Afghanistan

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Afghanistan

  1. 1. AFGHAN IMBROGLIO &<br />ITS IMPLICATIONS ON PAKISTAN&apos;S SECURITY<br />
  2. 2. INTRODUCTION<br />
  3. 3. land of antiquity and promise<br />
  4. 4. INTRODUCTION<br />
  5. 5. PAK – AFGHAN RELATIONS<br /><ul><li>History of mistrust and suspicion
  6. 6. Short lived thaw
  7. 7. Impact of 9/11
  8. 8. Baseless accusations
  9. 9. Issue of Durand Line and sp to Al-Qaida / Taliban
  10. 10. Growing Indian influence
  11. 11. Unfulfilled dreams</li></li></ul><li>What else would it take to earn their <br />goodwill ?<br />How complex is Afghan imbroglio ?<br />What is the nature of our differences ?<br />How it impacts on our national interests ? <br />Future shape of Afghanistan ???<br />
  12. 12. AIM<br />Critically analyse Afghan imbroglio, spanning areas of friction with Pakistan with a view to ascertaining future shape of Afghanistan in order to recommend a broad based response strat for safeguarding our national interests<br />
  13. 13. SEQ<br />Part-1Fact File & events leading to 9/11 <br />Part-2External Dynamics of Afghan Imbroglio<br /> and areas of friction with Pakistan<br />Part-3Present State of Afghanistan<br />Part-4Future Shape of Afghanistan &<br /> Emerging Scenarios<br />Part-5Recommendations<br />
  14. 14. <ul><li>TOPOGRAPHY
  15. 15. DEMOGRAPHY
  16. 16. HISTORY
  17. 17. 9 / 11 SCENARIO</li></ul>FACT FILE<br />
  18. 18. GEOGRAPHY<br />
  19. 19. GEOGRAPHY<br />
  20. 20. 1206 KM<br />76KM<br />137 KM<br />744 KM<br />936 KM<br />2430 KM<br />BORDERS<br />
  21. 21. HINDUKUSH<br />
  22. 22. KABUL<br />HERAT<br />QANDHAR<br />
  23. 23.
  24. 24. 25%<br />8%<br />10%<br />44%<br />DEMOGRAPHY<br />
  25. 25. RELIGION<br />Sunni 84%<br />Shi&apos;a 15%<br />Sikhs, Hindus/Jews 1% <br />
  26. 26. CULTURE AND TRADITIONS<br /><ul><li>Strong attachment to religion.
  27. 27. Love for freedom and resistance to any foreign invasion.
  28. 28. Strong tribal system and Loyalty to own tribe.
  29. 29. Adherence to traditions.</li></li></ul><li>NATURAL RESOURCES<br />
  30. 30.
  31. 31. GEO-STRAT IMP<br />THE NEW ENERGY GREAT GAME<br />Tri Junction of Three Strat Regions<br />Natural Resources of Central Asian States<br />Land Locked Nature of Central Asian States<br />
  32. 32. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE<br />
  33. 33. BRITISH RULE AND GREAT GAME<br />
  34. 34. SECOND AFGHAN WAR<br />
  35. 35. KING ZAHIR SHAH ERA<br />
  36. 36. SARDAR DAUD RULE<br />
  37. 37. SAUR REVOLUTION<br />DAUD<br />TARAKAI<br />
  38. 38. SOVIET INVASION<br />AMIN<br />BABRAK KARMAL<br />
  39. 39. MUJAHIDEEN RESISTANCE<br />
  40. 40. NAJIB ERA<br />
  41. 41. ROLE OF PAKISTAN<br />
  42. 42. SOVIET WITHDRAWAL<br />
  43. 43. IMPACT OF SOVIET WDR<br />
  44. 44. POLITICAL VACUUM<br />
  45. 45. WAR LORDS AND FACTIONAL MILITANCY<br />
  46. 46. RISE OF FUNDAMENTALISM<br />
  47. 47. DRUG AND NARCOTICS<br />
  48. 48. FOREIGN INTERFERENCE<br />
  49. 49. REFUGEE PROBLEM<br /><ul><li>Eco burden
  50. 50. Law and order problem
  51. 51. Drug /Kalashnikov culture
  52. 52. Demographic disturbances
  53. 53. Burdened civic amenities
  54. 54. Inc unemployment
  55. 55. Con over small businesses</li></li></ul><li>TALIBAN PHENOMENON<br />
  56. 56. RISE OF TALIBAN<br />
  57. 57. INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM<br />
  58. 58. US – TALIBAN RELATIONS<br />
  59. 59. POST 9/11 SCENARIO<br />
  60. 60. POST 9/11 SCENARIO<br />Intl reaction<br />Invoking of article 5 of NATO<br />Majority of Muslim countries sided with US<br />
  61. 61. POST 9/11 SCENARIO<br />Pakistan’s stance<br />Int<br />Log<br />Air bases<br />
  62. 62. OP ENDURING FREEDOM<br />
  63. 63. OP ENDURING FREEDOM<br />
  64. 64. PART - II<br /> INTERESTS OF EXTERNAL PLAYERS INCL PAKISTAN<br />
  65. 65. SEQUENCE<br />Interests of external players<br />Pakistan’s current policy<br />Areas of friction<br />
  66. 66. US INTERESTS<br /><ul><li>Energy resources
  67. 67. Contain China
  68. 68. Flow of narcotics
  69. 69. Religious extremism
  70. 70. Check Russian and Iranian influence</li></li></ul><li>JAPAN / EU INTERESTS<br /><ul><li>Flow of energy resources
  71. 71. Share in re-const of Afghanistan
  72. 72. Elimination of terrorism
  73. 73. Marginalize influence of Russia and Iran</li></li></ul><li>RUSSIAN INTERESTS<br /><ul><li>Con over hydro-carbon flow
  74. 74. Prevent spread of Islamic extremism/ prevention of terrorism
  75. 75. Friendly Afghan government</li></li></ul><li>CHINESE INTERESTS<br /><ul><li>Future energy reqs
  76. 76. Presence of ERF
  77. 77. Economic opportunities
  78. 78. Containment of religious extremism</li></li></ul><li>INDIAN INTERESTS<br /><ul><li>Create friction b/w Afghanistan and Pakistan
  79. 79. Offn LIC against Pakistan
  80. 80. Economic opportunities
  81. 81. Friendly Afghan government</li></li></ul><li>IRANIAN INTERESTS<br /><ul><li>Friendly Afghan government
  82. 82. Tn of hydro-carbon resources of CARs
  83. 83. Share in re-const of Afghanistan</li></li></ul><li>CARs INTERESTS<br />
  84. 84. CARs INTERESTS<br /><ul><li>Tn of hydro-carbon resources
  85. 85. Re-orientation of trade routes
  86. 86. Elimination of sources of religious extremism</li></li></ul><li><ul><li>PAKISTAN’S INTERESTS
  87. 87. Political interests
  88. 88. Economic interests
  89. 89. Security interests</li></li></ul><li>OVERVIEW OF PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY<br />
  90. 90. <ul><li>Areas of friction
  91. 91. Legacy of mistrust
  92. 92. Durand line dispute
  93. 93. Influence of external players
  94. 94. Role of Northern Alliance
  95. 95. Repatriation of Afghan refugees
  96. 96. Transit trade /smuggling</li></li></ul><li><ul><li>Growing Indian influence
  97. 97. Al-Qaida and Taliban activities
  98. 98. Interference in internal affairs
  99. 99. Sharing of Kabul river water
  100. 100. Pakistani prisoners in Afghan jails</li></li></ul><li>PRESENT STATE OF AFGHANISTAN<br />
  101. 101. BONN AGREEMENT(PARTICIPANTS)<br />Reps Of Northern Alliance<br /> Tajiks<br /> Hazaras<br /> Uzbiks<br />Exiled Factions<br /> Rome Gp<br /> Peshawar Gp<br /> Cyprus Gp<br />
  102. 102. BONN AGREEMENT(PROVISIONS)<br />Political future. <br />Broad based govt<br />Emergency loyajirga within 6 months<br />Constitutionaloyajirga within 18 months<br />Restores 1964 constitutuion<br />Rep of women in LoyaJirga<br />Election of head of state<br />
  103. 103. BONN AGREEMENT(CONSTRAINTS)<br />UN and US in favour of NA<br />18 x ministers from NA<br />8 x ministers from Rome gp<br />All key portfolios to NA<br />Pushtuns were under rep<br />
  104. 104. LOYAJIRGA<br />EMERGENCY LOYAJIRGA<br />Held on 19 Jun<br /> It set up the <br /> transitional govt<br />CONSTITUTIONAL LOYAJIRGA<br /> Held in Dec 2003<br /> Secured a deal on constitution <br />
  105. 105. AFGHANISTAN’S NEW CONSTITUTION<br />President Elected for 5 yrs <br />Parliament Consists of two houses<br />WolesiJirga (The house of people)<br />MeshranoJirga (The house of elders)<br />Political Parties Not on the basis of sect, ethnicity, language or region<br />Women 50% seats in MeshranoJirga<br />
  106. 106. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPACT<br />Strong presidential system<br />Paves the way for elections<br />Recognises multi ethnic make up<br />Pushtuns remain unhappy<br />Interpretation controversial <br />
  107. 107. ISAF<br />Under comd NATO<br />Maj role – security / law and order in the capital<br />6100 soldiers depl<br />Influence confined to Kabul and Kunduz<br />Eventually to con the entire country<br />
  108. 108. AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY (ANA)<br />Formed in May 2002<br />Initially local malitia forced to join ANA<br />Later based on volunteers<br />Maj desertions on completion of trg<br />Unlikely to meet the goal of 10,000 soldiers till elections and full str(70,000) till 2010<br />
  109. 109. MENACE OF DRUGS<br />Poppy production inc on departure of TALIBANS<br />3400 MT of Opium in past 3 years<br />Generates 100-200 billion USD per year<br />
  110. 110. REASONS FOR DRUG RESURGENCE<br />Strict ban by Taliban- reduction by 90%<br />Post Taliban Govt writ restd to Kabul<br />NATO turning a blind eye to Narco Trade<br />Drug peddling ensures loyality of war lords<br />
  111. 111. ELECTIONS - 2004<br />Postponed till Sep 2004<br />Voters registration since Dec 2003<br />Only 2.5 million registered so far<br />Maj impediments are :-<br />Insecurity and violence<br />Non finalization of constituencies<br />Non registration of political parties <br />Slow registration of voters<br />Rivalry between war lords<br />
  112. 112. RECONSTRUCTION<br />War and drought<br />Dependent on fin sp <br />15 billion $ needed<br />4.5 billion $ pledged<br />Lack of security <br />
  113. 113. THE KABUL GOVERNMENT<br />
  114. 114. IMPEDIMENTS<br />No writ beyond Kabul<br />Pushtuns’ alienation<br />War lordism<br />Intervention of neighbours<br />Slow reconstruction<br />Uncertainty of US cmt<br />
  115. 115. IMPLICATIONS<br />(POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS)<br /> Pakistan’s cont relevance<br /> US willingness to negotiate with moderate Talibans<br /> Stability on estb of broad based govt<br /> Convergence of Pak-Afghan eco interests<br />
  116. 116. IMPLICATIONS<br />(AREAS OF CONCERN)<br />Greater Indian influence<br />Elm of mistrust <br />Law and order sit<br />Fallout of op in Tribal Area<br />Ethnic rifts<br />Estranged sp of pushtuns<br />
  117. 117. PART-IVFUTURE SCENARIOS<br />
  118. 118. IMP FACTORS<br />Acceptable Ethnic Bal<br />Competing Power Struggle<br />Role of Global and Regional Powers<br />Re-estb of State Institutions <br />Substantial Eco Aid<br />US Cmt (reconst, voters’ regn, elections, ISAF) <br />
  119. 119. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS<br /><ul><li> Broad Based Democratic and Stable Afghanistan
  120. 120. Status Quo Leads to Divided Afghanistan
  121. 121. Status Quo Leads to Political Reconciliation</li></li></ul><li>SCENARIO-1ELECTIONS LEAD TO BROAD BASED GOVT<br />Envmt<br />Transparent Regn Process <br />Fair elections <br />Pushtuns Participate in Elections<br />A Broad Based Govt estb<br />Taliban and Al-Qaeda marginalized<br />Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme Successful <br />Pakistan Provides Eco Asst <br />
  122. 122. SCENARIO-1BROAD BASED GOVT<br />Envmt………cont……<br />Pakistan’s relevance to US Cont<br />Expanded ISAF <br />Warlords brought under govt con<br />ANA and Police <br />Provincial Reconst Teams (PRTs) depl in all maj towns<br />
  123. 123. SCENARIO-1BROAD BASED GOVT<br />Implications<br />Pak-Afghan relations improve<br /> LIC by India <br />Regional stability<br />Chinese concern <br />Gwadar Port<br />Afghan reconst <br />Extremism marginalized<br />Return of refugees <br />
  124. 124. SCENARIO-2STATUS QUO LEADS TO A DIVIDED AFGHANISTAN<br />STAGES<br />Stage-1.Status quo leads to anarchy and sharp ethnic div (upto 5 years)<br />Stage-2.Div on ethnic lines (5-10 years)<br />
  125. 125. SCENARIO-2STATUS QUO LEADS TO A DIVIDED AFGHANISTAN<br />Envmt (Stage-1)<br />Disenfranchisement of Pushtuns<br />Northern Alliance Govt in the centre<br />Pushtun marginalized<br />Exiled Elite Pushtun class in the govt <br />Pushtun heartland out of govt con<br />Ethnic divide further widens<br />
  126. 126. SCENARIO-2STATUS QUOLEADS TO A DIVIDED AFGHANISTAN<br />Envmt (Stage-1)<br />ANA commits excesses in the south<br />DDRprogramme not successful<br />Reconst Process <br />Taliban and Al-Qaeda tgt coalition <br />ISAF confined To Kabul <br />
  127. 127. SCENARIO-2STATUS QUOLEADS TO A DIVIDED AFGHANISTAN<br />Envmt (Stage-2)<br />Factional fighting for con of Kabul<br />USA depends on altn oil pipelines<br />Disappearance of Unified Afghan State<br />Coalition forces pull out<br />Kabul taken over by Pushtun forces<br />Ethnic divide sharpens and Country breaks up<br />
  128. 128. SCENARIO-2STATUS QUOLEADS TO A DIVIDED AFGHANISTAN<br />Implications<br />Inc temptation among regional states<br />Regional instability inc<br />Smaller gps and warlords influence<br /> Population realignment<br />
  129. 129. SCENARIO-2STATUS QUOLEADS TO A DIVIDED AFGHANISTAN<br />Implications<br />Pak-US eco interests jeopardized<br />Most dangerous scenario for Pakistan<br />Issue of Pukhtunistan likely to resurface<br />Altn oil routes<br />
  130. 130. SCENARIO-3STATUS QUO LDG TO POL RECONCILIATION<br />STAGES<br />Stage-1 (Status Quo). 1-5 years<br />Stage-2 (Political Reconciliation).<br /> 5-10 years<br />
  131. 131. SCENARIO-3STATUS QUO LDG TO POL RECONCILIATION<br />Envmt (Stage-1)<br />Elections could not be held<br />Pol impasse cont<br />Pushtun remain marginalized<br />DDR Programme not successful<br />ANA <br />
  132. 132. SCENARIO-3STATUS QUO LDG TO POL RECONCILIATION<br />Envmt (Stage-1)<br />Govt tenure expired and extended<br />Taliban and Al-Qaeda <br />Reconst could not gather pace<br />ISAF could not be expanded<br />
  133. 133. SCENARIO-3STATUS QUO LDG TO POL RECONCILIATION<br />Envmt (Stage-2)<br />Warlords<br />Law and order improves<br />Pol reconciliation is finally achieved<br />Elections are held<br />Eco activities resume as per Scenario-1 <br />
  134. 134. SCENARIO-3STATUS QUO LDG TO POL RECONCILIATION<br />Implications<br />Status quo undesirable<br />Instability detrimental to Pakistan’s interests<br />Offn LIC by India<br />Neg effs on Pakistan’s eco<br />Gwadar Port<br />Positive effs<br />
  135. 135. RECOMMENDATIONS<br />
  136. 136. POLICY OPTIONS<br />
  137. 137. Hands Off Policy<br /><ul><li>Leaving Afghanistan to be governed by its own laws of conflict
  138. 138. Pakistan to disassociate itself completely
  139. 139. Flawed policy under the circumstances
  140. 140. Can impact negatively on our interests</li></li></ul><li>Policy of Status Quo<br /><ul><li>Cont of existing policies
  141. 141. Policy based on non-interference, coop in ctr terrorism, anti smuggling and reconst projs
  142. 142. Drawbacks</li></ul>Policy evolved under constrained geo-pol envmt<br />No let-up in anti Pakistan sentiments<br />Heightened security concerns <br />Controversies about Durand Line, Kabul River & border vialations<br />Marginalization of Pashtoons<br />
  143. 143. Proactive Policy for Peace (PPP)<br />Proactive version of existing policy<br />Remain engaged at all lvls to safe gd own interests<br />Based on principles of <br />Non-interference<br />Sovereign equality<br />Enhanced trade and economic coop <br />Normalisation/improvement of relations with all<br />
  144. 144. AFGHAN POLICY OBJS<br /><ul><li>Need to have a stable, peaceful and friendly neighbour
  145. 145. Prudent apch towards resolution of outstanding issues / irritants
  146. 146. Need to put contentious issues on the backburner
  147. 147. Estb greater understanding with present Afghan Govt
  148. 148. Strengthening of trade and commercial ties
  149. 149. Early return of lt over refugees</li></li></ul><li>AFGHAN POLICY OBJS<br /><ul><li>Eff anti terrorism drive along the Western borders to eliminate Al-Quaida’s presence and remnants of Taliban
  150. 150. Concerns of neighboring countries be taken into acct
  151. 151. Imp of sustained engagement by maj powers in Afghanistan
  152. 152. Cont strife or balkanization of Afghanistan must be strongly opposed
  153. 153. Imp of maint contacts with moderate Talibans/ Pashtoon ldrship</li></li></ul><li>SPECIFIC MEASURES<br />
  154. 154. DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE<br /><ul><li>Imp of sustained engagement by maj powers
  155. 155. Making US/West realize about the consequence of sidelining Pashtoons
  156. 156. Estb cordial relations with countries bordering Afghanistan
  157. 157. Winning over hearts of anti Pakistan gps
  158. 158. Opening of addl consulates
  159. 159. Facilitating Afghanistan’s entry into SAARC</li></li></ul><li>ECONOMIC COOP<br /><ul><li>Generous aid/assistance in visible re-const projs
  160. 160. Dev of comm infrastructure having bg on our trade with CARs
  161. 161. Estb rail link from Quetta to Qandahar and subsequently to Kabul
  162. 162. AddlPIA flights to Kabul and Qandahar
  163. 163. Assistance in setting up Banks, airline maint facilities, telecommsvcs and export facilities</li></li></ul><li>AFGHAN TRANSIT TRADE<br /><ul><li>Transit trade should not get diverted towards Iran
  164. 164. Addl concessions in Afghan Transit Trade
  165. 165. Negative trade lists be completely abolished
  166. 166. Preferential processing of Afghani exports at Karachi and subsequently at Gawadar port
  167. 167. Const of new roads
  168. 168. Expediting Turkmenistan-Afghanistan–Pakistan Gas pipeline and related comm infrastructure dev projs</li></ul>ECONOMIC COOP …<br />
  169. 169. STRAT FOR DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES<br /><ul><li>Durand Line Issue
  170. 170. Undue media projection / coverage of the issue be discouraged
  171. 171. Issue be put on the back burner
  172. 172. Failing which Govt to adopt a firm stance about its status as a settled intl border </li></li></ul><li>STRAT FOR DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES<br /><ul><li>Prisoners Issue
  173. 173. Afghan Govt be vigorously pursed for the rel of detained Pakistanis
  174. 174. Attn of intl humanitarian orgs (ICRC) and NGOs be carefully drawn towards the plight of Pakistani prisoners, without causing embarrassment to Kabul
  175. 175. Atrocities be made pub if req</li></li></ul><li>STRAT FOR DEALING WITH CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES<br /><ul><li>Kabul River Dispute
  176. 176. Accept Afghanistan’s right over the River and be prep to accept a drop in river flow
  177. 177. Reach an accord with Afghan Govt similar to Indus Water Treaty
  178. 178. Instead of Indians financing the hydel projs on the River, reach out to Afghans by offering tech and fin sp
  179. 179. In case of any indifferent response, option of diverting the River at its source (Chitral) be considered</li></li></ul><li>COUNTERING GROWING INDIAN INFLUENCE<br /><ul><li>Afghan Govt be apprised about the neg implications of the growing Indian presence
  180. 180. Extend own diplomatic reach by opening consulates in non-Pashtoon areas as well
  181. 181. Dev better relations with the Afghan mil and civ bureaucracy through:
  182. 182. Trg of Afghan cadets in own academies on gratis basis
  183. 183. Trg of Afghan offrs in our schools of instr
  184. 184. Exch of mil delegations
  185. 185. Trg of Afghan police, immigration and custom officials</li></li></ul><li>OPS IN FATA<br /><ul><li>Flushing out of miscreants with the help of locals
  186. 186. Respect for local traditions and customs
  187. 187. Dev projs be undertaken in massive and visible manner
  188. 188. Consultation with the tribal chieftains
  189. 189. Tribal areas be gradually transformed into enlightened, prosperous and tolerant society for Pashtoons living across the border to emulate
  190. 190. Border violations by coalition forces must not be allowed to occur</li></li></ul><li>CONCL<br />
  191. 191. Thank You<br />

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