societal corruption, as an indicator of an anti-procedural justice climate in a country, on trust in the police. However, we must not forget that procedural justice is before all else an individual matter. Citizens’ trust in the police is, according to the procedural justice perspective, mainly dependent on their
  • 16 individual perception of police procedural justice. But this individual perception is affected by macro- level mechanisms. When corruption in society or among the police is less present, citizens perceive the police as acting according to the principles of procedural justice to a greater extent (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Tankebe, 2010; Tyler, 1990). We are, then, quite likely to find differences between countries in the extent to which police officers are perceived to act according to the principles of procedural justice since police organizations operate differently in each country and the pervasiveness of corruption also varies over nations. Subsequently, this leads to differences between countries in the extent to which citizens perceive the police to apply procedural justice principles, explaining differences between nations in levels of public trust in the police. From the framework above, we can distil three hypotheses: Hypothesis 2a: In countries with higher levels of corruption, citizens have less trust in the police. Hypothesis 2b: Citizens who perceive the police to act according to the principles of procedural justice to a larger degree have more trust in the police. Hypothesis 2c: In countries with higher levels of corruption, citizens perceive the police to act according to the principles of procedural justice to a lesser extent. 2.3.2 The instrumental perspective The instrumental perspective differs from the other two in that it has seen more or less systematic testing on the level of neighbourhoods (Reisig & Parks, 2000; Jackson et al., 2009) and, more important for present study, in an international setting (Jang, Joo & Zhao, 2010; Kääriäinen, 2007). In this section, I take the liberty of discerning two somewhat different interpretations of the instrumental perspective; a narrow interpretation as employed for example in the analyses of Jang, Joo and Zhao (2010), Reisig and Parks (2000) and Weitzer & Tuch (2005), and a broader interpretation that is used by Sunshine and Tyler (2003: 514), Goldsmith (2005), Bradford and Jackson (2010) and Tankebe (2008; 2010), among others. The basic assumption of the instrumental perspective, highly influenced by the New Public Management and its emphasis on measurable output (Terpstra & Trommel, 2009), is that the public judges the police by their performance in several measurable areas. In the instrumental perspective, the police should before all else be effective to be judged by citizens in a positive fashion (Kääriäinen, 2008). Let us first take a look into how the narrow interpretation of the instrumental perspective deals with this assumption. According to this view, the public judgement is dependent most specifically on police performance in the key area of crime control (Jang, Joo & Zhao, 2010). Although the police in most countries have much broader tasks than reducing crime, such as preventing forms of disorder and
  • 17 helping those in need2 , the narrow interpretation assumes that the public holds the police primarily responsible for adequately dealing with crime, and most of all with violent crime (Jang, Joo & Zhao, 2010; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005: 281). This holds regardless of the fact that the police on their own have very limited possibilities to decrease crime (Garland, 1996; Ashford & Gibbs, 1990). One could reason that (violent) crime is so central to citizens’ evaluations of the police because it is measurable, and because it attracts the continuous interest of the media and the public (Terpstra & Van der Vijver, 2006; Reiner, 2010) more than any other policing activity. In this view, the public may thus have more trust in the police when crime rates are lower. Previous research has used various empirical indicators for crime rates. Crime statistics all have serious disadvantages even within a single nation (Maguire, 2007), and are notoriously difficult to compare internationally, partly due to differences in criminal law but especially because of differences in quality of victimization surveys and police registration (Neapolitan, 1999). The most reliable and valid indicator of crime occurrence is generally considered to be the homicide rate in a country, because of the seriousness of this crime: it is the most likely type of crime to be registered systematically (Neapolitan, 1999) and is hence internationally relatively easy to compare. It is also a very serious type of crime and hence most likely to affect citizens’ emotions and judgements concerning the police, as indicated by Stoutland (2001). Following the studies of Jang, Joo and Zhao (2010) and Reisig and Parks (2000), it is most straightforward to expect the public to have less trust in the police once homicide rates in a country are higher. Compared to this narrow interpretation of the instrumental perspective, the broader interpretation is not as stringent concerning the type of police performance that is expected to affect public attitudes towards the police. In this broader view, citizens judge the police by their overall effectiveness and efficiency which may include, but is definitely not limited to, violent crime rates. Examples of elements that are also included in this broader view are the extent to which the police respond quickly to emergency calls and their successfulness in addressing anti-social behaviour (Bradford & Jackson, 2010), their investigation of criminal acts and prosecution of criminals (Goldsmith, 2005) and their effectiveness in helping those who ask for it (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). In this broad interpretation, police effectiveness often depends on how citizens themselves define it rather than on fixed standards. So other than using crime statistics, police scientists who follow this broader interpretation often rely on citizens’ perceptions of overall police effectiveness to determine the 2 See for extended overviews of police practice in various countries for example Newburn (2008) and Liedenbaum (2011).
  • 18 influence of police effectiveness on attitudes towards the police. In this study, it is possible to test indicators of both the narrower and the broader interpretation. Hence, my expectation based on the narrower interpretation of the instrumental perspective is that citizens have less trust in the police in countries with higher homicide rates, whereas my hypothesis based on the broader interpretation of this perspective is that citizens who perceive the police to be more effective have more trust in the police. Next to these two hypothesized relationships, it is also relevant to study the relationship between the determinants linked to the narrow and the broader interpretation. To what extent do homicide rates affect citizens’ perceptions of police effectiveness? I expect the two to be negatively related. This implies that I expect the narrow interpretation of the instrumental perspective to partially overlap with the broader interpretation: crime rates in a country are hypothesized to decrease perceptions of police effectiveness. Finally, previous research also found that corruption is a factor that decreases institutional effectiveness and the public perception thereof. When corruption is rampant, civil servants are more interested in serving their own benefit than that of the public (Wolters & De Graaf, 2005: 216), leading to a decrease in institutional effectiveness (Rose-Ackerman, 1997; 1999). This holds for the police (Tankebe, 2010) as well as for most other institutions (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Rothstein, 2000). I expect that corruption on the national level will thus decrease public perceptions of police effectiveness. Obviously, this is where the procedural justice perspective and the broader interpretation of the instrumental perspective overlap to some degree; illustrating that the perspectives are not mutually exclusive. I summarize the above in four hypotheses: Hypothesis 3a: In countries with higher homicide rates, citizens have less trust in the police. Hypothesis 3b: Citizens who perceive the police to be more effective have more trust in the police. Hypothesis 3c: In countries with higher homicide rates, citizens perceive the police to be less effective. Hypothesis 3d: In countries with higher levels of corruption, citizens perceive the police to be less effective. 2.3.3 The proximity policing perspective The proximity policing perspective is a police science approach that has had a major influence on the way police forces across the globe operate. Several models of police practice can be argued to fit under the umbrella of proximity policing (Tilley, 2003), of which the most well-known model is community- oriented policing (COP). The two concepts – proximity policing and community-oriented policing – could
  • 19 be argued to be one and the same thing (Holmberg, 2002), but I make a certain distinction. I use the phrase “proximity policing” when referring to the police science perspective, whereas I consider “community policing” to be a police practice paradigm; the application of proximity policing as interpreted by police organizations in large parts of the Western world but especially in the US and UK. It is hard to define proximity policing, since one of the most central implications of this perspective is that the police need to adapt to local communities and contexts (Holmberg, 2002). Still, all interpretations of the proximity policing perspective share some basic premises: that in order to improve the relationship between the police and the public, the police should decrease their distance to citizens by being approachable and visible, focus on addressing a broad range of (social) neighbourhood problems such as disorder and feelings of insecurity, and be proactive in the battle against crime and disorder by involving the community and exchanging information with the public (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997; Goldstein, 1987; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990; Terpstra, 2010). The goal of the police is not merely to enforce the law in a literal, means-over-ends way, as in traditional approaches to “professional” policing (Goldstein, 1979; Stone & Travis, 2011), but to include the human factor in policing and in its more idealistic interpretation to help create a better society (Alderson, 1979). In order to achieve this goal, citizen involvement and participation in neighbourhood security are vital elements of proximity policing. This decreased distance between the police and citizens is expected to improve citizens’ views of the police (Tilley, 2003). There are several issues with the proximity policing school of thought. The first problem is that it proves difficult to implement successfully in practice. Part of the value of proximity policing-related ideas appears to lie on the rhetorical level, even causing Klockars (1988) to imply that the concept is hardly more than a rhetorical tool. Additionally, there is often a large divide between “management cops” (Reuss-Ianni, 1983) on the one hand, who might wish to apply the ideas provided by proximity policing, and the extent to which they are then actually implemented by “street cops”, who are often deemed conservative and resistant to change (Reiner, 2010). This daily, street-level application of these ideas in the form of community policing is often something of a black box (Terpstra, 2010). Not only from the side of the police can the application of proximity policing ideas suffer setbacks: citizens themselves are often unwilling to get – and remain – involved in community partnerships (Grinc, 1994). A second problem, briefly addressed above, is in its vague definition or perhaps even the absence of any definition at all (Stone & Travis, 2011; Seagrave, 1996; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997: 5). This has lead to the blossoming of many different interpretations and elaborations of the ideas offered by the proximity policing perspective next to community-oriented policing, such as intelligence-based
  • 20 policing (Maguire, 2000), problem-oriented policing (Goldstein, 1979; Braga et al., 1999), and reassurance policing (Innes, 2004; Petersen, 2010). If interpreted narrowly by police management or governments, the application of some measures inspired by proximity policing may even rub the wrong way, resulting in “aggressive enforcement of minor ordinances, [...] enhanced traffic enforcement, and any police action that instils public confidence” (Bayley, 1994: 104), thus causing the very opposite of what proximity policing aims to achieve. Despite these problems, however, there is evidence that the application of proximity policing principles can have a positive effect on neighbourhoods (Skogan, 2006b; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997), indicating that Klockars’ (1988) view may be too negative. Unfortunately, systematic international comparisons on the subject of proximity policing are thus far rather few in number. Policing modes inspired by proximity policing have become leading police paradigms in most Western countries over the recent decades, at the very least on a rhetorical level (Terpstra, 2010; Bayley & Shearing, 1996; Stone & Travis, 2011). Still, there are differences between nations in the extent to which they have actually managed to realize the principles of proximity policing in the street-level police practice. This could partially be due to the aforementioned difficulties in implementing them: there are differences between nations in the extent to which citizens are willing to cooperate with the police (Mawby, 1992), differences in relations between police management and community officers (Liedenbaum, 2011: 322-323), and different types of proximity policing-inspired methods are applied in different countries. Besides, there are differences in terminology. In Norway, for example, the local Lensmann or sheriff has been responsible for many of the main tasks associated with proximity policing (closeness to citizens, cooperation with local agencies, and focusing on a wide range of issues) for centuries, but these tasks are not labelled as community policing or a related police practice paradigm and are thus not accepted as such (Larsson, 2010). This means that, if we wish to study the effects of the proximity policing practice on trust in the police, it is important to concentrate on the implementation of specific elements that proximity policing proposes regardless of the way these elements have been labelled. These differences between countries in the adoption and implementation of proximity policing ideas and principles allow us to study the relationship between COP and trust in the police on the national level. I expect countries in which community-oriented measures have been implemented to a greater extent to maintain higher levels of trust in the police. We must not forget, however, that proximity policing is all about the proximity and hence interaction between police and citizens. It would thus not be feasible to study proximity policing only on
  • 21 the macro-level; but we need to take into account citizens’ perceptions of proximity policing. One of the elements that make up proximity policing is the prevention of crime. Preventive police work is, in the proximity policing perspective, preferred over the reactive “rapid response” methods that were dominant in the earlier “reform” or “professional” type of policing (Stone & Travis, 2011). Although prevention is only one out of several aspects of proximity policing, and proximity policing is not the only perspective in which prevention is important, there is a distinct overlap between the two. Greene (2000: 311) considers a focus on prevention to be the most important aspect of proximity policing, whereas most authors appear at least to acknowledge it as one of several main indicators (Rohe et al., 1996; Skolnick & Bayley, 1988; Maguire & Mastrofski, 2000). While not the ideal test of proximity policing on the individual level, citizens’ perceptions of police crime prevention successfulness can hence provide an indication of their perception of proximity policing as a whole3 . When the public has a more positive perception of police crime prevention successfulness, the police is perceived to be better equipped to prevent various types of crime. Citizens are then likely to be more trusting towards the police, since they protect their interests, even before those interests can be harmed. I thus expect citizens who have more positive perceptions of police crime prevention successfulness to have more trust in the police. Additionally, if my presumption that proximity policing and a focus on prevention are related is correct, it is also reasonable to expect a relationship between the implementation of proximity policing and citizens’ perceptions of police crime prevention successfulness. This way, we may not only expect a direct effect of proximity policing on the level of nations on public trust in the police, but it is also possible to hypothesize an indirect effect of proximity policing through perceived police prevention abilities. The resulting hypotheses are as follows: 4a: In countries in which the police force has adopted and implemented the principles of proximity policing to a larger degree, citizens have more trust in the police. 4b: Citizens who perceive the police to be more capable of preventing crime have more trust in the police. 4c: In countries in which the police force has adopted and implemented the principles of proximity policing to a larger degree, citizens perceive the police to be more capable of preventing crime. 2.4 Control variables based on the demographic-attitudinal research branch 3 I acknowledge that the interpretation of proximity policing on the individual level as police prevention successfulness is far from ideal and theoretically quite problematic. However, under this rare circumstance, empirical limitations have steered my choice to accept police prevention as a partial coverage of proximity policing. Results will have to be interpreted with care.
  • 22 As mentioned in previous sections, early studies on trust in the police mostly focused on the effect of individual background characteristics on trust in the police. Central in these factors was most often the citizen (the demographic-attitudinal branch), although the police officer was sometimes also included in the study (the interactional branch). The determinants these types of research offer can still be relevant for cross-national and research, even though they are on the micro level. That is because they can be aggregated to the macro level. The theoretically limited demographic approach usually included individual characteristics such as gender, age and education: males, the elderly and the lower educated were generally found to have more trust in the police force (Gourley, 1954; Preiss & Ehrlich, 1958). On the whole, these early results have mostly been confirmed by later research (Correia, Reisig & Lovrich, 1996), and income was also added to this basic list of determinants: those with higher incomes were found to have less trust (Cao & Zhao, 2005). A substantial body of research has been dedicated to the relationship between ethnic minorities and the police (Bayley & Mendelsohn, 1969; Jacob, 1971; Smith & Hawkins, 1973) and judiciary (Jacob, 1971). In the turbulence of ethnic conflict in the United States during the 1960’s and early 1970’s, the study of ethnic minorities attitudes towards law enforcement grew highly relevant (Albrecht & Green, 1977). Blacks held much more negative views of the police than whites, while Hispanics were somewhere in between the two groups (Gourley, 1954; Jacob, 1971; Skogan, 1978). As stated before, however, this relation was later criticized (Dunham & Alpert, 1988; Cao, Frank & Cullen, 1996; Kusow, Wilson & Martin, 1997). In later studies, religiosity was also found to be related to trust: frequent church attendants had more trust in the police (Cao, Stack & Sun, 1998; Jang, Joo & Zhao, 2010). Most of these demographic factors play a role in police trust as well as trust in other institutions (Newton & Norris, 2000). Another early focus of study was the relationship between victimization of crime and trust in and satisfaction about the police. Crime victims, especially those who were victimized recently, were generally found to have less trust in police and the courts, since law enforcement had failed to protect them in the past (Smith & Hawkins, 1974; Homant, Kennedy & Fleming, 1984; Koenig, 1980). The effect of victimization on trust, however, tended to be much weaker or even non-existent once citizens’ (neighbourhood) context was taken into account (Garofalo & Hindelang, 1977; Thomas & Hyman, 1977). Nevertheless, victimization may be a factor determining citizens’ trust in the police. Later on, this type of research was supplemented by various other individual factors, based on attitudes rather than demographics. This was based on insights from a broad range of psychological
  • 23 studies concerning cognitive consistency theories, such as Festinger’s (1957) cognitive dissonance theory, stating that attitudes tend to cluster together in sets (Albrecht & Green, 1977). Not only does this imply that trust in the police is related to trust in other public institutions, but also that certain other types of attitudes and opinions may be related to trust in the police. Skogan (1978) stressed an effect of one’s satisfaction with life in general on trust. Political conservatism (a right-wing orientation) was found to be positively related to trust in the police (Cao, Stack & Sun, 1998; Jang, Joo & Zhao, 2010). Additionally, various scholars hypothesized that feelings of unsafety and fear of crime cause a decrease in trust in the police (Biderman et al., 1967; Reisig & Parks, 2000; Kääriäinen, 2007; Jackson et al., 2009). Skogan (2009), however, concluded through a longitudinal study that causality in this matter is reversed and that it is a loss of confidence in the police that precedes feelings of unsafety. A final factor that may well affect trust in the police is (general) social trust. However, there is no consensus over the causality: does a general inclination to trust other people also affect institutional trust, and thus trust in the police, or is it the other way around? Newton and Norris (2000) provide two opposing theories on the matter. The first is that institutions act as a precedent and example for citizens (Newton & Norris, 2000: 7), causing Rothstein and Stolle (2002; 2008) to expect that institutional trust precedes general social trust: when institutions cannot gain the people’s trust, citizens will also distrust one another. The second approach is that trust is basically a personality trait developed in one’s early childhood (Newton & Norris, 2000: 5), and that people who are generally more trusting also tend to trust institutions to a higher degree. Allum et al. (2010), in an international study, find more support for the second approach than for the first, making social trust a possible relevant control variable. These micro-level demographic and attitudinal determinants can affect trust on the macro-level. Once a nation’s people have attained a higher average education, we can expect their attitudes to be more critical towards the police, and trust in the police will decrease. Similar processes may hold for other changes in the demographics in a country, but also for developments in values and attitudes of citizens in a country (Inglehart, 1999). If a country’s population is less conservative, for example, the level of trust in public institutions will be lower. Therefore, it is important to take into account these individual factors when we test for determinants on the macro level. In the previous sections, I addressed several ways in which police science perspectives presume that trust in the police is shaped and affected. These perspectives concentrated on institutional characteristics of the police force, and acted on the macro level as well as the micro level. Especially the latter is rooted in the interactional branch of research. One control determinant that is part of this interactional branch will be taken into account. In assessing factors influencing trust in the police,
  • 24 urbanization was found to have an effect (Zamble & Annesley, 1987; Cao & Zhao, 2005). People living in smaller communities generally have more trust in their governmental institutions due to increased personal contact between police officers and the public (Albrecht & Green, 1977), leading to more familiarity and thus trust between the two. Although this cannot be directly linked to either of the three police science perspectives, urbanization may be an relevant control variable. Summarizing, in my analysis I will control for various individual determinants: gender, age, education, income, minority membership, victimization, religiosity, life satisfaction, political orientation on a right-left scale, generalized social trust and urbanization. 2.5 Differential effects of macro-level determinants In section 2.2, I hypothesized that income inequality in a country affects trust in the police. In section 2.3.1, I did the same for the prevalence of corruption. It should be noted, though, that Jang, Joo and Zhao (2010) did not find significant effects of either income inequality or corruption in their international comparative study. Is this because income inequality and corruption do not play a role in determining trust in the police? Perhaps there are differences between citizens in the effects of these macro-level determinants. There could be a difference between those with high and those with low incomes, leading to contrary effects of macro-level determinants on trust that cancel each other out if one only takes into account the net effect. It can be argued that high income inequality and rampant corruption are especially harmful to the poor, while the rich may actually profit from this unequal division of political and economic resources. The wealthiest will have larger income shares when income inequality is greater, and they are more capable of buying their way to power and influence in corrupt nations. Officials in these countries are more sensitive to bribery: one’s income determines one’s political power. According to revisionist or critically influenced views on law enforcement, the police (Reiner, 2010: 47-55; Greenberg, Kessler & Loftin, 1985) and the entire criminal justice system (Chambliss & Seidman, 1982: 72-73) are thought to protect the “haves” more than the “have-nots”. Thus, increasing divisions of power due to income inequality and corruption will induce more trust in the police in those with the highest incomes, because the police will be more likely to protect their interests. Those with lower incomes have less trust, due to the fact they consider the police a tool of the rich and powerful. This leads to the following expectations: Hypothesis 5a: In countries with high income inequality, the difference between those with higher income as compared to those with lower income in terms of trust in the police, will be larger.
  • 25 Hypothesis 5b: In countries with high levels of corruption, the difference between those with higher income as compared to those with lower income in terms of trust in the police, will be larger. 2.6 Theoretical model of trust in the police In figure 1, the entire conceptual model as discussed above is summarized. First of all, determinants based on the three police science perspectives are expected to affect trust in the police. The first perspective is that of procedural justice. On the macro-level, I consider corruption to be an indicator of procedural justice, affecting trust (2a). On the individual level I expect perceptions of police procedural justice to induce more trust in the police (2b). I also expect corruption to influence citizens’ perceptions of procedural justice (2c). The second is instrumental perspective, which also has several hypotheses: I expect homicide, measured on the macro-level, to decrease trust (3a). I also expect the micro-level determinant of perceived police effectiveness to affect trust in the police (3b). Moreover, homicide (3c) as well as corruption (3d) are expected to influence the public perception of police effectiveness. Proximity policing, directly operationalized on the macro level, is also expected to affect trust (4a). On the micro level, I hypothesize perceived police prevention successfulness to influence trust in the police (4b). Furthermore, I expect a relationship between proximity policing on the macro level and individual perceptions of police prevention successfulness. This makes perceived procedural justice, perceived police effectiveness and perceived police prevention successfulness intermediary variables. Unconnected to the three police science perspectives, I include two other contextual factors: income inequality (1a) and democratic history (1b). However, for income inequality (5a), as well as for the level of corruption in a country (5b), I expect differential effects depending on one’s income. Finally, I also include a range of micro-level control variables.
  • 26 Figure 1: Conceptual model of trust in the police 2.7 Cross-country equivalence of trust in the police In the previous sections, I have drawn a theoretical framework attempting to determine the most important factors in explaining trust in the police across countries. This framework can be tested through empirical research, but there is one important precondition: we must ascertain that a comparison of trust in the police across countries is valid and equivalent. The measurement of “trust in the police” must be equivalent in different countries. Why is this a fundamental question? We must remember that large amounts of police research in the past concentrated on only one country. Internationally comparative studies in police science were often of a predominantly qualitative nature. These studies proved convincingly that there are large differences in the way police forces in various countries function due to differences in history, structure and culture of the police (for example Mawby, 2003; Liedenbaum, 2011; Cassan, 2010; Bayley, 1979; 1985). This implies that “the police” may not be equivalently understood by people in different nations.
  • 27 Moreover, the concept of “trust”, being notoriously complex, could also be interpreted in a different way across languages and cultures. Previous quantitative international comparative studies on trust in the police consistently ignored this empirically testable question, even when including culturally extremely diverse countries. Examples are the comparison between the United States and China (Cao & Hou, 2001), Japan (Cao, Stack & Sun, 1998) or Latin America (Cao & Zhao, 2005), between various Eastern and Western European nations (Kääriäinen, 2007) or even a wide range of countries all over the globe (Jang, Joo & Zhao, 2010). A rare exception to the rule is the study of Jackson et al. (2011), which found non-equivalence between England and Bulgaria for certain aspects of public attitudes towards the police. This indicates that it is relevant to test for cross-country equivalence of trust in the police if we wish to conduct a valid comparison. Tests for equivalence must be applied to a set of several observed indicators intending to measure one or more theoretical constructs: multiple manifest indicators are required (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000: 10). If we aim to test whether trust in the police is equivalent, we need to compare its relationship with a set of closely related variables across different countries. The most logical choice for such a set of variables are other types of institutional trust. Past research often included trust in the police as an indicator for institutional trust, along with trust in the legal system, parliament, politicians and more (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Wallace & Latcheva, 2006; Newton & Norris, 2000). The cross-country equivalence of institutional trust, however, has seldom been tested before in an adequate fashion. Present study aims to fill that gap, focusing on the relationship between trust in the police and trust in different institutions. When this relationship proves to be similar across countries, evidence for equivalence is provided. Only when this has been achieved is an international comparison of trust in the police justified.
  • 28 3 Data and measurements 3.1 Main data source and dependent variable In this section, I will describe the data I use to answer my research questions. Consecutively, I will address the nature of the data I use, the operationalization of the dependent variable, of country-level determinants, and of determinants on the individual level. The main data source for my analysis is the fifth round of the European Social Survey (ESS), conducted in 2010. The ESS is a well-known international large-scale quantitative survey that has been repeated every two years since 2002, generally including between 20 and 30 European countries. Of the 2010 wave, data on 20 European countries became available in October 20114 with data on eight other countries to be released in 20125 . In each country, methodology is documented in a detailed fashion, and much effort has been put in ensuring sample representativeness of the population. Selection of respondents, age 15 and older, was conducted through random probability sampling methods and all respondents were interviewed face-to-face (European Social Survey, 2011). Slightly different sampling methods were used across countries. Interviews were either conducted with the help of computers or paper and pencil. Response rates were generally reasonably high at around 60%, but there were some exceptions6 (European Social Survey, 2011). Despite these exceptions, the result is still a high-quality data set well suited for international comparisons. This most recent wave of the survey is particularly fit for present study due to the inclusion of a special module related to attitudes towards the police, justice and safety (Jackson et al., 2011). Initially, 38,974 respondents were included in the data set, of which 33,239 remained after removing respondents with missing data on key variables, part of the German population, and respondents from Northern Ireland7 . 4 These are, in alphabetical order: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 5 These are Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Ukraine. 6 Most noteworthy is the low response rate in Germany: only 30.5%. This was mostly due to refusal to participate and to an inability of the interviewer to contact the respondent, even after four visits. 7 In Germany, policing is determined not on the national level but on that of Bundesländer, causing large differences between regions in the organization and working styles of the police (Liedenbaum, 2011). It would thus be invalid to include people from each region in the analysis, when I only have contextual data on policing for one region. Besides, differences between former communist East-Germany and democratic West-Germany pose problems when analyzing the duration of democracy. As a result, I only take into account citizens from Nordrhein- Westfalen, treating it as a country. A similar issue is at stake in the United Kingdom, where the police forces and history of Northern Ireland differ substantially from that of Great Britain (Mawby, 2003). I decided to remove the respondents from Northern Ireland from further analysis.
  • 29 The dependent variable trust in the police is present in this data set. It is operationalized on a 11-point scale, where 0 means no trust at all, and 10 implies that the respondent is extremely trusting towards the police. The variable is approximately normally distributed, although there are some differences between countries in the distribution curves. For 1,4% of all respondents, no information was available on trust in the police. I removed these respondents from further analysis. Other types of institutional trust, necessary to conduct equivalence tests, are trust in the legal system, trust in parliament, trust in politicians, and trust in political parties. All of these are measured the same way as trust in the police. These latter four variables will not be included in any analysis except for the purpose of equivalence testing. 3.2 Contextual determinants and additional data sources In order to be able to operationalize several macro-level determinants, I use other data sources to supplement the European Social Survey data. Values for each of these contextual determinants in every country are attached in appendix A. The level of income inequality in a country is assessed by the United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER, 2011a). This data source, the World Income Inequality Database, provides gini-coefficients from 0 to 100 to indicate income inequality, in which a high coefficient implies a high degree of inequality. These coefficients are based on both income and consumption, while the household is generally the unit of analysis (UNU- WIDER, 2011b). Multiple approaches might be used to measure the democratic history of a country; but the most straightforward is to detract the year that democracy was constituted from the year of study (Gesthuizen, Van der Meer & Scheepers, 2008), so that a low number means that demographic history is short, while a larger number implies a longer history of democracy in a country. I simplify this distinction, discerning a scale of five categories of democratic history. First, the countries that have had democratic regimes from the early 20th century onwards. This includes most Western European nations such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark. The second category consists of countries that became fully democratic shortly after the second World War including Israel and (West-)Germany – the latter having suffered twelve years of national-socialist rule after the admittedly democratic interbellum Weimar republic. Then there are the Southern European countries of Portugal and Spain which had military dictatorships until the 1970’s. The fourth category can be found behind the former Iron Curtain: the Warsaw-pact nations of Eastern Europe that made their acquaintance with democracy in the early
  • 30 1990’s as well as the former Yugoslavic republic of Slovenia. The fifth and final category is for countries that cannot (yet) be considered democratic, including only one nation in my sample: Russia. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2010) refers to Russia as a hybrid regime rather than a (flawed) democracy. I reversed the coding so that a higher value means that the democratic history is longer. Each of the three police science perspectives I discern is measured by a macro-level indicator. These require other data than those provided by the ESS. The country-level indicator of the procedural justice perspective is the level of corruption in a country. Transparency International (2010a) has been releasing annual reports on perceptions of corruption in a large amount of nations ever since 1993. These reports combine the results of various independent surveys on business people’s opinions and analysts’ perceptions of corruption in the public sector (Transparency International, 2010b), and rate each country on a scale from 1.0 (very corrupt) to 10.0 (not corrupt at all). I reverse this coding so that it measures the presence of corruption rather than absence of corruption. The narrow interpretation of the instrumental perspective of trust in the police is tested through the level of homicide; an indicator of the actual crime rate in a country. Crime rates are notoriously difficult to measure validly and reliably across countries. While homicide rates can be considered the most valid and reliable of crime statistics, Neapolitan (1999) argues that these data are still problematic due to differences in the quality of police registration and to cross-country differences in definitions of homicide. An alternative to police (Interpol) registration of homicide is the European Mortality Database from the World Health Organization (2011). This database contains information on the causes of death in all European countries, including homicide rates per 100.000 citizens, and can be considered more valid because causes of death are registered by doctors. Despite the fact that even these data have their flaws and biases, I consider these WHO data superior to police registrations for three main reasons: first of all, the World Health Organization data are likely to be more complete. Medics are required to register a cause of death for every deceased. The vast majority of homicide cases will also be registered as such: since victims are almost always found and recognized as being murdered, we may assume that the dark number for homicide is small in most European countries8 . The second difference is that doctors are less likely to be affected by possible governmental pressure to keep official crime rates as low as possible than the police, and are thus more independent in their registration of homicide. Finally, we may also expect fewer differences between countries in their definitions of what homicide entails, 8 This holds only for nations without serious territorial conflicts and (civil) wars. In my year of measurement, however, I assume that in my sample of countries no conflict is pervasive enough to cause a substantial bias in mortality registrations.
  • 31 since medical registrations are not determined by national definitions but by medical, internationally agreed upon, criteria. The proximity policing perspective is difficult to operationalize. Never before has there been an attempt to make a systematic comparison between a large amount of European countries in the extent to which they implemented the principles of proximity policing regardless of the label under which they implement them. There are no systematic data available on the subject. Therefore, an alternative approach is required. In the following section, I attempt to construct a proximity policing index for each of the countries of study. In order to create an index as reliable and valid as possible, I dissect the concept of proximity policing into six main criteria based on the work of Terpstra (2008): 1. To what extent is the police organization in the country centralized? 2. To what extent do proximity – or community – police officers have a central position in the police forces of the country? 3. Do neighbourhoods and local communities in the country usually have their own police station? 4. To what extent do the police in the country have to focus on a broad range of local problems besides crime, such as social disorder and feelings of insecurity among citizens? 5. To what extent do the police in the country consider it important to use not just reactive, but also proactive strategies to prevent crime and disorder? 6. To what extent do the local police in the country cooperate with other local agencies and the public in the management of crime and disorder? Each of these criteria can score from 1 (high degree) to 4 (low degree). In my analyses, I reversed the scores of item 1 so that a score of 1 means for each item that the country adheres to the principles of proximity policing to a larger degree. Moreover, I gave the items 4 through 6 double the weight of the items 1 through 3, since I consider them more essential to the principles of proximity policing. Several means are used to create this index. First of all, I use a unique collection of data on several Eastern European countries. Just before the turn of the century, the European Union held admission negotiations with a set of former communist nations in Eastern and Central Europe. Many criteria had to be fulfilled in order for these countries to join the EU, one of which was the modernization and democratization of the police force. As part of the project to achieve this goal, police officers of these countries attended courses on various subjects taught by police trainers from the EU. The results of these meetings were evaluated and summarized in a series of reports from the
  • 32 Association of European Police Colleges (AEPC, 2001g). These reports contain much information on the state of policing in Central and Eastern European countries around 1999/2000. For this study, I use reports on training sessions of Bulgarian, Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Polish and Slovenian police officers. Since the aim is to collect data for around 20 European countries, these project reports are only the start. For three other countries, Belgium, the Netherlands and the German Bundesland of Nordrhein-Westfalen, I have used an expert survey to code the six criteria of proximity policing9 . Finally, the rest of the index is constructed using existing literature on the subject of police structure, culture and daily practice in various countries. Appendix B contains a more in-depth report on the construction of the proximity policing-index. Results of the index are summarized in Table 1, in which the final score (PXP) is the weighted average of the six criteria (PXP1 through PXP6), in which the last three items have double weight. In my analyses, I reversed the coding of this index so that a higher value means that the principles of proximity policing are implemented to a larger degree. 9 Values for the Netherlands were coded by Jan Terpstra, values for Nordrhein-Westfalen by Caroline Liedenbaum, and values for Belgium by Sofie de Kimpe. These researchers are all highly experienced with the daily practice of the respective police forces in these countries, especially when community- or proximity policing are concerned.
  • 33 Table 1: Index of proximity policing. 1=high degree of PXP, 4=low degree of PXP. PXP PXP1 PXP2 PXP3 PXP4 PXP5 PXP6 Sources Belgium 1,89 2 2 1 1 2 3 Questionnaire Terpstra Bulgaria 3,63 4 3 - 4 4 3 AEPC 2001a Switzerland - 1 - - - - - Wisler & Onwudiwe 2009 Czech Republic 2,38 3 2 - 3 2 2 AEPC 2001b Nordrhein- Westfalen 2,56 2 4 3 2 2 3 Questionnaire Liedenbaum Denmark 1,86 2 3 2 - 2 1 Holmberg 2002, 2005 Estonia 2,88 4 3 - 3 2 3 AEPC 2001c, Hilborn & Leps 2005 Spain 2,25 3 3 - 3 2 1 Rabot 2004 Finland 1,56 2 4 2 1 1 1 Holmberg 2005, Virta 2002 France 3,56 4 3 3 4 4 3 Cassan 2010, Dupont 2007 United Kingdom 1,75 2 2 - 1 2 2 Long & Cullen 2007, Cassan 2010, Mawby 2003 Hungary 3,75 4 4 - 4 3 4 AEPC 2001d, Dimovné 2003 Israel - - - - - - - - Netherlands 2,22 2 2 2 2 2 3 Questionnaire Terpstra Norway 1,44 2 2 1 2 1 1 Larsson 2010, Das & Robinson 2001 Poland 2,00 1 3 2 2 2 2 AEPC 2001e, Haberfeld et al. 2002 Portugal - - - - - - - - Russian Federation 2,89 3 3 2 4 3 2 Beck & Robertson 2009, Roudik 2007, Favarel-Garrigues & Le Huérou 2004 Sweden 2,33 2 2 - 2 3 - Holmberg 2005, Peterson 2010 Slovenia 2,11 3 2 3 1 2 3 AEPC 2001f, Meško et al. 2005 3.3 Micro-level determinants In this section, the three intermediary variables that are relevant to my hypotheses are operationalized: perceived procedural justice (PPJ) and the intermediary variables perceived police effectiveness (PPE) and perceived police prevention successfulness (PPP). Objective measures or indices of police procedural justice are not available. However, we do have information on procedural justice as perceived by citizens. I operationalize the procedural justice perspective through three items in the European Social Survey 2010 special module related to police, security and justice. These items, measured on a four-point scale, ask whether the respondent thinks the police treat citizens respectfully, fairly, and whether they explain their choices and actions to citizens.
  • 34 Thus, perceived procedural justice is measured on the individual level. Together, these three items cover the procedural justice perspective as formulated by Tyler (1988) almost literally, making this a theoretically exceptionally valid operationalization. However, mere theoretical considerations do not suffice: we need empirical proof that these three items form an acceptable scale, in each and every country included in the European Social Survey. This is an especially important matter since these items are included in the ESS for the first time and their validity as indicators for the latent concept perceived procedural justice (shortened to PPJ) has hardly ever been tested before (Jackson et al., 2011). This, and the fact that procedural justice is one of the central concepts of present study, demands that the most sophisticated method of testing for the validity of the PPJ scale is applied: the use of equivalence tests, which I will address in the next chapter. Aside of the validity of the PPJ scale, I have applied reliability tests for each country. Results were acceptable, with a minimum Cronbach’s alpha of .571 in the German Bundesland of Nordrhein-Westfalen and a maximum of .829 in Bulgaria. I expect the instrumental country-level determinants of corruption and homicide to influence perceived police effectiveness, which I abbreviate to PPE. PPE is operationalized by the item “how successful are the police at catching house burglars in your country?”, measured on a 0-to-10 scale. Although one may argue that asking for one specific type of crime only measures a very small part of perceived police effectiveness, making it a partial coverage measure, I do consider it a reasonably valid operationalization of perceived overall police effectiveness. House burglaries are common in each European country, so that most people have some direct or indirect experience with this type of crime. Besides, house burglaries are a somewhat “average” crime, not too severe yet for their victims still quite serious in their consequences. They are also considered by virtually everyone to be morally wrong. Asking respondents about the police effectiveness in catching house burglars is hence not ambivalently interpretable and a quite straightforward operationalization of perceived police effectiveness in fighting crime and disorder in general. The application of the principles of proximity policing is expected to affect the perceived police prevention successfulness (PPP) of citizens in a country, imperfect a measure as it may be. I use an item on a 0-to-10 scale in the ESS data to measure this perceived prevention successfulness: the question asked to each respondent is to what extent the police are thought to be successful in preventing crimes in which violence is used or threatened with. These three determinants all have some missing values in the ESS. In the vast majority of these cases, respondents answered that they did not know whether they perceived the police to act according to the principles of procedural justice or whether they were effective or successful in preventing crime. I
  • 35 assume that these respondents have no outspoken opinion on these subjects and hence removed them from further analyses. 3.4 Control variables Control variables on the individual demographic level include gender and age in years, both of which are straightforwardly coded. Education is measured on a 7-point ISCED scale, which I assume to be of interval level. The lowest category contains respondents who have less than secondary education, while the highest category is for those with higher tertiary education. Income is a variable measured on a 1-10 scale, with a relatively large amount of missing values. I adjusted the variable for the average income level of that country so that it measures relative wealth in a country. Missing values were imputed on the basis of the country mean, except for Portugal, where no information on income was available at all. Minority membership is a dichotomous determinant. In Israel, non-response was exceptionally high on this variable. I used the first language of the respondent to establish whether he could be considered a minority member: Arab-speaking respondents who did not answer the minority membership question were coded as minority members, while Hebrew, Russian and Amharic-speaking Israelians were coded as non-minority members when they did not answer the question. After this procedure, I lacked information on ethnicity for only a handful of respondents. Church attendance is measured by the frequency of the respondent’s attendance of religious services in seven categories ranging from every day to never. I treat the attendance scale as being of interval level. Victimization is a dichotomous variable indicating whether a respondent or a household member of the respondent was victim of burglary or assault in the past 5 years or not. Several attitudinal individual determinants were also included. Life satisfaction is coded on an 11-point scale, just like political orientation, where low values indicate low life satisfaction in the former and a left-wing orientation for the latter. I assumed that respondents who indicated not to know their political preference tend neither to the right nor to the left but fall in the middle category. Generalized social trust (GST) is a latent construct consisting of three manifest items on 11-point scales: whether most people can be trusted or one cannot be too careful, whether most people try to take advantage of you or try to be fair, and whether people are helpful most of the time or are mostly looking out for themselves. Since this is not a central variable to my research, I refrained from performing equivalence
  • 36 tests10 and performed separate factor analyses and reliability tests for each country in the sample instead; results were satisfactory. Practically all items consistently had communalities above 0.2, while their factor loadings were nearly all above 0.411 . Cronbach’s alfa values were satisfactory between .831 and .597. Together, the three manifest items formed an 11-point Likert scale of generalized social trust. Urbanization was measured on a 5-point scale. I reversed the original scale, so that the highest value now means that the respondent lives in a big city, while the lowest implies that he or she lives on the countryside. Table 2 features descriptive data from all included variables. The total amount of missing values – after data manipulations and recoding – is included, as well as the minimum and maximum observed values, the mean of each variable and its standard deviation. Table 2: descriptive table of all included variables N=36,445 Missing Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Dev. gini 0 23.00 45.10 30.78 5.37 democratic history 0 0 4 2.55 1.43 homicide 0 0.30 14.01 1.87 3.08 corruption 0 2.1 9.3 6.73 2.00 proximity policing - 1.50 3.80 2.46 .68 trust in the police 541 0 10 5.74 2.63 gender 2 0 1 .46 .50 age 68 14 99 48.31 18.82 education 84 0 6 2.75 1.88 income 2150 12 0.24 10 5.57 2.53 minority 260 0 1 .07 .25 church attendance 215 0 6 4.60 1.47 victimization 90 0 1 .17 .38 life satisfaction 148 0 10 6.87 2.30 political orientation 664 0 10 5.23 2.08 GST 38 0 10 5.18 1.95 urbanization 66 0 4 1.81 1.24 perc. procedural justice (PPJ) 1104 0 3 1.68 .61 perc. police effectiveness (PPE) 1618 0 10 4.67 2.18 perc. police prevention (PPP) 1506 0 10 5.17 2.02 10 Van der Veld and Saris (2010) tested for European measurement equivalence of generalized social trust, concluding that it is an equivalent concept in most countries. 11 One exception was Spain, where parameters narrowly were below these thresholds. I decided that this violation was so minor that it could be ignored. 12 After mean substitution per country. The missing values left are all respondents from Portugal.
  • 37 Now that I have dealt with the nature of my data, it is time to start analyses and attempt to answer the research questions as formulated in the introduction of this study. In the next section, I will address the question to what extent trust in the police is empirically comparable across countries. After I have ascertained whether it is justified to compare trust in the police, I will proceed to analyze differences in trust and test which micro- and macro-level determinants affect it.
  • 38 4 The equivalence of trust in the police 4.1 Three forms of invariance In this section, I address the international measurement equivalence of key variables in my research, predominantly of trust in the police13 . Are we allowed to compare trust in the police in different countries? In order to test this, I compare the relationship of trust in the police and four other types of institutional trust between different countries. Previous research considered items quite similar to the ones I include to measure the concept of institutional trust (Mishler & Rose, 2001; Newton & Norris, 2000). This factor model, in which the five types of trust – which are labeled y1 through y5 – are manifest indicators of the latent construct institutional trust, labeled η1, is illustrated in figure 214 . Drawn are the factor loadings (λ), which indicate how strongly each item reflects the latent factor institutional trust, and the error terms of the indicators (ε). Additionally, the intercepts of the observed indicators (τ) and of the factor (α) are included. The intercepts reflect the point of reference of the manifest indicators and latent factor. Figure 2: theoretical factor structure of institutional trust 13 In this study I address the problem of measurement equivalence, concerning the equivalence of the relationship between manifest indicators and their latent construct. This contrasts with structural equivalence, which concerns the equivalence of relationships between constructs across groups (Van de Vijver, 2011). 14 The five types of trust or indicators are trust in the police (y1), trust in the legal system (y2), trust in parliament (y3), trust in politicians (y4) and trust in political parties (y5). The questions are all asked in the same fashion, without particular specifications towards, for example, elements of the legal systems such as judges or laws.
  • 39 If we wish to compare trust in the police across nations, it is necessary to test whether the factor structure in Figure 2, and more specifically, the position of the observed indicator trust in the police (y1) in that factor structure, is equal in each country. In order to do so, we need to conduct a special kind of factor analysis: a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis. This type of analysis, focusing on measurement equivalence, tests not only whether a previously determined factor structure such as depicted in Figure 2 holds, but it also does so for every country, comparing them with one another. This factor structure can be described as: 1) yk (n) = τk (n) + λk (n) η(n) + εk (n) In Equation 1, y is the value of the observed or manifest indicator, while subscript k refers to the specific indicator (in this case, k can take values from 1 to 5 since there are five observed indicators) and superscript n to the different groups. The groups are, in this context, countries. y is a function of the indicator intercept τ, the factor loading λ multiplied by the value of the latent construct η, and an error component ε which is assumed to be randomly distributed: its mean is zero and there are no correlated errors with other indicators (Van der Veld & Saris, 2011). In establishing measurement equivalence, three key requirements must be met: configural invariance, metric invariance and scalar invariance (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000; De Beuckelaer & Lievens, 2009; Van der Veld & Saris, 2011). Of these types of invariance, configural invariance is the least stringent, while scalar invariance is the strictest. Configural and metric invariance need to be reached if we wish to compare relationships between variables, while we also require scalar invariance once we aim to compare indicator and construct means. Configural invariance addresses the matter whether the factor structure holds across all countries. Does each of the observed indicators load on the latent construct, and are there no correlated error terms between the different indicators? If configural invariance is reached, respondents in different countries have similar frames of reference and the basic threshold of measurement equivalence has been passed. The indicators measure what they should measure and the factor structure of Equation 1 holds for each country. When configural invariance has been found, we can say that a construct consists of the same elements (indicators) in each group, and it is justified to compare factor loadings across groups. If configural invariance cannot be found, we may aim for partial configural
  • 40 invariance; we then release parameters that are not equivalent across countries. This way, we can proceed to higher forms of invariance controlling for flaws in configural invariance. The next step is to test for metric invariance: do the indicators have equal factor loadings on the latent construct in each country? This tests whether the indicator represents the latent construct equally well in each country. If we concentrate on trust in the police, the question is: is trust in the police an equally strong element of institutional trust in each country? Or, in other words: is factor loading λ1 equivalent across countries? The equation for metric equivalence is: 2) λk (1) = λk (2) = … = λk (n) Once metric invariance is found, or at the very least after we have achieved partial metric invariance by releasing non-invariant parameters, it is justified to compare relationships between trust in the police and other variables between countries. However, it is not yet justified to compare the mean levels of trust in the police across countries, which is after all the first of my research questions. In order to answer this question, we also need to reach the third level of measurement equivalence: scalar invariance. Scalar invariance implies that indicators in each country not only have the same metric, but also the same point of reference. The indicator intercepts τ should be identical across countries. After all, only when one’s point of reference is the same can one compare means between groups. If full scalar invariance is not found, we need to establish partial scalar invariance by releasing non-invariant indicator intercepts. The equation is: 3) τk (1) = τk (2) = … = τk (n) In order to test for aforementioned three stages of measurement equivalence, I analyze data from the European Social Survey 2010 using the statistical package LISREL 8.80 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996) and the auxiliary program Judgment Rule 3.0.4 (Van der Veld & Saris, 2011). LISREL has specifically been constructed for problems that can be solved through structural equation modeling (SEM), for which tests for measurement equivalence are well-suited. The Judgment Rule program is intended to simplify the analysis of LISREL output, which can otherwise be extremely tiresome when as many as 20 countries are compared. LISREL can provide maximum likelihood estimates of each parameter present in Figure 2
  • 41 and indicates both model fit and possible misspecifications, the latter being extremely important when attempting to achieve partial invariance. These misspecifications help determining which parameters need to be released in order to achieve partial invariance when full invariance does not hold. Judgment Rule further analyzes the possibility of misspecifications and makes multi-group comparisons that much easier. It calculates for each parameter in every country whether it is no misspecification, may be a misspecification and needs to be judged by other criteria, or is misspecified, on the basis of LISREL output and criteria selected by the researcher. Judgment Rule uses the expected parameter change and the expected Chi-square change if the parameter is released (the modification index), along with the statistical power to calculate the degree to which that parameter may be misspecified and thus causes non-invariance. It is up to the researcher to set appropriate cut-off values for misspecification. 4.2 Configural invariance For the first test, that of configural invariance, I analyze the factor structure of Figure 2 in 20 countries. In this first stage of equivalence testing, the focus is on testing for the same pattern of factor loadings and for the possible presence of correlated errors between manifest indicators. Other parameters are not yet constrained. The factor loading of one manifest item must be constrained to 1 in order to set a scale for factor loadings. This reference item should be the one that is expected to be the most closely related with the latent factor, and can be chosen on grounds of face validity (Van der Veld & Saris, 2011). I select the third item, trust in parliament, as a reference item because it is probably the most representative of institutional trust in general. As the most powerful legislative institution, it is likely to be more closely connected to the latent concept of institutional trust than the other manifest indicators. As a cut-off value for modification index and expected parameter change if the parameter was released, indicated in Judgment Rule by the delta-1 (factor loadings) and the delta-3 (correlated error terms) setting, I use a value of respectively 0.30 and 0.15. A preliminary test of configural invariance found that the structure as posed in Figure 2 did not hold. There were no issues with equivalence between countries, but the factor structure itself was faulty. A first indication was that the RMSEA value, an often-used Chi-square-based index of model fit, was 0.266. Although existing literature does not agree entirely upon cut-off values for rejecting a model, it is generally accepted that the RMSEA value must at the very least be below 0.1 in order to have a fitting model (Vandenberg & Lance, 2000): since the RMSEA indicates the size of discrepancies of the data from
  • 42 the (theoretical) model, the smallest possible value is generally preferred. Hence, the original model must be rejected. But what causes this bad model fit? In each of the 20 countries, LISREL found the same model misspecifications, in the form of correlated errors: trust in the police was found to correlate with trust in the legal system, while trust in politicians was related to trust in political parties. These results somewhat complicate further analyses, but were not completely unexpected. Wallace and Latcheva (2006), as well as Rothstein and Stolle (2008), in simpler procedures, already found a difference between trust in “legal” institutions and trust in “political” ones. Additionally, trust in politicians and trust in political parties are conceptually and linguistically so closely related that we can expect them to be correlated more than other items. The conceptual factor model was adjusted to reflect these results, and is shown in Figure 3 in a simplified form – without parameter indications. Figure 3: Improved factor structure of institutional trust The adjusted factor model was then again tested for configural invariance. This time, the RMSEA value was satisfactory at .056, implying that the model fits the data well and there is little chance for error (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Furthermore, the analysis in Judgment Rule did not yield any misspecifications: configural invariance has been reached. I also tested for a two-factor solution in which I discerned two latent variables: firstly trust in legal institutions, consisting of trust in the police and trust in the legal system, and secondly trust in political institutions, containing the other three indicators. However, this type of factor structure had a much worse fit than a one-factor structure with correlated error terms. I hence preferred the one-factor model of institutional trust with correlated error terms between trust in the police and in the legal system and between trust in politicians and trust in political parties.
  • 43 4.3 Metric invariance The next step in equivalence testing is measurement invariance. Now that the factor structure, in an adjusted form, is found to be equivalent, it is time to test whether the factor loadings are equivalent. Do items measuring institutional trust in each country have the same metric? For this analysis, it is necessary to choose a reference country to compare the factor loadings of the other countries with. It is recommended to choose a country that has more or less average factor loadings compared to the other countries on each item. This choice decreases the chance of misspecifications. On the basis of this criterion, I selected Switzerland to be the reference country (Table 3). Furthermore, I adjust the delta-1 value – the cut-off value for deviations in expected parameter change from the reference country, which in the configural invariance test was set to 0.30 – to 0.15. The metric equivalence test in LISREL yields an RMSEA value of .072. Not perfect according to some criteria (Hu & Bentler, 1999), but within the boundaries of a reasonable error of approximation (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). The analysis in Judgment Rule, however, did indicate some misspecifications. Minor misspecifications were found for trust in the police in Bulgaria and Russia and for trust in the legal system in Slovenia, while a larger misspecification existed for trust in the police in Finland. I decided to accept the minor misspecifications in Bulgaria, Russia and Slovenia, but released the constraint on factor loading for trust in the police in Finland, acknowledging that metric equivalence is not established for this country. This slightly adjusted model has an RMSEA value of .067. In this model, partial metric invariance has been reached. Table 3 provides information on misspecifications and factor loadings of each country. There are clear differences in the height of factor loadings between countries. This variance in factor loadings is especially large for trust in the police, but also quite substantial for trust in the legal system. We can conclude that these two indicators generally fit in slightly less well with institutional trust than the others.
  • 44 Table 3: factor loadings of five items measuring institutional trust Country Police Legal system Parliament (ref.) Politicians Pol. parties Belgium 0.61 0.85 1 0.91 0.88 Bulgaria 0.84* 0.83 1 0.95 0.91 Czech Rep 0.63 0.85 1 0.85 0.81 Denmark 0.40 0.54 1 0.8 0.76 Estonia 0.61 0.83 1 0.82 0.76 Finland 0.29* 0.57 1 0.85 0.79 France 0.69 0.81 1 0.97 0.85 NR-Westfalen 0.50 0.76 1 0.89 0.80 Great Britain 0.58 0.77 1 0.90 0.86 Hungary 0.61 0.81 1 0.81 0.73 Israel 0.74 0.76 1 0.81 0.75 Netherlands 0.61 0.79 1 0.88 0.85 Norway 0.50 0.67 1 0.77 0.70 Poland 0.58 0.78 1 0.80 0.75 Portugal 0.48 0.80 1 0.76 0.74 Russia 0.86* 0.91 1 0.88 0.84 Slovenia 0.74 1.00* 1 0.82 0.74 Spain 0.58 0.88 1 0.86 0.81 Sweden 0.53 0.74 1 0.85 0.79 Switzerland (ref.) 0.55 0.81 1 0.88 0.77 Mean 0.60 0.79 1 0.85 0.80 On closer observation of this table, one may discern a difference between former communist states and non-former communist countries. Mishler and Rose (1997) found that trust in fifteen political and social institutions, including the police, were all equivalent in nine post-communist states in 1994. They state that this may be due to the fact that the civil state in most post-communist nations was still in a very early stage of development at that time. This could have caused the public to perceive “the state” holistically like in communist times, when most institutions were under tight control of the communist party (Mishler and Rose, 1997: 420). The data in Table 3 give reason to suspect that this was still the case to some degree in 2010: Eastern European countries have, on average, much higher factor loadings on trust in the police and trust in the legal system (for Eastern European nations the values for police and legal system taken together average .78). Non-former communist nations, however, score lower with an average value for these two institutions of .65. These high factor loadings in former communist states indicate that the public views the police and legal system as part of a more-or-less one- dimensional state, while citizens in non-former communist countries consider their public institutions to be somewhat more multi-faceted. Hence, there are strong indications that Misher and Rose’s
  • 45 hypothesis of citizens’ holistic perception of institutions in post-communist states still holds after more than a decade. 4.4 Scalar invariance Now that partial metric invariance has been established, we should test for scalar invariance. Scalar invariance implies that the intercept, or zero-point, of the latent factor is equivalent in every country, which requires that the intercepts of each observed indicator are invariant across countries. It is the strictest of the three forms of invariance and is seldom reached fully. However, in order to conduct a meaningful comparison of the means of trust in the police, it is necessary to achieve scalar invariance. There is one exception: since metric equivalence was not found for Finland, full scalar invariance is also impossible to reach for this country. The advantage for present study is that complete scalar invariance for institutional trust is not necessary: as long as the observed indicator trust in the police has equal intercepts across countries, the prerequisite for my analysis is met. Remember that the purpose of this research is not to study institutional trust as a whole, but trust in the police specifically. It would hence be satisfactory if we found invariant indicator intercepts only for trust in the police. Unfortunately, the results of the scalar invariance test indicate that this is not entirely the case. Table 4 contains the expected parameter change if the parameter is released for each indicator in every country. A value of 0.50 means that the observed indicator intercept is actually 0.50 points higher in that country than expected on the basis of the latent institutional trust mean. This would imply that citizens from that country score on average higher on this specific indicator than expected on the basis of the other indicator scores: the point of reference for this indicator, for trust in this institution, is higher. I accept a 0.07 parameter change for each point on the scale before labeling it a misspecification. Generally, any expected parameter change higher than around 0.77 or lower than -0.77 on the 11-point scale of the manifest indicator (meaning that the delta-4 value in J-Rule is set at 0.07) can thus be considered a misspecification, but this criterion is somewhat arbitrary. In Table 3, we can observe that there are three clear-cut misspecifications: trust in the police is non-invariant in Russia and Israel, while trust in the legal system is also non-invariant in Israel. Thus, full scalar invariance is not found. However, we can achieve partial scalar invariance by releasing the three non-invariant indicator intercepts.
  • 46 Table 4: Results of scalar invariance tests: expected indicator intercept change if parameter is released Country Police Legal system Parliament (ref.) Politicians Pol. parties Belgium 0.07 -0.32 -0.05 0.08 0.06 Bulgaria -0.37 -0.58 0.13 0.17 0.05 Czech Rep -0.31 0.15 0.02 -0.04 0.05 Denmark 0.20 0.42 -0.51 -0.17 0.16 Estonia 0.16 0.11 -0.18 0.13 -0.16 (Finland) (0.69) (0.07) (-0.26) (-0.17) (0.09) France -0.14 0.14 0.22 0.05 -0.18 Germany 0.58 0.16 -0.09 -0.07 -0.12 GB 0.24 0.09 -0.23 -0.05 0.09 Hungary -0.56 -0.02 0.47 -0.10 0.02 Israel 1.05 1.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 Netherlands -0.37 -0.13 -0.44 0.19 0.28 Norway -0.09 0.28 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 Poland 0.07 -0.02 0.10 0.04 -0.11 Portugal 0.23 -0.40 0.40 0.03 -0.09 Russia -1.41 -0.12 0.06 0.14 0.04 Slovenia 0.22 -0.71 0.37 0.07 -0.06 Spain 0.68 -0.50 0.70 -0.07 -0.14 Sweden -0.12 -0.05 0.28 -0.16 0.10 Switzerland (ref.) 0.12 -0.12 -0.06 0.13 -0.11 Now that partial scalar invariance is reached, it is also interesting to interpret the results of this test and consider why we find some non-invariant parameters. On average, Eastern European countries appear to have more negative expected parameter changes than Western European countries on the items trust in the police and trust in the legal system. This may be caused by the recollection of the authoritarian communist regimes, where police and courts were instruments of the one-party system, and high perceptions of corruption in this region may also have an important role. In Russia, where the police are considered to be exceptionally corrupt and violent (Shlapentokh, 2006), the intercept of trust in the police is 1.41 points lower than expected, the largest value in the entire table and one of the three misspecifications. In Western Europe, the expected parameter changes on these two indicators are generally closer to zero or more positive, meaning that the public’s frame of reference towards these two institutions is often more positive than was expected. Israel stands out in this case, with high, non- invariant, values for the police and the legal system. This may to some extent be attributed to the constant tensions with its Arab neighbours – and with Palestinians within the disputed territories occupied by Israel. In such a strained environment, the public may have more support for law-enforcing institutions than can be expected on the basis of their general institutional trust (Jonathan, 2010).
  • 47 What can we learn from this series of equivalence tests? Testing for the equivalence of trust in the police in the context of institutional trust yields several important deliberations, with implications for the study of trust in general and trust in the police more specifically. First of all, the often-used dichotomy between generalized social trust on the one hand and institutional trust on the other may be too simple. Institutional trust is a complex concept that is not entirely one-dimensional. There are indications that trust in legal institutions such as the legal system and the police are one sub-dimension, while the outright political institutions of politicians and political parties are another. Additionally, there are differences between former communist nations in Eastern Europe, where governmental institutions are perceived more holistically, and non-former communist states in Western Europe, where much stronger distinctions are being made between different institutions. Moreover, full scalar invariance was not reached, indicating that comparing mean values of trust in the police and institutional trust in general in Israel and Russia is not justified. Trust in the police is the indicator with the lowest factor loadings, and was also found to be the most problematic indicator in attempting to reach scalar invariance. The unique, national context is very important when studying trust in the police, something that previous research may not always have appreciated sufficiently (Cao, Stack & Sun, 1998; Kääriäinen, 2007; Jang, Joo & Zhao, 2010). Apparently, trust in the police is a rather unique element in institutional trust. There are differences between countries in interpretation and meaning of the concept trust in the police, causing trust in the police to not always fit in well with other types of institutional trust. Yet despite all this, trust in the police is invariant for most European countries. We can compare and analyze means of trust in the police over seventeen countries. 4.5 The equivalence of perceived procedural justice One other factor that is important to my conceptual framework is measured by multiple manifest indicators. This is the concept perceived procedural justice, measured by three items on a four-point scale15 . As stated in the previous chapter, these items will be subject to equivalence tests as well, since they form a central concept in my theoretical framework. Moreover, these items are included for the first time in the European Social Survey and information on cross-national measurement equivalence of perceived procedural justice may prove to be of value for future research. Jackson et al. (2011) 15 The items are: 1) How often do the police treat people in your country with respect? 2) How often do the police make fair, impartial decisions? 3) How often do the police explain their decisions and actions when asked to?
  • 48 performed tests for equivalence for these very same items, and some others, comparing only the United Kingdom and Bulgaria. It is my intention to test for equivalence in all 20 countries included in the most recent wave of the European Social Survey. For the latent construct perceived procedural justice, I include the same three items as Jackson et al. (2011). In my configural invariance analysis, I chose the first item as reference indicator: whether the respondent thinks the police treat citizens with respect. On the basis of face validity, I do not expect either one of the three items to be the particularly most powerful indicator in the latent construct perceived procedural justice. With the same delta-1 and delta-3 cutoff-points as in the previous analysis on institutional trust, configural invariance was established without any problems. For the metric invariance test, I selected Belgium as reference country because its factor loadings on items 2 and 3 were closest to the group average. The metric invariance test, in which I set the critical expected parameter change (delta-1) once again to 0.15, showed one misspecification: the factor loading for the indicator “respect” in Portugal was below the threshold, meaning that this particular indicator plays too weak a role in the construction of the latent construct perceived procedural justice. However, there was still a good model fit with an RMSEA value of .037. I released the constraint on this item in Portugal, which further improved the model fit to .028. Partial metric equivalence was thus reached. Finally, I performed a scalar invariance test. The procedure was similar to what I did for institutional trust, with one exception: the criterion for misspecifications was different. Since perceived procedural justice was measured on four-point scales, the delta-4 value or critical parameter change if intercept is released was 0.28 instead of 0.77. The results of the scalar invariance test can be found in Table 5.
  • 49 Table 5: expected indicator intercept change if parameter is released for perceived procedural justice Country Respect (ref.) Fair Explain Belgium (ref.) 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 Bulgaria 0.04 0.07 -0.21 Czech Rep -0.08 0.07 0.01 Denmark -0.03 -0.05 0.11 Estonia -0.06 0.06 -0.01 Finland -0.08 0.07 0.02 France 0.03 0.08 -0.20 Germany 0.00 -0.02 0.05 GB 0.03 -0.04 0.03 Hungary 0.01 0.00 -0.02 Israel -0.05 0.03 0.02 Netherlands 0.00 -0.03 0.05 Norway 0.02 -0.02 0.00 Poland -0.04 0.00 0.06 (Portugal) (0.43) (-0.01) (-0.12) Russia -0.05 -0.05 0.13 Slovenia -0.04 0.00 0.07 Spain 0.12 -0.04 -0.16 Sweden 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 Switzerland 0.04 -0.11 0.10 In Table 5, we can observe that one indicator intercept shows a higher expected parameter change if released than the critical limit of 0.28. Just like in the metric invariance test, the “respect” indicator is misspecified in Portugal. Since a sound basis (full metric invariance) for conducting scalar invariance tests was not reached in Portugal, this finding is not particularly meaningful. Some other values come quite close to reaching the critical value of 0.28; the two best examples being the expected parameter changes for the “explain” item in Bulgaria and France. In these countries, people consider the police to explain their decisions and actions less often than could be expected on the basis of the construct score. In the case of the French police, this is exactly in line with what Cassan (2010: 14) describes when studying the French police culture. These violations, however, are not large enough to consider the indicator non-invariant in these countries. On the basis of these three analyses we can conclude that the three indicators measuring the public perception of police procedural justice in the ESS are equivalent across nearly all countries. There are some minor differences between countries in their item intercepts, but it is generally justified to compare levels of perceived police procedural justice between European nations. One notable exception is Portugal, where the first indicator (how often do the police treat people in your country with respect?)
  • 50 was found to be non-invariant. Since English-language scientific studies on the police in Portugal are rare, I can only guess as to why this item was not invariant. 4.6 Concluding remarks regarding measurement equivalence Now that we have tested for the cross-country equivalence of trust in the police and of the perceived procedural justice measure newly included in the ESS round 5, it is time to draw some conclusions. Where do we stand on the cross-country comparability of measurement of these two latent constructs and what are the consequences of these tests for the rest of present study? The first and foremost of these conclusions is that these tests indicate that both trust in the police and perceived procedural justice can be compared across most countries. According to the equivalence tests, the measures are invariant across these countries and comparisons are valid. This conclusion fills an important gap in our knowledge and does not only have consequences for this study, but could be relevant to all scientists aiming to compare the relationship between the police and the public. However, there are some things one should note. First of all, not every country passed the equivalence tests. In Finland, Russia and Israel, trust in the police was not invariant. In the cases of Russia and Israel, this may be explained by the fact that they are not exactly “European”. Both countries have many distinct features that set them apart from most European nations, and some of those features may affect the nature of the police and the ways in which trust in the police is understood. The case of Finland is less clear-cut. One may perhaps explain the weak position of trust in the police in the factor structure of institutional trust through the fact that crime and crime control have less weight in the Finnish social discourse (Kääriäinen, 2008), which may decrease the importance of the police in the public debate as related to other institutions. Perceived procedural justice was found to be equivalent across all nations with the exception of Portugal: the indicator referring to the amount of respect with which the police treats citizens showed metric and scalar non-invariance. The unique national context must play a role, but whether the non- invariance is due to differences in policing, differences in public evaluations of police behaviour or both, I cannot tell. Since I already lacked the necessary information on the Portuguese police force to construct a community-oriented policing index, the exclusion of Portugal on the basis of non- equivalence will not have further consequences for my analyses. Summarizing, with the exceptions of Finland, Russia, Israel and Portugal, we can proceed to analyzing differences in trust in the police between countries.
  • 51 5 Analyses 5.1 The presence of trust In this section, I test my hypotheses and attempt to find answers to my research questions concerning trust in the police. First of all, I present a comparison of mean levels of trust, answering the first research question. After that, it is time to test the theoretical model: which characteristics on the micro- and macro level determine trust in the police? This way, we can answer the third research question. Information on mean levels of trust in different countries can be quite insightful. The goal is to study trust in the police in an international context, so it is necessary to first determine what these differences are. Since trust in the police was found to be validly, reliably and moreover equivalently assessable across countries, we can meaningfully compare average levels of trust in different nations. Exceptions are Finland, Israel and Russia, in which no full scalar invariance for trust in the police was established. Figure 4 features mean levels of trust in each country included in my analysis. Remember that trust in the police is measured on a scale of 0 to 10, in which 0 is no trust at all and 10 implies very high trust. The four non-invariant countries are displayed separately – to the right of the vertical black line – since comparing their mean levels of trust may not be valid. The horizontal black line indicates the mean level of trust across all countries: just below 6 out of 10. We can observe that trust in the police is generally highest, above 7 on the 0-10 scale, in Scandinavian countries. Finland is included in this very high-trust category, although it is non-invariant so this result needs to be interpreted with care. The German Bundesland of Nordrhein-Westfalen and Switzerland also have high trust. Then, there is a group of countries with somewhat above average rates of public trust, scoring slightly above 6: the Netherlands, Great Britain (UK minus Northern Ireland), Spain, Estonia and Belgium. The other countries score below average: France, Poland, Portugal, Hungary, Slovenia and Czech Republic, along with Israel in the non-equivalent group, have somewhat low scores of public trust in the police with values barely above 5 on the 0-10 scale. Two countries with exceptionally low trust, with scores around 4, are Bulgaria and Russia (of which the latter result may not be validly comparable to the rest due to non-equivalence).
  • 52 Figure 4: mean levels of trust in the police in 20 countries Summarizing, Eastern-European, former communist nations have lower trust in the police, with the lowest scores for the far-Eastern European countries Bulgaria and Russia. Scandinavian countries, on the other hand, have the highest trust. The rest of Western Europe is somewhat in between these two groups, mostly scoring around average values of public trust. With or without non-equivalent countries, these differences are quite substantial. This is indicated both by the sizeable intra-class correlation and the significant F-value obtained through ANOVA-tests16 . 5.2 Determinants of trust in the police Previous sections showed that there are substantial and significant differences between countries in the extent to which the public trusts the police. Hence, there is plenty of variance to account for. This makes 16 The intra-class correlation with all countries included is 0.22, meaning that 22% of all differences between individuals can be attributed to differences between countries. When Russia, Portugal and Israel are removed, the intra-class correlation decreases to 0.19, while the additional removal of Finland causes the correlation to drop to 0.16. All of these differences between countries, however, are highly significant at p=.001.
  • 53 it possible to test my hypotheses using a framework of multilevel regression analyses. These analyses are capable of adequately dealing with a nested structure such as is present in my data: individual respondents are nested within countries. I conduct these analyses with statistical package IBM SPSS version 19. I do not include every country in the following analyses. Russia and Israel, beside the fact that they showed non-invariance in the previous chapter, are also non-European countries. This leads to the conclusion that it is probably better not to take them into account in these analyses. Portugal and Switzerland are also difficult cases. I could not gather enough information about the police forces in these countries to compute a score on the proximity policing index. Besides, in the case of Portugal, there is also insufficient information available on the subject of income – required for the hypothesized cross-level interactions – in the ESS. Moreover, it was the only country that was found to be non- invariant in the procedural justice scale that is included in ESS. Hence, my analyses proceed without these four countries. I decided to take Finland into account for the time being. It was found to be non- equivalent in terms of trust in the police in the previous chapter, but all necessary information to include the country in the analyses is present. Hence, I am left with sixteen European countries. I will address the matter to what extent the in- or exclusion of Finland alters my results later in this chapter. In the following sections, I first study the impact of macro-level determinants on trust in the police. Then, I proceed to control for possible confounding variables, add the intermediary variables, and test the cross-level interactions. Finally, I analyze the impact of macro-level factors on the intermediary variables. Additional robustness checks are conducted to test the robustness – the stability – of the results. After all this, my hypotheses have been tested and it is possible to answer the research questions. 5.2.1 Country-level determinants and trust A large number of my hypotheses deals with the relationship between several macro-level determinants and public trust in the police. Let us first observe each of these relationships, without controlling for any other variables. The question, then, is whether there is a significant bivariate relationship between each of the country characteristics and trust in the police. If there is no such relationship, it is already looking quite bleak for the hypotheses involved. Remember that I hypothesize relationships between trust and five different country characteristics: income inequality or gini-coefficient (hypothesis 1a), democratic history (1b), level of corruption (2a), level of homicide (3a), and finally the degree to which proximity policing is accepted and applied (4a).
  • 54 In Table 6, I analyze the bivariate relationships between each macro-level determinant and trust, and finally include all five of them in one model to find out whether this changes their effects. Since macro-level variables in this type of cross-national research tend to correlate at least to some extent, it is likely that some effects will lessen, disappear or even change direction when the other macro-level determinants are also tested for in the same multilevel regression model17 . All effects are standardized to Z-scores, making each variable mean 0 and its standard error 1 in order to enable easy comparison of effect sizes. Table 6: regression estimates of macro-level determinants on trust in the police N=25,180 B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. Gini -.93* .37 .06 .25 Demhistory .86*** .21 -.08 .25 Corruption -1.22*** .14 -.1.27*** .33 Homicide -.11 .80 .32 .38 Prox police .67** .21 .10 .15 Country-lvl variance .84 .56 .20 1.17 .73 .17 Two-tailed tests: * P=.05 |** P=.01 |*** P=.001 | null-model country-level variance = .99 We can observe that there are significant bivariate relationships between trust in the police and all but one macro variable. That one exception is homicide, which is not a significant determinant of trust, even without controlling for any other possible determinant. The other country characteristics are all significant, as long as no other variables are included, and all relationships are in the expected direction: higher income inequality, a shorter democratic history, more corruption and lack of appliance of the principles of proximity policing are all related to lower rates of trust, albeit to varying extent. But when we include all five macro determinants simultaneously in one multilevel regression analysis, most relationships disappear. The only variable that remains significant is corruption. Apparently, the inclusion of corruption explains away the relationship between trust and income inequality, democratic history and proximity policing. Note that these variables explain a large amount of all variance on the country-level: only 0.17 remains of the original 0.99. The results of this analysis are in line with hypothesis 2a, but do not bode well for hypotheses 1a, 1b, 3a and 4a. However, more stringent tests are required before we can reject these hypotheses with any confidence: it is necessary to test the complete theoretical model. 17 These correlations between macro variables and trust in the police are included in Appendix C.
  • 55 5.2.2 Constructing a full model of trust in the police The construction of such a complete model requires several steps. In Table 7, all but one of these steps are taken. All variables, with the exception of the dichotomous ones18 , are standardized to Z-scores to ease interpretation. The base model, model 1, is equal to the final model of Table 6, containing all macro-level variables. I then add a range of individual-level control variables in order to construct model 2. After that, I test for the hypothesized relationships between the intermediary variables perceived procedural justice (PPJ), perceived police effectiveness (PPE) and perceived police prevention successfulness (PPP) on the one hand, and trust in the police on the other. These are the models 3, 4 and 5. Model 6 tests the effects of all three variables together. The central matter in the models 3 through 6 is whether the effects of other determinants change substantially due to the inclusion of PPJ , PPE and PPP. If that is the case, then those variables have an intermediary function: mediating the relationship between trust and – some of – its determinants. The inclusion of these intermediary variables tests the hypotheses concerning the relationship between PPJ and trust (hypothesis 2b) PPE and trust (hypothesis 3b) and between PPP and trust (4b). In model 7, finally, I add the cross-level interactions of income inequality and corruption with income, testing for differential effects of these macro variables for different levels of income (hypotheses 5a and 5b). 18 The dichotomous variables consisting of gender, minority membership and victimization.
  • 56 Table 7: full multilevel regression model on trust in the police N=25,180 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. Gini .06 .25 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.19 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.05 0.10 Dem history -.08 .25 -0.04 0.23 -0.03 0.19 -0.04 0.18 -0.02 0.18 -0.03 0.16 0.07 0.14 Corruption -.1.27*** .33 -0.83** 0.30 -0.70** 0.26 -0.97*** 0.24 -0.90*** 0.24 -0.83*** 0.21 -0.55** 0.17 Homicide .32 .38 0.19 0.35 0.25 0.29 0.16 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.12 0.08 Proximity policing .10 .15 0.02 0.14 -0.05 0.12 -0.02 0.11 -0.03 0.11 -0.07 0.10 0.02 0.09 Female ref ref ref ref ref ref Male -0.10*** 0.03 -0.08*** 0.02 -0.07** 0.03 -0.09*** 0.02 -0.07** 0.02 -0.07** 0.02 Age 0.07*** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.09*** 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.01 Education 0.00 0.01 -0.03** 0.01 0.09*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 Income 0.04** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.07*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.06** 0.02 Majority ref ref ref ref ref ref Minority 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.06 -0.08 0.06 -0.11* 0.06 -0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.05 Church attend 0.07*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 Non-victim ref ref ref ref ref ref Victim -0.30*** 0.03 -0.23*** 0.03 -0.10** 0.03 -0.14*** 0.03 -0.08** 0.03 -0.08** 0.03 Life satisfaction 0.34*** 0.02 0.26*** 0.01 0.27*** 0.02 0.24*** 0.01 0.20*** 0.01 0.21*** 0.01 Political orient 0.09*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 GST 0.64*** 0.02 0.52*** 0.01 0.51*** 0.02 0.48*** 0.01 0.42*** 0.01 0.42*** 0.01 Urbanization 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.01 Perc proc justice (PPJ) 0.90*** 0.01 0.60*** 0.01 0.60*** 0.01 Perc pol effect (PPE) 0.78*** 0.01 0.30*** 0.02 0.30*** 0.02 Perc pol prevention (PPP) 0.88*** 0.01 0.49*** 0.02 0.49*** 0.02 Income*gini 0.03 0.02 Income*corruption 0.03 0.02 Individual-level variance 4.99 4.42 3.79 3.88 3.75 3.42 3.42 Country-level variance 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 Two-tailed tests: * P=.05 |** P=.01 |*** P=.001 | null-model individual-level variance: 5.17
  • 57 In Table 7, we can first of all observe that the inclusion of a range of attitudinal and demographic control variables (gender through urbanization) in Model 2 hardly alters the effects of the macro-characteristics displayed in Model 1. The relationship between corruption and trust remains significant, while the effects of the other country characteristics continue to be insignificant. Most of the control variables themselves have significant effects. Men and younger people have less trust in the police than women and the elderly. Wealthier respondents and those who attend church more often are more trusting towards the police than poorer respondents and people who attend church less often. Crime victims have less trust. Three attitudinal variables are significantly related to trust: respondents who are dissatisfied with life, have a left-wing political orientation, and have less trust in other people in general are all less trusting towards the police than those who are satisfied, have a right-wing political orientation and have more social trust in general. Education, minority membership and urbanization do not appear to have a significant effect. What, then, happens to these effects once we take into account the three intermediary variables PPJ, PPE and PPP? The effect of perceived procedural justice, as demonstrated in model 3, is positive and highly significant. In line with hypothesis 2b, a more positive perception of police procedural justice increases trust in the police. The inclusion of PPJ in the model also alters the effects of some other variables; it explains part of the effects of age, church attendance, victimization, life satisfaction, political orientation and generalized social trust. In the case of education, interestingly, we see the reverse: a suppressor effect. While there is no significant effect of education on trust in the police in model 2, the inclusion of perceived procedural justice in model 3 renders the relationship significant. Once we control for their perceptions of procedural justice, citizens with higher education have less trust in the police. The other intermediary variables, PPE and PPP, appear to have a positive and significant impact on trust in the police in models 4 and 5. Again, they also alter the effects of some other determinants; in the most cases explaining part of control variables’ effects. The positive effect of religiosity on trust, for example, disappears entirely once PPE or PPP are controlled for. Another remarkable result is that the effect of victimization on trust decreases considerably, especially if we take into account the extent to which the police are perceived to be effective. This indicates that victims of crime hold much more negative views of police effectiveness than non-victims and that this is mainly responsible for their decrease of trust in the police. Another interesting result is that the effect of education on trust becomes positive when we take into account either PPE or PPP – remember that the effect was negative once I controlled for perceived procedural justice and non-existent if none of the three intermediary
  • 58 variables were taken into account. Again, this indicates a suppressor effect, but this time the other way around. The net effect of education on trust in the police, when taking all three intermediary variables into account, is positive. The above illustrates that the intermediary variables are quite relevant in understanding the relationships between various control variables and trust in the police. In the next section, I will deal with these intermediary variables in more detail, but suffice to say that the hypotheses 2b, 3b and 4b have for now found support. All three individual-level hypothesized relationships can hence not be rejected; even if included all in the same model (model 6), their effects on trust in the police remain highly significant. There are, however, differences in the sizes of the effects: the most powerful effect is that of perceived procedural justice, whereas the weakest is for perceived police effectiveness. None of these intermediary variables, no matter how significant themselves, substantially alter the impact of country characteristics: only corruption remains a significant determinant of trust in the police. We can now proceed to analyzing the two cross-level interactions. Model 7 provides the results of the full model including interactions terms between income and income inequality and the one between income and corruption. Both effects are not significant: there are neither differential effects for corruption nor for income inequality, refuting hypotheses 5a and 5b. If we observe model 7, the full regression model of trust in the police, it is clear that the effect of corruption is still the most important – and only significant – macro-level determinant of trust, corroborating hypothesis 2a. In this full model, there are no significant relationships between income inequality, democratic history, homicide or proximity policing and trust in the police, refuting hypotheses 1a, 1b, 3a and 4a. Still, despite these mostly negative results for my macro-level hypotheses, nearly all country-level variance is now accounted for. Only 0.07 of the original 0.99 points of country- level variance remains, indicating that Model 7 explains the differences between countries in terms of trust in the police quite well. On the individual level, 3.42 of the initial 5.16 points of variance – the mean difference between individuals within countries in terms of trust in the police – remains unaccounted for in model 7. This implies that the model cannot account for the better part of differences between individuals, but still explains around 34% of all individual-level variance. The individual-level hypotheses found much more support in the full regression model: the effects of procedural justice and of the intermediary variables police effectiveness and police prevention successfulness are all significant, supporting hypotheses 2b, 3b and 4b. Additionally, most micro-level control variables were also significantly related to trust, although their effects were often weakened by the inclusion of the intermediary variables.
  • 59 5.2.3 Intermediary variables Let us now have a closer look into the three individual-level intermediary variables PPJ, PPE and PPP. That they have an intermediary function at least for some control variables was already indicated by the results of Table 7, but we need more information to achieve a complete analysis of the theoretical model. To what extent does corruption affect procedural justice (hypothesis 2c), do homicide (hypothesis 3c) and corruption (hypothesis 3d) affect the public’s perception of police effectiveness, and is there evidence for a positive relationship between the implementation of proximity policing principles and the public’s perception of police successfulness in preventing crime (hypothesis 4c)? Table 8 displays the answers to these questions. For each of the three different dependent variables (procedural justice, police effectiveness and police prevention) two models are presented: one with only macro-level determinants and one in which individual-level control variables are also taken into account. Table 8: multilevel regression estimates of intermediary variables Two-tailed tests: * P=.05 |** P=.01 |*** P=.001 Perceived proc justice (PPJ) Perceived pol effect (PPE) Perceived pol prevention (PPP) N=25,180 Model 8a Model 8b Model 9a Model 9b Model 10a Model 10b B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. Gini 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.18 0.27 -0.24 0.28 -0.12 0.15 -0.16 0.15 Dem history -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.09 0.27 0.00 0.27 -0.08 0.15 -0.03 0.15 Corruption -0.15* 0.07 -0.09 0.07 0.07 0.36 0.37 0.37 -0.13 0.20 -0.15 0.20 Homicide -0.02 0.07 -0.04 0.07 0.02 0.41 0.10 0.42 -0.13 0.23 -0.13 0.23 Proximity policing 0.06* 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.16* 0.09 0.11 0.09 Female ref ref ref Male -0.02** 0.01 -0.10*** 0.03 -0.03 0.02 Age 0.03*** 0.00 -0.03* 0.01 0.09*** 0.01 Education 0.02*** 0.00 -0.23*** 0.01 -0.14*** 0.01 Income 0.01*** 0.00 -0.07*** 0.01 -0.04** 0.01 Majority ref ref ref Minority -0.01 0.02 0.27*** 0.06 0.28*** 0.05 Church attendance 0.02*** 0.00 0.15*** 0.01 0.12*** 0.01 Non-victim ref ref ref Victim -0.05*** 0.01 -0.55*** 0.03 -0.36*** 0.03 Life satisfaction 0.05*** 0.00 0.21*** 0.02 0.23*** 0.01 Political orientation 0.02*** 0.00 0.03** 0.01 0.07*** 0.01 GST 0.08*** 0.00 0.36*** 0.02 0.35*** 0.01 Urbanization -0.01*** 0.00 -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 Individual level variance 0.28 0.27 4.33 4.02 3.73 3.47 Country level variance 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.21 0.06 0.06
  • 60 There are several things we can learn from this table19 . First of all, there are indications that some macro-level determinants are related to intermediary variables, even when controlling for other country characteristics. These relationships are not very strong, and disappear once control variables are also taken into account, but let us look at them before proceeding. The expected relationship between corruption and perceived procedural justice is present in model 8a. Perceived procedural justice is also related to proximity policing in this model, although I did not expect this. In model 8b, these relationships do not remain significant. Although hypothesis 2c does thus not find sufficient support, there are indications that corruption may affect perceived procedural justice. The unexpected – and after control for background determinants also insignificant – relationship between proximity policing and perceived procedural justice may be considered support for my earlier statement that the three theoretical police science perspectives are not mutually exclusive but might overlap to some extent. The two other variables that I hypothesized to mediate between macro-level determinants and trust in the police, PPE and PPP, have similar results. There is no significant relationship between perceived police effectiveness and macro-level determinants whatsoever regardless of any control variables20 . Hence, both hypotheses 3c and 3d are refuted. In the case of perceived police prevention, there is a weak effect of proximity policing that disappears when individual-level control variables are included in the analysis. Although this is not enough support to fully corroborate hypothesis 4c, there may be something in the relationship between proximity policing and perceived police prevention successfulness. Despite this rather weak support for the hypotheses concerning the relationship between country characteristics and intermediary variables, the intermediary determinants are strongly related to several background characteristics, the strongest relationships being with education, minority membership, victimization, life satisfaction and generalized social trust. Without accounting for these three intermediary variables, we may hence over- or in the case of education underestimate the impact of these background characteristics21 . 19 The regression estimates for PPJ appear to be lower than for PPE and PPP, but this is due to its measurement (on a 0-10 scale) rather than actual effect sizes. PPE and PPP were both measured on four-point scales. 20 Even when I only observed bivariate relationships between each individual macro-level determinant and perceptions of police effectiveness, there was not a single significant result. Procedural justice and perceived police prevention successfulness was significantly related to several country characteristics as long as I did not control for confounding variables. For more details, I refer to Appendix D. 21 An example, briefly addressed above, is the effect of victimization on trust. In model 4 of Table 7, one can observe that the effect of victimization on trust decreases dramatically once perceived police effectiveness is taken into account. This indicates that victims of crimes not so much directly lose trust in the police, but that they lose confidence in the effectiveness of the police, and because of that, their trust is lower. This interpretation is
  • 61 Summarizing, perceived procedural justice, perceived police effectiveness and perceived police prevention successfulness do not significantly mediate the relationship between country characteristics and trust in the police, but there are some indications of weak links between them. Despite the fact that there might not be an intermediary function for PPJ, PPE and PPP in the relationship between country characteristics and trust in the police, they do mediate the effects of individual-level control variables on trust in the police. I will evaluate the implications of these results for present study in the concluding chapter. 5.2.4 Robustness checks All hypotheses have now been put to the test. As it is, we should now be ready to draw conclusions about what affects trust in the police and what does not, answering the third and final of my research questions. However, before we proceed to the concluding stage of this study, we need to be more certain of the results of the analyses. Therefore, I conduct a series of robustness checks. This type of test is usually performed by removing clusters of observations (countries) from the analyses (Van der Meer, Te Grotenhuis & Pelzer, 2010). If this removal substantially alters the results of the analyses, there is a lack of stability in the findings: relationships may hold for certain clusters of countries but may be entirely different for others. Besides, certain countries might be outliers, affecting the results of the analyses disproportionately. The complete analyses are presented in Appendix E, but I will summarize the results here. My robustness checks consist of conducting several additional analyses based on the full model as presented in Table 7. First, I analyze the full model without Finland. Finland was not equivalent to the other countries in terms of trust in the police, so it is the most obvious choice to remove in a robustness check. The results, however, showed that the disappearance of Finland from the analyses made little if any difference. After that, I split the country sample in three clusters: Scandinavia, the rest of Western Europe, and Eastern Europe. Aside of geographical units, these clusters also roughly correspond to their mean levels of trust as discussed in section 5.1. In each of the three following analyses, I removed one of the clusters while retaining the other two. Generally speaking, changes in effects were only minor when any cluster was removed. This indicates high stability of the effects as displayed in Table 7. Most relationships between the various determinants and trust in the police appear to hold more or less across all countries. The small changes supported by the estimate of victimization in model 9b: the effect of victimization on perceived police effectiveness is negative and quite large. Including perceived police effectiveness in the analysis thus helps us understand the mechanism through which trust in the police is affected by victimization.
  • 62 that are sometimes observed in levels of significance may be caused by a loss in degrees of freedom rather than by actual differential effects over countries. There were two noteworthy exceptions. First of all, if Western Europe is removed from the analysis, the effects of several country characteristics turn significant. Apparently, these (small) effects hold only for Eastern European and Scandinavian countries. Additional analyses showed that the inclusion of a single Western European country already renders all macro variables but corruption insignificant once again. I conclude that, while there may be some differences between countries in the effect of macro determinants, the hypotheses concerning income inequality, democratic history or homicide can generally not be corroborated. A second point of interest is that the effects of several micro-level determinants vary over country clusters. Some of these variables have no significant impact when one cluster is removed; examples being gender and education when Western Europe is not included in the analyses. The direction of the relationship never changes (what was negative does not become positive and vice versa). Hence, we may conclude that the results of my analyses are generally reasonably robust. 5.3 Summarizing the results The results of the robustness checks, though insightful in several ways, do not give much cause to distrust any of the effects displayed in Table 7: my judgement of the hypotheses remains unchanged. So where do we currently stand? Which expectations found support, and which ones did not and hence have to be rejected? Table 9 gives an overview of the hypotheses that were formulated in the theory section of this study, of the theoretical perspectives the hypotheses represent, and the empirical findings regarding these hypotheses.
  • 63 Table 9: overview of the hypotheses and their results The hypotheses 1a and 1b were brought forward from the contextual research tradition, concerning the impact of contextual characteristics beyond police control on trust in the police. Neither of the two hypotheses found support, although there were significant bivariate relationships between the determinants and trust in the police and robustness checks indicated that there might be something of a relationship in some countries. Hypotheses 2a and 2b, both operationalizations of the procedural justice perspective, found support. Corruption on the country level and the individual-level variable of perceived procedural justice proved to be powerful determinants of trust in the police. Hypothesis 2c, concerning the relationship between the macro- or micro operationalization of procedural justice, did find some support, but not sufficient to be corroborated. Hypotheses 3a and 3b were deducted from the instrumental perspective: the public judges the police by their performance and effectiveness, for which I took homicide as a macro-level operationalization of the narrow instrumental perspective interpretation, and perceived police effectiveness as an individual-level indicator of the broader interpretation. There was no effect of homicide on trust, refuting the hypothesis, but perceived police effectiveness was significantly related to Hypothesis Main theoretical perspective Hypothesized relationship Result 1a Contextual Income inequality – less trust in police Refuted 1b Contextual Democratic history – more trust in police Refuted 2a Procedural justice Corruption – less trust in police Corroborated 2b Procedural justice Perc procedural justice – more trust in police Corroborated 2c Procedural justice Corruption – less perc procedural justice Refuted 3a Instrumental Homicide – less trust in police Refuted 3b Instrumental Pol. less effective – less trust in police Corroborated 3c Instrumental Homicide – pol. less effective Refuted 3d Instrumental/Procedural justice Corruption – pol. less effective Refuted 4a Proximity policing Proximity pol – more trust in police Refuted 4b Proximity policing More pol. prevention – more trust in police Corroborated 4c Proximity policing Proximity pol – more pol. prevention Refuted 5a Contextual Differential effect of income for inc. inequality Refuted 5a Instrumental Differential effect of income for corruption Refuted
  • 64 trust in the police. The broader interpretation hence found more support than the narrow interpretation. Homicide did not appear to influence perceived police effectiveness, and neither did corruption, refuting hypotheses 3c and 3d. Hypothesis 4a tested the proximity policing perspective on the macro level. The proximity policing index score of a country did not significantly affect trust in the police when other factors were controlled for, although there was a bivariate relationship. Perceived police prevention successfulness did significantly affect trust in the police, corroborating hypothesis 4b. There appeared to be some overlap between proximity policing on the macro level and individual perceptions of police prevention successfulness, but this relationship disappeared once individual background characteristics were controlled for. Evidence for this partial-coverage relationship was too weak to consider hypothesis 4c corroborated. Hypotheses 5a and 5b concerned the cross-level interactions with income. Neither found support; a result that was robust over countries. There are apparently no differential effects for different income categories in terms of the relationship between corruption or income inequality and trust in the police. Summarizing, none of the three main theoretical perspectives – procedural justice, instrumental and proximity policing – were rejected completely. There was some support for each perspective, and they all appear to help understand trust in the police to some extent. The most straightforward support was for procedural justice, while the instrumental perspective yielded mixed results. The weakest support was for the effect of proximity policing on trust in the police. In the next chapter, I will aim to provide more food for thought by evaluating these results and their implications for both police theory and practice. I will also discuss strengths and weaknesses of present study.
  • 65 6 Conclusions and discussion 6.1 Three research questions In this study, I aimed to improve upon existing literature on the subject of citizens’ trust in the police in three respects: by incorporating more than a single theoretical approach towards trust in the police, by including a relatively large sample of countries in my analysis, and by testing the often too automatic assumption that trust in the police is equivalently measured and hence comparable over countries. In order to achieve these three improvements, I posed three research questions: 1) what are the differences between European nations in police trust in 2010? 2) to what extent is trust in the police empirically comparable across nations? 3) which factors on the national and on the individual level explain these differences in police trust? Of these three questions, the first one I addressed in my analyses was the matter to what extent we can actually compare trust in the police across nations. This was the prerequisite for answering the other two questions: cross-country measurement equivalence had to be established. I found that trust in the police was empirically equivalent for most countries in 2010, making a comparison of mean levels in police trust between European nations valid. Exceptions were Russia, Israel and Finland22 . Of these nations, Russia and Israel are not entirely European so their non-equivalence is not surprising. The police force in these countries is of a different nature. In Russia, the status of the police is unique as compared to the rest of the world in a sense that many officers engage in criminal activities and violent behaviour, which leads to absolutely devastating results in terms of public attitudes towards the police (Shlapentokh, 2006). The function of the police also differs from that of most European police forces: public policing is a commodity that can be paid for by private agencies (Favarel-Garrigues & Le Huérou, 2004). Israel is in quite another, but equally unique situation. Threats of terrorist attacks and conflicts with the Palestine authority give the military but also the police a status aparte in Israel (Jonathan, 2010). The non-invariance of Finland in the equivalence tests can probably be explained by the absence of a security debate in Finland (Kääriäinen, 2008) and hence a less critical attitude towards the police. Since trust in the police was found to be equivalent for the other countries, we can validly compare mean values of trust in the police across those nations. This also has implications for future and past research: trust in the police is a concept that is empirically comparable across most European countries and can hence be studied through quantitative methods. Outside European space, however, 22 Two other exceptions are Northern Ireland and part of Germany, which I removed from my analyses before conducting equivalence tests.
  • 66 comparisons between countries appear to be much more problematic; something future researchers need to take into account. Not only did I find that we can validly compare mean levels of trust across most European countries, I also found evidence for large differences between these countries in terms of trust in the police. These differences were significant whether non-invariant nations were included or not. High-trust nations included the Scandinavian countries, while Eastern European countries typically had low trust. Other Western European nations had levels of trust that were around average or somewhat above. So what causes these substantial differences? Are the police doing a much better job in Scandinavia, or are there other societal factors at play? This problem is addressed by the third research question: explaining differences in police trust on the national and on the individual level. 6.2 Factors influencing trust In order to answer this third research question, I formulated a range of hypotheses, taking into account four different historical branches of police research. The demographic-attitudinal branch of research provided a range of control variables, whereas the interactional branch provided the theoretical foundation for the three police science perspectives I focused on. Together with two macro-level determinants detracted from the contextual research branch, these three police science perspectives provided a framework for understanding differences in citizens’ trust in the police between countries. 6.2.1 Contextual research The contextual branch of research deals with the question to what extent societal factors, or the societal context, affect the public’s view of the police. Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) found that more income equality increased generalized social trust in a country, while Caparini and Marenin (2005) argued that the political (democratic) past of the country was especially important in shaping institutional trust. I hence hypothesized that more income equality and a longer democratic history increase trust in the police. Both hypotheses did not find much support in present study. In the case of income equality, this may be due to the fact that the relationship was originally found for generalized social trust instead of institutional or even police trust. For the democratic history of a country, I did find a small significant effect once the Western European countries were removed. This is in line with the study of Caparini and Marenin (2005), which focused on Eastern Europe. There might be an effect of the democratic history of a country on trust in the police, but this effect does not hold for all of Europe. On the basis of these results, one could conclude that a merely contextual approach is not the most effective way of studying
  • 67 citizens’ trust in the police. Instead, the theoretically more coherent police science perspectives might be more successful. In the police science perspectives, the agency of the police themselves is more central as compared to other societal factors. What police actions, behaviour and organizational properties affect citizens’ trust in the police? I discerned three distinct perspectives. 6.2.2 The procedural justice perspective The first police science perspective I tested is that of procedural justice. For the first time applied to the police by Tyler (1988; 1990), the procedural justice perspective concerns the direct interaction between police officers and individual citizens. It is expected that the police possess more social legitimacy and are trusted to a higher degree when they interact with citizens on the basis of fairness and respectfulness. I operationalized this perspective both on the macro- and on the micro level. On the macro level, I expected societal corruption to have a negative effect on trust in the police because corruption decreases the likelihood of fair and equal treatment of citizens. Corruption was found to be a powerful determinant of trust in the police; in line with previous findings on the micro-level of Weitzer and Tuch (2005) and on the country level (Kääriäinen, 2007). One can also ask individual citizens about their perceptions of procedural justice. A measure of perceived procedural justice is present in the ESS 2010, which I found to be internationally equivalent. My hypothesis was that trust in the police is higher with people who have more positive perceptions of procedural justice. Not only was this hypothesis corroborated, the relationship between perceived procedural justice and trust in the police was also particularly powerful. The expected relationship between corruption and perceived procedural justice was weak, and disappeared once individual-level control variables were accounted for. Summarizing, there is much evidence to support the existence of a relationship between perceived procedural justice and trust in the police, both on the macro- and on the micro level. The procedural justice perspective appears well-equipped to study citizens’ trust in the police. This is in line with previous studies such as conducted by Sunshine and Tyler (2003) or Jackson and Sunshine (2007). 6.2.3 The instrumental perspective The second police science perspective, the instrumental perspective, entails that the public judges the police based on their performance. I argued that this perspective has two different interpretations; a narrow and a broad interpretation. The narrower interpretation holds that the public judgement is mostly dependent on police effectiveness in the key area of (violent) crime control. Homicide rates were
  • 68 in the past often used as indicator (Jang, Joo & Zhao, 2010; Reisig & Parks, 2000). My hypothesis was that trust in the police is lower in countries with higher levels of homicide. The broader interpretation of the instrumental perspective is less specific about the type of police effectiveness; although the public judges the police by their effectiveness, it need not necessarily concern (violent) crime. I hypothesized that citizens who perceive the police to be more effective have more trust in the police. I found that perceptions of police effectiveness are positively related to trust, whereas the level of homicide in a country did not have a significant effect. Additionally, I also hypothesized a relationship between homicide rates and citizens’ perceptions of police effectiveness, but did not find any support. It seems most likely that this relationship was absent because they concerned rather different types of crime; while I measured the narrow interpretation as homicide, the broader perception of police effectiveness was measured as their performance in arresting house burglars. There is a substantial discrepancy between homicide and house burglaries. Apparently, the public considers this discrepancy to be quite large and values broader concerns of police effectiveness in fighting “average” crimes like burglary over violent crime rates; an interesting finding for the instrumental perspective. While there is evidence that the public judges the police through their performance in the field of crime control, there may be differences according to the type of crime. Yes, the public may base its judgement of the police on police performance, but citizens appear to base their judgement on a broader sense of police effectiveness, which need not necessarily be related to violent crime. This supports the broader interpretation in favour of the narrow interpretation. Next to a relationship between homicide and perceptions of police effectiveness I also expected corruption to influence perceived police effectiveness. As well as for homicide, I found no support for an intermediary function of perceived police effectiveness in the relationship between corruption and trust in the police. This is not in line with previous research of for example Tankebe (2010). Surprisingly, the results concerning corruption and homicide are exactly the reverse of what Jang, Joo and Zhao (2010) reported: they found that homicide had a significant impact on confidence in the police and corruption did not. I suspect this has to do with their country sample, consisting of many developing countries next to several Western ones, whereas my country sample and that of Kääriäinen (2007) consisted only of European nations. Hence, my conclusions merely concern European nations and may not hold for other countries.
  • 69 6.2.4 The proximity policing perspective Next to the procedural justice and the instrumental perspective, I discerned the proximity policing perspective. A police science paradigm that has had major influence, proximity policing holds that the police must decrease their distance to the public by being more approachable, visible, proactive instead of reactive, concerned with local problems other than crime, and generally involve the community in police work (Skogan & Hartnett, 1997; Goldstein, 1987; Trojanowicz & Bucqueroux, 1990; Terpstra, 2010). This is expected to increase trust in the police. Since there are no indicators of proximity policing in existence, I constructed my own on the basis of literature on the subject. There was no direct relationship between proximity policing and trust in the police when I controlled for possible confounding variables, although a bivariate relationship was established. Since proximity policing concerns the interaction between citizens and police officers, I also attempted to operationalize proximity policing on the individual level. Unfortunately, only a far-from-perfect partial coverage measure was available in my data: perceived police prevention successfulness. Since one of the elements of proximity policing is that it focuses on preventive rather than reactive policing (Stone & Travis, 2011; Rohe et al., 1996; Skolnick & Bayley, 1988; Maguire & Mastrofski, 2000; Greene, 2000), I used this as an indicative measure for perceived proximity policing. I then hypothesized that a more positive perception of police prevention successfulness went with more trust in the police. This hypothesis was confirmed, indicating that there may be something to proximity policing or at least its preference for preventive methods in affecting public attitudes towards the police. Further assessing the relationship between proximity policing, perceived prevention successfulness and trust in the police, I also hypothesized proximity policing on the macro level to affect the intermediary variable perceived police crime prevention successfulness. This relationship was weak but present as long as I did not control for individual background characteristics. Despite the problematic operationalization of proximity policing on the micro-level, there are hence indications that the two concepts overlap at least to some extent. We may hence conclude that the proximity policing perspective did not find as much support in my analyses as the procedural justice perspective; although there are indications that a focus on crime prevention rather than only a reactive approach, one of the elements of proximity policing, has positive effects on trust in the police. The relationship between my operationalization of proximity policing and trust in the police was weak. This does not necessarily imply that the application of proximity policing has no influence on public attitudes towards the police. This mode of policing is especially intended to operate on the level of neighbourhoods, in which it was previously found to be effective (Skogan,
  • 70 2006b). While my analyses were done both on the level of individuals and of countries, I could not analyze the level of neighbourhoods: with the data currently available, such an analysis is not possible for European countries. The application of proximity policing principles may improve trust in the police, but if it is only (successfully) applied in a few problematic neighbourhoods, the net effect on trust in the police in the entire country may be minimal. 6.2.5 Differential effects Additional to the three police science perspectives on trust in the police, I also hypothesized two differential effects. Because Jang, Joo and Zhao (2010) did not find the expected effects of income (in)equality and corruption on trust in the police, I suspected that these country characteristics may work out differently for the wealthy than for the poor. I expected income inequality and corruption to be harmful for the poor, while they would not be as damaging or even profitable for the wealthy in terms of trust in the police. My analyses, however, did not yield much support for these expectations; there does not appear to be any differential effect of income inequality or corruption. In the case of corruption, it is equally harmful for all income categories in terms of trust in the police, whereas there is no effect of income inequality whatsoever. 6.2.6 Control variables In my analyses, I took several other determinants into account as individual-level control variables. Most of these variables were significantly related to trust in the police, in line with many previous studies. In line with most previous research, women have more trust in the police, as well as older people. Higher education as well as higher income induce more trust, the former refuting early studies into public attitudes towards the police (Preiss & Ehrlich, 1958), the latter surprisingly contradicting previous research of Cao and Zhao (2005). Minority membership was no significant determinant of trust in the police, in line with more recent studies on the subject (Cao, Frank & Cullen, 1996) and neither was church attendance. The initially powerful effect of victimization decreased substantially once control variables were taken into account. This is exactly what earlier studies found (Garofalo & Hindelang, 1977; Thomas & Hyman, 1977). Three attitudinal variables included in my analyses were all closely related to trust in the police. Overall satisfaction with life and generalized social trust proved to be especially powerful determinants of trust in the police, and right-wing political orientation increased trust in the police to a lesser extent.These variables were important in controlling for overall negative dispositions towards life and
  • 71 other people, that could otherwise have confounded my results. These results were also found in previous studies (Jang, Joo & Zhao, 2010; Cao, Stack & Sun, 1998). The effect of urbanization on trust in the police proved to be quite weak. While there are undoubtedly some determinants of trust that I did not take into account in my analyses, the multilevel model that was used explained a great deal of the differences between persons and especially between countries. Over 90% of all between-country differences in terms of trust in the police was explained by the determinants included in this study. Of the differences between individuals, about 34% was explained. If we consider the fact that the social sciences are probabilistic in nature, rather than determinist, the total explained variance of around 43%, combining the between- and within-country explained variance, is quite high. The factors that I included in present study can hence be considered quite relevant in understanding how to promote trust in the police. 6.3 Discussion No study is without its weaknesses, and present one is no exception. This study provided a unique contribution toward the problem of trust in the police in a sense that three theoretical perspectives were tested while one is the norm, and that the cross-country equivalence of trust in the police was also assessed. However, some critical notes that may be of use to future researchers are justified. Let us first of all think about one of the most fundamental issues when studying trust, legitimacy or related concepts. Attitudes towards authorities are shaped by a complex blend of emotions and thoughts, of personal experiences and hearsay, of expectations, hopes and fears. To think that these psychological dynamics can easily be captured through a quantitative study would be a serious misunderstanding. Quantitative methods can definitely bring us somewhere, an example being the application of equivalence tests in testing for the cross-country comparability of institutional trust, but if we really want to grasp the mechanisms behind the formation of trust in the police, we need more information than is provided by mere numbers. What happens in people’s minds after a positive encounter with a policeman? How does a police officer interpret and apply the principles of community policing? To what extent does local culture shape the interaction between police and citizens? In quantitative studies, this still remains something of a black box. Additional to a systematic, quantitative analysis, a qualitative study would offer valuable insight into these mechanisms and into the relevance of instrumental concerns, community policing and procedural justice in shaping trust in the police.
  • 72 A second note concerns one the three theoretical police science perspectives. The proximity policing perspective mainly concentrates on the level of individuals and that of neighbourhoods. The secondary data I used were well-equipped for testing on the country- and individual levels, but not for the neighbourhood level. Data on this level are simply not available. This might be one of the reasons that I did not find much evidence for a positive effect of proximity policing on the macro level on trust. Future research on this subject might manage to do more justice to these characteristics of proximity policing. A researcher must also take note of the fact that proximity policing is often applied specifically in more problematic, low-trust neighbourhoods. Still, this is one of very few systematic comparative studies on proximity policing, and to my knowledge the very first international comparative quantitative study to take proximity policing into account, which offers despite its flaws a valuable contribution in itself. The third issue I wish to address is that of causality and spuriousness. How do we know that it is perceptions of procedural justice that affect trust in the police, and that there is not the reverse, or a third factor determining both? As I stated in the theory section, attitudes tend to cluster together in sets (Albrecht & Green, 1977). I controlled for spuriousness problems by including control variables that were intended to measure such a cluster of attitudes; in this case a positive disposition towards life and other people in general. However, I cannot be sure that it is not trust in the police affecting perceptions of procedural justice through a process of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) instead of the other way around. Similar issues hold for perceived police effectiveness and prevention successfulness: it could be that more trust in the police induces more positive perceptions of their crime prevention successfulness. The ideal fashion of controlling for this problem in a quantitative context is to apply either a quasi-experimental or longitudinal – panel – design. The earlier proposed inclusion of a qualitative study may also pose a sufficient solution to this problem. 6.4 Final notes Based on all this, we may conclude that there are some priorities that police management, individual police officers, and policy makers all over Europe might focus on to improve trust in the police. Of the three theoretical perspectives I studied, procedural justice appeared to be the most central in determining public trust; more important than proximity policing or instrumental concerns of police effectiveness. Hence, a police force would be ill-advised to ignore the concept of procedural justice when dealing with the public. When the police emphasize fairness and respectfulness in their
  • 73 interaction with the public, trust in the police will most likely be high. Police officers need to behave fairly in their interactions with citizens, adhering to the principles of procedural justice. Police violence and disrespectful behaviour should be prevented at all costs, since the impact of negative encounters is so large (Skogan, 2006a). This implies that police corruption and –violence, as opposed to fair treatment, should be limited to an absolute minimum if the police seek public trust. It is of vital importance for citizens’ trust in the police that corruption in a country should be countered as much as possible. Corruption is devastating for trust in the police – and if we are to believe earlier research, also for trust in other institutions (Wolters & De Graaf, 2005; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). Eastern European countries, which often have lower trust rates, could in this sense perhaps learn from police forces in Scandinavian nations where trust is high. Careful training and education of police officers may help in improving police procedural justice, as indicated by a study of Paoline and Terrill (2007). International exchange of police officers and managers might contribute to this goal. However, if we really want to improve trust in the police, we need to take into account trust in government and especially legal institutions as a whole. The equivalence tests indicated that the public, especially in Eastern European countries, still views the government as one large institution with several related branches. Anyone seeking to improve the attitudes towards the police should hence consider the attitudes towards the entire government.
  • 74 Literature Albrecht, S. L., & Green, M. (1977). Attitudes toward the police and the larger attitude complex. Implications for police-community relationships. Criminology, 15(1), 67-86. Alderson, J. (1979). Policing freedom. Plymouth: MacDonald & Evans. Allum, N., Patulny, R., Read, S., & Sturgis, P. (2010). Re-evaluating the links between social trust, institutional trust and civic association. Journal of Spatial and Social Disparities, 2, 199-215. Anderson, C. J., & Tverdova, Y. V. (2003). Corruption, political allegiances, and attitudes toward government in contemporary democracies. American Journal of Political Science, 47(1), 91-109. Ashford, B. E., & Gibbs, B. W. (1990). The double-edge of organizational legitimization. Organization Science, 1(2), 177-194. Bayley, D. H. (1979). Police function, structure and control in Western Europe and North America: comparative and historical studies. Crime and Justice, 1, 109-143. Bayley, D. H. (1985). Patterns of policing. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Bayley, D. H. (1994). Police for the future. New York: Oxford University Press. Bayley, D. H., & Mendelsohn, H. (1969). Minorities and the police. New York: The Free Press. Bayley, D. H., & Shearing, C. D. (1996). The future of policing. Law & Society Review, 30(3), 585–606. Beck, A., & Robertson, A. (2009). The challenges to developing democratic policing in post-Soviet societies: the Russian experience. Police Practice and Research, 10(4), 285-293. Biderman, A. D., Johnson, L. A., McIntyre, J., & Weir, A. W. (1967). Report on a pilot study in the District of Columbia on victimization and attitudes toward law enforcement. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Bradford, B., & Jackson, J. (2010). Different things to different people? The meaning and measurement of trust and confidence in policing across diverse social groups in London. Social Science Research Network Working Paper, retrieved June 22 nd 2012 from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1628546 . Braga, A. A., Weisburd, D. L., Waring, E. J., Green Mazerolle, L., Spelman, W., & Gajewski, F. (1999). Problem- oriented policing in violent crime places: A randomized controlled experiment. Criminology, 37(3), 541-580. Browne, M. W., & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. In K. A. Bollen & J. S. Long (Eds.), Testing structural equation models (pp. 136-162). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Cao, L., Frank, J., & Cullen, F. T. (1996). Race, community context and confidence in the police. American Journal of Police, 15(1), 3-22. Cao, L., & Hou, C. (2001). A comparison of confidence in the police in China and in the United States. Journal of Criminal Justice, 29, 87-99. Cao, L., Stack, S., & Sun, Y. (1998). Public attitudes toward the police: A comparative study between Japan and America. Journal of Criminal Justice, 26(4), 279-289. Cao, L., & Zhao, S. J. (2005). Confidence in the police in Latin America. Journal of Criminal Justice, 33(5), 403-412. Caparini, M., & Marenin, O. (2005). Crime, insecurity and police reform in post-socialist CEE. The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, 2, retrieved June 22 nd 2012 from http://pipss.revues.org/330 . Cassan, D. (2010). Police socialisation in France and in England: How do they stand towards the community policing model? Cahier Politiestudies, 16(3), 243-260. Chambliss, W., & Seidman, R. (1982). Law, order, and power (2nd ed.). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Chanley, V. A., Rudolph, T. J., & Rahn, W. M. (2000). The origins and consequences of public trust in government. A time series analysis. Public Opinion Quarterly, 64(3), 239-256. Correia, M. E., Reisig, M. D., & Lovrich, N. P. (1996). Public perceptions of state police: a public analysis of individual-level and contextual variables. Journal of Criminal Justice, 24(1), 17-28. Dalton, R. J. (2005). The social transformation of trust in government. International Review of Sociology, 15(1), 133- 154. Das, D. K., & Robinson, A. L. (2001). The police in Norway: a profile. Policing. An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 24(3), 330-346. De Beuckelaer, A., & Lievens, F. (2009). Measurement equivalence of paper-and-pencil and internet organizational surveys: a large scale examination in 16 countries. Applied Psychology, 58(2), 336-361. Dimovné, É. K. (2004). Hungarian police reform. In M. Caparini & O. Marenin (Eds.), Transforming police in Central and Eastern Europe: process and progress. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
  • 75 Dunham, R., & Alpert, G. (1988). Neighborhood differences in attitudes toward policing: evidence for a mixed-strategy model of policing in a multi-ethnic setting. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 79(2), 504-521. Dupont, B. (2007). Caught between a rock and a hard place - the tension of serving both the state and the public. In M. R. Haberfeld & I. Cerrah (Eds.), Comparative policing. The struggle for democratization (pp. 247-276). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Elias, N. (1982). The civilizing process: State formation and civilization. Oxford: Blackwell. European Social Survey (2011). ESS-5 2010 documentation report. Bergen: European Social Survey Data Archive. Favarel-Garrigues, G., & Le Huérou, A. (2004). State and the multilateralization of policing in post-Soviet Russia. Policing and Society, 14(1), 13-30. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row Peterson. FitzGerald, M. (2010). A confidence trick? Policing. A Journal of Policy and Practice, 4(3), 298-301. Fleming, J., & McLaughlin, E. (2010). 'The public gets what the public wants?' Interrogating the 'public confidence' agenda. Policing. A Journal of Policy and Practice, 4(3), 199-202. Foster, J. (2003). Police cultures. In T. Newburn (Ed.), Handbook of policing (pp. 196-227). Cullompton: Willan. Frank, J., Smith, B. W., & Novak, K. J. (2005). Exploring the basis of citizens' attitudes toward the police. Police Quarterly, 8(2), 206-228. Garland, D. (1996). The limits of the sovereign state. Strategies of crime control in contemporary society. British Journal of Criminology, 36(4), 445-471. Garland, D. (2000). The culture of high crime societies: some preconditions of recent “law and order” policies. British Journal of Criminology, 40(3), 347-375. Garofalo, J., & Hindelang, M. J. (1977). Police and public opinion - an analysis of victimization and attitude data from 13 American cities. Rockville, MD: National Institute of Justice. Gesthuizen, M., Van der Meer, T., & Scheepers, P. (2008). Education and dimensions of social capital: Do educational effects differ due to educational expansion and social security expenditure? European Sociological Review, 24(5), 617-632. Gibson, J. L. (2007). The legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a polarized polity. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 4(3), 507-538. Gibson, J. L., Caldeira, G. A., & Baird, V. A. (1998). On the legitimacy of national High Courts. American Political Science Review, 92(2), 343-358. Goldsmith, A. (2005). Police reform and the problem of trust. Theoretical Criminology, 9(4), 443-470. Goldstein, H. (1979). Improving policing: a problem-oriented approach. Crime and Delinquency, 25(2), 238-258. Goldstein, H. (1987). Toward community-oriented policing: potential, basic requirements, and threshold questions. Crime and Delinquency, 33(6), 6-30. Goudriaan, H., Wittebrood, K., & Nieuwbeerta, P. (2006). Neighbourhood characteristics and reporting crime: Effects of social cohesion, confidence in police effectiveness and socio-economic disadvantage. British Journal of Criminology, 46(4), 719-742. Gourley, G. D. (1954). Police public relations. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 291, 135-142. Greenberg, D. F., Kessler, R. C., & Loftin, C. (1985). Social inequality and crime control. Criminology, 76(3), 684-704. Greene, J. R. (2000). Community policing in America: Changing the nature, structure, and function of the police. In J. Horney (Ed.), Criminal justice 2000: Policies, processes, and decisions of the criminal justice system (Vol. 3, pp. 299–370). Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. Grinc, R. M. (1994). “Angels in marble”: Problems in stimulating community involvement in community policing. Crime and Delinquency, 40(3), 437-468. Haberfeld, M. R., Walancik, P., & Uydess, A. M. (2002). Teamwork - not making the dream work. Community policing in Poland. Policing. An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 25(1), 147-168. Hawdon, J. (2008). Legitimacy, trust, social capital, and policing styles: a theoretical statement. Police Quarterly, 11(2), 182-201. Hetherington, M. J. (1998). The political relevance of political trust. American Political Science Review, 92(4), 791- 808. Hilborn, J., & Leps, A. (2005). Crime prevention policy in Estonia, 1991-2005. In E. Marks, A. Meyer & R. Linssen (Eds.), Quality in crime prevention (pp. 156-178). Norderstedt: Books on Demand GmbH. Holmberg, L. (2002). Personalized policing. Results from a series of experiments with proximity policing in Denmark. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 25(1), 32-47.
  • 76 Holmberg, L. (2005). Policing and the feeling of safety: the rise (and fall?) of community policing in the Nordic countries. Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, 5(2), 205-219. Homant, J. R., Kennedy, D. B., & Fleming, R. M. (1984). Effect of victimization and the police response on citizens' attitudes toward police. Journal of Police Science and Administration, 12(3), 323-332. Hough, M., Jackson, J., Myhill, A., & Quinton, P. (2010). Procedural justice, trust, and institutional legitimacy. Policing. A Journal of Policy and Practice, 4(3), 203-210. Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal, 6(1), 1-55. Inglehart, R. (1999). Postmodernization erodes respect for authority, but increases support for democracy. In P. Norris (Ed.), Critical citizens: Global support for democratic government. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Innes, M. (2004). Reinventing tradition? Reassurance, neighbourhood security and policing. Criminology and Criminal Justice, 4(2), 151-171. Jackson, J., & Bradford, B. (2010). What is trust and confidence in the police? Policing. A Journal of Policy and Practice, 4(3), 241-248. Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Hohl, K., & Farrall, S. (2009). Does the fear of crime erode public confidence in policing? Policing. A Journal of Policy and Practice, 3(1), 100-111. Jackson, J., Bradford, B., Hough, M., Kuha, J., Stares, S., Widdop, S., et al. (2011). Developing European indicators of trust in justice. European Journal of Criminology, 8(4), 267-285. Jackson, J., & Sunshine, J. (2007). Public confidence in policing. A neo-Durkheimian perspective. British Journal of Criminology, 47(2), 214-233. Jacob, H. (1971). Black and white perceptions of justice in the city. Law and Society Review, 6(1), 69-90. Jang, H., Joo, H. J., & Zhao, S. J. (2010). Determinants of public confidence in the police: an international perspective. Journal of Criminal Justice, 38, 57-68. Jonathan, T. (2010). Police involvement in counter-terrorism and public attitudes toward the police in Israel - 1998- 2007. British Journal of Criminology, 50(4), 748-771. Jöreskog, K. G., & Sörbom, D. (1996). LISREL 8 user’s guide. Chicago, IL: Scientific Software. Kääriäinen, J. T. (2007). Trust in the police in 16 European countries. A multilevel analysis. European Journal of Criminology, 4(4), 409-435. Kääriäinen, J. T. (2008). Why do the Finns trust the police? Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, 9(2), 141-159. Klockars, C. B. (1988). The rhetoric of community policing. In J. R. Greene & S. D. Mastrofski (Eds.), Community policing: rhetoric or reality (pp. 239–258). New York: Praeger. Koenig, D. J. (1980). The effects of criminal victimization and judicial or police contacts on public attitudes toward local police. Journal of Criminal Justice, 8(4), 243-249. Kusow, A. M., Wilson, L. C., & Martin, D. E. (1997). Determinants of citizen satisfaction with the police: the effects of residential location. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 20(4), 655-664. Lambert, E. G., Jiang, S., Khondaker, M. I., Oko Elechi, O., Baker, D. N., & Tucker, K. A. (2010). Policing views from around the globe: an exploratory study of the views of college students from Bangladesh, Canada, Nigeria and the United States. International Criminal Justice Review, 20(3), 229-247. Larsson, P. (2010). Ideology as a cover up: community policing in Norway. Cahier Politiestudies, 16(3), 233-241. Liedenbaum, C. M. B. (2011). Politiewerk: tussen taak en uitvoering. Een vergelijkend onderzoek naar de basispolitiezorg in Nederland en Noordrijn-Westfalen. Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers. Lind, E. A. (1982). The psychology of courtroom procedure. In N. L. Kerr & R. M. Bray (Eds.), The psychology of the courtroom. New York: Academic Press. Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy. New York: Russel Sage Foundation. Loader, I., & Mulcahy, A. (2003). Policing and the condition of England: Memory, politics and culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Loader, I., & Walker, L. (2001). Policing as a public good: Reconstituting the connections between policing and the state. Theoretical Criminology, 5(1), 9-35. Long, M., & Cullen, S. (2007). Democratic policing - global change from a comparative perspective. In M. R. Haberfeld & I. Cerrah (Eds.), Comparative policing. The struggle for democratization (pp. 277-302). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Luhmann, N. (1988). Familiarity, confidence, trust: Problems and alternatives. In D. Gambetta (Ed.), Trust: Making and breaking cooperative relations (pp. 94-107). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
  • 77 Maguire, M. (2000). Policing by risks and targets: Some dimensions and implications of intelligence-led crime control. Policing and Society, 9(4), 315-336. Maguire, M. (2007). Crime data and statistics. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of criminology (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Maguire, M., & Mastrofski, S. D. (2000). Patterns of community policing in the United States. Police Quarterly, 3(1), 4- 45. Manning, P. K. (1977). Police work: The social organization of policing. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Mawby, R. I. (1992). Comparative police systems: Searching for a continental model. In K. Bottomley et al. (Ed.), Criminal justice theory and practice (pp. 108-132). London: British Society of Criminology. Mawby, R. I. (2003). Models of policing. In T. Newburn (Ed.), Handbook of Policing (pp. 15-40). Cullompton: Willan. McCluskey, J. D. (2003). Police requests for compliance: Coercive and procedurally just tactics. New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing. Meško, G., Nalla, M., & Sotlar, A. (2005). Cooperation of police and private security officers in crime prevention in Slovenia. In E. Marks, A. Meyer & R. Linssen (Eds.), Quality in crime prevention. Norderstedt: Books on Demand GmbH. Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (1997). Trust, distrust and skepticism: Popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist societies. Journal of Politics, 59, 418-451. Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2001). What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional and cultural theories in post-communist societies. Comparative Political Studies, 34(1), 30-62. Muir, W. K. (1977). Police: Streetcorner politicians. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Myhill, A., & Quinton, P. (2010). Confidence, neighbourhood policing, and contact: Drawing together the evidence. Policing. A Journal of Policy and Practice, 4(3), 273-281. Naumann, S. E., & Bennett, N. (2000). A case for procedural justice climate: Development and test of a multilevel model. The Academy of Management Journal 43(5), 881-889. Neapolitan, J. L. (1999). A comparative analysis of nations with low and high levels of violent crime. Journal of Criminal Justice, 27(3), 259-274. Newton, K., & Norris, P. (2000). Confidence in public institutions: Faith, culture or performance? In S. Pharr & R. Putnam (Eds.), Disaffected democracies: What's troubling the trilateral countries? . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University press. O'Neill, O. (2002). A question of trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paoline, E. A. III, & Terrill, W. (2007). Police education, experience, and the use of force. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 34(2), 179-196. Petersen, A. (2010). From Great Britain to Sweden - the import of reassurance policing. Local police offices in metropolitan Stockholm. Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention, 11(1), 25-45. Preiss, J. J., & Ehrlich, H. J. (1958). An examination of role theory: the case of the state police. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Punch, M. (2000). Police corruption and its prevention. European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research, 8(3), 301- 324. Punch, M. (2009). Police corruption: deviance, accountability and reform in policing. Cullompton: Willan. Rabot, A. (2004). The implementation and evaluation of community policing in Spain: Results and future prospects. European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 12(3), 212-231. Reiner, R. (2010). The politics of the police (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reisig, M. D., Bratton, J., & Gertz, M. G. (2007). The construct validity and refinement of process-based policing measures. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 34(8), 1005-1028. Reisig, M. D., & Parks, R. B. (2000). Experience, quality of life, and neighbourhood context: A hierarchical analysis of satisfaction with police. Justice Quarterly, 17(3), 607-630. Reuss-Ianni, E. (1983). The two cultures of policing. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Rohe, W. M., Adams, R. E., Arcury, T. A., Memory, J., & Klopovic, J. (1996). Community oriented policing: The North Carolina experience. Chapel Hill, NC: The Center for Urban and Regional Studies. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1997). The political economy of corruption. In K. A. Elliott (Ed.), Corruption and the global economy (pp. 31-60). Washington, DC: Institute for International Economy. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and government: Causes, consequences and reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rose-Ackerman, S. (2001). Truth and honesty in post-communist societies. Kyklos, 54(2-3), 415-443.
  • 78 Rothstein, B. (2000). Trust, social dilemmas and collective memories. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12(4), 477-501. Rothstein, B., & Stolle, D. (2002). How political institutions create and destroy social capital: An institutional theory of generalized trust. Paper presented at the 98th Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Rothstein, B., & Stolle, D. (2008). The state and social capital: An institutional theory of generalized trust. Comparative Politics, 40(4), 441-459. Rothstein, B., & Uslaner, E. M. (2005). All for all. Equality, corruption and social trust. World Politics, 58(1), 41-72. Roudik, P. (2007). Policing the Russian Federation. In M. R. Haberfeld & I. Cerrah (Eds.), Comparative policing. The struggle for democratization (pp. 139-168). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Sampson, R. J., & Bartusch, D. J. (1998). Legal cynicism and (subcultural?) tolerance of deviance: The neighborhood context of racial differences. Law & Society Review, 32(4), 777-804. Scaglion, R., & Condon, R. G. (1980). Determinants of attitudes toward city police. Criminology, 17(4), 485-494. Seagrave, J. (1996). Defining community policing. American Journal of Police, 15(2), 1-22. Sharp, D., & Atherton, S. (2007). To serve and protect? The experiences of policing in the community of young people from black and other ethnic minority groups. British Journal of Criminology, 47(5), 746-763. Shlapentokh, V. (2006). Trust in public institutions in Russia: The lowest in the world. Communist and Post- Communist Studies, 39(2), 153-174. Skogan, W. G. (1978). Citizen satisfaction with police services: individual and contextual effects. Policy Studies Journal, 7(1), 469-479. Skogan, W. G. (2006a). Asymmetry in the impact of encounters with police. Policing and Society, 16(2), 99-126. Skogan, W. G. (2006b). Police and community in Chicago: A tale of three cities. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Skogan, W. G. (2009). Concern about crime and confidence in the police: Reassurance or accountability? Police Quarterly, 12(3), 301-318. Skogan, W. G., & Hartnett, S. M. (1997). Community policing, Chicago style. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press. Skolnick, J. H., & Bayley, D. H. (1988). Theme and variation in community policing. In M. Tonry & N. Morris (Eds.), Crime and justice: a review of research (Vol. 10, pp. 1-37). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Smith, P. E., & Hawkins, R. O. (1973). Victimization, types of citizen-police contacts, and attitudes toward the police. Law and Society Review, 8(1), 135-152. Stack, S., Cao, L., & Adamzyck, A. (2007). Crime volume and law and order culture. Justice Quarterly, 24(2), 291- 308. Stone, C., & Travis, J. (2011). Toward a new professionalism in policing. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice. Stoutland, S. E. (2001). The multiple dimensions of trust in resident/police relations in Boston. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 38(3), 226-256. Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. The Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571-610. Sunshine, J., & Tyler, T. R. (2003). The role of procedural justice and legitimacy in shaping public support for policing. Law and Society Review, 37(3), 513-547. Tankebe, J. (2008). Police effectiveness and police trustworthiness in Ghana: An empirical appraisal. Criminology and Criminal Justice, 8(2), 185-202. Tankebe, J. (2010). Public confidence in the police. Testing the effects of public experiences of police corruption in Ghana. British Journal of Criminology, 50(2), 296-319. Terpstra, J. (2008). Wijkagenten en hun dagelijks werk. Een onderzoek naar de uitvoering van gebiedsgebonden politiewerk. Den Haag: Reed Business. Terpstra, J. (2010). Community policing in practice: Ambitions and realization. Policing. A Journal of Policy and Practice, 4(1), 64-72. Terpstra, J. (2011). Two theories on the police – The relevance of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim to the study of the police. International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice, 39(1), 1-11. Terpstra, J., & Schaap, D. (2011). Politiecultuur. Een empirische verkenning in the Nederlandse context. Proces, 90(4), 183-196. Terpstra, J., & Trommel, W. (2009). Police, managerialization and presentational strategies. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 32(1), 128-143. Terpstra, J., & Van der Vijver, K. (2006). The police, changing security arrangements and late modernity: The case of The Netherlands. German Policy Studies, 3(1), 80-111.
  • 79 Terrill, W., & Reisig, M. D. (2003). Neighborhood context and police use of force. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 40(3), 291-321. The Association of European Police Colleges (2001a). Bulgaria on its way to the EU. Warnsveld: AEPC. The Association of European Police Colleges (2001b). Czech on its way to the EU. Warnsveld: AEPC. The Association of European Police Colleges (2001c). Estonia on its way to the EU. Warnsveld: AEPC. The Association of European Police Colleges (2001d). Hungary on its way to the EU. Warnsveld: AEPC. The Association of European Police Colleges (2001e). Poland on its way to the EU. Warnsveld: AEPC. The Association of European Police Colleges (2001f). Slovenia on its way to the EU. Warnsveld: AEPC. The Association of European Police Colleges (2001g). Ten candidate member states on their way to the EU. Warnsveld: AEPC. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2010). Democracy index 2010. Democracy in retreat. Retrieved 22-6-2012, from http://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy_Index_2010_web.pdf . Thibaut, J., & Walker, L. (1975). Procedural justice: A psychological analysis. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Thomas, C. W., & Hyman, J. M. (1977). Perceptions of crime, fear of victimization, and public perceptions of police performance. Journal of Policy Science and Administration, 5(3), 305-317. Tilley, N. (2003). Community policing, problem-oriented policing and intelligence-led policing. In T. Newburn (Ed.), Handbook of Policing. Cullompton: Willan. Transparency International (2010a). Corruption perceptions index 2010. Retrieved 22-6-2012, from http://www.transparency.org/content/download/55725/890310/CPI_report_ForWeb.pdf . Transparency International (2010b). Corruption perceptions index 2010. Long methodological brief. Retrieved 24-2- 2012, from http://www.transparency.org/content/download/55903/892623/CPI2010_long_methodology_En.pdf . Trojanowicz, R., & Bucqueroux, B. (1990). Community policing: A contemporary perspective. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson. Tyler, T. R. (1988). What is procedural justice? Criteria used by citizens to assess the fairness of legal procedures. Law & Society Review, 22(1), 103-136. Tyler, T. R. (1990). Why people obey the law. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Tyler, T. R. (2004). Enhancing police legitimacy. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 593, 84-99. Tyler, T. R., & Huo, Y. J. (2002). Trust in the law. Encouraging public cooperation with the police and courts. New York: Russel Sage Foundation. United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (2011a). UNU-WIDER world income inequality database version 2.0c. Retrieved 22-6-2012, from http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/ . United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (2011b). World income inequality database. User guide and data sources. Retrieved 22-6-2012, from http://62.237.131.23/wiid/WIID2c.pdf . Van de Vijver, F. (2011). Capturing bias in structural equation modeling. In E. Davidov, P. Schmidt & J. Billiet (Eds.), Cross-cultural analysis. Methods and applications. (pp. 3-35). New York: Routledge. Van der Meer, T., Te Grotenhuis, M., & Pelzer, B. (2010). Influential cases in multilevel modeling: a methodological comment. American Sociological Review, 75(1), 173-178. Van der Veld, W. M., & Saris, W. E. (2011). Causes of generalized social trust. In E. Davidov, P. Schmidt & J. Billiet (Eds.), Cross-cultural analysis. Methods and applications. (pp. 207-248). New York: Routledge. Vandenberg, R. J., & Lance, C. E. (2000). A review and synthesis of the measurement invariance literature: Suggestions, practices, and recommendations for organizational research. Organizational Research Methods 3(1), 4-70. Virta, S. (2002). Local security management. Policing through networks. Policing. An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 25(1), 190-200. Waddington, P. A. J. (1999a). Policing citizens: Authority and rights. London: UCL Press. Waddington, P. A. J. (1999b). Police (canteen) sub-culture: An appreciation. British Journal of Criminology, 39(2), 287-309. Waddington, P. A. J. (2003). Policing public order and political contention. In T. Newburn (Ed.), Handbook of Policing (pp. 394-421). Cullompton: Willan.
  • 80 Wallace, C., & Latcheva, R. (2006). Economic transformation outside the law: corruption, trust in public institutions and the informal economy in transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Europe-Asia Studies, 58(1), 81-102. Weitzer, R., & Tuch, S. A. (2005). Determinants of public satisfaction with the police. Police Quarterly, 8(3), 279-297. Wilson, J. Q. (1968). Varieties of police behavior. The management of law and order in eight communities. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Wisler, D., & Onwudiwe, I. D. (2009). Rethinking police and society: Community policing in comparison. In D. Wisler & I. D. Onwudiwe (Eds.), Community policing. International patterns and comparative perspectives. Boka Raton, FL: CRC Press. Wolters, W., & De Graaf, N. D. (2005). Maatschappelijke problemen. Beschrijvingen en verklaringen. Amsterdam: Boom Onderwijs. World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe. (2011). European mortality database. Retrieved 22-6-2012, from http://data.euro.who.int/hfamdb/ Zamble, E., & Annesley, P. (1987). Some determinants of public attitudes toward the police. Journal of Police Science & Administration, 15(4), 285-290.
  • 81 Appendix A: Values of contextual variables for each country. Table A1: values of contextual variables - Gini: year of measurement = 2006, except for Israel (2001), Switzerland (2002) and Czech Republic (2005). - Homicide: year of measurement = 2009, except for Belgium (2006), Switzerland, Denmark (2007) and France (2008). Gini Democratic History Homicide Corruption Proximity policing Belgium 28.0 4 1.35 7.1 1,83 Bulgaria 31.0 1 1.80 3.6 3,60 Switzerland 30.9 3 0.58 8.7 - Czech Republic 27.0 1 0.82 4.6 2,40 Germany/NR-Westfalen 27.0 3 0.53 7.9 2,67 Denmark 24.0 4 0.69 9.3 2,00 Estonia 33.0 1 5.61 6.5 3,00 Spain 31.0 2 0.68 6.1 2,40 Finland 26.0 4 1.90 9.2 1,83 France 27.0 4 0.69 6.8 3,50 United Kingdom 32.0 4 0.30 7.6 1,80 Hungary 33.0 1 1.32 4.7 3,80 Israel 38.9 3 2.11 6.1 - Netherlands 26.0 4 0.94 8.8 2,17 Norway 30.0 4 0.64 8.6 1,50 Poland 34.0 1 1.02 5.3 2,00 Portugal 38.0 2 0.92 6.0 - Russian Federation 45.1 0 14.01 2.1 2,83 Sweden 23.0 4 0.91 9.2 2,25 Slovenia 30.7 1 0.52 6.4 2,17
  • 82 Appendix B: Developing indicators of proximity policing in Europe i. Introduction In this appendix I intend to document my approach in developing an index for proximity policing. The goal is to make proximity policing measurable in however primitive a fashion. The effectiveness of proximity policing has previously mainly been tested through evaluations of the impact of specific policy measures in specific areas. The aim of this index is to create a more generalized measure of where the principles of proximity policing are implemented and where they are not. Since this is to my knowledge the first effort of its kind to have been undertaken, the index is naturally crude and open to much improvement; in the criteria that I apply as well as the data sources used. The challenge of creating such an index varies enormously over countries; I found that the hardest countries to code are those in which there is either very little (Spain, Portugal, Switzerland) or very much information (the UK) available. Countries for which a limited but sufficient amount of literature exists are relatively easy to code in the 6-criteria proximity policing format. Originally, I intended the index to be constructed through expert surveys only. Surveys on proximity policing as well as on several other key features of police forces were sent to police liaison offices of many different European countries gathered under the umbrella of Eupol early in 2011. While the response rate of this survey was around 50% and many police liaison officers obviously took the time and effort needed to thoughtfully fill in the form and often add additional comments, the validity of the survey results was, unfortunately, doubtful at best. Each liaison office had its own image of its national police force – sometimes most likely too positive and sometimes probably too negative, making comparisons between these countries completely invalid. Although these data provided valuable insights into ongoing processes in individual countries, they were not fit for comparison. I used the results of this expert survey only for reference purposes and did not actively apply them in constructing the proximity policing index. ii. Methodology The proceedings on constructing the index were as follows: for each country, except those coded through the expert survey, I attempted to find two high-quality scientific written works on the nature of the police in that country. When two works were not enough to code at least five out of six criteria of
  • 83 proximity policing, I searched for one more. For each criterion in every country, I coded a value only when there was a specific page or specific pages that contained the required information. These page numbers are included in the original data file of the index in order to make my work as transparent as possible. I attempted to code, for each country, the following six criteria: a) To what extent is the police organization in the country centralized? b) To what extent do proximity – or community – police officers have a central position in the police forces of the country? c) Do neighbourhoods and local communities in the country usually have their own police station? d) To what extent do the police in the country have to focus on a broad range of local problems besides crime, such as social disorder and feelings of insecurity among citizens? e) To what extent do the police in the country consider it important to use not just reactive, but also proactive strategies to prevent crime and disorder? f) To what extent do the local police in the country cooperate with other local agencies and the public in the management of crime and disorder? Scores had a minimum of 1 (the principles of proximity policing applied very much) and a maximum of 4 (the principles not applied at all). A minimum of four criteria had to be fulfilled before a sum score of proximity policing could be calculated. For the three countries coded by experts (the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany) I did not search for additional literature since they themselves are authors of prominent literature on proximity – or community – policing in those countries. The AEPC project reports are an important data source. These highly systematic descriptions of police courses offered to officers from various Eastern- and Central European countries are easily comparable since they all address the same issues. Hence, the scores for these countries are probably most reliable. When searching for other literature, I preferred book sections from works that were intended to provide a comparative perspective on policing in various nations in Europe, and only when these did not suffice did I resort to loose articles. iii. Remarks and problems The literature I based my index on is taken from a decade of police research. When I could find multiple sources on proximity policing in the country, I attempted to find literature for different periods in time. No literature was based on data before 1999, and none after 2009. However, much can change in 10
  • 84 years. In much of Western Europe, belief in the principles of proximity policing seems to be fading, while Eastern European countries are adhering to these principles to an increasing extent. This poses difficulties for the creation of a proximity policing index. Generally, I have tried to take into account the average situation in the past decade. The third item is the most difficult to code; information on a subject so seemingly mundane as the amount of and spread in police stations over the country is very rare. However, it is an important indicator on the application of the proximity principles and a researcher should thus at least attempt to find information on the subject. I did not test for inter-rater reliability or inter-coder agreement. iv. Unique countries Russia is the most difficult country to code, not because of a lack of literature but due to the nature of the police. Russia’s police force is rather unique in that it still has several defining features from the communist age. Some of these features could be confused with elements from proximity policing: the police do not only focus on crime, but also have various bureaucratic duties. They attempt to involve citizens in the fight against crime – or what they perceive as such. Police forces are often not steered centrally, but by local governors or other important party officials, resembling a private army rather than a public police force. Favarel-Garrigues & Le Huérou (2004) describe a Russian state in which private initiatives in policing are plenty and the population is often involved in security programs. However, citizens cooperating with police can be considered a type of para-police, often with racist intentions, rather than actual community involvement. Private security firms regularly take over police duties, implying a privatization of policing rather than implementation of proximity policing. This is reinforced by the fact that companies and businesses buy police attention: public policing is a commodity just as well as private policing. Depending on one’s interpretation and definition, one could score item 6 1 as well as 4. In most Scandinavian countries, proximity policing initiatives are considered to have failed (Holmberg, 2005). However, this is in some cases more because a form of proximity policing already existed, for example in Norway (Larsson, 2010) and Finland (Virta, 2002), than due to other issues. Hence, these countries score low on item 2 (how central are proximity or community officers), but high on other items such as the local police stations.
  • 85 In several countries (France, Denmark, and other Scandinavian countries), the phrase community policing is used interchangeably with proximity policing. In coding the index, I have not distinguished between the two, assuming that they are often used synonymously. In some European countries, proximity policing is the preferred term but differences are only minor, if existent at all. In my thesis, I stick to the term proximity policing since it does not have the specific Anglo-Saxon connotation that community policing carries, and is less politically charged. This is reflected by my choice to label the police science perspective as proximity policing while the practice of proximity policing ideals may be known as community policing. I did not yet code any literature on Israel, since the country was removed from my analysis due to its unique cultural, political and geographic character. However, plenty of information is available on attempts of introducing proximity or community policing in Israel. It would be a waste not to use this information, even if it is not included in any analyses right now. Future research might take note of this. I lack the necessary information for two countries: Portugal and Switzerland. Despite my best efforts, I have so far not found any literature on the subject of the police in Portugal, let alone the application of proximity policing principles. The situation for the Swiss police is only marginally better; the only relevant information available in literature on the subject is on the stark decentralization of the police force in the country. For Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Spain, information so far is thinly spread but sufficient to code. I intend to improve upon these five countries in the future.
  • 86 Appendix C: macro determinants, Pearson correlations These correlations are computed without inequivalent countries, but with Finland. Table C1: correlations of macro-determinants N=25,180 Trust police Gini Dem history Homicide Corruption COP Trust police 1 -.215 .323 -.007 .411 .297 Gini -.215 1 -.595 .279 -.591 -.216 Dem history .323 -.595 1 -.349 -.854 .485 Homicide -.007 .279 -.349 1 -.134 -.269 Corruption .411 -.591 -.854 -.134 1 .641 Prox policing .297 -.216 .485 -.269 .641 1
  • 87 Appendix D: macro determinants on intermediary variables Dependent = perceived procedural justice PPJ Intraclass correlation: .11 Table D1: Macro determinants on PPJ N=25,180 B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. Gini -.08* .04 0.01 0.05 Demhistory .12*** .03 -0.01 0.05 Homicide -.04 .04 -0.02 0.07 Corruption -.15*** .03 -0.15* 0.07 Prox policing .13*** .03 0.06* 0.03 C-lvl var .02 .02 .03 .01 .01 .01 Dependent = perceived police effectiveness PPE Intraclass correlation: .05 Table D2: Macro determinants on PPE N=25,180 B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. Gini -.05 .12 -.11 .17 Demhistory .01 .12 -.08 .25 Homicide -.03 .12 .01 .14 Corruption -.04 .12 .06 .30 Prox policing .11 .12 .17 .17 C-lvl var .22 .22 .22 .22 .21 .20 Dependent = perceived police prevention PPP Intraclass correlation: .03 Table D3: Macro determinants on PPP N=25,180 B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. Gini -.14* .08 -0.12 0.15 Demhistory .15* .08 -0.08 0.15 Homicide -.10 .08 -0.13 0.23 Corruption -.20** .07 -0.13 0.20 Prox policing .22** .07 0.16* 0.09 C-lvl var .10 .10 .11 .08 .07 .06
  • 88 Appendix E: Robustness checks - Without interactions Table E1: Robustness checks without interactions N=25,180 Full model Minus Finland Minus Scandinavia Minus W-Europe Minus E-Europe B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. Gini 0.12 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.14 0.08 Dem history -0.03 0.16 -0.04 0.13 -0.02 0.14 -0.02 0.19 0.42 0.17 Homicide 0.25 0.24 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.32 0.34 0.16* 0.06 Corruption -0.83*** 0.21 -0.70*** 0.17 -0.63** 0.18 -0.92* 0.42 -0.37* 0.17 Prox policing -0.07 0.10 -0.12 0.09 -0.14 0.10 -0.19 0.23 0.01 0.09 Female ref ref ref ref ref Male -0.07** 0.02 -0.07** 0.02 -0.10*** 0.03 -0.07** 0.03 -0.03 0.03 Age 0.02* 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03* 0.02 Education 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.01 0.02 0.02 Income 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.02 0.04** 0.01 0.05** 0.02 Majority ref ref ref ref ref Minority -0.08 0.05 -0.07 0.06 -0.03 0.06 -0.14* 0.07 -0.10 0.07 Church att 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 Non-victim ref ref ref ref ref Victim -0.08** 0.03 -0.09** 0.03 -0.08* 0.04 -0.08** 0.03 -0.10** 0.04 Life satisf 0.20*** 0.01 0.20*** 0.01 0.21*** 0.02 0.20*** 0.02 0.21*** 0.02 Political or 0.04*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.03* 0.02 GST 0.42*** 0.01 0.42*** 0.01 0.41*** 0.02 0.40*** 0.02 0.42*** 0.02 Urbanization 0.02* 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.03* 0.02 Proc justice 0.60*** 0.01 0.57*** 0.01 0.56*** 0.02 0.63*** 0.02 0.54*** 0.02 Police effect 0.30*** 0.02 0.30*** 0.02 0.30*** 0.02 0.28*** 0.02 0.30*** 0.02 Police prevent 0.49*** 0.02 0.49*** 0.02 0.51*** 0.02 0.48*** 0.02 0.47*** 0.02
  • 89 - Robustness checks with interactions. Where Eastern Europe was removed, I had to retain Poland in order for the model to converge. Table E2: Robustness checks with interactions N=25,180 Full model Minus Finland Minus Scandinavia Minus W-Europe Minus E-Europe B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. Gini 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.14* 0.08 0.21 0.19 Dem. history 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.13 -0.02 0.14 0.43* 0.17 -0.05 0.16 Homicide 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.16* 0.06 0.36 0.23 Corruption -0.55** 0.17 -0.56** 0.16 -0.63** 0.18 -0.39* 0.17 -0.90** 0.33 Prox policing 0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.09 -0.14 0.10 -0.02 0.09 -0.17 0.14 Female ref ref ref ref ref Male -0.07** 0.02 -0.07** 0.02 -0.10*** 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.08*** 0.03 Age 0.02* 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.04** 0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.02 0.01 Education 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.07*** 0.01 Income 0.06** 0.02 0.06** 0.02 0.07** 0.02 0.07** 0.02 0.06* 0.02 Majority ref ref ref ref ref Minority -0.08 0.05 -0.08 0.06 -0.04 0.06 -0.10 0.07 -0.16** 0.07 Church attend. 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 Non-victim ref ref ref ref ref Victim -0.08** 0.03 -0.09** 0.03 -0.08* 0.04 -0.10** 0.04 -0.08** 0.03 Life satisfaction 0.21*** 0.01 0.20*** 0.01 0.21*** 0.02 0.21*** 0.02 0.19*** 0.02 Political orient. 0.04*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.03* 0.02 0.05*** 0.01 GST 0.42*** 0.01 0.42*** 0.01 0.41*** 0.02 0.42*** 0.02 0.40*** 0.02 Urbanization 0.02* 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.02 0.03** 0.01 Proc justice 0.60*** 0.01 0.57*** 0.01 0.55*** 0.02 0.54*** 0.02 0.60*** 0.02 Police effect. 0.30*** 0.02 0.30*** 0.02 0.30*** 0.02 0.30*** 0.02 0.29*** 0.02 Police prevent. 0.49*** 0.02 0.49*** 0.02 0.51*** 0.02 0.47*** 0.02 0.48*** 0.02 Inc*gini 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 Inc*corruption 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04