Your SlideShare is downloading. ×
Public policy analytical models
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×

Thanks for flagging this SlideShare!

Oops! An error has occurred.

×
Saving this for later? Get the SlideShare app to save on your phone or tablet. Read anywhere, anytime – even offline.
Text the download link to your phone
Standard text messaging rates apply

Public policy analytical models

1,559
views

Published on

Analyzes the various models of public policy

Analyzes the various models of public policy

Published in: Education

0 Comments
4 Likes
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

No Downloads
Views
Total Views
1,559
On Slideshare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
2
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
0
Comments
0
Likes
4
Embeds 0
No embeds

Report content
Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
No notes for slide

Transcript

  • 1. PA 763Kristen O’Donovan & Shantanu Basu 21st March 2007
  • 2. The Policy FrameworksOverview & Comparison PA 763 Shantanu Basu 21st March 2007
  • 3. The Pioneer Model – David Easton Policy Environment Structural Social Economic PoliticalGovernment Transfer paytts National Parties Demographics Tax expend. moodLegislature
  • 4. Easton’s Systems Theory THE POLITICAL SYSTEM or The Black Box Translates inputs to outputs. Inputs Environments influence Election results policy making and politics Public opinion Communications to elected officials Media coverage of issues Personal experiences of Outputs decision makers Laws Regulations DecisionsAdapted from Birkland, Thomas, A. (2005): Introduction to the Policy Process. ME Sharpe, New York. P. 202
  • 5. The Policy Models Elinor Ostrom Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) Paul A. Sabatier Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) John Kingdon Multiple Streams Metaphor (MS)Frank A. Baumgartner & Bryan D. Jones Punctuated Equilibrium William D. & Frances Stokes Berry Policy Innovations (PI) Richard I. Hofferbert Elite Behavior
  • 6. The Policy Stages Issue emergence Agenda setting F e e Alternative selection d b Implementation Enactment a c k EvaluationAdapted from Birkland, Thomas, A. (2005): Introduction to the Policy Process. ME Sharpe, New York. P. 225
  • 7. Inputs and OutputsInputs1. Voting Decisions2. National opinion 1. Rational3. Communications Comprehensive4. Mass Media 2. Incrementalism & Bounded Rationality5. Interest Groups 3. Garbage Can 4. Organizational Process & Governmental Outputs Politics 1. Laws 2. Oversight 3. Evaluation
  • 8. The Importance of ModelsEdella Schlager Emphasis on unfolding than on decision, i.e. process rather than decision Attention to structure Context and constraints of processes Actual decisions and events = Policy process analysis
  • 9. The Criteria for Comparison CRITERIA Types Units of of actors Analysis Variables and Levels relationships Scopeof Analysis between actors
  • 10. Types of Actors Unit of analysis in frameworks remains the individualIAD framework most clearly specifiesindividual as actor and provides generalvariables that structure the individualACF structures individual by ahierarchically ordered set of beliefs, goalsand ability to process informationPI variables for individual are motivationand obstacles to innovate and resourcesto overcome obstaclesHofferbert does not identify variables forelite behavior
  • 11. Variable Development Between FWs IAD most clearly specifies individual asactor and provides general variables thatstructure the individualAction arena most developed thoughnot action situation No variables for analyzing communityfeatures (Easton’s environments?) ACF structures individual by ahierarchically ordered set of beliefs,goals and ability to process information ACF’s developed variables includeforums
  • 12. Variable Development Between FWs PI variables for individual are motivation, obstacles in innovation and resources to overcome obstacles Hofferbert’s elite behavior does not identify variables Hofferbert well-developed except for elite behavior and govt. institutions Poorly specified variables = ad hoc theorizing and model building
  • 13. Units of Analysis IAD & Hofferbert FWs leaveunit of analysis choice toanalyst Both FWs are flexible ACF and PI specify units ofanalysis But units are flexible forapplication
  • 14. Levels of Analysis Changing alignments of individual actors Graduating to collective-choice actions Only IAD FW pays explicit attention tolevels Other FWs pay implicit attention ACF & PI’s primary focus is on collective-choice action only & individual byimplication Hofferbert by implication collective choicefor govt. institutions and elite behavior –the rest is historical-geographic conditionsand socio-economic composition
  • 15. Scope of Framework General variables and the relations betweenthem not developed for any policy stage IAD alone encompasses all stages primarilydue to attention to levels of action Interactive policy stage action situationsdovetail into collective-choice that, in turn,fits into implementation with constantfeedback between levels that again, wouldaffect operational-level rules ACF focused on initiation, estimation andselection, i.e. policymaking PI and Hofferbert relate primarily to policyadoption or selection, i.e. policy adoption
  • 16. THEORIESOverview & Comparison
  • 17. Comparison of Theories COMMON COMMON POOL POOLMULTIPLEMULTIPLE ADVOCACY ADVOCACY THEORIES THEORIES COALITIONSTREAMS STREAMS COALITION PUNCTUATED PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM
  • 18. Criteria for Comparison BLOMQUIST Boundaries andInstitutions scope of enquiryModel of the Collective Action individualPolicy change
  • 19. Model of the Individual - I Each theory uses rationality models Individuals assumed to be goal-oriented andboundedly rational Contexts of policy making drive boundedrationality Uncertainty, complexity & weak selectivepressures characterize those contexts (Ostromand Zahariadis) Major variations in theories – updater(Ostrom), selective attender (B&J), belief-er(Sabatier), satisficer (Zahariadis)
  • 20. Model of the Individual-IICP Complexity of situations determines behavior incommon pool resource setting Results in poorly defined problems and poorreactive preferences that cannot eliminateuncertainties Situational variables are therefore all-importantthan assumptions about internal calculation process(Ostrom)PE Similarity with IAD in that preferences relativelyfixed and slow to change; therefore change is large Decisions grounded in situational factors than
  • 21. Model of the Individual-IIIAC Belief systems, instead of information,determines individual choice and action Results in incremental change asbelief systems act as information filtersMS Grounded in garbage can model of choice = Interesting twists on boundedly rational model
  • 22. Collective Action -IMS Least attention to collectiveaction Focus on policy entrepreneursand conditions for changePE Policy makers plus collective actionmake for change Emphasis on consequences of suchorganization & activity, not modes oforganization
  • 23. Collective Action -IIAC High degree of coordination not always present Outcome result of congruence of various commoninterests rather than conscious coalition (Sabatier &Jenkins-Smith) Empirical measures of action not developed – existingmeasures not adequateCP Supports collective action and inhibits free-ridingbehavior Focuses on characteristics of physical world,community and the rules-in-use to explain collectiveaction
  • 24. Institutions - IMS Focus on individual behavior Institutional implication indirect in policy entrepreneurs –affects only political stream Needs more attention to institutions for greater structure andconsistency This is required to facilitate comparison across policycommunitiesPE Structure sets policymaking context Multiple venues that influence decision-making Conceptualized as one whole institution – micro-levelprocesses and macro-level outcomes overlooked Identify rule configuration using IAD and replace venues withchanges in rules (Schlager)
  • 25. Institutions - IIAC Emphasis on individuals in institutions Roles and structures of institutions need to be speltout – present framework only gross like PE Required to establish link between institutions andbelief systems of coalitions to assess relative influenceof individual actors Emphasis shift required to institutionsCP Emphasis on individuals using institutions Micro-level analysis creates individual rules Rules too many and configurations difficult todetermine Absence of any meta rules – good judgment onlypossible for analyst
  • 26. Policy Change AC, MS & PE : Major policy change No guarantee of policy change Ambiguity over what is major and minor policychange Major change for one subsystem could be minorfor another – definition of subsystem loose How does the secondary core of a belief systembecome the core of another – nested systems? Catalysts required for action Not possible to predict specific issues on whichthere would be policy changes CP : Incremental policy change Substantial change to come thorough series ofincremental changes
  • 27. Boundaries & Scope of Inquiry - IMS• Limited to explaining pre-decision processes inpolicy making process• Primary DVs are agenda-setting and specification ofpolicy alternatives• Uses exogenous variables to explain DVs withoutexplaining the policy stream content and context –Why do we see the types of policies or ideas that wedo in the policy stream?PE• Uses DV of agenda setting and explains by using IVssuch as interest group activity, mass mobilization,media images, etc.
  • 28. Boundaries & Scope of Inquiry - IIAC• Focuses on both decision and pre-decision• Based primarily on case study anddifficult to generalize• Sabatier & Jenkins Smithapproach using DVs as advocacycoalitions and IVs of policy actors,coordination, types and venues
  • 29. Boundaries & Scope of Inquiry - IIICP Explains specific action situation withreference to rules implemented DVs are outcomes of situation and IVs arerules-in-use, resource, community andindividual characteristics CP can also explain origins of rules-in-use byreversing IVs and DVs. IVs remain the same except for rules(collective and constitutional choice) thatstructure operational-level rulemakingactivities
  • 30. Why Institutional? INSTITUTIONAL INDIVIDUALS Permanent and Uncertain preferencesrepresentative entities Unpredictable behavior Similar subsystems No predefined rules Function within FW ofspecified rules No orgn. culture Predictable forward and Std. rules not possiblebackward integration with Wide interest grouppolicy by rules variations Possible to devise No fixed time framecommon micro and macromeasures Fluidity of human relations– therefore cross Theories generalizable generalizations may notacross geog. boundaries always be possible

×