Your SlideShare is downloading. ×
0
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×

Thanks for flagging this SlideShare!

Oops! An error has occurred.

×
Saving this for later? Get the SlideShare app to save on your phone or tablet. Read anywhere, anytime – even offline.
Text the download link to your phone
Standard text messaging rates apply

Putting the tea back into cyber terrorism

940

Published on

Presentation by Charl van der Walt, Roelof Temmingh and Haroon Meer at BlackHat USA 2003. …

Presentation by Charl van der Walt, Roelof Temmingh and Haroon Meer at BlackHat USA 2003.

This presentation is about targeted, effective, automated attacks that could be used in countrywide cyberterrorism. A worm that targets internal networks is discussed as an example of such an attack.

Published in: Technology
0 Comments
1 Like
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

No Downloads
Views
Total Views
940
On Slideshare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
7
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
16
Comments
0
Likes
1
Embeds 0
No embeds

Report content
Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
No notes for slide

Transcript

  • 1. Cyber terrorism/warfareA packet can’t fly a plane…Typical types of attack: –Denial of service –Breeching the perimeterProblems with these attacks –Does not hurt enough –Not effective
  • 2. What we really need is…Attacks that are: –Targeted / Closely focused (T) –Closely coordinated –Wide enough to cripple a country –Very effective (E) –Too fast for human intervention – i.e. automated (A)
  • 3. Part I: A very nasty worm…Internal networks are weakPerimeters are strongInternal network: –Machines are never patched –Installed with unpatched software –New machines are added –Not segmented on network layerA multi–exploit worm’s paradise
  • 4. Part I: A very nasty worm…Let’s see: 1. Microsoft IIS Unicode / 2x decode 2. Microsoft IIS MSADC 3. Microsoft IIS .printer extensions 4. Microsoft IIS WebDAV 5. Microsoft SQL with blank SA configured 6. Blank local administrator passwords on Microsoft Windows hosts 7. …slammer… 8. Apache Chunked Encoding 9. OpenSSL < 0.9.6
  • 5. Part I: A very nasty worm…Finding more food Targeting on internal network and Internet very different. 1. Find your current network/mask 2. SNMP queries all around 3. Traceroute to Internet 4. Pingsweep one class C higher and lower 5. …brute force…
  • 6. Part I: A very nasty worm…Denial of service on internal networks is fun: –Wire speed flooding –ICMP redirection –MAC/ARP table trickery –DHCP lease exhaustion –Hijacking of TCP connectionsSince we are here…: –DOC/XLS/ZIP/MDB file corruption –BIOS flashing –Pop-up messages –Disable all routers you can find – island-ification
  • 7. IP/MASK TRACEROUTE LOCAL EXE INFECTIONSNMP BRUTE FORCE FLOODS TESTER BIOS FLASH ETC POP-UPS MAC/ARP POISON COPY REMOTE EXEC DHCP EXHAUST MESSAGE PROTOCOL
  • 8. Part II: DeliveryWho needs 0day silent delivery when you can mail an EXE to someone: • Using the correct language • From marketing@companyXX.com • Subject: “New screensaver for companyXX – click here” • With HTTPS link to intranet.companyXX.com…and then some funny characters…☺ • SSL neatly bypass all content level filters(even PowerPoint thinks its valid)
  • 9. Part II: DeliverySome stats:– Target group : IT security team – bank– 13 people in group– 8 downloaded the EXE– 5 executed itOne guy executed it 3 times…
  • 10. Part III: Targeted deliveryHow do you find someone on the Internet?• Google is your friend• +@companyXX.com -www.companyXX.com• Scrape it (TOC of Google)• Example…Hurriyet Newspaper in Turkey # perl emails.pl hurriyet.com.tr Received 83 Hits: [bavci@hurriyet.com.tr] [tturenc@hurriyet.com.tr] [ecolasan@hurriyet.com.tr] [yatakan@hurriyet.com.tr] [dhizlan@hurriyet.com.tr] [fsever@hurriyet.com.tr] [rcaglayangil@hurriyet.com.tr] </snip>
  • 11. Part III: Footprinting a countryWe can extract email addresses from companies – we need to find companies for each country in the following sectors: – Telecommunication – Energy providers (hydro, nuclear, fossil fuel, oil etc.) – Government departments / Military – Media providers – Financial services – Prominent businesses – Emergency services – Transport
  • 12. Part III: Footprinting a countryPrivate sector/Public sectorPrivate:• Problems with online directories (e.g. Google/DMOZ)• Solution is specialized directories• Some online (http://www.world-newspapers.com/), some better to extract (pros/cons)• Challenge – mapping company name to domain name• Method – page 9 of paper.
  • 13. Part III: Footprinting a countryPrivate sector/Public sectorPublic – government and militaryConcept of sub TLD – e.g. gov.zaNot the same for every country – e.g. France (gouv.fr)Interested in sub domains – maps to departments• We have Google scraper• We scrape gov.za (for example)• Look at all the subdomains• These becomes targetsMany military domains contained in gov sub TLD.Recursive scraping…finding *all* the sub domains
  • 14. Part IV: Putting it all togetherYears in the industrytaught us well-you need a GUI…!
  • 15. We love Turkey Conclusion Focused cyber attacks are possible This method would most likely have negative impact How does it compare to real life attacks? Is this YABMT? (yet another bigger mouse trap) What’s the chances of this happening? Should we worry?

×