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Copyright © 2008, Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, annapolis, Mary-PROFESSIONAL NOTES                                   ...
the Soviet air threat—and see how they           height of our Cold War confrontation with      the Russians dust off thei...
PROFESSIONAL NOTES                                                                                                        ...
seriously and make crucial decisions with         gether target data from ships and aircraft           CEC composite track...
PROFESSIONAL NOTES radar data contributed to the composite                                            in warfighting capab...
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FPD Thailand Shows the Way - U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine

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Transcript of "FPD Thailand Shows the Way - U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Magazine"

  1. 1. Copyright © 2008, Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, annapolis, Mary-PROFESSIONAL NOTES land (410) 268-6110 www.usni.org The Bear Comes Out of Hibernation The ex-Soviet surface navy has become By Commander T. J. McKearney, U.S. Navy (Retired) a largely coastal force. It has abandoned sea-based tactical aviation and relies onT he Russian overflight of U.S. forces operating near Guam last Au- surface combatants for at-sea strikes. gust brings flashbacks to those of us who grew up in the Cold War The evolution of the Russian submarine capability has been slow, and the Kursk Navy. A routine part of our deployments then was to anticipate tragedy of 2000 raises legitimate ques-similar events by the Soviet naval air Knee-jerk tendencies and larger issues tions as to the proficiency of the once-forces. From the first indication that a of contemporary Russian strategy aside, proud Soviet submarine force. Finally,Soviet Bear D (Delta) reconnaissance air- how should we see this? Are the Russians the Soviets’ ability to fight at sea wascraft had launched in search of our carrier really as bad we thought back then? Are dependent on a now-dismantled surveil-battle or amphibious ready group, to the they a mere shadow of what they once lance network, the SOSS (Soviet Oceanhighly photogenic overflight of the lum- were? Just as important, have we lost the Surveillance System), to locate U.S. navalbering, turboprop-driven behemoth with ability to respond to a threat that we spent forces and coordinate an overwhelmingits escort of our F-14s, we were ready. The the better part of half a century learning saturation attack.surveillance, intercept, and engagement re- to counter? For our part, the U.S. Navy has madesources of the U.S. battle group and sup- steady gains in the evolution of some ofporting forces ashore were all boresighted The Looming Past? our area air-defense capabilities, but aon catching the Soviets outside the launch It’s been about 15 years since our dis- couple of asterisks are in order. On theenvelope of their antiship missile-equipped engagement from the Soviet threat at sea. plus side, the current-generation Aegis,Badger and Backfire bombers. Both the U.S. and Russian navies have SM-2, and soon-to-be-deployed SM-3 provide an umbrella over a force that is far more responsive and integrated than it was the last time we strained our eyes look- ing for the Bear D to appear on our scopes. However, the com- bination of the F-14 Tomcat and the Phoe- nix missile system made it possible for us to engage air-to-air the Soviet Badger and Backfire regiments at a range of 500 miles. U.S. Navy We can’t do this today.BEARS ON THE LOOSE The Soviet Tu-95 Bear D, a lumbering, turboprop-driven behemoth (here in 1983), was always And our smaller carriera photogenic threat during the Cold War. Today it’s back. air wings, built around the F/A-18 Hornet and This was serious stuff. Our ability to changed a great deal in that time. The new Super Hornet, lack the airframes to main-project power around the globe and to the Russian federation made it clear in the tain the antiair “grid” and simultaneouslyvery edge of the Soviet empire was de- early 1990s that the cost of global naval conduct long-range strikes.pendent on winning this game of counting operations was one they were unwilling to This brief assessment does not sug-coup. I’m sure the recent Guam incident bear. Consequently, this recent attempt to gest we’ve regressed to a point where aand subsequent pronouncement by Sovi— threaten us with their long-range aviation shooting match against the Russian Navyoops! I mean Russian military officials will be a struggle. The aviation forces fly- would be a near thing. We’re still thethat their sortie was a sign of things to ing out to meet us now are substantially big guys now, and those Russian pilotscome have led to brow-furrowing by those the same as during the Cold War, but the flying out to our operating areas shouldwho remember the bad old days. These threat the Soviets presented in their hey- keep smiling and looking friendly. But it’sinitial reactions are likely to be reflexive: day was the product of their employment clearly time to pull out the greensheets“See, here they go again; we really can’t in an integrated, coordinated force that and TACNOTES of 20 years ago—thetrust them!” cannot be reconstructed anytime soon. tactics on which we relied in the face of76 • February 2008 www.usni.org
  2. 2. the Soviet air threat—and see how they height of our Cold War confrontation with the Russians dust off their flight manuals,stack up today. the Soviets. The Chinese are a long way we need to be mindful that naval power is from presenting the sort of global naval on the rise globally—among nations of allThe Bear or the Dragon? threat that the Soviets did, and it’s debat- sizes and all intentions. Stay tuned. Soon The mildly upsetting sensation that the able whether they will; global hegemony we’ll see a news report about a RussianRussians may be giving us with their re- may not be their style. aircraft flying over a Chinese PLAN ex-born naval aviation adds to a more recent However, the aggressiveness with ercise.distress that the Chinese People’s Libera- which the PLAN is expanding its over- The Russian Bear excursion high-tion Army Navy (PLAN) has caused. The all capabilities is impressive and should lights the fact that the western Pacific isPLAN is building new systems (or buying shock us out of our post-Soviet compla- a crowded place. The Russians have de-them from other people—like the Rus- cency in regard to warfighting at sea. In cided to nudge their way back in, whichsians!), conducting out-of-area deploy- truth, we’re straining to reestablish blue- should remind us that we need to maintainments, and confronting our naval forces water capabilities, such as antisubmarine a broad naval capability that is equally vi-at sea in a manner not unlike the Soviets warfare, that we have not exercised since able in the small wars of the littorals andof old. the ex-Soviets tied themselves to the piers against other navies intent on sharing the Concern is in order, whether this is part and put the Bears in mothballs in the early blue waters of the open oceans.of the perennial conflict over our Taiwan 1990s.policy or a wider challenge to our regional For several years following that de-naval power projection in the western Pa- velopment, the United States gradually Commander McKearney, a retired surface warfarecific and Indian Oceans. Clearly the PLAN shifted naval power toward the Pacific. officer, spent his naval career worrying about the Soviets. Today he is president of The Ranger Groupis committed to developing a tactical ca- But clearly the race is now on again. As in San Diego, analyzing contemporary and futurepability unseen by the U.S. Navy since the the Chinese work to get their sea legs and naval and military needs. FPD Thailand Shows the Way By Scott M. BernatT he U.S. military remains dependent on host nation support to ensure thesafety and security of its forward-deployed with host nation security forces inevitably dictate the quality and level of support we receive. plained in both English and Thai, while demonstrations by Thai security forces show the FPD the country’s capabilities,forces in many countries throughout the limitations, and intentions. Reporting thisworld. An effective Force Protection Pro- Relationships Evolve from critical information remains essential togram is equally dependent on the timely Communication the development of appropriate force pro-receipt of accurate threat information and FPD Thailand ensured a high level of tection plans and the establishment of aon a thorough understanding of a country’s host nation security response and support meaningful security posture.security capabilities, limitations, and inten- through seminars, exchanges between ex-tions. Force Protection Detachment (FPD) perts on subjects of mutual importance, Teamwork Gets ResultsThailand’s comprehensive approach to FP and lecture programs. Since the program’s inception, FPDsupport includes continuous interaction and Established during September 2004 in Thailand has relied on the expertise ofteamwork with Royal Thai law enforce- partnership with the Naval Criminal In- many qualified individuals and associatedment and military security personnel, effec- vestigative Service (NCIS) Greater South- agencies, including the U.S. Departmenttively leveraging host nation physical secu- east Asia Field Office and the NCIS Secu- of State Diplomatic Security Service,rity and intelligence support before, during, rity Training, Assistance, and Assessment Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force,and after U.S. military deployments. Team Pacific, the program capitalizes on Coast Guard, Naval Criminal Investiga- Sovereign country legal restrictions an exchange of information during each tive Service, Air Force Office of Specialoften prohibit American security person- session. Investigations, National Guard and Re-nel from disembarking weapons or other Direct participation is often required serves, federal, state, and local law-en-designated equipment such as handcuffs, through question and answer periods, forcement agencies, as well as privatebatons, and even bulletproof vests. There- practical exercises, and scenarios designed contractors, all with verified law-enforce-fore, for our deployed ships, aircraft, ve- to showcase the equipment, procedures, ment and/or security experience. S-3 Ser-hicles, and personnel to remain secure, we response, and effectiveness of each host vices Inc., a U.S.-Thai-owned companyneed host nation security support. We are nation agency in attendance. that the U.S. Army Special Forces, Drugalways dependent on their capabilities and American standards of conduct and Enforcement Administration, and Depart-limitations. The relationships that we form security-support requirements are ex- ment of Energy routinely use, provideswww.usni.org PROCEEDINGS • 77
  3. 3. PROFESSIONAL NOTES blankets with the various Royal Thai law enforcement and military security forces that provide direct support to U.S. deploy- ments. This heightens local security, both for U.S. forces and for the Thai and in- ternational communities. Shared Information Improves International Rapport As FPD productivity has increased, relationships with Thai law enforcement and military security personnel have im- proved, which demonstrates the program’s success. Requests for threat information and security support routinely receive positive responses from program attend- ees, who often participate in the planning, preparation, and execution of U.S. mili- tary security-related activities. FPD Thailand has set the standard for excellence, effectively leveraging host na- tion FP intelligence and physical security support through the use of available re- FPD ThaIlaND (DavID l. TUrNer) sources, liaison, and the demonstration of force protection requirements. This program model has been imple- mented around the world in various forms, STUDY OTHER CULTURES During a Force Protection Seminar in Phuket, Royal Thai Police dem- based on assessed needs of the host na- onstrate techniques for clearing a room and securing a scene. tion’s security services. FPDs located in Australia, Chile, Columbia, El Salvador, critical interpreter/translator and admin- and survival, and police officer first re- Guatemala, the Philippines, and Singapore istrative support. sponder. Law enforcement and security have already presented seminars and ex- In presentations, exchanges, and lectures scenario-based English language sessions pert exchanges in direct support of U.S. on the security needs of deployed forces, are also included to help the Royal Thai military deployments. The continuation the numerous topics covered include port Police interact with visiting U.S. military and expansion of this program will en- and airfield security, physical security, personnel. hance host nation security force engage- convoy security, terrorism and terrorist More than 2,000 host nation personnel ment and understanding, leading to an methodologies, introduction to explosives have participated in the program—Royal effective FP posture for visiting forces. and improvised explosive devices (IED), Thai government officials, police, and all bomb threat and IED response, weapons branches of the military. In addition, to Mr. Bernat is a U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative of mass destruction, checkpoint security further enhance the country’s mitigation Service special agent assigned to FPD Thailand. procedures, vulnerability surveys, route and response capabilities, FPD Thailand During his 21-year career, Bernat has deployed throughout Asia, Central America, Europe, Middle analysis, surveillance detection, maritime has deployed metal detectors, search mir- East, Oceania, and the United States in support of law enforcement, police officer safety rors, flashlights, and bomb suppression the U.S. military. Beating the Fast Attack Craft Threat By Steven Noonen O n 6 January 2008, five Iranian speed- boats were reported to have made “provocative actions” against three U.S. to have been heard via radio. But Iran de- nied the incident, and subsequent report- ing confirmed that alternative explanations ships and our allies against threats on the high seas. These types of actions occur globally— warships in the Strait of Hormuz. “I’m may include normal radio noise and chat- pirates attack off Somalia, Tamil rebels coming at you and you will blow up in a ter. Nevertheless, this is an example of fight Sri Lankan naval ships—and ships’ couple of minutes,” was the threat thought the growing challenge of protecting U.S. commanding officers have to take threats78 • February 2008 www.usni.org
  4. 4. seriously and make crucial decisions with gether target data from ships and aircraft CEC composite tracks are integrated the information available on the scene. to create a comprehensive air picture of into the Aegis combat system and the ship Small fast-boat tactics pose a number the surrounding battle space. In this ex- self-defense system (SSDS) for weapons of technical and tactical challenges that periment, CEC fused radar information engagement. But CEC was developed to U.S. Navy Research and Development and from multiple ships on surface targets. defend ships in the air warfare domain, Experimentation processes are addressing Thus, the exercise demonstrates a tech- not the surface warfare domain. today. nical capability that will fulfill a critical For the summer 2007 experiment, gap. minor modifications were needed on Truth Is Strangest These small boat threats, known as fast both CEC and CIWS processors, to in- The would-be showdown on 6 Janu- attack craft or fast inshore attack craft, tegrate the CIWS search radar into the ary very closely duplicated an exercise have been a concern to the U.S. Navy CEC processor and to initiate and main- that was conducted in summer 2007 off for a number of years. They can move tain surface tracks on the CEC network. Virginia Beach. During the previous 14 at amazingly high speeds, are extremely No modifications were made to the CEC months, the Program Executive Office maneuverable, and are made of fiberglass, data distribution system, Aegis or SSDS Integrated Warfare Systems 6 had been so they can evade normal radar detection. Combat Systems, or to the CIWS radar working on a sea trial experiment with The more effective integration of exist- for the experiment. Johns Hopkins University Applied Phys- ing capabilities onboard Navy ships pro- The initial at-sea execution worked far ics Laboratory, Program Executive Office vides a first step to defend against such better than had been anticipated. CIWS Integrated Warfare Systems 3, and Naval threats. initiated surface tracks out to the maxi- Network Warfare Command. This was a mum range expected and maintained track critical first step in expanding sensor fu- Technical Limitations—and continuity, even during close-weaving for- sion capability to include tracking surface Possibilities mations or near the other combatants. contacts. Most shipboard radar systems do not Once initiated, these surface tracks The effort culminated in the Trident have the accuracy or update rate to ad- were maintained and updated by all the Warrior ’07 Netted Surface Tracking Ex- equately track fast attack craft/fast inshore sensors integrated into CEC, on the ships, periment (12–13 June), in the Virginia attack craft. CIWS has an extremely ac- and at CDSA Dam Neck. The CIWS-ini- Capes operating area just off the beach curate search radar with a high update tiated surface tracks were displayed in from Combat Directive System Activity rate; but, as its name implies, it has only the Aegis combat system, making them (CDSA) Dam Neck. Similar to the inci- a close-in or limited-range engagement eligible for engagement with the ships’ dent in the Strait of Hormuz, five small envelope. longer-range weapons. speedboats simulated attacks against two And CIWS operates autonomously The CEC system at CDSA Dam Neck U.S. warships. But these two combatants from the rest of the ship’s combat sys- had not been modified to include the had been specially modified. For the first tem. The CEC fuses sensor measurements CIWS integration, as had been done on time at sea, the track information from from radars integrated into the network the Aegis ships. But Dam Neck’s CEC the close-in weapon system (CIWS) was to develop a composite track shared by equipment received and processed the provided to the Aegis weapon system for all CEC-equipped ships. This sensor fu- surface track data into the SSDS combat target tracking and engagement via the co- sion maximizes radar diversities and ge- system, and then the roof-mounted radars operative engagement capability (CEC). ography to build a significantly improved at Dam Neck contributed to maintaining The significant breakthrough here is that composite track that all networked radars the composite surface track. In addition CEC was originally designed to pull to- contribute toward maintaining. to the surface tracks, the CIWS searchl-3 CoMMUNICaTIoNS (STaN BIalaS) SMALL BIG THREATS These fast inshore attack craft (returning to Virginia Beach after the first day’s testing, June 2007) are destined for foreign governments under the Security Assistance program or the DOD counternarcotics program. The three in the forefront, modified Boston Whalers, are designated for riverine duty in Colombia. All move faster than 30 knots. www.usni.org PROCEEDINGS • 79
  5. 5. PROFESSIONAL NOTES radar data contributed to the composite in warfighting capability. Embracing spi- ber-one initiative in the 2007 Sea Trial air tracks in the CEC network. ral development, these technologies and Experiment process. But there’s been no concepts will then be matured through time or opportunity to use these modifi- Looking Ahead targeted investment and guided through cations in the Fleet ships that could take The summer experiment went beyond a process of rapid prototyping and fleet advantage of them. The acquisition com- just the technical integration of systems experimentation.” munity (the Program Office and OPNAV) to combat fast attack craft/fast inshore at- The June 2007 experiment was a pro- has to determine the overall cost to imple- tack crafts. Surface Warfare Development totype demonstration. Within the context ment this capability into operational as- Group at Little Creek was also involved of Program Executive Office Integrated sets, and the best method to fund the im- to test and assess their emerging tac- Warfare Systems, it has provided the provements. They have the arduous duty, tics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) thread to warfighting improvements, in a constrained economy, of balancing against small-boat threats. They and through coordination of emerging TTPs technological and operational benefits Operational Test and Evaluation Force and system capabilities. This effort will against cost. ensured that scenarios accurately repre- directly lead to improved ship self-de- The incident on 6 January 2008 was sented the current fast attack craft/fast fense for our Fleet against air and surface resolved without firing weapons. But if inshore attack craft profiles. The tactics targets, and it will change the focus of political and military tensions continue to demonstrated in the summer experiment platform sensor integration into network- rise, casualties may result. Hopefully be- were almost identical to those reported centric operations. fore that occurs, some of the new technol- in the Hormuz incident. Surface Warfare All the testing was done under the ogies and tactics being developed today Development Group was able to validate CNO Sea Trial Experimentation program, will be in place to provide our Sailors, their TTPs during the free play period, designed to explore technologies that may ships, and allies with the best protection leveraging the assets already committed fill mission capability gaps. Once the ex- we can offer. to the experiment. periments are completed, Naval Network In keeping with the Sea Power 21 Vi- Warfare Command makes its recommen- Mr. Noonen is a contractor with L-3 Communica- sion, the CNO directed that Naval Net- dation to the CNO on the viability of the tions, supporting the Navy Program Executive Offi- work Warfare Command would identify technology. cer for Integrated Warfare Systems. He coordinates “candidate [technologies] with the great- exercises and experiments with the Navy Combat In September 2007, the Netted Surface Systems to test interoperability with other Navy and est potential to provide dramatic increases Tracking Effort was endorsed as the num- Joint systems. EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT solutions@battelle.org U.S. Navy imagery used in illustration without endorsement expressed or implied. Unbiased Expertise for Custom Battelle Armor Solutions  Rapid armor solutions and prototypes Lightweight Protection  testing In-house  Specialized production for Combatant Craft  installation and training Kitting,  Concurrent electronics and propulsion upgrades As the worlds largest private, non-profit R&D company, Battelle is an unmatched resource for the Armed Services. www.battelle.org80 • February 2008 www.usni.org

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