The Future of    Automated Malware Generation                  Stephan Chenette    Director of Security Research & Develop...
Who Am I?    • Stephan Chenette @StephanChenette (twitter)    • Currently Director of Security R&D @ IOActive      •Buildi...
What I hope you learn…    • An understanding of the current malware landscape    • Various malware/exploit defense techniq...
Statement    This particular topic/area is a personal research interest    of mine –    I’m hoping to basically motivate y...
Agenda    • Current State of Automated Malware Generation    • Current State of Malware Defense (Tech.)    • Malware Trend...
Malware Distribution Networks              (MDNs)6
Malware Distribution Networks    Malware has evolved into a profitable business for    cyber criminals    •Complex/Organiz...
Malware Distribution Networks (MDNs)                                 2                 3                4                 ...
Malware Distribution Networks (MDNs)      Single Sample Repository        A repository that does not update the malicious ...
Example: Blackhole Exploit Kit     Blackhole contains an integrated AV scanner and will auto-repackage if     malware is d...
Exploit Kits and Malware        Blackhole | Ingognito || ZeroAccess | TDSS     Source: Manufacturing Compromise: The Emerg...
Agenda     • Current State of Automated Malware Generation     • Current State of Malware Defense (Tech.)     • Malware Tr...
Current State of Malware         Defense (Tech.)13
Current Techniques     • Hash     • Signatures     • Heuristics     • Semantics-aware detection14
Current Techniques              Attacker             Defender          Easier to bypass   Easier to implement          Har...
Hash-based detection     • Full file hashing (cryptographic checksum)       •MD5, SHA1, SHA256     • Portable Executable (...
Defeating Hash-based detection     • Create Unique malware sample per user request       •Randomizing single byte in irrel...
Signature-based detection     • Regular Expression based signatures (PCRE, RE2)     • Byte-signatures      rule ASPack    ...
Defeating Signature-based detection     • Syntax mutation easily defeats this technique              •    Garbage Code Ins...
Heuristics are introduced…     AV engines were forced to evolve and use heuristics by     way of emulation/behavioral anal...
Heuristics-based detection     General term for the different techniques used to     detect malware by their behavior     ...
Defeating Heuristics-based detection     • Detect emulation and execute different code path     • Break emulation engine  ...
Semantics-aware Detection      • Captured execution trace is transformed into a higher-level        representation capturi...
Semantics-aware detection      Good idea in theory, but unknown (to me) how widely      implemented this is in security pr...
Defeating Semantics-aware detection      Implementation is difficult      Limited support for equivalent code sequences   ...
Recap26
Agenda     • Current State of Automated Malware Generation     • Current State of Malware Defense (Tech.)     • Malware Tr...
Malware Trends28
Malware Detection Reality Check     • How well are current detection techniques working?                       33%!29
Malware Samples     Observation: # of Malware Samples are increasing     Source: Mcafee Global Q12012 Threat Report     (h...
Mobile Malware Samples     Observation: # of Android Malware Samples are     increasing     Source: Kaspersky Q12012 Threa...
Use of Behavior Sandboxes     Client binary is malware but isn’t detected.     Suspicious files are sent back to “home bas...
The Overworked Malware Analyst33
Solving the problem with people      Malware Analysts      Malware Samples                            Samples             ...
Agenda     • Current State of Automated Malware Generation     • Current State of Malware Defense (Tech.)     • Malware Tr...
The Future of Malware Defense     Skynet? …probably not     But some of the concepts aren’t too far fetched…36
The Future of Malware Defense       Perhaps malware detection should have more                  science applied to it.37
The Malware Infinity Problem     Malware detection     As malware samples approaches ∞ we can’t manually     add detection...
The Future of Malware Defense     IF we are going to start modeling we must make     some assumptions:     1.Attackers are...
The Who is important…     “Researchers at Symantec traced the group’s work after     finding a number of similarities betw...
Statistics     A discipline that makes you understand data and     makes you make decisions based on data                 ...
Train the Machines            •Classify            •Cluster42
Automatic Classification                                                                                                  ...
Machine learning     Where we train computers to make statistical     decisions on real-time data based on inputted data  ...
Historical Observation     Historically certain malware has     •No icon     •No description or company in resource sectio...
Expert Humans train Machines     “You can’t effectively and consistently manage what you can’t     measure, and you can’t ...
Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms     • Naive Baysian Classifier (each feature is independent of the       other features) ...
The Future of Malware Defense                      Network                     File System                   Physical Memo...
The Future of Malware Defense49
Existing Academic work…     • D. Plonka and P. Barford. Context-Aware Clustering of DNS Query       Traffic. In Proceedings...
Projects using machine learning      •Razorbacktm -       http://sourceforge.net/projects/razorbacktm/files/      •Malheur...
Statistics Based Detection Tools52
The Future of Malware Defense      •Using Machine learning for malware detection is only as       useful as the features y...
PDF Example Features     • Compressed JavaScript     • PDF header location e.g %PDF - within first 1024 bytes     • Does i...
Detecting shellcode                                   • Marchov chains                                     To determine pr...
Shellcode detection     Decoder routine clustering     Detect entropy of bytes to indicated encoded     payload     ...fea...
Malware features in action …     • Features:       •Static:          • Packed          • File size          • Origin      ...
The Future of Malware Defense     • Choose features that are harder for the attacker to       change.       •E.g. bot netw...
Agenda     • Current State of Automated Malware Generation     • Current State of Malware Defense (Tech.)     • Malware Tr...
The Future of Automated       Malware Generation60
The Future of Malware Offense     The Attacker has a few things in their favor:     1.Prone to False Positives          Ma...
Prone to false positives     If the defense side creates models based on a small sample     set or a sample set that doesn...
Avoid feature indicators     • Attackers can always do the same research and model generic       malware and avoid feature...
New features come out…     • If format changes, or gets updated:       •A new file/protocol parser must be created/updated...
…OR Just keep is simple     Encrypt binaries with a user-specific key so that AV     can’t decrypt it     •Targeted binary...
Conclusion     • Complex/Organized Network     • Malware distribution network (MDNs)       •Pay-per-install (PPI) clients ...
Conclusion     Today, what I hope that you learned is that if     you want to truly understand your defensive     technolo...
Conclusion     Proper security is all about a defense-in-depth     strategy. Create multiple layers of defense.     Every ...
Conclusion     External reconnaissance     Penetration     Internal reconnaissance + stage persistent state     Exfiltrati...
Questions?     questions.py:     while len(questions) > 0:       if time <= 0:           break       print answers[questio...
Thanks Pacsec!            Stephan Chenette | @StephanChenette            Director of Research and Development             ...
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The Future of Automated Malware Generation

  1. 1. The Future of Automated Malware Generation Stephan Chenette Director of Security Research & Development1
  2. 2. Who Am I? • Stephan Chenette @StephanChenette (twitter) • Currently Director of Security R&D @ IOActive •Building / Breaking / Hacking / Researching • R&D @ eEye Digital Security 4+ years • Head Security Researcher @ Websense 6+ years • (Graduate Student @ UCSD - Network Security)2
  3. 3. What I hope you learn… • An understanding of the current malware landscape • Various malware/exploit defense techniques • Where I think detection/defense technologies are headed • How malware authors will most likely react  drive the future of automated malware generation3
  4. 4. Statement This particular topic/area is a personal research interest of mine – I’m hoping to basically motivate you to think offensively when building or using defensive technologies… For Example: I’m currently helping on an open source automated detection technology for the cuckoo sandbox – and am trying to evade/bypass it at the same time4
  5. 5. Agenda • Current State of Automated Malware Generation • Current State of Malware Defense (Tech.) • Malware Trends • The Future of Malware Defense • The Future of Automated Malware Generation5
  6. 6. Malware Distribution Networks (MDNs)6
  7. 7. Malware Distribution Networks Malware has evolved into a profitable business for cyber criminals •Complex/Organized/Distributed Network •Malware Distribution Network (MDNs) •Pay-per-install (PPI) clients (RogueAV, SpamBot, keylogger) •PPI Services •PPI Affiliates (landing pages, redirection services, etc.)7
  8. 8. Malware Distribution Networks (MDNs) 2 3 4 1 Source: Microsoft Security Intelligence Threat Report (http://www.microsoft.com/sir )8
  9. 9. Malware Distribution Networks (MDNs) Single Sample Repository A repository that does not update the malicious executable for the lifetime of the repository. Multiple Sample Repository A repository that performs updates to the malicious executable over time, but is not generating the samples for each request Polymorphic/Metamorphic Repository A repository that produces a unique malicious executable for every download request9
  10. 10. Example: Blackhole Exploit Kit Blackhole contains an integrated AV scanner and will auto-repackage if malware is detected Figure: Blackhole exploit kit download chain Source: Manufacturing Compromise: The Emergence of Exploit-as-a-Service (http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~voelker/pubs/eaas-ccs12.pdf)10
  11. 11. Exploit Kits and Malware Blackhole | Ingognito || ZeroAccess | TDSS Source: Manufacturing Compromise: The Emergence of Exploit-as-a-Service (http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~voelker/pubs/eaas-ccs12.pdf)11
  12. 12. Agenda • Current State of Automated Malware Generation • Current State of Malware Defense (Tech.) • Malware Trends • The Future of Malware Defense • The Future of Automated Malware Generation12
  13. 13. Current State of Malware Defense (Tech.)13
  14. 14. Current Techniques • Hash • Signatures • Heuristics • Semantics-aware detection14
  15. 15. Current Techniques Attacker Defender Easier to bypass Easier to implement Harder to change Harder to implement15
  16. 16. Hash-based detection • Full file hashing (cryptographic checksum) •MD5, SHA1, SHA256 • Portable Executable (PE) •Sectional hashing •Custom hashing •Fuzzy hashing (ssdeep) • Error on the side of caution16
  17. 17. Defeating Hash-based detection • Create Unique malware sample per user request •Randomizing single byte in irrelevant file offset •Re-packaging binary (FSG, ASPack, Themida) •Re-building malware dynamically17
  18. 18. Signature-based detection • Regular Expression based signatures (PCRE, RE2) • Byte-signatures rule ASPack {         strings:         $ = { 60 E8 ?? ?? ?? ?? 5D 81 ED ?? ?? (43 | 44) ?? B8 ?? ?? (43 | 44) ?? 03 C5 }         $ = { 60 EB ?? 5D EB ?? FF ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? E9 }         $ = { 60 EB 03 5D FF E5 E8 F8 FF FF FF 81 ED 1B 6A 44 00 BB 10 6A 44 00 03 DD 2B 9D 2A }         $ = { 60 E8 00 00 00 00 5D ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? BB ?? ?? ?? ?? 03 DD }         $ = { 60 E8 41 06 00 00 EB 41 }         $ = { 60 E8 7? 05 00 00 EB (33 | 4C) }              condition:                  for any of them : ($ at entrypoint) } • Deeper contextual content scanning with proprietary language18
  19. 19. Defeating Signature-based detection • Syntax mutation easily defeats this technique • Garbage Code Insertion e.g. NOP, “MOV ax, ax”, “SUB ax 0” • Register Renaming • Subroutine Permutation • Code Reordering through Jumps • Equivalent instruction substitution Instruction Equivalent instruction MOV EAX, EBX PUSH EBX, POP EAX Call Emulated Call Misused Call CALL <target> PUSH <PC + sizeof(PUSH) + sizeof(JMP)> CALL <target> JMP <target> .target POP <register-name> • Same behavior but different syntax19
  20. 20. Heuristics are introduced… AV engines were forced to evolve and use heuristics by way of emulation/behavioral analysis due to: •Polymorphic engines • Encrypt body with randomly generated encryption algorithm • Private key normally in decoding engine •Metamorphic engines • Employs obfuscation/substitution techniques instead of encryption • Junk insertion, equivalent instruction substitution, etc.20
  21. 21. Heuristics-based detection General term for the different techniques used to detect malware by their behavior Emulation, API hooking, sand-boxing, file anomalies and other analysis techniques Rule A Rule B Rule C IF Rule A then Rule B then Rule C then Poison Ivy Source: (http://http://hooked-on-mnemonics.blogspot.com)21
  22. 22. Defeating Heuristics-based detection • Detect emulation and execute different code path • Break emulation engine • Avoid the heuristics • Overall solid method • Possible false positives22
  23. 23. Semantics-aware Detection • Captured execution trace is transformed into a higher-level representation capturing its semantic meaning, i.e., the trace is first abstracted before being compared to a malicious behavior • Make the time to build the code flow or extraction of a model infeasible for real-time AV using time lock puzzles • Intermediate representation (IR) • Abstract Syntax Trees, Register Transfer Language23
  24. 24. Semantics-aware detection Good idea in theory, but unknown (to me) how widely implemented this is in security products24
  25. 25. Defeating Semantics-aware detection Implementation is difficult Limited support for equivalent code sequences a = b * 2 a = b << 1 A left arithmetic shift by n is equivalent to multiplying by 2n (provided the value does not overflow) Focus on same techniques used to defeat signatures and heuristics + likelihood of limited support less popular instructions25
  26. 26. Recap26
  27. 27. Agenda • Current State of Automated Malware Generation • Current State of Malware Defense (Tech.) • Malware Trends • The Future of Malware Defense • The Future of Automated Malware Generation27
  28. 28. Malware Trends28
  29. 29. Malware Detection Reality Check • How well are current detection techniques working? 33%!29
  30. 30. Malware Samples Observation: # of Malware Samples are increasing Source: Mcafee Global Q12012 Threat Report (http://mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-quarterly-threat-q1-2012.pdf)30
  31. 31. Mobile Malware Samples Observation: # of Android Malware Samples are increasing Source: Kaspersky Q12012 Threat Report (http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792231/IT_Threat_Evolution_Q1_2012)31
  32. 32. Use of Behavior Sandboxes Client binary is malware but isn’t detected. Suspicious files are sent back to “home base/cloud” lab for analysis 1.Sent to sandbox system 2.Meta data report is created for easier export of new rules a. Hash and blacklist entries are added b. Signatures are added c. Heuristic detection is added32
  33. 33. The Overworked Malware Analyst33
  34. 34. Solving the problem with people Malware Analysts Malware Samples Samples A D!! L O O VER34
  35. 35. Agenda • Current State of Automated Malware Generation • Current State of Malware Defense (Tech.) • Malware Trends • The Future of Malware Defense • The Future of Automated Malware Generation35
  36. 36. The Future of Malware Defense Skynet? …probably not But some of the concepts aren’t too far fetched…36
  37. 37. The Future of Malware Defense Perhaps malware detection should have more science applied to it.37
  38. 38. The Malware Infinity Problem Malware detection As malware samples approaches ∞ we can’t manually add detection for every file. We must model WHAT actions malware take, HOW it makes those actions and WHERE it makes connected. Malware Attribution As Attack Surface approaches ∞ we can’t defend everything from everyone. We must model WHO is after WHICH assets and HOW they attack.38
  39. 39. The Future of Malware Defense IF we are going to start modeling we must make some assumptions: 1.Attackers are going to change their code and techniques only enough to avoid detection 2.The majority of malware/exploits code and techniques will continue to represent future malware/exploits code and techniques39
  40. 40. The Who is important… “Researchers at Symantec traced the group’s work after finding a number of similarities between the Google attack code and methods and those used against other companies and organizations over the last few years. The researchers, who describe their findings in a report published Friday, say the gang — which they have dubbed the “Elderwood gang” based on the name of a parameter used in the attack codes — appears to have breached more than 1,000 computers in companies spread throughout several sectors – including defense, shipping, oil and gas, financial, technology and ISPs. The group has also targeted non- governmental organizations, particularly ones connected to human rights activities related to Tibet and China” Source: http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/09/google- hacker-gang-returns/40
  41. 41. Statistics A discipline that makes you understand data and makes you make decisions based on data S T A T I Data S Decisions T I C S41
  42. 42. Train the Machines •Classify •Cluster42
  43. 43. Automatic Classification Steps: 1.Extract features 2.Train models using ML algorithms 3.Feature Selection 4.Use models as classifiers 5.Use models to classify unknown files as 0 or 1 Source: http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-dlp_machine_learning.WP_en-us.pdf43
  44. 44. Machine learning Where we train computers to make statistical decisions on real-time data based on inputted data While machine learning as a concept has been around for decades and has been used in everything from anti-spam engines to Google™ algorithms for translating text, it is only now being applied to web filtering, DLP and malware content analysis.44
  45. 45. Historical Observation Historically certain malware has •No icon •No description or company in resource section •Is packed •Lives in windows directory or user profile These are the type of “features” that expert humans would feed to machine learning classifiers to train on45
  46. 46. Expert Humans train Machines “You can’t effectively and consistently manage what you can’t measure, and you can’t measure what you haven’t defined…” SOURCE: http://fairwiki.riskmanagementinsight.com/?page_id=3 •The job of the human •List features •The job of the machine •Model which features are important, in what grouping and in what order •Classify •Cluster46
  47. 47. Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms • Naive Baysian Classifier (each feature is independent of the other features) • Support Vector Machine (SVM) when high dimensionality (high dimensionality.. more than a thousand of variables are in the model) • Random Forest when you want an interpretable model (< 2000 features) • Marchov Chains (Natural Language Processing) for when you want to assess the sequence probability47
  48. 48. The Future of Malware Defense Network File System Physical Memory Inspection Point Every Layer provides various degrees of “features” to inspect48
  49. 49. The Future of Malware Defense49
  50. 50. Existing Academic work… • D. Plonka and P. Barford. Context-Aware Clustering of DNS Query Traffic. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet Measurement, October 2008. • R. Perdisci, W. Lee, and N. Feamster. Behavioral Clustering of HTTP- Based Malware and Signature Generation Using Malicious Network Traces. In Proceedings of the 7th USENIX conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation, April 2010. • K. Rieck, P. Trinius, C. Willems, T. Holz. Automatic Analysis of Malware Behavior using Machine Learning. e Journal of Computer Security, 201150
  51. 51. Projects using machine learning •Razorbacktm - http://sourceforge.net/projects/razorbacktm/files/ •Malheur - http://www.mlsec.org/malheur/ •Malvic - http://www.malvic.org •Adobe Open Source Malware Classification Tool http://sourceforge.net/projects/malclassifier.adobe/ • 98.21% accuracy • 6.7% false positive rate • 7 features = DebugSize, ImageVersion, IatRVA, ExportSize, ResourceSize, VirtualSize2, NumberOfSections51
  52. 52. Statistics Based Detection Tools52
  53. 53. The Future of Malware Defense •Using Machine learning for malware detection is only as useful as the features you create and the good and bad sample sets it’s trained on. • Features • Good Sample Set • Bad Sample Set • If you have 1000’s of samples but on the same malware or sample exploit…not good!!!53
  54. 54. PDF Example Features • Compressed JavaScript • PDF header location e.g %PDF - within first 1024 bytes • Does it contain an embedded file (e.g. flash, sound file) • Signed by a trusted certificate • Encoded/Encrypted Streams e.g. FlatDecode • Names hex escaped • Bogus xref table Reference: http://blog.fireeye.com/files/27c3_julia_wolf_omg-wtf-pdf.pdf54
  55. 55. Detecting shellcode • Marchov chains To determine probability of instruction sequences 0.3 • Technique clustering 0.7 0.4 0.6 XOR ECX, ECX ; ECX = 0 MOV ESI, [FS:ECX + 0x30] ; ESI = &(PEB) ([FS:0x30]) MOV ESI, [ESI + 0x0C] ; ESI = PEB->Ldr MOV ESI, [ESI + 0x1C] ; ESI = PEB->Ldr.InInitOrder next_module: MOV EBP, [ESI + 0x08] ; EBP = InInitOrder[X].base_address MOV EDI, [ESI + 0x20] ; EBP = InInitOrder[X].module_name (unicode) MOV ESI, [ESI] ; ESI = InInitOrder[X].flink (next module) CMP [EDI + 12*2], CL ; modulename[12] == 0 ? JNE next_module ; No: try next module.55
  56. 56. Shellcode detection Decoder routine clustering Detect entropy of bytes to indicated encoded payload ...features =]56
  57. 57. Malware features in action … • Features: •Static: • Packed • File size • Origin •Dynamic (Network) • Makes a connection • Number of DNS request • Encrypted Communication • Burst/length of communication •Dynamic (File) • Register keys • File level modifications57
  58. 58. The Future of Malware Defense • Choose features that are harder for the attacker to change. •E.g. bot network communication protocol (if not encrypted)58
  59. 59. Agenda • Current State of Automated Malware Generation • Current State of Malware Defense (Tech.) • Malware Trends • The Future of Malware Defense • The Future of Automated Malware Generation59
  60. 60. The Future of Automated Malware Generation60
  61. 61. The Future of Malware Offense The Attacker has a few things in their favor: 1.Prone to False Positives Machine learning can be prone to false positives and false negatives if feature and sample sets aren’t extensive enough 1.Avoid Feature Indicators Detection via machine learning can be defeated if an attacker can find out where the features are and avoid them 1.New Features Come Out… You cant protect yourself from a new weapon if you dont know it exist61
  62. 62. Prone to false positives If the defense side creates models based on a small sample set or a sample set that doesn’t represent a diverse enough sample set than the model will be too restrictive – false negatives If the defense creates models based only on malicious files and not enough good files there will be tons of false positives An Attacker can always try poison the sample sets if they have enough manipulation power and resources (VirusTotal)62
  63. 63. Avoid feature indicators • Attackers can always do the same research and model generic malware and avoid features that are being used by most malware • …to instead use features that that are more popular in benign software • This will also avoid being placed in known clusters63
  64. 64. New features come out… • If format changes, or gets updated: •A new file/protocol parser must be created/updated to understand and extract features •The model must be retrained and shipped out64
  65. 65. …OR Just keep is simple Encrypt binaries with a user-specific key so that AV can’t decrypt it •Targeted binary like Gauss •Encrypted DLL with user key •Zeus •Encrypted the downloaded binary with user key65
  66. 66. Conclusion • Complex/Organized Network • Malware distribution network (MDNs) •Pay-per-install (PPI) clients •Malware crypt services will include • Feature verification • anti-clustering technology  the Future? • anti-classification technology  The Future? Will this be the future of automated malware generation? Or will it just be more of the same?66
  67. 67. Conclusion Today, what I hope that you learned is that if you want to truly understand your defensive technology you have to understand it’s limitations and look at things from an attacker/offensive viewpoint.67
  68. 68. Conclusion Proper security is all about a defense-in-depth strategy. Create multiple layers of defense. Every layer presenting a different set of challenges, requiring different skill sets and technology. So every layer will increase the time and effort to compromise your environment and exfiltration data.68
  69. 69. Conclusion External reconnaissance Penetration Internal reconnaissance + stage persistent state Exfiltration If security strategy is successful: via your layered defenses the attack is stopped before exfiltration of data can happen.69
  70. 70. Questions? questions.py: while len(questions) > 0: if time <= 0: break print answers[questions.pop()]70
  71. 71. Thanks Pacsec! Stephan Chenette | @StephanChenette Director of Research and Development IOActive, Inc. http://ioactive.com71
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