STUXNET – THE FORMIDABLE CYBER WEAPON<br />Sathish Kumar<br />Rajeev Chaubey<br />
  AGENDA<br /><ul><li> Stuxnet Background
 Introduction to SCADA systems
 Stuxnet Architecture
 Installation procedure
Injection technique
Infection routine flow
 Command and Control server communication
 Stuxnet propagation methods
 Security issues and mitigation techniques</li></li></ul><li>  SCADA SYSTEMS – GLOBAL INCIDENTS<br />   Sewage Hacker - SC...
STUXNET BACKGROUND<br />  Stuxnet is a Windows computer worm discovered in July 2010.<br />  Targets industrial software a...
STUXNET DAY BY DAY EVOLUTION<br />
SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION<br />
PLC – PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER<br />STUXNET SEEKS SPECIFIC MODELS S7-300 S7-400<br />
PLC – SCAN CYCLE<br />Read Input<br />Execute program<br />Diagnostics and communications<br />Update output<br />
STUXNET ARCHITECTURE<br />
STUXNET – INSTALLATION PROCEDURE<br />
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  • As part of the Q4 announcement group we are expanding our data center initiatives in 2 important ways, in line with our overall data center networking vision and strategy:1/ We are expanding our guidelines for designing next generation data center infrastructures, building on the foundations of our network simplification approach introduced in 2008 (simplifying the network, collapsing network tiers, virtualizing infrastructure elements, and simplifying management designs). We are expanding by delivering techniques for sharing network infrastructures with unique features, intelligence and scale, end-to-end based on Junos. And we are introducing a framework for delivering comprehensive and consistently managed security infrastructures for the cloud.2/ As detail to support delivering on the vision we are introducing 5 new security solution modules and associated best practices and implementation guidance to protect the critical information flows and assets associated with highly virtualized and distributed cloud data center networks.The rest of the presentation fills out information supporting these important announcements.
  • Stuxnet

    1. 1. STUXNET – THE FORMIDABLE CYBER WEAPON<br />Sathish Kumar<br />Rajeev Chaubey<br />
    2. 2. AGENDA<br /><ul><li> Stuxnet Background
    3. 3. Introduction to SCADA systems
    4. 4. Stuxnet Architecture
    5. 5. Installation procedure
    6. 6. Injection technique
    7. 7. Infection routine flow
    8. 8. Command and Control server communication
    9. 9. Stuxnet propagation methods
    10. 10. Security issues and mitigation techniques</li></li></ul><li> SCADA SYSTEMS – GLOBAL INCIDENTS<br /> Sewage Hacker - SCADA system of Maroochy Water Services in Australia beginning in January 2000, which saw millions of gallons of sewage spill into waterways, hotel grounds and canals around the Sunshine Coast suburb<br /> Trans-Siberian Pipeline USSR - spectacular trans-Siberian pipeline disaster in 1982<br /> Nuclear Power Plant, US - California, The vulnerability was demonstrated by a January event at the shutdown Davis-Besse nuclear power plant. The worm infection increased data traffic in the site’s network, resulting in the plant’s Safety Parameter Display System and plant process computer being unavailable for several hours<br /> Power Grid, US - California, hackers broke into computer systems owned by California's primary electric power grid operator and remained undetected for 17 days<br /> Airport Hacker, US - Massachusetts, a computer hacker who disabled a key telephone company computer servicing the Worcester airport. As a result of a series of commands sent from the hacker's personal computer, vital services to the FAA control tower were disabled for six hours in March of 1997. In the course of his hacking, the defendant also electronically broke into a pharmacy computer and copied patient records.<br />
    11. 11. STUXNET BACKGROUND<br /> Stuxnet is a Windows computer worm discovered in July 2010.<br /> Targets industrial software and equipment. <br /> Its speculated that stuxnet was specifically designed to damageIran nuclear facilities and widely believed stuxnet introduced delay in Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant startup<br /> The first to include a programmable logic controller (PLC) rootkit.<br />
    12. 12. STUXNET DAY BY DAY EVOLUTION<br />
    13. 13. SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION<br />
    14. 14. PLC – PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER<br />STUXNET SEEKS SPECIFIC MODELS S7-300 S7-400<br />
    15. 15. PLC – SCAN CYCLE<br />Read Input<br />Execute program<br />Diagnostics and communications<br />Update output<br />
    16. 16. STUXNET ARCHITECTURE<br />
    17. 17. STUXNET – INSTALLATION PROCEDURE<br />
    18. 18. STUXNET – INFECTION ROUTINE FLOW<br />
    19. 19. Stuxnet – C & C Server Communication<br />
    20. 20. STUXNET PROPAGATION METHODS<br />
    21. 21. Security issues and mitigation techniques<br /> Security Information and Event Management systems <br /> Intrusion monitoring systems integrated with SIEM<br /> Implement “Extrusion Detection”<br /> Implement passive vulnerability scanners (PVS) on the control systems network<br />
    22. 22. JUNIPER IDP SCADA SIGNATURES<br />SCADA:DNP3:DISABLE-RESP - This signature detects attempts to stop unsolicited responses from devices. Attackers can prevent devices from sending alarms<br />SCADA:DNP3:READ - This signature detects attempts by clients to read information from a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). Attackers can use this information to plan future, more targeted attacks<br />SCADA:DNP3:STOP - This signature detects attempts to stop a DNP3 server<br />SCADA:DNP3:WARM-RESTART- This signature detects attempts to reinitialize a PLC or DNP3 server<br />SCADA:MODBUS:LISTEN-ONLY -This signature detects attempts to force a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) into listen-only mode, in which the PLC does not respond to request packets<br />SCADA:MODBUS:DOS - This signature detects attempts to force a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) to restart. The PLC is unavailable while powering on<br />
    23. 23. STUXNET – THE FORMIDABLE CYBER WEAPON<br />Q&A<br />
    24. 24. STUXNET – THE FORMIDABLE CYBER WEAPON<br />Thank you!<br />

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