• Like

Loading…

Flash Player 9 (or above) is needed to view presentations.
We have detected that you do not have it on your computer. To install it, go here.

Session2_Report Chap..

  • 531 views
Published

 

  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Be the first to comment
    Be the first to like this
No Downloads

Views

Total Views
531
On SlideShare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
0

Actions

Shares
Downloads
2
Comments
0
Likes
0

Embeds 0

No embeds

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
    No notes for slide

Transcript

  • 1. Building Integrated Financial Markets 10 years after the Asian Crisis (Chapter 4 of ADB Flagship Study) Jenny Corbett AJRC ANU This is a first draft and not for quotation. 17 September 2007
  • 2. Chapter 4 Building Integrated Financial Markets 10 years after the Asian Crisis Jenny Corbett I Introduction 10 years after the financial crisis of 1997 there is still some debate about the proximate and more fundamental causes of the crisis. There is broad consensus that at the time of the crisis, Asian financial systems were not equipped to handle the capital flows generated by rapidly changing global markets, giving rise to the “double mismatch” problem. There is much less consensus on which specific aspects of their financial systems were crucial to the multiple failures. Most economies have subsequently strengthened financial supervision and disclosure; consolidated and recapitalized financial firms; improved reserves and asset quality; and restructured non-financial firms with an eye to governance (including privatization). As a result, the region has seen considerable financial deepening and improvements in financial sector performance. The contagion of the 1990s, however, demonstrated that the quality of every financial system in the region is of overall regional concern so it is relevant to look at the range of experience across the region, not just at average performance. Some assessments of the progress in quality of the financial sectors are still gloomy but broadly there is a evidence of considerable improvement. Today most Asian countries have made partial progress to more diversified financial systems but have not yet developed a full range of assets and markets of sufficient quality to intermediate their large savings and investment flows. Thus, reforms need to continue, along with initiatives to deepen and connect capital markets and these policies need to be coordinated with macroeconomic policies on the capital account. The initiatives required to accelerate financial development, and financial integration, are largely national, but regional cooperation can offer support, for example, by defining standards for supervision, disclosure and regulation, by creating settlement
  • 3. mechanisms, and by jump-starting a range of markets. Such measures should reduce financial vulnerabilities region-wide and also improve access to resources for investments in infrastructure, business capacity, social needs and consumer durables. These are key steps toward achieving the long-term vision of a more closely integrated Asian capital market though they cannot guarantee stability if the global financial markets are harbouring systemic problems. This paper is designed to consider the current situation of financial integration in the East Asian region against the background of changes in financial systems since the crisis of 1997. Since the main indicators of integration reflect the extent of cross border financial flows (or the price convergence that would indicate the potential for arbitrage even if physical flows don't take place) the natural first focus is on border barriers and capital controls. There are, however, several deeper elements that also need consideration. To begin with, the questions of national treatment and market entry behind the border have an obvious impact on the activity of foreign service providers. Even deeper, and more difficult to assess, is the role played by different levels of development in the markets in the region, by variation in the quality, reliability and transparency of markets and the impact of differing regulatory systems. Despite a plethora of studies on financial integration in the region there is no clear view of how important these elements are, nor which among them rank most highly as barriers to greater financial development and integration. It is therefore difficult to give good policy advice and to identify priorities for regional cooperation. Many things can be done, but current advice does not, and cannot, reflect empirically established priorities and sequences. A more coordinated research effort to establish these is an urgent priority II Savings and investment Financial systems develop in response to the need to intermediate savings and investment. While savings in the region have remained high over the last ten years, private sector investment has not returned to levels achieved during the higher growth period before the crisis. 9The matching current account surpluses are discussed elsewhere).
  • 4. Two features are important: national differences in savings-investment balances are significant and “within sector” patterns are informative. The private sector (combined corporate and household) savings-investment balances give an aggregate sense of how much of domestic saving is being absorbed by the corporate sector for investment purposes (and, by implication how much is absorbed either by the government or foreign sectors). Looking specifically at the corporate sector’s own S-I balance is also informative since it indicates how much financing is required from outside the sector. Both of these flows of funds have implications for the financial system since they demonstrate in aggregate what funds transfers are taking place domestically and externally. Data from Lee and McKibbin (2006) (Figure 1) show the pattern for the region. As noted, investment demands have fallen while savings rates have generally stayed constant in the region (Japan is an exception since demographic effects have begun to impact savings behaviour). The fall in investment is much greater for the Southeast Asian countries than for those in the North (Figure 2 below). The causes of the decline are debateable. They must reflect increased uncertainty about future growth and productivity prospects since the pre-crisis days but they may also reflect a species of “credit crunch” (cf Kramer, F&D, 2006). This is the implication of the often stated claim that it is necessary for sustainable growth that the region should recycle more of its own savings within the region. The idea that it is bad for growth to have regional savings flowing out of the region and in to the US and Europe must imply that regional borrowers, i.e. investors with good projects (including public sector infrastructure projects), cannot find the funding they need. There is currently insufficient research to support or reject such a claim and most statements about the need to recyle regional savings are statements of belief rather than analysis. As a recent Finance and Development article put it in assessing the “savings glut” argument about global imbalances “ [there is a …] possibility that a significant part of the picture reflects an investment slump in emerging Asia. Excluding China, aggregate saving has been relatively stable over the past 10 to 15 years and, according to some IMF studies, broadly consistent with economic fundamentals (IMF, 2005). In contrast, aggregate investment declined sharply around the time of the crisis, has recovered only partially, and by some measures seems low relative to its fundamental determinants. To be sure, the underlying picture is more complex—notably, the mix of saving (public, household, and corporate) has changed over time, and the extent
  • 5. and nature of the investment slump, as well as the factors underlying it, differ across countries. But the broad-based decline in investment relative to GDP warrants an attempt at a regional explanation.” (Kramer,2006) Detailed data on corporate sector savings and investment patterns are not easily available but the pattern displayed in Figure 3 (Lee and McKibbin’s Figure 7) is likely to be borne out in many of the countries of the region. Where the corporate sector was previously a large borrower of external funds most countries show a shift to internal financing – the corporate sector’s demand for funds is largely met from its own savings. The Japanese data illustrate this point. The significance of this pattern is that, as the flows of funds change, both the outstanding indebtedness of the corporate sector and the role of market intermediaries will also change. Corporate sectors that rely heavily on external financing will display a marked savings-investment gap (i.e. a financing need) while those that are largely internally financed will show a smaller gap. Over time, and across countries, these financing needs will change and the pattern of the corporate sector’s own savings also changes. The sectoral S-I gap thus gives some clue to the role performed by external capital markets – in largely internally-financed systems the role of capital markets would be different from the role in systems where the corporate sector is more externally financed1. For a more advanced view of whether the region as a whole is sending savings out of the region, and whether this is creating a financing shortage for investment inside the region, we would need a careful study of sectoral and industry level data. Figure 1
  • 6. Source: Lee and McKibbin op cit Figure 2
  • 7. Source: Jong Wha Lee and Warwick McKibbin, Domestic Investment and External Imbalances in East Asia, Lowy Institute Working Paper in International Economics no 206, October 2006
  • 8. Figure 3 Source: Lee and McKibbin op cit III Regional Integration and Regional Interdependence What is the meaning of integration? In recent years many studies of the causes of the financial crisis and of the changes since those years have focused on the way the region’s financial systems link with other financial systems. High profile studies have asked the question “How financially integrated are countries in the region, both globally and among themselves?” (World Bank, 2006) and many have reported (and repeated) claims that “Standard measures of
  • 9. financial integration indicate that inter-regional integration continues to dominate intra- regional integration” (Cowen et al, 2006). Others note that Asia is less regionally integrated than Europe in terms of finance (Lee, 2007, Eichengree and Park, 2005). In addition it is usually commented that trade integration has progressed further than financial integration. On the face of it there is multi-faceted data to support these observations but they pose a fundamental question about what is meant by financial integration and whether it is meaningful to describe systems as “more integrated’ with some subset of the global financial system than another. If we take the statements as meaningful the big questions that remain are what are the barriers holding the region back and what policy initiatives could help. But before we can consider those questions a closer look at what the data can really tell us about the nature of financial integration is needed. As described below, many of the most widely used measures reflect the extent of openness of financial markets (i.e. the absence of barriers to capital flows and, hence, arbitrage) rather than integration in a deeper sense that would reflect the closeness and interoperability of these systems. Care is needed in thinking about what these measures are telling us about Asia’s engagement with the region and the world in financial terms. Takagi (2004) is clear that the use of the term financial integration is not new but that over time the term has become used in a number of different ways. One use of the term, the most common, is to mean price arbitrage, as described below, when rates of return on financial instruments with identical characteristics are equalized across markets. The term has also been used to describe the relationship between markets with large transactions volumes between them, somewhat akin to the idea of trade integration. More integrated markets would have greater capital flows and trade in financial services. A third meaning, dealt with elsewhere in this volume, is that of monetary integration, referring to close co-movements between exchange rates or interest rates resulting from coordination of monetary policies. But as Takagi points out, while these meanings are related to each other they are not synonymous and may not even be consistent. Perfectly integrated markets in the price sense may not exhibit any capital flows at all if financial flows are very elastic with respect to price. Price adjustments could take place instantaneously with no quantity movements at all. And markets that are completely open, in the sense of having no explicit barriers to financial
  • 10. flows, may still exhibit low transactions volumes if other markets act as financial intermediaries for them. Some markets may also have few formal barriers but may still fail to attract or generate flows and may remain segmented from other markets in the price sense, because they are overlooked by investors or for what Freixas et al, 2004 call “institutional or cultural” reasons. Takagi concludes, as does this study, “There may not be a clearly established logical connection between financial integration and other aspects of economic interdependence, … but we need to better understand what is meant by financial integration ..” How integrated are Asia’s financial markets? Measures of financial integration are broadly divided into 3 types: price measures, quantity measures and regulatory or institutional measures. The price measures are based on assumptions that in fully “integrated”, or completely open, markets, arbitrage would bring price equality on similar assets. In the case of cross-border transactions, involving different currencies, interest parity conditions are used and there is a hierarchy of measures with increasingly stringent assumptions and implications about the degree of integration. At the least stringent level, covered interest parity would show a basic degree of financial integration (or at least, a failure of CIP would suggest strongly that markets were not integrated) while at the top of the pyramid (least likely to hold) real interest parity would indicate not only integrated markets but also similarity of risk preferences. Some studies also look for price co-movements in other asset classes such as stock markets but here the theoretical basis is less compelling, since asset and risk characteristics may vary significantly. Even within interest parity studies the details of methods vary considerably and the fundamental question remains whether the assets being compared are truly identical as required by theory. Covered interest parity measures are based on the idea that if currency risk can be “covered” by hedging then the interest rates on identical instruments will be identical. If forward markets for currencies exist then any gap between interest rates will be “covered” by the gap between the spot exchange rate and the forward rate. Domestic investors will accept lower interest rates if their currency is set to appreciate and they can lock in that appreciation by forward contracting, so that their overall return in local currency will be the same as in identical instruments in foreign currency. Since the currency risk is entirely removed from investor’s calculation any deviation from CIP must
  • 11. be due to barriers to the free flow of investor’s funds. Thus, the deviation from the CIP condition measures the extent of barriers to capital flows. Deviations from other interest parity conditions (uncovered and real interest) may reflect additional conditions in the market as well. In the case of UIP deviations may reflect exchange rate risk or country risk that is not covered and deviations from real interest parity reflect the fact that purchasing power parity frequently fails over medium run periods. But it is clear that what these conditions mainly measure is the existence of some barrier to investment flows i.e. a lack of openness of financial markets. This may be due to explicit capital controls or to other barriers to foreign funds entry (or domestic funds exit) or it might be due to a lack of information and awareness of external opportunities in small countries that are “off the radar” of the international investment world. It might also be because there are few truly identical financial instruments and, at the retail level at least, the difference between a bank deposit in your home country and one abroad is likely determined by your confidence in the level of protection afforded by regulations and the ease of access to funds. Such factors may even influence assets such as wholesale money market funds. There have been several studies of the extent to which interest parity conditions hold between individual Asian economies and global or regional indicators and between pairs of countries. Several older studies are surveyed by Cavoli et al (2004) and they also recalculate the uncovered interest parities between 8 East Asian economies (Table 1). These are simple uncovered interest differentials using 6 month commercial CD rates and using the actual spot rates 6 months out in place of expected exchange rate changes and the authors note that this constitutes a joint test of the covered interest parity condition and the currency risk premium. Thus, data issues cannot be ignored (and there are no hypothesis or significance tests offered) but these data do not appear to support a view that there has been a general increase in the degree of integration of money markets around the region since the crisis. Some pairs of countries (Indonesia with Malaysia, Indonesia with Hong Kong, Malaysia with Hong Kong, Philippines with Malaysia; Singapore with Philippines) appear to have nearly fulfilled the UIP condition during the period 2000 to 2002 and to have come closer to UIP after the crisis than before. On average Indonesia, Singapore, Korea and China have smaller differentials after the crisis than before, though it is not clear that the simple averages are very meaningful.
  • 12. Table 1 Uncovered Interest Differential (in percent) January 1995-December 1996 Foreign Counties Domestic Economy Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Korea China Hong Kong Indonesia Average Indonesia 2.98 2.53 4.83 1.98 5.26 1.02 3.84 - 3.21 Thailand 1.01 0.54 2.85 - 3.27 -0.96 1.73 -1.98 0.92 Malaysia - -0.45 1.85 -1.01 2.41 -1.96 0.66 -2.98 -0.21 Philippines 0.45 - 2.28 -0.54 2.87 -1.51 1.44 -2.53 0.35 Singapore -1.85 -2.28 - -2.85 0.54 -3.79 -2.57 -4.83 -2.33 Korea -2.41 -2.87 -0.54 -3.27 - -4.37 -1.92 -5.26 -2.95 China 1.96 1.51 3.79 0.96 4.37 - 2.68 -1.02 2.04 Hong Kong -0.66 -1.44 1.23 -1.73 1.92 -2.68 - -3.84 -1.03 Source: Cavolli et al, 2004 Uncovered Interest Differential (in percent) January 2000-June 2002 Foreign Counties Domestic Economy Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Korea China Hong Kong Indonesia Average Indonesia 0.04 2.8 3.3 3.6 2.04 0.6 -0.03 - 1.76 Thailand -3.38 -0.78 -0.56 - -1.76 -2.82 -3.44 -3.6 -2.33 Malaysia - 2.8 2.44 3.38 1.37 0.56 -0.07 -0.04 1.49 Philippines -2.8 - 0.02 0.78 -1.13 -2.24 -2.86 -2.8 -1.58 Singapore -2.44 -0.02 - 0.56 -0.45 -1.94 -1.55 -3.3 -1.45 Korea -1.37 1.13 0.45 1.76 - -1.31 -1.94 -2.04 -0.47 China -0.56 2.24 1.94 2.82 1.31 - -0.63 -0.6 0.93 Hong Kong 0.07 2.86 2.57 3.44 1.94 0.63 - 0.03 1.65 Source: Cavolli et al, 2004
  • 13. Poonpatpibul, Tanboon and Leelapornchai (2006) use the same “law of one price” motivation to report the cross-country variation of overnight money market rates for 9 East Asian economies and note that while the dispersion fell markedly after 1999 the standard deviation remains around 3% (Figure 4). They compare this with a figure for European unsecured lending rates (Baele et al, 2004) of virtually zero after the introduction of the Euro but since neither of these studies use covered or uncovered interest differentials and therefore are not correcting for currency risks, comparisons after the introduction of the Euro (with no currency risk) are not informative. Pre-Euro deviations within Europe averaged around 2% between 1994 and 1998 so apparently Asia post crisis is rather closer to Europe pre-Euro. Baele et al add a further test, which would be useful for Asia if data were available, that compares the cross-country variation with in-country variation (i.e across banks within country) to see whether the remaining variation between countries is greater than the normal variation between banks. In Europe both are nearly the same but no information is available for Asia. Without data for the pre-crisis era in Asia it is also rather difficult to discern whether there has been an increase in this measure of integration. Figure 4 Source: Chaipat Poonpatpibul et al, 2006. Takagi (2004) uses bilateral deviations from uncovered interest parity and bilateral interest rate correlations to give a picture of which of ten Asian economies are closely
  • 14. linked to each other. The results are not directly comparable to other interest rate measures but broadly indicate that a few countries stand out as much less integrated with others in the region and a few country pairs are strongly linked. Japan and Indonesia appear to have larger deviations from UIP over the period while Taiwan, Singapore and Australia have smaller ones. A few obvious pairs seem closely linked: Australia with New Zealand and Singapore with Hong Kong. The interest rate correlation data does not give the same picture however, suggesting that Australia has rather small correlations with others in the regions. Indonesia has small correlations with most others in the region (though some country pairs are exceptions) while Thailand and Singapore have high correlations. It is difficult to take away an overall sense of close regional integration in interest rate measures from this data and it averages the whole period, pre and post crisis, giving no information about trends. Ngiam (2002) is cited by Takagi as reporting that deviations from covered interest parity widened in the region after the crisis compared with before, though de Brouwer had noted a shrinking of differentials between the 1980s and 1990s. In addition to price convergence in money or banking markets, similar arguments have been made for bond and equities markets, although it is much harder to find anything like identical assets in these markets. In fact, many of the tests for co-movement or convergence of prices do not appeal strictly to the law of one price as justification but to an idea that, if markets are integrated, then the basic discount rates will converge which will cause other rates of return to move together. Ghosh (2006) shows local currency bond returns (of what type is not specified) exhibiting very low correlations between Asian region markets (China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan) in 2004 and comparisons with developed country (UK, USA, Germany) correlations of 0.8 or larger make the contrast striking. Stock market correlations tend to show a more marked picture of co-movement of prices and suggest some increase in integration after the crisis. Ghosh 2006 shows correlations of equity returns pre and post crisis for 8 Asian economies and for the group of East Asia together. For most economies the cross-correlations, and those with the group, increase after the crisis, and they are higher than correlations for the region with
  • 15. the US or the EU. Tests for the importance of news as a determinant of equity returns also suggests that news is more important after the crisis, implying more efficient markets with less underlying volatility and markets that are more attune to developments in the rest of the region and the rest of the world. With the exception of Korea, Thailand and Hong Kong, however, the proportion of volatility explained by external news, even in the post-crisis period, is still considerably lower than for the EU countries even before the introduction of the Euro. There is at least general consistency with a number of studies surveyed by Cavolli et al (2006) that stock markets in the region have become more sensitive to external influences in the post crisis period although it is not easy to read a regional effect in the results. Poonpatpibul et al (2006) give a similar picture using only correlations, while Chai and Rhee (2005) give the same picture using both correlations and variance decomposition, although the results of essentially the same calculations as in Ghosh are of a completely different magnitude. They also find that there is a large difference between the proportion of variance explained locally between East Asia and Europe although they also show a reduction in local effects and an increase in external ones in the recent period. While no study does the comprehensive analysis across all the major financial markets that Beale et al (2004) are able to do for Europe (covering money markets, corporate bonds, government bonds, credit and equity), the pattern for Europe seems different from the picture that has emerged for Asia. In Europe the money market is the most integrated, government bond markets have become “significantly integrated” after the introduction of the Euro while corporate bonds are “reasonably well integrated”. Equity markets too have become more integrated while banking markets remain the least integrated and display quite high price differentials, particularly in the consumer credit sector. In the absence of detailed data for Asia all that can be said is that there is evidence of some increased integration in price data for equity markets but not much in the money markets and in bonds. Indeed some observers conclude that integration in these areas has reduced since the crisis. Quantitative measures capture the extent of cross-border financial flows or the extent of cross-border holdings of foreign assets and liabilities. These measures have no particular theoretical foundation but do at least show the extent of actual flows (or stocks) of cross-border financial activity. The difficulties here are usually data. For
  • 16. developing countries the accuracy and coverage of cross-border capital flow data is particularly problematic, and for some asset classes almost non-existent. Nevertheless, a number of studies have tried to discern patterns of cross-border activity and have described these as reflecting the degree of integration of the markets. Ghosh (2006) focuses simply on the proportions of assets held abroad in different regions and on the sources of foreign-owned assets in the region. Both assets held abroad by the region and the stock of foreign-owned assets inside the region grew, and this is offered as evidence of increased integration with the world financial system. Ghosh notes also that intra-regional holdings of both equities and bonds have increased and that the main pattern is investment by the industrialising economies (Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore) both into each others economies and into the developing economies (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) in both bonds and equities. The developing East Asian economies have become considerable owners of equities in both global markets and in the industrializing East Asian economies but do not have significant bond holdings within the region. Ghosh takes these data to support the conclusions of price data showing integration both globally and within East Asia in the equities markets but less so in the bond markets. What is not evident is how this pattern appears against any benchmarks. Are these holdings absolutely large or small and how do they compare with either some theoretical norm or other regions’ behaviour? At a minimum we need comparisons across countries and regions of the size of financial holdings relative to GDP to give some normalization (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003, Obstfeld and Rogoff). Asian economies hold, on average, assets valued at only about half the European level relative to GDP (Lee (2007, using CIPS). Different data (IFS) confirm broadly the same picture (Figure 5, Poonpatpibul et al, 2006) but there are important caveats. Compared to the US, the average of Asian economies is quite deeply integrated with the world financial system. The US has a much lower value of foreign assets to GDP than either Asia or Europe. It can be misleading, however, to talk of the degree of integration of the region as a whole, or on average. Within the Asian region there is very large variation. Hong Kong and Singapore, as regional financial centres, are much more integrated than the average European economy. Most of the other countries of the region still hold very modest foreign assets in relation to their GDP. Figure 5
  • 17. Source: Poonpatipbul et al, BOT, 2006 The geographical distribution of asset holdings abroad and foreign holdings in the host country give a more nuanced perspective on the Asian region’s engagement with external financial systems compared with Europe and the US. This is not a theoretical benchmark (which would make comparisons of countries’ holding relative to their share of world financial endowments to judge deviation from the expected portfolio allocation in a perfectly open world2) but it is a reasonable rule-of-thumb comparison. On average, Lee shows that East Asian economies held about 4.9% of their foreign portfolio assets within East Asia in 2003, while they owned 8.6% of the total foreign-held assets in the region. These compared with 57% and 62% for Europe’s holdings in Europe. (see Lee, Tables 1 and 2). Lee concludes, as do Poonpatpibul et al, that Asia is much less integrated into the world’s financial system than Europe. In corss-border bank flows Eichengreen and Park (2005) conclude the same. Closer examination suggests something rather different. If Japan is excluded from the East Asian group then 17% of assets held abroad are held in the East Asian region
  • 18. compared with Europe’s 57%. In equities the proportion is 20% compared with Europe’s 53%, while in long term debt the comparison is 15% against 46% and in short term debt 18% against 59%. There is still, certainly, a large difference between Asia and Europe, but excluding Japan increases the figures by several multiples. This reflects the fact that Japan, a large, post-industrial economy is heavily invested in equivalent economies elsewhere, rather than near neighbours. It also highlights the growth in Asia’s integration in all directions since the first detailed data became available in 1997. The pattern of ownership of the regions’ liabilities is also different from the conventional view when Japan is excluded. Ownership shares jump from only 8.2% of all foreign held liabilities in East Asia to 22%. These shares are still smaller than European ownership of liabilities in Europe (at 61%) but by less of a margin. The pattern is consistent across the different portfolio investment markets but remarkably, in short term debt, Asia’s holdings of the regions’ liabilities (at 86% excluding Japan) is larger than Europe’s holdings within Europe (at 86%). On these data, the markets in which the Asian region is most “regionally integrated” in terms of its holdings of assets are first the equity markets, then short term debt and finally long term debt (ranked excluding Japan) but the international holdings of short term debt are much smaller than either of the other two and are almost entirely accounted for by Hong Kong and Singapore. In terms of the ownership of liabilities in the region, the order is reversed. The regional share is largest in short term debt, next in long term debt and least in equities. The reason is that extra- regional investors account for very large proportions of the inward portfolio investments in equities.
  • 19. Table 2 Ownership shares within the region
  • 20. Total Portfolio Asset Holdings, Year-End 2005 (in millions of U.S. dolloars) Ho ng (% o f (% o f Eme rg ing Ko ng , Ta iwa n , China , g lo ba l AS EAN - 5 g lo ba l As ia - 10 (% o f g lo ba l S o urc e Co untry China Ko re a S ing a po re China Indo ne s ia Ma la ys ia P hilippine s Tha ila nd Vie tna m P . R. Ja pa n India NIEs To ta l to ta l) To ta l to ta l) To ta l to ta l) Glo ba l To ta l Ho ng Ko ng , China .... 12,276 7,097 4,539 467 4,186 1,119 2,219 (c) 41,299 16,683 2,058 23,911 5.48% 7,991 1.83% 73,201 16.77% 436,570 Ko re a 1,018 -- 317 25 6 278 22 39 -- 101 1,463 291 1,360 3.12% 346 0.79% 1,807 4.14% 43,665 S ing a po re 13,746 9,039 -- 3,216 6,332 16,783 948 4,476 -- 3,177 9,020 2,415 26,000 40.19% 28,539 44.12% 57,716 89.22% 64,686 Ta iwa n , China Indo ne s ia -- 1 217 -- -- -- 5 -- -- 102 17 27 218 18.69% 5 0.39% 325 27.78% 1,169 Ma la ys ia 196 70 751 37 26 -- 10 76 -- 14 51 16 1,055 27.89% 112 2.96% 1,180 31.21% 3,781 P hilippine s 59 60 163 -- 5 44 -- 18 -- 40 19 17 282 5.81% 67 1.39% 389 8.03% 4,851 Tha ila nd 155 97 180 -- 157 19 4 -- 37 1 90 2 432 13.89% 217 6.98% 650 20.90% 3,108 Vie tna m China , P . R . Ja pa n 8,924 7,456 4,415 1,347 573 1,263 1,382 746 12 4,074 .... 2,977 22,142 1.05% 3,976 0.19% 30,193 1.43% 2,114,888 India 4 -- 5 -- -- 1 -- 1 -- -- 1 -- 9 10.92% 2 2.03% 10 12.95% 81 NIEs To ta l 14,764 21,315 7,413 7,780 6,806 21,247 2,088 6,734 -- 44,577 27,165 4,764 (% o f g lo ba l to ta l) 10.74% 8.91% 8.91% 6.80% 23.35% 41.93% 9.50% 20.88% 0.03% 39.69% 2.17% 4.18% AS EAN - 5 To ta l 409 228 1,312 38 188 63 19 94 37 157 177 62 (% o f g lo ba l to ta l) 0.30% 0.10% 1.58% 0.03% 0.64% 0.12% 0.09% 0.29% 3.17% 0.14% 0.01% 0.05% Eme rg ing As ia - 10 to ta l 15,173 21,543 8,725 7,817 6,994 21,310 2,107 6,828 37 44,734 27,342 4,826 (% o f g lo ba l to ta l) 11.04% 9.01% 10.48% 6.84% 23.99% 42.05% 9.58% 21.17% 3.21% 39.83% 2.18% 4.24% Glo ba l To ta l 137 ,4 9 3 2 3 9 ,09 6 8 3,2 13 114 ,3 5 4 2 9 ,153 5 0 ,67 7 2 1,98 5 ####### 1,16 2 112 ,3 12 1,2 5 1,4 17 113,93 8
  • 21. Small values of cross-border assets (or low shares to GDP) alone cannot necessarily be taken to indicate low integration. The issue of benchmarks is crucial. By what standard do we interpret these quantitative data? The gravity model is one approach to determining whether intra-regional integration is lower than might be expected (cf Lee, 2007, Eichengreen & Park, 2005). Taking several characteristics of country pairs into account this approach considers whether bilateral financial relations are lower or higher than might be expected given the range of factors that generally explain bilateral cross-border holdings of assets (size of the two economies, distance between the two, common language, common borders and common colonial heritage). For portfolio holdings Lee finds that the extra effect of being within the East Asian region is significant. Country pairs within East Asia hold assets in each other that are 1.54 times larger than would be held by a random pair of countries. Thus there is indeed evidence of a degree of integration greater than “normal”. Furthermore, these data include Japan in the East Asian group and, as already noted, this has the effect of depressing the average proportion of assets held in the region. A similar exercise excluding Japan should give an even larger regional integration factor. The number in these estimates remains much smaller than the “Europe effect” which is on the order of 9 times the size for a random pair. The behaviour of cross-border bank claims is rather different in very simple gravity models (Eichengreen and Park, 2005) and suggests that the Asian regional effect is even greater than the effect for Europe. Once bilateral trade flows are accounted for, however, the Asian regional effects in both portfolio and bank claims become negative. This means that larger bilateral trade flows have such a large positive effect on financial flows that, once that effect is taken out, the additional effect of being within the Asian region is negative – financial flows in both Asia and Europe are lower than they would be between random pairs of countries with similar bilateral 3 trade flows. The conclusion from these studies is that there is evidence of above average financial integration amongst Asian economies, even though it is still less than between European economies, but that it may be largely explained by the degree of bilateral trade between countries in the region. Once trade is accounted for there is less integration in the region than normal and this pattern is replicated across most types of portfolio assets (equities, long-term debt and bank claims; short term debt is not so affected). Interestingly similar patterns are found in Europe – once trade is accounted for, the positive regional effect either becomes negative (in bank claims), very small (short term debt) or at least much smaller than before trade
  • 22. effects (equities and long term debt). These are important indicators of what drives or impedes financial integration, to which we will return. Another important aspect of the quantitative integration of the regions’ financial markets is shown by measures of correlations between consumption, savings and investments. The rationale is that integrated financial markets allow global movements of savings and investment. This should mean that investors in one country are not limited by access to only domestic savings4. Fully open capital markets and fully integrated financial systems should imply no correlation between domestic savings and investment for any individual country. Furthermore, the desire to smooth consumption can be met by access to capital markets either at home or abroad, so a related approach to measuring integration is to look for convergence of consumption paths between countries. If countries are able to smooth the path of their consumption this implies that they have access to capital markets and are able to reduce or share the risks of consumption volatility. Under perfect risk sharing the consumption growth rate of one country would equal that of the world consumption growth. There are relatively few careful attempts to analyse consumption risk sharing as an indicator of the degree of integration for the Asian region and several are quite old. Broadly the data suggest that there have always been quite high correlations between domestic investment and savings, indicating low degrees of openness before and after the crisis years (Montiel, 1994, Le, 2000, Isaksson, 2001). Performance for individual countries across the region varied considerably. The diagrams from the Poonpatpibul et al give a pretty clear picture of what all variations of this analytical approach will find - a high degree of comovement of domestic consumption with domestic production. Figure 5
  • 23. Source: Chaipat Poonpatpibul, Surach Tanboon and Pornnapa Leelapornchai, 2006, BOT . Notes: Figures in brackets refer to the growth rate between 1986 and 2004 of real consumption and real output respectively In formal tests of whether individual countries in the Asian region share risks with other regional economies or with the world (or not at all) Kim, Lee and Shin (2007) show that the pattern of regional and global risk sharing for Asia and Europe are quite different. Asian economies have a lower degree of risk sharing within the region but a higher degree of risk sharing globally than Europe. Not all countries are achieving risk sharing. Out of 10 Asian countries 4 had significant risk sharing with the region (China, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan) while four had significant global risk sharing (Japan, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). On average the Asian economies have lower overall levels of risk sharing than Europe. The authors propose a challenging explanation for these results. Under a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) view of the world, investors should diversify their
  • 24. portfolios to the greatest possible extent, choosing securities with low correlation with each other and with the home portfolio. If this argument carries across to countries (and it is much more complex to make this transition) then “countries with different structures, subject to different economic shocks, with low business cycle correlation, will find it more advantageous to develop closer financial links with one another. In this regard, extensive portfolio diversification within East Asia may not be necessarily an optimal strategy, considering the homogeneity of East Asian economies.” By homogeneity, the authors mean close correlation of output growth rates within the region. This argument seems to imply that “the welfare gains for regional financial integration are lower in East Asia than in Europe” (Lee et al, 2007). This is not necessarily a wide-spread view and other estimates have set the gains from consumption risk sharing very high in Asia. As noted earlier, both quantity and price measures may be seen as measuring either integration or openness of financial systems and while the two concepts are often used interchangeably they are not quite the same. The integration measures capture the after-the-fact extent of financial trades and price movements and indirectly reflect the openness of systems to cross-border flows. Direct measures of the barriers to flows can be an important part of the picture. The distinction here is between de facto measures of openness (or the degree of integration) and de jure measures (that show whether policies restrict access to financial markets or limit capital account transactions). There are several different interpretations of just how open Asian financial markets are, based on variations of the de jure measures. The measures most commonly capture direct capital controls but a few indicate the extent of deeper liberalization in financial sectors behind the border. Most Asian economies had made quite modest commitments on financial services by the end of the GATS round in 1997 (see Table in Appendix and Figures below). Since the GATS requires only limited capital account opening and only in so far as capital flows form an “essential part of the liberalized service” or are “related to the supply of the service” (Kono and Schuknecht, 1998 and Parrenas, 2007). This picture does not suggest that the financial sectors in Asia have been significantly opened as a result of trade commitments5. Contreras and Yi (2004, cited by Parrena) concluded that East Asian economies’ core banking, core insurance and securities services are closed or partially closed to foreign competition while auxiliary
  • 25. financial services, financial data processing and other insurance services are largely open. These conclusions, drawn from study of the GATS commitments, do not sit well alongside evidence of the actual involvement of foreign providers in financial services and indicate how difficult it is to match policy statements with actual practice and outcome. Figure 6 Source: Parrenas, 2007, p 24 Figure 7
  • 26. Source: Parrenas, 2007, p 24 Other indicators of behind-the-border liberalization give a picture of greater opening. The most frequently cited are the measures of Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) that show gradual progress in liberalisation of the domestic financial systems and stock markets but much slower opening in capital markets in seven East Asian economies (Figure 8, from Park and Bae, 2002). Figure 8
  • 27. Source: Cited in Park and Bae, (2002). Notes: To measure the liberalization of the domestic financial system, Kaminsky and Schmukler analyze the regulations on deposit interest rates, lending interest rates, allocation of credit, and foreign currency deposits. As additional information, they also collect data on reserve requirements. To set the liberalization dates, they focus mainly on the first two variables, the price indicators. However, they complement that information with the regulations on the last three variables, those on quantities, to have a better picture of the degree of repression of the domestic financial sector. Finally, to track the liberalization of stock markets, they study the evolution of regulations on the acquisition of shares in the domestic stock market by foreigners, repatriation of capital, and repatriation of interest and dividends. (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002, p 9) Direct measures of capital account opening are also an important component of understanding the pattern of Asia’s financial integration. These are likely to be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for greater integration. Without some such
  • 28. measures it is difficult to assess the effect capital controls have on the degree of integration and to consider whether they are part of a policy arsenal that could be deployed to encourage further integration. The difficulty of capturing policy change by measurable variables is well known. The choices for measurement of the extent of capital account opening are fairly limited but there are a number of different approaches. Essentially there are several variations on an index of “on-off” restrictions based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions and there are (fewer) measures based on the actual accessibility of parts of the financial system. The results of these studies do not give a consistent picture. Miniane (2004) concludes that there has been minimal reduction in capital account restrictions in Asia, with the exception of Korea, and that in many economies barriers rose after the financial crisis. With more disaggregated data from the same underlying IMF source Park and Bae (2002) conclude that there has been fairly steady reduction in capital account barriers in most Asian economies with the exception of Malaysia which famously imposed tighter controls in response to the crisis. Using dummy variables, however disaggregated, gives no way to distinguish which of the components drives the change in status of a particular country even though it is likely that not all components matter equally. Chinn and Ito (2007) develop a variant of the dummy variable measures of Miniane and others. They derive the principal component of four variables that include both the conventional capital account controls and also measures of the presence of multiple exchange rates, controls on current account transactions and the need to surrender export proceeds. These are expressed in terms of degrees of openness rather than whether restrictions exist, and data are available for 181 countries back to 1983. This measure has the advantage of incorporating a more extensive range of restrictions that would impact on cross-border capital movements. From Figure 9 it is clear that “the pace – and pattern – of financial opening exhibits wide regional variation. The Asian region has had relatively high levels of financial openness since the 1970s, although the rate of financial opening slowed down in the aftermath of the Asian crisis of 1997-98” (p7). Figure 9
  • 29. Source: Chinn and Ito, 2007, p 17 Figure 10, using the most recent version of the Chinn-Ito data, shows the position for individual economies in East Asian up to 2006. Individual variation within the region is noticeable, with some countries decreasing openness after the crisis. Figure 10 1986-1996 A verage 1999-2005 A verage 3 2 1 0 -1 IND IDN US AUS SGP MYS VNM PHL HKG UK JPN PRC KOR THA -2 Source: Calculated from data available at http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~mchinn/research.html Note: The apparent decline in openness for Australia is an artifact of the more detailed data that became available after 1996 when one component of the IMF data was provided at a more disaggregated level. This resulted in one
  • 30. variable that previously had been classified as no restriction becoming a restriction. In contrast to the previous figure the data are not normalized to have minimum values of zero. Edison and Warnock combine some elements of both de facto and de jure characteristics by measuring the proportion of an economy’s stock market that is available to foreign investors. Taking one minus the ratio of the investable part of the stock market to the total market capitalisation they create an index which captures not only the legal restrictions, but also the intensity of them. A higher index shows that a higher proportion of the stock market is not accessible to foreign investment – showing not merely the existence of restrictions but how pervasive they are. The data for 10 Asian countries are shown below (Figure 11) Figure 11 Edison-Warnock measure of restrictiveness of controls on stock markets
  • 31. Source; H.J. Edison, F.E. Warnock, (2003) These data show that restrictions in Asia were initially quite high and that, while they declined over the 1990s, the timing extent and evolution varied in different economies. The overall level of restriction remains quite high for most of the region. The patterns are similar to those shown by other measures: Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan have become more open while Malaysia’s experiment with restrictions shows very clearly. The Philippines shows very little change from its quite high pre-crisis level of restriction. It is notable that India remains quite heavily restricted. However it is hard to take away from these measures the conviction expressed by Takagi and Hirose (2004, p 133) that there has been a reversal of the pre-crisis trend to great financial integration, reflecting a change in attitude globally towards a greater acceptance of moderate capital controls. In their view this attitude shift explains why “the capital account regime, at least in some countries in East Asia, is not as open today as it was before the crisis” p 133 .
  • 32. Considering the mixed picture presented by different measures of de facto and de jure integration or openness, the appeal of some composite measure covering several different indices seems clear. Surprisingly, composite (multivariate) indicators of financial integration are a relatively recent development and few studies have applied this approach to Asia. Takagi and Hirose (2004) is an exception that uses principal components analysis of five dimensions of financial integration: exchange rate volatility, deviations from purchasing power parity, deviations from uncovered interest parity, trade intensity, and short term nominal interest rate correlation. They derive a single indicator of integration between pairs of countries in the Asia region and then group countries by cluster analysis to show which are more closely integrated and whether groups of closely integrated countries can be identified. They conclude that there are two groups of closely integrated economies: one group consists of Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Taiwan while the second group covers Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. These groups are, however, significantly influenced by the heavy weight given to exchange rate volatility in the principal components analysis and may not be very informative. Their research was not designed to compare the degree of integration within the region against any other, nor to show changes over time, although it could be adapted to both purposes. More importantly, the choice of which underlying indicators of integration to include is crucial and there would be many competing choices available but the approach warrants further development. What drives integration? Although the extent of financial integration between the region and the rest of the world, and within the region itself, may still be open to debate, and there is still some variation in views about whether integration and openness have increased or decreased since the crisis, a picture emerges of slow, and sometimes sporadic, increase in financial integration. What can be said about the main drivers of the process? In particular, do the remaining de jure barriers explain a low level of financial integration or are other factors more important? The literature here is extensive but mainly does not focus on this specific question, but a few conclusions do emerge. Most research suggests that removing de jure capital controls does not automatically result in increased integration although removing the Edison Warnock type restrictions on access to domestic stock markets by foreign investors does result in increased portfolio investment by foreigners.
  • 33. Adding capital control variables to the gravity models does not suggest that financial flows would be closer in the absence of the controls. The major explanation of degrees of financial integration seems to be trade. Countries with large trade flows will likely also have large capital flows relative to GDP. There is debate about whether finance follows trade or the reverse but it does seem that this is an important element of the difference between Asia and Europe. In so far as trade integration has been a market-driven, bottom-up process in Asia, it is probable that the same will be true of financial integration. What is much less clear is how much is actually contributed by the policy and financial structure variables that regularly turn up in lists of desirable reforms to promote greater integration. Ghosh (2006) lists the impediments to greater cross- border transactions as including withholding taxes, a lack of hedging instruments, differences in market practices and infrastructure such as trading platforms and conventions, procedures for clearance and settlement and custodian systems, differences in rating standards, national legal and regulatory frameworks and accounting and auditing practices. To this list others have added the “underdevelopment of financial markets”, inadequate financial and legal structure, low auditing and accounting standards, low transparency, weak corporate governance (Lee, 2007). Parrenas (2007) surveys several papers and picks out recommendations to improve transparency, legal systems, insolvency systems and workout procedures, competition and free entry, risk pricing undistorted by subsidies or interest rate controls, clearing and settlement systems, government bond markets and benchmark yields and the promotion of securitization. We have only limited consistent statistical evidence on which of these desiderata actually affect the extent of financial integration. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) find that financial depth and the size of stock markets have an effect but, tellingly, corporate income tax rates and the introduction of insider trading laws have no effect. Ostry et al (IMF, 2007) suggest that domestic policies towards the financial system do have an effect. Capital controls, institutional quality, trade openness and the level of economic development affect the overall extent of openness (measured by total foreign liabilities as a share of GDP). The institutional quality index is an average of indicators covering voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. The measurement of all of these is contentious and they are much bigger
  • 34. policy issues than simply improving financial systems, difficult as that may be. Much of the policy advice and discussion that follows here, and in other papers, is based on intuition and anecdotal evidence about what would improve financial systems, rather than on hard evidence. There is a clear need for more research on these issues. Foreign influence in regional financial systems is growing Despite the impression of a relatively slow-to-integrate region there has been a very marked increase in the degree of foreign participation in the domestic systems of the region and in some types of cross-border activity. As Park and Bae (2002) document there has been a dramatic increase in foreign ownership of banks in most emerging market economies during the second half of the 1990s. Foreign banks’ penetration was traditionally low in East Asia because of barriers to entry but this has changed since the 1997-98 crisis (Table 3 from their Table 14, reproduced below). Foreign bank control over assets of local banks jumped from less than one percent in Korea in 1994 to 4.3 percent in 1999. In Indonesia, it rose by more than ten times during the same period. On average, the foreign control in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand rose to 6 percent in 1999 from 1.6 percent five years earlier. Similarly, as a result of the lending behaviour of BIS reporting banks, foreign banks’ credit as a share of total bank credit more than doubled in Malaysia: it rose to more than 40 percent after the 1997 crisis from an average of less than 20 percent over the 1990-96 period. In the Philippines the share jumped to 35.5 percent in 2001 after a sustained decline during the first half of the 1990s and in Thailand there has been a gradual increase in foreign banks share. Foreign banks also made a substantial gain in terms of the loan market share, which reached almost the 30 percent level in Malaysia. Only in Taiwan and Korea, have foreign banks have not been able to increase their loan market shares. Much of the increase in the market share of foreign banks in the Southeast Asian countries has come from the large increase in their local currency (see Park and Bae’s Figure 4). Table 3
  • 35. Source: Park and Bae, 2002 An important additional feature is that while foreign bank penetration in East Asia is still lagging behind that in other emerging market economies, American and European banks have established a near monopoly position in providing two major services in the capital markets in East Asia: 1) underwriting in the primary market and 2) trading and consulting in the secondary market. It is hard to quantify the value of financial services and data are sparse so only data related to investment banking are presented to show the dominance of American and European financial institutions in financial services in East Asia. Western financial institutions, in particular American ones, have been by far the largest providers of financial services in global investment banking. A Euromoney 1996 “poll of polls’ showed that of the top 20 investment banks (based on a compilation of 70 Euromoney polls and league tables produced in 1995), almost all were either American or European. Six years later, this dominance remained unchanged; only one Japanese investment bank made the list (see Table 4). Table 4
  • 36. Source: Park and Bae, 2002 Euromoney poll results in other areas also confirm the dominance of American and European institutions in providing the entire range of financial services (see Table 12 in Park & Bae) . US-based financial institutions led in every category of services, followed by British-based ones. No financial institution was based in Asia with the exception of Japan, and even then, the Japanese institutions were ranked last. The Euromoney poll in 2002 shows that American investment banks had increased their dominance further; Japanese investment banks have been largely driven out of the market for capital market services since 1995. Table 5 and 6 classify the capital market instruments issued in the five Asian countries during the 1991-2001 period by nationality of the lead managers or book runners who sponsored the new issues. Out of US$ 31.96 billion that was financed through capital markets for the 1998-2001 period by the six countries, 74 percent was undertaken by American and European investment banks, and 6 percent by Japanese institutions. The cumulative figures for the 1991-1997 period show almost 70 percent of the capital market financing was managed by western institutions, compared to 30 percent by East Asian investment banks. Table 5 further shows a very significant change in the structure of East Asia’s international financing. Before the 1997 crisis the East Asian countries had relied heavily on syndicated loan financing. In the early 1990s, the six East Asian countries secured more than 70 percent of their total international financing from banking institutions. The proportion
  • 37. of loan financing declined gradually, and after the 1997 crisis, all of their foreign financing has come from capital markets. In managing the syndication loan financing, East Asian banks maintained a share of the market during the 1991-2001 period, reflecting the bank dominance of the East Asian financing systems. Table 5 Source: Park and Bae, 2002
  • 38. Park and Bae further use the evidence in Table 6 to show that American and European lead managers accounted for more than 70 percent of all capital market financing, while Japanese institutions represented only 9 percent over 1991-2001. Table 7 lists the top 20 lead managers in the management of debt and equity issues. As they point out, the total amount underwritten shows a similar pattern of dominance by American and European institutions which represented 90 percent while the East Asian institutions only accounted for 10 percent. They report that according to Risk Magazine (November 1996), most first-tier derivative brokers and dealers were either American or European institutions when evaluated on pricing ability, market making reliability and liquidity, innovation and speed of transaction, even before the 1997- 98 crisis. No Asian region financial institution was ranked in the first tier as either active brokers or dealers of Asian derivatives. One important cause of the absence of regional players in these markets was the financial crisis and the non-performing loan problems of Japanese banks which curtailed their lending activities and caused them to withdraw from the region. Table 6 Source: Park and Bae, 2002
  • 39. Table 7 Source; Park and Bae, 2002 Table 8
  • 40. Source: Park and Bae, 2002 A similar picture emerges from other indicators. Parrenas (2007) notes that trends in foreign investment in East Asia’s financial services industries reflect the growing openness of the region’s markets throughout the last decade, particularly with respect to commercial presence. Figures 12 – 16 shows the growth of foreign investment in financial services in a number of East Asian economies. Despite the overall growth, there are some variations in the importance of foreign investment (relative to domestic investment) in the restructuring of financial systems (Figure 13). In about half of East Asian economies (Thailand, Hong Kong, China, Indonesia and South Korea), foreign investment played a substantial role in the restructuring of regional financial systems, exceeding 50% of total investment in Thailand, Hong Kong and China. In the other half (Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Taiwan), financial restructuring was largely achieved through domestically-funded mergers and acquisitions. Commercial banking has been the sector most transformed by foreign investment (Figures 14-15) in part as a result of acquisitions
  • 41. of non-performing loan portfolios). In a few economies, however, investment in other financial services was significant. The insurance industry in China and Taiwan, and the securities industry in Hong Kong, Malaysia and China are example. There is also variety in the region in both the size and sector distribution of foreign investment, as Figure 15 shows. These data indicate that, with the exception of Thailand, foreign investment in East Asia’s financial services industry has come to play more significant roles in the insurance and securities industries, as well as in other credit institutions. Figure 16 confirms the points made by Park and Bae about the dominance of foreign lead managers. Figure 12 Source: Parrenas, 2007, p 26 Figure 13
  • 42. Source: Parrnas, 2007, P 27 Figure 14 Source: Parrenas, 2007.
  • 43. Figure 15 Source: Parrenas, 2007, p Figure 16
  • 44. Source: Parrenas, 2007, These indicators of penetration by foreign financial service providers are important not only for what they say about the extent to which financial integration is taking place but also for the challenge they pose in terms of regulation and supervision, to which we return below. IV Major improvements since the financial crisis Since most studies of the extent of regional financial integration lay some stress on the limitations created by the development of domestic financial systems it is useful to see what changes have taken place and how these systems are assessed against international benchmarks. There is a consensus emerging that the depth and coverage of financial markets, as represented by aggregate data, has increased significantly over the last 10 years (Ghosh/World Bank 2006; Ghill and Kharas/World Bank 2006) but less consensus on what further quantitative developments are needed and on the extent to which
  • 45. reforms have adequately improved the quality of financial, governance and regulatory systems. Starting with simple quantitative measures, Asian financial systems have grown and deepened significantly since the crisis of 1997-98. World Bank data (Ghosh, 2006) show that asset growth has been remarkable across the bank, equities and even bond markets. By comparison with countries of similar income levels Asian markets are of comparable or larger size (Table 9 and Figure 17) and on some measures (e.g. equity market capitalisation in Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia ) surpass those of developed countries.6 Table 9 Source: Gill and Kharas, 2006, p 174
  • 46. Figure 17 Source, Ghosh 2006, p 4 and 27. Note: The data for Thailand in this chart are not consistent with the data in the preceding table which is also reproduced by Ghosh on the same page as the chart. Other country data, excluding Thailand, do seem consistent. It is frequently remarked that bond markets are still small in East Asia relative to other types of finance and that the growth of bond markets has come mainly from public bond issues (frequently to restructure ailing banking systems). The data, however, suggest that the bond markets have been amongst the most rapidly growing sectors of the financial systems in the region. Dhalla (2005) claims that there are now three bond markets in East Asia (China, Korea and Malaysia) with over US$100 billion and that the world’s two largest corporate bond markets relative to GDP are in East Asia (Korea and Malaysia) Beyond the bond and equity markets, It is not easy to get data on the size of markets for the whole range of financial services that now exist in developed countries so it is difficult to tell to what extent markets in Asia have expanded in sophistication and
  • 47. range of services. One indicator is the size of assets of institutional investors in the different segments of the market as shown in Table 4 which indicates that the markets in the region are still fairly small. TABLE 10 Ghosh, p 130 Assessments of the improvement in the quality and efficiency of the financial systems in the region are varied. Quantitative measures indicate significant improvement in the levels of bad debts and corporate indebtedness (see Figures 18 -19) Figures 18
  • 48. Source: Burton, Tseng and Kang, 2006. Figure 19 Source: Burton, Tseng and Kang, 2006. Efficiency indicators also suggest that the functions of financial markets have improved. Efficiency of the banking sector has improved in terms of costs, NPLs, return on assets and capital adequacy as indicated in Figures 20 - 21 (although data
  • 49. limitations and cross-country differences in accounting practices require caution here) . Figure 20 Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability report, Sept 2005, cited in Ghosh, 2006, p 68 Figure 21 Source: Ghosh, 2006, p 66 In the securities markets there is also evidence of improvement in function as well as scale. Liquidity, transactions costs and informational quality are all important to the functioning of securities markets. A World Bank index of market quality shown in Figure 22 uses two indices, one of market liquidity and one of the information quality of the market. The informational quality index captures three measures from the
  • 50. World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators i.e. disclosure, director liability and shareholder suits. These three are taken to measure the strength of minority shareholder protection. Combined with the liquidity measure these create a composite index of market efficiency showing that most of the region’s markets are well below average standards. Figure 22 shows some international comparisons. Ultimately the information quality of the markets is demonstrated by lack of synchronicity (i.e. the ability to distinguish individual movements of stocks within the market). In explaining the outcomes on information quality Ghosh and Revilla find that some institutional arrangements matter but many that might be expected to have an effect do not appear important. Amongst their determinants disclosure rules are very important but so are the availability of stock lending and short selling. FIGURE 22 Stock market efficiency A further important indicator of the functioning of financial systems is the development of the insurance industry since it acts not only as an alternative savings vehicle in many of these markets but also as a risk-sharing mechanism. The most commonly used measures to assess the level of development of the sector are insurance penetration (measured as the insurance premium as a percentage of
  • 51. GDP) and density (measured as the premium per capita). As Ghosh notes, “There is still substantial scope for further development, particularly in China, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand (Table 6.6). Distribution channels are an important factor in increasing the coverage of insurance. In most insurance markets in the region, distribution has been built on the agency sales-force model, often extending to large numbers of sales forces (with varying degrees of productivity, reflecting the extent to which agents work full- or part-time).” (p 139). The alternative model for extending insurance is for banks to market insurance products. This model, known as bancassurance, developing rapidly in Europe, is also appearing in Asia. 7 Table 11 Source: Ghosh, p 139 Despite these developments in the region over the 10 years since the crisis it is still common to find assessments that vary on the details of how much more needs to be
  • 52. done and how transparent, efficient and robust the region’s financial markets are now. 8 Most assessments show modest improvements in corporate governance measures (e.g. Cowen et al, 2006, p 20, based on Asian Corporate Governance Association survey data) but several countries in the region are performing worse on measures of the general governance climate or of corruption and law and order (Kramer, 2006 and Poonpatpibul, 2006 p 41). Bank governance appears still to be an area that needs improvement in many of the region’s economies. Data from the IMF Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes provide an important addition to these qualitative data. Developing Asia (Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand) exhibits lower compliance with Basel Core Principles than the average for middle income countries. Most developing Asian countries were non-compliant in principles regarding information sharing between supervisors, ownership, prudential regulation and requirements, on-site and off-site supervision, remedial measures, and cross-bordering banking. In addition, no supervisor in the sample practiced consolidated supervision or incorporated country risk control. On IAIS Principles (in insurance) the group outperformed peers. The main weaknesses for insurance supervisors around the world lie in corporate governance standards, internal controls and market conduct. In general, the assessed Asian systems exhibit the same deficiencies as in other regions. In applying IOSCO principles, securities regulators were not conducting proper market surveillance and did not have adequate rules to detect and deter manipulation and other unfair practices. In the implementation of standards of the committee on Payment and Settlement Systesm (CPSS) developing Asia also lacks risk management procedures, prompt final settlement, and arrangements for security, reliability and governance ( Cowen et al, 2006, p 40). Figure ss gives a snapshot of this information from Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAPs) over the period 1999-2005. Figure 23
  • 53. Source: Cowen et al, 2006, p 39 Note: More detail is available in the same source on the specific components of each standard assessed. One noticeable feature is that participation in both the FSAP and ROSC process is low within the region. While there have certainly been criticisms of the procedures and effectiveness of the IMF’s surveillance this is an obvious area for early decision within regional fora. Either more countries in the region should take part in these processes or regional alternatives should be created to provide similar monitoring. Figure 24 and 25
  • 54. Source: Cowen et al, 2006, p 43 Detailed survey data from Central Banks (shown in Table 12) also shows that countries vary significantly in their compliance with best practice in detailed banking supervision. Table 12
  • 55. Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Risk-based supervision x x x x x Consolidated supervision x x x x More effective organization, risk-focus x x x Risk focus in allocation of staff resources x x x x x Specialized staff and supervisory units x x x x x Risk-focused, targeted on-site examinations x x x x x Strengthened off-site micro and macro monitoring x x x x x Early Warming Systems (EWS) x x x x x Improved databases x x x x x New examination manuals x x x x Major training efforts x x x x x Accreditation of bank examiners x Accreditation of banks’ credit and risk managers x Incremental enforcement actions x X Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework x X n/a Encourage mergers and consolidation x x X x x Mandate all banks to be externally rated x Mandate all banks to be listed X Deregulate pricing and fees x X n/a x Consumer protection and education x X x Corporate governance x x X x x Require board committees x x X x x Encourage outsourcing x X Encourage institutional investors x X Remove expatriate restrictions x Remove restrictions on salaries and mobility x External auditor accreditation and rotation x X x x Coordination with other dom. supervisors x x X n/a x Coordination with for. Supervisors x x X x x : Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Strengthen competition x X x Limit new entry after X x x x crisis Liberalize entry x x x x Anti-commingling policy x Strengthen bank X x x x x governance Loan classification and X x x x x provisioning Accrual of interest x
  • 56. Source: Lindgren, Carl-Johan (May 2006), Banking Integration in the ASEAN- Region: An Overview’, ADB Manila Philippines. Table based on questionnaires and central bank websites and annual reports.
  • 57. Similarities and differences of structure Financial systems around the world differ in many respects and comparing them is fraught with difficulty. Allen and Gale (2004) and Allen, Chui and Maddaloni, 2004, note that comparisons should be made across many dimensions, recognising the many functions of financial systems. Size of markets, measured by assets of particular categories, is only one aspect. They also add the allocation of household and firms’ assets and liabilities by type, the size and number of institutions, the portfolio allocations of institutional investors and aspects affecting the transmission of monetary policy, such as the operation of mortgage markets and the formation of house prices. The practitioner and policy community would add to this list disclosure systems, quality of regulation and governance. Each of these comparisons is informative about different aspects of a financial system and avoids the temptation to label systems simply as, for example, “bank dominated” or “market oriented”. Quantitative measures and simple labels say little about the efficiency and stability of financial systems which is, at the end of the day, what we care about most. Even on the simple quantitative dimensions, as noted above, while bond market development has lagged by some measures, comparisons across a wider universe show that variations in the size of bond markets are marked across developed markets as well – the role and function of bonds appear to be a major source of difference in financial markets across the globe. Corporate bond markets remain very small in the UK and Japan as well as non-Japan Asia (see Allen, Chui and Maddaloni, 2004, figure 2). The fact that bank assets still make up a relatively large share of many Asian countries financial systems is also not unusual in global terms. Ghosh notes “Despite the progress made in diversifying financial markets, the banking sector remains dominant, accounting for around 58 percent of the region’s total financial assets at the end of 2005 (down from 63 percent in 1997)” (p 27) but also shows data that imply that Asian countries (with the exception of China) are mostly not far from global averages in the ratio of bank assets to other assets when adjusted for per capita income levels (see Figure 22)
  • 58. Figure 26 Source: Ghosh, 2006 It is not only comparison of financial systems that is difficult. Since many different models of financial systems persist around the globe, there is no consensus in the research literature that one system is better than another. Some systems appear to suit particular industrial structures and systems for innovation better than others, but there is no strong tendency towards convergence in type of financial system even amongst advanced, industrialized economies. Freixas et al (2004) note that while differences are frequently characterized as bank- versus market-oriented “… this distinction dos not stand up to close scrutiny” . While continental Europe has large banking markets and relatively small stock markets, it also has large bond markets. Japan not only has a large banking market but also large bond and equity markets. The US is one “market- oriented” system with large bond and equity markets but small banking markets but there are few like it. Freixas et al go on to note that “A more significant difference is the nature of financial institutions in different countries. Non-bank financial institutions, such as pension funds and insurance companies play an even greater role in the Netherlands
  • 59. than they do in the UK but in the rest of continental Europe they are quite small. In the US mutual funds are an important savings vehicle while in continental Europe equity investments have frequently been channelled through banks so that equity markets and the associated nbfis are relatively small”. They conclude “Overall, financial institutions and markets have been organized on national lines and there has traditionally been little cross-border flow in financial services”. The key point is that there is still little evidence of convergence in financial market structure or in the relative importance of different financial institutions towards any one particular model. This is not to say that there is no adoption of some common practices. Most countries have moved in the direction of global standards of disclosure and some similarity in regulatory structures to protect investors. But there is an important distinction between arguing for the advantages of adopting regulatory best practice and confusing this with the need to move financial systems towards a standardized model. The conclusion is that it is natural to expect a range of financial structures in the Asian region to co-exist. Even with the greater adoption of standards of best practice in the functioning of financial systems, the region will be home to a multitude of systems that may be more or less “bank-centred”, with more or less active equity and bond markets. The variation is evident in the data already presented. The shares of investment in GDP and the contribution of investment to growth over the last 5 years has been erratic, with falls much larger in Indonesia and Malaysia than in China and the faster growing transition economies. Similarly, the development and change in financial markets is as noticeable for the variance across the region as for the overall growth. Bank assets to GDP ratios in 2005 ranged from 50% in Indonesia to 444% in Hong Kong; equity market capitalization ranged from 18% in China to nearly 600% in Hong Kong while bond markets ranged from close to 20% in Indonesia to 76% in Korea and 88% in Malaysia. The range in the assets of institutional investors to GDP (pension funds, life insurance funds and mutual funds ) was similarly wide. This variation may not only reflect differences in levels of income and development but may also reflect the structural, historical and local differences that were noted by Freixas et al across the globe. That is, these differences may prove persistent, not merely transitory. If that is the case policy attention should not be focused on trying to bring all economies in the region to
  • 60. the same level but on ensuring that systems are transparent and open enough to ensure that all savers, borrowers and investors have access to the services they need to smooth their consumption through time, to maximize returns to their investment and to match the risk of their portfolios to their risk appetites. Regulation As noted above, despite the overall pattern of lower than expected financial integration and of significant barriers to entry, there is a considerable degree of foreign penetration in the region’s markets. As Table 4 shows, there have also been significant numbers of cross-border banking investments in recent years and, where these groups continue to operate in multiple markets, they pose some new regulatory and supervisory challenges. This is true in a number of other financial service areas where the role of financial conglomerates is large. TABLE 13 Source: Ghosh, 2006, Appendix 1, p 182
  • 61. The challenge this poses is in the design of policies to adequately regulate the systems and to ensure that they can interact and integrate smoothly. This requires a degree of coordination and cooperation around the region that may grow exponentially if the degree of financial integration increases. V Regional cooperation There already exist a number of regional fora in which financial issues are considered. Table 14 indicates the membership of the major government level groups and some elements of their structure. In addition there are several industry-initiated bodies that exchange information and may have a role in helping develop best practice and self- regulatory expertise. Several recent studies (Poonpatibul et al, 2006; Yap 2007; Boao Forum Annual Report, 2007; ASEAN Secretariat and Australian Treasury (Hew et al), 2007) Dobson, 2004 and 2006) describe well the range and functions of the various regional groups that have some involvement with financial issues. As Table 14 shows, most countries in the region belong to several different groupings and many have work programs covering related (or substantially the same) areas. At present it is probably fair to say that there are enough groups tasked with collecting and sharing information between their members (although as noted in the conclusions there are still some kinds of information that could usefully be added) but, though several of them are also intended to carry out surveillance and peer review, the surveillance element is still weaker than desirable. Furthermore, there is clearly considerable overlap in the focus of several different groups. This may have desirable elements since some groups include members that bring valuable perspectives to the task but who are excluded from other groups. It does mean, however, that there can be considerable duplication of effort. It is also unnecessarily difficult to discover the different work programs and initiatives within each group relating to the same area. The compilations from which Table 14 are drawn are found in research papers or deep within annual reports. Yet this, at-a-glance description of the work being done on financial integration and market building is necessary every time a working group considers what remains to be done. In addition it would be useful to have similar information organised by topic or market segment so that it would be
  • 62. easy to discover under the heading say of “liquidity support” or “capital market rules harmonisation” which groups were working on what elements. Such a database would not be very difficult to compile and could be kept up-to-date by agreement across the various organisations. It could usefully reside at the ADB ARIC website.
  • 63. TABLE 14 REGIONAL COOPERATION FORA CENTRAL BANK COOPERATION FINANCE MINISTRY-LED COOPERATION ACD EMEAP SEACEN SEANZA APEC ASEAN ASEAN+3 ASEM Year established 1991.2 1966.2 1956 1994.3 1967.8 1999.4 1997.9 Members 28 11 16 20 21 10 13 39 Indonesia,Malaysia, X X X X X X X X Philippines, Singapore, Thailand Brunei X X X X X X Vietnam X X X X X X Cambodia, X X(all X X X Myanmar, Lao PDR except Laos?) Hong Kong, X X ? X X Taiwan X X X X Korea X X X X X X X China, Japan X X X X X X Australia, X X X New Zealand X X X Mongolia, Nepal, ? X Sri Lanka Papua New Guinea ? X X Bangladesh, Iran, ? X Macau, India ? X X X Fiji ? X Canada, Chile, X Mexico, Russia, US EU-25 X
  • 64. ACD EMEAP SEACEN SEANZA APEC ASEAN ASEAN+3 ASEM Structure Governors’ mtg 1x pa 1x pa biennial Deputies mtg 2x pa 1x pa 1x pa 1x pa 3x pa 1x pa Working level WGFM: 4x pa On a need On a need One a WGBS, basis basis need basis WGPS: 2x pa Areas of Work Financial Market X ABF 1 & 2 X X AFMM X X Development (insert others) ACBG AFMM+3 (ACBF) ABMI Payment and X BPA Settlement Banking X Supervision Surveillance X X X X X ASCU X X - Economic Review X X X X - Policy Dialogue X X X X X X Capacity Building X X X X X X X - Training X X X X X X Reseach X X X X X X Liquidity X EMEAP X CMI arrangements Repo Initiatives (finance Finance Finance related) Ministers Ministers Process; Process; Surveillance Economic Process; Review ASEAN Swap and Policy
  • 65. Arrangement; Dialogue Roadmap for (ERPD); Financial and ASEAN+3 Monetary Research Integration; Group; ACMF; CMI, ABMI Exchange Linkages Task Force; Asia 100 benchmark and index Source: Poonpatpibul et al, 2006; Yap, 2007; Baoa Forum Annual Report, 2007 Notes: ACD = Asia Cooperation Dialogue; APEC=Association of Pacific Economic Cooperation; ASEAN=Association of Southeast Asian Nations; ASEM=Asia Europe Meeting; EMEAP=Executives’ Meeting of East Asia and Pacific Central Banks;SEACEN=South East Asia Central Banks; SEANZA= South East Asia, New Zealand, Australia. CMI = Chiang Mai Initiative; ABMI= Asian Bond Market Initiative; ABF = Asian Bond Fund; AFMM = ASEAN Finance Ministers’ Meeting; ACGM (ACBF) = ASEAN Central Bank Governors’ Meeting (ASEAN Central Bank Forum); ACMF = ASEAN Capital Market Forum;
  • 66. The surprising element that emerges from a close look at these organisations and their work programs is the range and extent of the apparent commitment to collaborative work on financial integration issues. If these pronouncements could be taken as truly reflecting a political commitment in the member economies to implementation of steps toward financial integration there would be grounds for optimism about how quickly things could change. The following description of the major regional cooperation initiatives illustrates the point.9 Under the ASEAN Finance Ministers Meeting (AFMM) there is a formal ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) which produces an annual report and is supported by the ASEAN Finance and Central Bank Deputies’ Meeting, its working groups, the ASEAN Surveillance Coordinating Unit and the ADB. While its focus is mainly macro-economic it also is reports on financial stability issues. ASEAN also has an ASEAN Central Bank Forum at Governor level and has established the ASEAN Insurance Training and Research Institute and the ASEAN Insurance Regulators’ Forum. In a series of summits since the Hanoi Action Plan 0f 1998 ASEAN has recognised the need for a Roadmap for Integration and has worked towards defining a goal that is currently enshrined in Vision 2020 and includes the idea of an ASEAN Economic Community. As part of the process, the AFMM adopted a Roadmap for the Integration of ASEAN in Finance covering four areas: capital market development; capital account liberalisation, financial services liberalisation and ASEAN currency cooperation. To facilitate financial services liberalisation the Hanoi Plan of Action called for intensified negotiations under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and several rounds of negotiations have taken place. A Fourth Round of Negotiations under the new positive list approach is expected to conclude by the end of 2007. To date the commitments have been criticised as being somewhat less than WTO (Stephenson and Nikomborirak, 2002) but it is never easy to assess the value of commitments alone, since they often lag behind the actual state of regulation and implementation. To support capital market development two approaches lie at the core of the Roadmap: i) institutional capacity building in areas necessary for the development of capital markets including the legal and regulatory framework, market infrastructure, and international best practices: and ii) initiatives to foster greater cross-border collaboration
  • 67. between capital markets in the region including the development of market linkages and harmonisation of capital market standards. In the Vientiane Action Plan three areas of financial cooperation were explicitly identified: a) strengthening surveillance mechanisms, including setting up an early warning system b) enhancing domestic financial systems particularly in the areas of legal and regulatory systems, risk management and market infrastructure and adoption of international codes and standards and c) developing and integrating financial markets, through the establishment of a regional network for capital market research and training, cross border collaboration to develop common conventions in debt and equity markets; and progressive liberalisation of financial services and capital accounts. At the same time the ASEAN Capital Market Forum (ACMF) was established to focus on the development of regional capital markets and was intended to be a meeting place for capital market regulators. Significantly, the ASEAN Finance Ministers set up the ASEAN Exchange Linkages Task Force to explore methods of linking securities exchanges in the region. Areas identified as high priority are: narrowing gaps in technology, platforms, market practices, and strengthening investor protection through, among other measures, harmonising disclosure standards. The Task Force also began to benchmark the “ASEAN 100” top listed companies across the major exchanges and developed an ASEAN Index, launched in London in 2005. The ACMF has agreed to cooperate on harmonising standards that would facilitate integration such as disclosure standards, distribution rules, accounting and auditing standards and cross-recognition of qualifications of capital market professionals. Since 1999 the ASEAN+3 process has been institutionalised and includes a Finance Ministers’ Meeting (AFMM+3) with four major pillars: the Economic Review and Policy Dialogue; the Chiang Mai Initiative; the Asian Bond Market Initiative and the ASEAN+3 Research Group. The ERPD is mainly concerned with surveillance on a macroeconomic level and does not concern us here. The Chiang Mai initiative and the ABMI are by now so well documented that there is little need to describe how they operate. There is no doubt that both are significant contributions to the institutional structure helping to build closer financial links in the region. The first (CMI) provides liquidity support via a system of bilateral currency swap agreements, in addition to what is available through the IMF, and is presently being extended by new bilateral agreements at a rapid rate. Discussion is under way on multilateralising CMI and changing the arrangements requiring IMF
  • 68. supported programs for large calls on the facility. In 2006 the AFMM+3 set up a Group of Experts (GOE) and an Economic Technical Working Group (ETWG) to find ways to further strengthen regional surveillance and to develop an Early Warning System. Both of these take on added significance in the context of the bilateral swap system of CMI. The ABMI grew out of the perceived need to diversify sources of finance in the “bank- dominated” (though note the earlier discussion about how meaningful this label is) Asian economies and to help provide the infrastructure that would encourage and enable local bond markets to develop. Alongside the Asian Bond Funds of the EMEAP there has certainly been development of bond markets, though at present they mainly trade government rather than private paper, and are still dominated by US dollar-denominated bonds. The structures that support the ABMI (working groups on new securitized debt instruments, credit guarantee and investment mechanisms, foreign exchange transactions and settlement systems and credit rating systems) together with the ASEAN + 3 Research Group have generated several studies that clarify aspects of the integration agenda. While there has been criticism of the effectiveness of the Working Groups there is a consensus that the ABMI has helped to diversify financing in Asia. The EMEAP Asian Bond Funds (1 & 2) provide the demand side of the market and help to build expertise and experience in managing and investing in bond funds. Groupings initiated by, and centred on, Central Banks have also played a role in regional cooperation on the finance agenda and have a long history in the region. SEANZA was established in 1956, initially to provide training and capacity building. SEANZA now also includes the SEANZA Forum for Banking Supervisors which has extended participation to some functional regulatory bodies such as the Korean Financial Supervisory Service and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. The forum is mainly an information exchange mechanism though SEANZA also carries out training. This appears to be the only regional body in which financial supervisors and prudential agencies meet to focus on supervisory issues (rather than on central bank issues) and, in view of the growing risks in financial systems, it might be useful to consider a higher profile and expanded responsibilities for this body (or some alternative, see Recommendations below). Since, as pointed out by Corbett (2007), many economies in the region still maintain functionally separated supervisory bodies outside the Central Banks, there is a risk that
  • 69. the heavy Central Bank and Treasury/Finance Ministry focus of the existing regional cooperation bodies could allow supervisory issues to fall through the cracks. SEACEN is principally a training and research centre, with a dedicated headquarters and training facility in Malaysia. It runs large numbers of training courses using both in- house and external resources and is financially assisted by the Bank of Japan. Several non-member Central Banks have observer status. The most recent of the Central Bank groupings, EMEAP, was a Japanese initiative to strengthen cooperative relationships between members. Its structure (Governors’ meetings, Deputies’ meetings and Working Groups) was established in 1996. There are three working groups: WG/PSS on payment and settlement systems, WG/FM on central bank services and developments of foreign exchange, money and bond markets and WG/BS on banking supervision. As noted above, since some member countries have taken banking supervision out of the Central Bank (and in some cases have separate supervisors for different market segments) EMEAP now includes representatives from the financial supervisory agencies of some countries although it is mainly comprised of Central Bank representatives. As we noted above and develop further below, this still leaves a potential gap in the opportunities for information sharing and surveillance-type activities in some countries and in several non-banking areas that are increasingly important to financial systems. Aside from its activities in establishing the two ABFs, EMEAP also provides training and capacity building programs through the Bank of Japan (the EMEAP secretariat) and has recently signalled its intention to raise its profile in the region. This raises the question of where such training should be carried out and how these activities relate to those of SEACEN. One limitation is that the CMLV countries and India are not members of EMEAP.10 APEC also has significant programs in the finance area. One of the core principles of APEC is to develop policy with a strategic goal (among others) that promotes stable and efficient financial markets and supports greater economic cooperation, integration and openness. The most recent Finance Ministers’ Meeting enunciated several initiatives with finance content, including a Voluntary Action Plan on Freer and More Stable Capital
  • 70. Flows, an extension of the Finance and Development Program, a Financial Regulators’ Training Initiative, a cooperative program for financial institutions for SMEs, a capacity building training course for non-life insurance regulators, a program on Reform of the Financial Sector (to include an online repository of finance-related information and experience for finance ministers, central bankers and financial regulatory agencies), a public-private dialogue on Bond Market development and a capacity-building initiative to offer technical assistance on capital market development. As with EMEAP, the CMLV countries and India are not members of APEC. The most recent cooperation initiatives in the region are the Asia Cooperation Dialogue and the East Asian Summit. At present the ACD covers a wide group, going beyond the East Asian and Pacific region to include South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. It is a loosely-structured and informal group that operates through dialogue and projects. The Ministerial Meetings are usually attended by Foreign Ministers but there is the possibility of extending the interactions under the ACD to finance ministers, central banks, security regulators and stock exchanges. Amongst the nine project areas recommended for consideration by Ministers, financial cooperation is included. Thailand is the prime mover for the financial cooperation project and has set up a Working Group on Financial Cooperation. Asian bond market development is the main focus of the WG and the purpose is to build support for the activities of other fora such as EMEAP, rather than to duplicate efforts. The Dialogue group has focussed its main attention on energy issues (since it includes the Middle East this is an obvious natural advantage) and has deliberately linked its initiatives to those of other bodies in a collaborative fashion while bringing in a wider membership. The EAS, at present, somewhat resembles the ACD in that it is a dialogue process with a wider membership than most existing East Asian groups but its agenda is not yet clear. It is difficult to assess the prospects for any of these groups since, while their agendas, initiatives and work programs look well-directed to the problems of the region there is a salutary lesson in the fate of the Manila Framework Group. Formed in 1997, it was described in 2002 as “seen by some observers as the pre-eminent forum for regional surveillance and peer pressure” (Wang for PECC, 2002) though Wang went on to caution that the MFG had not been very successful as a mechanism for regional financial cooperation because it had not clearly specified its priorities, it had no peer
  • 71. review process but was limited to discussion only, and had no clear focus on financial issues. Its membership was also limited. Sure enough, by 2004 the MFG had been wound up. Private-sector cooperation initiatives In addition to the government bodies outlined above, there are a number of private- sector or semi-government/multilateral regulatory bodies in which regional financial market actors meet. For securities markets there is the Asia-Pacific Regional Committee of IOSCO (and, as noted above, the ASEAN Capital Market Forum). Most information sharing between securities market regulators, however, is done on the basis of bilateral MOUs. Within IOSCO 90 countries and regions signed more than 1000 MOUs for bilateral cooperation11 and nine Asian economies have become, or have committed to become, signatories to IOSCO’s Multilateral MOU, the first global information-sharing arrangement among security regulators. The East Asian Stock Exchanges Conference (EASEC) was founded in 1982 to facilitate the exchange of information among member exchanges. In 1990, seventeen of the region’s stock exchanges (Australia, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, India National, Mumbai, Jakarta, Surabaya, Tokyo, Osaka, Korea, Kuala Lumpur, New Zealand, Philippine, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand) formed a grouping (EAOSEF) that changed its name in 2005 to the Asian Oceanian Stock Exchanges Federation (AOSEF). Its activities include dialogue and research and it has developed proposals on cross-border trading, market linkages, demutualization, corporate governance, information management and harmonization and coordination of listing, trading and clearing, and market surveillance. These proposals have apparently been discussed within the organization but not necessarily advanced to government policy levels and it is not clear how they can be implemented since they will depend on voluntary adoption by member exchanges yet they would require coordinated supervision and, in some cases, legislative support. Progress on the ASEAN initiative, noted above, to commit to develop an inter-linked ASEAN securities market by 2010 will 12 be an indication of how these problems can be solved. Despite these potential difficulties there has been some practical progress toward linkages between some regional exchanges13. In addition to bilateral links, the TSE
  • 72. announced an intention to cooperate with stock exchanges of 10 Asian cities in 2002 on researching a system for the mutual free transactions of stock and bonds listed in the 11 stock exchanges and for promoting cross listings. It is not yet clear what progress has been made14. There are other forms of cooperation among independent organizations in the securities industry, such as the Asian Securities Forum and the Asian Securities Analysts Federation and financial institutions also play an active role. For example, five major Asian Securities Houses from four Asian economies formed the first Pan-Asian online stock exchange network, the Asian Stock Exchange Network, in April 2000. In other market segments there is a similar growth of regional groupings. Depository insurance corporations formed the Asian Regional Committee of the International Association of Deposit Insurers. Credit rating agencies formed the Association of Credit Rating Agencies in Asia (ACRAA) and there is a Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform. The main purpose of these bodies is to promote dialogue, information exchange and capacity building. The derivatives industry, still relatively underdeveloped in the region and heavily concentrated in Singapore, established the Asian Pacific Association of Derivatives (APAD), in 2004; an organization comprising academics, practitioners and regulators to promote research and increase knowledge of the use of derivative securities and markets. The Financial Stability Forum, serviced by the BIS, also occasionally convenes regional meetings bringing together regional central banks, finance ministries and capital market regulators as part of its global program promoting information exchange. Gaps in regional cooperation? It emerges from the description above that, while there are several overlapping groups exchanging information, they are many and varied. It is bound to be difficult to coordinate across the groups and to share information emerging from one forum with (differing) members of other groups. Moreover, the structure of the government level groups seems based around a view of financial systems that does not reflect the realities of the region. Consisting mainly of Central Banks or Finance Ministers or of deputies of these groups, they may not be able to capture the complex nature of financial market
  • 73. regulation in a changing world and across varying systems. Enhanced communication across the groups and greater public-private sector dialogue would be useful. Financial regulation within the region and around the world does not display a uniform structure. With the growth of integrated financial service provision and the wave of mergers creating large financial conglomerates, many countries have questioned whether the supervisory arrangements of previous decades are still appropriate. The pace of financial innovation has increased, financial conglomerates are not only complex organizations to supervise but also change the way in which risk is transmitted within the financial system. As a result both the risks in the system, and the regulatory objectives, have become more complex. The response around the world has been to consider whether regulators should also be consolidated into integrated bodies that deal with many previously-separate financial sectors. This has implications for the role and structure of regional cooperation for a. There are many variations of the model of unified and integrated agencies (Llewellyn, 2006). Unified agencies cover not only prudential supervision but also “conduct-of- business” supervision (i.e. consumer and investor protection issues such as disclosure, fairness etc). There is a spectrum of agencies, with some covering more than one, but not all, parts of the financial system (e.g. the Australian system where APRA supervises banking and insurance but not the securities industry). The “twin peaks” model has two bodies, one to carry out prudential supervision and the other to do “conduct-of-business” supervision (again Australia is an example). Under this model there is always the question of whether the Central Bank should become the prudential supervisor across the whole financial system, though this may have the risk that safety nets become extended to areas beyond those for which they were originally designed. The role of the Central Bank is an important one, and particularly so in East Asia, where many countries still rely on the Central Bank for supervision. There is a very wide range of supervisory models around the world. Around a third of countries have a single, integrated prudential supervisor (like the FSA of Britain), a small proportion have supervisors that combine a couple of financial sectors and over 40% have specialist, multiple supervisors dealing with only one financial sector (Llewellyn, 2006; Cihak and Podpiera, 2006) Thus, the majority of countries are still
  • 74. supervising separately but the striking feature is how varied is the international experience. Table 14 Supervision Structures Around the World Fully Integrated 39 Central Bank 9 Other 30 Partially Integrated 23 Banks and Insurance 9 Banks and Securities 5 Insurance and Securities 9 Separate 43 TOTAL 105 Source: Llewellyn, 2006 There is, however, an increasing trend to integrated financial supervision (Barth et al, 2006) thought interpretations of how to classify countries vary widely. The World Bank survey of regulators suggests that 11 out of 32 countries in the Asia Pacific region have a single supervisor for the financial sector. In addition, some countries have multiple supervisors for one type of financial institution (typically banks). Within East Asia the picture is equally varied. Table 15 gives details of East Asian supervisory arrangements. TABLE 15 SUPERVISION IN EAST ASIA Integrated Banking & Banking Securities B, S, I Central Securities and and separate Bank Insurance Insurance supervises banks? Singapore(1984) Yes Malaysia Y (1988) Japan (1998) Koreae (1999) N Taiwane (2004) N China e N Hong Kong Y Indonesiaa Y
  • 75. Philippinesb Y Thailand c,e Y Lao d Y Cambodia Y Vietnam Y Asutralia N (1998) India Y New N Zealand Notes: a) Designing and debating a single regulator b) Two banking supervisors c) Banking supervisor also covers asset management and other financial services d) Not clear where securities would be regulated as the market does not yet exist e) Barth et al, 2006, classifies these as having multiple bank supervisors Source: Corbett, 2007, updated The division within the East Asian region is broadly along income lines, with the higher income group mainly having moved, mostly quite recently, to the integrated supervision model. There are few studies of why countries choose integrated supervision nor many empirical studies of the impact of integrated supervisors. This partly explains why there is no consensus view about what system works best. The present World Bank view is that different countries may well need (or be able to get by with) different systems. Importantly they also stress that the transition from multiple, specialist supervisors to single, integrated supervisor is a complex process that can be costly and difficult (Martinez and Rose, 2003)15. What this means for discussions of East Asian regionalism is that information exchange and coordination of views will be made more difficult by the fact that different types of regulators, with different expertise and regulatory philosophy, are involved. Under the current structure of regional cooperation bodies, some of these regulators are not included in the dialogue mechanisms because of institutional definitions that do not match the realities. Central Bank groups may not be able to adequately cover regional prudential issues if the prudential regulators are not represented. With increasing consolidation in the financial sector, banking prudential issues cannot be fully divorced from risks in the securities industry but they cannot be fully addressed if the separate securities regulators are not included in the dialogue and surveillance mechanisms. So an obvious proposal to add to the regions’ arsenal in the financial sector is to create a wide-ranging Financial Supervisory Forum that includes the full range of supervisors and discusses the new supervisory challenges that arise from both the trend to financial
  • 76. conglomeration that blurs boundaries between market segments and the trend to cross- border activities that blurs the boundaries of national regulation. Harmonisation and Mutual Recognition Several of the private sector regional groups (and some of the government ones) make mention of the desirability of harmonisation of standards. This is frequently cited as a desirable step towards closer financial integration but it should not be assumed to be an easy one. The aim of harmonisation of standards is to ease the difficulty of regulating activities across different systems and regimes, to lift the burden of enforcing regulation across jurisdictions and to increase the familiarity of systems so that investors, consumers and service providers face lower information and transactions costs. There are broadly three models for regulating cross-border financial services (see Corbett and de Brouwer, 2005, for a more complete version of the following arguments). First, countries can engage in full harmonisation, in which the participating countries adopt the same set of rules. Second, governments or self-regulatory bodies can agree upon a system of mutual recognition, which requires weak harmonisation as a basis, but leaves more discretion to the individual economies. Finally, private insurance can be used in lieu of formal legal systems, to create a system of self-regulation of financial services that compensates for failures but doesn’t try to regulate them away. Each of these models has benefits and difficulties in terms of both efficacy and the ability to ensure the aims of consumer and investor protection and financial sector stability. Harmonisation requires the development of laws or treaties that govern activity in each of the members of a regional group. This approach is in many ways the most difficult of the three regulatory models, as it requires implementation by all of the national governments concerned and involves the acceptance of rules negotiated elsewhere and the loss of a degree of sovereignty. There are different levels of rigour with which harmonisation can be imposed. In minimal harmonisation regimes the states decide on a minimum set of standards, leaving it up to individual countries to adopt more extensive regulations if desired. Full harmonisation leaves less open to chance at the national level, and imposes a higher set of standards. The challenge with harmonisation comes from the difficulties of enacting appropriate rules that are accepted and enforced by all participating countries. Negotiating legislative tools at the international level is a complicated, time-consuming, and costly project, and not necessarily one that
  • 77. governments are ready and willing to enter into. Rules have the advantage of providing a predictable, and clearly understood, regulatory regime but harmonisation may also remove the competitive market pressure of regulatory arbitrage that forces countries to respond to ‘best practice’ developments elsewhere. And, at the end of the day, the rules must be enforced at the domestic level to make harmonisation operate. Mutual recognition is similar to harmonisation in that it relies on the state for its enforcement. While harmonisation requires participating countries to adopt laws containing the same standards and regulations, mutual recognition only requires states to recognise minimum standards for market participants, allowing regulators to assume that financial services firms in other countries have met certain quality and other requirements. It is based on the notion of home country control. In other words, the firm’s home country is responsible for regulating its activities, and must abide by certain minimum standards set by the countries as a group. Other countries must then 16 recognise the validity of the home country’s approach. The main benefit of the mutual recognition model is its relative informality, at least compared with full harmonisation schemes. The best existing example of a mutual recognition system in financial services is the European Union, where the model has been applied directly to the problem of cross-border business-to-consumer financial services.17 The European Union has adopted a number of Directives in the financial services area based on the notion of mutual recognition. These Directives state that authorisation in one Member State to provide banking or investment financial services, serves as authorisation to provide those same services in any other Member State, subject to compliance with the provisions of those Directives (the “Banking Passport” notion). Services covered by this regime include investment services, (securities brokerage and underwriting), and dealing in over-the-counter financial derivatives. 18 In 1987, a directive provided that if the listing particulars of an issuer of equities or mutual funds were approved by authorities in one Member State, that they must be recognised in other Member States without additional scrutiny. This directive was a first step towards reciprocal recognition of financial services rules in the European Union.19
  • 78. The Investment Services Directive (the “ISD”) was a further step in this direction. The ISD applied generally to any firms in the business of providing investment services, including brokerage, dealing, market making, portfolio management, securities underwriting, and individual investment advice.20 (Other Directives also provide mutual recognition for financial services within the European Union.) The EU experience with the ISD shows the problems these systems can encounter, and that, eventually, deeper harmonisation may be necessary. Any legislation that refers to developing technologies suffers from the risk that it will be obsolete by the time it is effective. Ultimately technological and other developments caused the ISD to be outdated very rapidly: “The ISD, pivotal to the integration of the investment services market, was nevertheless designed in 1992 for an era when the underlying securities and money markets were heavily fragmented by ex- change risk and where national exchanges were the uncontested point of liquidity for local securi- ties. Now national exchanges are facing increased competition in their core business from alternative trading systems and globalisation. Markets are pressing for European-level consolidation of clearing and settlement and retail investors are increasingly seeking to trade securities directly for their own account.” 21 The Financial Services Policy Group of the Commission has proposed that revision of the ISD should focus on cross-border provision of investment services, taking account of competition with traditional exchanges from electronic trading alternatives, and the difficulties presented by the consolidation of clearing and settlement procedures.22 On a more general level, mutual recognition schemes are open to the danger that consumers will only be able to rely upon the lightest of regulatory regimes, and that the nature of consumer protection will thus fall to the lowest common denominator.23 The answer to the problems of mutual recognition is not necessarily full harmonisation, but may in fact be less harmonisation. An alternative is not strictly “regulation” at all, but rather a reliance on private contracting between firms, or self-regulation. This may involve third parties providing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (e.g. mediation that does not go through courts or rely on regulators for enforcement). By obtaining insurance for individual transactions, banks and brokerage companies may be able to create a transnational market for financial services that does not rely on recourse to regulatory remedies in the event of problems. Financial services firms would be
  • 79. responsible for obtaining private insurance for their services, such that the participating governments would allow these firms to do business on a cross-border basis. However the mechanism for creating a standard accepted by the governments is unclear, and may run into the same problems met by full harmonisation and mutual recognition approaches. The message is that glib recommendations that harmonisation or mutual recognition is needed within the region underestimate the difficulties. While it may be desirable to begin a process to achieve these aims, integration can and will proceed before they are fully realised. VI Conclusions and policy recommendations We have argued that integration is hard to measure in quantitative terms and, while regional integration still looks low by conventional measures the pattern is varied across countries and markets. At the same time there are many elements of growing interdependence in the financial sector and there are multi-faceted attempts at closer regional cooperation. If progress is slow this reflects the fact that development priorities differ across the region (because of differences in income levels and other development gaps). It also reflects the fact that some economies and some groups within economies remain somewhat ambivalent about the goals of financial integration. In this situation, it is unrealistic to discuss progress in terms of integration of the type defined by the European Central Bank 24, which considers the market for a given set of financial instruments or services is fully integrated when all potential market participants in such a market i) are subject to a single set of rules when they decide to deal with those financial instruments or services – common rules ii) have equal access to this set of financial instruments or services– common access and iii) are treated equally when they operate in the market - common treatment. In the present situation in the Asian region it is more realistic to consider more limited objectives, such that i) capital can move freely within an economic area ii) issuers are
  • 80. free to raise capital anywhere within the economic area and iii) investors can invest anywhere within the economic area. Further, we might wish to establish that financial service providers can operate in any market in the region without barriers to entry based on nationality. Even these goals will take a considerable time to establish and therefore one should be measuring success in terms of movement in the direction of open and integrated markets rather than attainment of specific objectives. Specific recommendations are regularly being made in research papers and reports but there are some that seem either more achievable or more fundamental than others and therefore recommend themselves as high priority next steps. Recommendations: 1 Training programs are currently being provided under a number of initiatives but there does not seem to be a rigorous, disinterested assessment of their quality. A review of training and capacity building programs across the range of regional fora could suggest ways of raising quality and reducing duplication. (Corbett and de Brouwer, 2005) 2 Surveillance processes are frequently identified as weak because they lack mechanisms to make policy recommendations and to carry out tougher assessments of national policies. There are now several surveillance mechanisms and processes and a review of the effectiveness of these would help to identify whether one regional forum is better placed than others to carry out surveillance or whether outside/independent bodies are best suited to the task. 3 There is a need for a regional forum to bring all financial regulators and supervisors together, recognising that different structures in different countries mean that currently not all the relevant regulators meet in the existing fora. It may be that one of the existing supervisors’ fora can be expanded to carry out this function but there is strong evidence that the widest country grouping possibly would be the best basis on which to build this structure. ( ASEAN Secretariat, 2007, Cowen et al, 2006, Wang 2002). There is also a need for more consistent interaction and exchange of views between the public and private sectors (Corbett and de Brouwer, 2005) 4 Building on the initiatives to link stock exchanges in the region together there may be merit in considering building an equity market equivalent to the ABMI (Yap, 2007 suggests an Asian Investment Corporation)
  • 81. 5 While there is a general sense that there is still considerable room for improvement in the level of domestic financial sector reform the data are patchy and inconsistent. Dobson (2004 and 2006) notes the need for timely and complete information on financial reforms - both domestic and regional. She points out “there is still no region-wide, publicly available evaluation of domestic reforms against best practice benchmarks and in terms of remaining gaps in implementation that need to be addressed. What do we know about the competitiveness of the region’s banking sectors? What do we know about governments progress in regulatory and supervisory reforms?...” (2004, p 6). In part this arises because the participation in the FSAP and ROSC processes is low. If there is resistance to taking part in IMF processes then building something similar into a strengthened regional surveillance mechanism could provide needed benchmarks. (Cowen et al make a similar point in calling for “efforts to harmonize rules and practices across the region and with global standards and best practices. In this regard, FSAPs and ROSCs could be useful instruments to benchmark Asian countries against best practices and identify priorities for reform.” ) 6 As noted in the section on regional organizations, it would be useful to have information on work programs organised by topic or market segment so that it would be easy to discover under the heading say of “liquidity support” or “capital market rules harmonisation” which groups were working on what elements. Such a database would not be very difficult to compile and could be kept up-to-date by agreement across the various organisations. It could usefully reside at the ADB ARIC website. 7 Cowen et al (2006, p32) add the need for “• Work to establish regional infrastructures such as clearing and payment systems, credit rating agencies, and benchmarks to complement ongoing initiatives such as the ASEAN Financial Roadmap and work in EMEAP and importantly • Coordination in crisis management. As institutions become active in a number of jurisdictions, crisis management becomes more complicated. Without touching on more intensive, and politically sensitive issues such as solvency support, much could still be done at the technical level to coordinate crisis management and contingency plans. This could involve protocols to share information and resolve practical issues such as public communication, and payments and settlements.”
  • 82. 8 Since these days an important element of financial liberalisation is incorporated in trade agreements in services, more attention needs to be paid to developing best practice in services agreements and to addressing the potential problems of the bilateral approach to negotiating them. Conclusion The evidence is that the East Asian economies, despite progress in domestic market liberalization and, to a lesser degree, capital account opening, have achieved only a modest degree of regional financial integration to date. The extent of their engagement with global financial markets has grown considerably, though by some measures, is still low relative to the size of their GDP. Several initiatives have developed over the last 10 years geared towards increasing regional financial cooperation. The effect of these developments and of the proposals we have included here, may not be the result that is currently hoped. Nevertheless, such domestic and regional efforts will be worthwhile. The nature of regional financial integration is complex. Patterns vary across different regional groupings and there is no unified theory of optimal financial areas that would parallel optimal currency areas. Furthermore, the evidence on the extent to which fully- open financial markets benefit economies is somewhat harder to read than the same evidence on trade openness so there is an important public education task to do. The consensus is that more open and liberal financial systems will ultimately lead to more developed, and deeper, systems and will help achieve efficiency, growth and, probably, stability. The transition to reach those targets is difficult – both sequencing and scale matter. Progress must be careful, and to some degree measured (if not slow), yet half measures are probably worse than no measures. Once openness is achieved there is no theoretical, or empirical, reason to predict that the direction of integration with external financial systems will favour near neighbours or regional groups. To some extent geography matters, and the East Asian region does not have the geography that promotes regional integration. History also matters, and entry into a world in which dominant financial centres and institutions already exist in Europe and North America will skew interactions towards those centres. Trade relations matter and, while regional trade has been important in Asia, the importance of wider, global trading relations is greater here than in some other regions. Relative to the degree of regional trade, Asia
  • 83. has probably achieved quite a significant level of financial integration, but it is unlikely to match some other, more intensely internally-traded groupings such as Europe. Does this mean that there is no point to regional efforts to enhance financial performance among member economies. No, it does not. There is little doubt that having strong, deep, well-regulated financial markets will improve growth, risk sharing and welfare in the region. Whether those markets, once established, interact more with global financial centres and institutions or more with regional ones will be ultimately a market decision. But the transition to stronger financial systems requires domestic policy actions that can be boosted by regional encouragement and support. As Kaminsky and Schmukler note “The evidence suggests that institutional reforms do not predate liberalization. Most of the time, government reforms are implemented within a few years after the partial opening of financial markets. As the quality of institutions improves, financial cycles become less pronounced. Perhaps due to lack of correct incentives, countries do not tend to improve their financial systems before liberalization, disregarding the typical policy prescriptions. Harmonisation with global standards and implementation of best practice will be more easily achieved with regional cooperation and information sharing.” (p 37)
  • 84. APPENDIX
  • 85. Source: Julius Caesar Parreñas, 2007, “Financial Liberalization and Integration in East Asia: Challenges, Prospects and Cooperation Opportunities” ABA Journal, Vol. XXII, No. 2, pp ?
  • 86. Bibliography Allen F, M Chui and A Maddaloni, 2004, Financial systems in Europe, the USA and Asia, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol 20m no 4, pp 490 - 508 Allen F, and D Gale, 2000, Comparing Financial Systems, Cambridge: MIT Press. ASEAN Secretariat Scoping Study, Baele et al, 2004 Boao Forum Annual Report, 2007, Burton, D, W Tseng, and K Kang, “Asia's Winds of Change”, Finance and Development, June 2006, Volume 43, Number 2 Cavoli T, et al, 2006 Cihak, M and R Podpiera, 2006, “Is one Watchdog better than three? International Experience with Integrated Financial Sector Supervision”, IMF Working Paper, WP/06/57 Claessens, S. “Benefits and Costs of Integrated Financal Services Provision in Developing Countries”, in Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services: 2003, pp 85-139 Chaipat Poonpatpibul, Surach Tanboon and Pornnapa Leelapornchai, 2006, “ The Role of Financial Integration in East Asia in Promoting Regional Growth and Stability”, Bank of Thailand, mimeo Chai and Rhee, 2005 Chinn and Ito, 2007-09-18 Contreras and Yi, 2004 Corbett J, J Edwards, T Jenkinson, C Mayer, O Sussman, 2004, “A Response to Hackethal and Schmidt (2003) ‘Financing Patterns: Measurment Concepts and Empirical Results’ ”, SSRN Corbett, J and de Brouwer, 2005, Corbett, J, 2007, Financial Institutions and Structures for Growth in East Asia, mimeo, ANU D Cowan, R Salgado, H Shah, L Teo and A Zanello, 2006, “Financial Integration in Asia: Recent Developments and Next Steps”, IMF WP/06/196. Dalla, I, 2005, “Deepening Capital Markets in East Asia” Background Paper, East Asian Finance Study, World Bank, mimeo.
  • 87. Dobson, W 2004 Dobson, W 2005 Edison and Warnock, Eichengreen and Park (2005), “Why has there been less financial integration in Asia than in Europe”, in …… (ed)…. H.J. Edison, F.E. Warnock, Journal of Empirical Finance ,10 (2003) 81–103 Freixas et al, Gill and Kharas, 2006, An East Asian Renaissance: Ideas for Economic Growth, World Bank. Ghosh, S., 2006, East Asian Finance: The Road to Robust Markets, World Bank IMF, 2001, International Capital Markets Report, IMF, 2004, Financial Sector Regulation: Issues and Gaps – Background Paper. Isaksson, 2001 Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003 Kim Soyoung, JW Lee and K Shin, 2006, “Regional and Global Financial Integration in East Asia” , paper presented at Worshop on Global Imbalances and Asian Financial Markets, UC Berkeley, mimeo. Kono and Schuknecht, Kramer. C, Finance and Development, June 2006, Volume 43, Number 2 Laeven, L., 2005, “Banking Sector Performance in East Asian Countries: The Effects of Competition, Diversification, and Ownership”, mimeo, World Bank Laeven, L and R Levine, 2006, “Is there a diversification discount in financial conglomerates?”, forthcoming ? Journal of Financial Economics, Lane and Milesi-Ferreti, 2003 Le N, 2000 Lee and McKibben, 2006 Lee, J W, 2007-09-18 Lindgren, Carl-Johan (May 2006), Banking Integration in the ASEAN- Region: An Overview’, ADB Manila Philippines. Llewelyn, 2006
  • 88. Martinez and Rose, 2003, “International Survey of Integrated Financial Sector Supervision”, World Bank Research Paper 3096. Miniane, 2004 Montiel, 1994 Ngiam, 2002 Chaipat Poonpatpibul Surach Tanboon Pornnapa Leelapornchai, 2006, The Role of Financial Integration in East Asia in Promoting Regional Growth and Stability, BOT Symposium Obstfeld and Rogoff, 200? Ostry et al, 2007, World Bank Park and Bae, 2002, Parrenas, 2007-09-18 Siregar, R.Y., and James, W.E., 2006. 'Designing an Integrated Finanical Supervision Agency: Selected Lessons and Challenges for Indonesia', ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 23,1, p 98 – 113 Stephenson, S and Nikomborirak, 2002, ‘Regional liberalisation in services’, in Stephenson, Findlay and Yi, Services Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation, ANU: Asia Pacific Press, p 89 – 124. Takagi and Hirose, 2004 Wang, 2002 for PECC
  • 89. 1 In a series of papers, Mayer, Corbett and Jenkinson and others have challenged the idea that the US and UK corporate sector are heavily dependent on capital markets for financing new investment. Their data show that internal sources of finance account for the largest share of financing sources. See Corbett et al 2004. The point in the text does not account for the possible role of intra-corporate sector lending and borrowing needs. Aggregate data may mask variation between lending and borrowing firms. 2 For example, a country with 1% of the world’s wealth in a world of perfectly open capital markets would hold 99% of it’s assets abroad. 3 There is evidence that this “finance follows trade” effect occurs in other countries too (Lane & Milesi-Ferreti, Rose and Spiegel 2002 cited in E&P, and Portes and Rey, 2005). 4 The famous result of Feldstein and Horioka showing high degrees of correlation has been challenged but is largely replicated for many countries and time periods. 5 “ Within Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) established the framework agreement on services in 1995 (amended in 2003), which incorporated by reference the GATS Annex on Financial Services. The ASEAN Finance Ministers have thus far concluded a third round of negotiations on liberalization of financial services under this framework, and the fourth round, which started in April 2005 is scheduled to be concluded in 2007.” Parrenas, 2007, p 3 6 Note the data issue remarked under the chart and table below – it is not clear where these data have been sourced and why they are not fully consisten 7 A recent conference described the situation: “Bancassurance in Asia has been a relatively recent phenomenon, drawing increasing attention as a rapidly growing distribution channel for insurance only since 2002. Notwithstanding its short history, bancassurance penetration in the region has increased tangibly to capture market shares in excess of 20% of life premium in the more developed bancassurance markets within Asia”. (6th Annual Bancassurance Asia conference (http://www.marcusevans.com/events/CFEventinfo.asp?EventID=11113). 8 The World Bank 2006 study is fairly complimentary though still listing a number of policies that are needed to move further. The IMF is less so. Kramer (2006 Finance and Development, Vol 43, no 2) notes that “ the perceived ranking of the governance environment is weaker than it was before the crisis. Along six different dimensions—voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and control of corruption—emerging Asia ranked lower in 2004 than in 1996 (see Chart 3).” 9 The information about the organisation and activities of the regional cooperation fora is taken from ASEAN Scoping Study produced in conjunction with the Australian Treasury which is, in turn, based on information from the websites of the ASEAN Secretariat, the ADB’s ARIC , the SEACEN website, the EMEAP website and the ACD website (www.acddialogue.com ) 10 Most of the information of the preceding paragraphs came from the sources noted in footnote 9. 11 China’s CSRC had signed 37 MOUs with 34 economies by June 2007, including 9 within the region. Hong Kong’s SFC had concluded 44 formal cooperative arrangements with 33 overseas regulators by June 2007, including 10 within the region. 12 The experience from the ABMI illustrated the variety of difficulties that needed to be overcome when operating across a number of different jurisdictions even though that initiative had high-level support from member economies’ governments, finance ministers and central banks. 13 These include an SGX-TSE strategic alliance in October 2001; an ASX-SGX co-trading linkage in December 2001; TSE and KRX signed “Memorandum of Intent” of cross-border securities trading in August 2005; TSE and KRX signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the "Market Alliance Project" on July 7, 2006 and TSE spent about $304 million to buy a 4.99 per cent stake in the SGX in June 2007. 14 Though there are a growing number of examples of cross listing. Eighty-one Chinese companies were listed in eight main overseas markets, raising 20.4 billion US dollars in 2005. The figures were 86 and 44 billion US dollars in 2006. 340 mainland-based companies have been listed in Hong Kong and105 mainland-based companies have been listed in SGX by August 2006. However, according to IMF Asia-Pacific Regional Outlook (September 2005), while some stock markets in the region have attracted a large international presence, this is mainly not from within Asia. 15 These paragraphs are drawn from Corbett, 2007 16 Robert J. Coleman, “Financial Services and Consumer Policy: The Regulatory Challenge” for European Banking & Financial Law Journal (2001. 17 The European Union first moved towards a mutual recognition approach in 1979 in the case of Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (commonly referred to as “Cassis de Dijon”), in which the European Court of Justice established a principle based on the freedom of goods between Member States, that if goods could legally be marketed in a Member State, then they also could be exported into and sold in another Member State, unless restricted by a
  • 90. specific provision in the EC Treaty or a requirement justified in the general good. This holding mean that Member States should respect the adequacy of other Member States’ laws with respect to the marketing of products. Andrea M. Corcoran and Terry L. Hart, “The Regulation of Cross-Border Financial Services in the EU Internal Market: A Primer for Third Countries” (2001), 15. 18 Andrea M. Corcoran and Terry L. Hart, “The Regulation of Cross-Border Financial Services in the EU Internal Market: A Primer for Third Countries” (2001), 17 (citing the Consolidated Banking Directive). 19 Karen M. Smith, “The Need for Centralised Securities Regulation in the European Union” (2000) 24 Boston Coll Int’l & Comp L Rev 205, 209; Council Directive 87/345/EEC of 22 June 1987 amending Directive 80/390/EEC coordinating the requirements for the drawing-up, scrutiny and distribution of the listing particulars to be published for the admission of securities to official stock exchange listing. 20 Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities field. 21 European Commission, “Financial Services Policy Group reviews Action Plan and discusses investment services reform and E-commerce” (15 May 2000). 22 European Commission, “Financial Services Policy Group reviews Action Plan and discusses investment services reform and E-commerce” (15 May 2000). 23 Robert J. Coleman, “Financial Services and Consumer Policy: The Regulatory Challenge” for European Banking & Financial Law Journal (2001). 24 ECB uses this definition to design a set of quantitative indicators of financial integration and monitor the progress of integration in its 2007 annual report on “Financial Integration in Europe”