SSL State of the Union
Sander Temme – Senior Product Line Manager
Thales e-Security – sctemme@apache.org
2
3 Everybody’s Going SSL
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/encrypt-web-report-whos-doing-what
4 Agenda
The SSL Protocol
Recent Security Developments
How Open Source Has Stumbled
Setting up a Test PKI
Questions?
SSL Protocol Considerations
6 What Does SSL Do For Us?
7
Server
www.example.com
Protocol Overview
Root CA
Certificate
Server
Certificate
Client
Here’s a Secret Scooby Snack
Hell...
8 Limitations
Only in transit
Must do Certificates Well
Blind Trust in Certificate Authorities
9 Limitations: Certificate Issues
10 Security Triad
11 Trust in Certificate Authorities?
Recent Security Developments
13 Protocol Attacks
BEAST, CRIME, TIME, Oh My!
We Are Not Cryptographers
u  We consume crypto
u  Sift through the headli...
14 Attacks are Good
Daylight as a Disinfectant
Flaws get fixed
Everyone benefits
But painful
u  Need a plan
15 This Week’s Joy: Heartbleed
Bug in heartbeat in OpenSSL
Fixed in 1.0.1g; 1.0.0, 0.9.8 not affected
Exploits virtually u...
16 Increase Trust in Certificates
DANE
Certificate Transparency
17 DANE: DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities
Associate Server Hostname with Certificate
TLS Association Records in ...
18 Certificate Transparency
Central registry of valid certificates
Domain owners publish, check
Client computers “gossip” ...
19 “New” Protocol Developments
Session Tickets
OCSP Stapling
Perfect Forward Secrecy
20 Session Tickets
Server encrypts session state
Hands to client
Resume: client hands back encrypted session
httpd 2.4 can...
21 OCSP Stapling
Online Certificate Status Protocol
Usually checked by client
Server obtains OCSP Response
Hands to client...
22 Perfect Forward Secrecy
No more Secret Scooby Snack
Diffie-Hellman key agreement
Server private key signs DH key
https:...
How Open Source has Stumbled
24
25 Apache Projects Implicated
Axis
Axis2
HttpClient 3.x
LibCloud
ActiveMQ
CXF
26 But Mostly Fixed
Axis – EOL
Axis2 – Workaround
HttpClient 3.x – EOL
LibCloud – Fixed
ActiveMQ – Fixed?
CXF – Fixed
Setting Up a PKI-let
Test Your Deployment with Real Certificates
28
Server
www.example.
com
Certificate Hierarchy
Root CA
Certificate
Issuing CA
Certificate
Leaf node
Certificate
Client
29 OpenSSL CA
https://github.com/sctemme/pkilet
Simple script + config
Quick CA hierarchy for testing
30 Usage
./pkilet.sh -newroot
./pkilet.sh -newissuing
./pkilet.sh -newleaf localhost
openssl s_server -accept 4433 
-key l...
31 Conclusion
The State of our Union is Strong
Continued Vigilance is needed
Supporting SSL is table stakes now
Embrace an...
32 Questions and Discussion
http://www.slideshare.net/sctemme
sctemme@apache.org
Follow @keysinthecloud on Twitter
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SSL State of the Union

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SSL State of the Union

  1. 1. SSL State of the Union Sander Temme – Senior Product Line Manager Thales e-Security – sctemme@apache.org
  2. 2. 2
  3. 3. 3 Everybody’s Going SSL https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/encrypt-web-report-whos-doing-what
  4. 4. 4 Agenda The SSL Protocol Recent Security Developments How Open Source Has Stumbled Setting up a Test PKI Questions?
  5. 5. SSL Protocol Considerations
  6. 6. 6 What Does SSL Do For Us?
  7. 7. 7 Server www.example.com Protocol Overview Root CA Certificate Server Certificate Client Here’s a Secret Scooby Snack Hello! Hello, it’s me! Verify Server Identity Derive Session Keys Encrypted Communications NOM NOM decrypt NOM
  8. 8. 8 Limitations Only in transit Must do Certificates Well Blind Trust in Certificate Authorities
  9. 9. 9 Limitations: Certificate Issues
  10. 10. 10 Security Triad
  11. 11. 11 Trust in Certificate Authorities?
  12. 12. Recent Security Developments
  13. 13. 13 Protocol Attacks BEAST, CRIME, TIME, Oh My! We Are Not Cryptographers u  We consume crypto u  Sift through the headlines u  Most attacks Responsibly Disclosed
  14. 14. 14 Attacks are Good Daylight as a Disinfectant Flaws get fixed Everyone benefits But painful u  Need a plan
  15. 15. 15 This Week’s Joy: Heartbleed Bug in heartbeat in OpenSSL Fixed in 1.0.1g; 1.0.0, 0.9.8 not affected Exploits virtually undetectable Unpleasant surprise u  Became public April 7, 2014 u  No advance warning u  Vendors are scrambling u  We all get to update! To wit u  New keys, get certificates reissued u  Old certificates revoked u  Assess and respond to possible intrusion https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2014-0160 http://heartbleed.com
  16. 16. 16 Increase Trust in Certificates DANE Certificate Transparency
  17. 17. 17 DANE: DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities Associate Server Hostname with Certificate TLS Association Records in DNS Secured by DNSSEC http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/ca-workshop-2013/presentations/Barnes_ca-workshop2013.pdf
  18. 18. 18 Certificate Transparency Central registry of valid certificates Domain owners publish, check Client computers “gossip” worldwide http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/ca-workshop-2013/presentations/Kasper_ca-workshop2013.pdf https://www.certificate-transparency.org
  19. 19. 19 “New” Protocol Developments Session Tickets OCSP Stapling Perfect Forward Secrecy
  20. 20. 20 Session Tickets Server encrypts session state Hands to client Resume: client hands back encrypted session httpd 2.4 can do this
  21. 21. 21 OCSP Stapling Online Certificate Status Protocol Usually checked by client Server obtains OCSP Response Hands to client httpd 2.4 can do this https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2013/07/29/ocsp-stapling-in-firefox/
  22. 22. 22 Perfect Forward Secrecy No more Secret Scooby Snack Diffie-Hellman key agreement Server private key signs DH key https://blog.twitter.com/2013/forward-secrecy-at-twitter
  23. 23. How Open Source has Stumbled
  24. 24. 24
  25. 25. 25 Apache Projects Implicated Axis Axis2 HttpClient 3.x LibCloud ActiveMQ CXF
  26. 26. 26 But Mostly Fixed Axis – EOL Axis2 – Workaround HttpClient 3.x – EOL LibCloud – Fixed ActiveMQ – Fixed? CXF – Fixed
  27. 27. Setting Up a PKI-let Test Your Deployment with Real Certificates
  28. 28. 28 Server www.example. com Certificate Hierarchy Root CA Certificate Issuing CA Certificate Leaf node Certificate Client
  29. 29. 29 OpenSSL CA https://github.com/sctemme/pkilet Simple script + config Quick CA hierarchy for testing
  30. 30. 30 Usage ./pkilet.sh -newroot ./pkilet.sh -newissuing ./pkilet.sh -newleaf localhost openssl s_server -accept 4433 -key leaves/localhost_key.pem -cert leaves/localhost_cert.pem -CAfile issuingCA/cacert.pem -www curl --cacert rootCA/cacert.pem https://localhost:4433/
  31. 31. 31 Conclusion The State of our Union is Strong Continued Vigilance is needed Supporting SSL is table stakes now Embrace and Test your SSL Support
  32. 32. 32 Questions and Discussion http://www.slideshare.net/sctemme sctemme@apache.org Follow @keysinthecloud on Twitter

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