Birkland, Thomas: Introduction to thePolicy Process: Theories, Concepts andModels of Public Policy Making. 2nd ed.2005. ME Sharpe. New York. Chapter 3-4.pp. 52-107 Ostrom, Elinor: Institutional RationalChoice: An Assessment of theInstitutional Analysis and DevelopmentFramework in Sabatier, Paul A. (ed.)Theories of the Policy Process. WestviewPress. Boulder. 1999. pp. 35-72
ACTORS OFFICIAL UNOFFICIAL INTERESTLEGISLATURE JUDICIARY CITIZENS GROUPS POLITICAL EXECUTIVE THINK TANKS PARTIES MEDIA
Difference President Congress Veto One-man 2/3 majority in decision both HousesOrganization Unitary Multiplicity Publicity Intensive DiffusedInformation Exhaustive Limited and delayed
Deliver indivisible and nonexclusive publicgoods Congress grants discretion for administrativeexpertise of bureaucracy Major issue of accountability vis-à-visdiscretion Discretion is not absolute Competition between bureaus and levels ofthe same department provide checks andbalances Legislative oversight for accountability
Power of judicial review in Marbury vs.Madison case Final word in the application of laws? Wilson – distinction between law andpolitics Easton – political and administrativeaction structured by constitutional order Dahl – courts political institution Progressive or regressive role?
Low electoral participation 40% disenfranchisedpopulation (Schattschneider) Periodic mobilization onlyfor specific interests Then how is public interest defined and who defines it?
Privatization of power (Schattschneider)? Madison’s federal support designed to contain suchgroupism Communication aids proliferation of groups Schattschneider categorizes them into special interestgroups and pressure groups (Birkland-institutionalinterest group) Concluded that special interest groups (Birkland-economic or private interest group) were very small Instruments used are lobbying, litigation, massmobilization Influence? Pharma majors & tobacco
Provide cues for voting – Democratsconservative or Republicans liberal(Statehouse Democracy)? Connecting link between ideologicalpreferences of electorate and Congress Help create public policy Controversial democraticaccountability – disproportionate powerover policy in senior members?
Brookings Institution (center-left), RAND & Cato (libertarian)Institute Ideologically placed but attimes disguised, eg NCPA Provide important social andpolitical inputs
Print media – muckrakers, Watergate, NYT,Washington Post Electronic media – CNN, VoA, NPR, C-SPAN Agenda-setting role: expand scope of conflict(Schattschneider) Debate between journalistic norms andprofitability Reporting bias, eg. Gulf War as confrontationbetween George Bush and Saddam Hossein ratherthan as war Remains major catalyst of public opinion
Regulated interest Subcommittees provide Agencies negotiatepolicy for distribution of with regulated interestbenefits Interests provide Interest support Congress political support towith political support and Congress and publiccontributions Be Be ne ne fiit ft s sp m pr om roov Subcommittees provide fiscal & political viid -C diin ub support to agency ngga .S ag Agency works for distribution of benefits ge ng enncCo with subcommittees cyy Birkland (2005): op. cit p. 98
Mutually reinforcing nature Policy monopolies (Baumgartner & Jones) Benefit distributing agency negotiates withinterests In return regulated interests supportsubcommittees In turn subcommittees support theagencies Eg. Dept., of Interior, Public Works,
Policies distributive – costs dispersed and benefitsconcentrated In reality the scope of conflict is much wider Conflict also complex with entering and exitingactors – venue shopping by interests (Baumgartner &Jones) Devolution of powers and public scrutiny add tocomplexity Wider definition – subgovernments – Ripley andFranklin Issue network – HecloDoes not explain ebbs and tides in policy making?
Socialization of power (Schattschneider) Focusing events, eg. Exxon-Valdez,March on Washington (1963) Mass mobilization, eg. Civil rights –liberal vs. conservative Local initiative, eg. California and MADD Public campaign using communicationand media
Varied definition of term ‘institution’ – “sharedconcepts used by humans in repetitive situationsorganized by rules, norms and strategies”. (Crawford &Ostrom 1995) Requirement of inputs from diverse disciplines Need for a coherent institutional framework tocompare models and theories in diverse settings Decisions made at multiple levels by variousindividuals with reference to combinations of sets ofrules Ostrom – institutions refer to “rules, norms andstrategies adopted by individuals operating within oracross organizations” (p. 37)
Ostrom (1999): op. cit p. 42Physical/Material Considerations Action Arena Attributes of Action Patterns of Community Situations Interactions Actors Evaluative Criteria Rules in Use Outcomes
Action Arena = Action Situation + Actors =“social space where individuals interact……” (p.42) 7 Variables of Action Situation: Participants,positions to be filled, outcomes, action-outcomelinkages, control that participants exercise,information & costs and benefits assigned tooutcomes Variables of Actors: Resources, valuation, useof information and knowledge contingencies,selection of particular courses of actionDo actors influence arenas or vice –versa?
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, FISCAL EQUIVALENCE, REDISTRIBUTIONALEVALUATION CRITERIA EQUITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, GENERAL MORALITY, ADAPTABILITY + INFORMATION INFORMATION PROCESSING Homo economicus COLLECTIVE CHOICE Fallible learner RULE CONFIGURATION - INFORMATION OUTCOME PHYSICAL WORLD
Free rider and excludability: Leads tounderinvestment in capital and maintenance, eg.irrigation projects – compliance depends uponlegitimacy of public choice mechanism used tomake provision decisions, eg. Public vote Subtractability of flow: Eg. Irrigation project –needs effective allocation mechanisms to obviateconflict among users – allocation rules determinesustainability Cultural attributes of a community: Ability tocooperate between communities reduces chancesof conflict , eg. involvement of tribes in forest areasfor ecological preservation
How is public interest defined and by whom? Do interest groups fill the void caused by generalelector disinterest? Does intensity of conflict between institutionsdetermine feasibility and sustainability of publicprojects? How do trades-off between institutions determinethe outcome of public policy? Do rule configurations regulate conflict betweencompeting institutions? Or are rule configurationsdecided by the competitors?