3 DO Analysis Composite of the Best Slides from class submissions
new product/service new process new business model K. Thakur Industry Analysis PEST Analysis Value Chain Porter’s 5 Forces Incumbency Competitive analysis Opportunity Value Proposition Target Customers Revenue Model Unique Capabilities Distinctive Activities Value Creating Activities
Market Structure, 1991 World-Wide Home Video Game $3 Billion North America Entertainment Arcade games, Movie theater, Video Rental Japan Europe Asia Home Video Game Companies belong to: All other amusement and recreation industry (713990) $29 Billion Overall HC Jun
Social Trends
Social Trends
Industry Analysis
Industry Analysis
Multiple Layers Industry Value Added * $50 Retailers $27.5 Developers Software Hardware $5 License Fee $450 – Retailers Manufacturer ** (Closed Architecture) 1~5% Margin * In case of Sega’s case. ** Only estimation is available, but some says that retail price could be lower than manufacturing cost. (http://www.alexassoc.com/white/sony.shtml) $19.5 Revenue
How Industry Worked HCJun
Pricing Strategy of Industry HCJun
What Attracts Gamers?
Own Titles
Best Seller?
Many titles sold?
Others have it?
Technology – Better System
Quality of Graphics or Sound?
Speed of Processing, Loading
Price
How many gamers can buy it?
… HCjun
HISTORY Philips CD-I 1991 1995 1992 Sega CD 1993 3DO 1994 Sega 32X Atari Jaguar 1994/1995 Sony PS-X Sega Saturn 64 bits Power PC 64 bits SGI 3DO M2 Accelerator Nintendo 64 32 bits Motorola 16 bits Motorola 32 bits RISC Machines 32 bits Hitachi 64 bits 68000 32 bits LSI R3000 32 bits Hitachi
3DO Achievements:
1st 32-bit system
Superior technology for its time
Video capabilities and audio quality unmatched in 1993
Ben Feiman
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS Natalie Rebot
Vying for the #1 spot
Trip Hawkins, former Electronic Arts head and 3DO founder:
“ My goal is to be out in the market first so I can develop an installed base in advance of them (Sega and Nintendo), drive my price down and figure out how to solve all my tactical execution problems before they even figure out they have problems, and to make it clear to software developers that they’re better off developing for 3DO, even if 3DO has a smaller installed base than, say, an IBM PC”
The 3DO Strategy
To create a new business plan in the 32-bit gaming market
One hardware platform that would cut the amount of time to build and write a program for software developers in half
They could then spend more time crafting the game
More enjoyment for the end user
Unlike the other major console vendors of the day, 3DO never actually manufactured a system
Instead, it licensed its hardware technology to companies like Goldstar, Sanyo, and Panasonic, which produced different versions of the 3DO
Strategic Move: 3DO (1)
Enter untapped home entertainment area
Dream Team Alliances:
EA, Matsushita, Time Warner, Kleiner Perkins, AT&T…
Comparable with a lot of Media Formats
The most advanced machine
First 32bit, RISC Microprocessor
CD-ROM based High-end platform
24bit Graphic Processor
Expandable
Peripherals and Enhancements
3DO Ownership Roles & Responsibilities: Matsushita: Manufactured double speed CD-ROM AT&T: Proprietary graphics processor chips Electronic Arts: Video game software Time Warner: Largest entertainment company Kleiner Perkins: Funding from Silicon Valley venture capital firm 3DO: Put it all together
VALUE CHAIN Customer Retailer Physical hardware Components are Gathered by the Manufacturer and Prepared for assembly. Manufactures assemble The video game console Using the different Hardware components. Video game consoles Packaged and ready to Be shipped to retail Stores worldwide. Video game consoles Are sold in retail stores Along with the video Games to be played on Them. Customers first Purchase the video Game console and Then purchase the Games to be played On them. This is Usually first done at The same retail Location at least for The first video Games purchased. Blank CDs or cartridges are a form of raw materials for video game software. Computer software Engineers write codes To add sound, graphics, And function to create An enjoyable video game. The final video game Whether in CD or Cartridge format are Then prepared for Distribution to retail Stores. Raw Materials Manufacturer Distributor Raw Materials Manufacturer Distributor Video Game Console (Hardware) Video Game Disc (Software)
VALUE CREATION PROCESS Raw Material Software Distributor Retailer Customer Price paid by customer $40 $37 $5 $31 Blank CD Buy games in bulk Reduce risk Economies of scale $3 per disc royalty to Hardware manufacturer Additional profits Markup $3 $3 Profit Value Added $20 $3 $6 $6 $7 Shelf space Own sales force Store experience Key: $2-$4 manufacturing cost Video game created Graphics, Audio, Interactive Code writing Most value added if enjoyable game $2 CD ROM Video Game
Why 3DO failed
Uncompetitive price
3DO priced its machine at $700, the highest among all competitors.
What Happened?
There were two types of consumers:
Those that previously owned a console
Those that didn’t
Both groups had a simple choice to make:
OR
Go with 3DO
Spend $700 on the console
Spend $75 per additional game
Only 40 titles available
Miss out on familiar game franchises
Stick with what you’ve got
Over 700 titles to choose from, new ones cost $50
Spend $150 - $300 on peripherals to increase functionality, or don’t
Enjoy games with familiar characters
Summary
Switching costs were too high for consumers
Could spend $700 on a machine with no games, or wait for peripherals that would allegedly increase the capacity of what I already own
And increase the performance of the games I already own
Would not be able to enjoy new Mario, Metroid, Zelda, or Sonic games on a 3DO
Early launch of the system was not coordinated with the number of games available, thus making it not as desirable at that price.
No real marketing campaign until after the launch (magazines, tv slots)
Failure to Price Properly:
The 3DO system was priced at $700 in the 1990’s which was unreasonable during this time. After the launch failure, the price dropped to $500
No Real Business Model:
3DO could have created its in-house game development team before the launch so that there were more partnering games, and should have establish licensing fees and marketing plan before the launch
No First Mover Advantage:
There were already big name players creating similar experiences and add-ons for better prices
Company Had Developer in Mind:
When 3DO was created, Hawkins had the developer in mind and wanted to create ease of use for developer, rather than solely focusing on marketing to gamers
Licensing Price Changes:
Changing the royalty fees from $3 to $6 per disc sold, outraged developers.
Hawkins believed that the “hardware” was more important
Despite all the product innovation at 3DO, the company failed to envision harnessing network economies. Unlike its competitors, it did not capitalize on the biggest invention of the decade; the internet. Another way of looking at the role of network effects is that although 3DO was getting its liquidity injections, the company’s solvency was not healthy enough for it wait for the internet to play a major part in its growth; the way it did for 3DO’s competitors. Essentially, 3DO’s competitors have leveraged off the social networking aspect and grown their brands stronger through the online/multiplayer aspects of gaming which bring a whole new dimension to the human interaction – emotions. 3DO however, could not use this to its advantage the way it should/would have wanted to. At the time 3DO sought bankruptcy protection, its top competitors besides Sega and Nintendo were EA and Activision Blizzard, both companies with evolving revenue models like online gaming which were essentially changing the rules of engagement in an old industry and therefore redefining the future. my takeaway – Innovation in and of itself is not the key to success. The ability to allocate resources and create unique/uncompromising value for the consumer should be a company’s goal.
Why did 3DO fail?
Refusal to reduce pricing until almost the end of 3DO’s life cycle
At $700 to $800, most people steered clear of the 3DO and continued to purchase the much cheaper and more established 16-bit game consoles
Goldstar released their own version of the 3DO with a far lower price tag of $399
However, the 3DO never recovered from its initial reputation as a “rich man's” videogame system
This was very unfortunate as the 3DO could have easily competed with the Playstation, Saturn and future systems
Because of constant delays to promised expansions like the 3DO 2nd generation design (the M2), 3DO games and systems were placed in clearance bins starting in 1996, with the ultimate death of the system coming near the end of that year
new product/service new process new business model K. Thakur Industry Analysis PEST Analysis Value Chain Porter’s 5 Forces Incumbency Competitive analysis Opportunity Value Proposition Target Customers Revenue Model Unique Capabilities Distinctive Activities Value Creating Activities
Super Mario Bros. (40.23 million)[39] Super Mario Bros. 3 (18 million)[40] Super Mario Bros. 2 (10 million)[40] The Legend of Zelda (6.51 million)[41] Zelda II: The Adventure of Link (4.38 million)[41] Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles (4 million)[42] The top 10 selling Xbox 360 games. Halo 3 (8.1 million)[24] Gears of War (5 million,[25] may include PC version) Grand Theft Auto IV (4.074 million approximately: 3.29 million in US,[26] 750,000 in UK,[27] 34,000 in Japan)[28] Gears of War 2 (4 million)[25] Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare (3.772 million approximately: 3.04 million in US,[29] 78,000 in Canada,[30] 53,501 in Japan,[31] 600,000 in UK)[32] Call of Duty: World at War (3.35 million approximately: 2.75 million in US,[26] 600,000 in UK)[32] Forza Motorsport 2 (2.674 million approximately: 2.23 million in US,[19] 31,255 and 100,500 Platinum Collection,[31] 12,600 in Canada,[33] 300,000 in UK)[34] Fable 2 (2.6 million)[35] Assassin's Creed (2.285 million approximately: 1.87 million in US,[29] 60,000 in Canada,[30] 55,041 in Japan,[31] 300,000 in UK)[34] Marvel: Ultimate Alliance (2.08 million in US)[19] Guitar Hero II (2 million in North America and Western Europe)[36]
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