Cognition and Self-Organization: The Role of MAS
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Cognition and Self-Organization: The Role of MAS

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Cristiano Castelfranchi's invited talk at AAMAS 2013 as winner of the IFAAMAS Influential Paper Award.

Cristiano Castelfranchi's invited talk at AAMAS 2013 as winner of the IFAAMAS Influential Paper Award.

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  • Through social goal-adoption we obtain another very important result as for the architecture of a social agent: • Goals (and then Intentions) do not born all as Desires or Wishes, they do not derive all from internal motives. A social agent is able to "receive" goals from outside: from other agents, from the group, as requests, needs, commands, norms. If it is really autonomous he will decide (on the basis of his own motives) whether to adopt or not the incoming goal. In its architecture this means that there is not an unique origin of potential intentions or candidate goals or ....
  • Reconcilig "Emegence" and "Cognition" EMERGENCE and COGNITION are not incompatible, are not two alternative approaches to intelligence and cooperation, two competitive paradigms. 1) Cognition as a level of emergence: - from objective to subjective - from implicit to explicit es. dipendenza 2) Beyond Cognition: emergent unaware, functional social phenomena (es. cooperation, problem solving) from cognitive agents Mind is not enough for modeling cooperation and society
  • Reconcilig "Emegence" and "Cognition" EMERGENCE and COGNITION are not incompatible, are not two alternative approaches to intelligence and cooperation, two competitive paradigms. 1) Cognition as a level of emergence: - from objective to subjective - from implicit to explicit es. dipendenza 2) Beyond Cognition: emergent unaware, functional social phenomena (es. cooperation, problem solving) from cognitive agents Mind is not enough for modeling cooperation and society

Cognition and Self-Organization: The Role of MAS Cognition and Self-Organization: The Role of MAS Presentation Transcript

  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiInMind and OutMindInMind and OutMindSocietal OrderSocietal OrderCognition & Self-Organization:The role of MAS_____________________Cristiano CastelfranchiInstitute for Cognitive Sciences and Technologies - Roma
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiPremise and Issues““Socio-(Cognitive-)Technical Systems”Socio-(Cognitive-)Technical Systems”What we are unavoidably building with computer networks, AI,and Ag technologies are Socio-Cognitive-Technical Systems:Socio-Technical System in fact means that any new technologyimplies/requires/introduces not only new skills and competences,but new expectations, goals, beliefs; new "scripts", with theirroles, norms; new form of interaction and conventions among thesocial actors.So we have to specify the "cognitive" and interactive side of thenew system.You are Social EngineersSocial Engineers; are you aware of that?
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiPremise and Issues““Socio-Cognitive-Technical Systems”Socio-Cognitive-Technical Systems”BUT….. this new complex Socio-Technical (and mental) Systemcannot be just planned and designedcannot be just planned and designed.It is dynamically emerging and self-organizing: it is aspontaneous Social Orderspontaneous Social Order (von Hayek); a dynamic equilibriumnot necessarily "good" for the goals of the actors.What we need is not just a top-down organization and control.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiPremise and Issues““Socio-Cognitive-Technical Systems”Socio-Cognitive-Technical Systems”in orderto support and mediate human interaction and organizationandto emulate them in efficient open MAS systems,we have to (partially) "understand" and to reproduce features ofhuman social mind (like commitments, norms, mind reading,power, trust, "institutional" effects, ...) and of social macro-phenomena.In particular we have to model "immergence""immergence" and "cognitivecognitiveemergence"emergence"; the mental "mediators" of societal phenomena andthe partial understanding and awareness in the actors
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiOur general PERSPECTIVE - 1The “Cognitive Mediators”“Cognitive Mediators” of Social PhenomenaSocial and cultural phenomena cannot be deeply accounted for withoutexplaining how they work through the individual agents’ minds (mental“counterparts” or “mediators”).This requires a richer cognitive model (architecture) for “Agents,”moving from formal and computational AI and ALife models, closer to thosedeveloped in psychology, cognitive science, and in cognitive approaches ineconomics, sociology, organization studies.“The most important fact concerning human interactions is that these events arepsychologically represented in each of the participants”(Kurt Lewin, 1935)
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi““COGNITIVIZING”COGNITIVIZING”Cooperation, Conflict, PowerPower,, Social‘Values’, Commitments, Norms,Rights, Social Order,Rights, Social Order, Trust,, …- AIJ paper- AIJ paper- Social Commitment paper- Social Commitment paper____________________________________________________________Von Hayek, Pareto, Garfinkel, … the aim of founding theVon Hayek, Pareto, Garfinkel, … the aim of founding theSocial Sciences as Autonomous from PsychologySocial Sciences as Autonomous from PsychologyOur general PERSPECTIVE - 1
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiOur general PERSPECTIVE - 1The “Cognitive Mediators”“Cognitive Mediators” of Social PhenomenaSocial phenomena are due to the agents’ behaviors, but…but…the agents’ behaviors are due the the mental mechanismscontrolling and (re)producing them. (Castelfranchi, Conte, Miceli, Falcone,…)For example:My Social PowerSocial Power lies in, consists of, the others’ Goals & Beliefs!!!!That’s why we need Mind Reading! Not for adjusting ourself,but for manipulating and exploiting the others or for helping orpunishing them.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiOur general PERSPECTIVE - 1The “Cognitive Mediators”“Cognitive Mediators” of Social PhenomenaSocial phenomena are due to the agents’ behaviors, but…but…the agents’ behaviors are due the the mental mechanismscontrolling and (re)producing them. (Castelfranchi, Conte, Miceli, Falcone,…)For example:• How the normnorm should work through the minds of the agents? Howis it “represented”?? Which are the proximate mechanismsunderlying the normative behavior?
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiOur general PERSPECTIVE – 2However,Mind is not enoughMind is not enough!!the “individualistic + cognitive” approach is not sufficientfor the social theory and processes (even when modelingjoint and collective attitudes and actions).The social actors dosocial actors do notnot understand, negotiate,understand, negotiate,and planand plan for all their collective behavior andcooperative activity.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiPremise and Issues““Socio-Cognitive-Technical Systems”Socio-Cognitive-Technical Systems”We have to "understand" and to reproduce alsohhow humans do socially construct somethingow humans do socially construct somethingwithout understandingwithout understanding itit!!How is it possible that intentional agents do not intend thefunctions of their collective behavior?Which the relationship between emergent functions and intendedgoals?CAN WE SUPPORT HUMAN ORGANIZATIONS &BUILD EFFECTIVE SOCIAL SYSTEMS WITHOUTUNDERSTANDING AND GOVERNING THAT!?
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiMind is not enoughMind is not enoughEmergence, Self-OrganizationFunctions and Cognitions1
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiINDIVIDUAL MINDCOLLECTIVESTRUCTURES& BEHAVIOURSBel --> G --> actionMind is not enoughemergenceemergence & immergenceimmergencenot only knowledge,mutual beliefs,reasoning,shared goalsanddeliberatelyconstructedsocial structuresandcooperation
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiAgents ina common world (INTERFERENCE)rorqqpqandpGobjectiveDEPENDENCEnetworkCognitiveCognitiveemergenceemergence:awarenessLevels ofemergence...
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiFor a (Pessimistic) Theory ofSpontaneous Social OrderSpontaneous Social OrderA critical homage to F. von Hayek
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiI will examine:• the crucial relationships between the intentional nature of the agentsactions and their explicit goals and preferences, and the possiblyunintended finality or function of their behavior.• in favor of cognitive architectures in computer simulations.• propose some solutions about the theoretical and functional relationshipsbetween agents intentions and non-intentional purposes of theiractions.• Social order is not necessarily a real order or something good anddesirable for the involved agents; nor necessarily the best possible solution.• It can be bad for the social actors against their intentions and welfarealthough emerging from their choices and being stable and self-maintaining.How to TRUST it?• Hayeks theory of spontaneous social order and Elsters oppositionbetween intentional explanation and functional one will be criticized.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiAgent-based Modeling & Social Simulation will becrucial for the solution of one of the most hardtheoreticaltheoretical problems of economic and social sciences:the spontaneous organization of a “dynamic socialthe spontaneous organization of a “dynamic socialorder” that cannot be planned, but emerges out oforder” that cannot be planned, but emerges out ofintentional planning agentsintentional planning agents guided by their ownguided by their ownchoices.choices.This is the problem that Hayek assumes to bethe real reason for the existence of the SocialSciences.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiSOCIALSCIENCESABMULTI-AGENTSYSTEMSB: Not only an ‘experimental method’ and experimentalplatformsCONCEPTS, MODELS, THEORIESThe new COMPUTATIONAL SOCIALSCIENCES
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiAgents & MASAgents & MAS paradigmJust a Technology?I stress those aspects still needing a theory (that we cannot just buyand import from the cognitive and social sciences) also because itis important not reducing “Agents” (and MAS) to a technology.This is not only an impoverishing move but even a risky move(remember the serious mistake that AI did with the “expertsystems”).““Agents”Agents” are an intellectual (and formal-computational)framework; a way of thinkinga way of thinking and of analyzing dynamic andcomplex phenomena that involve active, partially independent,distributed but interfering and interactive entities, producingcommon (either planned or unplanned) collective results, forindividual or collective advantages.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiOnly MAS can fully deal with this problemOnly MAS can fully deal with this problem>> Up & Down>> Up & Down
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi“THE core theoretical problemof the whole social science”(Hayek )
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi“THE core theoretical problemof the whole social science” (Hayek )"This problem (the spontaneous emergence of an unintentional"This problem (the spontaneous emergence of an unintentionalsocial order and institutions) is in no way specific of thesocial order and institutions) is in no way specific of theeconomic science.... it doubtless iseconomic science.... it doubtless is THE core theoreticalTHE core theoreticalproblem of the whole social scienceproblem of the whole social science"" (von Hayek, Knowledge,Market, Planning)the problem is not simply how a given equilibrium orcoherence is achieved and some stablesome stable orderorder emergesemergesTo have a "social order" or an "institution", spontaneous emergence andequilibrium are not enough. They must be "functional".
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiAdam Smith’s "invisible hand"Adam Smith’s original formulation of “THE problem” is much deeperand clearerThe great question is how:"(the individual) - that does neither, in general"(the individual) - that does neither, in general, intend to, intend topursuepursue thethe public interestpublic interest,, nor is awarenor is aware of the fact that he isof the fact that he ispursuing it,...pursuing it,... is conduced by an invisible hand tois conduced by an invisible hand to pursue anpursue anendend that is not among histhat is not among his intentionsintentions"" (Smith, ).(Smith, ).Hayek like Smith in acknowledging the teleological nature of the invisiblehand and of spontaneous order, cannot avoid attributing to ita (positive) value judgment, a providential, benevolent,a (positive) value judgment, a providential, benevolent,optimistic visionoptimistic vision of this process of self-organizationof this process of self-organization((ideologismideologism).).
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiIn the “Invisible Hand”:1) there are intentions and intentional behavior2) some unintended and unaware (long term or complex) effect emergesfrom this behavior3) but it is not just an effect, it is an end we “pursue”, i.e. its orients andcontrols -in some way- our behavior: we "necessarily operate for" thatresult (Smith).- how is it possible that we pursuepursue something that is not anintention of ours; that the behavior of an intentional andplanning agent be goal-oriented, finalistic (‘end’‘end’), withoutbeing intentional;- in which sense the unintentional effect of our behavior isan "endend”??
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiTheory of “Function”Theory of “Function”This problem appeared in other social sciences as theproblem of the notion of "functions" (social andbiological) impinging on the behavior of anticipatoryand intentional agents, and of their relations with their"intentions".
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiSocial FunctionsSocial Functions and CognitionCognitiona) no theory of social functions is possible and tenablewithout clearly solving this problem;b)without a theory of emerging functions among cognitiveagents social behavior cannot be fully explained.Moreover: we have towe have to buildbuild social functionssocial functions andandspontaneous ordersspontaneous orders (conventions, conformity,(conventions, conformity,…) in Agent supported human organizations and…) in Agent supported human organizations andin open MASin open MASnot only goodnot only goodintentionallyintentionally cooperating/competing systemscooperating/competing systems
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiSocial FunctionsSocial Functions and CognitionCognitionFunctions install and maintain themselvesFunctions install and maintain themselves parasitical totocognition:cognition:functions install and maintain themselvesthanks to and through agents mental representationsbut not as mental representations:i.e. without being known or at least intended.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiSocial FunctionsSocial Functions and CognitionCognitionWhile Social NormsSocial Norms emergence and functioning require also a(partial) "cognitive emergencecognitive emergence",Social FunctionsSocial Functions require an extra-cognitiveextra-cognitive emergence andworkingFor a Social Norm to work as a Social Norm and be fullyeffective, agents should recognize and treat it as a Social Norm.On the contrary the effectiveness of a Social Function isindependent of agents understandingindependent of agents understanding of this function oftheir own behavior:a) the function can rise and maintain itself without the awareness of theagents;b) if the agents intend the results of their behavior, these would no morebe mere "social functions" of their behavior, but just "intentions".
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiThe problem:Emergence and Functions should not bewhat thelikes or notices,(“just in the eye of the beholder”)but should be indeed observer-independent,based on self-organizing and self-reproducing phenomena,>>> "positive”, “good” can just consists in this.We cannot exclude "negative functions" (Merton) (kako-functions) from the theory: perhaps the same mechanisms areresponsible for both positive and negative functions.>> Two kinds of finalistic notionsfinalistic notions:- evolutionary finalities, adaptive goals; and- mental ends (motives, purposes, intentions).
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiIntentionalIntentional behavior Vs. functionalfunctional behaviorFinalistic systems:There are twotwo basic types of system having a finalistic (teleonomic)behaviour:Goal-oriented systems - (Mc Farland, 1983),Goal-governed systemsa specific type of Goal-oriented system based on representationsrepresentationsthat anticipate the results
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiMAIN PROBLEMSMAIN PROBLEMS• If a behavior is reproduced thanks to its good effects, thatare good relatively to the goals of the agent (individual orcollective) who reproduces them by acting intentionally, thereis no room for "functions” (Elster).If the agent appreciates the goodness of these effects and theaction is replied in order to reproduce these effects, they aresimply "intended".• How is it possible that a system which actintentionally and on the basis of the evaluation ofthe effects relative to its internal goals reproducesbad habits thanks to their bad effects?
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi>> ?? a behavioristic reinforcement layer (van Parijs)together with>> a deliberative layer (controlled by beliefs and goals) ???the deliberative layer accounting for intentional actions and effects,the behavioristic layer (exploiting conditioned or unconditioned reflexes)accounting for merely "functional" behaviors??Are “functions” and “roles” just impinging on ‘habitus’ ???(Bourdieu), whileintentions would just be for personal purposes??Our problem is indeed that: intentional actionsintentional actions have functionsfunctions!Goals and beliefs of the agents have functions.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiThe fundamental problem ishow to graft teleological but unintentional behavioursprecisely on intention-driven behaviours.[WE HAVE TO BUILD THIS KIND OF MAS-BASEDTHIS KIND OF MAS-BASEDSYSTEMSSYSTEMS]What answer can be given to Elster according to whom the ideaof intention makes that of the function of behaviourimpracticable and superfluous.How can intentional acts also be functional,How can intentional acts also be functional, that is,that is,unwitting butunwitting butreproducedreproduced precisely as a result of theirprecisely as a result of their unintentionalunintentionaleffectseffects.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiWhy alsoKako-functions?Kako-functions?How is it possible?
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiWhy also kako-functionskako-functions?- thethe mechanism that install a bad function can be exactlymechanism that install a bad function can be exactlythe same installing a good onethe same installing a good one- to definitely separate a functional view of behavior andsociety from any teleological, providential view (functionscan be very bad and persist although bad)- kako-functions cannot be explained in a strictlybehavioristic framework of reinforcement learning: theresult of the behavior can be disagreeable or useless, but thebehavior will be "reinforced", consolidated and reproduced.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiUnexpected evil effects exist, or evil effects combined with good individualintentions (Boudon, 1977) in whichthe intended good effects reproducedthe intended good effects reproducedin spite ofin spite of the negative consequencesthe negative consequences.This is true,- both in the case in which the evil effects are not perceived or are notattributed correctly,- and in the case in which they are perceived(in the second case the good effects must be subjectively more important and in anycase preferred (for instance, be closer in time), or else are more conditioning/reinforcingthan the evil effects)actionnegativeunexpected effectsnegativeexpected effectspositiveexpected andintendedeffectspositiveunexpected effectsreproducePerceived effects
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiBut there are alsoharmful effects capable of self-reproductionharmful effects capable of self-reproduction (through the action)precisely because of their negative naturebecause of their negative nature (Castelfranchi, 1997; 1998b;1998d).a long line of automobiles and the slowing down due to the simple individual intentionof rapidly glancing at an accident that has occurred in the other laneazioneeffetti negativiinattesieffetti negativiattesieffetti positiviattesi ed intesieffettipositivi inattesiriproduceriproduce
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiThe notion of ‘functionasan effect selecting and reproducingan effect selecting and reproducingits own causeits own causeHow is it possible for a system that acts intentionally on the basisof an evaluation of the effects vis-à-vis its own goals, to reproducebad habits precisely as a result of their bad effects?And even more crucially - if a behaviour is instead reproducedthanks to its good effects with respect to the (individual orcollective) goals of the agent who reproduces them by actingintentionally, then there is no room for the "functions".
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiIt is necessary to have complex reinforcement learning forms notmerely based on classifiers, rules, associations, motor sequences,etc. but operating on the cognitive representationsoperating on the cognitive representations governing theaction, that is, on beliefsbeliefs and goalsgoals.In this view "the consequences of the action, which may be more orless consciously anticipated, nevertheless modify the probability ofthe action being repeated the next time in similar stimulusconditions " (Macy, 1998). More exactly:the functions are simply effects of behaviour whichthe functions are simply effects of behaviour whichgogo beyond thebeyond the intended effectsintended effects but which canbut which cansuccessfully be reproduced because they reinforcesuccessfully be reproduced because they reinforcethe agents beliefs and goals that give rise to thisthe agents beliefs and goals that give rise to thisbehaviour.behaviour.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiHow Social Functions areimplemented throughcognitive representationsThe basic modelActBelGoals++IntendedeffectsUnintendedeffectsFunctionalunintendedeffects
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiThere are two Cognitive "reinforcement" principles:1. Belief Reinforcement:two different mechanisms can be postulated:association (accessibility) :the association between the belief and that context or scenario isstrengthened: the believe will have more probability to be retrieved nexttime in similar situations; it will be more activated, more available andaccessible (accessibility bias);confirmation (reliability) :some of the actions effects are perceived by the agent (even if notnecessarily understood and causally connected to its actions) and theyconfirm the beliefs supporting the action: they give new evidence for thatbelief, increase its "credibility", and reliability: they augment its “truth” orthe subjective probability of the event.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi2. Goal Reinforcementtwo different mechanisms can be postulated (analogous to the beliefsreinforcement mechanisms):association (accessibility) :the success of the chosen goal, plan, action is memorized in the sense that the associationbetween the goal-plan and that problematic context or scenario is strengthened: thegoal/plan (solution) will have more probability to be retrieved next time in similarsituations; it will be more activated, more available and accessible;confirmation (reliability) :the success of the chosen goal, plan, action is memorized; it increments a "successfulnessindex" relative to that choice; or better some meta-cognitive evaluation of the value of theaction. This memorized behavioral choice is "confirmed": next time the probability tochoose the same way (goal, plan, strategy, action) will be greater: it will be more preferableand reliable (we will trust more it).The reinforcement of both the belief and the goal/planwill determine a reinforcement of that behavior
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiAn example: dirty and clean streetsA social (kako)function based on social conformity and imitation.The agent assumes (B1) that this is a bad behavior or even a forbidden one; he assumes (B2) that a lot of otherpeople behave this way; that (B3) this can be quite practical and easy sometimes; he assumes that (B4) hiscontribution to the garbage is quite marginal and small (that its true). He has the goal (G1) to do as others do anduntil others do so (Bicchieri, 1989); or at least, to do as others do and until others do so if this is useful andpractical for his goals. Goal G1 on the bases of beliefs B2, B3, B4 will generate a goal (G2) to leave small garbagein the street, which overcomes the possible goal (G3) -based on B1- of not dirtying the city. Now the result of sucha behavior is that streets are dirtier; this is perceived and then it will confirm the supporting beliefs (B2, B4) andthe goal G2.Everybody reinforces the behavior of the others.The global effect is not wanted and intended by anybody; thereinforcement effect is also unattended and unintended.The behavior is (reciprocally) reinforced by its effects. These effectsare self-maintaining and reproducing through the reinforcement oftheir own causes. This passes through the mind of the agents (theirbeliefs and goals) but not through their consciousness and intention.It is quite interesting to observe that exactly the same kind of beliefs, and an identicalgoal (G1) can generate in this case an eu-function: to maintain the city clean.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiInterpersonal and collective level: vicious circlesvicious circlesHubbub in a restaurant or at a party(The example given is merely -on a small scale- the model followed by the armsrace).Hostility leads to hostility
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiInstitutional level: vicious circlesvicious circlesPrisons <==><==> Delinquency><><><><D E L I N Q U E N Z AP O L I Z I A / T R I B U N A L I C A R C E R I
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiWhat distinguishes function from non function is notnot that theunintentional (collective) effect is good but that it is self-organizing and self-producing by means of positive feedback,that is, by reinforcing, selecting, and reproducing thebehaviour that generated it:unintended effects that select their own causesunintended effects that select their own causes.>> functionality must be kept distinct from goodness (and that is fromthe subjective goals of the agents),>> good and bad functions (exactly like unintended good and bad effects)are on the same plane: both may be self-organizing.>> the function is not reproduced or maintained or repeated by virtue ofits good effects (a risky approach owing to the boundary with intention)
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiGoalsGoals vs. “Functions”“Functions”An example:The ADOPTION of a NORMADOPTION of a NORMwithout the UNDERSTANDINGUNDERSTANDING (sharing)of its END
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiDelegation, Proactivity,Delegation, Proactivity,Order, Norms, ViolationOrder, Norms, Violation3
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi“We have to maintain the control”We can delegate “how” to achieve a given goal, butnot “what”: goal decision and choice should remainsour power (a general worry; ex. Müller-Schloer)However…. There are different kinds and level of“delegation” useful for cooperation, and autonomy, andiniciative or pro-activity.Over-helpOver-helpNot always our objective is the right one (ex. expertsystems’ advices).Not always we understand our own interest.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiGoalactionsubGoalsubGoalPLANDes.action actionLevels ofLevels of DelegationDelegationClosed-Delegation:mere executionA plan-based approach
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiGoalactionsubGoalsubGoalPLANDes.action actionGoalactionsubGoal?Open-DelegationOpen-Delegation:• Delegation of meta-tasks (searching,planning, deciding, monitoring, ...)• Intelligence, autonomy (agent modelling)Levels ofLevels of DelegationDelegation
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiSocial-AgentSocial-Agent’’s Architectures Architectureand Multiple Goal-SourcesMultiple Goal-SourcesACTIVEGOALSACTIONSINTENTIONSADOPTEDADOPTEDGOALSGOALSEMOTIONSBODILYNEEDSDESIRESDESIRESPRACTICALREASONINGEXOGENOUS GOALS
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchinon shared plannon shared plan GoalactionsubGoal subGoalaction actionsubGoalGoalPLANactionsubGoalPLAN GoalactionsubGoal subGoalactionUnaware CooperationUnaware Cooperation•Reconciling EmergenceEmergence and CognitionCognition
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiGoalaction actionactionsubGoalsubGoalPLANDes.Goal-DelegationGoal-Delegation VsGoal-AdoptionGoal-Adoption• Over- HelpOver- Help• Critical-HelpCritical-HelpLevels of collaboration
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiDegrees of AutonomyDegrees of AutonomyThere are degrees of Autonomy, but alsodomains of Autonomy;And we also need ““adjustableadjustable”” autonomyautonomyPossibly based on “negotiation”: both sides(delegator and delegated) might ask for abroader or more limited autonomy and initiative;and for more or less control.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiMonitoring PeopleMonitoring People(and Autonomous Agents)?We cannot monitor and control peoplewithout understandingwithout understanding “what” they are doing(goal) and “why”,and why sometime they have to violatehave to violatenorms or roles? the possible danger of a computer-basedformalization and enforcement of rules inorganizations
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiFunctional violationsof norms and commitmentsFor "functional disregard" I meanThe violation of a norm/rule/prescription/commitmentfinalized to make the required/expected work (also) morefunctional to the organisations aims (over- and critical-help). (“functional” here means “good for ..“functional” here means “good for ..”!)“Finalized” can mean either “intentional”(goal-governed)or “functional” (goal-oriented)
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiFunctional violationsof norms and commitmentsTwo different forms of “functional disregard or violation”:(“functional” here means “good for ..“functional” here means “good for ..”!)Deliberated functional violationsDeliberated functional violationsIn order to be deliberated this behaviour has to be free(one could have done differently), and aware of its consequencesand on purpose, thus the agent cannot be merely self-interested.• Deliberated is not only the violation but also its functionalityto the organisationI focus on felicitous deliberateddeliberated violations (first kind)
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiFunctional violationsof norms and commitmentsThe Sociological Description and Definition of thePhenomenon"The repeated and systematic violation of criteria, prescriptions anddispositions included in the normative apparatus that defines and regulates(through "norms", in a broad sense) a collective organised activity. Thisviolation favours an acceptable level of functioning of the organisation itself,while the literal and punctual application of the normative will produce levelsof functioning either unacceptable or less efficacious" (Manciulli et al., 1986,p. XI)."grève du zéle" - "forms of sabotage consisting just in a rigorousapplication of rulements" (Mottez, 1971).
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiFunctional violationsof norms and commitments" it is well known that the best way for sabotaging an organisation is that ofliterally obeying to all its rules and to refusing to use our own judgementcapacity. Beyond what is obtainable by commands, beyond what iscontrollable by supervision, beyond what is inducible by incentives orpreventable by punishment, even in the execution of the more humble jobsthere is a bit of discretionality... This "discretion" can be used both to allowThis "discretion" can be used both to allowor to subvert the aims of the organisation"or to subvert the aims of the organisation".. (Bendix, 1959/72).WILL WEWILL WE “SABOTAGE” ORGANIZATIONs“SABOTAGE” ORGANIZATIONsvia our COMPUTATIONAL CONTROL?via our COMPUTATIONAL CONTROL?During the Tayloristic period in the industrial organisation one of the mainpoints in the dominant paradigm of the "scientific management" was themonito to the worker: "you are not paid for thinking, but just for executingorders and instructions".
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiFunctional violationsof norms and commitmentsSocial conventions to violateSocial conventions to violateFly controllers in an airport control tower should use the interphone , also incommunication among people within the same control room. There is a ruleon this. However, the interphone has some inconvenience (for ex. voicesoverlaps, misunderstandings, ... ) and the controllers consider its use not onlyless natural for them, but “potentially safety critical”. This is why they in factdo not use interphone for messages within the same room, and communicate“directly”.In this real example we clearly have:a systematic violation for functional, cooperative reasons
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiTrustingTrusting & Delegating& DelegatingwithoutwithoutUnderstandingUnderstanding4
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiThe a-technical, non-rational nature of thedeontic “ought”deontic “ought”The “alienated”“alienated” natureof norm adoption&
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiThe a-technical, non-rational natureof the deontic “ought”In a sense the deontic “ought” “have to” is a de-technicalized “ought”: no longer a necessary meansmeansfor....for.... something that you have to want, to chose.you have to want, to chose.“If you like/want to ..., you should, have to.....”(technical ought)“You have to” for what? why? (deontic ought)In the mind of the “issuer” the N is supposed to be ameans, a solution for some problem, a way ofachieving a higher goal.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiM O T H E R C H I L DG o a l :c h i l d b r u s h e sh i s th e e tsG o a l :c h i l d b r u s h e sh i s th e e tsG o a l :t o p r e v e n td e c a yG o a l :to m a k em o m m yh a p p yCitizens like childrensWe are not supposed to ‘cooperate’ but to ‘obey’!
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiThe a-technical, non-rational natureof the deontic “ought”the deontic “ought”Both the ‘ideal’ and the ‘sub-ideal’ (for avoiding sanctions)obedience share a fundamental core, crucial for the real natureof the deontic ‘norm’, ‘ought’.A core that differentiate the mind of the normative ‘subject’ S from themind of the ‘issuer’ or legislator.S is NOT supposed to (have to) adopt the N (to ‘adhere’ to the imperative)because s/he understands or agrees about its funtion, aim.On the contrary, S is supposed to have to obey even if s/heto obey even if s/hedoes not understand the meaning of the N, or disagreesdoes not understand the meaning of the N, or disagreesabout it.about it.A normative education is precisely an education to obey in anycase, and even to not wondering and worry about the validity ofthe N. (That’s why Socrates takes the poison)
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiThe “alienated”“alienated” natureof norm adoption and oninstitution and social powersWe do not intend the ends ofour intentional behavior!
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiMulti-Agent SystemsMulti-Agent Systems&Emergence, Self-OrganizationFunctions and Cognitions5
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiNot only the MAS supported social order cannot justcannot justbe top-downbe top-down, but it must allow autonomy and flexibility,and true delegations and commitments, and"conventions" and "norms" (top-down & bottom-up)with their intrinsic possible “violation”.We need cooperation/support by “autonomous”“autonomous”, ““pro-pro-activeactive””, really helping, really helping Agents.Not stupid executors.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiCompliance to norms and commitments is assumed to be and tohave to be absolutely guaranteed in E-institutions. Why?N-violation (commitments, rules, roles, ...) can be adaptive,functional. But to really be adaptive should not be just accidental;it should be based on some "understanding" and giving-priority tothe "goal" of that norm or task or request or prescription. It shouldbe based on some Over-help.That’s why we need “Trust”That’s why we need “Trust”However,how to support "trust" within those self-organizing,changing, and normatively not-rigid system?
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiOnly MAS can solve this theoretical and technicalproblems; by changing the Social Sciences methods,data, and modeling tools.By modeling EmergenceEmergence but also ImmergenceImmergence and CognitiveCognitiveEmergenceEmergence, and different levels and kinds of order; how mindsbecome coordination artifacts; different kinds and levels ofcooperation. And in particular the relation between mentalrepresentations and learning and self-organizing autonomoussystems.Can we Program with the "Invisible Hand"? Will the"Invisible Hand" - governing human society - beimplemented in the emergent intelligence of Self-Self-organizing open MA systemsorganizing open MA systems?How to combine Control & Self-Organization?
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiMAS will play several crucial roles:- Experimental methods and platforms for the Social and political sciences;- New conceptual, theoretical and modeling tools;- Infrastructure for Self-organizing but monitored and governedorganizations: MA implementation, Ag mediation and support;- Participation, transparence, information; mediamorphosis of knowledgeinstitutions;- Simulation for understanding, predicting and deciding about real socialdynamics;- MA coordination/interpretation of feedbacks from intelligent sensors,stakeholders, people, ... to authorities and control institutions.Let me stress just one:Artificial Social ImaginationImagination“The best way to predict the future .. is to invent it” Allan McKay
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiArtificial Social “Imagination”like human imagination/simulation guiding both humanexecutive actions and long-term decisions.Anticipatory Simulation in action control: ex.Comparison between purely stimulus-response systems (a) and those endowedwith anticipatory capabilities, which run an ‘internal looprun an ‘internal loop’ on-line with action(b), or off-line (c) (Pezzulo).
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiSocial Simulation, SocialInnovation, andSystem Management6
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiGovernement and SimulationSocial Simulation will be Agent-basedAgent-basedand will be crucial for planning and governance ofcomplex systems.The most serious problem of the Social “Sciences” isthat they cannot do real experiments.This is even more dramatic for Social Policies!Simulation provides this.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi… in fact, learning (and adjustment) requires trialsand errorserrors! You cannot do this on purpose in realcontext and people.But we can systematically explore ““what wouldwhat wouldhappen if….happen if….”” in the computational model of thegiven system.Even more simple for/in those (future) systems andorganizations that will be fully networked and based onagents. Their working not just they simulation!Governement and Simulation
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi“Simulation” is so important and crucial because it finallyprovides to the social sciences a truly “experimental” method,for the validation and adjustment of the models (and ofworking “architectures” not simply “formal”).But:“Simulation” is more than “experimental method”; it is amodeling method (synthetic approach; proximate mechanismsThe challenge is much more serious: to develop a new forma new formof collective intelligenceof collective intelligence; of imagination, prediction,experimental design and planning, finally able to supportcollective strategic decisions and policies.76The SimulationSimulation Revolution
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi77political issues and challengespolitical issues and challengesWhat will happen in a few decades is the systematicuse of Simulations as the basis for any big decisionabout strategies and policies in any domain:military, environmental, financial, economic, urban,demographic, energetic, educational, logistic, sanitary,....No political/managerial complex decision will betaken without a grounded previsionprevision about possibleeffects and trends; thanks to the modeling andsimulation of the phenomenon.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi78given the power of future computational scientific modelsand platforms, andgiven a society fully connected in real-time, on-line, reactiveand ‘virtualized’, with “smart environments and ambientintelligence”, with continuous simulation and re-simulation of what ishappening,there would be the cognitive collective powerthe cognitive collective powerand intelligenceand intelligence for better governing future andcomplexitypolitical issues and challengespolitical issues and challenges
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi79A fundamental challenge for the future is - in my view - thefollowing one:"How" to systematically integrate-the simulationssimulations of social phenomena with-the real-time feedbackreal-time feedback from the "playground”dynamic processes?political issues and challengespolitical issues and challenges
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi80A "cyclic" modelPlanning/design may not just remainPlanning/design may not just remain top-downtop-down andand centralizedcentralized,and be just "applied""applied" to the field.One will need to combine:- simulative models and their running and predictionsand the consequent decisions and choices, with possible timelyfeedbacks from the territory, due to intelligent sensors orwitnesses; then- run time readjusting the simulations and then thepolicy or intervention; and- so on, cyclically (Figure).political issues and challengespolitical issues and challenges
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi81A "cyclic" modelpolitical issues and challengespolitical issues and challengesENVIRONMENT
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi82Information and computer technology gives us the tools and the culturalconditions for those run time, decentralized, high qualified feedbacksrun time, decentralized, high qualified feedbacks.Different kinds of "agents" might be exploited:(i) local sensors and detectors, of various kinds (possibly learning and adjusting), eveninterconnected and locally "cooperating" for a more reliable and global information;(ii) local computational elaborations and intelligences, for primary elaboration andreaction (additional data, additional "agents", alarm smart systems, ...);(iii) active voluntary people communicating via sms, call centers, ...(iv) local or domain "groups", “communities”, associations interested inmonitoring and giving advice on the phenomenon: bloggers, consumers unions, ..;Elaboration of big-data, sentiment analysis, specific alert, ….(v) local professionals in charge: policemen, bombers, medical staff, teachers,social workers, specialized observatories (economic, demographic,environmental,..), ......(vi) local administrations, with their "research/documentation centers" or theirmanagers and administrators;...political issues and challengespolitical issues and challenges
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi83Obviously, the solution (and the design) cannot be the same inevery domain.For example, in traffic monitoring and planning (for instance, in view of atransportation strike or of a big political demonstration) this is quite trivial: oneshould design a fast interaction between the simulated intervention "plans" (withtheir predictions) and the various feedbacks from the actual event: indicationsfrom sensors; telephonic advices from people; advices from policemen and tollbooths; recommendations and requests from users blogs, or consumers’associations, or local authorities.Rather different feedbacks are needed in case of an epidemic, or for the leakage oftoxic substances.political issues and challengespolitical issues and challenges
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi84Much less simple is the case of social policies and interventions onpopulation welfare ..:Who are the stakeholders to privilegestakeholders to privilege and which role/weight shouldthey be given? Which (objective or subjective) wellbeing indicators should bechosen? And which conflicting “interests”? (Friedman’s talk)Which instruments should be adopted for the surveys? (expert evaluations?interviews? groups? ......).The decision and re-planning is not technical; it is politicalThe decision and re-planning is not technical; it is political!And requires the right subjects and participation andnegotiation.political issues and challengespolitical issues and challenges
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiTo play such a role however computer SocialSimulation must become stronger and much morereliable.Not biased by internal arbitrary parameters, that mightproduce whatever result we want, guided by the values of agiven group of interest.And perhaps we even will need a“participatory” simulation (like in scientificwork) with different stakeholders providingand comparing their results.85The SimulationSimulation Revolution
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi86The computer modeling and simulation is apossible revolution of the"collective" cognitio"collective" cognitionn:its “anticipatory” and “imagination” power… or such anan unbelievable cognitive powerunbelievable cognitive power shouldbe only at disposal of the army, of the “big brother”,or of the word corporations??political issues and challengespolitical issues and challenges
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiConcluding RemarksConcluding Remarks
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi??
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiCan We……?Can we engineering and manage our society(in part) preserving self-organizationself-organization and individuality and (semi-)autonomy of(semi-)autonomy ofpeoplepeople?
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchithe new synthesisnew synthesis
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi• Reconciling EmergenceEmergence and CognitionCognition1) Cognition as a level of emergence:- from objective to subjective- from implicit to explicitex. dependence2) Beyond cognition:emergent unaware, functional social phenomena(ex. cooperation, problem solving)among cognitive agentsthe new synthesisnew synthesis
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiThe “Cognitive Mediators”“Cognitive Mediators” of Social PhenomenaSocial and cultural phenomena cannot be deeply accounted forwithout explaining how they work through the individual agents’minds (mental “counterparts” or “mediators”).This requires a richer cognitive model (architecture) for “Agents,”a richer cognitive model (architecture) for “Agents,”moving from formal and computational AI and ALife models,closer to those developed in psychology, cognitive science, and incognitive approaches in economics, sociology, organization studies.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiWILLWILL THIS “COGNITIVE MEDIATED” VIEWTHIS “COGNITIVE MEDIATED” VIEW of socialof socialphenomena ad dynamics, and of Agent-based modelingphenomena ad dynamics, and of Agent-based modeling WIN??WIN??Not so sure at all: short cut of statistics, big data,correlations, probability, … Ex. of current robust trendPREDICTING WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING, withoutPREDICTING WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING, withoutmodeling themodeling the “proximate causes”“proximate causes”.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - Castelfranchi“AlienationAlienation”:We are dominated by our own ‘delegated’(emergent) (social and intellectual) powers, we arenot aware of;we do not realize and we do not decide/intend tocreate such collective or such institutional powersimpinging on us.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiCan We Overcome our AlienationAlienation?Will the Leviathan becomea giant connected and informedconnected and informedcommunity of agentscommunity of agents,managing their collective Power?1. I’m skeptical about that (also for cognitivereasons)2. I also worry about possible net-Demagogy
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiEngineering a new SocietyEngineering a new Society?Are we aware that we are in fact building,engineering a new SOCIETY?A society where we shape H-H, C-C (Ag-Ag), H-C& C-H interactions and organizations,with their mental and behavioral counterparts.
  • Minnesota AAMASAAMAS 2013 - CastelfranchiENDENDThank you for your attention!And sorry for my “English”